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      "title": "Awesome Vehicle Security [![Awesome](https://cdn.rawgit.com/sindresorhus/awesome/d7305f38d29fed78fa85652e3a63e154dd8e8829/media/badge.svg)](https://github.com/sindresorhus/awesome)",
      "full_name": "jaredthecoder/awesome-vehicle-security",
      "name": "awesome-vehicle-security",
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      "url": "https://github.com/jaredthecoder/awesome-vehicle-security",
      "description": "🚗 A curated list of resources for learning about vehicle security and car hacking.",
      "readme": "# Awesome Vehicle Security [![Awesome](https://cdn.rawgit.com/sindresorhus/awesome/d7305f38d29fed78fa85652e3a63e154dd8e8829/media/badge.svg)](https://github.com/sindresorhus/awesome)\n\n\n*A curated list of awesome resources, books, hardware, software, applications, people to follow, and more cool stuff about vehicle security, car hacking, and tinkering with the functionality of your car.*\n\n![](assets/car_hacking_jeep.gif)\n\n---\n\nI would love as much help as I can get. [Start contributing!](https://github.com/jaredmichaelsmith/awesome-vehicle-security/blob/master/contributing.md)\n\nFollow me on [Twitter](https://twitter.com/jaredthecoder) for more security goodness.\n\n---\n\n# Contents\n\n- [Related Lists](#related-lists)\n- [Learn](#learn)\n    - [Articles](#articles)\n    - [Presentations](#presentations)\n    - [Books](#books)\n    - [Research Papers](#research-papers)\n    - [Courses](#courses)\n    - [Blogs](#blogs)\n    - [Websites](#websites)\n    - [Newsletters](#newsletters)\n    - [Conferences](#conferences)\n    - [Who to Follow](#who-to-follow)\n    - [Podcasts and Episodes](#podcasts-and-episodes)\n        - [Podcasts](#podcasts)\n        - [Episodes](#episodes)\n    - [Miscellaneous](#miscellaneous)\n- [Projects](#projects)\n- [Hardware](#hardware)\n- [Software](#software)\n  - [Applications](#applications)\n  - [Libraries and Tools](#libraries-and-tools)\n    - [C](#c)\n    - [Java](#java)\n    - [C++](#c++)\n    - [Python](#python)\n    - [Go](#go)\n    - [JavaScript](#javascript)\n- [Companies and Jobs](#companies-and-jobs)\n    - [Coordinated Disclosure](#coordinated-disclosure)\n- [Other Awesome (non-vehicle related) Lists](#other-awesome-lists)\n- [Contributing](#contributing)\n\n# Related Lists\n\nThese lists are related to a specific protocol that you will find in the world of car hacking.\n\n- [Awesome CAN Bus - an awesome list just for CAN Bus-related tools (hardware, software, etc.)](https://github.com/iDoka/awesome-canbus)\n- [Awesome LIN Bus - an awesome list just for LIN-Bus related tools (hardware, software, etc.)](https://github.com/iDoka/awesome-linbus)\n\n# Learn\n\n## Articles\n\n- [How to hack a car — a quick crash-course](https://medium.freecodecamp.org/hacking-cars-a-guide-tutorial-on-how-to-hack-a-car-5eafcfbbb7ec) - Car enthusiast Kenny Kuchera illustrates just enough information to get you up and running. An excellent resource for first timers!\n- [Stopping a Jeep Cherokee on the Highway Remotely](https://www.wired.com/2015/07/hackers-remotely-kill-jeep-highway/) - Chris Valasek's and Charlie Miller's pivotal research on hacking into Jeep's presented at DEFCON in 2015.\n- [Troy Hunt on Controlling Nissans](https://www.troyhunt.com/controlling-vehicle-features-of-nissan/) - Troy Hunt goes into controlling Nissan vehicles.\n- [Tesla hackers explain how they did it at Defcon](http://www.cnet.com/roadshow/news/tesla-hackers-explain-how-they-did-it-at-def-con-23/) - Overview of DEFCON 23 presentation on hacking into Tesla cars.\n- [Anatomy of the Rolljam Wireless Car Hack](http://makezine.com/2015/08/11/anatomy-of-the-rolljam-wireless-car-hack/) - Overview of the RollJam rolling code exploitation device.\n- [IOActive's Tools and Data](http://blog.ioactive.com/2013/08/car-hacking-content.html) - Chris Valasek and Charlie Miller release some of their tools and data for hacking into vehicles in an effort to get more people into vehicle security research.\n- [Developments in Car Hacking](https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/ICS/developments-car-hacking-36607) - via the SANS Reading Room, Currie's paper analyses the risks and perils of smart vehicle technology.\n- [Car Hacking on the Cheap](http://www.ioactive.com/pdfs/IOActive_Car_Hacking_Poories.pdf) -  A whitepaper from Chris Valasek and IOActive on hacking your car when you don't have a lot of resources at your disposal.\n- [Car Hacking: The definitive source](http://illmatics.com/carhacking.html) - Charlie Miller and Chris Valasek publish all tools, data, research notes, and papers for everyone for free\n- [Car Hacking on the cheap](https://community.rapid7.com/community/transpo-security/blog/2017/02/08/car-hacking-on-the-cheap) - Craig Smith wrote a brief article on working with Metasploit’s HWBrige using ELM327 Bluetooth dongle\n- [Researchers tackle autonomous vehicle security](https://phys.org/news/2017-05-tackle-autonomous-vehicle.html) - Texas A&M researchers develop intelligence system prototype.\n- [Reverse engineering of the Nitro OBD2](https://blog.quarkslab.com/reverse-engineering-of-the-nitro-obd2.html) - Reverse engineering of CAN diagnostic tools.\n- [Analysis of an old Subaru Impreza - Subaru Select Monitor v1 (SSM1)](https://p1kachu.pluggi.fr/project/automotive/2018/12/28/subaru-ssm1/) - Digging into an old ECU through an old protocol and disabling a 1997 Subaru Impreza's speed limiter.\n- [Car Hacking in 30 Minutes or Less](https://brysonpayne.com/2018/10/20/start-car-hacking-in-30-minutes-or-less/) - Using VirtualBox and Kali Linux, you can start car hacking using completely free open-source software and tools, including can-utils, ICSim, ScanTool, Wireshark, and tcpdump\n\n## Presentations\n\n- [\"Hopping on the CAN Bus\" from BlackHat Asia 2015](https://www.blackhat.com/asia-15/briefings.html#hopping-on-the-can-bus) - A talk from BlackHat Asia 2015 that aims to enable the audience to \"gain an understanding of automotive systems, but will also have the tools to attack them\".\n- [\"Drive It Like You Hacked It\" from DEFCON 23](https://samy.pl/defcon2015/) - A talk and slides from Samy Kamkar's DEFCON 23/2015 talk that includes hacking garages, exploiting automotive mobile apps, and breaking rolling codes to unlock any vehicle with low cost tools.\n- [Samy Kamkar on Hacking Vehicles with OnStar](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3olXUbS-prU&feature=youtu.be) - Samy Kamkar, the prolific hacker behind the Samy worm on MySpace, explores hacking into vehicles with OnStar systems.\n- [Remote Exploitation of an Unaltered Passenger Vehicle](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OobLb1McxnI) - DEFCON 23 talk Chris Valasek and Charlie Miller give their now famous talk on hacking into a Jeep remotely and stopping it dead in its tracks.\n- [Adventures in Automotive Networks and Control Units](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n70hIu9lcYo) - DEFCON 21 talk by Chris Valasek and Charlie Miller on automotive networks.\n- [Can You Trust Autonomous Vehicles?](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=orWqKWvIW_0) - DEFCON 24 talk by Jianhao Liu, Chen Yan, Wenyuan Xu\n- [Ken Munro & Dave Lodge - Hacking the Mitsubishi Outlander & IOT](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YLBQdO6a5IQ) - talk from BSides Manchester 2016 by Ken and Dave of [Pen Test Partners](#who-to-follow)\n- [FREE-FALL: HACKING TESLA FROM WIRELESS TO CAN BUS](https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-17/thursday/us-17-Nie-Free-Fall-Hacking-Tesla-From-Wireless-To-CAN-Bus-wp.pdf) - Zeronights 2016 and later BlackHat talk by Sen Nie, Ling Liu, and Yuefeng Du from Tencent and KEEN Security lab\n- [Car Hacking 101](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P-mzo2X47sg) - Bugcrowd LevelUp 2017 by Alan Mond\n- [State of Automotive Cyber Safety, 2015](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g-a20ORka-A) - State of automotive hacking, policy, industry changes, etc. from I Am The Cavalry track at BSides Las Vegas, 2015.\n- [State of Automotive Cyber Safety, 2016](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WcObDVy2-1I) - State of automotive hacking, policy, industry changes, etc. from I Am The Cavalry track at BSides Las Vegas, 2016.\n- [How to Hack a Tesla Model S](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KX_0c9R4Fng) - DEF CON 23 talk by Marc Rogers and Kevin Mahaffey on hacking a Tesla. Tesla Co-Founder and CTO, JB Straubel, joins them to thank them and present a challenge coin.\n- [Car Hacking Videos](http://tekeye.uk/automotive/cyber-security/car-hacking-videos) -  A web page with a long list of videos (40+) that are available online related to the topic of car hacking. From a 2007 DEF CON talk on modding engine ECUS and onwards (e.g. the 2017 Keen Security Tesla hack).\n- [Self-Driving and Connected Cars: Fooling Sensors and Tracking Drivers](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=C29UGFsIWVI) - Black Hat talk by Jonathan Petit. Automated and connected vehicles are the next evolution in transportation and will improve safety, traffic efficiency and driving experience. This talk will be divided in two parts: 1) security of autonomous automated vehicles and 2) privacy of connected vehicles. 2015\n- [A Survey of Remote Automotive Attack Surfaces](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MAGacjNw0Sw) - Black Hat talk By Charlie Miller and Chris Valasek. Automotive security concerns have gone from the fringe to the mainstream with security researchers showing the susceptibility of the modern vehicle to local and remote attacks. Discussion of vehicle attack surfaces. 2014.\n- [Pentesting vehicles with YACHT (Yet Another Car Hacking Tool)](https://www.blackhat.com/docs/eu-16/materials/eu-16-Sintsov-Pen-Testing-Vehicles-With-Cantoolz.pdf) -A presentation that discusses different attack surfaces of a vehicle, then continues to describe an approach to car hacking along with tools needed to analyse and gather useful information.\n- [How to drift with any car](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KU7gl1n1tIs) - Introduction to CAN hacking, and using a real car as an Xbox controller.\n- [Car Infotainment Hacking Methodology and Attack Surface Scenario](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F0mYkI2FJ_4) - A guide on how to attack, hunt bugs or hack your IVI by Jay Turla which was presented at the Packet Hacking Village / Wall of Sheep during DEF CON 26.\n- [TR19: Automotive Penetration Testing with Scapy](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7D7uNqPWrXw) - Overview on how Scapy can be used for automotive penetration testing at Troopers Conference 2019.\n- [Analysis and Defense of Automotive Networks](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a1huGwMjjd4) - Overview of CAN, security, and potential intrusion detection approaches at BSides Knoxville 2020\n- [Remote Exploitation of Honda Cars](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=y4Uzm-CTa0I&ab_channel=CarHackingVillage) - The Honda Connect app used by Honda City 5th generation used weak security mechanisms in its APIs for access control which would allow a malicious user to perform actions like starting the car, locking/unlocking car etc. remotely by interacting with it's Telematics Control Unit (TCU)\n- [TR22: UDS Fuzzing and the Path to Game Over](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c_DqxHmH7kc) - UDS diagnostics protocol fuzzing methodology, presented as a result of numerous penetration testing projects in the automotive industry, with real world exploitation PoCs, presented during Troopers Conference 2022.\n- [CCC - Horror Stories From the Automotive Industry](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rAA-agcNeeg) - Horrifying examples of common vulnerabilities in the automotive industry, result of more than 100 penetration tests targeting Tier 1 suppliers and OEMs, with ultimate goal to raise awareness on the current state of automotive security. Additionally, PoC of automated week seed randomness exploitation in automotive components, by using a battery isolator in heavy-duty vehicles and the UDS protocol, for complete compromise of a target. Presented in Chaos Communication Camp, DeepSec 2023 and Troopers Conference 23.\n- [Car Hacking Scene in the PH: How Far We've Come](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JaF-_KYQ46A) - Car Hacking Village PH presents their first attempt on the main tracks for ROOTCON. This is a rundown of CHVPH's past security research to current research - from hacking infotainment systems to CAN Bus protocols and a summary of cars available in the Philippines which are susceptible to car thefts.\n- [Analysis of an In-vehicular network: From CAN bus to infotainment](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4d-uhs2VLCQ) - This talk will feature Div0 CSQ’s 3 test benches as they explore more features on Connected vehicles. This was presented in ROOTCON 17 Car Hacking Village.\n- [An overview of Automotive Defensive Engineering](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MfTNv9SXd-o) - This talk is for car hackers to learn about modern defense measures being added to ECUs and Vehicle Architectures. This was presented in ROOTCON 17 Car Hacking Village.\n- [Hacking Back Your Car](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=akMok3Hb-pE) - Kamel Ghali's talk on ROOTCON 17 about how an attacker's perspective on hacking a car and origins of such attacks, how they've been used in different countries over the years, and explore the technical details of what makes such an attack possible.\n- [TR23: V2GEvil: Ghost in the wires](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JVWFfSmIlRY) - This research is dedicated to enhancing the cybersecurity of electric vehicles, with a specific focus on identifying vulnerabilities in the Electric Vehicle Communication Controller (EVCC), and an introduction to the tool V2GEvil. Accessible through the On-Board Charging (OBC) port, makes this attack vector really important for the security of future vehicles.\n- [DEF CON CHV - V2GEvil: Ghost in the wires](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ui2etjRyrUE) - Shortened and summarized version of the talk V2GEvil: Ghost in the wires, from the DEF CON 32 Car Hacking Village, by Pavel Khunt and Thomas Sermpinis.\n- [The hack, the crash and two smoking barrels. (And all the times I (almost) killed an engineer.)](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MDndWJxfP-U) - Thomas Sermpinis goes through the process of responsibly disclosing findings affecting the Blind Spot Detection Sensor of a current MY vehicle from one of the biggest OEMs in the world, leading to accusations that he was collaborating with hostile nations by the OEM. A story about how automotive manufacturers are treating the security industry, where are we heading, and how to be better, on the stage of DEF CON 32.\n\n## Books\n\n- [2014 Car Hacker's Handbook](https://www.amazon.com/Car-Hackers-Manual-Craig-Smith/dp/0990490106) - Free guide to hacking vehicles from 2014.\n- [2016 Car Hacker's Handbook](https://www.amazon.com/Car-Hackers-Handbook-Penetration-Tester/dp/1593277032) - Latest version of the Car Hacker's handbook with updated information to hack your own vehicle and learning vehicle security. For a physical copy as well unlimited PDF, MOBI, and EPUB copies of the book, buy it at [No Starch Press](https://www.nostarch.com/carhacking). Sections are available online [here](https://books.google.com/books?id=Ao_QCwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&dq=car%20hacking&pg=PP1#v=onepage&q&f=false).\n- [A Comprehensible Guide to Controller Area Network](https://www.amazon.com/Comprehensible-Guide-Controller-Area-Network/dp/0976511606/ref=pd_sim_14_1?ie=UTF8&dpID=41-D9UhlE9L&dpSrc=sims&preST=_AC_UL160_SR124%2C160_&psc=1&refRID=3FH8N10610H0RX8SMB6K) - An older book from 2005, but still a comprehensive guide on CAN buses and networking in vehicles.\n- [智能汽车安全攻防大揭秘](https://www.amazon.cn/dp/B075QZXY7W)This book first introduced some basic knowledge of security for automotive R&D personnel, such as encryption and decryption, security authentication, digital signatures, common attack types, and methods. Then it introduced the working principles of some smart cars for security researchers, such as the automotive intranet. Protocol, network architecture, principle of X-By-Wire remote control system, common potential attack surface, etc. Finally, a detailed analysis of some actual automotive attack or security test cases, and defense analysis of the loopholes involved in the case during the analysis process.\n- [Controller Area Network Prototyping with Arduino](https://www.amazon.com/Controller-Area-Network-Prototyping-Arduino/dp/1938581164/ref=pd_sim_14_2?ie=UTF8&dpID=51J27ZEcl9L&dpSrc=sims&preST=_AC_UL160_SR123%2C160_&psc=1&refRID=V42FKNW09QGVGHW7ZFRR) - This book guides you through prototyping CAN applications on Arduinos, which can help when working with CAN on your own car.\n- [Embedded Networking with CAN and CANopen](https://www.amazon.com/Embedded-Networking-CANopen-Olaf-Pfeiffer/dp/0929392787/ref=pd_sim_14_37?ie=UTF8&dpID=41UnLKYFpmL&dpSrc=sims&preST=_AC_UL160_SR122%2C160_&psc=1&refRID=V42FKNW09QGVGHW7ZFRR) - From 2003, this book fills in gaps in CAN literature and will educate you further on CAN networks and working with embedded systems.\n- [Inside Radio: An Attack and Defense Guide](https://www.amazon.com/Inside-Radio-Attack-Defense-Guide/dp/9811084467)This book discusses the security issues in a wide range of wireless devices and systems,Chapter 4 433/315MHz Communication (4.3　4.4 4.5 is about car keys Security)\n\n## Research Papers\n\n- [Koscher et al. Experimental Security Analysis of a Modern Automobile, 2010](http://www.autosec.org/pubs/cars-oakland2010.pdf)\n- [Comprehensive Experimental Analyses of Automotive Attack Surfaces, 2011](http://static.usenix.org/events/sec11/tech/full_papers/Checkoway.pdf)\n- [Miller and Valasek](http://illmatics.com/carhacking.html) - Self proclaimed \"car hacking the definitive source\".\n  - [Adventures in Automotive Networks and Control Units (aka car hacking)](http://illmatics.com/car_hacking.pdf)\n  - [Car Hacking for Poories](http://illmatics.com/car_hacking_poories.pdf)\n  - [A Survey of Remote Automotive Attack Surfaces, 2014](http://illmatics.com/remote%20attack%20surfaces.pdf)\n  - [Remote Compromise of an Unaltered Passenger Vehicle (aka The Jeep Hack), 2015](http://illmatics.com/Remote%20Car%20Hacking.pdf)\n  - [Advanced CAN Message Injection, 2016](http://illmatics.com/can%20message%20injection.pdf)\n- [5-Star Automotive Cyber Safety Framework, 2015](https://iamthecavalry.org/5star)\n- [A Vulnerability in Modern Automotive Standards and How We Exploited It](https://documents.trendmicro.com/assets/A-Vulnerability-in-Modern-Automotive-Standards-and-How-We-Exploited-It.pdf)\n- [A Car Hacking Experiment: When Connectivity Meets Vulnerability](http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/7413993/)\n- [Security issues and vulnerabilities in connected car systems](http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/7223297/)\n- [Automobile Driver Fingerprinting, 2016](http://www.autosec.org/pubs/fingerprint.pdf)\n- [Intrusion detection system based on the analysis of time intervals of CAN messages for in-vehicle network, 2016](https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/7427089)\n- [Modeling Inter-Signal Arrival Times for Accurate Detection of CAN Bus Signal Injection Attacks](https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=3064816)\n- [The Connected Car - Ways to get unauthorized access and potential implications, 2018](https://www.computest.nl/documents/9/The_Connected_Car._Research_Rapport_Computest_april_2018.pdf)\n- [CAN-D: A Modular Four-Step Pipeline for Comprehensively Decoding Controller Area Network Data](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2006.05993.pdf)\n- [Time-Based CAN Intrusion Detection Benchmark](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2101.05781.pdf)\n- [Addressing the Lack of Comparability & Testing in CAN Intrusion Detection Research: A Comprehensive Guide to CAN IDS Data & Introduction of the ROAD Dataset](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2012.14600.pdf)\n- [On the Insecurity of Vehicles Against Protocol-Level Bluetooth Threats](https://hexhive.epfl.ch/publications/files/22WOOT.pdf)\n- [Pavel, K. Vehicle On-Board Charging Security Scanner, 2024](https://dspace.cvut.cz/bitstream/handle/10467/113764/F8-DP-2024-Khunt-Pavel-thesis.pdf)\n\n## Courses\n\n- [Udacity's Self Driving Car Engineer Course](https://github.com/udacity/self-driving-car) - The content for Udacity's self driving car software engineer course. The actual course on Udacity's website is [here](https://www.udacity.com/course/self-driving-car-engineer-nanodegree--nd013).\n\n## Blogs\n\n- [Keen Security Lab Blog](http://keenlab.tencent.com/en/) - Blog created by Keen Security Lab of Tencent that posts research on car security.\n\n## Websites\n\n- [Automotive Security Research Group](https://asrg.io/knowledge/) - The Automotive Security Research Group (ASRG) is a non-profit initiative to promote the development of security solutions for automotive products.\n- [OpenGarages](https://github.com/opengarages) - Provides public access, documentation and tools necessary to understand today's modern vehicle systems.\n- [DEFCON Car Hacking Village](http://www.carhackingvillage.com/) - Car Hacking exercises from DEFCON 24.\n- [canbushack: Hack Your Car](http://www.canbushack.com/blog/index.php) - course on Vehicle Hacking methodology.\n- [OWASP Internet of Things Project](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Internet_of_Things_Project#tab=Community) - OWASP's project to secure IoT, from cars to medical devices and beyond.\n- [I Am The Cavalry](https://www.iamthecavalry.org/) - Global grassroots (eg. volunteer) initiative focused on the intersection of security and human life/public safety issues, such as cars. Participation from security researchers, OEMs, Tier 1s, and many others. Published [Automotive 5-Star Cyber Safety Framework](https://iamthecavalry.org/5star).\n- [Carloop Community](https://community.carloop.io/) - Community of people interested in car hacking and connecting vehicles to the cloud.\n- [Python Security](http://www.pythoncarsecurity.com/) - A website for browsing and buying python-integrated cars having certain vehicular security features.\n- [NIST Automotive Cybersecurity Community of Interest](https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/auto-cybersecurity-coi) - NIST, the organization behind the NVD CVE database and modern cryptographic standards, runs a Community of Interest group for Automotive Cybersecurity that seeks to \"provide a way for NIST to facilitate the discussions and receive comments and feedback from the automotive industry, academia, and government.\".\n\n## Newsletters\n\n[Welcoming contributions](https://github.com/jaredmichaelsmith/awesome-vehicle-security/blob/master/contributing.md)!\n\n\n## Conferences\n\n- [U.S. Automotve Cyber Security Summit](http://www.automotivecybersecurity.com/) [European Automotive Cyber Security Summit](https://automotive-cyber-security.iqpc.de/) - Conference series dedicated to automotive cyber security involving many OEMs, Tier 1s, academics, consultants, etc.\n- [escar conference](https://www.escar.info/) - Embedded security in cars. European event has run for over 10 years, and they now have US and Asia events.\n- [IT Security for Vehicles](https://www.vdi-wissensforum.de/en/event/it-security-for-vehicles/) - Conference run by the Association of German Engineers (VDI), with participation from US and European OEMs, Tier 1s, and others.\n- [Cyber Truck Challenge](https://www.cybertruckchallenge.org/) - Conference that focuses on heavy vehicle cybersecurity issues. Includes hands-on assessments of heavy vehicles and subsystems.\n\n\n## Who to Follow\n\n- Chris Valasek: Security Lead at [UberATC](#companies-and-jobs)\n    - [Twitter](https://twitter.com/nudehaberdasher)\n    - [Website](http://chris.illmatics.com/about.html)\n- Charlie Miller: Hacked the first Apple iPhone, now does car security.\n    - [Twitter](https://twitter.com/0xcharlie)\n- Samy Kamkar: Created MySpace Worm, RollJam, OwnStar.\n    - [Twitter](https://twitter.com/samykamkar)\n    - [Website](https://samy.pl)\n- Justin Seitz: Author of Black Hat Python (No Starch Press).\n    - [Twitter](https://twitter.com/jms_dot_py)\n- Troy Hunt: Pluralsight author. Microsoft Regional Director and MVP for Developer Security. Creator of [haveibeenpwned](https://haveibeenpwned.com/).\n    - [Twitter](https://twitter.com/troyhunt)\n    - [Website](https://www.troyhunt.com/)\n- Ken Munro: British researcher, works at Pen Test Partners; major interest in vehicle security\n    - [Twitter](https://twitter.com/TheKenMunroShow)\n- OpenGarages: Initiative to created Vehicle Research Labs around the world.\n    - [Twitter](https://twitter.com/opengarages)\n    - [Website](http://opengarages.org/index.php/Main_Page)\n- Hackaday: Collaborative project hosting for hackers - there are frequently car projects on here.\n    - [Twitter](https://twitter.com/hackaday)\n- Pen Test Partners: British penetration testing firm; several posts concern their disclosed car security vulns\n    - [Twitter](https://twitter.com/pentestpartners)\n    - [Website](https://www.pentestpartners.com/blog)\n- I Am The Cavalry: Global grassroots (eg. volunteer) initiative focused on the intersection of security and human life/public safety issues, such as cars.\n    - [Twitter](https://twitter.com/iamthecavalry)\n    - [Website](https://iamthecavalry.org)\n    - [Discussion Group](https://groups.google.com/forum/#!forum/iamthecavalry)\n- Car Hacking Village\n    - [Twitter](https://twitter.com/CarHackVillage)\n    - [Website](https://www.carhackingvillage.com/)\n- carfucar: Founder of Car Hacking Village and Speaker or Trainer\n    - [Twitter](https://twitter.com/CarHackVillage)\n- Ian Tabor / mintynet: Car Hacker, Car Hacking Village staff\n    - [Twitter](https://twitter.com/mintynet)\n    - [Website](https://www.mintynet.com/)\n- Daniel Öster: Dala's EV Repair, electric vehicle CAN hacking/upgrading\n    - [Youtube](https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCc3g-KhOBoicgOrB4KkMeew)\n    - [Website](https://dalasevrepair.fi/)\n\n## Podcasts and Episodes\n\nPodcasts and podcast episodes, that either directly focus on vehicle security or have some episodes on it.\n\n### Podcasts\n- [Security Weekly](http://securityweekly.com/) - Excellent podcast covering all ranges of security, with some episodes focusing portions on vehicle security from cars to drones.\n- [TrustedSec Podcast](https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/security-noise/id1428851782) - From the people at TrustedSec, leaders in Social Engineering, their episodes often go into recent vehicle vulnerabilities and exploits.\n- [SANS Internet Storm Center](https://isc.sans.edu/) - the ISC run a regular podcast going into the latest vulnerabilities and security news.\n- [Security Ledger](https://soundcloud.com/securityledger) - A podcast focusing on interviewing security experts about topics related to security.\n\n### Episodes\n- [Car Hacking with Craig Smith](http://softwareengineeringdaily.com/2015/09/02/car-hacking-with-craig-smith/) - Software Engineering Daily did an amazing episode with Craig Smith, author of the Car Hacking Handbook (above), on hacking into vehicles.\n- [Big Bugs Podcast Episode 1: Auto Bugs - Critical Vulns found in Cars with Jason Haddix](https://blog.bugcrowd.com/big-bugs-podcast-episode-1) - Jason Haddix explores major vulnerabilities found in cars.\n- [Hacking Under the Hood and Into Your Car](http://www.npr.org/2013/08/02/208270026/hacking-under-the-hood-and-into-your-car) - Chris Valasek and Charlie Miller discuss with NPR how they were able to hack into vehicles.\n- [Hacking Connected Vehicles with Chris Valasek of IOActive](https://soundcloud.com/securityledger/chris-valasek-of-ioactive) - Chris Valasek talks about hacking into connected vehicles.\n\n## Miscellaneous\n- [Reverse Engineering Resources](https://github.com/ps1337/automotive-security-research)\n- [Real ORNL Automotive Dynamometer (ROAD) CAN Intrusion Dataset](https://0xsam.com/road/)\n- [CAN DoS Fuzzing Attack Video](https://www.youtube.com/shorts/80A5IhvwsJU)\n- [ECU Reflashing Detector Demo](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HPpGzwWQY5Y)\n\n# Projects\n\n- [Open Vehicle Monitoring System](https://github.com/openvehicles/Open-Vehicle-Monitoring-System) - A community project building a hardware module for your car, a server to talk to it, and a mobile app to talk to the server, in order to allow developers and enthusiasts to add more functionality to their car and control it remotely.\n- [Open Source Car Control Project](https://github.com/PolySync/OSCC) - The Open Source Car Control Project is a hardware and software project detailing the conversion of a late model vehicle into an autonomous driving research and development vehicle.\n- [Uptane](https://uptane.github.io/overview.html) - Uptane is an open and secure software update system design protecting software delivered over-the-air to the computerized units of automobiles and is designed to be resilient even to the best efforts of nation state attackers.\n\n# Hardware\n\nOverview of hardware, both open source and proprietary, that you can use when conducting vehicle security research. [This article](http://makezine.com/2016/04/08/car-hacking-tools-trade/) goes through many of the options below.\n\n- [Arduino](https://www.arduino.cc/) - Arduino boards have a number of shields you can attach to connect to CAN-enabled devices.\n    - [CANdiy-Shield](https://github.com/watterott/CANdiy-Shield)\n    - [DFRobot CAN-BUS Shield For Arduino](http://www.dfrobot.com/index.php?route=product/product&product_id=1444)\n    - [SparkFun CAN-BUS Shield](https://www.sparkfun.com/products/13262)\n    - [arduino-canbus-monitor](https://github.com/latonita/arduino-canbus-monitor) - No matter which shield is selected you will need your own sniffer. This is implementation of standard Lawicel/SLCAN protocol for Arduino + any MCP CAN Shield to use with many standard CAN bus analysis software packages or SocketCAN\n- [CANtact](https://cantact.io/cantact/users-guide.html) - \"The Open Source Car Tool\" designed to help you hack your car. You can buy one or make your own following the guide here.\n- [Freematics OBD-II Telematics Kit](http://freematics.com/pages/products/arduino-telematics-kit-3/) - Arduino-based OBD-II Bluetooth adapter kit has both an OBD-II device and a data logger, and it comes with GPS, an accelerometer and gyro, and temperature sensors.\n- [ELM327](https://www.elmelectronics.com/obdic.html) - The de facto chipset that's very cheap and can be used to connect to CAN devices.\n- [GoodThopter12](http://goodfet.sourceforge.net/hardware/goodthopter12/) - Crafted by a well-known hardware hacker, this board is a general board that can be used for exploration of automotive networks.\n- [USB2CAN](http://www.8devices.com/products/usb2can/) - Cheap USB to CAN connector that will register a device on linux that you can use to get data from a CAN network.\n- [Rinho Telematics](https://rinho.com.ar/en) - GPS trackers with native CAN Bus (J1939/FMS), WiFi fallback for offline data download, and BLE 5.0 sensors. Compatible with Traccar and Wialon.\n- [Intrepid Tools](http://store.intrepidcs.com/) - Expensive, but extremely versatile tools specifically designed for reversing CAN and other vehicle communication protocols.\n- [Red Pitaya](http://redpitaya.com/) - Replaces expensive measurement tools such as oscilloscopes, signal generators, and spectrum analyzers. Red Pitaya has LabView and Matlab interfaces, and you can write your own tools and applications for it. It even supports extensions for things like Arduino shields.\n- [ChipWhisperer](http://newae.com/tools/chipwhisperer/) - A system for side-channel attacks, such as power analysis and clock glitching.\n- [HackerSDR](https://greatscottgadgets.com/hackrf/) - A Software Defined Radio peripheral capable of transmission or reception of radio signals from 1 MHz to 6 GHz. Designed to enable test and development of modern and next generation radio technologies.\n- [Carloop](https://www.carloop.io/) - Open source development kit that makes it easy to connect your car to the Internet. Lowest cost car hacking tool that is compatible with SocketCAN and can-utils.  No OBD-II to serial cable required.\n- [CANBadger](https://gutenshit.github.io/CANBadger/) - A tool for reverse-engineering and testing automotive systems. The CANBadger consists of both hardware and software. The main interface is a LPC1768/LPC1769 processor mounted on a custom PCB, which offers two CAN interfaces, SD Card, a blinky LED, some GPIO pins, power supply for peripherals and the ethernet port.\n- [CANSPY](https://bitbucket.org/jcdemay/canspy) - A platform giving security auditors to audit CAN devices. It can be used to block, forward or modify CAN frames on the fly autonomously as well as interactively.\n- [CANBus Triple](https://canb.us/) - General purpose Controller Area Network swiss army knife and development platform.\n- [USBtin](http://www.fischl.de/usbtin/) - USBtin is a simple USB to CAN interface. It can monitor CAN busses and transmit CAN messages. USBtin implements the USB CDC class and creates a virtual comport on the host computer.\n- [OpenXC](http://openxcplatform.com/hardware.html) - OpenXC is a combination of open source hardware and software that lets you extend your vehicle with custom applications and pluggable modules. It uses standard, well-known tools to open up a wealth of data from the vehicle to developers. Started by researchers at Ford, it works for all 2002 and newer MY vehicles (standard OBD-II interface). Researchers at Ford Motor Company joined up to create a standard way of creating aftermarket software and hardware for vehicles.\n- [Macchina M2](https://www.macchina.cc/m2-introduction) - Macchina 2.0 is a complete overhaul of our 1.X generation of Macchina. The goals are still the same: Create an easy-to-use, fully-open, and super-compatible automotive interface.\n- [PandwaRF](https://pandwarf.com/) - PandwaRF is a pocket-sized, portable RF analysis tool operating the sub-1 GHz range. It allows the capture, analysis and re-transmission of RF via an Android device or a Linux PC. Capture any data in ASK/OOK/MSK/2-FSK/GFSK modulation from the 300-928 MHz band.\n- [CAN MITM Bridge by MUXSCAN](https://www.tindie.com/products/muxsan/can-mitm-bridge-3-port-rev-25/) - a tool to MITM CAN messages, allowing easy interaction with your car.\n- [PiCCANTE](https://github.com/Alia5/PiCCANTE) - Open-source CAN hacking tool based on Raspberry Pi Pico [2] (W) - Up to 3x CAN interfaces, includes ELM327 emulator.\n- [AutoPi](https://github.com/autopi-io/autopi-core) - Open-source core software for the AutoPi dongle, a Raspberry Pi-based OBD-II device for vehicle telematics, CAN bus data collection, and automotive IoT applications.\n\n# Software\n\nOverview of software, both open source and proprietary, as well as libraries from various programming languages. [This article](http://makezine.com/2016/04/08/car-hacking-tools-trade/) goes through many of the options below.\n\n## Applications\n\nSoftware applications that will help you hack your car, investigate it's signals, and general tinkering with it.\n\n- [Wireshark](https://www.wireshark.org/) - WireShark can be used for reversing CAN communications.\n- [Kayak](http://kayak.2codeornot2code.org/) - Java application for CAN bus diagnosis and monitoring.\n- [UDSim](https://github.com/zombieCraig/UDSim/) - GUI tool that can monitor a CAN bus and automatically learn the devices attached to it by watching communications.\n- [RomRaider](http://www.romraider.com/) - An open source tuning suite for the Subaru engine control unit that lets you view and log data and tune the ECU.\n- [Intrepid Tools](http://store.intrepidcs.com/) - Expensive, but extremely versatile tools specifically designed for reversing CAN and other vehicle communication protocols.\n- [O2OO](http://web.archive.org/web/20201108091723/https://www.vanheusden.com/O2OO/) - Works with the ELM327 to record data to a SQLite database for graphing purposes. It also supports reading GPS data. You can connect this to your car and have it map out using Google Maps KML data where you drive.\n- [CANToolz](https://github.com/eik00d/CANToolz) - CANToolz is a framework for analysing CAN networks and devices. It is based on several modules which can be assembled in a pipeline.\n- [BUSMASTER](https://rbei-etas.github.io/busmaster/) -An Open Source tool to simulate, analyze and test data bus systems such as CAN, LIN, FlexRay.\n- [BlackFlag ECU](https://github.com/bad-antics/blackflag-ecu) - Professional ECU diagnostics and tuning suite with OBD-II scanning, DTC reading, live sensor monitoring, and reflash capabilities.\n- [OpenXC](http://openxcplatform.com/getting-started/index.html) - Currently, OpenXC works with `Python` and `Android`, with libraries provided to get started.\n- [openpilot](https://github.com/commaai/openpilot) - openpilot is an open source driving agent that performs the functions of Adaptive Cruise Control (ACC) and Lane Keeping Assist System (LKAS) for Hondas and Acuras.\n- [openalpr](https://github.com/openalpr/openalpr) - An open source Automatic License Plate Recognition library written in C++ with bindings in C#, Java, Node.js, Go, and Python.\n- [metasploit](https://community.rapid7.com/community/transpo-security/blog/2017/02/02/exiting-the-matrix) - The popular metasploit framework now supports Hardware Bridge sessions, that extend the framework's capabilites onto hardware devices such as socketcan and SDR radios.\n- [Mazda AIO Tweaks](https://mazdatweaks.com/) - All-in-one installer/uninstaller for many available Mazda MZD Infotainment System tweaks.\n- [mazda_getInfo](https://github.com/shipcod3/mazda_getInfo) - A PoC that the USB port is an attack surface for a Mazda car's infotainment system and how Mazda hacks are made (known bug in the CMU).\n- [talking-with-cars](https://github.com/P1kachu/talking-with-cars) - CAN related scripts, and scripts to use a car as a gamepad\n- [CANalyzat0r](https://github.com/schutzwerk/CANalyzat0r) - A security analysis toolkit for proprietary car protocols.\n- [Tesla Mod](https://github.com/hypery11/flipper-tesla-fsd) - Tesla CAN bus toolkit for Flipper Zero and ESP32. Nag killer, FSD region unlock, track mode, BMS dashboard, blind spot alert, high beam strobe, and 30+ more CAN handlers. Open source (GPL-3.0).\n\n## Libraries and Tools\n\nLibraries and tools that don't fall under the larger class of applications above.\n\n[Custom Applications SDK for Mazda Connect Infotainment System](https://github.com/flyandi/mazda-custom-application-sdk) - A micro framework that allows you to write and deploy custom applications for the Mazda Infotainment System.\n\n### C\n\n- [SocketCAN Utils](https://github.com/linux-can/can-utils) - Userspace utilites for SocketCAN on Linux.\n- [vircar](https://github.com/dn5/vircar) - a Virtual car userspace that sends CAN messages based on SocketCAN\n- [dbcc](https://github.com/howerj/dbcc) - \"dbcc is a program for converting a DBC file primarily into into C code that can serialize and deserialize CAN messages.\" With existing DBC files from a vehicle, this file allows you to convert them to C code that extracts the CAN messages and properties of the CAN environment.\n\n### C++\n\n- [High Level ViWi Service](https://github.com/iotbzh/high-level-viwi-service) - High level Volkswagen CAN signaling protocol implementation.\n- [CanCat](https://github.com/atlas0fd00m/CanCat) - A \"swiss-army knife\" for interacting with live CAN data. Primary API interface in Python, but written in C++.\n- [CANdevStudio](https://github.com/GENIVI/CANdevStudio) - Development tool for CAN bus simulation. CANdevStudio enables to simulate CAN signals such as ignition status, doors status or reverse gear by every automotive developer.\n- [UnlockECU](https://github.com/jglim/UnlockECU) - Free, open-source ECU seed-key unlocking tool.\n\n### Java\n- [ITS Geonetworking](https://github.com/alexvoronov/geonetworking) - ETSI ITS G5 GeoNetworking stack, in Java: CAM-DENM / ASN.1 PER / BTP / GeoNetworking\n\n### Python\n\n- [CANard](https://github.com/ericevenchick/canard) - A Python framework for Controller Area Network applications.\n- [Caring Caribou](https://github.com/CaringCaribou/caringcaribou/) - Intended to be the *nmap of vehicle security*.\n- [c0f](https://github.com/zombieCraig/c0f/) - A fingerprinting tool for CAN communications that can be used to find a specific signal on a CAN network when testing interactions with a vehicle.\n- [Python-CAN](https://github.com/hardbyte/python-can) - Python interface to various CAN implementations, including SocketCAN. Allows you to use Python 2.7.x or 3.3.x+ to communicate over CAN networks.\n- [Python-OBD](https://github.com/brendan-w/python-OBD) - A Python module for handling realtime sensor data from OBD-II vehicle ports. Works with ELM327 OBD-II adapters, and is fit for the Raspberry Pi.\n- [CanCat](https://github.com/atlas0fd00m/CanCat) - A \"swiss-army knife\" for interacting with live CAN data. Primary API interface in Python, but written in C++.\n- [Scapy](https://github.com/secdev/scapy) - A python library to send, receive, edit raw packets. Supports CAN and automotive protocols: see the [automotive doc](https://scapy.readthedocs.io/en/latest/layers/automotive.html)\n- [CanoPy](https://github.com/tbruno25/canopy) - A python gui used to visualize and plot message payloads in real time.\n- [canTot](https://github.com/shipcod3/canTot) - A python-based cli framework based on sploitkit and is easy to use because it similar to working with Metasploit. This similar to an exploit framework but focused on known CAN Bus vulnerabilities or fun CAN Bus hacks.\n- [SocketCAN](https://python-can.readthedocs.io/en/master/interfaces/socketcan.html) Python interface to SocketCAN\n- [canmatrix](https://github.com/ebroecker/canmatrix) Python module to work with CAN matrix files\n- [Jumpstarter](https://github.com/jumpstarter-dev/jumpstarter) - A hardware-in-the-loop testing framework with automotive diagnostic drivers for UDS, DoIP, and CAN bus protocols.\n- [canopen](https://canopen.readthedocs.io/en/latest/) Python module to communicate with CANopen devices\n- [cantools](https://github.com/eerimoq/cantools) Python module to decode and encode CAN messages using a DBC file\n- [Caring Caribou Next](https://github.com/Cr0wTom/caringcaribounext) - Upgraded and optimized version of the original Caring Caribou project.\n- [canarchy](https://github.com/hexsecs/canarchy) - CANarchy is a stream-first CAN analysis and manipulation runtime designed for automation, security research, and agent-driven workflows.\n\n\n### Go\n\n- [CANNiBUS](https://github.com/Hive13/CANiBUS/) - A Go server that allows a room full of researchers to simultaneously work on the same vehicle, whether for instructional purposes or team reversing sessions.\n- [CAN Simulator](https://github.com/carloop/simulator-program) - A Go based CAN simulator for the Raspberry Pi to be used with PiCAN2 or the open source [CAN Simulator board](https://github.com/carloop/simulator)\n\n### JavaScript\n\n- [NodeJS extension to SocketCAN](https://github.com/sebi2k1/node-can) - Allows you to communicate over CAN networks with simple JavaScript functions.\n\n# Companies and Jobs\n\nCompanies and job opportunities in the vehicle security field.\n\n- [UberATC](https://www.uber.com/us/en/autonomous/) - Uber Advanced Technologies Center, now Uber AV - <info@uberatc.com>.\n- [Tesla](https://www.tesla.com/careers/search#/filter/?keyword=security&department=1) - Tesla hires security professionals for a variety of roles, particularly securing their vehicles.\n- [Intrepid Control Systems](https://www.intrepidcs.com/jobs/) - Embedded security company building tools for reversing vehicles.\n- [Rapid7](https://www.rapid7.com/company/careers.jsp) - Rapid7 does work in information, computer, and embedded security.\n- [IOActive](http://www.ioactive.com/) - Security consulting firm that does work on pentesting hardware and embedded systems.\n- [Cohda Wireless](https://cohdawireless.com/) - V2X DSRC Radio and Software\n- [VicOne](https://www.vicone.com/) - A subsidiary of Trend Micro which focuses on automotive security\n\n## Coordinated disclosure\n\n- [General Motors](https://hackerone.com/gm) on HackerOne - Coordinated disclosure submissions accepted\n- [Stellantis](https://bugcrowd.com/stellantis) on Bugcrowd - Coordinated disclosure submissions accepted, paid bounties offered\n- [Tesla Motors](https://bugcrowd.com/tesla) on Bugcrowd - Coordinated disclosure submissions accepted, paid bounties offered\n- [ASRG](https://asrg.io/disclosure/) - The ASRG Disclosure Process is to support responsible disclosure when direct communication with the responsible company is unavailable or not responsive.\n- [Zeekr](https://security.zeekrlife.com/vulnerability) - Zeekr and Geely Responsible disclosure program\n\n\n# Other Awesome Lists\n\nList of lists.\n\n- Security\n  - [Application Security](https://github.com/paragonie/awesome-appsec)\n  - [Security](https://github.com/sbilly/awesome-security)\n  - [Capture the Flag](https://github.com/apsdehal/awesome-ctf)\n  - [Malware Analysis](https://github.com/rshipp/awesome-malware-analysis)\n  - [Android Security](https://github.com/ashishb/android-security-awesome)\n  - [Hacking](https://github.com/carpedm20/awesome-hacking)\n  - [Honeypots](https://github.com/paralax/awesome-honeypots)\n  - [Incident Response](https://github.com/meirwah/awesome-incident-response)\n- Meta\n  - [awesome](https://github.com/sindresorhus/awesome)\n  - [lists](https://github.com/jnv/lists)\n\n# Contributing\n\nYour contributions are always welcome! Please take a look at the [contribution guidelines](https://github.com/jaredmichaelsmith/awesome-vehicle-security/blob/master/contributing.md) first.",
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      "url": "https://github.com/iDoka/awesome-canbus",
      "description": ":articulated_lorry: Awesome CAN bus tools, hardware and resources for Cyber Security Researchers, Reverse Engineers, and Automotive Electronics Enthusiasts.",
      "readme": "# Awesome CAN Bus [![Awesome](https://awesome.re/badge.svg)](https://awesome.re)\n[![GitHub stars](https://badgen.net/github/stars/iDoka/awesome-canbus)](https://GitHub.com/iDoka/awesome-canbus/stargazers/)\n[![GitHub forks](https://badgen.net/github/forks/iDoka/awesome-canbus)](https://GitHub.com/iDoka/awesome-canbus/network/)\n[![GitHub watchers](https://badgen.net/github/watchers/iDoka/awesome-canbus/)](https://GitHub.com/iDoka/awesome-canbus/watchers/)\n[![GitHub contributors](https://badgen.net/github/contributors/iDoka/awesome-canbus)](https://GitHub.com/iDoka/awesome-canbus/graphs/contributors/)\n[![GitHub pull-requests merged](https://badgen.net/github/merged-prs/iDoka/awesome-canbus)](https://github.com/iDoka/awesome-canbus/pulls?q=is%3Amerged)\n[![GitHub latest commit](https://badgen.net/github/last-commit/iDoka/awesome-canbus)](https://GitHub.com/iDoka/awesome-canbus/commit/)\n\n<p align=\"center\"><img src=\"https://github.com/iDoka/awesome-canbus/raw/main/media/can_logo.png\" alt=\"CAN logo\"/></p>\n\n<!--<p align=\"center\">\n<img src=\"https://github.com/iDoka/awesome-canbus/raw/main/media/can_logo.png\" alt=\"CAN logo\"/>\n</p>-->\n\n<!-- # :tractor: Awesome Tools, Hardware and Resources for CAN Bus\n[![GitHub latest commit](https://badgen.net/github/last-commit/iDoka/awesome-canbus)](https://GitHub.com/iDoka/awesome-canbus/commit/)\n[![GitHub forks](https://badgen.net/github/forks/iDoka/awesome-canbus)](https://GitHub.com/iDoka/awesome-canbus/network/)\n[![GitHub stars](https://badgen.net/github/stars/iDoka/awesome-canbus)](https://GitHub.com/iDoka/awesome-canbus/stargazers/)\n[![GitHub watchers](https://badgen.net/github/watchers/iDoka/awesome-canbus/)](https://GitHub.com/iDoka/awesome-canbus/watchers/)\n[![GitHub contributors](https://img.shields.io/github/contributors/iDoka/badges.svg)](https://GitHub.com/iDoka/badges/graphs/contributors/)\n[![GitHub contributors](https://badgen.net/github/contributors/iDoka/awesome-canbus)](https://GitHub.com/iDoka/awesome-canbus/graphs/contributors/)\n[![PR welcome issues still open](https://badgen.net/https/pr-welcome-badge.vercel.app/api/badge/fastify/help)](https://github.com/iDoka/awesome-canbus/)\n[![GitHub pull-requests](https://img.shields.io/github/issues-pr/iDoka/awesome-canbus.svg)](https://GitHub.com/iDoka/awesome-canbus/pull/)\n[![GitHub pull-requests merged](https://badgen.net/github/merged-prs/iDoka/awesome-canbus)](https://github.com/iDoka/awesome-canbus/pulls?q=is%3Amerged)\n[![GitHub latest commit](https://badgen.net/github/last-commit/iDoka/awesome-canbus)](https://GitHub.com/iDoka/awesome-canbus/commit/)\n-->\n\n\n> :tractor: Awesome Tools, Hardware And Resources For CAN Bus\n\nThis curated list helps a reverse engineering CAN bus devices with lightly specializing in automotive embedded controller software and communication understanding.\n\n> **Note**\n> Items marked as \"🔝\" are highly recommended.\n\n<!--lint disable double-link-->\nPermanent URL to this list: https://github.com/iDoka/awesome-canbus\n<!--lint enable double-link-->\n\n## Contents\n\n* [Hacking and Reverse Engineering tools](#hacking-and-reverse-engineering-tools)\n* [Test equipment and simulators](#test-equipment-and-simulators)\n* [Protocols](#protocols)\n  * [OBD-II tools](#obd-ii-tools)\n  * [UDS](#uds)\n  * [ISO-TP](#iso-tp)\n  * [J1939 Tools](#j1939-tools)\n  * [J2534 Tools](#j2534-tools)\n* [Utils](#utils)\n  * [Common](#common)\n  * [Linux related](#linux-related)\n  * [GUI Tools](#gui-tools)\n  * [TUI Tools](#tui-tools)\n  * [Python Tools](#python-tools)\n  * [CAN-over-IP](#can-over-ip)\n  * [Other Utils](#other-utils)\n  * [Libraries](#libraries)\n  * [Examples](#examples)\n* [CAN Database](#can-database)\n  * [Formats (DBC, KCD)](#formats-dbc-kcd)\n  * [Converters and Parsers](#converters-and-parsers)\n  * [DBC only](#dbc-only)\n* [Hardware](#hardware)\n  * [ARM](#arm)\n  * [Arduino](#arduino)\n  * [Espressif Systems (ESP8266, ESP32)](#espressif-systems-esp8266-esp32)\n  * [SBC](#sbc)\n  * [IP cores for ASIC and FPGA](#ip-cores-for-asic-and-fpga)\n  * [Others HW](#others-hw)\n  * [Hardware related tools](#hardware-related-tools)\n\n\n\n## Hacking and Reverse Engineering tools\n\n* 🔝[CarHackingTools](https://github.com/jgamblin/CarHackingTools) - Collection of Common Car Hacking Tools a scripts collection to help jump start car research and hacking.\n* 🔝[Caring Caribou](https://github.com/CaringCaribou/caringcaribou) - A friendly car security exploration tool for the CAN bus.\n* 🔝[CAN_Reverse_Engineering](https://github.com/brent-stone/CAN_Reverse_Engineering) - Automated Payload Reverse Engineering Pipeline for the Controller Area Network (CAN) protocol.\n* 🔝[carhacking](https://github.com/daedalus/carhacking) - Car hacking scripts and docs collection.\n* [ReCAN](https://github.com/Cyberdefence-Lab-Murcia/ReCAN) - Reverse engineering of Controller Area Networks.\n* [parse_can_logs](https://github.com/v-ivanyshyn/parse_can_logs) - Parse CAN logs and visualize data streams on plot.\n* [reversegear](https://github.com/linklayer/reversegear) - Offline Reverse Engineering Tools for Automotive Networks.\n* 🔝[CANalyzat0r](https://github.com/schutzwerk/CANalyzat0r) - Security analysis toolkit for proprietary car protocols.\n* 🔝[CANToolz](https://github.com/CANToolz/CANToolz) - Black-box CAN network analysis framework.\n<!--lint disable double-link-->\n* [GVRET](https://github.com/collin80/GVRET) - Generalized Electric Vehicle Reverse Engineering Tool (Arduino FW).\n<!--lint enable double-link-->\n* [UDSim](https://github.com/zombieCraig/UDSim) - Unified Diagnostic Services Simulator and Fuzzer (successor of uds-server).\n* [uds-server](https://github.com/zombieCraig/uds-server) - CAN UDS Simulator and Fuzzer.\n* [CANalyse](https://github.com/KartheekLade/CANalyse) - A vehicle network analysis and attack tool.\n* [canhack](https://github.com/kentindell/canhack) - A low-level CAN protocol hacking library.\n* [canDrive](https://github.com/adamtheone/canDrive) - Tools for hacking your car.\n* [Carpunk](https://github.com/souravbaghz/Carpunk) - CAN injection toolkit and successor of CANghost.\n* [CANghost](https://github.com/souravbaghz/CANghost) - Automated Script For Hacking Into CAN Bus.\n* [canTot](https://github.com/shipcod3/canTot) - Quick and dirty canbus h4xing framework.\n* [CANanalyze](https://github.com/renault/cananalyze) - This framework can be used to interact with automotive protocols like CAN/ISOTP/UDS.\n* [Scapy](https://github.com/secdev/scapy) - Python-based interactive packet manipulation program & library. Supports CAN/ISOTP/UDS/GMLAN plus many other protocols.\n* [CAN-RE-Tool](https://github.com/openvehicles/CAN-RE-Tool) - Reverse engineering tool for systems based on CAN bus communications.\n* 🔝[can-explorer](https://github.com/Tbruno25/can-explorer) - A CAN bus visualization tool to aid in reverse engineering.\n\n\n## Test equipment and simulators\n\n* [canerrsim](https://github.com/zeljkoavramovic/canerrsim) - CAN bus error frame simulator and monitor for testing error conditions using SocketCAN.\n* [ECU-simulator](https://github.com/lbenthins/ecu-simulator) - Tool that simulates some vehicle diagnostic services. It can be used to test OBD-II dongles or tester tools that support the UDS (ISO 14229) and ISO-TP (ISO 15765-2) protocols.\n* [ELM327-emulator](https://github.com/Ircama/ELM327-emulator) - ELM327 Emulator for testing software interfacing OBDII via ELM327 adapter supporting multi-ECU simulation.\n* [elmulator](https://github.com/qadanm/elmulator) - Scriptable Bluetooth LE and TCP ELM327 adapter emulator with a CI test harness for OBD2 app developers (with an in-process BLE test double so apps can test their Bluetooth stack with no radio).\n* [CANopen Bench](https://github.com/NobseVomBerg/CANopen-Bench) - Web-based test bench and machine control for CANopen devices: scan, EDS-driven SDO access, YAML test cases, firmware download and a live trace that decodes SDO/PDO/EMCY. IXXAT, PCAN and Vector.\n\n\n## Protocols\n\n### OBD-II tools\n\n* [DDT4All](https://github.com/cedricp/ddt4all) - Tool to create your own ECU parameters screens and connect to a CAN network with a cheap ELM327 interface.\n* [ELM327SLCAN](https://github.com/qnx425/ELM327SLCAN) - ELM327 based vehicle's CAN bus sniffer.\n* [Arduino-OBD2-Async](https://github.com/v-ivanyshyn/Arduino-OBD2-Async) - Arduino OBD library with asynchronous data requesting.\n* [CAN-Shark](https://github.com/quantyle/CAN-Shark) - Working with OBD PIDs from Arduino + MCP2515 shield.\n* [OBD2-Scantool](https://github.com/AustinMurphy/OBD2-Scantool) - A python scantool to read OBD2 info from cars.\n* [O2OO](https://www.vanheusden.com/O2OO/) - OBD-II compliant car diagnostic tool. It reads sensor data from a car into an SQLite database.\n* [freediag](https://github.com/fenugrec/freediag) - Free diagnostic software for OBD-II compliant motor vehicles.\n* [pyvit](https://github.com/linklayer/pyvit) - Python Vehicle Interface Toolkit _(archived)_.\n* [OBDium](https://github.com/provrb/obdium) - Vehicle diagnostics app for live OBD-II data, fault code analysis, and offline VIN decoding over ELM327 adapters.\n\n### UDS\n\n_ISO 14229 Standard_\n\n* [python-UDSonCAN](https://github.com/pylessard/python-udsoncan) - Python implementation of UDS ISO-14229 standard.\n* [uds-c](https://github.com/openxc/uds-c) - Unified Diagnostics Service (UDS) and OBD-II C Library.\n* [iso14229](https://github.com/driftregion/iso14229) - C implementation of UDS ISO-14229 server and client for embedded systems.\n\n### ISO-TP\n\n_ISO 15765-2 Standard_\n\n* [isotp-c](https://github.com/openxc/isotp-c) - An implementation of the ISO-TP (ISO15765-2) CAN protocol in C.\n* [python-can-IsoTP](https://github.com/pylessard/python-can-isotp) - Python implementation of the ISO-TP (ISO15765-2) CAN protocol.\n* [CanTp](https://github.com/Sauci/CanTp) - Implementation of the CanTp module (ISO 15765-2), according to AUTOSAR specification v4.4.0.\n* [aioisotp](https://github.com/christiansandberg/aioisotp) - ISO-TP implemenation for asyncio Python.\n\n### J1939 Tools\n\n_SAE J1939 Standard_\n\n* [J1939-CANBUS](https://github.com/taha842/J1939-CANBUS) - Supported Engines CAT, Perkins, Wartsalla, MTU, VOLVO.\n* [J1939-Framework](https://github.com/famez/J1939-Framework) - Framework to work with J1939 Frames used in CAN bus in bus, car and trucks industries.\n* [python-j1939](https://github.com/milhead2/python-j1939) - SAE J1939 support dependent on python-can package. Provides codec and filtering by PGN but not full SPN decoding.\n* [can-utils with J1939 support](https://github.com/kurt-vd/can-utils/tree/j1939-v6) - Fork of can-utils with a few additional tools for J1939.\n* [test-can-j1939](https://github.com/kurt-vd/test-can-j1939) - How to use CAN J1939 on linux.\n* [libj1939](https://github.com/paoloteti/libj1939) - Library to work with J1939 Frames (intended to be used in microcontrollers).\n* [Pretty-J1939](https://github.com/nmfta-repo/pretty_j1939) - Python libs and scripts for pretty-printing J1939 logs.\n* [TruckDevil](https://github.com/LittleBlondeDevil/TruckDevil) - A tool and framework for interacting with and assessing ECUs that use J1939 for communications on the CANBUS.\n* [python-can-j1939](https://github.com/juergenH87/python-can-j1939) - Package provides SAE J1939 support for Python developers.\n* [Open-SAE-J1939](https://github.com/DanielMartensson/Open-SAE-J1939) - SAE J1939 protocol free to use for embedded systems or PC with CAN-bus.\n* [embr::j1939](https://github.com/malachi-iot/j1939) - Lean, portable J1939 library for embedded MCUs.\n\n### J2534 Tools\n\n_SAE J2534 Standard_\n\n<!--lint disable no-repeat-punctuation-->\n<!-- * [~~JCanalog~~](https://github.com/ZacharyWalsh57/JCanalog) - ~~Easy To Use J2534 Vehicle Logger~~ _(left for history)_. -->\n<!--lint enable no-repeat-punctuation-->\n* [j2534-tcp](https://github.com/brandonros/j2534-tcp) - Virtual J2534 driver over TCP/IP.\n* [SharpWrap2534](https://github.com/MEAT-Inc/SharpWrap2534) - The Ultimate J2534 Wrapper Suite.\n* [gocanflasher](https://github.com/roffe/gocanflasher) - Trionic 5/7/8 CANbus flasher with J2534 support.\n\n\n## Utils\n\n### Common\n\n* 🔝[cantools](https://github.com/mwkpe/cantools) - Collection of CLI tools for the CAN bus network.\n* [BUSMASTER](https://github.com/rbei-etas/busmaster) - An Open Source Software tool to simulate, analyze and test data bus systems such as CAN.\n* [signalbroker-server](https://github.com/AleksandarFilipov/signalbroker-server) - Tool to read and write CAN/LIN/flexray and other buses using gRPC which allows usage of preferred language.\n* [CANiBUS](https://github.com/Hive13/CANiBUS/) - CAN Device Vehicle Research Server (OpenGarages.org).\n* [CANopenTerm](https://github.com/CANopenTerm/CANopenTerm) - Tool for developing, testing and analyzing CANopen CC & CAN CC networks and devices.\n\n### Linux related\n\n* 🔝[Linux CAN Utils](https://github.com/linux-can/can-utils) - Linux-CAN / SocketCAN user space useful utils.\n* [CAN support in Linux](https://elinux.org/CAN_Bus#CAN_Support_in_Linux) - Linux kernel support for CAN hardware interfaces.\n* [SocketCAN](https://docs.kernel.org/networking/can.html) - Linux kernel support (kernel >= 2.6).\n* [J1939](https://docs.kernel.org/networking/j1939.html) - Linux kernel support (kernel >= 5.4) also see [can-j1939 kernel module](https://github.com/linux-can/can-utils/blob/master/can-j1939-install-kernel-module.md).\n* [elmcan](https://github.com/norly/elmcan) - Linux SocketCAN kernel driver for ELM327 based devices (kernel >= 6.0).\n* [can-isotp](https://github.com/hartkopp/can-isotp) - Linux Kernel Module for ISO 15765-2:2016 CAN transport protocol (part of the Linux kernel >= 5.10).\n* [gs_usb](https://github.com/ryedwards/gs_usb) - Linux/Windows CAN driver based on WCID for Geschwister Schneider USB/CAN devices and candleLight USB CAN interfaces.\n\n\n### GUI Tools\n\n* [CANdevStudio from GENIVI](https://github.com/GENIVI/CANdevStudio) - CAN simulation software using a drag-and-drop style GUI with interconnected functional blocks.\n* [CANAL-View](https://github.com/rusoku/CANAL-View) - Qt GUI for TouCAN USB to CAN bus converter.\n* [wxCAN-Sniffer](https://github.com/KruFFT/wxCAN-Sniffer) - CAN bus sniffer (PC side) with animation and chart.\n* [CANLogger](https://github.com/olegel/CANLogger) - CAN bus logger and analyzer tool.\n* [Seeed-USB-CAN-Analyzer](https://github.com/SeeedDocument/USB-CAN-Analyzer/) - Closed source binary for noname Chinese USB-CAN adapter.\n* [CANtact-app](https://github.com/linklayer/cantact-app) - Desktop application for CANtact hardware interface.\n* [SavvyCAN](https://github.com/collin80/SavvyCAN) - Cross-platform Qt based GUI analysis tool. Supports SocketCAN compatible interfaces.\n* [openCanSuite](https://github.com/sebi2k1/openCanSuite) - Set of tools for analyzing, simulating and visualizing a CAN system.\n* [Plotter and Scanner from SmartGauges](https://github.com/smartgauges/obd2-bt-stm32/tree/master/qt) - Scanning and visualizing tool for automotive systems.\n* [ICSim](https://github.com/zombieCraig/ICSim) - Instrument Cluster Simulator for SocketCAN by OpenGarages.\n* [CANgaroo](https://github.com/HubertD/cangaroo) - Qt-based CAN bus analyzer software.\n* [CAN-X](https://github.com/karlyamashita/CAN-X) - C# CAN bus analyzer software.\n* [CAN-Monitor-qt](https://github.com/tixiv/CAN-Monitor-qt) - Universal CAN bus monitoring program.\n* [CANBUS-Analyzer](https://github.com/amund7/CANBUS-Analyzer) - Development tool/companion software for graphs, displays and analyzes both known and unknown CANBUS packets.\n* [SLSS-CANAnalyser](https://github.com/SeppHansen/SLSS-CANAnalyser) - SLSS CANAnalyser is Windows CAN-Bus-Analysis-Software to show, record and evaluate CAN-Bus signals.\n* [TSMaster](https://github.com/TOSUN-Shanghai/TSMaster) - Powerful open environment for automotive bus monitoring, simulation, testing, diagnostics, calibration and so on _(Closed source)_.\n* [CAN++](https://github.com/TDahlmann/canpp) - Windows program for receiving and transmitting CAN bus messages. After import of CAN data base files (`*.dbc` or `*.kcd`) CAN signals are shown in symbolic form. In addition they can be shown as graphics (wave forms).\n* [CANcool](https://github.com/MHS-Elektronik/CANcool) - CAN bus Analyser and Simulation Software with CAN-FD support.\n* [Kayak](https://github.com/dschanoeh/Kayak) - Java-based CAN traffic GUI analysis tool _(archived)_.\n* [PlotJuggler](https://github.com/facontidavide/PlotJuggler) - The Powerful Time Series Visualization Tool (With panda hardware, cabana and plotjuggler, you can quickly RE the entire car in a few days).\n* [PlotJuggler::CAN-dbs](https://github.com/PlotJuggler/plotjuggler-CAN-dbs) - Plugin to visualize CAN .dbs (or .dbc?) files in PlotJuggler.\n* [OpenSourceLogger](https://github.com/DanielMartensson/OpenSourceLogger) - Data acquisition software that can collect measurement, analyze CAN-messages and send SAE-J1939 messages to other ECUs.\n* [EcuBus-Pro](https://github.com/ecubus/EcuBus-Pro) - A powerful automotive ECU development tool. UDS, CAN-TP, DOIP, LIN , Script(TS) like CAPL.\n* [Novo Bus Analyzer](https://github.com/reymor/novobusanalyzer) - Fork of BUSMASTER (BUSMASTER is an Open Source Software tool to simulate, analyze and test data bus systems such as CAN).\n* [bootCAN](https://github.com/friessssss/bootCAN) - Allows monitoring, tracing, and plotting of messages, as well as .SYM decoding and message transmitting.\n* [CANviz](https://github.com/Chanchaldhiman/CANviz) - Browser-based CAN bus analyzer with J1939 and CANopen CiA 301/402 passive decode. Installs via pip, no native app required. Works with almost any CAN harware including low cost ones.\n* [BUSMASTER-NG](https://github.com/teoCLMR/busmaster-ng) - Maintained fork of BUSMASTER for Windows 7–11: CAN and LIN monitoring, logging, replay and node simulation, with direct DBC loading.\n* [Canmetry](https://github.com/WanderZil/canmetry) - Browser-based CAN log viewer for BLF, ASC, CSV, MF4, and DBC, with local decoding and Graph, Trace, and DBC views.\n* [cantraceviewer](https://github.com/tomrford/cantraceviewer) - Free, open-source and private web-based CAN log plotter for ASC, BLF, MF4 and TRC with DBC decoding.\n\n\n\n### TUI Tools\n\n* [socanui](https://github.com/miwagner/socanui) - SocketCAN User Interface for the Terminal.\n* [canscope](https://github.com/OlegShishlyannikov/canscope.git) - CAN bus inspection and reverse-engineering tool.\n* [canair](https://github.com/philipkocanda/canair) - CLI/TUI for reverse engineering CAN/UDS diagnostics over-the-air using a WiCAN or a generic ELM327 dongle.\n\n\n### Python Tools\n\n* 🔝[cantools](https://github.com/cantools/cantools) - CAN BUS tools in Python.\n<!--lint disable double-link-->\n* 🔝[python-can](https://github.com/hardbyte/python-can) - CAN package provides controller area network support for Python developers.\n<!--lint enable double-link-->\n* [strym](https://github.com/jmscslgroup/strym) - Real time CAN data logging and visualization tool to work with USB-CAN Interface.\n* [canviewer](https://github.com/tsabelmann/canviewer) - GUI program that allows the inspection of incoming can-bus messages, either from recorder can-bus data or live data.\n<!--lint disable double-link-->\n* [can4python](https://github.com/caran/can4python) - A package for handling CAN bus signals on Linux SocketCAN.\n<!--lint enable double-link-->\n* [Python-Vector-CANoe](https://github.com/hmq2018/Python-Vector-CANoe) -  Control Vector CANoe API by Python.\n* [CanCat](https://github.com/atlas0fd00m/CanCat) - Swiss army knife of CAN often used in cars and building automation, etc.\n* [Pyfuzz_can](https://github.com/bhass1/pyfuzz_can) - May be used in research to inject messages into a truck and cause acceleration, cluster spoofing, and degrade brake performance.\n* [Robotell-USB-CAN-Python](https://github.com/nopnop2002/Robotell-USB-CAN-Python) - Python program for Robotell USB-CAN Adapter.\n* [python-socketcan-monitor](https://github.com/P1kachu/python-socketcan-monitor) - Script to display data from a CAN bus over network interfaces.\n* [CanoPy](https://github.com/tbruno25/canopy) - A python gui used to visualize and plot message payloads in real time.\n* [PythonVectorXL](https://github.com/Prindl/PythonVectorXL) - Complete python ctypes wrapper lib for the Vector XL Driver Library. Contains the #define instructions, struct/union typdef instructions and function definitions (loads the DLL as well) of the 'vxlapi.h' _(Windows only)_. Inspired by `python-can`.\n* [py4can](https://github.com/SikkandarSulaiman/py4can) - Python utility to send and receive CAN messages through CANalyzer.\n\n### CAN-over-IP\n\n* [cannelloni](https://github.com/mguentner/cannelloni) - SocketCAN over Ethernet tunnel.\n* [tincan](https://github.com/mwkpe/tincan) - Visualization of CAN bus traffic via UDP interface.\n* [pican](https://github.com/ovravna/pican) - TCP CAN reader.\n* [canny](https://github.com/m10k/canny) - Simple CAN-over-IP gateway.\n* [can-hub](https://github.com/can-hub-io/can-hub) - Encrypted CAN-over-IP hub: export SocketCAN buses from devices behind NAT and use them from anywhere.\n\n\n### Other Utils\n\n* [Seeed-USB-CAN-Linux](https://github.com/alexmohr/usb-can) - CLI Linux Support for noname Chinese USB-CAN adapter.\n* [opendlv-device-can-replay](https://github.com/chalmers-revere/opendlv-device-can-replay) - OpenDLV Microservice to replay captured CAN frames to a CAN interface.\n* [c0f](https://github.com/zombieCraig/c0f/) - CAN bus fingerprinting tool is designed to analyze CAN bus traffic and fingerprint the Maker and Model.\n* [canqv](https://github.com/kurt-vd/canqv) - Quick CAN frame inspection using CAN_RAW.\n* [Candle.NET](https://github.com/elliotwoods/Candle.NET) - .NET wrapper for the Candle API for candlelight CAN bus gateways/analysers (e.g. CANable, CANtact, etc).\n* [canSerializer](https://github.com/zainahm3d/canSerializer) - Lib for serializing and deserializing CAN frames for transmission over a non CAN transport layer (Can be used to transport CAN frames over UART, SPI, etc).\n\n\n### Libraries\n\n* [libwecan](https://github.com/nisennenmondai/libwecan) - Header only lib to encode and decode CAN signal.\n* [VCAN](https://github.com/TheMatjaz/VCAN) - A tiny virtual CAN and CAN-FD bus library in C.\n* [IMCTFD](https://github.com/tonton81/IMCTFD) - Improved Microchip CAN Teensy FlexData Library MCP2517FD.\n* [go-socketcan](https://github.com/linklayer/go-socketcan) - Golang library for SocketCAN.\n* [Qt CAN Bus](https://doc.qt.io/qt-5/qtcanbus-backends.html) - A multiplatform C++ plugin based library with support for various CAN Devices (SocketCAN, Sys Tec, PEAK, Virtual).\n* [JavaCAN](https://github.com/pschichtel/JavaCAN) - A Java binding library for SocketCAN with support for RAW, BCM and ISO-TP sockets using epoll-based event-driven IO.\n* [iso15765-canbus](https://github.com/devcoons/iso15765-canbus) -  Implementation of ISO15765-2 in C.\n* [CanKit](https://github.com/pkuyo/CanKit) - Cross-platform C#/.NET CAN communication library with a unified API across multiple CAN adapters.\n* [CANvenient](https://github.com/CANopenTerm/CANvenient) - An abstraction layer for multiple CAN APIs on Windows and Linux.\n\n### Examples\n\n* [CAN-Examples](https://github.com/craigpeacock/CAN-Examples) - Example C code for CAN Sockets on Linux.\n* [socketcan-demo](https://github.com/zhanglongqi/socketcan-demo) - Set of example programs which highlight how to make use of SocketCAN on Linux.\n\n\n\n\n\n## CAN Database\n\n### Formats (DBC, KCD)\n\n#### DBC\n\nDBC - The de facto standard for CAN databases is the DBC file format developed by Vector Informatik GmbH. It is a proprietary format in that no official public documentation or specification is available.\n\n* [DBC Format Specification v1.0](http://read.pudn.com/downloads766/ebook/3041455/DBC_File_Format_Documentation.pdf) - Leaked DBC file format specification v1.0 (the obsolete specification).\n* [DBC Format](http://socialledge.com/sjsu/index.php/DBC_Format) - Brief explanations about various sections, many examples and explains multiplexed signals well.\n* [DBC File Explained](https://www.csselectronics.com/screen/page/can-dbc-file-database-intro/language/en) - A Simple Intro to DCB file format.\n* [J1939 and DBC introduction](https://www.kvaser.com/developer-blog/an-introduction-j1939-and-dbc-files/) - An Introduction to J1939 and DBC files.\n* 🔝[cabana](https://github.com/commaai/cabana) - CAN visualizer and DBC maker (a tool developed to view raw CAN data; one use for this is creating and editing CAN Dictionaries (DBC files)).\n\n#### KCD\n\n* [KCD](https://github.com/julietkilo/kcd) - An open format to describe communication relationships in CAN. similar to DBC format but written in XML.\n\n\n### Converters and Parsers\n\n* 🔝[cantools by Erik Moqvist](https://github.com/eerimoq/cantools) - CAN tools in python for DBC, KCD, SYM, ARXML 4 and CDD file parsing.\n* [cantools by Andreas Heitmann](https://github.com/aheit/cantools) - A set of libraries and command line tools for handling ASC, BLF, CLG, VSB, MDF, and DBC files.\n* [CanDB](https://github.com/skysky97/Candb) - Generate CAN dbc file with OEM defined CAN matrix (xls).\n* [canmatrix](https://github.com/ebroecker/canmatrix) - Converting CAN Database Formats .arxml .dbc .dbf .kcd.\n* [CANBabel](https://github.com/julietkilo/CANBabel) - Translator for several CAN description formats (supports KCD r/w and DBC read).\n<!--lint disable double-link-->\n* [can4python](https://github.com/caran/can4python) - A useful package for showing the contents of KCD files (also those converted from DBC files).\n<!--lint enable double-link-->\n* [dbcc](https://github.com/howerj/dbcc) - DBC to C (and CSV, JSON and XML) compiler using the mpc parser combinator library.\n* [convert_dbc_to_cpp_file](https://github.com/jobgeodev/convert_dbc_to_cpp_file) - Util for convert dbc (canbus) to cpp(cplusplus) function.\n\n\n### DBC only\n\n* [Vector DBC](https://bitbucket.org/tobylorenz/vector_dbc) - Library to access CAN Databases (aka CANdb, aka DBC files) from Vector Informatik.\n* [dbcppp](https://github.com/xR3b0rn/dbcppp) - C/C++ DBC file parser/tool.\n* [can_decoder](https://github.com/CSS-Electronics/can_decoder) - API module for decoding raw CAN bus data to physical values using a DBC CAN database.\n* [CANdb from GENIVI](https://github.com/GENIVI/CANdb) - Library for parsing DBC - CAN bus database description formats.\n* [dbc-parser](https://github.com/msalau/dbc-parser) - A Flex/Bison/Lemon parser/scanner for DBC files.\n* [Vector CANdb++ DBC file parser](https://github.com/kdschlosser/vector_dbc) - Modified version of the dbc file parser of eerimoq.\n* [dbc_reader](https://github.com/autti/dbc_reader) - Virtual can bus reader from dbc file (python).\n* [CAN_BUS_DBC_VIEWER](https://github.com/akshaych92/CAN_BUS_DBC_VIEWER) - GUI based CAN bus dbc viewer.\n* [dbcview](https://github.com/driftregion/dbcview) - DBC visualization tool - plots a graph of sending and receiving nodes linked by messages.\n* [VectorDbcChecker](https://github.com/Golyshkin/VectorDbcChecker) - Vector DBC Checker a Python GUI application for checking DBC files for messages duplication, missed network nodes, signals overlap in message, etc.\n* [pydbc](https://github.com/Sauci/pydbc) - AST generator for dbc format.\n* [pydbc](https://github.com/christoph2/pydbc) - Process vehicle network descriptions (CAN .dbc files).\n* [dbc-matrix-audit](https://github.com/autosar-skills/autosar-agent-skills) - Static DBC matrix auditor in pure standard-library Python: bit overlap, out-of-range signals, asymmetry, naming drift, GBK encoding, plus revision diff and frame decoding. Also cross-checks a DBC against AUTOSAR ARXML configuration.\n\n\n## Hardware\n\nAll kind of HW like CAN bus USB2CAN dongles, loggers, sniffers, adapters, etc.\n\n\n### ARM\n\n* [USB_CAN-FD on ATSAME51](https://github.com/RudolphRiedel/USB_CAN-FD) - This is an Open Source Hardware USB to CAN-FD Interface (ATSAME51J).\n* [SuperCAN](https://github.com/jgressmann/supercan) - An open source USB to CAN-FD protocol firmware (ATSAME51).\n* [FlexCAN](https://github.com/collin80/FlexCAN_Library) - Arduino library for CAN on Teensy 3.1, 3.2, 3.5, and 3.6.\n* [ELM327](https://github.com/ObdDiag-Net/allpro) - Open-source ELM327 OBD adapter based on LPC1517JDB48.\n* [Open-OBD2-datalogger](https://github.com/arturlangner/Open-OBD2-datalogger) - NXP Kinetis E datalogger that saves live engine data to SD card (Visualization is done with HTML5 and JavaScript).\n* [CANBootloader](https://github.com/596142041/CANBootloader-Qt) - GUI + CAN booloader protocol.\n* [PiCCANTE](https://github.com/Alia5/PiCCANTE) - Open-source CAN hacking tool based on Raspberry Pi Pico (1|2|W) - Up to 3x CAN interfaces, includes ELM327 emulator.\n\n#### STM32\n\n* 🔝[panda](https://github.com/commaai/panda) - It supports 3x CAN, 2x LIN, and 1x GMLAN (and it has J2534 over USB on host side). It uses an STM32F413 (Using a panda with cabana provides the best RE and development suites for CANBUS).\n* 🔝[STM32duino_CAN_Library](https://github.com/adamczykpiotr/STM32duino_CAN_Library) - CanBus library for STM32F103 running on STM32duino.\n* 🔝[pcan_pro_x](https://github.com/moonglow/pcan_pro_x) - PEAK PCAN PRO/PRO FD firmware for STM32F4 based boards.\n* [CANnon](https://github.com/mxcd/CANnon) - A versatile CAN bootloader for the STM32 and friends.\n* [hadoucan-fw on STM32H750](https://github.com/suburbanembedded/hadoucan-fw) - Firmware for SM-1301 USB-CAN FD adapter based on.\n* [CANCAN](https://github.com/DDolphin/CANCAN) - CAN recorder based on STM32F407ZGTx.\n* [stm32-CAN-bus-example-HAL-API](https://github.com/timsonater/stm32-CAN-bus-example-HAL-API) - A simple example of CAN bus communications between two STM32 microcontrollers using the updated HAL API functions.\n* [CAN-to-USB-lawicel-for-stm32](https://github.com/kolyandex/CAN-to-USB-lawicel-for-stm32) - CAN to USB adapter using Lawicel/Canhacker protocol based on STM32F103.\n* [stm32-slcan](https://github.com/walmis/stm32-slcan) - SLCAN compatible firmware for BluePill based on STM32f103C8T6.\n* [cantact-pro-hw](https://github.com/linklayer/cantact-pro-hw) - Hardware for the CANtact Pro, use [cantact-pro-fw](https://github.com/linklayer/cantact-pro-fw) as firmware.\n* [STM32-CAN-Busadapter](https://github.com/IvanDev2018/STM32-CAN-Busadapter) - CAN adapter on MCU stm32f303cb.\n* [Ethernet-CAN converter](https://github.com/MikhailBerezhanov/cncu-01) - Based on STM32F407.\n* [CANBUS_UART](https://github.com/Oktay97/Canbus_Uart) - CANBUS to UART for STM32F1 (BluePill and Nucleo boards).\n* [Arduino-STM32-CAN](https://github.com/nopnop2002/Arduino-STM32-CAN) - Can communication example for Arduino Core STM32.\n* [eXoCAN](https://github.com/exothink/eXoCAN) - CAN Library for the STM32F103 aka Blue Pill.\n* [CAN-BUS-Man-In-The-Middle](https://github.com/damienmaguire/CAN-BUS-Man-In-The-Middle) - Dual CAN MitM-device based on STM32F105.\n* [CAN-Bus-Arduino_Core_STM32](https://github.com/seeers/CAN-Bus-Arduino_Core_STM32/blob/master/CanLowlevel.ino) - Lowlevel CanBUS Example for Arduino Core STM32.\n* [BudgetCANv2](https://github.com/ryedwards/budgetcan_fw) - FW for use on STM32 microcontroller to implement FDCAN and USB using the STM32 HAL. Tested on [BudgetCANv2-HW](https://github.com/ryedwards/BUDGETCANFD_G0-Hardware).\n* [CanDybugFW](https://github.com/IntergatedCircuits/CanDybugFW) - Embedded firmware of the CanDybug, a CAN bus traffic analyzer which uses a custom protocol over a USB serial port emulation (STM32F302/STM32F042).\n* [CAN-USB-dongle-fw](https://github.com/cvra/CAN-USB-dongle-fw) - A slcan firmware for the CVRA CAN to USB dongle (STM32F302).\n* [zubax_babel](https://github.com/Zubax/zubax_babel) - High performance CAN-USB/CAN-UART adapter + UAVCAN devboard (STM32F37x).\n* [CAN-RS485-adapter](https://github.com/YuriyLogvin/CAN-RS485-adapter) - CAN-RS485 Adapter (STM32F103).\n* [vector_can](https://github.com/moonglow/vector_can) - Vector VN1610 protocol implementation for cheap STM32F407/405 hardware (Two CAN channel).\n* [CAN_OMEGA](https://github.com/zjlywjh001/CAN_OMEGA) - Ultimate CAN Bus hardware for Car hacking based on STM32F411. Full Featured [firmware](https://github.com/zjlywjh001/CAN_Omega_Firmware) & [software](https://github.com/zjlywjh001/CAN_OMEGA_Tools).\n\n\n#### STM32F0x2 based HW\n\n* [candleLight_fw](https://github.com/candle-usb/candleLight_fw) - Compatible firmware for candleLight, cantact, canable, CANAlyze, VulCAN.\n* [CANsniffer on STM32F042](https://github.com/majbthrd/CANsniffer) - CANbus sniffer less complicated than existing commercial products.\n* [candleLight](https://github.com/HubertD/candleLight) - KiCAD project of usb-can adapter based on STM32F0.\n* [cantact-hw](https://github.com/linklayer/cantact-hw) - Hardware design files for the CANtact tool, use [cantact-fw](https://github.com/linklayer/cantact-fw) as firmware source.\n* [cantact](https://github.com/linklayer/cantact/) - Drivers and Command Line Interface for CANtact tools.\n* [USB2CAN](https://github.com/roboterclubaachen/usb2can) - Compact and isolated USB-to-CAN Adapter.\n* [CANAlyze](https://kkuchera.github.io/canalyze/) - An open source, native CAN interface for Linux that can be built entirely using open source tools, use [canalyze-fw](https://github.com/kkuchera/canalyze-fw) as firmware source.\n* [Cantact FW](https://github.com/x893/cantact-fw) - Cantact FirmWare by x893.\n* [ELM329](https://github.com/ObdDiag-Net/elm329) - Open-source ELM329 OBD adapter based on STM32F042.\n* [OBD2CAN](https://github.com/autosportlabs/OBD2CAN) - Bridge between any OBD2 compliant vehicle and the CAN bus interface (firmware is targeted for the STM32F072, and uses ChibiOS as a RTOS).\n* [pcan_cantact](https://github.com/moonglow/pcan_cantact) - XCAN firmware for CANtact ( CANable ) or any other similar boards based on STM32F042.\n* [kvaser_cantact](https://github.com/moonglow/kvaser_cantact) - Xvaser LL v2 firmware for CANtact/CANable or any other similar boards based on STM32F042.\n\n\n### Arduino\n\n* 🔝[arduino-canhacker](https://github.com/autowp/arduino-canhacker) - CanHacker (lawicel) CAN adapter on Arduino + MCP2515.\n* [open-usb-can from Fabio Baltieri](https://github.com/fabiobaltieri/open-usb-can) - CAN-to-USB dongle based on ATMega32U and MCP2515.\n* [Arduino-CAN-bus-SD-logger](https://github.com/DieselDuz42/Arduino-CAN-bus-SD-logger) - Arduino script to log CAN bus information to SD card. Mainly focused on J1939.\n* [Arduino-canbus-monitor](https://github.com/latonita/arduino-canbus-monitor) - Can bus monitoring tool based on arduino and can bus shield. Implements CAN ASCII/SLCAN protocol compatible with Lawicel CAN232/CANUSB.\n* [Arduino-psa-comfort-can-adapter](https://github.com/ludwig-v/arduino-psa-comfort-can-adapter) - Arduino sketch to operate new PSA (Peugeot, Citroen, DS, Opel) comfort devices (CAN2010) on old BSI CAN-BUS (CAN2004).\n* [epasuino](https://github.com/srenner/epasuino) - Arduino based Speed sensitive electric power steering for automobiles  Speed sensitive electric power steering for automobiles.\n* [carfuino](https://github.com/srenner/carfuino) - Arduino based Automotive performance computer with Megasquirt integration.\n* [W203-canbus](https://github.com/rnd-ash/W203-canbus) - Arduino project for W211/W219 W203/W209 Mercedes (bluetooth audio control and more).\n* [CANBus-Triple](https://github.com/CANBus-Triple/CANBus-Triple-Hardware) - The car hacking platform based on AVR and MCP2515 works with [this firmware](https://github.com/CANBus-Triple/CANBus-Triple).\n<!--lint disable double-link-->\n* [GVRET](https://github.com/collin80/GVRET) - Generalized Electric Vehicle Reverse Engineering Tool (Arduino FW).\n<!--lint enable double-link-->\n* [open-source-can-bridge](https://bitbucket.org/emile_nijssen/open-source-can-bridge) - Gateway with several CAN interfaces based on Xmega.\n* [arduino-mcp2515](https://github.com/autowp/arduino-mcp2515) - Arduino MCP2515 CAN interface library.\n* [slcanuino](https://github.com/kahiroka/slcanuino) - USB-CAN (SocketCAN) sketch for Arduino CAN-BUS shield.\n* [CITM02](https://github.com/BXProject/CITM02) - CAN In The Middle (CITM) the Dual channel CANBUS adapter built around Arduino.\n* [arduino-OBD2](https://github.com/sandeepmistry/arduino-OBD2) - Arduino library for reading OBD-II data from your car over CAN bus.\n* [arduino-ecu-logger](https://github.com/ihaque/arduino-ecu-logger) - Arduino-based OBD2 engine monitor and data logger.\n\n\n\n### Espressif Systems (ESP8266, ESP32)\n\n* [ESP-IDF-CANBus-Monitor](https://github.com/nopnop2002/esp-idf-CANBus-Monitor) - Monitor Canbus traffic ESP32.\n* [connected-car](https://github.com/marmotton/connected-car) - Connecting a Nissan e-NV200 (or Leaf) to MQTT.\n* [PSASteeringWheelAdapter](https://github.com/morcibacsi/PSASteeringWheelAdapter) - ESP32 based steering wheel adapter for Peugeot and Citroen cars.\n<!--lint disable double-link-->\n* [esp32-slcan](https://github.com/mintynet/esp32-slcan) - ESP32 slcan compatible device.\n* [esp32s3-slcan](https://github.com/Pacerino/TWAI_SLCAN) - SLCAN implementation for ESP32-S3 (based on [esp32-slcan](https://github.com/mintynet/esp32-slcan)).\n<!--lint enable double-link-->\n* [ESP32-Arduino-CAN](https://github.com/miwagner/ESP32-Arduino-CAN) - Arduino CAN-Bus library for ESP32.\n* [ESP32_CAN_Interface](https://github.com/PhilippFux/ESP32_CAN_Interface) - Wireless CAN-Interface for the ESP32 which uses the cannelloni protocol to send CAN-Frames via UDP over an Wi-Fi tunnel.\n* [esp32_canbus_gateway](https://github.com/vigoballak/esp32_canbus_gateway) - CAN module on esp32 + tja1050 coded on micropython.\n* [esp32-cantroller](https://github.com/neg2led/esp32-cantroller) - ESP32-S2-WROVER/WROOM based CANBUS controller thingy.\n* [esp32-canbus-logger](https://github.com/scipioni/esp32-canbus-logger) - CAN bus logger on uSD-card based on ESP32.\n* 🔝[ESP32_CANViewer](https://github.com/Cellgalvano/ESP32_CANViewer) -  ESP32 based CAN interface for your webbrowser.\n* [esp-idf-can2http](https://github.com/nopnop2002/esp-idf-can2http) -  CANbus to http bridge using ESP32.\n* [esp32-obd2-emulator](https://github.com/limiter121/esp32-obd2-emulator) - Open-source OBD-II emulator based on an ESP32 + CAN transceiver IC, controllable via WiFi through a simple web UI (or via API).\n* [ESP32RET](https://github.com/collin80/ESP32RET) - CAN Reverse engineering tool for ESP32 based boards (unmaintained).\n* [ESP32S3RET](https://github.com/MagnusThome/ESP32S3RET) - CAN Reverse engineering tool for ESP32-S3 based boards.\n* [esp32_obd2](https://github.com/MagnusThome/esp32_obd2) - Simplified OBD2 layer to run on top of the esp32_can library that supports the newer ESP32-S3 (Arduino library).\n* [ESP32_OBD2_Emulator](https://github.com/MagnusThome/ESP32_OBD2_Emulator) - Simple OBD2 car emulator which runs on ESP32-S3 (replies to all OBD2 requests with dummy data).\n* [RejsaCAN-ESP32](https://github.com/MagnusThome/RejsaCAN-ESP32) - ESP32-S3 board with CAN interface.\n* [RejsaCAN-ESP32-C6](https://github.com/MagnusThome/RejsaCAN-ESP32/tree/main/Code%20Examples/RejsaCAN%20v6.x%20-%20ESP32-C6%20-%20DUAL%20CAN%20self%20test) - Example code that is tested and runs on the new ESP32-C6 that has TWO built in CAN controllers.\n* [CAN-wizard](https://github.com/okhsunrog/can_wizard) - CAN bus sniffer on esp32/esp32-c3 + SN65HVD230. Is developed using ESP-IDF and implement serial control console.\n\n\n### SBC\n**SBC** - Single Board Computers.\n\n* [beaglebone_black_socketcan](https://github.com/BlueAndi/beaglebone_black_socketcan) - How to get access to the CAN bus on a BeagleBone Black via socketcan interface.\n* [rpi-can-logger](https://github.com/JonnoFTW/rpi-can-logger) - Project to log CAN bus data from a PiCAN2 and a GPS module.\n* [CANoPi](https://github.com/SushiBits/CANoPi) - CAN interface for Raspberry Pi Zero.\n\n\n### IP cores for ASIC and FPGA\n\n* [CAN](https://opencores.org/projects/can) - IP core for classic CAN Protocol Controller (VHDL).\n* [CTU-CAN-FD](https://github.com/Logic-Design-Services/CTU-CAN-FD) - CAN FD IP Core, ISO 11898-1:2015 compliant (VHDL).\n\n\n\n### Others HW\n\n* [Microchip CAN BUS Analyzer on PIC18F2550/PIC18F2680 Firmware](https://github.com/rkollataj/mcba_firmware) - Microchip CAN BUS Analyzer firmware.\n* [Microchip CAN BUS Analyzer on PIC18F2550/PIC18F2680 Driver](https://github.com/rkollataj/mcba_usb) - Linux kernel driver for Microchip CAN BUS Analyzer Tool.\n* [BB-to-STM32](https://github.com/mvollrath/canbus_bbone_stm32) - LED sync between BeagleBone Black and STM32F4 Discovery Board.\n* [elm327_clone](https://github.com/darkspr1te/elm327_clone) - ELM327 firmware for pic18f25k80 chip from china clone OBD2.\n\n\n### Hardware related tools\n\n* [CAN Bus Bit Timing Calculator](https://www.kvaser.com/support/calculators/bit-timing-calculator/) - Online tool for obsolete SJA1000 and MCP2510 (probably it works for MCP2515).\n* [Bit Timing Calculator for CAN FD](https://kvaser.com/support/calculators/can-fd-bit-timing-calculator/) - Online tool to calculate detailed bit timing parameters for general CAN FD devices.\n* [STM8S208 CAN Speed Calculator](https://github.com/iDoka/STM8S208-CAN-Speed-Calculator) - CAN Speed Calculator for STM8 (perhaps it also works for STM32 family).\n* [STMG431 FDCAN SOLVER](https://phryniszak.github.io/stm32g-fdcan/) - Online tool to calculate bit timing parameters for STM32G4 (likely compatible with STM32G0).\n\n---\n\n## Contributing\n\n* Your contributions are always welcome! Please read the [contribution guidelines](contributing.md) first.\n\n\n## Footnotes\n<!--lint disable double-link-->\n1. Please follow [this](https://github.com/iDoka/awesome-canbus) root-repo for lastest updates.\n2. The another awesome list :arrow_forward: [CAN ID collections](https://github.com/iDoka/awesome-automotive-can-id) :arrow_backward: also might be useful.\n3. Also might be useful [this curated list](https://github.com/iDoka/awesome-linbus) of awesome tools and resources for LIN bus reverse engineering, LIN hardware development and debugging.\n<!--lint enable double-link-->\n\n<!--\n## Tags\n\n#awesome\n#awesome-list\n#can\n#can-bus\n#canbus\n#canfd\n#can-fd\n#logger\n#sniffer\n#slcan\n#socketcan\n#car-hacking\n#bus-monitoring\n#lawicel\n#elm327\n#obd2\n#canutils\n#automotive\n#embedded\n#arduino\n#rpi\n#raspberry-pi\n#sae\n#uds\n#j1962\n#j1939\n#j1979\n#j2534\n#lin\n#lin-bus\n#local-interconnect-network\n#flexray\n#obd-ii\n#slcan-protocol\n#usbtin\n#usb2can\n#iso11898\n#iso11565\n#iso11765\n#iso14229\n#dbc\n#odb\n#ldf\n#electric-vehicles\n#vehicular-networks\n#python\n#automotive-security\n-->",
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      "title": "🏴 BlackFlag ECU - Professional Automotive Diagnostic & Tuning Suite",
      "full_name": "bad-antics/blackflag-ecu",
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      "readme": "# 🏴 BlackFlag ECU - Professional Automotive Diagnostic & Tuning Suite\n\n<div align=\"center\">\n\n**Advanced ECU Diagnostics | Performance Tuning | Real-Time Data Analysis**\n\n[![.NET 8.0](https://img.shields.io/badge/.NET-8.0-512BD4)](https://dotnet.microsoft.com/)\n[![Platform](https://img.shields.io/badge/platform-Windows-0078D4)](https://www.microsoft.com/windows)\n[![License](https://img.shields.io/badge/license-MIT-green)](LICENSE)\n[![Built by](https://img.shields.io/badge/Built%20by-Bad%20Antics%20Development-orange)](https://github.com/bad-antics)\n\n</div>\n\n---\n\n## 🚀 Overview\n\n**BlackFlag ECU** is a comprehensive, native Windows application for automotive diagnostics, ECU tuning, and performance optimization. Built with C# and WPF on .NET 8.0, it provides professional-grade tools for mechanics, tuners, and automotive enthusiasts.\n\n### ✨ Key Features\n\n- **🔍 ECU Scanner** - Scan and identify ECU types across all major manufacturers\n- **🔓 ECU Unlock** - Unlock write-protection on supported processors (Tricore, MPC5xx, SH7xxx)\n- **📊 Live Data** - Real-time voltage meter and diagnostic data streaming\n- **🎯 VIN Decoder** - Comprehensive vehicle identification and specs lookup\n- **🔌 Wiring Diagrams** - Interactive pinout diagrams for connectors and modules\n- **⚡ Tune Manager** - Create, edit, and flash custom ECU tunes\n- **💾 ECU Cloning** - Backup and restore complete ECU configurations\n- **📈 Performance Dashboard** - Real-time charts for horsepower, torque, boost, and AFR\n\n---\n\n## 📋 System Requirements\n\n- **OS:** Windows 10/11 (64-bit)\n- **.NET:** .NET 8.0 Runtime (included in standalone build)\n- **RAM:** 4GB minimum, 8GB recommended\n- **Storage:** 200MB available space\n- **Hardware:** J2534-compatible interface (for live diagnostics)\n\n---\n\n## 🔧 Installation\n\n### Standalone Executable\n\n1. Download `BlackFlag.exe` from the [Releases](https://github.com/bad-antics/blackflag-ecu/releases) page\n2. Run `BlackFlag.exe` - No installation required\n3. All dependencies are included in the single-file executable\n\n### First Launch\n\nOn first launch, BlackFlag will create the following directories:\n```\n%LOCALAPPDATA%\\BlackFlag\\\n├── vehicles.json     # Vehicle database\n├── history.json      # Scan/tune history\n├── ecuprofiles.json  # ECU profile library\n├── tunes.json        # Custom tune library\n└── settings.json     # Application settings\n```\n\n---\n\n## 🎯 Quick Start Guide\n\n### 1. Dashboard\nThe main dashboard provides quick access to all features and displays recent activity.\n\n### 2. VIN Decoder\n- Enter a 17-character VIN\n- Instantly retrieve vehicle specs (make, model, year, engine, transmission)\n- View supported ECU types and systems\n\n### 3. ECU Scanner\n- Connect J2534 interface to OBD-II port\n- Select communication protocol (CAN, K-Line, J1850)\n- Click **Scan** to identify ECU type and software version\n- View live diagnostic codes\n\n### 4. Tune Manager\n- Load stock ECU file\n- Modify parameters (boost, timing, fuel, rev limit)\n- Preview changes in real-time\n- Flash to ECU with progress tracking\n\n### 5. ECU Unlock\n- Select processor vendor (Infineon, NXP/Freescale, Renesas, STMicroelectronics)\n- Choose specific processor model\n- Click **Unlock** to disable write protection\n- Monitor unlock progress\n\n---\n\n## 📊 Features Overview\n\n### ECU Support\n\n**Supported Manufacturers:**\n- Bosch (EDC17, MED17, ME17, MD1)\n- Denso\n- Continental\n- Delphi\n- Magneti Marelli\n- Siemens/Continental\n- Hitachi\n- OEM-specific ECUs (Ford, GM, Chrysler, etc.)\n\n**Supported Processors:**\n- Infineon Tricore (TC1766, TC1796, TC1797, TC1798)\n- NXP/Freescale MPC5xx (MPC5534, MPC5554, MPC5566)\n- Renesas SH7xxx (SH7058, SH7059, SH72531)\n- STMicroelectronics ST10\n\n### Communication Protocols\n\n- **CAN Bus** (ISO 15765, High/Mid/Low Speed)\n- **K-Line** (ISO 9141, ISO 14230 KWP2000)\n- **J1850 PWM/VPW**\n- **LIN Bus**\n- **FlexRay** (read-only)\n\n### Diagnostic Features\n\n- **DTC Reading** - Read and clear diagnostic trouble codes\n- **Live Data** - Real-time sensor values (O2, MAF, MAP, IAT, ECT, TPS, etc.)\n- **Freeze Frame** - Capture engine state at fault occurrence\n- **Oxygen Sensor Tests** - Monitor O2 heater and response\n- **EVAP Tests** - Leak detection and purge valve control\n- **Readiness Monitors** - Emissions system readiness status\n\n---\n\n## 🎨 Themes\n\nBlackFlag includes 4 professionally designed themes:\n\n1. **Dark Theme** - Modern dark mode (default)\n2. **Retro Green Theme** - Classic terminal aesthetic\n3. **Ford Blue Theme** - OEM Ford blue styling\n4. **Orange Tech Theme** - High-contrast orange accents\n\nSwitch themes from **Dashboard → Theme Selector**\n\n---\n\n## 🛠️ Technical Details\n\n### Architecture\n\n- **Framework:** .NET 8.0 Windows Desktop\n- **UI:** WPF (Windows Presentation Foundation)\n- **Charts:** LiveChartsCore v2.0.0-rc2\n- **Serial:** System.IO.Ports\n- **JSON:** Newtonsoft.Json\n- **Size:** 155.56 MB (standalone executable)\n\n### Data Storage\n\nAll data is stored in JSON format in `%LOCALAPPDATA%\\BlackFlag\\`:\n- **vehicles.json** - 900+ vehicle database entries\n- **ecuprofiles.json** - ECU configuration profiles\n- **tunes.json** - Custom tune files\n- **history.json** - Scan and flash history\n\n---\n\n## 🔒 Security & Legal\n\n### Safety Features\n\n- **Read-Only Mode** - Preview ECU data without modification\n- **Backup Before Flash** - Automatic ECU backup before any write operation\n- **Checksum Validation** - Verify tune file integrity before flashing\n- **Live Monitoring** - Abort flash if voltage drops or connection lost\n\n### Legal Notice\n\n**BlackFlag ECU is intended for off-road use, racing, and professional tuning only.**\n\n- Modifying emissions-related systems may violate local laws\n- Users are responsible for compliance with EPA, CARB, and local regulations\n- Warranty on modified vehicles may be voided\n- Use at your own risk\n\n---\n\n## 📝 License\n\nMIT License - Free and Open Source\n\n```\nCopyright (c) 2025 Bad Antics Development\n\nPermission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy\nof this software and associated documentation files (the \"Software\"), to deal\nin the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights\nto use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell\ncopies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is\nfurnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:\n\nThe above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all\ncopies or substantial portions of the Software.\n\nTHE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED \"AS IS\", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR\nIMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,\nFITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE\nAUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER\nLIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM,\nOUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE\nSOFTWARE.\n```\n\n---\n\n## 🤝 Support\n\n- **Issues:** [GitHub Issues](https://github.com/bad-antics/blackflag-ecu/issues)\n- **Discussions:** [GitHub Discussions](https://github.com/bad-antics/blackflag-ecu/discussions)\n- **Author:** Built by antx @ Bad Antics Development\n\n---\n\n## 🚀 Version History\n\n### v2.1 (Current)\n- Initial standalone release\n- 155.56 MB single-file executable\n- 900+ vehicle database\n- 4 premium themes\n- Full J2534 support\n- ECU unlock for Tricore, MPC5xx, SH7xxx processors\n\n---\n\n<div align=\"center\">\n\n**🏴 BlackFlag ECU - Professional Automotive Power**\n\n*Built by [Bad Antics Development](https://github.com/bad-antics)*\n\n</div>\n\n## 🚗 Supported Vehicles\n\n### Domestic\n- **Ford** - F-150, Mustang, Bronco, Ranger (2015-2025)\n- **GM** - Silverado, Camaro, Corvette, Sierra (2014-2025)\n- **Dodge/Ram** - Ram 1500/2500, Charger, Challenger (2013-2025)\n\n### European\n- **BMW** - 3/5/7 Series, M3/M4/M5 (2012-2025)\n- **Mercedes** - C/E/S Class, AMG (2014-2025)\n- **Audi** - A4/A6/RS6, Q5/Q7 (2015-2025)\n- **VW** - Golf R, GTI, Tiguan (2016-2025)\n\n### Japanese\n- **Toyota** - Supra, GR86, Tacoma (2018-2025)\n- **Honda** - Civic Type R, Accord (2017-2025)\n- **Nissan** - GT-R, Z, 370Z (2009-2025)\n- **Subaru** - WRX, STI, BRZ (2015-2025)\n\n## ⚡ Tuning Features\n\n- ECU flash read/write\n- Custom map creation\n- Emissions delete options\n- Performance calibrations\n- Rev limiter adjustments\n- Speed limiter removal\n\n\n<!-- Updated: 2026-01-25 13:02:46 -->\n\n<!-- Updated: 2026-01-25 13:42:31 -->\n\n<!-- Updated: 2026-01-25 13:52:19 -->",
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      "title": "***🚗 EV Cybersecurity Specialist***",
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      "readme": "# ***🚗 EV Cybersecurity Specialist***\n\n\n\n<p align=\"center\">\n\t<img src=\"Images/Logos/EV_Cybersecurity_Specialist_Dark.png\">\n</p>\n\n\n\n---\n\n\n\n> Personal notes, research, references, standards, attack techniques, charging infrastructure security, and exam preparation materials collected while studying the **[EV Cybersecurity Specialist](https://www.cybentia.com/product/curso-de-ciberseguridad-para-vehiculos-electricos/)** certification.\n\nThis repository contains my personal notes, study materials, references, diagrams, research papers, videos, standards, and practical resources related to **electric vehicle cybersecurity**, **charging infrastructure security**, and the technologies that support modern connected mobility.\n\nThe goal is not only to prepare for the certification exam, but also to build a long-term knowledge base covering vehicle architectures, automotive cybersecurity regulations, attack surfaces, charging technologies, communication protocols, and real-world security incidents affecting electric vehicles and charging infrastructures.\n\n\n\n---\n---\n---\n\n\n\n## ***📑 Table of Contents***\n\n1. [Course Modules](#modules)\n2. [Why EV Cybersecurity Matters Right Now](#why)\n3. [Hands-On Labs & Practice Platforms](#handson)\n4. [Key Standards & Regulations](#standards)\n\n\n\n---\n---\n---\n\n\n\n<div id='modules'/>\n\n## ***🗺️ Course Modules***\n\n| Module | Topic |\n|--------|-------|\n| [Module 01](./Course/Module01_EV_Fundamentals/README.md) | EV Fundamentals & Cybersecurity |\n| [Module 02](./Course/Module02_Regulations_And_Standards/README.md) | Regulations & Standards |\n| [Module 03](./Course/Module03_Common_Automotive_Cyber_Risks/README.md) | Common Automotive Cyber Risks |\n| [Module 04](./Course/Module04_EV_Specific_Threats_And_Mitigations/README.md) | EV-Specific Threats & Mitigations |\n| [Module 05](./Course/Module05_Charging_Infrastructure/README.md) | Charging Infrastructure |\n| [Module 06](./Course/Module06_Charging_Station/README.md) | Charging Station Security |\n| [Test](./Course/Module07_Exam_Questions/README.md) | Exam Questions & Certification Preparation |\n| [Lab 01](./Practice/CAN%20Bus/README.md) | CAN Bus Hacking & Automotive Security Testing |\n| [Lab 02](./Practice/Security%20Labs/README.md) | Automotive Security Labs & Research Resources |\n\n\n\n---\n---\n---\n\n\n\n<div id='why'/>\n\n## ***🚨 Why EV Cybersecurity Matters Right Now***\n\nThe automotive industry is living through a security reckoning that enterprise IT went through twenty years ago. The numbers are stark: in 2024 alone, **530 automotive-related CVEs** were published - nearly double the total from 2019. In the same year, **60% of cybersecurity incidents in the automotive sector impacted thousands to millions of vehicles or charging assets simultaneously**, and attacks capable of giving remote control over a moving vehicle rose to account for **over 35% of all automotive cyberattacks**.\n\nElectric vehicles sit at the centre of this storm for a specific reason: they are not merely cars with batteries. They are software-defined platforms, permanently connected to charging networks, mobile apps, OEM backend servers, and increasingly to the electricity grid itself via V2G technology. Every one of those connections is a potential attack surface, and unlike a compromised web server, a compromised EV has consequences that are physical and immediate.\n\nThe regulatory response has arrived. **UNECE/R155** mandated Cybersecurity Management Systems for all new vehicles sold in the EU from July 2024. **ISO/SAE 21434** defines the engineering lifecycle for automotive cybersecurity. **ISO 15118** governs the security of the charging session. The field has moved from academic curiosity to regulated engineering discipline in the span of a few years - and the talent gap is enormous.\n\n\n\n<p align=\"center\">\n\t<img src=\"Images/Illustrations/Illustration_Cybersecurity_Risks.png\">\n</p>\n\n\n\n<p align=\"center\">\n\t<img src=\"Images/Illustrations/Illustration_BMS_Telemetry_V2G.png\">\n</p>\n\n\n\n<p align=\"center\">\n\t<img src=\"Images/Illustrations/Illustration_Charging_Station.png\">\n</p>\n\n\n\n---\n---\n---\n\n\n\n<div id='handson'/>\n\n## ***🔬 Hands-On Labs & Practice Platforms***\n\nThere is no single \"Hack The Box for vehicles\" yet, but the ecosystem is growing fast. Here are the most useful platforms and tools for hands-on practice, organised by focus area.\n\n---\n\n### ***📶 CAN Bus & In-Vehicle Network Simulation***\n\n- **[ICSim - Instrument Cluster Simulator for SocketCAN](https://github.com/zombieCraig/ICSim)**: The classic starting point for anyone learning vehicle network security. ICSim simulates a vehicle's CAN bus and instrument cluster, letting you practice sniffing, reverse engineering message IDs, replaying frames, and injecting commands - all without touching a real car. Created by Craig Smith, author of *The Car Hacker's Handbook*.\n- **[SocketCAN userspace utilities and tools](https://github.com/linux-can/can-utils)**: The standard Linux toolkit for CAN bus work. Includes candump (capture), cansend (inject), canplayer (replay), cangen (fuzzing), and cansniffer (live monitoring). Essential companion to ICSim and any real hardware setup.\n- **[CANBusHack](https://canbushack.com)**: One of the most focused platforms for CAN bus security education.\n\n---\n\n### ***🔌 EV Charging / OCPP Labs***\n\n- **[SteVe - OCPP Backend Server](https://github.com/steve-community/steve)**: Open-source OCPP 1.6 / 2.0 backend (Charge Point Management System). You can run SteVe locally and connect simulated or real charge points to it, then observe and manipulate the OCPP traffic - authentication, session management, firmware update commands, remote start/stop.\n- **[EVerest](https://github.com/EVerest/everest-core)**: Open-source EV charging software stack maintained by the Linux Foundation Energy project. More complex to set up, but gives you the full stack.\n\n---\n\n### ***🏁 CTFs & Competitions***\n\n- **[Car Hacking Village - DEF CON](https://www.carhackingvillage.com)**: Runs annually at DEF CON and publishes all materials afterward. Challenges cover CAN injection, ECU reverse engineering, telematics exploitation, and increasingly EV charging security.\n- **[Pwn2Own Automotive](https://vicone.com/pwn2own-automotive)**: The world's largest zero-day competition focused exclusively on automotive targets.\n\n---\n\n### ***📖 Self-Study Resources***\n\n- **[OWASP Automotive Security Guide](https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Automotive_Security_Cheat_Sheet.html)**: Threat modeling framework adapted for automotive.\n- **[OpenGarages](https://opengarages.org)**: Community hub for vehicle security research. Hosts workshops, hardware guides, and the free PDF of *[The Car Hacker's Handbook by Craig Smith](https://opengarages.org/handbook/)* (still the most comprehensive introductory text on automotive security).\n- **[Auto-ISAC](https://automotiveisac.com)**: The Automotive Information Sharing and Analysis Center. 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      "title": "🧭 In one minute",
      "full_name": "Mukta01/EVNet_Sentinel",
      "name": "EVNet_Sentinel",
      "owner": "Mukta01",
      "url": "https://github.com/Mukta01/EVNet_Sentinel",
      "description": "🛡️ Real-time Intrusion Detection System (IDS) for Electric Vehicle Charging Stations (EVCS). Combines Adaptive Random Forest (ARF + ADWIN drift detection) and static ML models on CICEVSE2024 telemetry, paired with an interactive Next.js dashboard.",
      "readme": "<div align=\"center\">\n  <img src=\"https://capsule-render.vercel.app/api?type=waving&color=gradient&height=250&section=header&text=EVNet%20Sentinel&fontSize=80&animation=fadeIn&fontAlignY=35&desc=Intrusion%20Detection%20for%20Electric%20Vehicle%20Charging%20Networks&descAlignY=60&descAlign=50\" alt=\"EVNet Sentinel Banner\" />\n\n  <p><b>We audited a published 98.4% intrusion detector for EV charging stations, found it was reading timestamps,<br/>and rebuilt it honestly: leak-free benchmarks, per-attack testing, and a working web system.</b></p>\n\n  <p>\n    <img src=\"https://img.shields.io/badge/macro--F1-0.558%20%C2%B1%200.008-22c55e?style=for-the-badge\" alt=\"Macro-F1\" />\n    <img src=\"https://img.shields.io/badge/tests-71%20passing-22c55e?style=for-the-badge&logo=pytest&logoColor=white\" alt=\"Tests\" />\n    <img src=\"https://img.shields.io/badge/dataset-CICEVSE2024-0ea5e9?style=for-the-badge\" alt=\"Dataset\" />\n    <img src=\"https://img.shields.io/badge/license-Apache%202.0-64748b?style=for-the-badge\" alt=\"License\" />\n  </p>\n  <p>\n    <img src=\"https://img.shields.io/badge/Python-3.13-3776AB?style=flat-square&logo=python&logoColor=white\" alt=\"Python\" />\n    <img src=\"https://img.shields.io/badge/scikit--learn-1.8-F7931E?style=flat-square&logo=scikitlearn&logoColor=white\" alt=\"scikit-learn\" />\n    <img src=\"https://img.shields.io/badge/River-online%20ML-0f766e?style=flat-square\" alt=\"River\" />\n    <img src=\"https://img.shields.io/badge/FastAPI-API-009688?style=flat-square&logo=fastapi&logoColor=white\" alt=\"FastAPI\" />\n    <img src=\"https://img.shields.io/badge/Next.js-16-000000?style=flat-square&logo=nextdotjs&logoColor=white\" alt=\"Next.js\" />\n    <img src=\"https://img.shields.io/github/stars/Mukta01/EVNet_Sentinel?style=flat-square&color=yellow\" alt=\"Stars\" />\n  </p>\n\n  <p>\n    <a href=\"#quick-start\"><b>Quick start</b></a> ·\n    <a href=\"#what-we-found\"><b>What we found</b></a> ·\n    <a href=\"#see-it\"><b>Screenshots</b></a> ·\n    <a href=\"#results\"><b>Results</b></a> ·\n    <a href=\"#documentation\"><b>Docs</b></a> ·\n    <a href=\"#team\"><b>Team</b></a>\n  </p>\n</div>\n\n---\n\n## 🧭 In one minute\n\n| | |\n|---|---|\n| ❓ **The question** | Makhmudov et al. (2025) report **98.4%** accuracy for an online detector (Adaptive Random Forest + ADWIN) on CICEVSE2024. Does that number measure attack detection? |\n| 🔍 **The answer** | Mostly not. **One timestamp column alone scores 99.76%**, because each attack was recorded in its own file at its own time. |\n| ✅ **The honest number** | With the leaks removed: **macro-F1 0.558 ± 0.008** (Random Forest, 3 seeds). Floods are near-perfect; network scans are not. |\n| 🛠️ **What we built** | A per-attack test harness, a prediction API, a closed-loop response (detect, contain, harden, verify) replayed over every recorded attack, and a website that shows every result live. |\n\n<a id=\"what-we-found\"></a>\n\n## 🔍 What we found\n\n<table>\n<tr>\n<td width=\"50%\" valign=\"top\">\n\n**1 · Timestamp leak**<br/>\n`bidirectional_first_seen_ms` alone recovers the 15-class label with **0.9976** accuracy, above the published 0.9840.\n\n**2 · The useful feature was dropped**<br/>\nThe published pipeline removes `dst_port`, the feature that *defines* a port scan, and keeps the timestamps.\n\n**3 · Stream order inflates accuracy**<br/>\nIn capture order the label changes only 54 times in 1.92M flows. \"Repeat the last label\" scores **0.99997**; shuffled, ARF drops to **0.5585**.\n\n</td>\n<td width=\"50%\" valign=\"top\">\n\n**4 · Drift alarms are file seams**<br/>\n**42 of 43** ADWIN alarms fall within 100 flows of a join between capture files (p < 0.0005).\n\n**5 · `src_port` is a fingerprint**<br/>\nEphemeral ports band per capture; removing it costs the Decision Tree twice what it costs Random Forest.\n\n**➜ After correction**<br/>\nFloods: **F1 ≥ 0.999**. The six nmap scans: **0.10 to 0.27**. Mutual information shows the best feature explains **98%** of DoS type but only **5%** of scan type: the limit is in the data.\n\n</td>\n</tr>\n</table>\n\n<a id=\"see-it\"></a>\n\n## 🖼️ See it\n\n<table>\n<tr>\n<td width=\"50%\"><img src=\"docs/images/dashboard.jpg\" alt=\"Results dashboard\" /><br/><sub><b>Dashboard</b>: the leak in three numbers</sub></td>\n<td width=\"50%\"><img src=\"docs/images/simulation-quarantine.jpg\" alt=\"Simulation with quarantine\" /><br/><sub><b>Simulation</b>: site goes \"not safe\", attacker quarantined</sub></td>\n</tr>\n<tr>\n<td width=\"50%\"><img src=\"docs/images/confusion-matrix.jpg\" alt=\"Confusion matrix\" /><br/><sub><b>Confusion explorer</b>: floods on the diagonal, scans smeared</sub></td>\n<td width=\"50%\"><img src=\"docs/images/attack-insights.jpg\" alt=\"Attack insights\" /><br/><sub><b>Attack insights</b>: what an operator should take away</sub></td>\n</tr>\n</table>\n\n<a id=\"quick-start\"></a>\n\n## ⚡ Quick start\n\n```bash\nmake setup && (cd frontend && npm install)   # once\n\nmake web        # 🌐 website   → http://localhost:3100\nmake api        # ⚙️  API       → http://localhost:8000   (needs locally trained models)\nmake diagrams   # 🗺️  diagrams  → http://localhost:8765\nmake test       # 🧪 71 tests\n```\n\n| Page | Try this |\n|---|---|\n| **`/`** | Drag an attack onto a charging station in *Beat the Sentinel*; move the slider in *Tune the detector*; scroll the testbed story |\n| **`/simulation`** | Launch an attack, watch the site turn **Network not safe**, then approve the recommended action: quarantine a flooder, restrict a scanner, or stop a compromised car's session |\n| **`/dashboard`** | *Findings* (the evidence) · *Attack insights* (per-attack results and response guidance) · *Live inference* |\n| **`/docs`** | Method at a glance and the architecture |\n\nMore detail, stopping servers, and sharing a public link with ngrok: **[docs/RUNNING.md](./docs/RUNNING.md)**.\n\n## ✨ Features\n\n| | Feature | What it does |\n|---|---|---|\n| 🔍 | **Leakage audit** | Five findings, each reproduced by its own script in `src/reproduction/` |\n| 📊 | **Corrected benchmarks** | 6 static models (incl. XGBoost, LightGBM) + ARF/ADWIN, 15 classes, 3 seeds, macro-F1 |\n| 🎯 | **Attack test harness** | Every attack × every model: detected / right category / named exactly, with regression gates |\n| 🛡️ | **Closed-loop response** | Threat level Safe → Elevated → Not safe; operator-approved quarantine (floods), restriction (scans) or session stop (compromised car); a scanner that later floods is quarantined on its first flood flow; replayed over all 20 recorded attacker-and-attack pairs |\n| 🌐 | **Web front end** | Landing page, simulation console, dashboard, all built from exported results |\n| ⚙️ | **Prediction API** | `POST /predict` classifies one flow with any corrected model |\n\n## 🏗️ How it fits together\n\n```mermaid\nflowchart LR\n    A[CICEVSE2024 captures] --> B[preprocess.py<br/>drop leaks · dedup · split · scale]\n    B --> C[run_experiments.py<br/>4 models × 3 seeds]\n    B --> D[ARF + ADWIN<br/>streaming]\n    C --> M[(saved_models)]\n    M --> H[Attack test harness]\n    C --> R[(evaluation_results)]\n    D --> R\n    H --> R\n    M --> API[FastAPI :8000]\n    R -->|export_*.py| J[(frontend/data)]\n    J --> W[Website :3100]\n    J --> P[Paper figures]\n```\n\n> The website reads the exported JSON and never calls the API, so it runs on a fresh clone with no dataset. Animated, source-linked versions of this diagram are in [`docs/diagrams/`](./docs/diagrams/).\n\n<a id=\"results\"></a>\n\n## 📈 Results\n\n| Model | Macro-F1 (3 seeds) | Accuracy | False alarms | |\n|---|---|---|---|---|\n| **Random Forest** | **0.558 ± 0.008** | 0.868 | 3% | highest macro-F1; trains in 8.5 s |\n| Decision Tree | 0.557 ± 0.010 | 0.868 | 11% | |\n| 🥇 **XGBoost** | 0.551 ± 0.011 | 0.869 | **2%** | recommended detector (fewest false alarms; tied with RF) |\n| LightGBM | 0.550 ± 0.004 | 0.868 | 3% | |\n| Logistic Regression | 0.436 ± 0.017 | 0.863 | 44% | best second opinion on scans |\n| SVM | 0.411 ± 0.017 | 0.862 | 58% | |\n\nThe four tree models are statistically tied: gradient boosting does not break the scan ceiling. Every model reaches about 0.86 accuracy, which is why macro-F1 is the headline. The recommended detector is chosen by a fixed rule: among models that name attacks within 2 points of the best, the fewest false alarms. Sources: [`MULTISEED_RESULTS.md`](./evaluation_results/multiseed/MULTISEED_RESULTS.md) · [`BOOSTING_RESULTS.md`](./evaluation_results/boosting/BOOSTING_RESULTS.md) · [`attack_tests.json`](./evaluation_results/attack_tests.json) · [guide to the results folder](./evaluation_results/README.md).\n\n> [!WARNING]\n> `evaluation_results/rf_evaluation_summary.md` and `SVM_evaluation_summary.md` predate the correction (their 0.9994 came from the timestamps). They are kept only as the \"before\".\n\n<a id=\"documentation\"></a>\n\n## 📚 Documentation\n\n| | Topic | Read |\n|---|---|---|\n| 📄 | **Research paper** | [v4 IEEE · 8 pages](./docs/research%20paper/EVNet_Sentinel_Research_Paper_v4_IEEE.pdf) · [Conference · 6 pages](./docs/research%20paper/EVNet_Sentinel_Conference_Draft.pdf) · [Journal · Elsevier](./docs/research%20paper/EVNet_Sentinel_Journal_Elsevier.pdf) · [walkthrough](./docs/PAPER_WALKTHROUGH.md) |\n| ▶️ | **Running the project** | [RUNNING.md](./docs/RUNNING.md) · [Runbook PDF](./docs/EVNet_Sentinel_Runbook.pdf) |\n| 🔍 | **Leakage audit** | [Results](./docs/leakage_audit_results.md) · [Findings PDF](./docs/EVNet_Sentinel_Findings.pdf) |\n| 🎤 | **Demo scripts** | [General](./docs/DEMO_SCRIPT.md) · [Data Warehousing & Mining](./docs/DEMO_DWM.md) |\n| 🧭 | **Walkthroughs** | [Website](./docs/WEBSITE_WALKTHROUGH.md) · [Notebooks](./docs/NOTEBOOK_WALKTHROUGH.md) |\n| 🏛️ | **Design** | [Architecture](./docs/ARCHITECTURE.md) · [Use cases](./docs/evnet_sentinel_use_cases.md) · [SRS](./docs/Project_SRS/WDL_SRS_EVNetSentinel.pdf) |\n| 🧪 | **Data** | [Feature engineering](./docs/dataset_feature_engineering.md) · [Resampling trade-offs](./docs/Resampling_Tradeoffs.md) · [Reference papers](./docs/papers.md) |\n\n<details>\n<summary><b>📁 Repository layout</b></summary>\n\n| Path | Contents |\n|---|---|\n| `src/data_prep/` | `preprocess.py`, the corrected (leak-free) pipeline |\n| `src/models/` | Training scripts and notebooks per model |\n| `src/evaluation/` | Multi-seed experiments, attack harness, exporters |\n| `src/reproduction/` | One script per leakage finding, plus attack routes |\n| `src/response/` | Containment policy (threat level; quarantine, restrict, end-session; escalation) |\n| `src/api/` | FastAPI prediction service |\n| `frontend/` | Next.js website; `frontend/data/` is what it displays |\n| `evaluation_results/` | Every reported number, labelled current / evidence / historical |\n| `tests/` | pytest suite (71 tests) |\n| `docs/` | Papers, figures, diagrams, guides |\n| `data/` · `saved_models/` · `datasets/` | Local only, never committed |\n\nNotebooks (single seed, saved with outputs): [Random Forest](./src/models/random_forest/Random_Forest_Training.ipynb) · [Decision Tree](./src/models/decision_tree/Decision_Tree_Training.ipynb) · [Logistic Regression](./src/models/log_reg/Logistic_Regression_Training.ipynb) · [SVM](./src/models/svm/svm_training.ipynb) · [XGBoost](./src/models/xgboost/XGBoost_Training.ipynb) · [LightGBM](./src/models/lightgbm/LightGBM_Training.ipynb) · [ARF + ADWIN](./src/models/arfadwin/ARF_ADWIN_Training.ipynb)\n\n</details>\n\n<details>\n<summary><b>🔐 Dataset access rules</b></summary>\n\nThe CICEVSE2024 dataset used for this project is heavy and access-restricted. Please follow these rules:\n1. **Never commit the dataset**: All dataset archives and CSV files (`*.tar.xz`, `*.zip`, `*.csv`) are strictly ignored in `.gitignore`. Do NOT bypass this rule.\n2. **Secure the URL**: The Google Drive URL for the dataset must never be hardcoded in the codebase or public documentation.\n3. **Local Setup & Data Retrieval**:\n   - Copy `.env.example` to `.env` in the root directory.\n   - Add the Google Drive URL (provided by the team admin) to your `.env` file under `CICEVSE2024_DATASET_URL`.\n   - Run the automated setup and data pipeline:\n     ```bash\n     make setup\n     make data\n     ```\n   - *Note: `make data` will download the 2.4GB dataset, extract it to `data/raw/`, and process it into `data/processed/`. Ensure you have sufficient disk space.*\n\n</details>\n\n<details>\n<summary><b>🙏 Acknowledgements</b></summary>\n\nThis project builds upon the foundational research and methodology open-sourced by the TATU-hacker team. We would like to acknowledge and cite their repository:\n- [TATU-hacker/Intrusion_Detection_on_Electric_Vehicle_Charging_Systems](https://github.com/TATU-hacker/Intrusion_Detection_on_Electric_Vehicle_Charging_Systems)\n\nTheir work on online machine learning for EVCS intrusion detection heavily inspired our approach, particularly our implementation of the ARF-ADWIN model and the use of the CICEVSE2024 dataset.\n\n</details>\n\n<a id=\"team\"></a>\n\n## 👥 Team\n\nGuide: **Prof. Mahesh Khandke**, Dept. of Computer Engineering, Vidyalankar Institute of Technology, Mumbai.\n\n\n| Roll No. | Name | Role | GitHub |\n|----------|------|---------------------|--------|\n| **24102A0013** | Mukta Varak | Cloud Deployment DevOps | [@Mukta01](https://github.com/Mukta01) |\n| **24102A0018** | Shruti Chaurasiya | Data Viz & Testing | [@shrutich-30](https://github.com/shrutich-30) |\n| **24102A0021** | Shardul Chogale | ML Pipelining & Evaluation | [@shard-c6](https://github.com/shard-c6) |\n| **24102A0022** | Neha Chavhan | Frontend & API Integration | [@nehachavhan2006](https://github.com/nehachavhan2006) |\n\n---\n<div align=\"center\">\n  <i>Created for Software Engineering academic requirements.</i>\n</div>",
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      "title": "ECU Offensive Simulation Framework",
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      "description": "Security testing framework for automotive ECUs - UDS/DoIP replay attacks, fuzzing, and negative testing",
      "readme": "# ECU Offensive Simulation Framework\n\n![License: MIT](https://img.shields.io/badge/License-MIT-yellow.svg) ![Python 3.12+](https://img.shields.io/badge/Python-3.12+-blue.svg)\n\nA security testing framework for automotive Electronic Control Units (ECUs) via UDS/DoIP protocols. Built for penetration testers and security engineers working on automotive cybersecurity assessments in compliance with ISO 21434.\n\n## Architecture\n\n```\n+---------------------------------------------------------------+\n|                        CLI Interface                          |\n|  record | replay | fuzz | analyze | report                    |\n+---------------------------------------------------------------+\n|                      Attack Modules                           |\n|  +----------+ +--------+ +-----------+ +------------------+  |\n|  |  Replay  | | Fuzzer | | Negative  | | SecurityAccess   |  |\n|  |  Attack  | |        | | Testing   | | Analysis         |  |\n|  +----------+ +--------+ +-----------+ +------------------+  |\n+---------------------------------------------------------------+\n|                     Protocol Layer                            |\n|  +--------+   +--------+   +--------------------+            |\n|  |  UDS   |   |  DoIP  |   |  CAN Interface     |            |\n|  | (0x10, |   | (TCP/  |   |  (python-can)      |            |\n|  |  0x27, |   |  13400)|   |                    |            |\n|  |  0x31) |   +--------+   +--------------------+            |\n|  +--------+                                                   |\n+---------------------------------------------------------------+\n|                    Reporting Engine                            |\n|  ISO 21434 Reports | CVSS Scoring | Risk Matrix              |\n+---------------------------------------------------------------+\n|                    Configuration                              |\n|  ECU Profiles (YAML) | Attack Configs | Logging              |\n+---------------------------------------------------------------+\n```\n\n## Supported Attack Types\n\n| Attack Type        | Description                                              |\n|--------------------|----------------------------------------------------------|\n| Replay Attack      | Capture and replay UDS diagnostic sessions               |\n| Fuzzing            | Random, sequential, and smart payload generation         |\n| Negative Testing   | Out-of-range DIDs, invalid transitions, oversized data   |\n| SecurityAccess     | Seed entropy analysis, key derivation, brute force       |\n\n## Protocols\n\n### UDS (Unified Diagnostic Services) - ISO 14229\n\nSupported service IDs:\n\n| SID  | Service                    | Purpose                          |\n|------|----------------------------|----------------------------------|\n| 0x10 | DiagnosticSessionControl   | Switch diagnostic sessions       |\n| 0x11 | ECUReset                   | Reset the ECU                    |\n| 0x22 | ReadDataByIdentifier       | Read DID values                  |\n| 0x27 | SecurityAccess             | Seed-key authentication          |\n| 0x2E | WriteDataByIdentifier      | Write DID values                 |\n| 0x31 | RoutineControl             | Execute routines                 |\n| 0x34 | RequestDownload            | Initiate download                |\n| 0x36 | TransferData               | Transfer firmware data           |\n| 0x37 | RequestTransferExit        | End data transfer                |\n| 0x3E | TesterPresent              | Keep session alive               |\n\n### DoIP (Diagnostics over IP) - ISO 13400\n\n- Vehicle identification request/response\n- Diagnostic message routing\n- TCP connection management on port 13400\n\n### CAN Bus\n\n- Configurable bus speed (125k, 250k, 500k, 1M baud)\n- Supports SocketCAN, PCAN, Vector interfaces\n- Traffic recording and deterministic playback\n\n## Setup\n\n```bash\n# Clone the repository\ngit clone https://github.com/jessmail/ecu-offensive-simulation.git\ncd ecu-offensive-simulation\n\n# Create virtual environment\npython -m venv venv\nsource venv/bin/activate  # Linux/macOS\n# or: venv\\Scripts\\activate  # Windows\n\n# Install dependencies\npip install -r requirements.txt\n```\n\n## Usage\n\n### Record CAN/UDS Traffic\n\n```bash\n# Record traffic from CAN interface\npython cli.py record --interface vcan0 --duration 60 --output captures/session.pcap\n\n# Record with specific arbitration ID filter\npython cli.py record --interface vcan0 --arb-id 0x7E0 --duration 30\n```\n\n### Replay Captured Traffic\n\n```bash\n# Replay a captured session\npython cli.py replay --capture captures/session.pcap --interface vcan0\n\n# Replay with timing analysis\npython cli.py replay --capture captures/session.pcap --interface vcan0 --preserve-timing\n```\n\n### Fuzz ECU Services\n\n```bash\n# Random fuzzing of SecurityAccess service\npython cli.py fuzz --target 0x7E0 --service 0x27 --strategy random --iterations 10000\n\n# Smart fuzzing with boundary values\npython cli.py fuzz --target 0x7E0 --service 0x22 --strategy smart --config configs/attack_configs/fuzz_config.yaml\n```\n\n### Analyze Security Access\n\n```bash\n# Collect and analyze seeds\npython cli.py analyze --target 0x7E0 --mode seed-entropy --samples 1000\n\n# Test for seed reuse\npython cli.py analyze --target 0x7E0 --mode seed-reuse --samples 500\n```\n\n### Generate Report\n\n```bash\n# Generate ISO 21434 compliant report\npython cli.py report --input results/ --format markdown --output report.md\n\n# Generate JSON report with CVSS scores\npython cli.py report --input results/ --format json --output report.json\n```\n\n## ECU Profiles\n\nECU profiles define target-specific parameters. See `configs/ecu_profiles/generic_ecu.yaml` for the template.\n\n```yaml\necu:\n  name: \"Target ECU\"\n  can_id_tx: 0x7E0\n  can_id_rx: 0x7E8\n  supported_sessions:\n    - default\n    - programming\n    - extended\n```\n\n## ISO 21434 Compliance\n\nThis framework supports the threat analysis and risk assessment (TARA) process defined in ISO 21434:\n\n- **Clause 8**: Cybersecurity risk assessment through automated attack simulation\n- **Clause 9**: Verification of cybersecurity goals via negative testing\n- **Clause 15**: Vulnerability analysis through fuzzing and SecurityAccess testing\n\nReports generated by this tool map findings to ISO 21434 clauses and include CVSS v3.1 base scores adapted for automotive context.\n\n## Disclaimer\n\nThis tool is intended for **authorized security testing only**. Use it exclusively on ECUs and systems you have explicit permission to test. Unauthorized access to vehicle systems is illegal in most jurisdictions. The author assumes no liability for misuse of this software.\n\nAlways:\n- Obtain written authorization before testing\n- Work in isolated lab environments\n- Follow your organization's responsible disclosure policy\n- Comply with applicable laws and regulations\n\n## License\n\nMIT License - see [LICENSE](LICENSE)\n\n## Author\n\nJ. Essmail",
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      "title": "EV-SEC — Vehicle & EV Charging Security Research Toolkit",
      "full_name": "saitddundar/bsg-2025-vehicle-sec",
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      "description": "BSG (Computer Systems Security) course project focusing on automotive cybersecurity. Implements blockchain-based security layer for CAN-Bus networks and explores OCPP vulnerabilities in EV charging infrastructure. Features virtual CAN (vcano) simulations and practical attack/defense scenarios.",
      "readme": "# EV-SEC — Vehicle & EV Charging Security Research Toolkit\n\nBSG (Computer Systems Security) course project focusing on automotive cybersecurity. This repository contains hands-on simulations and attack/defense scenarios for:\n\n- **EV charging infrastructure security**, with emphasis on **OCPP (1.6J / 2.0.1)** threat modeling and protocol abuse.\n- **In-vehicle network security**, including **CAN-Bus**-oriented simulations (e.g., replay/DoS-like behaviors).\n- Practical lab-oriented components (e.g., virtual/simulated environments) to support demonstrations and experimentation.\n\n> **Educational / research use only.** Do not run offensive scenarios against real vehicles, EVSE devices, or production networks without explicit authorization.\n\n---\n\n## Contents\n\n- [Key Features](#key-features)\n- [Tech Stack](#tech-stack)\n- [Simulation & Attack Scenarios](#simulation--attack-scenarios)\n- [Getting Started](#getting-started)\n- [Repository Layout](#repository-layout)\n- [Safety & Legal Notice](#safety--legal-notice)\n- [License](#license)\n\n---\n\n## Key Features\n\n- Modular simulations for **OCPP** and **vehicle-side** behaviors\n- Focus on realistic security narratives: spoofing, MitM, manipulation, DoS/PDoS patterns, and covert channels\n- Designed for:\n  - classroom demos\n  - security experimentation in isolated labs\n  - protocol understanding and threat analysis\n\n---\n\n## Tech Stack\n\n| Category | Tools / Technologies |\n|---|---|\n| Language | Python (primary) |\n| Protocols | OCPP 1.6J, OCPP 2.0.1 (scenario-driven) |\n| Networking / Analysis | Scapy, Wireshark / TShark |\n| Runtime / Environment | Docker, Docker Compose (where applicable) |\n\n---\n\n## Simulation & Attack Scenarios\n\nThe following scenarios are included as part of the project’s research and demonstration scope:\n\n| # | Scenario | Core Idea | Example Impact |\n|---:|---|---|---|\n| 1 | Charging Station Identity Spoofing | Weak identity / handshake assumptions enable impersonation | Unauthorized session start, data exposure |\n| 2 | In‑Motion Charging Inconsistency | Desync between EV and CSMS during dynamic charging | Incorrect SoC, safety risks, hardware stress |\n| 3 | V2G Protocol Manipulation (Microgrid Destabilization) | Manipulate energy transfer/control signals | Local grid instability / unsafe load shifts |\n| 4 | Stealth Beaconing (Covert C2 via Heartbeats) | Abuse legitimate messages for data exfiltration | IDS evasion, covert signaling |\n| 5 | “Copycat” ECU (Replay-like behavior) | Replay valid CAN frames to mimic ECU behavior | Bypass interlocks / confuse state machines |\n| 6 | HMI / Screen Manipulation | Inject malicious `DataTransfer` payloads | Phishing via UI, fraudulent payment prompts |\n| 7 | Phantom SoC / MeterValues Fraud | Forge telemetry / meter data | Billing fraud, battery degradation incentives |\n| 8 | Station Spoofing & DoS | Intercept boot/registration flows | Service disruption, station lockout |\n| 9 | Malicious Permanent DoS (PDoS) | Firmware update abuse to “brick” devices | Permanent service outage, costly recovery |\n\n> Notes:\n> - Some scenarios may be implemented as separate simulations under `src/simulations/`.\n> - Scenario naming can differ slightly per module (see module READMEs).\n\n---\n\n## Getting Started\n\n### Prerequisites\n- Python 3.10+ recommended\n- Optional: Docker / Docker Compose (depending on the module you run)\n\n### Installation\n\n```bash\ngit clone https://github.com/saitddundar/bsg-2025-vehicle-sec.git\ncd bsg-2025-vehicle-sec\npip install -r requirements.txt\n```\n\n### Running a Simulation\n\nThis repository contains multiple simulations; check the relevant module README under `src/simulations/` for exact commands.\n\nExample (placeholder pattern):\n```bash\npython simulator.py --scenario \"V2G_Manipulation\" --target <CSMS_IP>\n```\n\n---\n\n## Repository Layout\n\n| Path | Description |\n|---|---|\n| `README.md` | Project overview (this file) |\n| `docs/` | Documentation and reports (if provided) |\n| `smart-swot/` | Course/project artifacts (if applicable) |\n| `src/` | Source code and simulations |\n| `src/simulations/` | Independent simulation modules (each may include its own README) |\n\n---\n\n## Safety & Legal Notice\n\nThis project is intended for **education and authorized security research** only.\n\n- Do **not** test on real EVSE, vehicles, or networks you do not own/control.\n- Use only in **isolated lab environments** (VMs, containers, test networks).\n- You are responsible for complying with applicable laws and institutional policies.\n\n---\n\n## License\n\nBSG 2025 Vehicle Security Project (course project).\nIf you plan to reuse or redistribute, consider adding a standard license (MIT/Apache-2.0/GPL-3.0) and crediting contributors accordingly.",
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      "full_name": "infobyte/doggie",
      "name": "doggie",
      "owner": "infobyte",
      "url": "https://github.com/infobyte/doggie",
      "description": "Welcome to the Doggie and EvilDoggie repository by Faraday Security! Doggie is a modular DIY CAN Bus to serial adapter (USB, BLE, UART) using the slcan protocol, compatible with SocketCAN and python-can. EvilDoggie adds offensive features like dominant-override, spoofing and custom attacks for automotive security testing and research.",
      "readme": "# Doggie and evilDoggie Project Overview\n\n<figure align=\"center\">\n    <img src=\"./docs/res/logo_inv.png\" alt=\"Doggie logo\">\n</figure>\n\n<figure align=\"center\">\n    <img src=\"./docs/res/banner.svg\" alt=\"Doggie banner\">\n</figure>\n\n\n**Doggie** is an open-source, modular project designed to build a DIY CAN Bus to serial adapter (USB, BLE, UART). It connects your computer to a CAN Bus network using the slcan protocol (CAN over Serial) for compatibility with tools like SocketCAN and Python-can. The project emphasizes modularity, supporting various microcontrollers (e.g., RP2040, STM32F103C8, ESP32) and CAN controllers (built-in or MCP2515).\n\n**evilDoggie** is the offensive firmware variant of Doggie, tailored for automotive security research and low-level CAN Bus manipulation. It enables advanced attacks like spoofing, bus off, double receive, and physical-layer overrides, making it ideal for red teaming and vulnerability testing in simulated or real CAN environments.\n\nDeveloped by Faraday Security, the project was presented at Black Hat Arsenal on August 6-7, 2025, in Las Vegas. Use responsibly for research and training only.\n\nFor detailed introductions, see the sub-sections for [Doggie](https://infobyte.github.io/doggie/software/doggie/intro) and [evilDoggie](https://infobyte.github.io/doggie/software/evil_doggie/intro).\n\n\n## Disclaimer\nThis project is a **work in progress**, and contributions are highly encouraged! While it is functional, some features may still be under development.\nIf you encounter issues or have suggestions for improvements, please feel free to open an issue or submit a pull request.\n\n*⚠ Doggie and EvilDoggie tools are provided for educational and research purposes only.\nBy participating, you acknowledge that any testing, experimentation, or use of these tools on real vehicles or\nproduction systems is solely your responsibility. The authors and organizers do not accept any liability for damage,\nmalfunction, legal consequences, or safety issues that may result from misuse, incorrect configuration, or applying\nthese techniques outside of a controlled environment.\nPlease use responsibly, and always test only on systems you own or have explicit permission to test.*\n\n## License\nThis project is licensed under the MIT License. See the [LICENSE](https://github.com/infobyte/doggie/blob/main/LICENSE) file for details.",
      "topics": [
        "can-utils",
        "canbus",
        "cantousb",
        "canusb",
        "carhacking",
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    "idoka/awesome-automotive-can-id": {
      "id": "github:idoka/awesome-automotive-can-id",
      "evidence_type": "repository",
      "record_type": "repository",
      "title": "Awesome CAN ID [![Awesome](https://awesome.re/badge.svg)](https://awesome.re)",
      "full_name": "iDoka/awesome-automotive-can-id",
      "name": "awesome-automotive-can-id",
      "owner": "iDoka",
      "url": "https://github.com/iDoka/awesome-automotive-can-id",
      "description": ":tractor: Collect of CAN IDs and its payloads for various car brands/models in one place. Might be useful for Cyber Security Researchers, Reverse Engineers, and Automotive Electronics Enthusiasts.",
      "readme": "# Awesome CAN ID [![Awesome](https://awesome.re/badge.svg)](https://awesome.re)\n[![GitHub stars](https://badgen.net/github/stars/iDoka/awesome-automotive-can-id)](https://GitHub.com/iDoka/awesome-automotive-can-id/stargazers/)\n[![GitHub forks](https://badgen.net/github/forks/iDoka/awesome-automotive-can-id)](https://GitHub.com/iDoka/awesome-automotive-can-id/network/)\n[![GitHub watchers](https://badgen.net/github/watchers/iDoka/awesome-automotive-can-id/)](https://GitHub.com/iDoka/awesome-automotive-can-id/watchers/)\n[![GitHub contributors](https://badgen.net/github/contributors/iDoka/awesome-automotive-can-id)](https://GitHub.com/iDoka/awesome-automotive-can-id/graphs/contributors/)\n[![GitHub pull-requests merged](https://badgen.net/github/merged-prs/iDoka/awesome-automotive-can-id)](https://github.com/iDoka/awesome-automotive-can-id/pulls?q=is%3Amerged)\n<!-- [![GitHub latest commit](https://badgen.net/github/last-commit/iDoka/awesome-automotive-can-id)](https://GitHub.com/iDoka/awesome-automotive-can-id/commit/) -->\n\n> Awesome CAN Bus Databases for Automotive Vendors\n\nAn attempt to collect info about CAN IDs and payloads for various car brands/models in one place.\n\nPermanent URL to this list: https://github.com/iDoka/awesome-automotive-can-id\n\n\n## Contents\n\nDB by Brands/Models:\n\n* [Common](#common)\n* [Acura](#acura)\n* [BMW](#bmw)\n  * [BMW Hybrid vehicles](#bmw-hybrid-vehicles)\n  * [iDrive](#idrive)\n* [BYD](#byd)\n* [General Motors (Buick, Cadillac, Chevrolet, GMC)](#general-motors-buick-cadillac-chevrolet-gmc)\n* [Daimler-Chrysler (Chrysler, Dodge, Jeep, RAM)](#daimler-chrysler-chrysler-dodge-jeep-ram)\n  * [Chrysler](#chrysler)\n  * [Dodge](#dodge)\n  * [Jeep](#jeep)\n* [Fiat](#fiat)\n* [Ford (Lincoln, Mercury)](#ford-lincoln-mercury)\n* [Honda](#honda)\n* [Hyundai](#hyundai)\n* [Infiniti](#infiniti)\n* [Jaguar](#jaguar)\n* [Kia](#kia)\n* [Land Rover](#land-rover)\n  * [Range Rover](#range-rover)\n* [Lexus](#lexus)\n* [Lotus](#lotus)\n* [Mazda](#mazda)\n* [Mercedes-Benz](#mercedes-benz)\n* [MINI](#mini)\n* [Mitsubishi](#mitsubishi)\n* [Nissan](#nissan)\n  * [Leaf](#leaf)\n* [Opel](#opel)\n  * [Astra](#astra)\n* [PSA (Peugeot, Citroen, DS)](#psa-peugeot-citroen-ds)\n  * [Citroen](#citroen)\n  * [Peugeot](#peugeot)\n  * [DS](#ds)\n* [Renault](#renault)\n* [SAAB](#saab)\n* [Subaru](#subaru)\n* [Suzuki](#suzuki)\n* [Tank](#tank)\n* [Tesla](#tesla)\n* [Toyota](#toyota)\n* [VAG (Audi, Porsche, Volkswagen, Seat, Skoda)](#vag-audi-porsche-volkswagen-seat-skoda)\n  * [Audi](#audi)\n  * [Porsche](#porsche)\n  * [Seat](#seat)\n  * [Skoda](#skoda)\n  * [Volkswagen](#volkswagen)\n* [Volvo](#volvo)\n  * [C30](#c30)\n  * [S60](#s60)\n* [Motorcycles](#motorcycles)\n  * [BMW motorcycle](#bmw-motorcycle)\n  * [Ducati](#ducati)\n  * [KTM motorcycle](#ktm-motorcycle)\n  * [Yamaha motorcycle](#yamaha-motorcycle)\n\n\n\n## Common\n\nLinks for general DB and uther useful resources:\n\n* [CommaAI](https://github.com/commaai/opendbc) - Democratize access to car decoder rings by CommaAI.\n* [Fandom Wiki](https://vehicle-reverse-engineering.fandom.com/wiki/Vehicle_Reverse_Engineering_Wiki) - Vehicle Reverse Engineering Wiki.\n* [Opengarages](http://opengarages.org/index.php/Raw_link_references_for_CAN_IDs) - Raw link references for CAN IDs.\n* [RACELOGIC](https://www.vboxautomotive.co.uk/index.php/en/customer-area/vehicle-can-database) - Vehicle CAN Database.\n* [rusEFI](https://github.com/rusefi/rusefi_documentation/tree/master/OEM-Docs) - Dump traces from various vehicles from rusEFI project.\n\n## Acura\n\n\n## BMW\n\n* [BMW](https://github.com/kmalinich/node-bmw-ref) - DBUS/IBUS/KBUS information/reference/examples.\n* [BMW](https://github.com/kmalinich/node-bmw-ref/tree/master/canbus) - CANBUS information/reference.\n* [BMW](https://www.ms4x.net/index.php?title=Siemens_MS43_CAN_Bus) - BMW E46, MS43 ECU.\n* [BMW](https://www.ms4x.net/index.php?title=Siemens_MS42_CAN_Bus) - BMW E46, MS42 ECU.\n* [BMW](https://github.com/damienmaguire/BMW-E65-CANBUS) - E65 7 Series Powertrain CAN bus.\n\n### BMW Hybrid vehicles\n\n* [BMW BMS/Sbox](https://github.com/damienmaguire/BMW_SBox) - Reverse Engineering of the BMW SBox for use in EV conversion projects.\n\n### iDrive\n\n* [BMW iDrive](https://github.com/thatdamnranga/iDrive) - Arduino library for devices compatible with either avr_can or due_can, to interface with a BMW iDrive controller.\n* [BMW iDrive](https://github.com/Autohome2/idrive-controller) - iDrive controller 500k CAN speed (2004y late model).\n* [BMW iDrive](https://github.com/jegb/iDrive_knob) - Arduino canbus reader for events on iDrive knob controller.\n\n## BYD\n\n* [BYD](https://gitlab.com/pelle8/gen24/-/blob/main/gen24_byd_registers.md) - EV car battery system Gen24.\n\n## General Motors (Buick, Cadillac, Chevrolet, GMC)\n\n* [GM](https://web.archive.org/web/20220124141625/http://opengarages.org/index.php/GM_LAN_29_Bit_ID) - Opengarages GM LAN 29 Bit ID.\n* [GM](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1qEwOXSr3bWoc2VUhpuIam236OOZxPc2hxpLUsV0xkn0/edit) - GM LAN bible.\n* [GM](https://github.com/karlyamashita/common_libraries/blob/master/Vehicle%20Drivers/GMLAN_CAN_ID.h) - GMLAN CAN ID.\n* [GM](https://github.com/karlyamashita/common_libraries/blob/master/Vehicle%20Drivers/GMLAN_CAN_ID_V2.h) - GMLAN CAN ID v2.\n\n\n## Daimler-Chrysler (Chrysler, Dodge, Jeep, RAM)\n\n### Chrysler\n* [CHRYSLER](https://github.com/karlyamashita/common_libraries/blob/master/CHRYSLER_CAN_ID.h) - Several CHRYSLER models CAN ID.\n\n### Dodge\n* [Dodge](http://opengarages.org/index.php/Dodge_CAN_ID) - Opengarages Dodge CAN ID.\n* [Dodge](https://github.com/BiggRanger/CANBUS-Vehicle-Reverse-Engineering/blob/master/CAN-IHS%202010%20JK.ods) - Durango 2008 Internal CANBUS 83.333Kbps.\n\n### Jeep\n* [Jeep](https://github.com/latonita/jeep-canbus) -  CAN BUS in Chrysler Jeep - VES enabler, other small features.\n* [Jeep](https://github.com/BiggRanger/CANBUS-Vehicle-Reverse-Engineering) - Grand Cherokee 2006, Wrangler 2010.\n* [Jeep](https://github.com/SvetlAl/docs/blob/master/jeep_grand_cherokee_2017.txt) - Grand Cherokee 2017, dashboard speed,cruise.\n\n## Fiat\n\n* [Fiat](https://github.com/P1kachu/talking-with-cars/blob/master/notes/fiat-500.txt) - 500.\n* Fiat 500L: [ID](https://github.com/VeryBusyBee/FiatMon/blob/master/Core/Inc/main.h) & [Payload](https://github.com/VeryBusyBee/FiatMon/blob/master/Core/Src/obd.cpp) - Model 500L.\n\n\n## Ford (Lincoln, Mercury)\n\n### General\n- [Extended PID Codes](https://web.archive.org/web/20190823053615/https://knowhow.windstar-club.de/index.php/PID-Codes) - extended PIDs.\n- [Fusion & Lincoln MKZ DBC](https://github.com/autti/abraham/blob/master/lincoln_mkz.dbc) - Files for Ford Fusion and Lincoln MKZ (DBC).\n\n### Escape\n- [Escape (2010)](https://github.com/andrewraharjo/CAN-Bus-Hack_Prius_Focus) - Escape 2010 LTD with Active Park Assist.\n- [Escape (2009, Hybrid)](https://github.com/msbence/ford-escape-mk2-can-id) - Ford Escape 2009 Limited Hybrid, CANbus reverse engineering.\n\n### Falcon\n- [FG Falcon 6FPA](https://github.com/jakka351/FG-Falcon/blob/master/6FPA.xlsx) - FG Falcon (XLSX).\n- [FG Falcon Decoded](https://github.com/jakka351/FG-Falcon/blob/master/fg_controller_area_network_latest.xlsx) - CANBus decoded (XLSX).\n- [Falcon Orion Platform](https://github.com/jakka351/FG-Falcon#orion-canbus) - Orion.\n\n### Fiesta\n- [Fiesta MK5 (2006+)](https://github.com/roncapat/Ford-Fiesta-MK5-MS-CAN-bus) - MK5 2006+ (MK5 restyling, Bus speed 125K).\n- [Fiesta MK7](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1oTembZpwUSb6LsxbFklwt7mOIdheLecYU2B6ZJ6AhQs/edit#gid=0) - MK7.\n- [Fiesta MK7.5](https://github.com/fereste/tablero/wiki/Ford-Fiesta-CAN-bus-description) - MK7.5.\n\n### Mustang\n- [Mustang (2005)](https://github.com/karlyamashita/common_libraries/blob/master/FORD_CAN_ID.h) - Mustang 2005 CAN 125k.\n- [Mustang (2007-2009)](https://github.com/thomastech/CAN2Cluster) - Emulator for Dashboard Instrument Cluster.\n- [Mustang S550 (2015-2017)](https://github.com/EricTurner3/s550-canbus) - Python scripts with notes and a [wiki](https://github.com/EricTurner3/s550-canbus/wiki) on CANBus ids and behavior.\n\n### Transit\n- [Transit (2020)](https://github.com/slyt/van-hack) - 2020.\n\n\n## Honda\n\n* [Honda](https://github.com/Knio/carhack/blob/master/Cars/Honda.markdown) - Civic 8th Gen.\n\n\n## Hyundai\n\n* [Hyundai](https://github.com/joshpatten/HyundaiCan) - Genesis 5.0 2015.\n* [Hyundai](https://github.com/Esprit1st/Hyundai-Ioniq-5-Torque-Pro-PIDs) - Ioniq 5.\n* [Hyundai](https://philipkocanda.github.io/canair/profiles/ioniq-2017) - Ioniq AE Electric 2017.\n* [Hyundai](https://www.drive2.ru/b/522073135831319435/) - Solaris 2013 (RU).\n* [Hyundai](https://opengk.org/index.php?title=SIMK43_CAN_Bus) - Tiburon/Coupe.\n* [Hyundai](https://github.com/tylerwatt12/VelosterCANBus) - Veloster 2016.\n\n## Infiniti\n\n* [Infiniti](https://github.com/icecube45/Dash_InfinitiG37/blob/master/InfinitiG37.dbc) - G37 2011 (DBC).\n\n\n## Jaguar\n\n* [Jaguar XJ 2010MY](https://www.drive2.ru/b/578433277237395801/) - CAN Codes (RU).\n* [Jaguar XF 2013MY - Facelift](https://github.com/fsfarmscaper/jaguar-xf-x250-can) - CAN Codes & DBCs\n\n\n## Kia\n\n> **Note**\n> ⚠ Kia Soul (2014+) - All KIA (except Picanto) 2014+ have same systems\n\n* [Kia](https://github.com/PolySync/OSCC) - Soul.\n* [Kia](https://github.com/PolySync/oscc/wiki/Firmware-OBD) - Soul OBD.\n* [Kia](https://github.com/PolySync/oscc/wiki/Firmware-Steering) - Soul Steering.\n* [Kia](https://github.com/PolySync/oscc/wiki/Firmware-Throttle) - Soul Throttle.\n* [Kia](https://github.com/PolySync/oscc/wiki/Firmware-Brake-%28Petrol%29) - Soul Brake-Petrol.\n* [Kia](https://github.com/PolySync/oscc/wiki/Firmware-Brake-%28EV%29) - Soul Brake-EV.\n* [Kia](https://github.com/JejuSoul/OBD-PIDs-for-HKMC-EVs) - EV.\n\n\n## Land Rover\n\n* [Freelander2 2.2 2007MY](https://www.drive2.ru/b/578407163836235804/) - CAN Codes (RU).\n* [Freelander2 2.2 2013MY](https://www.drive2.ru/b/578407438714142951/) - CAN Codes (RU).\n* [Discovery3 4.4 2006MY](https://www.drive2.ru/b/578407713592049777/) - CAN Codes (RU).\n* [Land Rover ( +Jaguar)](https://github.com/Tom-evnut/Land-Rover-Gearknob) - Gearknob.\n\n### Range Rover\n\n* [Range Rover L322 2010MY](https://www.drive2.ru/b/588586167608284905/) - CAN Codes (RU).\n\n\n## Lexus\n\n\n* [Lexus](https://habr.com/ru/post/450140/) - RX 450h (RU).\n* [Lexus](https://github.com/Paucpauc/lexus_canbus_id) - RX350 2011 (RU).\n\n\n## Lotus\n\n## Mazda\n\n* [Mazda](https://github.com/majbthrd/MazdaCANbus) - Database of known Mazda (SkyActiv and RX-8) CAN messages.\n* [Mazda](http://opengarages.org/index.php/Mazda_CAN_ID) - Opengarages Mazda CAN ID.\n* [Mazda](http://www.madox.net/blog/projects/mazda-can-bus/) - 3 (MS and HS CAN).\n* [Mazda](https://github.com/ihaque/arduino-ecu-logger/blob/master/data/RX-8%20CAN%20bus%20data.xls) - RX8.\n* [Mazda](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1SKfXAyo6fbAfMUENw1KR3w4Fvx_Ihj6sTPSVXBdOXKk/edit?usp=sharing) - Model 3 (2nd gen) HS CAN.\n* [Mazda](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1wjpo5WGLxsswjUi0MUDwKySKp3XejPfE5vdeieBFiGY/edit#gid=0) - Model 3 (2nd gen) MS CAN.\n* [Mazda](https://github.com/silverchris/Mazda3_Canbus_Messages) - Model 3.\n\n## Mercedes-Benz\n\n* [Mercedes-Benz](https://github.com/dvjcodec/Mercedes-Benz-CAN-BUS) - Understand and run units via CAN-bus network.\n* [Mercedes-Benz](https://github.com/mkovero/7226ctrl) - Controller for 722.6 automatic transmission.\n* [Mercedes-Benz](https://github.com/rnd-ash/W203-canbus) - W203 Open source project for W211/W219 W203/W209 Mercs (bluetooth audio control and more).\n* [Mercedes-Benz](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1krPDmjjwmlta4jAVcDMoWbseAokUYnBAHn67pOo00C0/edit#gid=2038710733) - W203 CAN BUS.\n* [Mercedes-Benz](https://github.com/rnd-ash/ultimate_nag52/tree/main/firmware/canframes) - W203 C200 CDI: Should theoretically work on W203/w209/w211/w219 vehicles.\n* [Mercedes-Benz](https://github.com/rnd-ash/MBUX-Port) - 2000-2007: See txt files with canbus desciption (tested on W203 C200 CDI, but in theory, any W203/211/219/209 should work).\n\n\n## MINI\n\n* [Mini](https://github.com/equinox311/open-can-db/raw/master/2002-2006_mini_cooper_all.xlsx) - Cooper 2002-2006 _(XLSX)_.\n\n## Mitsubishi\n\n* [Mitsubishi](https://habr.com/ru/post/448658/) - Lancer 2008 (RU).\n* [Mitsubishi](https://github.com/plaes/i-miev-obd2) - I-Miev.\n\n\n## Nissan\n\n* [Nissan](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1EHa4R85BttuY4JZ-EnssH4YZddpsDVu6rUFm0P7ouwg/edit#gid=1) - Various Nissan models (Nissan LEAF and around).\n\n* [Nissan](https://github.com/jackm/carhack/blob/master/nissan.md) - Sentra 2010.\n* [Nissan](https://github.com/Knio/carhack/blob/master/Cars/Nissan.markdown) - 370Z 2010.\n\n### Leaf\n* [Nissan Leaf](https://github.com/dalathegreat/leaf_can_bus_messages) - CAN bus message decoding with proper database files.\n* [Nissan Leaf](https://github.com/damienmaguire/LeafLogs) - Some Logs from Gen 1 Nissan Leaf.\n* [Nissan Leaf](https://github.com/dalathegreat/EV-CANlogs/tree/main/Nissan%20LEAF) - #1.\n* [Nissan Leaf](https://leaf-obd.readthedocs.io/en/latest/pid/index.html) - #2.\n\n\n## Opel\n\n\n### Astra\n* [Opel Astra H](https://github.com/alex161rus/Opel-Astra-H) - CAN BUS.\n* [Opel Astra H](https://github.com/megadrifter/AstraH_climate/blob/master/AstraH_climate.ino) - Climate.\n* [Opel Astra H](https://github.com/Trueffelwurm/Car-CAN-Message-DB) - CAN Message Databases.\n* [Opel Astra H](https://github.com/megadrifter/Astra-H-Public) - LS CAN, MS CAN.\n\n\n## PSA (Peugeot, Citroen, DS)\n\n### Citroen\n\n* [Citroen C5 X7 (2gen)](https://www.drive2.ru/l/534950890893739117/) - Body module LS CAN messages I.\n* [Citroen C5 X7 (2gen)](https://www.drive2.ru/l/560788039756941142/) - Body module LS CAN messages II (including CAN pinouts).\n* [Citroen C5 X7 (2gen)](https://www.drive2.ru/l/551286060269699839/) - Body module LS CAN messages III.\n\n### Peugeot\n\ntemporaly unsorted:\n\n<!--\n\n* https://github.com/ludwig-v\n* https://github.com/ludwig-v/psa-seedkey-algorithm\n* https://github.com/prototux/PSA-RE\n* https://github.com/prototux/PSA-RE/blob/master/sandbox/uds_auth_algorithm.c\n* https://github.com/prototux/PSA-RE/blob/master/sandbox/immobilizer_algorithm.c\n* https://github.com/morcibacsi?tab=repositories\n\n-->\n\n### DS\n\n\n\n## Renault\n\n* [Renault](https://github.com/ashtorak/CanSeeNoiseGen/blob/main/src/zoe.cpp) - Zoe CAN ID.\n\n## SAAB\n\n## Subaru\n\n* [Subaru](https://github.com/equinox311/open-can-db/raw/master/2005-2008_subaru_legacy_gt.xlsx) - Legacy 2005-2009 _(XLSX)_.\n* [Subaru](https://github.com/equinox311/open-can-db/raw/master/2013%2B_subaru_brz.xlsx) - BRZ 2013+ _(XLSX)_.\n* [Subaru](https://github.com/equinox311/open-can-db/raw/master/2015%2B_subaru_impreza_sti.xlsx) - Impreza WRX STi 2015+ _(XLSX)_.\n* [Subaru](https://github.com/afreiday/2016-wrx-can-ids) - WRX 2016.\n\n## Suzuki\n\n* [Suzuki](https://github.com/P1kachu/talking-with-cars/blob/master/notes/suzuki-swift-IV.txt) - Swift IV AZG 1.3 DDiS 16V 75cv.\n\n## Tank\n\n* [Tank](https://github.com/SvetlAl/docs/blob/master/tank500.txt) - Tank-500 FD CAN speedometer, odometer.\n\n## Tesla\n\n* [Tesla](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1ijvNE4lU9Xoruvcg5AhUNLKr7xYyHcxa8YSkTxAERUw/edit#gid=0) - Model 3 CAN IDs and payload.\n* [Tesla](https://github.com/joshwardell/model3dbc) - Model 3 DBC file CAN messages _(DBC)_.\n* [Tesla](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1UBHw2eY3QyJL3vUz0CnTZ7iLlLB-ao5s61hexT0GuHM/edit#gid=0) - Model S/X CAN IDs and payload.\n\n## Toyota\n\n* [TIS Document Ripper](https://github.com/threadproc/tis-rip) - Script allows you to rip electrical wiring diagrams, collision/body repair manuals, and repair manuals from Toyota's TIS.\n* [Toyota](https://github.com/gerdbremer/Prius-gen2-torque-PIDs) - Prius gen2.\n<!--lint disable double-link-->\n* [Toyota](https://github.com/andrewraharjo/CAN-Bus-Hack_Prius_Focus) - Prius 2010 with Intelligent Parking Assist.\n<!--lint enable double-link-->\n* [Toyota AVC LAN](https://github.com/halleysfifthinc/Toyota-AVC-LAN) - Arduino emulating a CD Changer on a Toyota AVC LAN network.\n* [Toyota AVC LAN](https://github.com/instalator/AVC-LAN-Toyota) - Arduino emulating a CD Changer on a Toyota AVC LAN network (another project).\n* [Toyota](https://github.com/HbirdJ/CAN-Translator) - Prius CAN message translator.\n* [Toyota](http://opengarages.org/index.php/Toyota_CAN_ID) - Opengarages Toyota CAN ID.\n* [Toyota](https://github.com/P1kachu/talking-with-cars/blob/master/notes/toyota-yaris.md) - Yaris.\n* [Toyota](https://github.com/karlyamashita/common_libraries/blob/master/TOYOTA_CAN_ID.h) - 2018 Tacoma.\n\n## VAG (Audi, Porsche, Volkswagen, Seat, Skoda)\n\n\n### Audi\n\n* [Audi](https://github.com/robbederks/q8_flexray_dumps) - Q8 2019: RAW dumps + decoded frames of the EPS FlexRay bus.\n* [Audi](https://github.com/bradarnold/e-tron_OBD2ABRP/blob/main/OBD/main.py) - E-tron.\n\n### Porsche\n\n### Seat\n\n### Skoda\n\n* [Skoda](https://habr.com/ru/post/442184/) - Octavia A5 2011 (RU).\n\n\n### Volkswagen\n\n* [Volkswagen](https://github.com/v-ivanyshyn/parse_can_logs/blob/master/VW%20CAN%20IDs%20Summary.md) - Drivetrain CAN bus IDs].\n* [Volkswagen](https://github.com/bri3d/MQBSimosLogVariables/blob/master/exportedPIDs.csv) - MQB platform (MK7 VW Golf R, GTI, 1.8, Audi S3/A3, etc).\n* [Volkswagen](https://github.com/jsphuebner/stm32-car#can-configuration-vw) - Touran 2004.\n* [Volkswagen](https://github.com/P1kachu/talking-with-cars/blob/master/notes/vw-polo-r6.txt) - Polo R6.\n* [Volkswagen](https://github.com/P1kachu/talking-with-cars/tree/master/docs) - Polo R6.\n* [Volkswagen](https://github.com/karlyamashita/common_libraries/blob/master/VW_CAN_ID.h) - CAN_ID.\n* [Volkswagen](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1eirT8LbSRl4j06BpwgsiE4PM_2BGH9UStdWLXwKvHJw/edit) - Golf GTI MK5.\n* [Volkswagen](https://www.goingelectric.de/wiki/Liste-der-OBD2-Codes/) - VW e-Up.\n\n#### VW Hybrid and EV\n\n* [Volkswagen](https://github.com/spot2000/Volkswagen-MEB-EV-CAN-parameters/blob/main/VW%20MEB%20UDS%20PIDs%20list.csv) - MEB EV (like ID.3 ID.4, Enyaq) UDS PIDs.\n* [Volkswagen](https://github.com/dalathegreat/EV-CANlogs/tree/main/Volkswagen%20e-Golf) - VW e-Golf.\n* [Volkswagen](https://github.com/EVNotify/EVNotify/blob/master/app/www/components/cars/E_GOLF.vue) - VW e-Golf #2.\n* [VW-GTE-ContactorBox](https://github.com/jamiejones85/VW-GTE-ContactorBox) - Reverse engineering the VW GTE Contactor Box (E-BOX).\n\n\n## Volvo\n\n* [Volvo](https://github.com/vtl/volvo-ddd/blob/master/data/2005_xc70_b5254t2_aw55_us.h) - XC70 2.5T 2005 B5254T2+AW55.\n* [Volvo](https://github.com/commaai/opendbc/blob/master/volvo_v60_2015_pt.dbc) - V60 2015 _(DBC)_.\n* [Volvo](https://github.com/olegel/VolvoCan) - XC90 CAN bus adapter to restore wheel buttons and park assistant functionality.\n* [Volvo](https://github.com/olegel/VolvoCan/tree/master/doc/VolvoModules) - XC90 CAN bus: CCM, CEM, TCM, LSM, REM, SWM.\n* [Volvo](https://github.com/johnbutol/CCM-busmaster/tree/master/SimulatedSystems/ccm) - BUSMaster files for emulation of Climate Control Module used in Volvo P1 platform (C30,C70,S40,V50).\n* [Volvo](https://github.com/johnbutol/CCM-busmaster/tree/master/SimulatedSystems/cem) - BUSMaster files for emulation of Central Electronics Module.\n* [Volvo](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/10vq5NIZu0Sd2SSoK2_YSrcsWrItZNC0X2rPcIWvLuS8/edit#gid=542587416) - P3 PIDs (RU).\n* [Volvo](https://github.com/damienmaguire/Volvo-V50-CAN-Info) - V50 (dumps in SavvyCAN format).\n\n### C30\n\n* [Volvo C30](https://paul.sullivan.za.org/volvo-c30-1.6d/OBD-II_CAN-bus/) - 1.6d DRIVe.\n* [Volvo C30](https://github.com/Alfaa123/Volvo-CAN-Gauge/blob/master/Codes.txt) - T5 2011 Codes.\n* [Volvo C30](https://github.com/Alfaa123/Volvo-CAN-Gauge/blob/master/Sniffing/Low%20Speed.cmt) - T5 2011 LowSpeed CAN.\n* [Volvo C30](https://github.com/Alfaa123/Volvo-CAN-Gauge/blob/master/Sniffing/High%20Speed.cmt) - T5 2011 HighSpeed CAN.\n\n### S60\n\n* [Volvo S60](https://github.com/ezkripke/volvo-CAN-exploration) - OBD-II CAN Data Extraction and Analysis.\n* [Volvo S60](https://github.com/andrewgabler/VolvoDIM/tree/master/Research) - 2007 DIM: Project to power a volvo DIM outside of the car.\n* [Volvo S60](https://github.com/andrewgabler/VolvoDIM/blob/master/Research/Notes%20on%20CANBUS) - 2007 DIM: Notes on CANBUS.\n* [Volvo S60](https://github.com/waal70/VolvoCANBUS) - MY2009, aka P2 facelift model.\n* [Volvo S60](https://github.com/waal70/S60CAN) - Arduino CANBUS Volvo S60 DPF soot filter.\n\n---\n\n\n## Motorcycles\n\n### BMW motorcycle\n\n* [BMW motorcycle](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1tUrOES5fQZa92Robr6uP8v2dzQDq9ohHjUiTU3isqdc/edit) - BMW Motorrad CAN messages.\n\n### Ducati\n\n* [Ducati](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1-NJ9OlGQYTGMzBzwDPYn-aI_7_ign9SCiscKZufx3Uw/edit?pli=1#gid=1950998351) - Collective decoding of Ducati CANBUS messages.\n* [Ducati](https://github.com/renatobo/DucatiPanigaleCanBus) - Ducati Panigale (899/959/1199/1199S/1199R/1299/1299S/R and Superleggera)].\n\n### KTM motorcycle\n\n* [KTM motorcycle](https://github.com/blalor/ktm-can) - Python library for decoding KTM motorcycle CAN-bus messages.\n\n### Yamaha motorcycle\n\n* [Yamaha Tracer 9 / CP3](https://github.com/bratukh/yamaha-cp3-can) - Yamaha Tracer 9 (2021-2024, CP3 engine): signal database, DBC, OBD-II and UDS, sample captures.\n* [Yamaha R9](https://github.com/DeziderMesko/motocan) - Yamaha R9 (2026) CAN bus: decoded signals, DBC, raw captures and tools.\n*\n---\n\n\n## Contributing\n\n* Your contributions are always welcome! Please read the [contribution guidelines](contributing.md) first.\n\n## Footnotes\n\n1. Please follow [this](https://github.com/iDoka/awesome-automotive-can-id) root-repo for lastest updates.\n2. Also might be useful [this curated list](https://github.com/iDoka/awesome-canbus) of awesome tools and resources for CAN bus reverse engineering with lightly specializing in automotive embedded controller software and communication understanding.\n3. The another [awesome list](https://github.com/iDoka/awesome-linbus) of tools and resources for LIN bus reverse engineering, LIN hardware development and debugging also might be useful.\n\n\n<!--\n## Tags\n\n#awesome\n#awesome-list\n#can\n#can-bus\n#canbus\n#logger\n#sniffer\n#socketcan\n#car-hacking\n#bus-monitoring\n#lawicel\n#elm327\n#obd2\n#canutils\n#automotive\n#embedded\n#sae\n#uds\n#obd-ii\n#usb2can\n#dbc\n#electric-vehicles\n#vehicular-networks\n#python\n#automotive-security\n-->",
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      "description": "Self-contained automotive-security lab: a deliberately vulnerable UDS/ISO-TP ECU (C11) on Linux SocketCAN plus a from-scratch Python attack toolkit — every vuln documented with exploit, impact and fix.",
      "readme": "# ECU Security Lab\n\n> A self-contained automotive-security lab: a deliberately vulnerable ECU that\n> speaks **UDS (ISO 14229)** over **ISO-TP (ISO 15765-2)** on Linux SocketCAN,\n> plus an offensive toolkit that scans it, breaks `SecurityAccess`, dumps its\n> pseudo-firmware and (later) flashes malicious firmware. Every weakness is\n> documented with an exploit, an impact note and a fix mapped to the relevant\n> standard.\n\n## ⚠️ Disclaimer\n\nThis project is for **education and research against the included target only**.\nThe ECU here is intentionally weak; the toolkit is built to attack *this* target\non a virtual CAN bus (`vcan`). Do **not** point it at any vehicle or device you do\nnot own and have explicit authorization to test.\n\n## Why this exists\n\nAutomotive ECUs are attacked over the same diagnostic stack they ship with. The\nfastest way to understand those attacks — and the fixes — is to build both sides:\na target that implements the protocol stack from scratch, and a toolkit that\nexploits it. Both sides are written by hand (no heavyweight UDS/ISO-TP libraries)\nso the wire-level mechanics stay visible and defensible.\n\n## Architecture\n\n- **`ecu/`** — the target ECU in portable **C11**. A `transport` HAL abstracts the\n  CAN layer, with two backends:\n  - *in-process* — frames travel through an in-memory queue; lets the ISO-TP/UDS\n    state machine and exploit logic be unit-tested on **any OS**.\n  - *SocketCAN* — raw `AF_CAN` sockets on Linux `vcan`/`can` (added in M3).\n- **`toolkit/`** — the attacker, **Python 3** over raw SocketCAN (no third-party\n  CAN libraries), so the framing and flow control are explicit.\n\n## Repository layout\n\n```\necu/                 C11 target ECU\n  include/           transport.h (HAL), isotp.h, uds.h (M2+)\n  src/               isotp.c, uds.c, securityaccess.c (M2+)\n  backends/          socketcan (Linux) + inproc (portable)\ntoolkit/ecutk/       sniffer, scanner, secaccess, memdump (M5)\ntests/               ECU state machine + exploit e2e (pytest / unittest)\ndocs/                DESIGN, VULNERABILITIES, UDS-primer, INTERVIEW-NOTES\ndocker/              Dockerfile + vcan bring-up\n.github/workflows/   CI: brings up vcan, runs attacks against the target\n```\n\n## Getting started (Linux / Docker)\n\n`vcan`/SocketCAN is Linux-only. On macOS/Windows use the provided Docker image.\n\n```bash\n# bring up a virtual CAN interface (root / CAP_NET_ADMIN)\nsudo docker/setup-vcan.sh vcan0\n\n# build the ECU (C11)\ncmake -S . -B build && cmake --build build\n./build/ecu/ecu\n\n# run the tests\npython3 -m unittest discover -s tests -v\n```\n\n## Documentation\n\n- [docs/DEMO.md](docs/DEMO.md) — run the full attack chain step by step\n- [docs/VULNERABILITIES.md](docs/VULNERABILITIES.md) — each weakness: exploit, impact, fix, standard\n- [docs/DESIGN.md](docs/DESIGN.md) — why the ISO-TP/UDS stack is built the way it is\n- [docs/UDS-primer.md](docs/UDS-primer.md) — short UDS/ISO-TP primer\n- [docs/INTERVIEW-NOTES.md](docs/INTERVIEW-NOTES.md) — study guide / Q&A\n\n## Standards referenced\n\nISO 15765-2 (ISO-TP) · ISO 14229 (UDS) · ISO/SAE 21434 · UNECE R155.\n\n## Scope & limitations\n\n- `vcan`/SocketCAN is **Linux-only**; the portable in-process backend lets the\n  protocol logic and exploit unit tests run on any OS.\n- Synthetic target and pseudo-firmware only — **no real-vehicle tooling**.\n- **Not audited**, no security guarantees — this is a learning artifact.\n\n## Roadmap\n\n- [x] **M1** — skeleton: build, CI, Docker/vcan, license, layout\n- [x] **M2** — ISO-TP (single + multi-frame, flow control) + tests\n- [x] **M3** — UDS core (`0x10` / `0x3E` / `0x22` / `0x2E`) + S3 timeout + tests\n- [x] **M4** — SecurityAccess (`0x27`) + ReadMemoryByAddress (`0x23`) with 5 documented vulns\n- [x] **M5** — attacker toolkit (sniffer, scanner, seed/key, dump) + e2e attacks in CI\n- [x] **M6** — docs (DEMO / VULNERABILITIES / DESIGN / UDS-primer / INTERVIEW-NOTES)\n- [ ] **M7** (stretch) — firmware-update exploit / fuzzer / CAN-IDS\n\n## License\n\n[MIT](LICENSE).",
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      "title": "🚗🔐 Car Security Simulator",
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      "description": "Automotive CAN-bus security research platform: AUTOSAR SecOC, CAN intrusion detection, UDS/ISO-TP Security Access, and attack simulation (replay/tamper/inject/DoS/fuzz). Runs in-process or on real CAN via python-can.",
      "readme": "# 🚗🔐 Car Security Simulator\n\n> **An automotive CAN-bus security research platform** — it simulates an in-vehicle\n> network of ECUs and lets you launch real attack techniques against it, then\n> defends with **AUTOSAR SecOC**, a **CAN intrusion-detection system**, and\n> **UDS Security Access**. Runs entirely in-process *or* on a real (virtual) CAN\n> bus via `python-can`.\n\n[![CI](https://github.com/Je1al/car-security-simulator/actions/workflows/ci.yml/badge.svg)](https://github.com/Je1al/car-security-simulator/actions/workflows/ci.yml)\n[![Python](https://img.shields.io/badge/python-3.9%E2%80%933.12-blue.svg)](https://www.python.org/)\n[![Lint: ruff](https://img.shields.io/badge/lint-ruff-261230.svg)](https://github.com/astral-sh/ruff)\n[![Types: mypy](https://img.shields.io/badge/types-mypy-blue.svg)](https://mypy-lang.org/)\n[![License: MIT](https://img.shields.io/badge/license-MIT-green.svg)](LICENSE)\n\n---\n\nClassic CAN — the bus in nearly every production car — has **no authentication**:\nany node that reaches the wire is trusted implicitly. That single design flaw is\nbehind a decade of vehicle attacks, from the 2015 remote Jeep Cherokee hack\nonward. This project makes that flaw, and the modern defences against it,\n**runnable and measurable**.\n\nEvery attack is demonstrated twice — once on an **insecure** bus (it succeeds) and\nonce on a **secured** bus (it is rejected *and* independently detected) — so you\ncan see exactly what each countermeasure buys you.\n\n```text\n        ECU_Engine ──┐                         ┌── Attacker (sniff / replay /\n        ECU_Brake  ──┤      ┌───────────┐      │   tamper / inject / DoS / fuzz)\n        ECU_Gateway ─┼──────┤  CAN bus  ├──────┤\n                     │      └───────────┘      └── IDS  (rule + frequency + entropy,\n        SecOC: HMAC + Freshness Value                   precision / recall / F1)\n               + timestamp on every frame\n```\n\n## Why this project\n\nIt is built to mirror how automotive security is actually done in industry, and\nmaps onto the relevant standards:\n\n| Capability | Standard / origin |\n| --- | --- |\n| Message authentication on CAN | **AUTOSAR SecOC**, **ISO/SAE 21434** |\n| Diagnostics & Security Access | **ISO 14229 (UDS)** service `0x27` |\n| Transport for large UDS messages | **ISO 15765-2 (ISO-TP)** |\n| Signal databases | **DBC** (via `cantools`) |\n| Real CAN I/O | **SocketCAN** / `python-can` |\n| Intrusion detection | timing/frequency + specification + entropy detectors |\n\n## Features\n\n- **Vehicle network simulation** — Engine, Brake (ABS), and Gateway ECUs exchange\n  CAN frames over a thread-safe broadcast bus, each on its own TX/RX threads.\n- **AUTOSAR SecOC layer** — HMAC-SHA256 authenticator (64-bit truncated MAC), a\n  counter-based **Freshness Value manager**, time-based freshness, constant-time\n  verification, and per-message Data-ID binding.\n- **Attack toolkit** — replay, tampering, injection, **bus-flooding DoS**, and a\n  **CAN fuzzer** (random + mutation).\n- **Intrusion Detection System** — three composable detectors (specification/rule,\n  inter-arrival **frequency**, payload **entropy**) scored with a real confusion\n  matrix → **precision / recall / F1**.\n- **UDS diagnostics** — ISO-TP segmentation, a Security Access state machine with\n  attempt-counter + time-delay lockout, and a **seed-key brute-force attack** that\n  recovers a weak 16-bit secret from *one* sniffed exchange (~ms) — defeated by an\n  HMAC seed-key.\n- **Real CAN bridge** — optional `python-can` backend mirrors the simulation onto\n  a real/virtual CAN interface (watch with `candump`, inject with `cansend`),\n  plus **DBC** signal decoding.\n- **Engineered like production code** — installable package, 52 tests, CI on\n  Python 3.9–3.12, `ruff`-clean and `mypy`-clean.\n\n## Quick start\n\n```bash\ngit clone https://github.com/Je1al/car-security-simulator\ncd car-security-simulator\n\n# Zero dependencies — the core runs on the Python standard library:\npython main.py                       # interactive menu\npython main.py -s all                # run every scenario with a comparison table\npython main.py -s replay-secure      # a single scenario\npython main.py --list                # list all scenarios\n```\n\nOptional extras unlock charts and the real-CAN/DBC backends:\n\n```bash\npip install -e \".[all]\"              # matplotlib + python-can + cantools + dev tools\ncarsec -s ids-benchmark             # console entry point after install\n```\n\n## Results\n\nRunning the full demo (`python main.py -s all`):\n\n```text\n  Scenario             Mode        Accept  Reject  Alerts\n  ──────────────────── ────────── ─────── ─────── ───────\n  normal-secure        SECURE          50       0       0\n  normal-insecure      INSECURE        48       0       0\n  replay-insecure      INSECURE        84       0       1\n  replay-secure        SECURE          79       5       1\n  tamper-insecure      INSECURE        84       0       3\n  tamper-secure        SECURE          80       6       3\n  inject-insecure      INSECURE        69       0       1\n  inject-secure        SECURE          58       9       1\n```\n\n**IDS benchmark** on a deterministic, labelled trace (`-s ids-benchmark`):\n\n```text\n  frames analysed : 470\n  confusion       : TP=48 FP=3 TN=417 FN=2\n  precision=0.941  recall=0.960  f1=0.950  accuracy=0.989\n```\n\n**UDS Security Access** (`-s uds-weak`): the weak 16-bit seed-key secret is\nrecovered offline from a single sniffed `(seed, key)` pair in tens of\nmilliseconds, then used to unlock the ECU and read a protected calibration. The\nidentical attack against the HMAC seed-key (`-s uds-secure`) fails.\n\n<p align=\"center\">\n  <img src=\"docs/images/demo_summary.png\" width=\"49%\" alt=\"event summary\">\n  <img src=\"docs/images/demo_timeline.png\" width=\"49%\" alt=\"event timeline\">\n</p>\n\n## Run it on a real CAN bus\n\n```bash\npip install -e \".[hardware]\"\n\n# Cross-platform (macOS/Windows/Linux), no kernel module needed:\npython examples/run_on_vcan.py --interface virtual\n\n# Linux against SocketCAN; watch with `candump vcan0` in another terminal:\nsudo scripts/setup_vcan.sh\npython examples/run_on_vcan.py --interface socketcan --channel vcan0\n```\n\nFrames the ECUs send are mirrored onto the wire (CAN-FD carries the full secured\nPDU, exactly as SecOC relies on FD's larger payload for the MAC), every frame\nseen is decoded against the bundled `vehicle.dbc`, and external frames are\ninjected back into the simulation.\n\n## Architecture\n\n```\nsrc/carsec/\n├── can/         frame model, broadcast bus, SocketCAN backend, DBC decoding\n├── security/    SecOC: crypto · freshness manager · layered verifier\n├── ecu/         Engine · Brake · Gateway ECUs (threaded TX/RX)\n├── attacks/     replay · tamper · injection · DoS · fuzzing\n├── ids/         rule · frequency · entropy detectors + metrics\n├── uds/         ISO-TP · services · server · client · security access · attack\n├── telemetry/   logging (console/JSON/CSV) · charts\n└── scenarios/   runner + scenario library + CLI\n```\n\nDeep dives:\n\n- [docs/architecture.md](docs/architecture.md) — components and data flow\n- [docs/secoc.md](docs/secoc.md) — SecOC design & ISO 21434 / AUTOSAR mapping\n- [docs/threat-model.md](docs/threat-model.md) — STRIDE threat model\n\n## Testing\n\n```bash\npip install -e \".[dev]\"\npytest --cov=carsec        # 52 tests\nruff check src tests       # lint\nmypy                       # static types\n```\n\n## Real-world background\n\n- **Miller & Valasek (2015)** — remotely killed the engine and disabled the\n  brakes of a Jeep Cherokee via CAN injection through the telematics unit; the\n  reason the industry adopted SecOC.\n- **AUTOSAR SecOC** & **ISO/SAE 21434 (Road vehicles — Cybersecurity engineering)**\n  define authenticated on-board communication and the cybersecurity lifecycle.\n- **ISO 14229 (UDS)** & **ISO 15765-2 (ISO-TP)** define vehicle diagnostics and\n  its transport — and the Security Access mechanism attacked here.\n\n## Disclaimer\n\nThis is an **educational / defensive** research tool. It contains no real-vehicle\nexploits — it models a simulated network to study CAN security and the standard\ncountermeasures. Use it to learn and to build defences.\n\n## License\n\n[MIT](LICENSE) © Je1al",
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      "title": "ECU-Bypass-Framework-XRS9000 (v7.0.4-LTS)",
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      "readme": "# ECU-Bypass-Framework-XRS9000 (v7.0.4-LTS)\n## Advanced Powertrain Intercept & Emulation System (ASIPE)\n\n[![License: MIT](https://img.shields.io/badge/License-MIT-yellow.svg)](https://opensource.org/licenses/MIT)\n[![Build Status](https://img.shields.io/badge/Build-Passing-brightgreen.svg)]()\n[![Platform: Automotive-Linux](https://img.shields.io/badge/Platform-Automotive--Linux-blue.svg)]()\n\n### [Classification: Tier-1 Hardware Abstraction Layer (HAL) Interceptor]\n\n## I. System Overview\nThe **ECU-Bypass-Framework-XRS9000** is a high-density, modular **Man-in-the-Middle (MitM)** hardware interface designed for the persistent interception and manipulation of **Vehicle Electronic Control Units (ECUs)**. By utilizing a **Hard-Wired V-BUS Bridge**, the system facilitates a **ROM-SHRED** exploit to neutralize **O-EM** safety protocols without triggering a **DTC** (Diagnostic Trouble Code) or a **Checksum Failure**.\n\nThe hardware resides physically between the **GWM (Gateway Module)** and the **PCM/ECM (Powertrain/Engine Control Module)**, operating at the **Kernel Level** to ensure total dominance over the **IVN (In-Vehicle Network)**.\n\n---\n\n## II. Hardware Architecture (AL-11B-CTX Core)\nThe core architecture is built upon an **Automotive-Grade NXP S32G** network processor combined with a **Xilinx Zynq-7000 FPGA** fabric for sub-microsecond signal gating.\n\n\n\n### Technical Specifications:\n* **MCU:** Dual-Core ARM Cortex-M7 (480MHz) with Lockstep Safety Cores.\n* **Logic Fabric:** Custom FPGA for **PWM (Pulse Width Modulation)** synthesis and **Crank/Cam (CKP/CMP)** signal shifting.\n* **Transceivers:** 4x Isolated **ISO 11898-2** CAN-FD Nodes (Support for 5Mbps+ data rates).\n* **Memory:** 512MB **LPDDR4** for real-time packet buffering; 16GB **eMMC** for **HEX/BIN** payload storage.\n* **Isolation:** 5kV Galvanic Isolation across all **Digital I/O** to prevent **Back-EMF** spikes.\n\n---\n\n## III. Protocol Support & Exploit Vectors\nThe platform utilizes the **\"Triad-Exploit\"** methodology to bypass security layers and achieve a **\"State of Grace\"** on the vehicle bus.\n\n\n\n| Protocol | Implementation | Functional Application |\n| :--- | :--- | :--- |\n| **UDS (ISO 14229)** | Service 0x27 Seed-Key | Bypasses SAK (Security Access Key) levels for R/W access. |\n| **CAN-FD** | Frame ID Masking | Overrides **ID 0x101 (Torque Command)** and **ID 0x202 (RPM)**. |\n| **DoIP (ISO 13400)** | Ethernet Tunneling | High-speed flashing of the **NAND/P-Flash** via RJ45 bridge. |\n| **J1939** | PGN Request Hijacking | Stripping speed governors and RPM ceilings in heavy-duty units. |\n| **LIN-Bus** | Master-Slave Spoofing | Controlling auxiliary subsystems (Turbo VGT, Pumps, Fans). |\n\n---\n\n## IV. Advanced Problem Solving & Module Neutralization\nBeyond standard remapping, the XRS-9000 solves critical integration hurdles in modern vehicle architecture:\n\n### 1. Persistent DTC Ghosting (Error Masking)\nThe framework employs a **Service 0x14 Suppression** algorithm. Unlike standard scanners that clear codes, the XRS-9000 intercepts the **Diagnostic Response Frame** from the ECU. It filters out specified **P-Codes (Powertrain)**, **U-Codes (Network)**, and **B-Codes (Body)** in real-time. To the factory technician's tool, the vehicle reports a \"Zero-Error\" state even if hardware components (like EGR or EVAP) are physically disconnected.\n\n### 2. ADAS Sensor Virtualization (Radar/Lidar Spoofing)\nIn engine-swap scenarios where the original **ADAS (Advanced Driver Assistance Systems)** sensors are missing, the ECU often limits vehicle speed or disables cruise control. The XRS-9000 emulates the **High-Speed CAN** heartbeats of missing Radar/Camera modules, feeding the **BCM** synthetic \"Clear Path\" data to maintain full powertrain functionality.\n\n### 3. Immobilizer Handshake Emulation (IMMO-BYPASS)\nThe system solves the \"No-Start\" issue in standalone swaps by performing a **Rolling Code Emulation**. It captures the initial **Challenge/Response** between the Key Module and the ECU, then utilizes a cached **Handshake Packet** to satisfy the security gate, allowing the engine to start without the original ignition barrel or key fob.\n\n---\n\n## V. Pinout & Connectivity (DB-37 Interface)\n\n\n\n| Pin | Mnemonic | Signal Type | Description |\n| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |\n| 1 | **V-BATT** | 12V-24V DC | Primary Power Input (Fused). |\n| 14 | **CAN-H1** | Differential | High-Speed CAN (Powertrain Bus). |\n| 15 | **CAN-L1** | Differential | High-Speed CAN (Powertrain Bus). |\n| 20 | **ADC-IN1** | 0-5V Analog | External Sensor Input (Wideband O2/EGT). |\n| 30 | **PWM-OUT** | Digital Pulse | Wastegate / Solenoid Duty Cycle Control. |\n| 37 | **GND** | Reference | Logic/Chassis Common Ground. |\n\n---\n\n## VI. Command Line Interface (CLI) Manual\nAccess the device via **UART/USB-C** at **115200 Baud**.\n\n```\n# Initialize the B-PASS Protocol\n$ xrs-link --init --protocol CAN-FD --speed 500k\n\n# Execute IMMO-Emulation for standalone start\n$ auth --immo-bypass --v-gate 0x0A\n\n# Inject custom Fuel-Map and calculate Checksums\n$ inject --map fuel_aggro.hex --calc-cs --verify\n\n# Mask specific P-Codes (Example: Catalyst Efficiency)\n$ suppress --dtc P0420 --dtc P0430 --status active\n```\n---\n## 🗺️ 2026 Development Roadmap\nThe XRS-9000 project is evolving to handle the next generation of encrypted automotive architectures.\n\n* **Q1 2026:** Integration of **AI-Driven Ignition Mapping**—Neural networks that optimize timing based on live cylinder pressure telemetry.\n* **Q2 2026:** **OTA Stealth Updates**—Enable encrypted firmware pushes over the vehicle's internal Wi-Fi/LTE bridge without physical DB-37 access.\n* **Q3 2026:** **V2X (Vehicle-to-Everything) Spoofing**—Initial support for manipulating DSRC/C-V2X safety messages to prevent external speed-limiting by smart infrastructure.\n* **Q4 2026:** Support for **800V EV Architecture**—Bypassing thermal limiters on high-output electric drive units (EDU).\n*\n\n## 🛠 Support & Commercial Inquiries\nFor technical support, custom **V-MAP** development, or hardware integration queries, contact the lead developer via the following encrypted channels:\n\n* **Telegram:** [@OWNEROFPTX](https://t.me/OWNEROFPTX)\n* **Discord:** `ahrd1`\n\n---",
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      "description": "W3C Strategic Highlights September 2019 This report was prepared for the September 2019 W3C Advisory Committee Meeting (W3C Member link). See the accompanying W3C Fact Sheet — September 2019. For the previous edition, see the April 2019 W3C Strategic Highlights. For future editions of this report, please consult the latest version. A Chinese translation is available. ☰ Contents Introduction Future Web Standards Meeting Industry Needs Web Payments Digital Publishing Media and Entertainment Web & Telecommunications Real-Time Communications (WebRTC) Web & Networks Automotive Web of Things Strengthening the Core of the Web HTML CSS Fonts SVG Audio Performance Web Performance WebAssembly Testing Browser Testing and Tools WebPlatform Tests Web of Data Web for All Security, Privacy, Identity Internationalization (i18n) Web Accessibility Outreach to the world W3C Developer Relations W3C Training Translations W3C Liaisons Introduction This report highlights recent work of enhancement of the existing landscape of the Web platform and innovation for the growth and strength of the Web. 33 working groups and a dozen interest groups enable W3C to pursue its mission through the creation of Web standards, guidelines, and supporting materials. We track the tremendous work done across the Consortium through homogeneous work-spaces in Github which enables better monitoring and management. We are in the middle of a period where we are chartering numerous working groups which demonstrate the rapid degree of change for the Web platform: After 4 years, we are nearly ready to publish a Payment Request API Proposed Recommendation and we need to soon charter follow-on work. In the last year we chartered the Web Payment Security Interest Group. In the last year we chartered the Web Media Working Group with 7 specifications for next generation Media support on the Web. We have Accessibility Guidelines under W3C Member review which includes Silver, a new approach. We have just launched the Decentralized Identifier Working Group which has tremendous potential because Decentralized Identifier (DID) is an identifier that is globally unique, resolveable with high availability, and cryptographically verifiable. We have Privacy IG (PING) under W3C Member review which strengthens our focus on the tradeoff between privacy and function. We have a new CSS charter under W3C Member review which maps the group's work for the next three years. In this period, W3C and the WHATWG have succesfully completed the negotiation of a Memorandum of Understanding rooted in the mutual belief that that having two distinct specifications claiming to be normative is generally harmful for the Web community. The MOU, signed last May, describes how the two organizations are to collaborate on the development of a single authoritative version of the HTML and DOM specifications. W3C subsequently rechartered the HTML Working Group to assist the W3C community in raising issues and proposing solutions for the HTML and DOM specifications, and for the production of W3C Recommendations from WHATWG Review Drafts. As the Web evolves continuously, some groups are looking for ways for specifications to do so as well. So-called \"evergreen recommendations\" or \"living standards\" aim to track continuous development (and maintenance) of features, on a feature-by-feature basis, while getting review and patent commitments. We see the maturation and further development of an incredible number of new technologies coming to the Web. Continued progress in many areas demonstrates the vitality of the W3C and the Web community, as the rest of the report illustrates. Future Web Standards W3C has a variety of mechanisms for listening to what the community thinks could become good future Web standards. These include discussions with the Membership, discussions with other standards bodies, the activities of thousands of participants in over 300 community groups, and W3C Workshops. There are lots of good ideas. The W3C strategy team has been identifying promising topics and invites public participation. Future, recent and under consideration Workshops include: Inclusive XR (5-6 November 2019, Seattle, WA, USA) to explore existing and future approaches on making Virtual and Augmented Reality experiences more inclusive, including to people with disabilities; W3C Workshop on Data Models for Transportation (12-13 September 2019, Palo Alto, CA, USA) W3C Workshop on Web Games (27-28 June 2019, Redmond, WA, USA), view report Second W3C Workshop on the Web of Things (3-5 June 2019, Munich, Germany) W3C Workshop on Web Standardization for Graph Data; Creating Bridges: RDF, Property Graph and SQL (4-6 March 2019, Berlin, Germany), view report Web & Machine Learning. The Strategy Funnel documents the staff's exploration of potential new work at various phases: Exploration and Investigation, Incubation and Evaluation, and eventually to the chartering of a new standards group. The Funnel view is a GitHub Project where new area are issues represented by “cards” which move through the columns, usually from left to right. Most cards start in Exploration and move towards Chartering, or move out of the funnel. Public input is welcome at any stage but particularly once Incubation has begun. This helps W3C identify work that is sufficiently incubated to warrant standardization, to review the ecosystem around the work and indicate interest in participating in its standardization, and then to draft a charter that reflects an appropriate scope. Ongoing feedback can speed up the overall standardization process. Since the previous highlights document, W3C has chartered a number of groups, and started discussion on many more: Newly Chartered or Rechartered Web Application Security WG (03-Apr) Web Payment Security IG (17-Apr) Patent and Standards IG (24-Apr) Web Applications WG (14-May) Web & Networks IG (16-May) Media WG (23-May) Media and Entertainment IG (06-Jun) HTML WG (06-Jun) Decentralized Identifier WG (05-Sep) Extended Privacy IG (PING) (30-Sep) Verifiable Claims WG (30-Sep) Service Workers WG (31-Dec) Dataset Exchange WG (31-Dec) Web of Things Working Group (31-Dec) Web Audio Working Group (31-Dec) Proposed charters / Advance Notice Accessibility Guidelines WG Privacy IG (PING) RDF Literal Direction WG Timed Text WG CSS WG Web Authentication WG Closed Internationalization Tag Set IG Meeting Industry Needs Web Payments All Web Payments specifications W3C's payments standards enable a streamlined checkout experience, enabling a consistent user experience across the Web with lower front end development costs for merchants. Users can store and reuse information and more quickly and accurately complete online transactions. The Web Payments Working Group has republished Payment Request API as a Candidate Recommendation, aiming to publish a Proposed Recommendation in the Fall 2019, and is discussing use cases and features for Payment Request after publication of the 1.0 Recommendation. Browser vendors have been finalizing implementation of features added in the past year (view the implementation report). As work continues on the Payment Handler API and its implementation (currently in Chrome and Edge Canary), one focus in 2019 is to increase adoption in other browsers. Recently, Mastercard demonstrated the use of Payment Request API to carry out EMVCo's Secure Remote Commerce (SRC) protocol whose payment method definition is being developed with active participation by Visa, Mastercard, American Express, and Discover. Payment method availability is a key factor in merchant considerations about adopting Payment Request API. The ability to get uniform adoption of a new payment method such as Secure Remote Commerce (SRC) also depends on the availability of the Payment Handler API in browsers, or of proprietary alternatives. Web Monetization, which the Web Payments Working Group will discuss again at its face-to-face meeting in September, can be used to enable micropayments as an alternative revenue stream to advertising. Since the beginning of 2019, Amazon, Brave Software, JCB, Certus Cybersecurity Solutions and Netflix have joined the Web Payments Working Group. In April, W3C launched the Web Payment Security Group to enable W3C, EMVCo, and the FIDO Alliance to collaborate on a vision for Web payment security and interoperability. Participants will define areas of collaboration and identify gaps between existing technical specifications in order to increase compatibility among different technologies, such as: How do SRC, FIDO, and Payment Request relate? The Payment Services Directive 2 (PSD2) regulations in Europe are scheduled to take effect in September 2019. What is the role of EMVCo, W3C, and FIDO technologies, and what is the current state of readiness for the deadline? How can we improve privacy on the Web at the same time as we meet industry requirements regarding user identity? Digital Publishing All Digital Publishing specifications, Publication milestones The Web is the universal publishing platform. Publishing is increasingly impacted by the Web, and the Web increasingly impacts Publishing. Topic of particular interest to Publishing@W3C include typography and layout, accessibility, usability, portability, distribution, archiving, offline access, print on demand, and reliable cross referencing. And the diverse publishing community represented in the groups consist of the traditional \"trade\" publishers, ebook reading system manufacturers, but also publishers of audio book, scholarly journals or educational materials, library scientists or browser developers. The Publishing Working Group currently concentrates on Audiobooks which lack a comprehensive standard, thus incurring extra costs and time to publish in this booming market. Active development is ongoing on the future standard: Publication Manifest Audiobook profile for Web Publications Lightweight Packaging Format The BD Comics Manga Community Group, the Synchronized Multimedia for Publications Community Group, the Publishing Community Group and a future group on archival, are companions to the working group where specific work is developed and incubated. The Publishing Community Group is a recently launched incubation channel for Publishing@W3C. The goal of the group is to propose, document, and prototype features broadly related to: publications on the Web reading modes and systems and the user experience of publications The EPUB 3 Community Group has successfully completed the revision of EPUB 3.2. The Publishing Business Group fosters ongoing participation by members of the publishing industry and the overall ecosystem in the development of Web infrastructure to better support the needs of the industry. The Business Group serves as an additional conduit to the Publishing Working Group and several Community Groups for feedback between the publishing ecosystem and W3C. The Publishing BG has played a vital role in fostering and advancing the adoption and continued development of EPUB 3. In particular the BG provided critical support to the update of EPUBCheck to validate EPUB content to the new EPUB 3.2 specification. This resulted in the development, in conjunction with the EPUB3 Community Group, of a new generation of EPUBCheck, i.e., EPUBCheck 4.2 production-ready release. Media and Entertainment All Media specifications The Media and Entertainment vertical tracks media-related topics and features that create immersive experiences for end users. HTML5 brought standard audio and video elements to the Web. Standardization activities since then have aimed at turning the Web into a professional platform fully suitable for the delivery of media content and associated materials, enabling missing features to stream video content on the Web such as adaptive streaming and content protection. Together with Microsoft, Comcast, Netflix and Google, W3C received an Technology & Engineering Emmy Award in April 2019 for standardization of a full TV experience on the Web. Current goals are to: Reinforce core media technologies: Creation of the Media Working Group, to develop media-related specifications incubated in the WICG (e.g. Media Capabilities, Picture-in-picture, Media Session) and maintain maintain/evolve Media Source Extensions (MSE) and Encrypted Media Extensions (EME). Improve support for Media Timed Events: data cues incubation. Enhance color support (HDR, wide gamut), in scope of the CSS WG and in the Color on the Web CG. Reduce fragmentation: Continue annual releases of a common and testable baseline media devices, in scope of the Web Media APIs CG and in collaboration with the CTA WAVE Project. Maintain the Road-map of Media Technologies for the Web which highlights Web technologies that can be used to build media applications and services, as well as known gaps to enable additional use cases. Create the future: Discuss perspectives for Media and Entertainment for the Web. Bring the power of GPUs to the Web (graphics, machine learning, heavy processing), under incubation in the GPU for the Web CG. Transition to a Working Group is under discussion. Determine next steps after the successful W3C Workshop on Web Games of June 2019. View the report. Timed Text The Timed Text Working Group develops and maintains formats used for the representation of text synchronized with other timed media, like audio and video, and notably works on TTML, profiles of TTML, and WebVTT. Recent progress includes: A robust WebVTT implementation report poises the specification for publication as a proposed recommendation. Discussions around re-chartering, notably to add a TTML Profile for Audio Description deliverable to the scope of the group, and clarify that rendering of captions within XR content is also in scope. Immersive Web Hardware that enables Virtual Reality (VR) and Augmented Reality (AR) applications are now broadly available to consumers, offering an immersive computing platform with both new opportunities and challenges. The ability to interact directly with immersive hardware is critical to ensuring that the web is well equipped to operate as a first-class citizen in this environment. The Immersive Web Working Group has been stabilizing the WebXR Device API while the companion Immersive Web Community Group incubates the next series of features identified as key for the future of the Immersive Web. W3C plans a workshop focused on the needs and benefits at the intersection of VR & Accessibility (Inclusive XR), on 5-6 November 2019 in Seattle, WA, USA, to explore existing and future approaches on making Virtual and Augmented Reality experiences more inclusive. Web & Telecommunications The Web is the Open Platform for Mobile. Telecommunication service providers and network equipment providers have long been critical actors in the deployment of Web technologies. As the Web platform matures, it brings richer and richer capabilities to extend existing services to new users and devices, and propose new and innovative services. Real-Time Communications (WebRTC) All Real-Time Communications specifications WebRTC has reshaped the whole communication landscape by making any connected device a potential communication end-point, bringing audio and video communications anywhere, on any network, vastly expanding the ability of operators to reach their customers. WebRTC serves as the corner-stone of many online communication and collaboration services. The WebRTC Working Group aims to bringing WebRTC 1.0 (and companion specification Media Capture and Streams) to Recommendation by the end of 2019. Intense efforts are focused on testing (supported by a dedicated hackathon at IETF 104) and interoperability. The group is considering pushing features that have not gotten enough traction to separate modules or to a later minor revision of the spec. Beyond WebRTC 1.0, the WebRTC Working Group will focus its efforts on WebRTC NV which the group has started documenting by identifying use cases. Web & Networks Recently launched, in the wake of the May 2018 Web5G workshop, the Web & Networks Interest Group is chaired by representatives from AT&T, China Mobile and Intel, with a goal to explore solutions for web applications to achieve better performance and resource allocation, both on the device and network. The group's first efforts are around use cases, privacy & security requirements and liaisons. Automotive All Automotive specifications To create a rich application ecosystem for vehicles and other devices allowed to connect to the vehicle, the W3C Automotive Working Group is delivering a service specification to expose all common vehicle signals (engine temperature, fuel/charge level, range, tire pressure, speed, etc.) The Vehicle Information Service Specification (VISS), which is a Candidate Recommendation, is seeing more implementations across the industry. It provides the access method to a common data model for all the vehicle signals –presently encapsulating a thousand or so different data elements– and will be growing to accommodate the advances in automotive such as autonomous and driver assist technologies and electrification. The group is already working on a successor to VISS, leveraging the underlying data model and the VIWI submission from Volkswagen, for a more robust means of accessing vehicle signals information and the same paradigm for other automotive needs including location-based services, media, notifications and caching content. The Automotive and Web Platform Business Group acts as an incubator for prospective standards work. One of its task forces is using W3C VISS in performing data sampling and off-boarding the information to the cloud. Access to the wealth of information that W3C's auto signals standard exposes is of interest to regulators, urban planners, insurance companies, auto manufacturers, fleet managers and owners, service providers and others. In addition to components needed for data sampling and edge computing, capturing user and owner consent, information collection methods and handling of data are in scope. The upcoming W3C Workshop on Data Models for Transportation (September 2019) is expected to focus on the need of additional ontologies around transportation space. Web of Things All Web of Things specifications W3C's Web of Things work is designed to bridge disparate technology stacks to allow devices to work together and achieve scale, thus enabling the potential of the Internet of Things by eliminating fragmentation and fostering interoperability. Thing descriptions expressed in JSON-LD cover the behavior, interaction affordances, data schema, security configuration, and protocol bindings. The Web of Things complements existing IoT ecosystems to reduce the cost and risk for suppliers and consumers of applications that create value by combining multiple devices and information services. There are many sectors that will benefit, e.g. smart homes, smart cities, smart industry, smart agriculture, smart healthcare and many more. The Web of Things Working Group is finishing the initial Web of Things standards, with support from the Web of Things Interest Group: Web of Things Architecture Thing Descriptions Strengthening the Core of the Web HTML The HTML Working Group was chartered early June to assist the W3C community in raising issues and proposing solutions for the HTML and DOM specifications, and to produce W3C Recommendations from WHATWG Review Drafts. A few days before, W3C and the WHATWG signed a Memorandum of Understanding outlining the agreement to collaborate on the development of a single version of the HTML and DOM specifications. Issues and proposed solutions for HTML and DOM done via the newly rechartered HTML Working Group in the WHATWG repositories The HTML Working Group is targetting November 2019 to bring HTML and DOM to Candidate Recommendations. CSS All CSS specifications CSS is a critical part of the Open Web Platform. The CSS Working Group gathers requirements from two large groups of CSS users: the publishing industry and application developers. Within W3C, those groups are exemplified by the Publishing groups and the Web Platform Working Group. The former requires things like better pagination support and advanced font handling, the latter needs intelligent (and fast!) scrolling and animations. What we know as CSS is actually a collection of almost a hundred specifications, referred to as ‘modules’. The current state of CSS is defined by a snapshot, updated once a year. The group also publishes an index defining every term defined by CSS specifications. Fonts All Fonts specifications The Web Fonts Working Group develops specifications that allow the interoperable deployment of downloadable fonts on the Web, with a focus on Progressive Font Enrichment as well as maintenance of WOFF Recommendations. Recent and ongoing work includes: Early API experiments by Adobe and Monotype have demonstrated the feasibility of a font enrichment API, where a server delivers a font with minimal glyph repertoire and the client can query the full repertoire and request additional subsets on-the-fly. In other experiments, the Brotli compression used in WOFF 2 was extended to support shared dictionaries and patch update. Metrics to quantify improvement are a current hot discussion topic. The group will meet at ATypi 2019 in Japan, to gather requirements from the international typography community. The group will first produce a report summarizing the strengths and weaknesses of each prototype solution by Q2 2020. SVG All SVG specifications SVG is an important and widely-used part of the Open Web Platform. The SVG Working Group focuses on aligning the SVG 2.0 specification with browser implementations, having split the specification into a currently-implemented 2.0 and a forward-looking 2.1. Current activity is on stabilization, increased integration with the Open Web Platform, and test coverage analysis. The Working Group was rechartered in March 2019. A new work item concerns native (non-Web-browser) uses of SVG as a non-interactive, vector graphics format. Audio The Web Audio Working Group was extended to finish its work on the Web Audio API, expecting to publish it as a Recommendation by year end. The specification enables synthesizing audio in the browser. Audio operations are performed with audio nodes, which are linked together to form a modular audio routing graph. Multiple sources — with different types of channel layout — are supported. This modular design provides the flexibility to create complex audio functions with dynamic effects. The first version of Web Audio API is now feature complete and is implemented in all modern browsers. Work has started on the next version, and new features are being incubated in the Audio Community Group. Performance Web Performance All Web Performance specifications There are currently 18 specifications in development in the Web Performance Working Group aiming to provide methods to observe and improve aspects of application performance of user agent features and APIs. The W3C team is looking at related work incubated in the W3C GPU for the Web (WebGPU) Community Group which is poised to transition to a W3C Working Group. A preliminary draft charter is available. WebAssembly All WebAssembly specifications WebAssembly improves Web performance and power by being a virtual machine and execution environment enabling loaded pages to run native (compiled) code. It is deployed in Firefox, Edge, Safari and Chrome. The specification will soon reach Candidate Recommendation. WebAssembly enables near-native performance, optimized load time, and perhaps most importantly, a compilation target for existing code bases. While it has a small number of native types, much of the performance increase relative to Javascript derives from its use of consistent typing. WebAssembly leverages decades of optimization for compiled languages and the byte code is optimized for compactness and streaming (the web page starts executing while the rest of the code downloads). Network and API access all occurs through accompanying Javascript libraries -- the security model is identical to that of Javascript. Requirements gathering and language development occur in the Community Group while the Working Group manages test development, community review and progression of specifications on the Recommendation Track. Testing Browser testing plays a critical role in the growth of the Web by: Improving the reliability of Web technology definitions; Improving the quality of implementations of these technologies by helping vendors to detect bugs in their products; Improving the data available to Web developers on known bugs and deficiencies of Web technologies by publishing results of these tests. Browser Testing and Tools The Browser Testing and Tools Working Group is developing WebDriver version 2, having published last year the W3C Recommendation of WebDriver. WebDriver acts as a remote control interface that enables introspection and control of user agents, provides a platform- and language-neutral wire protocol as a way for out-of-process programs to remotely instruct the behavior of Web, and emulates the actions of a real person using the browser. WebPlatform Tests The WebPlatform Tests project now provides a mechanism which allows to fully automate tests that previously needed to be run manually: TestDriver. TestDriver enables sending trusted key and mouse events, sending complex series of trusted pointer and key interactions for things like in-content drag-and-drop or pinch zoom, and even file upload. Since 2014 W3C began work on this coordinated open-source effort to build a cross-browser test suite for the Web Platform, which WHATWG, and all major browsers adopted. Web of Data All Data specifications There have been several great success stories around the standardization of data on the web over the past year. Verifiable Claims seems to have significant uptake. It is also significant that the Distributed Identifier WG charter has received numerous favorable reviews, and was just recently launched. JSON-LD has been a major success with the large deployment on Web sites via schema.org. JSON-LD 1.1 completed technical work, about to transition to CR More than 25% of websites today include schema.org data in JSON-LD The Web of Things description is in CR since May, making use of JSON-LD Verifiable Credentials data model is in CR since July, also making use of JSON-LD Continued strong interest in decentralized identifiers Engagement from the TAG with reframing core documents, such as Ethical Web Principles, to include data on the web within their scope Data is increasingly important for all organizations, especially with the rise of IoT and Big Data. W3C has a mature and extensive suite of standards relating to data that were developed over two decades of experience, with plans for further work on making it easier for developers to work with graph data and knowledge graphs. Linked Data is about the use of URIs as names for things, the ability to dereference these URIs to get further information and to include links to other data. There are ever-increasing sources of open Linked Data on the Web, as well as data services that are restricted to the suppliers and consumers of those services. The digital transformation of industry is seeking to exploit advanced digital technologies. This will facilitate businesses to integrate horizontally along the supply and value chains, and vertically from the factory floor to the office floor. W3C is seeking to make it easier to support enterprise-wide data management and governance, reflecting the strategic importance of data to modern businesses. Traditional approaches to data have focused on tabular databases (SQL/RDBMS), Comma Separated Value (CSV) files, and data embedded in PDF documents and spreadsheets. We're now in midst of a major shift to graph data with nodes and labeled directed links between them. Graph data is: Faster than using SQL and associated JOIN operations More favorable to integrating data from heterogeneous sources Better suited to situations where the data model is evolving In the wake of the recent W3C Workshop on Graph Data we are in the process of launching a Graph Standardization Business Group to provide a business perspective with use cases and requirements, to coordinate technical standards work and liaisons with external organizations. Web for All Security, Privacy, Identity All Security specifications, all Privacy specifications Authentication on the Web As the WebAuthn Level 1 W3C Recommendation published last March is seeing wide implementation and adoption of strong cryptographic authentication, work is proceeding on Level 2. The open standard Web API gives native authentication technology built into native platforms, browsers, operating systems (including mobile) and hardware, offering protection against hacking, credential theft, phishing attacks, thus aiming to end the era of passwords as a security construct. You may read more in our March press release. Privacy An increasing number of W3C specifications are benefitting from Privacy and Security review; there are security and privacy aspects to every specification. Early review is essential. Working with the TAG, the Privacy Interest Group has updated the Self-Review Questionnaire: Security and Privacy. Other recent work of the group includes public blogging further to the exploration of anti-patterns in standards and permission prompts. Security The Web Application Security Working Group adopted Feature Policy, aiming to allow developers to selectively enable, disable, or modify the behavior of some of these browser features and APIs within their application; and Fetch Metadata, aiming to provide servers with enough information to make a priori decisions about whether or not to service a request based on the way it was made, and the context in which it will be used. The Web Payment Security Interest Group, launched last April, convenes members from W3C, EMVCo, and the FIDO Alliance to discuss cooperative work to enhance the security and interoperability of Web payments (read more about payments). Internationalization (i18n) All Internationalization specifications, educational articles related to Internationalization, spec developers checklist Only a quarter or so current Web users use English online and that proportion will continue to decrease as the Web reaches more and more communities of limited English proficiency. If the Web is to live up to the \"World Wide\" portion of its name, and for the Web to truly work for stakeholders all around the world engaging with content in various languages, it must support the needs of worldwide users as they engage with content in the various languages. The growth of epublishing also brings requirements for new features and improved typography on the Web. It is important to ensure the needs of local communities are captured. The W3C Internationalization Initiative was set up to increase in-house resources dedicated to accelerating progress in making the World Wide Web \"worldwide\" by gathering user requirements, supporting developers, and education & outreach. For an overview of current projects see the i18n radar. W3C's Internationalization efforts progressed on a number of fronts recently: Requirements: New African and European language groups will work on the gap analysis, errata and layout requirements. Gap analysis: Japanese, Devanagari, Bengali, Tamil, Lao, Khmer, Javanese, and Ethiopic updated in the gap-analysis documents. Layout requirements document: notable progress tracked in the Southeast Asian Task Force while work continues on Chinese layout requirements. Developer support: Spec reviews: the i18n WG continues active review of specifications of the WHATWG and other W3C Working Groups. Short review checklist: easy way to begin a self-review to help spec developers understand what aspects of their spec are likely to need attention for internationalization, and points them to more detailed checklists for the relevant topics. It also helps those reviewing specs for i18n issues. Strings on the Web: Language and Direction Metadata lays out issues and discusses potential solutions for passing information about language and direction with strings in JSON or other data formats. The document was rewritten for clarity, and expanded. The group is collaborating with the JSON-LD and Web Publishing groups to develop a plan for updating RDF, JSON-LD and related specifications to handle metadata for base direction of text (bidi). User-friendly test format: a new format was developed for Internationalization Test Suite tests, which displays helpful information about how the test works. This particularly useful because those tests are pointed to by educational materials and gap-analysis documents. Web Platform Tests: a large number of tests in the i18n test suite have been ported to the WPT repository, including: css-counter-styles, css-ruby, css-syntax, css-test, css-text-decor, css-writing-modes, and css-pseudo. Education & outreach: (for all educational materials, see the HTML & CSS Authoring Techniques) Web Accessibility All Accessibility specifications, WAI resources The Web Accessibility Initiative supports W3C's Web for All mission. Recent achievements include: Education and training: Inaccessibility of CAPTCHA updated to bring our analysis and recommendations up to date with CAPTCHA practice today, concluding two years of extensive work and invaluable input from the public (read more on the W3C Blog Learn why your web content and applications should be accessible. The Education and Outreach Working Group has completed revision and updating of the Business Case for Digital Accessibility. Accessibility guidelines: The Accessibility Guidelines Working Group has continued to update WCAG Techniques and Understanding WCAG 2.1; and published a Candidate Recommendation of Accessibility Conformance Testing Rules Format 1.0 to improve inter-rater reliability when evaluating conformance of web content to WCAG An updated charter is being developed to host work on \"Silver\", the next generation accessibility guidelines (WCAG 2.2) There are accessibility aspects to most specifications. Check your work with the FAST checklist. Outreach to the world W3C Developer Relations To foster the excellent feedback loop between Web Standards development and Web developers, and to grow participation from that diverse community, recent W3C Developer Relations activities include: @w3cdevs tracks the enormous amount of work happening across W3C W3C Track during the Web Conference 2019 in San Francisco Tech videos: W3C published the 2019 Web Games Workshop videos The 16 September 2019 Developer Meetup in Fukuoka, Japan, is open to all and will combine a set of technical demos prepared by W3C groups, and a series of talks on a selected set of W3C technologies and projects W3C is involved with Mozilla, Google, Samsung, Microsoft and Bocoup in the organization of ViewSource 2019 in Amsterdam (read more on the W3C Blog) W3C Training In partnership with EdX, W3C's MOOC training program, W3Cx offers a complete \"Front-End Web Developer\" (FEWD) professional certificate program that consists of a suite of five courses on the foundational languages that power the Web: HTML5, CSS and JavaScript. We count nearly 900K students from all over the world. Translations Many Web users rely on translations of documents developed at W3C whose official language is English. W3C is extremely grateful to the continuous efforts of its community in ensuring our various deliverables in general, and in our specifications in particular, are made available in other languages, for free, ensuring their exposure to a much more diverse set of readers. Last Spring we developed a more robust system, a new listing of translations of W3C specifications and updated the instructions on how to contribute to our translation efforts. W3C Liaisons Liaisons and coordination with numerous organizations and Standards Development Organizations (SDOs) is crucial for W3C to: make sure standards are interoperable coordinate our respective agenda in Internet governance: W3C participates in ICANN, GIPO, IGF, the I* organizations (ICANN, IETF, ISOC, IAB). ensure at the government liaison level that our standards work is officially recognized when important to our membership so that products based on them (often done by our members) are part of procurement orders. W3C has ARO/PAS status with ISO. W3C participates in the EU MSP and Rolling Plan on Standardization ensure the global set of Web and Internet standards form a compatible stack of technologies, at the technical and policy level (patent regime, fragmentation, use in policy making) promote Standards adoption equally by the industry, the public sector, and the public at large Coralie Mercier, Editor, W3C Marketing & Communications $Id: Overview.html,v 1.60 2019/10/15 12:05:52 coralie Exp $ Copyright © 2019 W3C ® (MIT, ERCIM, Keio, Beihang) Usage policies apply.",
      "readme": "# -L-\nW3C Strategic Highlights  September 2019  This report was prepared for the September 2019 W3C Advisory Committee Meeting (W3C Member link). See the accompanying W3C Fact Sheet — September 2019. For the previous edition, see the April 2019 W3C Strategic Highlights. For future editions of this report, please consult the latest version.  A Chinese translation is available.  ☰ Contents  Introduction Future Web Standards Meeting Industry Needs Web Payments Digital Publishing Media and Entertainment Web &amp; Telecommunications Real-Time Communications (WebRTC) Web &amp; Networks Automotive Web of Things Strengthening the Core of the Web HTML CSS Fonts SVG Audio Performance Web Performance WebAssembly Testing Browser Testing and Tools WebPlatform Tests Web of Data Web for All Security, Privacy, Identity Internationalization (i18n) Web Accessibility Outreach to the world W3C Developer Relations W3C Training Translations W3C Liaisons Introduction  This report highlights recent work of enhancement of the existing landscape of the Web platform and innovation for the growth and strength of the Web.  33 working groups and a dozen interest groups enable W3C to pursue its mission through the creation of Web standards, guidelines, and supporting materials. We track the tremendous work done across the Consortium through homogeneous work-spaces in Github which enables better monitoring and management.  We are in the middle of a period where we are chartering numerous working groups which demonstrate the rapid degree of change for the Web platform:  After 4 years, we are nearly ready to publish a Payment Request API Proposed Recommendation and we need to soon charter follow-on work. In the last year we chartered the Web Payment Security Interest Group. In the last year we chartered the Web Media Working Group with 7 specifications for next generation Media support on the Web. We have Accessibility Guidelines under W3C Member review which includes Silver, a new approach. We have just launched the Decentralized Identifier Working Group which has tremendous potential because Decentralized Identifier (DID) is an identifier that is globally unique, resolveable with high availability, and cryptographically verifiable. We have Privacy IG (PING) under W3C Member review which strengthens our focus on the tradeoff between privacy and function. We have a new CSS charter under W3C Member review which maps the group's work for the next three years. In this period, W3C and the WHATWG have succesfully completed the negotiation of a Memorandum of Understanding rooted in the mutual belief that that having two distinct specifications claiming to be normative is generally harmful for the Web community. The MOU, signed last May, describes how the two organizations are to collaborate on the development of a single authoritative version of the HTML and DOM specifications. W3C subsequently rechartered the HTML Working Group to assist the W3C community in raising issues and proposing solutions for the HTML and DOM specifications, and for the production of W3C Recommendations from WHATWG Review Drafts.  As the Web evolves continuously, some groups are looking for ways for specifications to do so as well. So-called \"evergreen recommendations\" or \"living standards\" aim to track continuous development (and maintenance) of features, on a feature-by-feature basis, while getting review and patent commitments.  We see the maturation and further development of an incredible number of new technologies coming to the Web. Continued progress in many areas demonstrates the vitality of the W3C and the Web community, as the rest of the report illustrates.  Future Web Standards W3C has a variety of mechanisms for listening to what the community thinks could become good future Web standards. These include discussions with the Membership, discussions with other standards bodies, the activities of thousands of participants in over 300 community groups, and W3C Workshops. There are lots of good ideas. The W3C strategy team has been identifying promising topics and invites public participation.   Future, recent and under consideration Workshops include:  Inclusive XR (5-6 November 2019, Seattle, WA, USA) to explore existing and future approaches on making Virtual and Augmented Reality experiences more inclusive, including to people with disabilities; W3C Workshop on Data Models for Transportation (12-13 September 2019, Palo Alto, CA, USA) W3C Workshop on Web Games (27-28 June 2019, Redmond, WA, USA), view report Second W3C Workshop on the Web of Things (3-5 June 2019, Munich, Germany) W3C Workshop on Web Standardization for Graph Data; Creating Bridges: RDF, Property Graph and SQL (4-6 March 2019, Berlin, Germany), view report Web &amp; Machine Learning. The Strategy Funnel documents the staff's exploration of potential new work at various phases: Exploration and Investigation, Incubation and Evaluation, and eventually to the chartering of a new standards group. The Funnel view is a GitHub Project where new area are issues represented by “cards” which move through the columns, usually from left to right. Most cards start in Exploration and move towards Chartering, or move out of the funnel.  Public input is welcome at any stage but particularly once Incubation has begun. This helps W3C identify work that is sufficiently incubated to warrant standardization, to review the ecosystem around the work and indicate interest in participating in its standardization, and then to draft a charter that reflects an appropriate scope. Ongoing feedback can speed up the overall standardization process.  Since the previous highlights document, W3C has chartered a number of groups, and started discussion on many more:  Newly Chartered or Rechartered  Web Application Security WG (03-Apr) Web Payment Security IG (17-Apr) Patent and Standards IG (24-Apr) Web Applications WG (14-May) Web &amp; Networks IG (16-May) Media WG (23-May) Media and Entertainment IG (06-Jun) HTML WG (06-Jun) Decentralized Identifier WG (05-Sep) Extended  Privacy IG (PING) (30-Sep) Verifiable Claims WG (30-Sep) Service Workers WG (31-Dec) Dataset Exchange WG (31-Dec) Web of Things Working Group (31-Dec) Web Audio Working Group (31-Dec) Proposed charters / Advance Notice  Accessibility Guidelines WG Privacy IG (PING) RDF Literal Direction WG Timed Text WG CSS WG Web Authentication WG Closed  Internationalization Tag Set IG Meeting Industry Needs Web Payments   All Web Payments specifications  W3C's payments standards enable a streamlined checkout experience, enabling a consistent user experience across the Web with lower front end development costs for merchants. Users can store and reuse information and more quickly and accurately complete online transactions.  The Web Payments Working Group has republished Payment Request API as a Candidate Recommendation, aiming to publish a Proposed Recommendation in the Fall 2019, and is discussing use cases and features for Payment Request after publication of the 1.0 Recommendation. Browser vendors have been finalizing implementation of features added in the past year (view the implementation report).  As work continues on the Payment Handler API and its implementation (currently in Chrome and Edge Canary), one focus in 2019 is to increase adoption in other browsers. Recently, Mastercard demonstrated the use of Payment Request API to carry out EMVCo's Secure Remote Commerce (SRC) protocol whose payment method definition is being developed with active participation by Visa, Mastercard, American Express, and Discover. Payment method availability is a key factor in merchant considerations about adopting Payment Request API. The ability to get uniform adoption of a new payment method such as Secure Remote Commerce (SRC) also depends on the availability of the Payment Handler API in browsers, or of proprietary alternatives.  Web Monetization, which the Web Payments Working Group will discuss again at its face-to-face meeting in September, can be used to enable micropayments as an alternative revenue stream to advertising.  Since the beginning of 2019, Amazon, Brave Software, JCB, Certus Cybersecurity Solutions and Netflix have joined the Web Payments Working Group.  In April, W3C launched the Web Payment Security Group to enable W3C, EMVCo, and the FIDO Alliance to collaborate on a vision for Web payment security and interoperability. Participants will define areas of collaboration and identify gaps between existing technical specifications in order to increase compatibility among different technologies, such as:  How do SRC, FIDO, and Payment Request relate? The Payment Services Directive 2 (PSD2) regulations in Europe are scheduled to take effect in September 2019. What is the role of EMVCo, W3C, and FIDO technologies, and what is the current state of readiness for the deadline? How can we improve privacy on the Web at the same time as we meet industry requirements regarding user identity? Digital Publishing   All Digital Publishing specifications, Publication milestones  The Web is the universal publishing platform. Publishing is increasingly impacted by the Web, and the Web increasingly impacts Publishing.  Topic of particular interest to Publishing@W3C include typography and layout, accessibility, usability, portability, distribution, archiving, offline access, print on demand, and reliable cross referencing. And the diverse publishing community represented in the groups consist of the traditional \"trade\" publishers, ebook reading system manufacturers, but also publishers of audio book, scholarly journals or educational materials, library scientists or browser developers.  The Publishing Working Group currently concentrates on Audiobooks which lack a comprehensive standard, thus incurring extra costs and time to publish in this booming market. Active development is ongoing on the future standard:  Publication Manifest Audiobook profile for Web Publications Lightweight Packaging Format The BD Comics Manga Community Group, the Synchronized Multimedia for Publications Community Group, the Publishing Community Group and a future group on archival, are companions to the working group where specific work is developed and incubated.  The Publishing Community Group is a recently launched incubation channel for Publishing@W3C. The goal of the group is to propose, document, and prototype features broadly related to:  publications on the Web reading modes and systems and the user experience of publications The EPUB 3 Community Group has successfully completed the revision of EPUB 3.2.  The Publishing Business Group fosters ongoing participation by members of the publishing industry and the overall ecosystem in the development of Web infrastructure to better support the needs of the industry. The Business Group serves as an additional conduit to the Publishing Working Group and several Community Groups for feedback between the publishing ecosystem and W3C. The Publishing BG has played a vital role in fostering and advancing the adoption and continued development of EPUB 3. In particular the BG provided critical support to the update of EPUBCheck to validate EPUB content to the new EPUB 3.2 specification. This resulted in the development, in conjunction with the EPUB3 Community Group, of a new generation of EPUBCheck, i.e., EPUBCheck 4.2 production-ready release.  Media and Entertainment   All Media specifications  The Media and Entertainment vertical tracks media-related topics and features that create immersive experiences for end users. HTML5 brought standard audio and video elements to the Web. Standardization activities since then have aimed at turning the Web into a professional platform fully suitable for the delivery of media content and associated materials, enabling missing features to stream video content on the Web such as adaptive streaming and content protection. Together with Microsoft, Comcast, Netflix and Google, W3C received an Technology &amp; Engineering Emmy Award in April 2019 for standardization of a full TV experience on the Web. Current goals are to:  Reinforce core media technologies: Creation of the Media Working Group, to develop media-related specifications incubated in the WICG (e.g. Media Capabilities, Picture-in-picture, Media Session) and maintain maintain/evolve Media Source Extensions (MSE) and Encrypted Media Extensions (EME). Improve support for Media Timed Events: data cues incubation. Enhance color support (HDR, wide gamut), in scope of the CSS WG and in the Color on the Web CG. Reduce fragmentation: Continue annual releases of a common and testable baseline media devices, in scope of the Web Media APIs CG and in collaboration with the CTA WAVE Project. Maintain the Road-map of Media Technologies for the Web which highlights Web technologies that can be used to build media applications and services, as well as known gaps to enable additional use cases. Create the future: Discuss perspectives for Media and Entertainment for the Web. Bring the power of GPUs to the Web (graphics, machine learning, heavy processing), under incubation in the GPU for the Web CG. Transition to a Working Group is under discussion. Determine next steps after the successful W3C Workshop on Web Games of June 2019. View the report. Timed Text  The Timed Text Working Group develops and maintains formats used for the representation of text synchronized with other timed media, like audio and video, and notably works on TTML, profiles of TTML, and WebVTT. Recent progress includes:  A robust WebVTT implementation report poises the specification for publication as a proposed recommendation. Discussions around re-chartering, notably to add a TTML Profile for Audio Description deliverable to the scope of the group, and clarify that rendering of captions within XR content is also in scope. Immersive Web  Hardware that enables Virtual Reality (VR) and Augmented Reality (AR) applications are now broadly available to consumers, offering an immersive computing platform with both new opportunities and challenges. The ability to interact directly with immersive hardware is critical to ensuring that the web is well equipped to operate as a first-class citizen in this environment.  The Immersive Web Working Group has been stabilizing the WebXR Device API while the companion Immersive Web Community Group incubates the next series of features identified as key for the future of the Immersive Web.  W3C plans a workshop focused on the needs and benefits at the intersection of VR &amp; Accessibility (Inclusive XR), on 5-6 November 2019 in Seattle, WA, USA, to explore existing and future approaches on making Virtual and Augmented Reality experiences more inclusive.  Web &amp; Telecommunications  The Web is the Open Platform for Mobile. Telecommunication service providers and network equipment providers have long been critical actors in the deployment of Web technologies. As the Web platform matures, it brings richer and richer capabilities to extend existing services to new users and devices, and propose new and innovative services.  Real-Time Communications (WebRTC)   All Real-Time Communications specifications  WebRTC has reshaped the whole communication landscape by making any connected device a potential communication end-point, bringing audio and video communications anywhere, on any network, vastly expanding the ability of operators to reach their customers. WebRTC serves as the corner-stone of many online communication and collaboration services.  The WebRTC Working Group aims to bringing WebRTC 1.0 (and companion specification Media Capture and Streams) to Recommendation by the end of 2019. Intense efforts are focused on testing (supported by a dedicated hackathon at IETF 104) and interoperability. The group is considering pushing features that have not gotten enough traction to separate modules or to a later minor revision of the spec.  Beyond WebRTC 1.0, the WebRTC Working Group will focus its efforts on WebRTC NV which the group has started documenting by identifying use cases.  Web &amp; Networks  Recently launched, in the wake of the May 2018 Web5G workshop, the Web &amp; Networks Interest Group is chaired by representatives from AT&amp;T, China Mobile and Intel, with a goal to explore solutions for web applications to achieve better performance and resource allocation, both on the device and network. The group's first efforts are around use cases, privacy &amp; security requirements and liaisons.  Automotive   All Automotive specifications  To create a rich application ecosystem for vehicles and other devices allowed to connect to the vehicle, the W3C Automotive Working Group is delivering a service specification to expose all common vehicle signals (engine temperature, fuel/charge level, range, tire pressure, speed, etc.)  The Vehicle Information Service Specification (VISS), which is a Candidate Recommendation, is seeing more implementations across the industry. It provides the access method to a common data model for all the vehicle signals –presently encapsulating a thousand or so different data elements– and will be growing to accommodate the advances in automotive such as autonomous and driver assist technologies and electrification.  The group is already working on a successor to VISS, leveraging the underlying data model and the VIWI submission from Volkswagen, for a more robust means of accessing vehicle signals information and the same paradigm for other automotive needs including location-based services, media, notifications and caching content.  The Automotive and Web Platform Business Group acts as an incubator for prospective standards work. One of its task forces is using W3C VISS in performing data sampling and off-boarding the information to the cloud. Access to the wealth of information that W3C's auto signals standard exposes is of interest to regulators, urban planners, insurance companies, auto manufacturers, fleet managers and owners, service providers and others. In addition to components needed for data sampling and edge computing, capturing user and owner consent, information collection methods and handling of data are in scope.  The upcoming W3C Workshop on Data Models for Transportation (September 2019) is expected to focus on the need of additional ontologies around transportation space.  Web of Things   All Web of Things specifications  W3C's Web of Things work is designed to bridge disparate technology stacks to allow devices to work together and achieve scale, thus enabling the potential of the Internet of Things by eliminating fragmentation and fostering interoperability.  Thing descriptions expressed in JSON-LD cover the behavior, interaction affordances, data schema, security configuration, and protocol bindings. The Web of Things complements existing IoT ecosystems to reduce the cost and risk for suppliers and consumers of applications that create value by combining multiple devices and information services. There are many sectors that will benefit, e.g. smart homes, smart cities, smart industry, smart agriculture, smart healthcare and many more.  The Web of Things Working Group is finishing the initial Web of Things standards, with support from the Web of Things Interest Group:  Web of Things Architecture Thing Descriptions Strengthening the Core of the Web HTML   The HTML Working Group was chartered early June to assist the W3C community in raising issues and proposing solutions for the HTML and DOM specifications, and to produce W3C Recommendations from WHATWG Review Drafts.  A few days before, W3C and the WHATWG signed a Memorandum of Understanding outlining the agreement to collaborate on the development of a single version of the HTML and DOM specifications.  Issues and proposed solutions for HTML and DOM done via the newly rechartered HTML Working Group in the WHATWG repositories  The HTML Working Group is targetting November 2019 to bring HTML and DOM to Candidate Recommendations.  CSS  All CSS specifications  CSS is a critical part of the Open Web Platform. The CSS Working Group gathers requirements from two large groups of CSS users: the publishing industry and application developers. Within W3C, those groups are exemplified by the Publishing groups and the Web Platform Working Group. The former requires things like better pagination support and advanced font handling, the latter needs intelligent (and fast!) scrolling and animations.  What we know as CSS is actually a collection of almost a hundred specifications, referred to as ‘modules’. The current state of CSS is defined by a snapshot, updated once a year. The group also publishes an index defining every term defined by CSS specifications.  Fonts   All Fonts specifications  The Web Fonts Working Group develops specifications that allow the interoperable deployment of downloadable fonts on the Web, with a focus on Progressive Font Enrichment as well as maintenance of WOFF Recommendations.  Recent and ongoing work includes:  Early API experiments by Adobe and Monotype have demonstrated the feasibility of a font enrichment API, where a server delivers a font with minimal glyph repertoire and the client can query the full repertoire and request additional subsets on-the-fly. In other experiments, the Brotli compression used in WOFF 2 was extended to support shared dictionaries and patch update. Metrics to quantify improvement are a current hot discussion topic. The group will meet at ATypi 2019 in Japan, to gather requirements from the international typography community. The group will first produce a report summarizing the strengths and weaknesses of each prototype solution by Q2 2020. SVG   All SVG specifications  SVG is an important and widely-used part of the Open Web Platform. The SVG Working Group focuses on aligning the SVG 2.0 specification with browser implementations, having split the specification into a currently-implemented 2.0 and a forward-looking 2.1. Current activity is on stabilization, increased integration with the Open Web Platform, and test coverage analysis.  The Working Group was rechartered in March 2019. A new work item concerns native (non-Web-browser) uses of SVG as a non-interactive, vector graphics format.  Audio  The Web Audio Working Group was extended to finish its work on the Web Audio API, expecting to publish it as a Recommendation by year end. The specification enables synthesizing audio in the browser. Audio operations are performed with audio nodes, which are linked together to form a modular audio routing graph. Multiple sources — with different types of channel layout — are supported. This modular design provides the flexibility to create complex audio functions with dynamic effects.  The first version of Web Audio API is now feature complete and is implemented in all modern browsers. Work has started on the next version, and new features are being incubated in the Audio Community Group.  Performance   Web Performance  All Web Performance specifications  There are currently 18 specifications in development in the Web Performance Working Group aiming to provide methods to observe and improve aspects of application performance of user agent features and APIs. The W3C team is looking at related work incubated in the W3C GPU for the Web (WebGPU) Community Group which is poised to transition to a W3C Working Group. A preliminary draft charter is available.  WebAssembly  All WebAssembly specifications  WebAssembly improves Web performance and power by being a virtual machine and execution environment enabling loaded pages to run native (compiled) code. It is deployed in Firefox, Edge, Safari and Chrome. The specification will soon reach Candidate Recommendation.  WebAssembly enables near-native performance, optimized load time, and perhaps most importantly, a compilation target for existing code bases. While it has a small number of native types, much of the performance increase relative to Javascript derives from its use of consistent typing. WebAssembly leverages decades of optimization for compiled languages and the byte code is optimized for compactness and streaming (the web page starts executing while the rest of the code downloads). Network and API access all occurs through accompanying Javascript libraries -- the security model is identical to that of Javascript.  Requirements gathering and language development occur in the Community Group while the Working Group manages test development, community review and progression of specifications on the Recommendation Track.  Testing  Browser testing plays a critical role in the growth of the Web by:  Improving the reliability of Web technology definitions; Improving the quality of implementations of these technologies by helping vendors to detect bugs in their products; Improving the data available to Web developers on known bugs and deficiencies of Web technologies by publishing results of these tests. Browser Testing and Tools  The Browser Testing and Tools Working Group is developing WebDriver version 2, having published last year the W3C Recommendation of WebDriver. WebDriver acts as a remote control interface that enables introspection and control of user agents, provides a platform- and language-neutral wire protocol as a way for out-of-process programs to remotely instruct the behavior of Web, and emulates the actions of a real person using the browser.  WebPlatform Tests   The WebPlatform Tests project now provides a mechanism which allows to fully automate tests that previously needed to be run manually: TestDriver.  TestDriver enables sending trusted key and mouse events, sending complex series of trusted pointer and key interactions for things like in-content drag-and-drop or pinch zoom, and even file upload.  Since 2014 W3C began work on this coordinated open-source effort to build a cross-browser test suite for the Web Platform, which WHATWG, and all major browsers adopted.  Web of Data   All Data specifications  There have been several great success stories around the standardization of data on the web over the past year.  Verifiable Claims seems to have significant uptake. It is also significant that the Distributed Identifier WG charter has received numerous favorable reviews, and was just recently launched. JSON-LD has been a major success with the large deployment on Web sites via schema.org.  JSON-LD 1.1 completed technical work, about to transition to CR More than 25% of websites today include schema.org data in JSON-LD The Web of Things description is in CR since May, making use of JSON-LD Verifiable Credentials data model is in CR since July, also making use of JSON-LD Continued strong interest in decentralized identifiers Engagement from the TAG with reframing core documents, such as Ethical Web Principles, to include data on the web within their scope Data is increasingly important for all organizations, especially with the rise of IoT and Big Data. W3C has a mature and extensive suite of standards relating to data that were developed over two decades of experience, with plans for further work on making it easier for developers to work with graph data and knowledge graphs.  Linked Data is about the use of URIs as names for things, the ability to dereference these URIs to get further information and to include links to other data. There are ever-increasing sources of open Linked Data on the Web, as well as data services that are restricted to the suppliers and consumers of those services.  The digital transformation of industry is seeking to exploit advanced digital technologies. This will facilitate businesses to integrate horizontally along the supply and value chains, and vertically from the factory floor to the office floor. W3C is seeking to make it easier to support enterprise-wide data management and governance, reflecting the strategic importance of data to modern businesses.  Traditional approaches to data have focused on tabular databases (SQL/RDBMS), Comma Separated Value (CSV) files, and data embedded in PDF documents and spreadsheets. We're now in midst of a major shift to graph data with nodes and labeled directed links between them. Graph data is:  Faster than using SQL and associated JOIN operations More favorable to integrating data from heterogeneous sources Better suited to situations where the data model is evolving In the wake of the recent W3C Workshop on Graph Data we are in the process of launching a Graph Standardization Business Group to provide a business perspective with use cases and requirements, to coordinate technical standards work and liaisons with external organizations.  Web for All Security, Privacy, Identity  All Security specifications, all Privacy specifications  Authentication on the Web   As the WebAuthn Level 1 W3C Recommendation published last March is seeing wide implementation and adoption of strong cryptographic authentication, work is proceeding on Level 2.  The open standard Web API gives native authentication technology built into native platforms, browsers, operating systems (including mobile) and hardware, offering protection against hacking, credential theft, phishing attacks, thus aiming to end the era of passwords as a security construct. You may read more in our March press release.  Privacy  An increasing number of W3C specifications are benefitting from Privacy and Security review; there are security and privacy aspects to every specification. Early review is essential. Working with the TAG, the Privacy Interest Group has updated the Self-Review Questionnaire: Security and Privacy.  Other recent work of the group includes public blogging further to the exploration of anti-patterns in standards and permission prompts.  Security  The Web Application Security Working Group adopted Feature Policy, aiming to allow developers to selectively enable, disable, or modify the behavior of some of these browser features and APIs within their application; and Fetch Metadata, aiming to provide servers with enough information to make a priori decisions about whether or not to service a request based on the way it was made, and the context in which it will be used.  The Web Payment Security Interest Group, launched last April, convenes members from W3C, EMVCo, and the FIDO Alliance to discuss cooperative work to enhance the security and interoperability of Web payments (read more about payments).  Internationalization (i18n)   All Internationalization specifications, educational articles related to Internationalization, spec developers checklist  Only a quarter or so current Web users use English online and that proportion will continue to decrease as the Web reaches more and more communities of limited English proficiency. If the Web is to live up to the \"World Wide\" portion of its name, and for the Web to truly work for stakeholders all around the world engaging with content in various languages, it must support the needs of worldwide users as they engage with content in the various languages. The growth of epublishing also brings requirements for new features and improved typography on the Web. It is important to ensure the needs of local communities are captured.  The W3C Internationalization Initiative was set up to increase in-house resources dedicated to accelerating progress in making the World Wide Web \"worldwide\" by gathering user requirements, supporting developers, and education &amp; outreach.  For an overview of current projects see the i18n radar. W3C's Internationalization efforts progressed on a number of fronts recently:  Requirements: New African and European language groups will work on the gap analysis, errata and layout requirements. Gap analysis: Japanese, Devanagari, Bengali, Tamil, Lao, Khmer, Javanese, and Ethiopic updated in the gap-analysis documents. Layout requirements document: notable progress tracked in the Southeast Asian Task Force while work continues on Chinese layout requirements. Developer support: Spec reviews: the i18n WG continues active review of specifications of the WHATWG and other W3C Working Groups. Short review checklist: easy way to begin a self-review to help spec developers understand what aspects of their spec are likely to need attention for internationalization, and points them to more detailed checklists for the relevant topics. It also helps those reviewing specs for i18n issues. Strings on the Web: Language and Direction Metadata lays out issues and discusses potential solutions for passing information about language and direction with strings in JSON or other data formats. The document was rewritten for clarity, and expanded. The group is collaborating with the JSON-LD and Web Publishing groups to develop a plan for updating RDF, JSON-LD and related specifications to handle metadata for base direction of text (bidi). User-friendly test format: a new format was developed for Internationalization Test Suite tests, which displays helpful information about how the test works. This particularly useful because those tests are pointed to by educational materials and gap-analysis documents. Web Platform Tests: a large number of tests in the i18n test suite have been ported to the WPT repository, including: css-counter-styles, css-ruby, css-syntax, css-test, css-text-decor, css-writing-modes, and css-pseudo. Education &amp; outreach: (for all educational materials, see the HTML &amp; CSS Authoring Techniques) Web Accessibility   All Accessibility specifications, WAI resources  The Web Accessibility Initiative supports W3C's Web for All mission. Recent achievements include:  Education and training: Inaccessibility of CAPTCHA updated to bring our analysis and recommendations up to date with CAPTCHA practice today, concluding two years of extensive work and invaluable input from the public (read more on the W3C Blog Learn why your web content and applications should be accessible. The Education and Outreach Working Group has completed revision and updating of the Business Case for Digital Accessibility. Accessibility guidelines: The Accessibility Guidelines Working Group has continued to update WCAG Techniques and Understanding WCAG 2.1; and published a Candidate Recommendation of Accessibility Conformance Testing Rules Format 1.0 to improve inter-rater reliability when evaluating conformance of web content to WCAG An updated charter is being developed to host work on \"Silver\", the next generation accessibility guidelines (WCAG 2.2) There are accessibility aspects to most specifications. Check your work with the FAST checklist.  Outreach to the world W3C Developer Relations   To foster the excellent feedback loop between Web Standards development and Web developers, and to grow participation from that diverse community, recent W3C Developer Relations activities include:  @w3cdevs tracks the enormous amount of work happening across W3C W3C Track during the Web Conference 2019 in San Francisco Tech videos: W3C published the 2019 Web Games Workshop videos The 16 September 2019 Developer Meetup in Fukuoka, Japan, is open to all and will combine a set of technical demos prepared by W3C groups, and a series of talks on a selected set of W3C technologies and projects W3C is involved with Mozilla, Google, Samsung, Microsoft and Bocoup in the organization of ViewSource 2019 in Amsterdam (read more on the W3C Blog) W3C Training   In partnership with EdX, W3C's MOOC training program, W3Cx offers a complete \"Front-End Web Developer\" (FEWD) professional certificate program that consists of a suite of five courses on the foundational languages that power the Web: HTML5, CSS and JavaScript. We count nearly 900K students from all over the world.  Translations  Many Web users rely on translations of documents developed at W3C whose official language is English. W3C is extremely grateful to the continuous efforts of its community in ensuring our various deliverables in general, and in our specifications in particular, are made available in other languages, for free, ensuring their exposure to a much more diverse set of readers.  Last Spring we developed a more robust system, a new listing of translations of W3C specifications and updated the instructions on how to contribute to our translation efforts.  W3C Liaisons   Liaisons and coordination with numerous organizations and Standards Development Organizations (SDOs) is crucial for W3C to:  make sure standards are interoperable coordinate our respective agenda in Internet governance: W3C participates in ICANN, GIPO, IGF, the I* organizations (ICANN, IETF, ISOC, IAB). ensure at the government liaison level that our standards work is officially recognized when important to our membership so that products based on them (often done by our members) are part of procurement orders. W3C has ARO/PAS status with ISO. 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      "readme": "<p align=\"center\">\n  <img src=\"static/img/drivefort-logo.png\" alt=\"DriveFort AI logo\" width=\"180\">\n</p>\n\n# DriveFort AI\n\n**Cybersecurity and resilient defense platform for connected and electric vehicles.**\n\n[![DriveFort AI CI](https://github.com/sarahalqaisi/DriveFort-AI/actions/workflows/ci.yml/badge.svg)](https://github.com/sarahalqaisi/DriveFort-AI/actions/workflows/ci.yml)\n[![Tests](https://img.shields.io/badge/tests-69%20passing-brightgreen)](#validation)\n[![V3 capabilities](https://img.shields.io/badge/V3%20capabilities-23%2F23-0b7285)](#complete-v3-capability-matrix)\n[![License](https://img.shields.io/badge/license-Apache--2.0-blue)](LICENSE)\n\n<p align=\"center\">\n  <img src=\"docs/screenshots/drivefort-dashboard.png\"\n       alt=\"DriveFort AI dashboard running in the repository's synthetic runtime\"\n       width=\"100%\">\n</p>\n\n## Why this matters\n\nConnected vehicles combine safety-critical controls, networked ECUs, sensors,\nsoftware updates, and cloud or fleet communication. DriveFort AI demonstrates\nhow those layers can be monitored and defended as one cyber-physical system:\ndetect an attack, explain the evidence, predict unsafe behavior, constrain\ncommands, recover trusted control, and preserve incident evidence.\n\n- **23/23 V3 security capabilities implemented** across backend APIs and the dashboard.\n- **69 automated tests passing** on the current repository state.\n- **33/33 offline API verification checks passing** in the synthetic runtime.\n\n> Benchmark values produced by the offline benchmark endpoint are **synthetic\n> analytical estimates**, not measured CARLA telemetry or real-world safety\n> evidence. See [Benchmark methodology](docs/BENCHMARK_METHODOLOGY.md).\n\nDriveFort AI is a controlled research and graduation-project platform. It is\nnot certified for public-road use or deployment as a production automotive\nsafety controller.\n\n## System architecture\n\n```mermaid\nflowchart LR\n    Runtime[\"Vehicle runtime<br/>CARLA 0.9.13 or synthetic mode\"]\n    Telemetry[\"Telemetry ingestion<br/>& attack simulation\"]\n    Detection[\"Detection, ECU trust<br/>& threat fusion\"]\n    Twin[\"Ghost digital twin<br/>& trajectory prediction\"]\n    Safety[\"Command validation<br/>& safety envelope\"]\n    Recovery[\"Mitigation, virtual ECU<br/>& recovery playbooks\"]\n    Outcomes[\"Forensics, reports,<br/>fleet/V2V & OTA security\"]\n\n    Runtime --> Telemetry\n    Telemetry --> Detection\n    Detection --> Twin\n    Twin --> Safety\n    Safety --> Recovery\n    Recovery --> Outcomes\n\n    Detection -. evidence .-> Outcomes\n    Twin -. counterfactual estimates .-> Outcomes\n```\n\nThe legacy-compatible simulation engine and CARLA bridge provide runtime state.\n`DriveFortV3Features` remains the orchestration facade, while dedicated V3\nservices handle threat fusion, benchmarking, recovery, fleet intelligence, OTA\nverification, and reporting. The facade does not monkey-patch the engine.\n\n## Demo in 60 seconds\n\n1. Start the application in the offline synthetic runtime:\n\n   ```bash\n   DRIVEFORT_ALLOW_MOCK=1 DRIVEFORT_RUNTIME_MODE=synthetic python app.py\n   ```\n\n2. Open `http://127.0.0.1:5000`, then select a supported attack scenario.\n3. Watch **Threat Fusion**, the **ECU Integrity Map**, and the **Ghost Digital\n   Twin** explain the emerging risk and predicted trajectory deviation.\n4. Activate protection or advance a **Recovery Playbook** to observe command\n   constraints, virtual ECU fallback, and lifecycle recovery.\n5. Run **Protected vs Unprotected Replay**, then inspect an executive,\n   technical, or forensic report.\n\nThis flow demonstrates application behavior and analytical models. It does not\nclaim physical validation. For simulator evidence, repeat the scenario with the\nsupported CARLA runtime and the validation checklist.\n\n## Capabilities by defense layer\n\n### Detection & threat intelligence\n\nThreat Confidence Fusion, ECU Integrity Map, AI Decision Explainer, DriveFort\nCopilot, Attack Graph, Time Machine, and Live Performance Score combine\nbehavioral, command, trust, and trajectory evidence.\n\n### Digital twin & safety\n\nGhost Digital Twin and Smart Safety Envelope compare actual and expected\nbehavior, predict unsafe deviation, and define constraints for vehicle commands.\n\n### Attack simulation\n\nProtected vs Unprotected Replay, Attack Chain Builder, Adaptive Attacker,\nStealth Attack Mode, Scenario Director, and Mission Control support repeatable\nsecurity demonstrations across synthetic and CARLA-compatible runtime paths.\n\n### Automated recovery\n\nVirtual Backup ECU and Automatic Recovery Playbooks demonstrate containment,\ntrusted fallback control, stabilization, and subsystem restoration.\n\n### Forensics & reporting\n\nIncident Storyboard, Evidence Integrity Verification, and executive, technical,\nand forensic reports preserve and communicate incident context.\n\n### Fleet & V2V security\n\nFleet Command Center and Vehicle-to-Vehicle Threat Sharing propagate security\nadvisories and policy state across the demonstration fleet.\n\n### OTA security\n\nOTA Security Center validates package hashes, HMAC signatures, compatible\nversions, secret configuration, and guarded demonstration-signing behavior.\n\n## Benchmark integrity\n\n`POST /api/v3/benchmark/run` currently creates deterministic **synthetic\ncounterfactual estimates**. Each completed result identifies:\n\n- its source and whether it was measured;\n- analytical model version, deterministic scenario ID, and scenario seed;\n- generation time and normalized benchmark evidence;\n- protected and unprotected metric categories, including detection latency,\n  maximum deviation, stabilization time, trust loss, and outcome.\n\nThe existing response fields remain available for compatibility. Synthetic\ncollision probability, deviation, latency, and recovery values must not be\npresented as measured simulator results. A result may be labeled\n`source: carla` and `measured: true` only when it comes from an instrumented\nCARLA run.\n\nFormulas, assumptions, rounding, reproducibility, CARLA evidence requirements,\nand limitations are documented in\n[docs/BENCHMARK_METHODOLOGY.md](docs/BENCHMARK_METHODOLOGY.md).\n\n## Runtime tracks\n\n### Modern development and Docker\n\nThe modern track supports Python 3.8 or newer. CI currently exercises Python\n3.10 and 3.12.\n\n```bash\npython -m venv .venv\nsource .venv/bin/activate       # Linux/macOS\n# .venv\\Scripts\\activate      # Windows\npip install -r requirements-dev.txt\npython app.py\n```\n\nOpen `http://127.0.0.1:5000`.\n\nDocker users can start the packaged service with:\n\n```bash\ndocker compose up --build\n```\n\n### Legacy CARLA 0.9.13\n\nCARLA 0.9.13 commonly uses a Python 3.7 wheel. Conditional dependencies retain\na Flask 2.2-compatible track for that environment.\n\n1. Start CARLA manually.\n2. Start DriveFort AI with the interpreter that can import the CARLA wheel.\n3. Select **Connect CARLA**, then **Spawn Vehicle**.\n4. Start normal driving and train the baseline.\n5. Open **V3 Innovation Lab** or run an adopted attack scenario.\n6. Follow [docs/VALIDATION_V3.md](docs/VALIDATION_V3.md) before describing any\n   output as measured simulator behavior.\n\nDo not enable mock mode when presenting claims about physical CARLA behavior.\n\n## Key implementation areas\n\n| Path | Responsibility |\n|---|---|\n| `app.py` | Flask application and legacy-compatible API integration |\n| `src/simulation_engine.py` | Synthetic/CARLA runtime orchestration |\n| `src/carla_bridge.py` | CARLA actor, telemetry, and control adapter |\n| `src/v3/advanced_features.py` | Backward-compatible V3 orchestration facade |\n| `src/v3/services.py` | Threat, benchmark, recovery, fleet, OTA, and reporting services |\n| `src/v3/benchmark.py` | Benchmark provenance and bounded evidence model |\n| `src/v3/api.py` | V3 Flask blueprint and endpoint contracts |\n| `src/v3/validation.py` | V3 request validation and consistent HTTP 400 errors |\n| `src/v3/reporting.py` | Dependency-free report PDF rendering |\n| `src/incident_store.py` | SQLite forensic ledger with SHA-256 hash chaining |\n| `templates/index.html` | Main dashboard |\n| `static/js/app.js` | Dashboard state rendering and controls |\n| `tests/` | Regression, API, security, feature, and UI-contract tests |\n\n## Complete V3 capability matrix\n\nThe grouped presentation above is the recommended project overview. This matrix\nretains the complete implementation inventory for technical review.\n\n| # | Capability | Defense area |\n|---:|---|---|\n| 1 | DriveFort Time Machine | Forensics & reporting |\n| 2 | Ghost Digital Twin | Digital twin & safety |\n| 3 | Protected vs Unprotected Replay | Attack simulation |\n| 4 | ECU Integrity Map | Detection & threat intelligence |\n| 5 | Smart Safety Envelope | Digital twin & safety |\n| 6 | AI Decision Explainer | Detection & threat intelligence |\n| 7 | DriveFort Copilot | Detection & threat intelligence |\n| 8 | Threat Confidence Fusion | Detection & threat intelligence |\n| 9 | Attack Chain Builder | Attack simulation |\n| 10 | Adaptive Attacker | Attack simulation |\n| 11 | Stealth Attack Mode | Attack simulation |\n| 12 | Virtual Backup ECU | Automated recovery |\n| 13 | Automatic Recovery Playbooks | Automated recovery |\n| 14 | Incident Storyboard | Forensics & reporting |\n| 15 | Evidence Integrity Verification | Forensics & reporting |\n| 16 | Three-Level Incident Reports | Forensics & reporting |\n| 17 | Automatic Attack Graph | Detection & threat intelligence |\n| 18 | Mission Control Mode | Attack simulation |\n| 19 | Scenario Director | Attack simulation |\n| 20 | Live Performance Score | Detection & threat intelligence |\n| 21 | Fleet Command Center | Fleet & V2V security |\n| 22 | Vehicle-to-Vehicle Threat Sharing | Fleet & V2V security |\n| 23 | OTA Security Center | OTA security |\n\n## V3 API\n\nAll V3 endpoints use the `/api/v3` prefix. Representative routes:\n\n| Purpose | Routes |\n|---|---|\n| System state | `GET /overview`, `GET /features`, `GET /mission-control` |\n| Detection and safety | `GET /threat-fusion`, `GET /ecu-integrity`, `GET /ghost-twin`, `GET /safety-envelope` |\n| Simulation | `POST /benchmark/run`, `POST /attack-chain/configure`, `POST /attack-chain/advance`, `POST /stealth/start` |\n| Recovery | `POST /virtual-ecu/activate`, `POST /recovery/playbook/prepare`, `POST /recovery/playbook/advance` |\n| Evidence and reports | `GET /time-machine`, `GET /evidence/verify`, `GET /report/<level>`, `GET /report/<level>/pdf` |\n| Fleet and updates | `GET /fleet`, `POST /v2v/share`, `POST /ota/verify` |\n\nSuccessful response contracts remain backward compatible. Invalid V3 POST\npayloads return HTTP 400 with a consistent JSON error object. V3 security-state\nresponses explicitly disable caching.\n\n## Environment configuration\n\nUse [.env.example](.env.example) as the configuration reference. Important\nsettings include:\n\n```text\nDRIVEFORT_HOST\nDRIVEFORT_PORT\nDRIVEFORT_DEBUG\nDRIVEFORT_ALLOW_MOCK\nDRIVEFORT_RUNTIME_MODE\nDRIVEFORT_COMMAND_SECRET\nDRIVEFORT_OTA_SECRET\nDRIVEFORT_OTA_DEMO_SIGNING\nDRIVEFORT_INCIDENT_DB\nCARLA_EXE_PATH\n```\n\nUse long random secrets outside isolated demonstrations. OTA verification\nrequires a secret of at least 32 bytes. See [SECURITY.md](SECURITY.md) for\nreporting and operational security guidance.\n\n## Validation\n\n```bash\npytest -q\npython verify_drivefort_v3.py\npython -m compileall -q app.py src tests\n```\n\nCurrent repository results:\n\n- **69 automated tests passed**\n- **33/33 offline V3 API checks passed**\n- **23/23 V3 capabilities represented**\n- Python compilation passed\n- GitHub Actions validates Python 3.10 and 3.12\n\nOffline checks validate application contracts and synthetic analytical behavior.\nThey cannot prove CARLA physics or real-vehicle safety. Use\n[docs/VALIDATION_V3.md](docs/VALIDATION_V3.md) for the simulator-specific\nvalidation boundary.\n\n## Project documentation\n\n- [Benchmark methodology](docs/BENCHMARK_METHODOLOGY.md)\n- [V3 validation guide](docs/VALIDATION_V3.md)\n- [CARLA integration](docs/CARLA_FULL_INTEGRATION.md)\n- [CARLA quick start](docs/carla_quickstart.md)\n- [Security policy](SECURITY.md)\n- [Contributing guide](CONTRIBUTING.md)\n- [Third-party notices](THIRD_PARTY_NOTICES.md)\n- [Changelog](CHANGELOG.md)\n- [Migration from ZoneGuard](docs/MIGRATION_FROM_ZONEGUARD.md)\n\n## License\n\nLicensed under the [Apache License 2.0](LICENSE).",
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      "title": "CAN Bus Intrusion Detection System (CAN IDS)",
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      "description": "Automotive CAN Bus Intrusion Detection System with ECU simulation, anomaly detection, attack correlation, and explainable cybersecurity analysis.",
      "readme": "# CAN Bus Intrusion Detection System (CAN IDS)\n\n![Python](https://img.shields.io/badge/Python-3.11-blue)\n![Status](https://img.shields.io/badge/Status-Simulation-orange)\n![Domain](https://img.shields.io/badge/Cybersecurity-Automotive-red)\n\n---\n\n## Overview\n\nThis project is a **simulated automotive CAN bus intrusion detection system** designed to model, detect, and analyze cyberattacks targeting in-vehicle communication networks.\n\nIt integrates:\n- ECU-level simulation (Engine, Brake, Gateway)\n- Attack injection framework\n- Real-time intrusion detection system (IDS)\n- Attack correlation and session tracking\n- Explainable security decision-making\n\nThe system is designed for **cybersecurity research, academic evaluation, and portfolio demonstration** in automotive security domains.\n\n## 🚀 Quick Start (Fresh Clone)\n\n### 1. Clone repository\n```bash\n    git clone <your-repo-url>\n    cd can-ids-project\n\n### Install dependencies\n    pip install -r requirements.txt\n\n### Setup CAN virtual interface (Linux only)\n    chmod +x setup_vcan.sh\n    ./setup_vcan.sh\n\n### Run the system\n    chmod +x run.sh\n    ./run.sh\n\n### Alternative (manual run)\n    python -m src.ecu.runner\n###  Save and exit\n\n    - Press `CTRL + X`\n    - Press `Y`\n    - Press `ENTER`\n\n## System Architecture\n\nThe simulated automotive environment consists of multiple Electronic Control Units (ECUs) communicating over a virtual CAN bus.\n\n### Architecture Flow\n\nECUs → CAN Bus → IDS Monitoring → Detection Engine → Correlation Layer → Explainability → Visualization\n\n### Architecture Diagram\n\n![CAN IDS Architecture](docs/diagrams/architecture.png)\n\n### Core Components\n\n### Engine ECU\nSimulates engine telemetry including RPM and temperature values.\n\n### Brake ECU\nSimulates braking pressure and braking-state messages.\n\n### Gateway ECU\nActs as the routing and communication coordination layer between simulated subsystems.\n\n### Attack ECU\nInjects malicious CAN traffic to simulate cyberattack scenarios such as spoofing and anomalous signal manipulation.\n\n### CAN IDS Core\nMonitors all bus traffic and performs anomaly detection.\n\n### Detection Engine\nIdentifies:\n\n- RPM spikes\n- Frequency anomalies\n- Message irregularities\n- Coordinated suspicious event sequences\n\n### Attack Intelligence Layer\nProvides:\n\n- Attack correlation\n- Campaign tracking\n- Phase detection\n- Session analysis\n\n### Explainability Engine\nGenerates interpretable reasoning for every detected anomaly.\n\n### Defensive Response Layer\nHandles:\n\n- Alert generation\n- Event logging\n- Blocking malicious activity\n\n## Detection Capabilities\n\nThe IDS analyzes CAN traffic for malicious patterns using multiple detection strategies.\n\n### RPM Spike Detection\nDetects sudden abnormal increases or decreases in engine RPM that indicate spoofed engine telemetry.\n\n### Frequency-Based Anomaly Detection\nMonitors CAN message transmission frequency to identify:\n\n- Flooding attacks\n- Message injection attempts\n- Timing irregularities\n\n### Attack Correlation\nCorrelates multiple suspicious events into larger attack campaigns.\n\nThis enables detection of:\n\n- Multi-stage attacks\n- Coordinated spoofing behavior\n- Escalating attack sequences\n\n### Session Tracking\nGroups related anomalies into attack sessions for forensic analysis.\n\n### Explainable Alerts\nEvery alert includes reasoning describing:\n\n- Trigger condition\n- Detection logic\n- Severity classification\n- Recommended interpretation\n\n## How to Run the System\n\n### Step 1: Setup Virtual CAN Interface\n\nInitialize the simulated CAN bus environment:\n\n\nbash scripts/start_vcan.sh\n\nTo stop the virtual CAN interface:\n\nbash scripts/stop_vcan.sh\n\n\n## Step 2: Install Dependencies\n\n### Install required Python packages:\n\n    pip install -r scripts/requirements.txt\n\n\n## Step 3: Start the CAN Simulation\n\n### Run the ECU simulation and IDS monitoring system:\n\n    python src/ecu/runner.py\n\n## Step 4: Launch Attack Simulation\n\n### Start malicious CAN traffic injection:\n    python src/attacks/attack_ecu.py\n\n## Step 5: Analyze IDS Output\n\n### Generate and review system results:\n    python scripts/generate_graphs.py\n    python scripts/analyze_alerts.py\n\n## Output Artifacts\n\n### After execution, the system generates:\n\n    results/alerts.json → detected intrusion events\n    results/attack_sessions.json → correlated attack campaigns\n    results/graphs/ → visualization of system behavior\n\n## Attack Scenarios\n\nThe system simulates multiple CAN bus attack vectors to evaluate IDS effectiveness under realistic automotive threat conditions.\n\n### 1. RPM Spoofing Attack\nThe Attack ECU injects falsified engine RPM values to simulate signal spoofing.\n\n- Target: Engine ECU\n- Effect: False engine state representation\n- Detection: Spike anomaly detection in RPM signal\n\n---\n\n### 2. Brake Pressure Manipulation\nMalicious messages modify brake pressure readings to simulate unsafe braking conditions.\n\n- Target: Brake ECU\n- Effect: Incorrect braking system state\n- Detection: Frequency + value deviation analysis\n\n---\n\n### 3. CAN Bus Flooding\nHigh-frequency message injection overwhelms the CAN network.\n\n- Target: Entire CAN bus\n- Effect: Message congestion and denial-of-service behavior\n- Detection: Frequency threshold violation\n\n---\n\n### 4. Coordinated Multi-Stage Attack\nSequential injection of multiple anomalies across ECUs to simulate advanced persistent attack behavior.\n\n- Stage 1: Reconnaissance traffic injection\n- Stage 2: Signal spoofing (RPM / Brake)\n- Stage 3: Persistent flooding\n- Detection: Attack correlation engine + session tracking\n\n## Results Interpretation\n\nThe CAN IDS is evaluated based on its ability to detect, correlate, and explain malicious activity across simulated automotive network conditions.\n\n### Detection Performance\n\nThe system successfully identifies:\n\n- Sudden RPM anomalies caused by spoofing attacks\n- Brake signal inconsistencies under manipulation\n- Abnormal message frequency patterns during flooding attacks\n\n### Correlation Capability\n\nIndividual suspicious events are aggregated into structured attack campaigns.\n\nThis enables the system to:\n\n- Distinguish isolated anomalies from coordinated attacks\n- Group related events into attack sessions\n- Reconstruct multi-stage intrusion behavior\n\n### Explainability Output\n\nEach detected event includes a human-readable explanation:\n\n- Why the event was flagged\n- Which rule or detector triggered it\n- Severity classification (low, medium, high)\n- Associated ECU and signal source\n\n### System Value\n\nThis project demonstrates how traditional automotive CAN systems can be extended with:\n\n- Real-time intrusion detection\n- Behavioral anomaly analysis\n- Attack lifecycle reconstruction\n- Interpretable security decision-making\n\nThe architecture is aligned with modern automotive cybersecurity research focusing on explainable and intelligent IDS systems.\n\n## System Architecture Diagram\n\nThe system is designed around a modular architecture that separates vehicle simulation, intrusion detection, and attack intelligence layers.\n\n### High-Level Flow\n\n- ECUs generate CAN messages (Engine, Brake, Gateway)\n- Attack ECU injects malicious traffic into the CAN bus\n- IDS monitors all bus traffic in real-time\n- Detection engine identifies anomalies and suspicious patterns\n- Intelligence layer correlates events into attack campaigns\n- Explainability module generates human-readable alerts\n- Visualization module produces analytical graphs\n\n### Planned Visualization\n\nThe architecture diagram represents:\n\n- ECU communication flow over CAN bus\n- Attack injection points\n- IDS monitoring layer placement\n- Data flow into detection and correlation engines\n- Output pipeline (alerts, graphs, reports)",
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      "title": "CAN Security Lab",
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      "description": "Automotive CAN bus security lab — replay, injection & DoS attacks with detection scripts and an ISO/SAE 21434-style TARA, built on a virtual CAN interface",
      "readme": "# CAN Security Lab\n\nA hands-on automotive cybersecurity lab demonstrating **replay attacks**,\n**message injection**, and **denial-of-service** simulation on a virtual\nCAN bus (`vcan0`), paired with detection scripts for each attack and a\nfull **ISO/SAE 21434-style TARA** (Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment).\n\nEvery claim in this repo — every attack, every detection result, every\nrisk rating — is backed by a script you can run yourself and a captured\nlog you can inspect. Where the simulation has real limitations (see\n[DoS findings](#3-dos-flood-simulation) below), that's stated explicitly\nrather than glossed over.\n\nBuilt as a follow-up to [can-sniffer-analyzer](https://github.com/d0ok/can-sniffer-analyzer),\nwhich covers passive traffic generation, capture, and analysis.\n\n## Why\n\nCAN (Controller Area Network) is the dominant in-vehicle communication\nprotocol, and it was designed in the 1980s with no message\nauthentication, encryption, or freshness guarantee. Any node with bus\naccess can impersonate any other node. This lab demonstrates that\nstructural weakness concretely, on a safe, fully virtual bus — no real\nvehicle or hardware required — and shows what basic detective controls\ncan and can't catch.\n\n## Repo structure\n```text\ncan-security-lab/\n├── scripts/\n│   ├── common/        # baseline traffic generator, log parser, lab startup helper\n│   ├── attacks/        # replay, injection, DoS attack + impact-analysis scripts\n│   └── detection/       # one detector per attack\n├── docs/\n│   ├── tara/            # ISO/SAE 21434-style TARA (scope, threats, risk matrix)\n│   └── plots/            # generated summary charts\n├── logs/                # sample captures from each attack\n└── requirements.txt\n```\n## Setup\n\n```bash\nsudo apt install -y can-utils python3-venv\nsudo modprobe vcan\nsudo ip link add dev vcan0 type vcan\nsudo ip link set up vcan0\n\npython3 -m venv venv\nsource venv/bin/activate\npip install -r requirements.txt\n```\n\n**Recommended: use the lab startup helper** instead of managing baseline\ntraffic + capture manually. It starts both, verifies the baseline is\nactually producing traffic, and cleans up on Ctrl+C:\n\n```bash\n./scripts/common/start_lab.sh logs/my_capture.log\n# wait for \"LAB READY\", then run any attack script in another terminal\n```\n\n## Simulated bus layout\n\n| ID    | Signal                  | Domain              | Period  |\n|-------|---------------------------|------------------------|---------|\n| 0x100 | Engine RPM                | Powertrain             | 20 ms   |\n| 0x200 | Vehicle speed              | Chassis                | 50 ms   |\n| 0x300 | Steering angle             | Chassis                | 10 ms   |\n| 0x400 | Door lock/unlock status    | Body                   | 500 ms  |\n| 0x500 | ECU heartbeat/counter      | Network management     | 1000 ms |\n| 0x7DF | Diagnostic request (OBD-II) | Diagnostics            | 2000 ms |\n\n## 1. Replay attack\n\nCaptures live frames for a target ID, then resends them later —\nCAN has no sequence number or timestamp to distinguish a replayed frame\nfrom a real one.\n\n```bash\npython3 scripts/attacks/replay_attack.py --id 0x400 \\\n    --capture-duration 5 --delay 5 --replay-count 5 --replay-interval 0.3\n```\n\n**Detection** — learns each ID's normal frame rate from a trusted\nbaseline, then flags time windows where an ID's rate significantly\nexceeds its own baseline (not payload repetition, which turned out to\nproduce false positives on naturally slow-changing signals — see the\ndetector's docstring for why):\n\n```bash\ncd scripts/detection\npython3 detect_replay.py ../../logs/replay_capture_clean.log\n```\n\n**Result:** cleanly flagged 15 consecutive anomalous windows for\n`id=0x400`, all correctly localized to the actual replay burst, with\nzero false positives on the other five IDs.\n\n## 2. Message injection\n\nTwo modes:\n\n- **`spoof`** — fabricate frames on an *existing* ID with an\n  attacker-chosen value (e.g. forcing RPM to an implausible fixed value)\n- **`rogue`** — inject frames on an ID that never appears in legitimate\n  traffic at all (simulating a compromised/rogue ECU)\n\n```bash\npython3 scripts/attacks/inject_attack.py --mode spoof --id 0x100 --value 8000 --count 30 --interval 0.05\npython3 scripts/attacks/inject_attack.py --mode rogue --id 0x666 --count 20 --interval 0.1\n```\n\n**Detection** — two independent checks: an unknown-ID allowlist (built\nfrom a trusted baseline), and a per-byte \"normal envelope\" learned from\nthe baseline, so signed values wrapping at zero or categorical status\nbytes don't trigger false positives the way a naive fixed-width\ninterpretation did in early development:\n\n```bash\npython3 detect_injection.py ../../logs/inject_rogue.log  --baseline-log ../../logs/replay_capture_clean.log\npython3 detect_injection.py ../../logs/inject_spoof.log --baseline-log ../../logs/replay_capture_clean.log\n```\n\n**Result:** rogue test flagged exactly `0x666`, zero false positives.\nSpoof test flagged 60 value-jump alerts, all on `0x100` byte 0, exactly\nmatching the injected RPM=8000 collisions against real (much lower)\nRPM values.\n\n## 3. DoS flood simulation\n\nFloods the bus with a fixed low ID (`0x000`) as fast as possible. On a\n**real** CAN bus, the lowest numeric ID always wins arbitration during a\nbus collision, so this would starve every other ECU at the electrical\nlayer. **`vcan0` is a software loopback with no electrical arbitration**,\nso this lab measured what a flood *actually* does on a virtual bus,\nrather than assuming the real-bus behavior would transfer automatically.\n\n```bash\npython3 scripts/attacks/dos_attack.py --id 0x000 --duration 10 --marker-file logs/dos_marker.json\n```\n\n### What was tested and found\n\n| Hypothesis | Method | Result |\n|--------------|----------|----------|\n| Flood degrades legitimate senders' timing | `analyze_dos_impact.py`, before/during/after jitter comparison across 3 IDs | **Not observed** — jitter was *lower* during the flood than baseline on all tested IDs |\n| Flood delays a receiver's frame processing | `dos_receiver_impact.py`, per-frame processing-lag measurement | **Not observed** — lag stayed sub-millisecond throughout, even at 700k+ total frames processed |\n| Flood causes packet loss in logging tools | Compared attacker's `frames_sent` (marker file) vs. frames actually captured in the log | **Confirmed** — of 2,107,914 frames sent in 10s, only 711,055 (34%) reached the log; kernel netdev stats showed zero drops, meaning the loss occurs in userspace tooling, not the bus/driver layer |\n\n**Honest conclusion:** this simulation does not demonstrate classic\nCAN bus-arbitration starvation (vcan0 can't reproduce that), but it does\ndemonstrate a real and arguably more practically important finding: **a\nflood attack can blind logging and monitoring tools during the exact\nwindow an attack is happening**, without needing to affect ECU-to-ECU\ndelivery at all.\n\n![Bus share during flood](docs/plots/dos_bus_share.png)\n![Packet loss in logging tool](docs/plots/dos_packet_loss.png)\n\n**Detection** — flags any ID responsible for a disproportionate share of\ntotal bus traffic:\n\n```bash\npython3 detect_dos.py ../../logs/dos_attack.log\n```\n\n**Result:** `0x000` flagged at 99.3% of total bus traffic, ~145,582 Hz\nobserved rate — unambiguous, no tuning required.\n\n## TARA — Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment\n\nFull write-up in [`docs/tara/`](docs/tara/), structured per **ISO/SAE\n21434**:\n\n1. [Scope, Assets & Damage Scenarios](docs/tara/01_scope_and_assets.md)\n2. [Threat Scenarios & Attack Feasibility](docs/tara/02_threat_scenarios_and_feasibility.md)\n3. [Risk Matrix & Countermeasures](docs/tara/03_risk_matrix_and_countermeasures.md)\n\n**Key finding:** all three spoofing-class threats (replay, value\ninjection, rogue-ID injection) rate as **Critical risk** — a direct\nconsequence of CAN 2.0's lack of native message authentication, not a\nflaw specific to this lab. The DoS flood rates as **High risk**, with\nits actual demonstrated impact being on logging/monitoring availability\nrather than bus-wide message delivery (see TARA doc 02 for the full\nfidelity discussion).\n\nEvery detector built in this lab is **passive, offline, and\ndetection-only** — none of them prevent an attack in real time, and the\nDoS findings show a severe-enough flood could itself blind a live\nversion of these tools. Recommended preventive controls (message\nauthentication / AUTOSAR SecOC, gateway segmentation, real-time IDS) are\ndocumented but intentionally out of scope for a software-only lab — see\nTARA doc 03 for the full list and reasoning.\n\n## Limitations\n\n- `vcan0` has no electrical layer, so bus-arbitration effects (a core\n  part of real CAN DoS) are not reproducible here — see Section 3 above.\n- Detectors use simple statistical baselines learned from a single\n  trusted capture; a production IDS would need continuous baseline\n  updates, redundant capture paths, and more robust anomaly models.\n- No message authentication (SecOC) or gateway segmentation is\n  simulated — this lab demonstrates the *absence* of those controls,\n  not an implementation of them.\n\n ## Disclaimer\n\nThis project is for **educational and research purposes only**, built\nand tested entirely on a virtual CAN interface (`vcan0`) with no\nconnection to any real vehicle, ECU, or hardware. It is intended to\ndemonstrate CAN bus security concepts in a safe, isolated environment.\n\nDo not use these scripts against any CAN bus, vehicle, or system you do\nnot own or do not have explicit written authorization to test. Running\nthese attacks (particularly the DoS flood or injection scripts) against\na real vehicle could cause malfunction, safety hazards, or damage, and\nmay be illegal depending on your jurisdiction.\n\nThe author provides this software \"as is\", for learning purposes, and\naccepts no responsibility for misuse or any damage resulting from its\nuse. See [LICENSE](LICENSE) for full terms.\n\n## License\n\nMIT",
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      "readme": "# Automotive IDS: ML anomaly detection on CAN traffic\n\n**Author:** Dhia Benothmen\n\nUnsupervised intrusion detection on the HCRL Car-Hacking dataset. All models\ntrain on **normal traffic only** and are evaluated per attack type (DoS, Fuzzy,\nGear spoofing, RPM spoofing).\n\n**Full write-up and threat model:** [`reports/security_report.md`](reports/security_report.md)\n**Analysis notebook:** [`notebook/analysis.ipynb`](notebook/analysis.ipynb)\n\n## Results (hybrid detector: ID whitelist + Isolation Forest)\n\n| Attack | Precision | Recall | F1 | FPR |\n|---|---|---|---|---|\n| DoS | 0.928 | 1.000 | 0.963 | 1.5% |\n| Fuzzy | 0.938 | 0.992 | 0.964 | 1.0% |\n| Gear spoofing | 0.832 | 0.981 | 0.900 | 3.1% |\n| RPM spoofing | 0.829 | 0.989 | 0.902 | 3.4% |\n\nMessage-level labels, full attack files. FPR is measured on normal messages\ninside attack files; far from any injection it falls to about 0.5%.\n\n![F1 by detector](reports/figures/f1_by_detector.png)\n\n## Main findings\n\n- A naive Isolation Forest **failed** (DoS F1 0.0002). It flagged legitimate\n  messages delayed by bus contention. Directional per-ID features fixed Gear/RPM (F1 about 0.90).\n- DoS and Fuzzy are largely solved by an ID whitelist **because the dataset's\n  attackers use IDs never seen in normal traffic**. This is a dataset property, not a general result.\n- An LSTM next-ID predictor **underperformed** the forest hybrid on every attack (documented as a negative result).\n\nSee the report for limitations (payload not modelled, rate-matched spoofing\nuntested, feature design informed by attack-file diagnostics).\n\n## Reproduce\n\n```bash\npython3 -m venv .venv && source .venv/bin/activate\npip install -r requirements.txt\n```\n\n1. **Get the data** (not included in this repo): download the Car-Hacking\n   dataset from the HCRL page\n   (https://sites.google.com/hksecurity.net/hcrl/Datasets/car-hacking-dataset)\n   and place `DoS_dataset.csv`, `Fuzzy_dataset.csv`, `gear_dataset.csv`,\n   `RPM_dataset.csv`, `normal_run_data.txt` in `data/raw/`.\n2. Run the pipeline in order:\n\n```bash\npython src/load_data.py          # CSV/TXT -> parquet (chunked, low memory)\npython src/features.py           # causal features\npython src/train_iforest.py      # v1 baseline\npython src/train_iforest_v2.py   # directional per-ID features\npython src/eval_hybrid.py        # whitelist + forest ablation\npython src/train_lstm.py         # LSTM (CPU: about 10 min)\npython src/compare_lstm.py\npython src/fpr_by_distance.py\npython src/make_figures.py\n```\n\nSeed 42 throughout. About 8 GB RAM recommended. Models and processed data are git-ignored.\n\n## Citation\n\nThis project uses the HCRL Car-Hacking dataset (Hacking and Countermeasure\nResearch Lab, Korea University), as its authors request, please cite:\n\n- Song, H. M., Woo, J., & Kim, H. K. (2020). In-vehicle network intrusion\n  detection using deep convolutional neural network. *Vehicular\n  Communications*, 21, 100198.\n- Seo, E., Song, H. M., & Kim, H. K. (2018). GIDS: GAN based Intrusion\n  Detection System for In-Vehicle Network. *2018 16th Annual Conference on\n  Privacy, Security and Trust (PST)*. IEEE.\n\nThe dataset is not redistributed here; download it from the HCRL page linked above.\n\n## License\n\nCode: MIT (see `LICENSE`). The dataset is not covered by this license; see the HCRL page for its terms.",
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      "description": "According to all known laws of aviation, there is no way that a bee should be able to fly. Its wings are too small to get its fat little body off the ground. The bee, of course, flies anyway. Because bees don’t care what humans think is impossible.” SEQ. 75 - “INTRO TO BARRY” INT. BENSON HOUSE - DAY ANGLE ON: Sneakers on the ground. Camera PANS UP to reveal BARRY BENSON’S BEDROOM ANGLE ON: Barry’s hand flipping through different sweaters in his closet. BARRY Yellow black, yellow black, yellow black, yellow black, yellow black, yellow black...oohh, black and yellow... ANGLE ON: Barry wearing the sweater he picked, looking in the mirror. BARRY (CONT’D) Yeah, let’s shake it up a little. He picks the black and yellow one. He then goes to the sink, takes the top off a CONTAINER OF HONEY, and puts some honey into his hair. He squirts some in his mouth and gargles. Then he takes the lid off the bottle, and rolls some on like deodorant. CUT TO: INT. BENSON HOUSE KITCHEN - CONTINUOUS Barry’s mother, JANET BENSON, yells up at Barry. JANET BENSON Barry, breakfast is ready! CUT TO: \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 1. INT. BARRY’S ROOM - CONTINUOUS BARRY Coming! SFX: Phone RINGING. Barry’s antennae vibrate as they RING like a phone. Barry’s hands are wet. He looks around for a towel. BARRY (CONT’D) Hang on a second! He wipes his hands on his sweater, and pulls his antennae down to his ear and mouth. BARRY (CONT'D) Hello? His best friend, ADAM FLAYMAN, is on the other end. ADAM Barry? BARRY Adam? ADAM Can you believe this is happening? BARRY Can’t believe it. I’ll pick you up. Barry sticks his stinger in a sharpener. SFX: BUZZING AS HIS STINGER IS SHARPENED. He tests the sharpness with his finger. SFX: Bing. BARRY (CONT’D) Looking sharp. ANGLE ON: Barry hovering down the hall, sliding down the staircase bannister. Barry’s mother, JANET BENSON, is in the kitchen. JANET BENSON Barry, why don’t you use the stairs? Your father paid good money for those. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 2. BARRY Sorry, I’m excited. Barry’s father, MARTIN BENSON, ENTERS. He’s reading a NEWSPAPER with the HEADLINE, “Queen gives birth to thousandtuplets: Resting Comfortably.” MARTIN BENSON Here’s the graduate. We’re very proud of you, Son. And a perfect report card, all B’s. JANET BENSON (mushing Barry’s hair) Very proud. BARRY Ma! I’ve got a thing going here. Barry re-adjusts his hair, starts to leave. JANET BENSON You’ve got some lint on your fuzz. She picks it off. BARRY Ow, that’s me! MARTIN BENSON Wave to us. We’ll be in row 118,000. Barry zips off. BARRY Bye! JANET BENSON Barry, I told you, stop flying in the house! CUT TO: SEQ. 750 - DRIVING TO GRADUATION EXT. BEE SUBURB - MORNING A GARAGE DOOR OPENS. Barry drives out in his CAR. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 3. ANGLE ON: Barry’s friend, ADAM FLAYMAN, standing by the curb. He’s reading a NEWSPAPER with the HEADLINE: “Frisbee Hits Hive: Internet Down. Bee-stander: “I heard a sound, and next thing I knew...wham-o!.” Barry drives up, stops in front of Adam. Adam jumps in. BARRY Hey, Adam. ADAM Hey, Barry. (pointing at Barry’s hair) Is that fuzz gel? BARRY A little. It’s a special day. Finally graduating. ADAM I never thought I’d make it. BARRY Yeah, three days of grade school, three days of high school. ADAM Those were so awkward. BARRY Three days of college. I’m glad I took off one day in the middle and just hitchhiked around the hive. ADAM You did come back different. They drive by a bee who’s jogging. ARTIE Hi Barry! BARRY (to a bee pedestrian) Hey Artie, growing a mustache? Looks good. Barry and Adam drive from the suburbs into the city. ADAM Hey, did you hear about Frankie? \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 4. BARRY Yeah. ADAM You going to his funeral? BARRY No, I’m not going to his funeral. Everybody knows you sting someone you die, you don’t waste it on a squirrel. He was such a hot head. ADAM Yeah, I guess he could’ve just gotten out of the way. The DRIVE through a loop de loop. BARRY AND ADAM Whoa...Whooo...wheee!! ADAM I love this incorporating the amusement park right into our regular day. BARRY I guess that’s why they say we don’t need vacations. CUT TO: SEQ. 95 - GRADUATION EXT. GRADUATION CEREMONY - CONTINUOUS Barry and Adam come to a stop. They exit the car, and fly over the crowd to their seats. * BARRY * (re: graduation ceremony) * Boy, quite a bit of pomp...under * the circumstances. * They land in their seats. BARRY (CONT’D) Well Adam, today we are men. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 5. ADAM We are. BARRY Bee-men. ADAM Amen! BARRY Hallelujah. Barry hits Adam’s forehead. Adam goes into the rapture. An announcement comes over the PA. ANNOUNCER (V.O) Students, faculty, distinguished bees...please welcome, Dean Buzzwell. ANGLE ON: DEAN BUZZWELL steps up to the podium. The podium has a sign that reads: “Welcome Graduating Class of:”, with train-station style flipping numbers after it. BUZZWELL Welcome New Hive City graduating class of... The numbers on the podium change to 9:15. BUZZWELL (CONT’D) ...9:15. (he clears his throat) And that concludes our graduation ceremonies. And begins your career at Honex Industries. BARRY Are we going to pick our job today? ADAM I heard it’s just orientation. The rows of chairs change in transformer-like mechanical motion to Universal Studios type tour trams. Buzzwell walks off stage. BARRY (re: trams) Whoa, heads up! Here we go. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 6. SEQ. 125 - “FACTORY” FEMALE VOICE (V.O) Keep your hands and antennas inside the tram at all times. (in Spanish) Dejen las manos y antennas adentro del tram a todos tiempos. BARRY I wonder what it’s going to be like? ADAM A little scary. Barry shakes Adam. BARRY AND ADAM AAHHHH! The tram passes under SIGNS READING: “Honex: A Division of Honesco: A Part of the Hexagon Group.” TRUDY Welcome to Honex, a division of Honesco, and a part of the Hexagon group. BARRY This is it! The Honex doors OPEN, revealing the factory. BARRY (CONT’D) Wow. TRUDY We know that you, as a bee, have worked your whole life to get to the point where you can work for your whole life. Honey begins when our valiant pollen jocks bring the nectar to the hive where our top secret formula is automatically color-corrected, scent adjusted and bubble contoured into this... Trudy GRABS a TEST TUBE OF HONEY from a technician. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 7. TRUDY (CONT’D) ...soothing, sweet syrup with its distinctive golden glow, you all know as... EVERYONE ON THE TRAM (in unison) H-o-n-e-y. Trudy flips the flask into the crowd, and laughs as they all scramble for it. ANGLE ON: A GIRL BEE catching the honey. ADAM (sotto) That girl was hot. BARRY (sotto) She’s my cousin. ADAM She is? BARRY Yes, we’re all cousins. ADAM Right. You’re right. TRUDY At Honex, we also constantly strive to improve every aspect of bee existence. These bees are stress testing a new helmet technology. ANGLE ON: A STUNT BEE in a HELMET getting hit with a NEWSPAPER, then a SHOE, then a FLYSWATTER. He gets up, and gives a “thumb’s up”. The graduate bees APPLAUD. ADAM (re: stunt bee) What do you think he makes? BARRY Not enough. TRUDY And here we have our latest advancement, the Krelman. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 8. BARRY Wow, what does that do? TRUDY Catches that little strand of honey that hangs after you pour it. Saves us millions. ANGLE ON: The Krelman machine. Bees with hand-shaped hats on, rotating around a wheel to catch drips of honey. Adam’s hand shoots up. ADAM Can anyone work on the Krelman? TRUDY Of course. Most bee jobs are small ones. But bees know that every small job, if it’s done well, means a lot. There are over 3000 different bee occupations. But choose carefully, because you’ll stay in the job that you pick for the rest of your life. The bees CHEER. ANGLE ON: Barry’s smile dropping slightly. BARRY The same job for the rest of your life? I didn’t know that. ADAM What’s the difference? TRUDY And you’ll be happy to know that bees as a species haven’t had one day off in 27 million years. BARRY So you’ll just work us to death? TRUDY (laughing) We’ll sure try. Everyone LAUGHS except Barry. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 9. The tram drops down a log-flume type steep drop. Cameras flash, as all the bees throw up their hands. The frame freezes into a snapshot. Barry looks concerned. The tram continues through 2 doors. FORM DISSOLVE TO: SEQ. 175 - “WALKING THE HIVE” INT. HONEX LOBBY ANGLE ON: The log-flume photo, as Barry looks at it. ADAM Wow. That blew my mind. BARRY (annoyed) “What’s the difference?” Adam, how could you say that? One job forever? That’s an insane choice to have to make. ADAM Well, I’m relieved. Now we only have to make one decision in life. BARRY But Adam, how could they never have told us that? ADAM Barry, why would you question anything? We’re bees. We’re the most perfectly functioning society on Earth. They walk by a newspaper stand with A SANDWICH BOARD READING: “Bee Goes Berserk: Stings Seven Then Self.” ANGLE ON: A BEE filling his car’s gas tank from a honey pump. He fills his car some, then takes a swig for himself. NEWSPAPER BEE (to the bee guzzling gas) Hey! Barry and Adam begin to cross the street. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 10. BARRY Yeah but Adam, did you ever think that maybe things work a little too well around here? They stop in the middle of the street. The traffic moves perfectly around them. ADAM Like what? Give me one example. BARRY (thinks) ...I don’t know. But you know what I’m talking about. They walk off. SEQ. 400 - “MEET THE JOCKS” SFX: The SOUND of Pollen Jocks. PAN DOWN from the Honex statue. J-GATE ANNOUNCER Please clear the gate. Royal Nectar Force on approach. Royal Nectar Force on approach. BARRY Wait a second. Check it out. Hey, hey, those are Pollen jocks. ADAM Wow. FOUR PATROL BEES FLY in through the hive’s giant Gothic entrance. The Patrol Bees are wearing fighter pilot helmets with black visors. ADAM (CONT’D) I’ve never seen them this close. BARRY They know what it’s like to go outside the hive. ADAM Yeah, but some of them don’t come back. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 11. The nectar from the pollen jocks is removed from their backpacks, and loaded into trucks on their way to Honex. A SMALL CROWD forms around the Patrol Bees. Each one has a PIT CREW that takes their nectar. Lou Loduca hurries a pit crew along: LOU LODUCA You guys did great! You’re monsters. You’re sky freaks! I love it! I love it! SCHOOL GIRLS are jumping up and down and squealing nearby. BARRY I wonder where those guys have just been? ADAM I don’t know. BARRY Their day’s not planned. Outside the hive, flying who-knows-where, doing who-knows-what. ADAM You can’t just decide one day to be a Pollen Jock. You have to be bred for that. BARRY Right. Pollen Jocks cross in close proximity to Barry and Adam. Some pollen falls off, onto Barry and Adam. BARRY (CONT’D) Look at that. That’s more pollen than you and I will ever see in a lifetime. ADAM (playing with the pollen) It’s just a status symbol. I think bees make too big a deal out of it. BARRY Perhaps, unless you’re wearing it, and the ladies see you wearing it. ANGLE ON: Two girl bees. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 12. ADAM Those ladies? Aren’t they our cousins too? BARRY Distant, distant. ANGLE ON: TWO POLLEN JOCKS. JACKSON Look at these two. SPLITZ Couple of Hive Harrys. JACKSON Let’s have some fun with them. The pollen jocks approach. Barry and Adam continue to talk to the girls. GIRL 1 It must be so dangerous being a pollen jock. BARRY Oh yeah, one time a bear had me pinned up against a mushroom. He had one paw on my throat, and with the other he was slapping me back and forth across the face. GIRL 1 Oh my. BARRY I never thought I’d knock him out. GIRL 2 (to Adam) And what were you doing during all of this? ADAM Obviously I was trying to alert the authorities. The girl swipes some pollen off of Adam with a finger. BARRY (re: pollen) I can autograph that if you want. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 13. JACKSON Little gusty out there today, wasn’t it, comrades? BARRY Yeah. Gusty. BUZZ You know, we’re going to hit a sunflower patch about six miles from here tomorrow. BARRY Six miles, huh? ADAM (whispering) Barry. BUZZ It’s a puddle-jump for us. But maybe you’re not up for it. BARRY Maybe I am. ADAM (whispering louder) You are not! BUZZ We’re going, oh-nine hundred at JGate. ADAM (re: j-gate) Whoa. BUZZ (leaning in, on top of Barry) What do you think, Buzzy Boy? Are you bee enough? BARRY I might be. It all depends on what oh-nine hundred means. CUT TO: SEQ. 450 - “THE BALCONY” \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 14. INT. BENSON HOUSE BALCONY - LATER Barry is standing on the balcony alone, looking out over the city. Martin Benson ENTERS, sneaks up behind Barry and gooses him in his ribs. MARTIN BENSON Honex! BARRY Oh, Dad. You surprised me. MARTIN BENSON (laughing) Have you decided what you’re interested in, Son? BARRY Well, there’s a lot of choices. MARTIN BENSON But you only get one. Martin LAUGHS. BARRY Dad, do you ever get bored doing the same job every day? MARTIN BENSON Son, let me tell you something about stirring. (making the stirring motion) You grab that stick and you just move it around, and you stir it around. You get yourself into a rhythm, it’s a beautiful thing. BARRY You know dad, the more I think about it, maybe the honey field just isn’t right for me. MARTIN BENSON And you were thinking of what, making balloon animals? That’s a bad job for a guy with a stinger. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 15. BARRY Well no... MARTIN BENSON Janet, your son’s not sure he wants to go into honey. JANET BENSON Oh Barry, you are so funny sometimes. BARRY I’m not trying to be funny. MARTIN BENSON You’re not funny, you’re going into honey. Our son, the stirrer. JANET BENSON You’re going to be a stirrer?! BARRY No one’s listening to me. MARTIN BENSON Wait until you see the sticks I have for you. BARRY I can say anything I want right now. I’m going to get an ant tattoo. JANET BENSON Let’s open some fresh honey and celebrate. BARRY Maybe I’ll pierce my thorax! MARTIN BENSON (toasting) To honey! BARRY Shave my antennae! JANET BENSON To honey! \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 16. BARRY Shack up with a grasshopper, get a gold tooth, and start calling everybody “Dawg.” CUT TO: SEQ. 760 - “JOB PLACEMENT” EXT. HONEX LOBBY - CONTINUOUS ANGLE ON: A BEE BUS STOP. One group of bees stands on the pavement, as another group hovers above them. A doubledecker bus pulls up. The hovering bees get on the top level, and the standing bees get on the bottom. Barry and Adam pull up outside of Honex. ADAM I can’t believe we’re starting work today. BARRY Today’s the day. Adam jumps out of the car. ADAM (O.C) Come on. All the good jobs will be gone. BARRY Yeah, right... ANGLE ON: A BOARD READING: “JOB PLACEMENT BOARD”. Buzzwell, the Bee Processor, is at the counter. Another BEE APPLICANT, SANDY SHRIMPKIN is EXITING. SANDY SHRIMPKIN Is it still available? BUZZWELL Hang on. (he looks at changing numbers on the board) Two left. And...one of them’s yours. Congratulations Son, step to the side please. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 17. SANDY SHRIMPKIN Yeah! ADAM (to Sandy, leaving) What did you get? SANDY SHRIMPKIN Picking the crud out. That is stellar! ADAM Wow. BUZZWELL (to Adam and Barry) Couple of newbies? ADAM Yes Sir. Our first day. We are ready. BUZZWELL Well, step up and make your choice. ANGLE ON: A CHART listing the different sectors of Honex. Heating, Cooling, Viscosity, Krelman, Pollen Counting, Stunt Bee, Pouring, Stirrer, Humming, Regurgitating, Front Desk, Hair Removal, Inspector No. 7, Chef, Lint Coordinator, Stripe Supervisor, Antennae-ball polisher, Mite Wrangler, Swatting Counselor, Wax Monkey, Wing Brusher, Hive Keeper, Restroom Attendant. ADAM (to Barry) You want to go first? BARRY No, you go. ADAM Oh my. What’s available? BUZZWELL Restroom attendant is always open, and not for the reason you think. ADAM Any chance of getting on to the Krelman, Sir? BUZZWELL Sure, you’re on. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 18. He plops the KRELMAN HAT onto Adam’s head. ANGLE ON: The job board. THE COLUMNS READ: “OCCUPATION” “POSITIONS AVAILABLE”, and “STATUS”. The middle column has numbers, and the right column has job openings flipping between “open”, “pending”, and “closed”. BUZZWELL (CONT’D) Oh, I’m sorry. The Krelman just closed out. ADAM Oh! He takes the hat off Adam. BUZZWELL Wax Monkey’s always open. The Krelman goes from “Closed” to “Open”. BUZZWELL (CONT’D) And the Krelman just opened up again. ADAM What happened? BUZZWELL Well, whenever a bee dies, that’s an opening. (pointing at the board) See that? He’s dead, dead, another dead one, deady, deadified, two more dead. Dead from the neck up, dead from the neck down. But, that’s life. ANGLE ON: Barry’s disturbed expression. ADAM (feeling pressure to decide) Oh, this is so hard. Heating, cooling, stunt bee, pourer, stirrer, humming, inspector no. 7, lint coordinator, stripe supervisor, antenna-ball polisher, mite wrangler-- Barry, Barry, what do you think I should-- Barry? Barry? \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 19. Barry is gone. CUT TO: SEQ. 775 - “LOU LODUCA SPEECH” EXT. J-GATE - SAME TIME Splitz, Jackson, Buzz, Lou and two other BEES are going through final pre-flight checks. Barry ENTERS. LOU LODUCA Alright, we’ve got the sunflower patch in quadrant nine. Geranium window box on Sutton Place... Barry’s antennae rings, like a phone. ADAM (V.O) What happened to you? Where are you? Barry whispers throughout. BARRY I’m going out. ADAM (V.O) Out? Out where? BARRY Out there. ADAM (V.O) (putting it together) Oh no. BARRY I have to, before I go to work for the rest of my life. ADAM (V.O) You’re going to die! You’re crazy! Hello? BARRY Oh, another call coming in. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 20. ADAM (V.O) You’re cra-- Barry HANGS UP. ANGLE ON: Lou Loduca. LOU LODUCA If anyone’s feeling brave, there’s a Korean Deli on 83rd that gets their roses today. BARRY (timidly) Hey guys. BUZZ Well, look at that. SPLITZ Isn’t that the kid we saw yesterday? LOU LODUCA (to Barry) Hold it son, flight deck’s restricted. JACKSON It’s okay Lou, we’re going to take him up. Splitz and Jackson CHUCKLE. LOU LODUCA Really? Feeling lucky, are ya? A YOUNGER SMALLER BEE THAN BARRY, CHET, runs up with a release waiver for Barry to sign. CHET Sign here. Here. Just initial that. Thank you. LOU LODUCA Okay, you got a rain advisory today and as you all know, bees cannot fly in rain. So be careful. As always, (reading off clipboard) watch your brooms, hockey sticks, dogs, birds, bears, and bats. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 21. Also, I got a couple reports of root beer being poured on us. Murphy’s in a home because of it, just babbling like a cicada. BARRY That’s awful. LOU LODUCA And a reminder for all you rookies, bee law number one, absolutely no talking to humans. Alright, launch positions! The Jocks get into formation, chanting as they move. LOU LODUCA (CONT’D) Black and Yellow! JOCKS Hello! SPLITZ (to Barry) Are you ready for this, hot shot? BARRY Yeah. Yeah, bring it on. Barry NODS, terrified. BUZZ Wind! - CHECK! JOCK #1 Antennae! - CHECK! JOCK #2 Nectar pack! - CHECK! JACKSON Wings! - CHECK! SPLITZ Stinger! - CHECK! BARRY Scared out of my shorts - CHECK. LOU LODUCA Okay ladies, let’s move it out. Everyone FLIPS their goggles down. Pit crew bees CRANK their wings, and remove the starting blocks. We hear loud HUMMING. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 22. LOU LODUCA (CONT'D) LOU LODUCA (CONT’D) Pound those petunia's, you striped stem-suckers! All of you, drain those flowers! A FLIGHT DECK GUY in deep crouch hand-signals them out the archway as the backwash from the bee wings FLUTTERS his jump suit. Barry follows everyone. SEQ. 800 - “FLYING WITH THE JOCKS” The bees climb above tree tops in formation. Barry is euphoric. BARRY Whoa! I’m out! I can’t believe I’m out! So blue. Ha ha ha! (a beat) I feel so fast...and free. (re: kites in the sky) Box kite! Wow! They fly by several bicyclists, and approach a patch of flowers. BARRY (CONT'D) Flowers! SPLITZ This is blue leader. We have roses visual. Bring it around thirty degrees and hold. BARRY (sotto) Roses. JACKSON Thirty degrees, roger, bringing it around. Many pollen jocks break off from the main group. They use their equipment to collect nectar from flowers. Barry flies down to watch the jocks collect the nectar. JOCK Stand to the side kid, it’s got a bit of a kick. The jock fires the gun, and recoils. Barry watches the gun fill up with nectar. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 23. BARRY Oh, that is one Nectar Collector. JOCK You ever see pollination up close? BARRY No, Sir. He takes off, and the excess pollen dust falls causing the flowers to come back to life. JOCK (as he pollinates) I pick some pollen up over here, sprinkle it over here, maybe a dash over there, pinch on that one...see that? It’s a little bit of magic, ain’t it? The FLOWERS PERK UP as he pollinates. BARRY Wow. That’s amazing. Why do we do that? JOCK ...that’s pollen power, Kid. More pollen, more flowers, more nectar, more honey for us. BARRY Cool. The Jock WINKS at Barry. Barry rejoins the other jocks in the sky. They swoop in over a pond, kissing the surface. We see their image reflected in the water; they’re really moving. They fly over a fountain. BUZZ I’m picking up a lot of bright yellow, could be daisies. Don’t we need those? SPLITZ Copy that visual. We see what appear to be yellow flowers on a green field. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 24. They go into a deep bank and dive. BUZZ Hold on, one of these flowers seems to be on the move. SPLITZ Say again...Are you reporting a moving flower? BUZZ Affirmative. SEQ. 900 - “TENNIS GAME” The pollen jocks land. It is a tennis court with dozens of tennis balls. A COUPLE, VANESSA and KEN, plays tennis. The bees land right in the midst of a group of balls. KEN (O.C) That was on the line! The other bees start walking around amongst the immense, yellow globes. SPLITZ This is the coolest. What is it? They stop at a BALL on a white line and look up at it. JACKSON I don’t know, but I’m loving this color. SPLITZ (smelling tennis ball) Smells good. Not like a flower. But I like it. JACKSON Yeah, fuzzy. BUZZ Chemical-y. JACKSON Careful, guys, it’s a little grabby. Barry LANDS on a ball and COLLAPSES. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 25. BARRY Oh my sweet lord of bees. JACKSON Hey, candy brain, get off there! Barry attempts to pulls his legs off, but they stick. BARRY Problem! A tennis shoe and a hand ENTER FRAME. The hand picks up the ball with Barry underneath it. BARRY (CONT'D) Guys! BUZZ This could be bad. JACKSON Affirmative. Vanessa walks back to the service line, BOUNCES the ball. Each time it BOUNCES, the other bees cringe and GASP. ANGLE ON: Barry, terrified. Pure dumb luck, he’s not getting squished. BARRY (with each bounce) Very close...Gonna Hurt...Mamma’s little boy. SPLITZ You are way out of position, rookie. ANGLE ON: Vanessa serving. We see Barry and the ball up against the racket as she brings it back. She tosses the ball into the air; Barry’s eyes widen. The ball is STRUCK, and the rally is on. KEN Coming in at you like a missile! Ken HITS the ball back. Barry feels the g-forces. ANGLE ON: The Pollen Jocks watching Barry pass by them in SLOW MOTION. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 26. BARRY (in slow motion) Help me! JACKSON You know, I don't think these are flowers. SPLITZ Should we tell him? JACKSON I think he knows. BARRY (O.S) What is this?! Vanessa HITS a high arcing lob. Ken waits, poised for the return. We see Barry having trouble maneuvering the ball from fatigue. KEN (overly confident) Match point! ANGLE ON: Ken running up. He has a killer look in his eyes. He’s going to hit the ultimate overhead smash. KEN (CONT'D) You can just start packing up Honey, because I believe you’re about to eat it! ANGLE ON: Pollen Jocks. JACKSON Ahem! Ken is distracted by the jock. KEN What? No! He misses badly. The ball rockets into oblivion. Barry is still hanging on. ANGLE ON: Ken, berating himself. KEN (CONT’D) Oh, you cannot be serious. We hear the ball WHISTLING, and Barry SCREAMING. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 27. BARRY Yowser!!! SEQ. 1000 - “SUV” The ball flies through the air, and lands in the middle of the street. It bounces into the street again, and sticks in the grille of an SUV. INT. CAR ENGINE - CONTINUOUS BARRY’S POV: the grille of the SUV sucks him up. He tumbles through a black tunnel, whirling vanes, and pistons. BARRY AHHHHHHHHHHH!! OHHHH!! EECHHH!! AHHHHHH!! Barry gets chilled by the A/C system, and sees a frozen grasshopper. BARRY (CONT’D) (re: grasshopper) Eww, gross. CUT TO: INT. CAR - CONTINUOUS The car is packed with a typical suburban family: MOTHER, FATHER, eight-year old BOY, LITTLE GIRL in a car seat and a GRANDMOTHER. A big slobbery DOG is behind a grate. Barry pops into the passenger compartment, hitting the Mother’s magazine. MOTHER There’s a bee in the car! They all notice the bee and start SCREAMING. BARRY Aaahhhh! Barry tumbles around the car. We see the faces from his POV. MOTHER Do something! \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 28. FATHER I’m driving! Barry flies by the little girl in her CAR SEAT. She waves hello. LITTLE GIRL Hi, bee. SON He’s back here! He’s going to sting me! The car SWERVES around the road. Barry flies into the back, where the slobbery dog SNAPS at him. Barry deftly avoids the jaws and gross, flying SPITTLE. MOTHER Nobody move. If you don’t move, he won’t sting you. Freeze! Everyone in the car freezes. Barry freezes. They stare at each other, eyes going back and forth, waiting to see who will make the first move. Barry blinks. GRANNY He blinked! Granny pulls out a can of HAIR SPRAY. SON Spray him, Granny! Granny sprays the hair spray everywhere. FATHER What are you doing? GRANNY It’s hair spray! Extra hold! MOTHER Kill it! Barry gets sprayed back by the hair spray, then sucked out of the sunroof. CUT TO: \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 29. EXT. CITY STREET - CONTINUOUS BARRY Wow. The tension level out here is unbelievable. I’ve got to get home. As Barry flies down the street, it starts to RAIN. He nimbly avoids the rain at first. BARRY (CONT’D) Whoa. Whoa! Can’t fly in rain! Can’t fly in rain! Can’t fly in-- A couple of drops hit him, his wings go limp and he starts falling. BARRY (CONT'D) Mayday! Mayday! Bee going down! Barry sees a window ledge and aims for it and just makes it. Shivering and exhausted, he crawls into an open window as it CLOSES. SEQ. 1100 - “VANESSA SAVES BARRY” INT. VANESSA’S APARTMENT - CONTINUOUS Inside the window, Barry SHAKES off the rain like a dog. Vanessa, Ken, Andy, and Anna ENTER the apartment. VANESSA Ken, can you close the window please? KEN Huh? Oh. (to Andy) Hey, check out my new resume. I made it into a fold-out brochure. You see? It folds out. Ken holds up his brochure, with photos of himself, and a resume in the middle. ANGLE ON: Barry hiding behind the curtains, as Ken CLOSES THE WINDOW. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 30. BARRY Oh no, more humans. I don’t need this. Barry HOVERS up into the air and THROWS himself into the glass. BARRY (CONT’D) (dazed) Ow! What was that? He does it again, and then multiple more times. BARRY (CONT'D) Maybe this time...this time, this time, this time, this time, this time, this time, this time. Barry JUMPS onto the drapes. BARRY (CONT'D) (out of breath) Drapes! (then, re: glass) That is diabolical. KEN It’s fantastic. It’s got all my special skills, even my top ten favorite movies. ANDY What’s your number one? Star Wars? KEN Ah, I don’t go for that, (makes Star Wars noises), kind of stuff. ANGLE ON: Barry. BARRY No wonder we’re not supposed to talk to them. They’re out of their minds. KEN When I walk out of a job interview they’re flabbergasted. They can’t believe the things I say. Barry looks around and sees the LIGHT BULB FIXTURE in the middle of the ceiling. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 31. BARRY (re: light bulb) Oh, there’s the sun. Maybe that’s a way out. Barry takes off and heads straight for the light bulb. His POV: The seventy-five watt label grows as he gets closer. BARRY (CONT’D) I don’t remember the sun having a big seventy five on it. Barry HITS the bulb and is KNOCKED SILLY. He falls into a BOWL OF GUACAMOLE. Andy dips his chip in the guacamole, taking Barry with it. ANGLE ON: Ken and Andy. KEN I’ll tell you what. You know what? I predicted global warming. I could feel it getting hotter. At first I thought it was just me. Barry’s POV: Giant human mouth opening. KEN (CONT’D) Wait! Stop! Beeeeeee! ANNA Kill it! Kill it! They all JUMP up from their chairs. Andy looks around for something to use. Ken comes in for the kill with a big TIMBERLAND BOOT on each hand. KEN Stand back. These are winter boots. Vanessa ENTERS, and stops Ken from squashing Barry. VANESSA (grabs Ken’s arm) Wait. Don’t kill him. CLOSE UP: on Barry’s puzzled face. KEN You know I’m allergic to them. This thing could kill me. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 32. VANESSA Why does his life have any less value than yours? She takes a GLASS TUMBLER and places it over Barry. KEN Why does his life have any less value than mine? Is that your statement? VANESSA I’m just saying, all life has value. You don’t know what he’s capable of feeling. Barry looks up through the glass and watches this conversation, astounded. Vanessa RIPS Ken’s resume in half and SLIDES it under the glass. KEN (wistful) My brochure. There’s a moment of eye contact as she carries Barry to the window. She opens it and sets him free. VANESSA There you go, little guy. KEN (O.C) I’m not scared of them. But, you know, it’s an allergic thing. ANDY (O.C) * Hey, why don’t you put that on your * resume-brochure? * KEN (O.C) It’s not funny, my whole face could puff up. ANDY (O.C) Make it one of your “Special Skills.” KEN (O.C) You know, knocking someone out is also a special skill. CUT TO: \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 33. EXT. WINDOWSILL - CONTINUOUS Barry stares over the window frame. He can’t believe what’s just happened. It is still RAINING. DISSOLVE TO: SEQ. 1200 - “BARRY SPEAKS” EXT. WINDOWSILL - LATER Barry is still staring through the window. Inside, everyone’s saying their good-byes. KEN Vanessa, next week? Yogurt night? VANESSA Uh, yeah sure Ken. You know, whatever. KEN You can put carob chips on there. VANESSA Good night. KEN (as he exits) Supposed to be less calories, or something. VANESSA Bye. She shuts the door. Vanessa starts cleaning up. BARRY I’ve got to say something. She saved my life. I’ve got to say something. Alright, here it goes. Barry flies in. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 34. INT. VANESSA’S APARTMENT - CONTINUOUS Barry hides himself on different PRODUCTS placed along the kitchen shelves. He hides on a Bumblebee Tuna can, and a “Greetings From Coney Island” MUSCLE-MAN POSTCARD on the fridge. BARRY (on fridge) What would I say? (landing on a bottle) I could really get in trouble. He stands looking at Vanessa. BARRY (CONT'D) It’s a bee law. You’re not supposed to talk to a human. I can’t believe I’m doing this. I’ve got to. Oh, I can’t do it! Come on! No, yes, no, do it! I can’t. How should I start it? You like jazz? No, that’s no good. Here she comes. Speak, you fool. As Vanessa walks by, Barry takes a DEEP BREATH. BARRY (CONT’D) (cheerful) Umm...hi. Vanessa DROPS A STACK OF DISHES, and HOPS BACK. BARRY (CONT’D) I’m sorry. VANESSA You’re talking. BARRY Yes, I know, I know. VANESSA You’re talking. BARRY I know, I’m sorry. I’m so sorry. VANESSA It’s okay. It’s fine. It’s just, I know I’m dreaming, but I don’t recall going to bed. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 35. BARRY Well, you know I’m sure this is very disconcerting. VANESSA Well yeah. I mean this is a bit of a surprise to me. I mean...you’re a bee. BARRY Yeah, I am a bee, and you know I’m not supposed to be doing this, but they were all trying to kill me and if it wasn’t for you...I mean, I had to thank you. It’s just the way I was raised. Vanessa intentionally JABS her hand with a FORK. VANESSA Ow! BARRY That was a little weird. VANESSA (to herself) I’m talking to a bee. BARRY Yeah. VANESSA I’m talking to a bee. BARRY Anyway... VANESSA And a bee is talking to me... BARRY I just want you to know that I’m grateful, and I’m going to leave now. VANESSA Wait, wait, wait, wait, how did you learn to do that? BARRY What? \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 36. VANESSA The talking thing. BARRY Same way you did, I guess. Mama, Dada, honey, you pick it up. VANESSA That’s very funny. BARRY Yeah. Bees are funny. If we didn’t laugh, we’d cry. With what we have to deal with. Vanessa LAUGHS. BARRY (CONT’D) Anyway. VANESSA Can I, uh, get you something? BARRY Like what? VANESSA I don’t know. I mean, I don’t know. Coffee? BARRY Well, uh, I don’t want to put you out. VANESSA It’s no trouble. BARRY Unless you’re making anyway. VANESSA Oh, it takes two minutes. BARRY Really? VANESSA It’s just coffee. BARRY I hate to impose. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 37. VANESSA Don’t be ridiculous. BARRY Actually, I would love a cup. VANESSA Hey, you want a little rum cake? BARRY I really shouldn’t. VANESSA Have a little rum cake. BARRY No, no, no, I can’t. VANESSA Oh, come on. BARRY You know, I’m trying to lose a couple micrograms here. VANESSA Where? BARRY Well... These stripes don’t help. VANESSA You look great. BARRY I don’t know if you know anything about fashion. Vanessa starts POURING the coffee through an imaginary cup and directly onto the floor. BARRY (CONT'D) Are you alright? VANESSA No. DISSOLVE TO: SEQ. 1300 - “ROOFTOP COFFEE” \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 38. EXT. VANESSA’S ROOF - LATER Barry and Vanessa are drinking coffee on her roof terrace. He is perched on her keychain. BARRY ...He can’t get a taxi. He’s making the tie in the cab, as they’re flying up Madison. So he finally gets there. VANESSA Uh huh? BARRY He runs up the steps into the church, the wedding is on... VANESSA Yeah? BARRY ...and he says, watermelon? I thought you said Guatemalan. VANESSA Uh huh? BARRY Why would I marry a watermelon? Barry laughs. Vanessa doesn’t. VANESSA Oh! Is that, uh, a bee joke? BARRY Yeah, that’s the kind of stuff that we do. VANESSA Yeah, different. A BEAT. VANESSA (CONT’D) So anyway...what are you going to do, Barry? \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 39. BARRY About work? I don’t know. I want to do my part for the hive, but I can’t do it the way they want. VANESSA I know how you feel. BARRY You do? VANESSA Sure, my parents wanted me to be a lawyer or doctor, but I wanted to be a florist. BARRY Really? VANESSA My only interest is flowers. BARRY Our new queen was just elected with that same campaign slogan. VANESSA Oh. BARRY Anyway, see there’s my hive, right there. You can see it. VANESSA Oh, you’re in Sheep Meadow. BARRY (excited) Yes! You know the turtle pond? VANESSA Yes? BARRY I’m right off of that. VANESSA Oh, no way. I know that area. Do you know I lost a toe-ring there once? BARRY Really? \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 40. VANESSA Yes. BARRY Why do girls put rings on their toes? VANESSA Why not? BARRY I don’t know. It’s like putting a hat on your knee. VANESSA Really? Okay. A JANITOR in the background changes a LIGHTBULB. To him, it appears that Vanessa is talking to an imaginary friend. JANITOR You all right, ma’am? VANESSA Oh, yeah, fine. Just having two cups of coffee. BARRY Anyway, this has been great. (wiping his mouth) Thanks for the coffee. Barry gazes at Vanessa. VANESSA Oh yeah, it’s no trouble. BARRY Sorry I couldn’t finish it. Vanessa giggles. BARRY (CONT'D) (re: coffee) If I did, I’d be up the rest of my life. Ummm. Can I take a piece of this with me? VANESSA Sure. Here, have a crumb. She takes a CRUMB from the plate and hands it to Barry. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 41. BARRY (a little dreamy) Oh, thanks. VANESSA Yeah. There is an awkward pause. BARRY Alright, well then, I guess I’ll see you around, or not, or... VANESSA Okay Barry. BARRY And thank you so much again, for before. VANESSA Oh that? BARRY Yeah. VANESSA Oh, that was nothing. BARRY Well, not nothing, but, anyway... Vanessa extends her hand, and shakes Barry’s gingerly. The Janitor watches. The lightbulb shorts out. The Janitor FALLS. CUT TO: SEQ. 1400 - “HONEX” INT. HONEX BUILDING - NEXT DAY ANGLE ON: A TEST BEE WEARING A PARACHUTE is in a wind tunnel, hovering through increasingly heavy wind. SIGNS UNDER A FLASHING LIGHT READ: “Test In Progress” & “Hurricane Survival Test”. 2 BEES IN A LAB COATS are observing behind glass. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 42. LAB COAT BEE 1 This can’t possibly work. LAB COAT BEE 2 Well, he’s all set to go, we may as well try it. (into the mic) Okay Dave, pull the chute. The test bee opens his parachute. He’s instantly blown against the rear wall. Adam and Barry ENTER. ADAM Sounds amazing. BARRY Oh, it was amazing. It was the scariest, happiest moment of my life. ADAM Humans! Humans! I can’t believe you were with humans! Giant scary humans! What were they like? BARRY Huge and crazy. They talk crazy, they eat crazy giant things. They drive around real crazy. ADAM And do they try and kill you like on TV? BARRY Some of them. But some of them don’t. ADAM How’d you get back? BARRY Poodle. ADAM Look, you did it. And I’m glad. You saw whatever you wanted to see out there, you had your “experience”, and now you’re back, you can pick out your job, and everything can be normal. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 43. ANGLE ON: LAB BEES examining a CANDY CORN through a microscope. BARRY Well... ADAM Well? BARRY Well, I met someone. ADAM You met someone? Was she Bee-ish? BARRY Mmm. ADAM Not a WASP? Your parents will kill you. BARRY No, no, no, not a wasp. ADAM Spider? BARRY You know, I’m not attracted to the spiders. I know to everyone else it’s like the hottest thing with the eight legs and all. I can’t get by that face. Barry makes a spider face. ADAM So, who is she? BARRY She’s a human. ADAM Oh no, no, no, no. That didn’t happen. You didn’t do that. That is a bee law. You wouldn’t break a bee law. BARRY Her name’s Vanessa. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 44. ADAM Oh, oh boy! BARRY She’s so-o nice. And she’s a florist! ADAM Oh, no. No, no, no! You’re dating a human florist? BARRY We’re not dating. ADAM You’re flying outside the hive. You’re talking to human beings that attack our homes with power washers and M-80’s. That’s 1/8 of a stick of dynamite. BARRY She saved my life. And she understands me. ADAM This is over. Barry pulls out the crumb. BARRY Eat this. Barry stuffs the crumb into Adam’s face. ADAM This is not over. What was that? BARRY They call it a crumb. ADAM That was SO STINGING STRIPEY! BARRY And that’s not even what they eat. That just falls off what they eat. Do you know what a Cinnabon is? ADAM No. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 45. BARRY It’s bread... ADAM Come in here! BARRY and cinnamon, ADAM Be quiet! BARRY and frosting...they heat it up-- ADAM Sit down! INT. ADAM’S OFFICE - CONTINUOUS BARRY Really hot! ADAM Listen to me! We are not them. We’re us. There’s us and there’s them. BARRY Yes, but who can deny the heart that is yearning... Barry rolls his chair down the corridor. ADAM There’s no yearning. Stop yearning. Listen to me. You have got to start thinking bee, my friend. ANOTHER BEE JOINS IN. ANOTHER BEE Thinking bee. WIDER SHOT AS A 3RD BEE ENTERS, popping up over the cubicle wall. 3RD BEE Thinking bee. EVEN WIDER SHOT AS ALL THE BEES JOIN IN. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 46. OTHER BEES Thinking bee. Thinking bee. Thinking bee. CUT TO: SEQ. 1500 - “POOLSIDE NAGGING” EXT. BACKYARD PARENT’S HOUSE - DAY Barry sits on a RAFT in a hexagon honey pool, legs dangling into the water. Janet Benson and Martin Benson stand over him wearing big, sixties sunglasses and cabana-type outfits. The sun shines brightly behind their heads. JANET BENSON (O.C) There he is. He’s in the pool. MARTIN BENSON You know what your problem is, Barry? BARRY I’ve got to start thinking bee? MARTIN BENSON Barry, how much longer is this going to go on? It’s been three days. I don’t understand why you’re not working. BARRY Well, I’ve got a lot of big life decisions I’m thinking about. MARTIN BENSON What life? You have no life! You have no job! You’re barely a bee! Barry throws his hands in the air. BARRY Augh. JANET BENSON Would it kill you to just make a little honey? Barry ROLLS off the raft and SINKS to the bottom of the pool. We hear his parents’ MUFFLED VOICES from above the surface. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 47. JANET BENSON (CONT'D) (muffled) Barry, come out from under there. Your father’s talking to you. Martin, would you talk to him? MARTIN BENSON Barry, I’m talking to you. DISSOLVE TO: EXT. PICNIC AREA - DAY MUSIC: “Sugar Sugar” by the Archies. Barry and Vanessa are having a picnic. A MOSQUITO lands on Vanessa’s leg. She SWATS it violently. Barry’s head whips around, aghast. They stare at each other awkwardly in a frozen moment, then BURST INTO HYSTERICAL LAUGHTER. Vanessa GETS UP. VANESSA You coming? BARRY Got everything? VANESSA All set. Vanessa gets into a one-man Ultra Light plane with a black and yellow paint scheme. She puts on her helmet. BARRY You go ahead, I’ll catch up. VANESSA (come hither wink) Don’t be too long. The Ultra Light takes off. Barry catches up. They fly sideby-side. VANESSA (CONT’D) Watch this! Vanessa does a loop, and FLIES right into the side of a mountain, BURSTING into a huge ball of flames. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 48. BARRY (yelling, anguished) Vanessa! EXT. BARRY’S PARENT’S HOUSE - CONTINUOUS ANGLE ON: Barry’s face bursting through the surface of the pool, GASPING for air, eyes opening in horror. MARTIN BENSON We’re still here, Barry. JANET BENSON I told you not to yell at him. He doesn’t respond when you yell at him. MARTIN BENSON Then why are you yelling at me? JANET BENSON Because you don’t listen. MARTIN BENSON I’m not listening to this. Barry is toweling off, putting on his sweater. BARRY Sorry Mom, I’ve got to go. JANET BENSON Where are you going? BARRY Nowhere. I’m meeting a friend. Barry JUMPS off the balcony and EXITS. JANET BENSON (calling after him) A girl? Is this why you can’t decide? BARRY Bye! JANET BENSON I just hope she’s Bee-ish. CUT TO: \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 49. SEQ. 1700 - “STREETWALK/SUPERMARKET” EXT. VANESSA’S FLORIST SHOP - DAY Vanessa FLIPS the sign to say “Sorry We Missed You”, and locks the door. ANGLE ON: A POSTER on Vanessa’s door for the Tournament of Roses Parade in Pasadena. BARRY So they have a huge parade of just flowers every year in Pasadena? VANESSA Oh, to be in the Tournament of Roses, that’s every florist’s dream. Up on a float, surrounded by flowers, crowds cheering. BARRY Wow, a tournament. Do the roses actually compete in athletic events? VANESSA No. Alright, I’ve got one. How come you don’t fly everywhere? BARRY It’s exhausting. Why don’t you run everywhere? VANESSA Hmmm. BARRY Isn’t that faster? VANESSA Yeah, okay. I see, I see. Alright, your turn. Barry and Vanessa walk/fly down a New York side street, no other pedestrians near them. BARRY Ah! Tivo. You can just freeze live TV? That’s insane. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 50. VANESSA What, you don’t have anything like that? BARRY We have Hivo, but it’s a disease. It’s a horrible, horrible disease. VANESSA Oh my. They turn the corner onto a busier avenue and people start to swat at Barry. MAN Dumb bees! VANESSA You must just want to sting all those jerks. BARRY We really try not to sting. It’s usually fatal for us. VANESSA So you really have to watch your temper? They ENTER a SUPERMARKET. CUT TO: INT. SUPERMARKET BARRY Oh yeah, very carefully. You kick a wall, take a walk, write an angry letter and throw it out. You work through it like any emotion-- anger, jealousy, (under his breath) lust. Barry hops on top of some cardboard boxes in the middle of an aisle. A stock boy, HECTOR, whacks him with a rolled up magazine. VANESSA (to Barry) Oh my goodness. Are you okay? \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 51. BARRY Yeah. Whew! Vanessa WHACKS Hector over the head with the magazine. VANESSA (to Hector) What is wrong with you?! HECTOR It’s a bug. VANESSA Well he’s not bothering anybody. Get out of here, you creep. Vanessa pushes him, and Hector EXITS, muttering. BARRY (shaking it off) What was that, a Pick and Save circular? VANESSA Yeah, it was. How did you know? BARRY It felt like about ten pages. Seventy-five’s pretty much our limit. VANESSA Boy, you’ve really got that down to a science. BARRY Oh, we have to. I lost a cousin to Italian Vogue. VANESSA I’ll bet. Barry stops, sees the wall of honey jars. BARRY What, in the name of Mighty Hercules, is this? How did this get here? Cute Bee? Golden Blossom? Ray Liotta Private Select? VANESSA Is he that actor? \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 52. BARRY I never heard of him. Why is this here? VANESSA For people. We eat it. BARRY Why? (gesturing around the market) You don’t have enough food of your own? VANESSA Well yes, we-- BARRY How do you even get it? VANESSA Well, bees make it... BARRY I know who makes it! And it’s hard to make it! There’s Heating and Cooling, and Stirring...you need a whole Krelman thing. VANESSA It’s organic. BARRY It’s our-ganic! VANESSA It’s just honey, Barry. BARRY Just...what?! Bees don’t know about this. This is stealing. A lot of stealing! You’ve taken our homes, our schools, our hospitals. This is all we have. And it’s on sale? I’m going to get to the bottom of this. I’m going to get to the bottom of all of this! He RIPS the label off the Ray Liotta Private Select. CUT TO: \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 53. SEQ. 1800 - “WINDSHIELD” EXT. BACK OF SUPERMARKET LOADING DOCK - LATER THAT DAY Barry disguises himself by blacking out his yellow lines with a MAGIC MARKER and putting on some war paint. He sees Hector, the stock boy, with a knife CUTTING open cardboard boxes filled with honey jars. MAN You almost done? HECTOR Almost. Barry steps in some honey, making a SNAPPING noise. Hector stops and turns. HECTOR (CONT’D) He is here. I sense it. Hector grabs his BOX CUTTER. Barry REACTS, hides himself behind the box again. HECTOR (CONT’D) (talking too loud, to no one in particular) Well, I guess I’ll go home now, and just leave this nice honey out, with no one around. A BEAT. Hector pretends to exit. He takes a couple of steps in place. ANGLE ON: The honey jar. Barry steps out into a moody spotlight. BARRY You’re busted, box boy! HECTOR Ah ha! I knew I heard something. So, you can talk. Barry flies up, stinger out, pushing Hector up against the wall. As Hector backs up, he drops his knife. BARRY Oh, I can talk. And now you’re going to start talking. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 54. Where are you getting all the sweet stuff? Who’s your supplier?! HECTOR I don’t know what you’re talking about. I thought we were all friends. The last thing we want to do is upset any of you...bees! Hector grabs a PUSHPIN. Barry fences with his stinger. HECTOR (CONT’D) You’re too late. It’s ours now! BARRY You, sir, have crossed the wrong sword. HECTOR You, sir, are about to be lunch for my iguana, Ignacio! Barry and Hector get into a cross-swords, nose-to-nose confrontation. BARRY Where is the honey coming from? Barry knocks the pushpin out of his hand. Barry puts his stinger up to Hector’s nose. BARRY (CONT'D) Tell me where?! HECTOR (pointing to a truck) Honey Farms. It comes from Honey Farms. ANGLE ON: A Honey Farms truck leaving the parking lot. Barry turns, takes off after the truck through an alley. He follows the truck out onto a busy street, dodging a bus, and several cabs. CABBIE Crazy person! He flies through a metal pipe on the top of a truck. BARRY OOOHHH! \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 55. BARRY (CONT'D) Barry grabs onto a bicycle messenger’s backpack. The honey farms truck starts to pull away. Barry uses the bungee cord to slingshot himself towards the truck. He lands on the windshield, where the wind plasters him to the glass. He looks up to find himself surrounded by what appear to be DEAD BUGS. He climbs across, working his way around the bodies. BARRY (CONT’D) Oh my. What horrible thing has happened here? Look at these faces. They never knew what hit them. And now they’re on the road to nowhere. A MOSQUITO opens his eyes. MOOSEBLOOD Pssst! Just keep still. BARRY What? You’re not dead? MOOSEBLOOD Do I look dead? Hey man, they will wipe anything that moves. Now, where are you headed? BARRY To Honey Farms. I am onto something huge here. MOOSEBLOOD I’m going to Alaska. Moose blood. Crazy stuff. Blows your head off. LADYBUG I’m going to Tacoma. BARRY (to fly) What about you? MOOSEBLOOD He really is dead. BARRY Alright. The WIPER comes towards them. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 56. MOOSEBLOOD Uh oh. BARRY What is that? MOOSEBLOOD Oh no! It’s a wiper, triple blade! BARRY Triple blade? MOOSEBLOOD Jump on. It’s your only chance, bee. They hang on as the wiper goes back and forth. MOOSEBLOOD (CONT'D) (yelling to the truck driver through the glass) Why does everything have to be so dog-gone clean?! How much do you people need to see? Open your eyes! Stick your head out the window! CUT TO: INT. TRUCK CAB SFX: Radio. RADIO VOICE For NPR News in Washington, I’m Carl Kasell. EXT. TRUCK WINDSHIELD MOOSEBLOOD But don’t kill no more bugs! The Mosquito is FLUNG off of the wiper. MOOSEBLOOD (CONT'D) Beeeeeeeeeeeeee! BARRY Moose blood guy! \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 57. Barry slides toward the end of the wiper, is thrown off, but he grabs the AERIAL and hangs on for dear life. Barry looks across and sees a CRICKET on another vehicle in the exact same predicament. They look at each other and SCREAM in unison. BARRY AND CRICKET Aaaaaaaaaah! ANOTHER BUG grabs onto the aerial, and screams as well. INT. TRUCK CAB - SAME TIME DRIVER You hear something? TRUCKER PASSENGER Like what? DRIVER Like tiny screaming. TRUCKER PASSENGER Turn off the radio. The driver reaches down and PRESSES a button, lowering the aerial. EXT. TRUCK WINDSHIELD - SAME TIME Barry and the other bug do a “choose up” to the bottom, Barry wins. BARRY Aha! Then he finally has to let go and gets thrown into the truck horn atop cab. Mooseblood is inside. MOOSEBLOOD Hey, what’s up bee boy? BARRY Hey, Blood! DISSOLVE TO: \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 58. INT. TRUCK HORN - LATER BARRY ...and it was just an endless row of honey jars as far as the eye could see. MOOSEBLOOD Wow. BARRY So I’m just assuming wherever this honey truck goes, that’s where they’re getting it. I mean, that honey’s ours! MOOSEBLOOD Bees hang tight. BARRY Well, we’re all jammed in there. It’s a close community. MOOSEBLOOD Not us, man. We’re on our own. Every mosquito is on his own. BARRY But what if you get in trouble? MOOSEBLOOD Trouble? You're a mosquito. You're in trouble! Nobody likes us. They’re just all smacking. People see a mosquito, smack, smack! BARRY At least you’re out in the world. You must meet a lot of girls. MOOSEBLOOD Mosquito girls try to trade up; get with a moth, dragonfly...mosquito girl don’t want no mosquito. A BLOOD MOBILE pulls up alongside. MOOSEBLOOD (CONT'D) Whoa, you have got to be kidding me. Mooseblood’s about to leave the building. So long bee. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 59. Mooseblood EXITS the horn, and jumps onto the blood mobile. MOOSEBLOOD (CONT'D) Hey guys. I knew I’d catch you all down here. Did you bring your crazy straws? CUT TO: SEQ. 1900 - “THE APIARY” EXT. APIARY - LATER Barry sees a SIGN, “Honey Farms” The truck comes to a stop. SFX: The Honey farms truck blares its horn. Barry flies out, lands on the hood. ANGLE ON: Two BEEKEEPERS, FREDDY and ELMO, walking around to the back of the gift shop. Barry follows them, and lands in a nearby tree FREDDY ...then we throw it in some jars, slap a label on it, and it’s pretty much pure profit. BARRY What is this place? ELMO Bees got a brain the size of a pinhead. FREDDY They are pinheads. The both LAUGH. ANGLE ON: Barry REACTING. They arrive at the back of the shop where one of them opens a SMOKER BOX. FREDDY (CONT’D) Hey, check out the new smoker. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 60. ELMO Oh, Sweet. That’s the one you want. FREDDY The Thomas 3000. BARRY Smoker? FREDDY 90 puffs a minute, semi-automatic. Twice the nicotine, all the tar. They LAUGH again, nefariously. FREDDY (CONT’D) Couple of breaths of this, and it knocks them right out. They make the honey, and we make the money. BARRY “They make the honey, and we make the money?” Barry climbs onto the netting of Freddy’s hat. He climbs up to the brim and looks over the edge. He sees the apiary boxes as Freddy SMOKES them. BARRY (CONT'D) Oh my. As Freddy turns around, Barry jumps into an open apiary box, and into an apartment. HOWARD and FRAN are just coming to from the smoking. BARRY (CONT’D) What’s going on? Are you okay? HOWARD Yeah, it doesn’t last too long. HE COUGHS a few times. BARRY How did you two get here? Do you know you’re in a fake hive with fake walls? HOWARD (pointing to a picture on the wall) \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 61. Our queen was moved here, we had no choice. BARRY (looking at a picture on the wall) This is your queen? That’s a man in women’s clothes. That’s a dragqueen! The other wall opens. Barry sees the hundreds of apiary boxes. BARRY (CONT'D) What is this? Barry pulls out his camera, and starts snapping. BARRY (CONT’D) Oh no. There’s hundreds of them. (V.O, as Barry takes pictures) Bee honey, our honey, is being brazenly stolen on a massive scale. CUT TO: SEQ. 2100 - “BARRY TELLS FAMILY” INT. BARRY’S PARENT’S HOUSE - LIVING ROOM - LATER Barry has assembled his parents, Adam, and Uncle Carl. BARRY This is worse than anything the bears have done to us. And I intend to do something about it. JANET BENSON Oh Barry, stop. MARTIN BENSON Who told you that humans are taking our honey? That’s just a rumor. BARRY Do these look like rumors? Barry throws the PICTURES on the table. Uncle Carl, cleaning his glasses with his shirt tail, digs through a bowl of nuts with his finger. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 62. HOWARD (CONT'D) UNCLE CARL That’s a conspiracy theory. These are obviously doctored photos. JANET BENSON Barry, how did you get mixed up in all this? ADAM (jumping up) Because he’s been talking to humans! JANET BENSON Whaaat? MARTIN BENSON Talking to humans?! Oh Barry. ADAM He has a human girlfriend and they make out! JANET BENSON Make out? Barry? BARRY We do not. ADAM You wish you could. BARRY Who’s side are you on? ADAM The bees! Uncle Carl stands up and pulls his pants up to his chest. UNCLE CARL I dated a cricket once in San Antonio. Man, those crazy legs kept me up all night. Hotcheewah! JANET BENSON Barry, this is what you want to do with your life? BARRY This is what I want to do for all our lives. Nobody works harder than bees. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 63. Dad, I remember you coming home some nights so overworked, your hands were still stirring. You couldn’t stop them. MARTIN BENSON Ehhh... JANET BENSON (to Martin) I remember that. BARRY What right do they have to our hardearned honey? We’re living on two cups a year. They’re putting it in lip balm for no reason what-soever. MARTIN BENSON Even if it’s true, Barry, what could one bee do? BARRY I’m going to sting them where it really hurts. MARTIN BENSON In the face? BARRY No. MARTIN BENSON In the eye? That would really hurt. BARRY No. MARTIN BENSON Up the nose? That’s a killer. BARRY No. There’s only one place you can sting the humans. One place where it really matters. CUT TO: SEQ. 2300 - “HIVE AT 5 NEWS/BEE LARRY KING” \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 64. BARRY (CONT'D) INT. NEWS STUDIO - DAY DRAMATIC NEWS MUSIC plays as the opening news sequence rolls. We see the “Hive at Five” logo, followed by shots of past news events: A BEE freeway chase, a BEE BEARD protest rally, and a BEAR pawing at the hive as the BEES flee in panic. BOB BUMBLE (V.O.) Hive at Five, the hive’s only full hour action news source... SHOTS of NEWSCASTERS flash up on screen. BOB BUMBLE (V.O.) (CONT'D) With Bob Bumble at the anchor desk... BOB has a big shock of anchorman hair, gray temples and overly white teeth. BOB BUMBLE (V.O.) (CONT'D) ...weather with Storm Stinger, sports with Buzz Larvi, and Jeanette Chung. JEANETTE is an Asian bee. BOB BUMBLE (CONT'D) Good evening, I’m Bob Bumble. JEANETTE CHUNG And I’m Jeanette Chung. BOB BUMBLE Our top story, a tri-county bee, Barry Benson... INSERT: Barry’s graduation picture. BOB BUMBLE (CONT'D) ...is saying he intends to sue the human race for stealing our honey, packaging it, and profiting from it illegally. CUT TO: \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 65. INT. BEENN STUDIO - BEE LARRY KING LIVE BEE LARRY KING, wearing suspenders and glasses, is interviewing Barry. A LOWER-THIRD CHYRON reads: “Bee Larry King Live.” BEE LARRY KING Don’t forget, tomorrow night on Bee Larry King, we are going to have three former Queens all right here in our studio discussing their new book, “Classy Ladies,” out this week on Hexagon. (to Barry) Tonight, we’re talking to Barry Benson. Did you ever think, I’m just a kid from the hive, I can’t do this? BARRY Larry, bees have never been afraid to change the world. I mean, what about Bee-Columbus? Bee-Ghandi? Be-geesus? BEE LARRY KING Well, where I’m from you wouldn’t think of suing humans. We were thinking more like stick ball, candy stores. BARRY How old are you? BEE LARRY KING I want you to know that the entire bee community is supporting you in this case, which is certain to be the trial of the bee century. BARRY Thank you, Larry. You know, they have a Larry King in the human world, too. BEE LARRY KING It’s a common name. Next week on Bee Larry King... \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 66. BARRY No, I mean he looks like you. And he has a show with suspenders and different colored dots behind him. BEE LARRY KING Next week on Bee Larry King... BARRY Old guy glasses, and there’s quotes along the bottom from the guest you’re watching even though you just heard them... BEE LARRY KING Bear week next week! They’re scary, they’re hairy, and they’re here live. Bee Larry King EXITS. BARRY Always leans forward, pointy shoulders, squinty eyes... (lights go out) Very Jewish. CUT TO: SEQ. 2400 - “FLOWER SHOP” INT. VANESSA’S FLOWER SHOP - NIGHT Stacks of law books are piled up, legal forms, etc. Vanessa is talking with Ken in the other room. KEN Look, in tennis, you attack at the point of weakness. VANESSA But it was my grandmother, Ken. She’s 81. KEN Honey, her backhand’s a joke. I’m not going to take advantage of that? \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 67. BARRY (O.C) Quiet please. Actual work going on here. KEN Is that that same bee? BARRY (O.C) Yes it is. VANESSA I’m helping him sue the human race. KEN What? Barry ENTERS. BARRY Oh, hello. KEN Hello Bee. Barry flies over to Vanessa. VANESSA This is Ken. BARRY Yeah, I remember you. Timberland, size 10 1/2, Vibram sole I believe. KEN Why does he talk again, Hun? VANESSA (to Ken, sensing the tension) Listen, you’d better go because we’re really busy working. KEN But it’s our yogurt night. VANESSA (pushing him out the door) Oh...bye bye. She CLOSES the door. KEN Why is yogurt night so difficult?! \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 68. Vanessa ENTERS the back room carrying coffee. VANESSA Oh you poor thing, you two have been at this for hours. BARRY Yes, and Adam here has been a huge help. ANGLE ON: A EMPTY CINNABON BOX with Adam asleep inside, covered in frosting. VANESSA How many sugars? BARRY Just one. I try not to use the competition. So, why are you helping me, anyway? VANESSA Bees have good qualities. BARRY (rowing on the sugar cube like a gondola) Si, Certo. VANESSA And it feels good to take my mind off the shop. I don’t know why, instead of flowers, people are giving balloon bouquets now. BARRY Yeah, those are great...if you’re 3. VANESSA And artificial flowers. BARRY (re: plastic flowers) Oh, they just get me psychotic! VANESSA Yeah, me too. BARRY The bent stingers, the pointless pollination. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 69. VANESSA Bees must hate those fake plastic things. BARRY There’s nothing worse than a daffodil that’s had work done. VANESSA (holding up the lawsuit documents) Well, maybe this can make up for it a little bit. CUT TO: EXT. VANESSA’S FLORIST SHOP They EXIT the store, and cross to the mailbox. VANESSA You know Barry, this lawsuit is a pretty big deal. BARRY I guess. VANESSA Are you sure that you want to go through with it? BARRY Am I sure? (kicking the envelope into the mailbox) When I’m done with the humans, they won’t be able to say, “Honey, I’m home,” without paying a royalty. CUT TO: SEQ. 2700 - “MEET MONTGOMERY” EXT. MANHATTAN COURTHOUSE - DAY P.O.V SHOT - A camera feed turns on, revealing a newsperson. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 70. PRESS PERSON #2 (talking to camera) Sarah, it’s an incredible scene here in downtown Manhattan where all eyes and ears of the world are anxiously waiting, because for the first time in history, we’re going to hear for ourselves if a honey bee can actually speak. ANGLE ON: Barry, Vanessa, and Adam getting out of the cab. The press spots Barry and Vanessa and pushes in. Adam sits on Vanessa’s shoulder. INT. COURTHOUSE - CONTINUOUS Barry, Vanessa, and Adam sit at the Plaintiff’s Table. VANESSA (turns to Barry) What have we gotten into here, Barry? BARRY I don’t know, but it’s pretty big, isn’t it? ADAM I can’t believe how many humans don’t have to be at work during the day. BARRY Hey, you think these billion dollar multinational food companies have good lawyers? CUT TO: EXT. COURTHOUSE STEPS - CONTINUOUS A BIG BLACK CAR pulls up. ANGLE ON: the grill filling the frame. We see the “L.T.M” monogram on the hood ornament. The defense lawyer, LAYTON T. MONTGOMERY comes out, squashing a bug on the pavement. CUT TO: \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 71. INT. COURTHOUSE - CONTINUOUS Barry SHUDDERS. VANESSA What’s the matter? BARRY I don’t know. I just got a chill. Montgomery ENTERS. He walks by Barry’s table shaking a honey packet. MONTGOMERY Well, if it isn’t the B-Team. (re: the honey packet) Any of you boys work on this? He CHUCKLES. The JUDGE ENTERS. SEQ. 3000 - “WITNESSES” BAILIFF All rise! The Honorable Judge Bumbleton presiding. JUDGE (shuffling papers) Alright...Case number 4475, Superior Court of New York. Barry Bee Benson vs. the honey industry, is now in session. Mr. Montgomery, you are representing the five major food companies, collectively. ANGLE ON: Montgomery’s BRIEFCASE. It has an embossed emblem of an EAGLE, holding a gavel in one talon and a briefcase in the other. MONTGOMERY A privilege. JUDGE Mr. Benson. Barry STANDS. JUDGE (CONT’D) You are representing all bees of the world? \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 72. Montgomery, the stenographer, and the jury lean in. CUT TO: EXT. COURTHOUSE - CONTINUOUS The spectators outside freeze. The helicopters angle forward to listen closely. CUT TO: INT. COURTHOUSE BARRY Bzzz bzzz bzzz...Ahh, I’m kidding, I’m kidding. Yes, your honor. We are ready to proceed. ANGLE ON: Courtroom hub-bub. JUDGE And Mr. Montgomery, your opening statement, please. Montgomery rises. MONTGOMERY (grumbles, clears his throat) Ladies and gentlemen of the jury. My grandmother was a simple woman. Born on a farm, she believed it was man's divine right to benefit from the bounty of nature God put before us. If we were to live in the topsy-turvy world Mr. Benson imagines, just think of what it would mean. Maybe I would have to negotiate with the silk worm for the elastic in my britches. Talking bee. How do we know this isn’t some sort of holographic motion picture capture Hollywood wizardry? They could be using laser beams, robotics, ventriloquism, cloning...for all we know he could be on steroids! Montgomery leers at Barry, who moves to the stand. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 73. JUDGE Mr. Benson? Barry makes his opening statement. BARRY Ladies and Gentlemen of the jury, there’s no trickery here. I’m just an ordinary bee. And as a bee, honey’s pretty important to me. It’s important to all bees. We invented it, we make it, and we protect it with our lives. Unfortunately, there are some people in this room who think they can take whatever they want from us cause we’re the little guys. And what I’m hoping is that after this is all over, you’ll see how by taking our honey, you’re not only taking away everything we have, but everything we are. ANGLE ON: Vanessa smiling. ANGLE ON: The BEE GALLERY wiping tears away. CUT TO: INT. BENSON HOUSE Barry’s family is watching the case on TV. JANET BENSON Oh, I wish he would dress like that all the time. So nice... CUT TO: INT. COURTROOM - LATER JUDGE Call your first witness. CUT TO: \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 74. INT. COURTHOUSE - LATER BARRY So, Mr. Klauss Vanderhayden of Honey Farms. Pretty big company you have there? MR. VANDERHAYDEN I suppose so. BARRY And I see you also own HoneyBurton, and Hon-Ron. MR. VANDERHAYDEN Yes. They provide beekeepers for our farms. BARRY Beekeeper. I find that to be a very disturbing term, I have to say. I don’t imagine you employ any bee free-ers, do you? MR. VANDERHAYDEN No. BARRY I’m sorry. I couldn’t hear you. MR. VANDERHAYDEN (louder) No. BARRY No. Because you don’t free bees. You keep bees. And not only that, it seems you thought a bear would be an appropriate image for a jar of honey? MR. VANDERHAYDEN Well, they’re very lovable creatures. Yogi-bear, Fozzy-bear, Build-a-bear. BARRY Yeah, you mean like this?! Vanessa and the SUPERINTENDANT from her building ENTER with a GIANT FEROCIOUS GRIZZLY BEAR. He has a neck collar and chains extending from either side. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 75. By pulling the chains, they bring him directly in front of Vanderhayden. The bear LUNGES and ROARS. BARRY (CONT'D) Bears kill bees! How would you like his big hairy head crashing into your living room? Biting into your couch, spitting out your throwpillows...rowr, rowr! The bear REACTS. BEAR Rowr!! BARRY Okay, that’s enough. Take him away. Vanessa and the Superintendant pull the bear out of the courtroom. Vanderhayden TREMBLES. The judge GLARES at him. CUT TO: INT. COURTROOM- A LITTLE LATER Barry questions STING. BARRY So, Mr. Sting. Thank you for being here. Your name intrigues me, I have to say. Where have I heard it before? STING I was with a band called \"The Police\". BARRY But you've never been a police officer of any kind, have you? STING No, I haven't. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 76. BARRY No, you haven’t. And so, here we have yet another example of bee culture being casually stolen by a human for nothing more than a prance-about stage name. STING Oh please. BARRY Have you ever been stung, Mr. Sting? Because I'm feeling a little stung, Sting. Or should I say, (looking in folder) Mr. Gordon M. Sumner? The jury GASPS. MONTGOMERY (to his aides) That’s not his real name? You idiots! CUT TO: INT. COURTHOUSE- LATER BARRY Mr. Liotta, first may I offer my belated congratulations on your Emmy win for a guest spot on E.R. in 2005. LIOTTA Thank you. Thank you. Liotta LAUGHS MANIACALLY. BARRY I also see from your resume that you’re devilishly handsome, but with a churning inner turmoil that’s always ready to blow. LIOTTA I enjoy what I do. Is that a crime? \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 77. BARRY Not yet it isn’t. But is this what it’s come to for you, Mr. Liotta? Exploiting tiny helpless bees so you don’t have to rehearse your part, and learn your lines, Sir? LIOTTA Watch it Benson, I could blow right now. BARRY This isn’t a goodfella. This is a badfella! LIOTTA (exploding, trying to smash Barry with the Emmy) Why doesn’t someone just step on this little creep and we can all go home? You’re all thinking it. Say it! JUDGE Order! Order in this courtroom! A MONTAGE OF NEWSPAPER HEADLINES FOLLOWS: NEW YORK POST: “Bees to Humans: Buzz Off”. NEW YORK TELEGRAM: “Sue Bee”. DAILY VARIETY: “Studio Dumps Liotta Project. Slams Door on Unlawful Entry 2.” CUT TO: SEQ. 3175 - “CANDLELIGHT DINNER” INT. VANESSA’S APARTMENT Barry and Vanessa are having a candle light dinner. Visible behind Barry is a “LITTLE MISSY” SET BOX, with the flaps open. BARRY Well, I just think that was awfully nice of that bear to pitch in like that. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 78. VANESSA I’m telling you, I think the jury’s on our side. BARRY Are we doing everything right...you know, legally? VANESSA I’m a florist. BARRY Right, right. Barry raises his glass. BARRY (CONT’D) Well, here’s to a great team. VANESSA To a great team. They toast. Ken ENTERS KEN Well hello. VANESSA Oh...Ken. BARRY Hello. VANESSA I didn’t think you were coming. KEN No, I was just late. I tried to call. But, (holding his cell phone) the battery... VANESSA I didn’t want all this to go to waste, so I called Barry. Luckily he was free. BARRY Yeah. KEN (gritting his teeth) Oh, that was lucky. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 79. VANESSA Well, there’s still a little left. I could heat it up. KEN Yeah, heat it up. Sure, whatever. Vanessa EXITS. Ken and Barry look at each other as Barry eats. BARRY So, I hear you’re quite a tennis player. I’m not much for the game myself. I find the ball a little grabby. KEN That’s where I usually sit. Right there. VANESSA (O.C) Ken, Barry was looking at your resume, and he agreed with me that “eating with chopsticks” isn’t really a special skill. KEN (to Barry) You think I don’t see what you’re doing? BARRY Hey look, I know how hard it is trying to find the right job. We certainly have that in common. KEN Do we? BARRY Well, bees have 100% employment, of course. But we do jobs like taking the crud out. KEN That’s just what I was thinking about doing. Ken holds his table knife up. It slips out of his hand. He goes under the table to pick it up. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 80. VANESSA Ken, I let Barry borrow your razor for his fuzz. I hope that was alright. Ken hits his head on the table. BARRY I’m going to go drain the old stinger. KEN Yeah, you do that. Barry EXITS to the bathroom, grabbing a small piece of a VARIETY MAGAZINE on the way. BARRY Oh, look at that. Ken slams the champagne down on the table. Ken closes his eyes and buries his face in his hands. He grabs a magazine on the way into the bathroom. SEQ. 2800 - “BARRY FIGHTS KEN” INT. BATHROOM - CONTINUOUS Ken ENTERS, closes the door behind him. He’s not happy. Barry is washing his hands. He glances back at Ken. KEN You know, I’ve just about had it with your little mind games. BARRY What’s that? KEN Italian Vogue. BARRY Mamma Mia, that’s a lot of pages. KEN It’s a lot of ads. BARRY Remember what Van said. Why is your life any more valuable than mine? \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 81. KEN It’s funny, I just can’t seem to recall that! Ken WHACKS at Barry with the magazine. He misses and KNOCKS EVERYTHING OFF THE VANITY. Ken grabs a can of AIR FRESHENER. KEN (CONT'D) I think something stinks in here. He sprays at Barry. BARRY I love the smell of flowers. KEN Yeah? How do you like the smell of flames? Ken lights the stream. BARRY Not as much. Barry flies in a circle. Ken, trying to stay with him, spins in place. ANGLE ON: Flames outside the bathroom door. Ken slips on the Italian Vogue, falls backward into the shower, pulling down the shower curtain. The can hits him in the head, followed by the shower curtain rod, and the rubber duck. Ken reaches back, grabs the handheld shower head. He whips around, looking for Barry. ANGLE ON: A WATERBUG near the drain. WATERBUG Waterbug. Not taking sides. Barry is on the toilet tank. He comes out from behind a shampoo bottle, wearing a chapstick cap as a helmet. BARRY Ken, look at me! I’m wearing a chapstick hat. This is pathetic. ANGLE ON: Ken turning the hand shower nozzle from “GENTLE”, to “TURBO”, to “LETHAL”. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 82. KEN I’ve got issues! Ken fires the water at Barry, knocking him into the toilet. The items from the vanity (emory board, lipstick, eye curler, etc.) are on the toilet seat. Ken looks down at Barry. KEN (CONT'D) Well well well, a royal flush. BARRY You’re bluffing. KEN Am I? Ken flushes the toilet. Barry grabs the Emory board and uses it to surf. He puts his hand in the water while he’s surfing. Some water splashes on Ken. BARRY Surf’s up, dude! KEN Awww, poo water! He does some skate board-style half-pipe riding. Barry surfs out of the toilet. BARRY That bowl is gnarly. Ken tries to get a shot at him with the toilet brush. KEN Except for those dirty yellow rings. Vanessa ENTERS. VANESSA Kenneth! What are you doing? KEN You know what? I don’t even like honey! I don’t eat it! VANESSA We need to talk! \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 83. She pulls Ken out by his ear. Ken glares at Barry. CUT TO: INT. HALLWAY - CONTINUOUS VANESSA He’s just a little bee. And he happens to be the nicest bee I’ve met in a long time. KEN Long time? What are you talking about? Are there other bugs in your life? VANESSA No, but there are other things bugging me in life. And you’re one of them! KEN Fine! Talking bees, no yogurt night...my nerves are fried from riding on this emotional rollercoaster. VANESSA Goodbye, Ken. KEN Augh! VANESSA Whew! Ken EXITS, then re-enters frame. KEN And for your information, I prefer sugar-free, artificial sweeteners, made by man! He EXITS again. The DOOR SLAMS behind him. VANESSA (to Barry) I’m sorry about all that. Ken RE-ENTERS. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 84. KEN I know it’s got an aftertaste! I like it! BARRY (re: Ken) I always felt there was some kind of barrier between Ken and me. (puts his hands in his pockets) I couldn’t overcome it. Oh well. VANESSA Are you going to be okay for the trial tomorrow? BARRY Oh, I believe Mr. Montgomery is about out of ideas. CUT TO: SEQ. 3300 - “ADAM STINGS MONTY” INT. COURTROOM - NEXT DAY ANGLE ON: Medium shot of Montgomery standing at his table. MONTGOMERY We would like to call Mr. Barry Benson Bee to the stand. ADAM (whispering to Vanessa) Now that’s a good idea. (to Barry) You can really see why he’s considered one of the very best lawyers-- Oh. Barry rolls his eyes. He gets up, takes the stand. A juror in a striped shirt APPLAUDS. MR. GAMMIL (whispering) Layton, you’ve got to weave some magic with this jury, or it’s going to be all over. Montgomery is holding a BOOK, “The Secret Life of Bees”. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 85. MONTGOMERY (confidently whispering) Oh, don’t worry Mr. Gammil. The only thing I have to do to turn this jury around is to remind them of what they don’t like about bees. (to Gammil) You got the tweezers? Mr. Gammil NODS, and pats his breast pocket. MR. GAMMIL Are you allergic? MONTGOMERY Only to losing, son. Only to losing. Montgomery approaches the stand. MONTGOMERY (CONT’D) Mr. Benson Bee. I’ll ask you what I think we’d all like to know. What exactly is your relationship to that woman? Montgomery points to Vanessa. BARRY We’re friends. MONTGOMERY Good friends? BARRY Yes. MONTGOMERY (softly in Barry’s face) How good? BARRY What? MONTGOMERY Do you live together? BARRY Wait a minute, this isn’t about-- \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 86. MONTGOMERY Are you her little... (clearing throat) ... bed bug? BARRY (flustered) Hey, that’s not the kind of-- MONTGOMERY I’ve seen a bee documentary or two. Now, from what I understand, doesn’t your Queen give birth to all the bee children in the hive? BARRY Yeah, but-- MONTGOMERY So those aren’t even your real parents! ANGLE ON: Barry’s parents. MARTIN BENSON Oh, Barry. BARRY Yes they are! ADAM Hold me back! Vanessa holds him back with a COFFEE STIRRER. Montgomery points to Barry’s parents. MONTGOMERY You’re an illegitimate bee, aren’t you Benson? ADAM He’s denouncing bees! All the bees in the courtroom start to HUM. They’re agitated. MONTGOMERY And don’t y’all date your cousins? \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 87. VANESSA (standing, letting go of Adam) Objection! Adam explodes from the table and flies towards Montgomery. ADAM I’m going to pin cushion this guy! Montgomery turns around and positions himself by the judge’s bench. He sticks his butt out. Montgomery winks at his team. BARRY Adam, don’t! It’s what he wants! Adam shoves Barry out of the way. Adam STINGS Montgomery in the butt. The jury REACTS, aghast. MONTGOMERY Ow! I’m hit! Oh, lordy, I am hit! The judge BANGS her gavel. JUDGE Order! Order! Please, Mr. Montgomery. MONTGOMERY The venom! The venom is coursing through my veins! I have been felled by a wing-ed beast of destruction. You see? You can’t treat them like equals. They’re strip-ed savages! Stinging’s the only thing they know! It’s their way! ANGLE ON: Adam, collapsed on the floor. Barry rushes to his side. BARRY Adam, stay with me. ADAM I can’t feel my legs. Montgomery falls on the Bailiff. BAILIFF Take it easy. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 88. MONTGOMERY Oh, what angel of mercy will come forward to suck the poison from my heaving buttocks? The JURY recoils. JUDGE Please, I will have order in this court. Order! Order, please! FADE TO: SEQ. 3400 - “ADAM AT HOSPITAL” INT. HOSPITAL - STREET LEVEL ROOM - DAY PRESS PERSON #1 (V.O) The case of the honey bees versus the human race took a pointed turn against the bees yesterday, when one of their legal team stung Layton T. Montgomery. Now here’s Don with the 5-day. A NURSE lets Barry into the room. Barry CARRIES a FLOWER. BARRY Thank you. Barry stands over Adam, in a bed. Barry lays the flower down next to him. The TV is on. BARRY (CONT'D) Hey buddy. ADAM Hey. BARRY Is there much pain? Adam has a BEE-SIZED PAINKILLER HONEY BUTTON near his head that he presses. ADAM (pressing the button) Yeah...I blew the whole case, didn’t I? \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 89. BARRY Oh, it doesn’t matter. The important thing is you’re alive. You could have died. ADAM I’d be better off dead. Look at me. Adam THROWS the blanket off his lap, revealing a GREEN SANDWICH SWORD STINGER. ADAM (CONT’D) (voice cracking) They got it from the cafeteria, they got it from downstairs. In a tuna sandwich. Look, there’s a little celery still on it. BARRY What was it like to sting someone? ADAM I can’t explain it. It was all adrenaline...and then...ecstasy. Barry looks at Adam. BARRY Alright. ADAM You think that was all a trap? BARRY Of course. I’m sorry. I flew us right into this. What were we thinking? Look at us, we’re just a couple of bugs in this world. ADAM What do you think the humans will do to us if they win? BARRY I don’t know. ADAM I hear they put the roaches in motels. That doesn’t sound so bad. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 90. BARRY Adam, they check in, but they don’t check out. Adam GULPS. ADAM Oh my. ANGLE ON: the hospital window. We see THREE PEOPLE smoking outside on the sidewalk. The smoke drifts in. Adam COUGHS. ADAM (CONT’D) Say, could you get a nurse to close that window? BARRY Why? ADAM The smoke. Bees don’t smoke. BARRY Right. Bees don’t smoke. Bees don’t smoke! But some bees are smoking. Adam, that’s it! That’s our case. Adam starts putting his clothes on. ADAM It is? It’s not over? BARRY No. Get up. Get dressed. I’ve got to go somewhere. You get back the court and stall. Stall anyway you can. CUT TO: SEQ. 3500 - “SMOKING GUN” INT. COURTROOM - THE NEXT DAY Adam is folding a piece of paper into a boat. ADAM ...and assuming you’ve done step 29 correctly, you’re ready for the tub. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 91. ANGLE ON: The jury, all with paper boats of their own. JURORS Ooh. ANGLE ON: Montgomery frustrated with Gammil, who’s making a boat also. Monty crumples Gammil’s boat, and throws it at him. JUDGE Mr. Flayman? ADAM Yes? Yes, Your Honor? JUDGE Where is the rest of your team? ADAM (fumbling with his swordstinger) Well, your honor, it’s interesting. You know Bees are trained to fly kind of haphazardly and as a result quite often we don’t make very good time. I actually once heard a pretty funny story about a bee-- MONTGOMERY Your Honor, haven’t these ridiculous bugs taken up enough of this court’s valuable time? Montgomery rolls out from behind his table. He’s suspended in a LARGE BABY CHAIR with wheels. MONTGOMERY (CONT'D) How much longer are we going to allow these absurd shenanigans to go on? They have presented no compelling evidence to support their charges against my clients who have all run perfectly legitimate businesses. I move for a complete dismissal of this entire case. JUDGE Mr. Flayman, I am afraid I am going to have to consider Mr. Montgomery’s motion. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 92. ADAM But you can’t. We have a terrific case. MONTGOMERY Where is your proof? Where is the evidence? Show me the smoking gun. Barry bursts through the door. BARRY Hold it, your honor. You want a smoking gun? Here is your smoking gun. Vanessa ENTERS, holding a bee smoker Vanessa slams the beekeeper's SMOKER onto the judge’s bench. JUDGE What is that? BARRY It’s a Bee smoker. Montgomery GRABS the smoker. MONTGOMERY What, this? This harmless little contraption? This couldn’t hurt a fly, let alone a bee. He unintentionally points it towards the bee gallery, KNOCKING THEM ALL OUT. The jury GASPS. The press SNAPS pictures of them. BARRY Members of the jury, look at what has happened to bees who have never been asked, \"Smoking or Non?\" Is this what nature intended for us? To be forcibly addicted to these smoke machines in man-made wooden slat work camps? Living out our lives as honey slaves to the white man? Barry gestures dramatically towards Montgomery's racially mixed table. The BLACK LAWYER slowly moves his chair away. GAMMIL What are we going to do? \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 93. MONTGOMERY (to Pross) He's playing the species card. Barry lands on the scale of justice, by the judge’s bench. It balances as he lands. BARRY Ladies and gentlemen, please, FreeThese-Bees! ANGLE ON: Jury, chanting \"Free the bees\". JUDGE The court finds in favor of the bees. The chaos continues. Barry flies over to Vanessa, with his hand up for a “high 5”. BARRY Vanessa, we won! VANESSA Yay! I knew you could do it. Highfive! She high 5’s Barry, sending him crashing to the table. He bounces right back up. VANESSA (CONT'D) Oh, sorry. BARRY Ow!! I’m okay. Vanessa, do you know what this means? All the honey is finally going to belong to the bees. Now we won’t have to work so hard all the time. Montgomery approaches Barry, surrounded by the press. The cameras and microphones go to Montgomery. MONTGOMERY (waving a finger) This is an unholy perversion of the balance of nature, Benson! You’ll regret this. ANGLE ON: Barry’s ‘deer in headlights’ expression, as the press pushes microphones in his face. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 94. PRESS PERSON 1 Barry, how much honey do you think is out there? BARRY Alright, alright, one at a time... SARAH Barry, who are you wearing? BARRY Uhhh, my sweater is Ralph Lauren, and I have no pants. The Press follows Barry as he EXITS. ANGLE ON: Adam and Vanessa. ADAM (putting papers away) What if Montgomery’s right? VANESSA What do you mean? ADAM We’ve been living the bee way a long time. 27 million years. DISSOLVE TO: SEQ. 3600 - “HONEY ROUNDUP” EXT. HONEY FARMS APIARY - MONTAGE SARAH (V.O) Congratulations on your victory. What are you going to demand as a settlement? BARRY (V.O) (over montage) First, we’re going to demand a complete shutdown of all bee work camps. Then, we want to get back all the honey that was ours to begin with. Every last drop. We demand an end to the glorification of the bear as anything more than a filthy, smelly, big-headed, bad breath, stink-machine. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 95. I believe we’re all aware of what they do in the woods. We will no longer tolerate derogatory beenegative nick-names, unnecessary inclusion of honey in bogus health products, and la-dee-da tea-time human snack garnishments. MONTAGE IMAGES: Close-up on an ATF JACKET, with the YELLOW LETTERS. Camera pulls back. We see an ARMY OF BEE AND HUMAN AGENTS wearing hastily made “Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Honey” jackets. Barry supervises. The gate to Honey Farms is locked permanently. All the smokers are collected and locked up. All the bees leave the Apiary. CUT TO: EXT. ATF OUTSIDE OF SUPERMARKET - MONTAGE Agents begin YANKING honey off the supermarket shelves, and out of shopping baskets. CUT TO: EXT. NEW HIVE CITY - MONTAGE The bees tear down a honey-bear statue. CUT TO: EXT. YELLOWSTONE FOREST - MONTAGE POV of a sniper’s crosshairs. An animated BEAR character looka-like, turns his head towards camera. BARRY Wait for my signal. ANGLE ON: Barry lowering his binoculars. BARRY (CONT'D) Take him out. The sniper SHOOTS the bear. It hits him in the shoulder. The bear looks at it. He gets woozy and the honey jar falls out of his lap, an ATF&H agent catches it. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 96. BARRY (V.O) (CONT'D) ATF&H AGENT (to the bear’s pig friend) He’ll have a little nausea for a few hours, then he’ll be fine. CUT TO: EXT. STING’S HOUSE - MONTAGE ATF&H agents SLAP CUFFS on Sting, who is meditating. STING But it’s just a prance-about stage name! CUT TO: INT. A WOMAN’S SHOWER - MONTAGE A WOMAN is taking a shower, and using honey shampoo. An ATF&H agent pulls the shower curtain aside, and grabs her bottle of shampoo. The woman SCREAMS. The agent turns to the 3 other agents, and Barry. ANGLE ON: Barry looking at the label on the shampoo bottle, shaking his head and writing in his clipboard. CUT TO: EXT. SUPERMARKET CAFE - MONTAGE Another customer, an old lady having her tea with a little jar of honey, gets her face pushed down onto the table and turned to the side by two agents. One of the agents has a gun on her. OLD LADY Can’t breathe. CUT TO: EXT. CENTRAL PARK - MONTAGE An OIL DRUM of honey is connected to Barry’s hive. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 97. BARRY Bring it in, boys. CUT TO: SEQ. 3650 - “NO MORE WORK” INT. HONEX - MONTAGE ANGLE ON: The honey goes past the 3-cup hash-mark, and begins to overflow. A WORKER BEE runs up to Buzzwell. WORKER BEE 1 Mr. Buzzwell, we just passed 3 cups, and there’s gallons mores coming. I think we need to shutdown. KEYCHAIN BEE (to Buzzwell) Shutdown? We’ve never shutdown. ANGLE ON: Buzzwell overlooking the factory floor. BUZZWELL Shutdown honey production! Stop making honey! ANGLE ON: TWO BEES, each with a KEY. BUZZWELL (CONT’D) Turn your key, Sir! They turn the keys simultaneously, War Games-style, shutting down the honey machines. ANGLE ON: the Taffy-Pull machine, Centrifuge, and Krelman all slowly come to a stop. The bees look around, bewildered. WORKER BEE 5 What do we do now? A BEAT. WORKER BEE 6 Cannon ball!! He jumps into a HONEY VAT, doesn’t penetrate the surface. He looks around, and slowly sinks down to his waist. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 98. EXT. HONEX FACTORY THE WHISTLE BLOWS, and the bees all stream out the exit. CUT TO: INT. J-GATE - CONTINUOUS Lou Loduca gives orders to the pollen jocks. LOU LODUCA We’re shutting down honey production. Mission abort. CUT TO: EXT. CENTRAL PARK Jackson receives the orders, mid-pollination. JACKSON Aborting pollination and nectar detail. Returning to base. CUT TO: EXT. NEW HIVE CITY ANGLE ON: Bees, putting sun-tan lotion on their noses and antennae, and sunning themselves on the balconies of the gyms. CUT TO: EXT. CENTRAL PARK ANGLE ON: THE FLOWERS starting to DROOP. CUT TO: INT. J-GATE J-Gate is deserted. CUT TO: \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 99. EXT. NEW HIVE CITY ANGLE ON: Bees sunning themselves. A TIMER DINGS, and they all turn over. CUT TO: EXT. CENTRAL PARK TIME LAPSE of Central Park turning brown. CUT TO: EXT. VANESSA’S FLORIST SHOP CLOSE-UP SHOT: Vanessa writes “Sorry. No more flowers.” on a “Closed” sign, an turns it facing out. CUT TO: SEQ. 3700 - “IDLE HIVE” EXT. NEW HIVE CITY - DAY Barry flies at high speed. TRACKING SHOT into the hive, through the lobby of Honex, and into Adam’s office. CUT TO: INT. ADAM’S OFFICE - CONTINUOUS Barry meets Adam in his office. Adam’s office is in disarray. There are papers everywhere. He’s filling up his cardboard hexagon box. BARRY (out of breath) Adam, you wouldn’t believe how much honey was out there. ADAM Oh yeah? BARRY What’s going on around here? Where is everybody? Are they out celebrating? \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 100. ADAM (exiting with a cardboard box of belongings) No, they’re just home. They don’t know what to do. BARRY Hmmm. ADAM They’re laying out, they’re sleeping in. I heard your Uncle Carl was on his way to San Antonio with a cricket. BARRY At least we got our honey back. They walk through the empty factory. ADAM Yeah, but sometimes I think, so what if the humans liked our honey? Who wouldn’t? It’s the greatest thing in the world. I was excited to be a part of making it. ANGLE ON: Adam’s desk on it’s side in the hall. ADAM (CONT’D) This was my new desk. This was my new job. I wanted to do it really well. And now...and now I can’t. Adam EXITS. CUT TO: SEQ. 3900 - “WORLD WITHOUT BEES” INT. STAIRWELL Vanessa and Barry are walking up the stairs to the roof. BARRY I don’t understand why they’re not happy. We have so much now. I thought their lives would be better. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 101. VANESSA Hmmm. BARRY They’re doing nothing. It’s amazing, honey really changes people. VANESSA You don’t have any idea what’s going on, do you? BARRY What did you want to show me? VANESSA This. They reach the top of the stairs. Vanessa opens the door. CUT TO: EXT. VANESSA’S ROOFTOP - CONTINUOUS Barry sees Vanessa’s flower pots and small garden have all turned brown. BARRY What happened here? VANESSA That is not the half of it... Vanessa turns Barry around with her two fingers, revealing the view of Central Park, which is also all brown. BARRY Oh no. Oh my. They’re all wilting. VANESSA Doesn’t look very good, does it? BARRY No. VANESSA And who’s fault do you think that is? \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 102. BARRY Mmmm...you know, I’m going to guess, bees. VANESSA Bees? BARRY Specifically me. I guess I didn’t think that bees not needing to make honey would affect all these other things. VANESSA And it’s not just flowers. Fruits, vegetables...they all need bees. BARRY Well, that’s our whole SAT test right there. VANESSA So, you take away the produce, that affects the entire animal kingdom. And then, of course... BARRY The human species? VANESSA (clearing throat) Ahem! BARRY Oh. So, if there’s no more pollination, it could all just go south here, couldn’t it? VANESSA And I know this is also partly my fault. Barry takes a long SIGH. BARRY How about a suicide pact? VANESSA (not sure if he’s joking) How would we do it? BARRY I’ll sting you, you step on me. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 103. VANESSA That just kills you twice. BARRY Right, right. VANESSA Listen Barry. Sorry but I’ve got to get going. She EXITS. BARRY (looking out over the park) Had to open my mouth and talk... (looking back) Vanessa..? Vanessa is gone. CUT TO: SEQ. 3935 - “GOING TO PASADENA” EXT. NY STREET - CONTINUOUS Vanessa gets into a cab. Barry ENTERS. BARRY Vanessa. Why are you leaving? Where are you going? VANESSA To the final Tournament of Roses parade in Pasadena. They moved it up to this weekend because all the flowers are dying. It’s the last chance I’ll ever have to see it. BARRY Vanessa, I just want to say I’m sorry. I never meant it to turn out like this. VANESSA I know. Me neither. Vanessa cab drives away. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 104. BARRY (chuckling to himself) Tournament of Roses. Roses can’t do sports. Wait a minute...roses. Roses? Roses!? Vanessa! Barry follows shortly after. He catches up to it, and he pounds on the window. Barry follows shortly after Vanessa’s cab. He catches up to it, and he pounds on the window. INT. TAXI - CONTINUOUS Barry motions for her to roll the window down. She does so. BARRY Roses?! VANESSA Barry? BARRY (as he flies next to the cab) Roses are flowers. VANESSA Yes, they are. BARRY Flowers, bees, pollen! VANESSA I know. That’s why this is the last parade. BARRY Maybe not. The cab starts pulling ahead of Barry. BARRY (CONT'D) (re: driver) Could you ask him to slow down? VANESSA Could you slow down? The cabs slows. Barry flies in the window, and lands in the change box, which closes on him. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 105. VANESSA (CONT'D) Barry! Vanessa lets him out. Barry stands on the change box, in front of the driver’s license. BARRY Okay, I made a huge mistake! This is a total disaster, and it’s all my fault! VANESSA Yes, it kind of is. BARRY I’ve ruined the planet. And, I wanted to help with your flower shop. Instead, I’ve made it worse. VANESSA Actually, it’s completely closed down. BARRY Oh, I thought maybe you were remodeling. Nonetheless, I have another idea. And it’s greater than all my previous great ideas combined. VANESSA I don’t want to hear it. Vanessa closes the change box on Barry. BARRY (opening it again) Alright, here’s what I’m thinking. They have the roses, the roses have the pollen. I know every bee, plant, and flower bud in this park. All we’ve got to do is get what they’ve got back here with what we’ve got. VANESSA Bees... BARRY Park... VANESSA Pollen... \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 106. BARRY Flowers... VANESSA Repollination! BARRY (on luggage handle, going up) Across the nation! CUT TO: SEQ. 3950 - “ROSE PARADE” EXT. PASADENA PARADE BARRY (V.O) Alright. Tournament of Roses. Pasadena, California. They’ve got nothing but flowers, floats, and cotton candy. Security will be tight. VANESSA I have an idea. CUT TO: EXT. FLOAT STAGING AREA ANGLE ON: Barry and Vanessa approaching a HEAVILY ARMED GUARD in front of the staging area. VANESSA Vanessa Bloome, FTD. Official floral business. He leans in to look at her badge. She SNAPS IT SHUT, VANESSA (CONT’D) Oh, it’s real. HEAVILY ARMED GUARD Sorry ma’am. That’s a nice brooch, by the way. VANESSA Thank you. It was a gift. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 107. They ENTER the staging area. BARRY (V.O) Then, once we’re inside, we just pick the right float. VANESSA How about the Princess and the Pea? BARRY Yeah. VANESSA I can be the princess, and-- BARRY ...yes, I think-- VANESSA You could be-- BARRY I’ve-- VANESSA The pea. BARRY Got it. CUT TO: EXT. FLOAT STAGING AREA - A FEW MOMENTS LATER Barry, dressed as a PEA, flies up and hovers in front of the princess on the “Princess and the Pea” float. The float is sponsored by Inflat-a-bed and a SIGN READS: “Inflat-a-bed: If it blows, it’s ours.” BARRY Sorry I’m late. Where should I sit? PRINCESS What are you? BARRY I believe I’m the pea. PRINCESS The pea? It’s supposed to be under the mattresses. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 108. BARRY Not in this fairy tale, sweetheart. PRINCESS I’m going to go talk to the marshall. BARRY You do that. This whole parade is a fiasco! She EXITS. Vanessa removes the step-ladder. The princess FALLS. Barry and Vanessa take off in the float. BARRY (CONT’D) Let’s see what this baby will do. ANGLE ON: Guy with headset talking to drivers. HEADSET GUY Hey! The float ZOOMS by. A young CHILD in the stands, TIMMY, cries. CUT TO: EXT. FLOAT STAGING AREA - A FEW MOMENTS LATER ANGLE ON: Vanessa putting the princess hat on. BARRY (V.O) Then all we do is blend in with traffic, without arousing suspicion. CUT TO: EXT. THE PARADE ROUTE - CONTINUOUS The floats go flying by the crowds. Barry and Vanessa’s float CRASHES through the fence. CUT TO: \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 109. EXT. LA FREEWAY Vanessa and Barry speed, dodging and weaving, down the freeway. BARRY (V.O) And once we’re at the airport, there’s no stopping us. CUT TO: EXT. LAX AIRPORT Barry and Vanessa pull up to the curb, in front of an TSA AGENT WITH CLIPBOARD. TSA AGENT Stop. Security. Did you and your insect pack your own float? VANESSA (O.C) Yes. TSA AGENT Has this float been in your possession the entire time? VANESSA (O.C) Since the parade...yes. ANGLE ON: Barry holding his shoes. TSA AGENT Would you remove your shoes and everything in your pockets? Can you remove your stinger, Sir? BARRY That’s part of me. TSA AGENT I know. Just having some fun. Enjoy your flight. CUT TO: EXT. RUNWAY Barry and Vanessa’s airplane TAKES OFF. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 110. BARRY (O.C) Then, if we’re lucky, we’ll have just enough pollen to do the job. DISSOLVE TO: SEQ. 4025 - “COCKPIT FIGHT” INT. AIRPLANE Vanessa is on the aisle. Barry is on a laptop calculating flowers, pollen, number of bees, airspeed, etc. He does a “Stomp” dance on the keyboard. BARRY Can you believe how lucky we are? We have just enough pollen to do the job. I think this is going to work, Vanessa. VANESSA It’s got to work. PILOT (V.O) Attention passengers. This is Captain Scott. I’m afraid we have a bit of bad weather in the New York area. And looks like we’re going to be experiencing a couple of hours delay. VANESSA Barry, these are cut flowers with no water. They’ll never make it. BARRY I’ve got to get up there and talk to these guys. VANESSA Be careful. Barry flies up to the cockpit door. CUT TO: INT. COCKPIT - CONTINUOUS A female flight attendant, ANGELA, is in the cockpit with the pilots. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 111. There’s a KNOCK at the door. BARRY (C.O) Hey, can I get some help with this Sky Mall Magazine? I’d like to order the talking inflatable travel pool filter. ANGELA (to the pilots, irritated) Excuse me. CUT TO: EXT. CABIN - CONTINUOUS Angela opens the cockpit door and looks around. She doesn’t see anybody. ANGLE ON: Barry hidden on the yellow and black “caution” stripe. As Angela looks around, Barry zips into the cockpit. CUT TO: INT. COCKPIT BARRY Excuse me, Captain. I am in a real situation here... PILOT (pulling an earphone back, to the co-pilot) What did you say, Hal? CO-PILOT I didn’t say anything. PILOT (he sees Barry) Ahhh! Bee! BARRY No, no! Don’t freak out! There’s a chance my entire species-- CO-PILOT (taking off his earphones) Ahhh! \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 112. The pilot grabs a “DUSTBUSTER” vacuum cleaner. He aims it around trying to vacuum up Barry. The co-pilot faces camera, as the pilot tries to suck Barry up. Barry is on the other side of the co-pilot. As they dosey-do, the toupee of the co-pilot begins to come up, still attached to the front. CO-PILOT (CONT'D) What are you doing? Stop! The toupee comes off the co-pilot’s head, and sticks in the Dustbuster. Barry runs across the bald head. BARRY Wait a minute! I’m an attorney! CO-PILOT Who’s an attorney? PILOT Don’t move. The pilot uses the Dustbuster to try and mash Barry, who is hovering in front of the co-pilot’s nose, and knocks out the co-pilot who falls out of his chair, hitting the life raft release button. The life raft inflates, hitting the pilot, knocking him into a wall and out cold. Barry surveys the situation. BARRY Oh, Barry. CUT TO: INT. AIRPLANE CABIN Vanessa studies her laptop, looking serious. SFX: PA CRACKLE. BARRY (V.O) (in captain voice) Good afternoon passengers, this is your captain speaking. Would a Miss Vanessa Bloome in 24F please report to the cockpit. And please hurry! \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 113. ANGLE ON: The aisle, and Vanessa head popping up. CUT TO: INT. COCKPIT Vanessa ENTERS. VANESSA What happened here? BARRY I tried to talk to them, but then there was a Dustbuster, a toupee, a life raft exploded...Now one’s bald, one’s in a boat, and they’re both unconscious. VANESSA Is that another bee joke? BARRY No. No one’s flying the plane. The AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER, BUD, speaks over the radio. BUD This is JFK control tower. Flight 356, what’s your status? Vanessa presses a button, and the intercom comes on. VANESSA This is Vanessa Bloome. I’m a florist from New York. BUD Where’s the pilot? VANESSA He’s unconscious and so is the copilot. BUD Not good. Is there anyone onboard who has flight experience? A BEAT. BARRY As a matter of fact, there is. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 114. BUD Who’s that? VANESSA Barry Benson. BUD From the honey trial? Oh great. BARRY Vanessa, this is nothing more than a big metal bee. It’s got giant wings, huge engines. VANESSA I can’t fly a plane. BARRY Why not? Isn’t John Travolta a pilot? VANESSA Yes? BARRY How hard could it be? VANESSA Wait a minute. Barry, we’re headed into some lightning. CUT TO: Vanessa shrugs, and takes the controls. SEQ. 4150 - “BARRY FLIES PLANE” INT. BENSON HOUSE The family is all huddled around the TV at the Benson house. ANGLE ON: TV. Bob Bumble is broadcasting. BOB BUMBLE This is Bob Bumble. We have some late-breaking news from JFK airport, where a very suspenseful scene is developing. Barry Benson, fresh off his stunning legal victory... \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 115. Adam SPRAYS a can of HONEY-WHIP into his mouth. ADAM That’s Barry. BOB BUMBLE ...is now attempting to land a plane, loaded with people, flowers, and an incapacitated flight crew. EVERYONE Flowers?! CUT TO: INT. AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL TOWER BUD Well, we have an electrical storm in the area, and two individuals at the controls of a jumbo jet with absolutely no flight experience. JEANETTE CHUNG Just a minute, Mr. Ditchwater, there’s a honey bee on that plane. BUD Oh, I’m quite familiar with Mr. Benson’s work, and his no-account compadres. Haven’t they done enough damage already? JEANETTE CHUNG But isn’t he your only hope right now? BUD Come on, technically a bee shouldn’t be able to fly at all. CUT TO: INT. COCKPIT. Barry REACTS BUD The wings are too small, their bodies are too big-- \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 116. BARRY (over PA) Hey, hold on a second. Haven’t we heard this million times? The surface area of the wings, and the body mass doesn’t make sense? JEANETTE CHUNG Get this on the air. CAMERAMAN You got it! CUT TO: INT. BEE TV CONTROL ROOM An engineer throws a switch. BEE ENGINEER Stand by. We’re going live. The “ON AIR” sign illuminates. CUT TO: INT. VARIOUS SHOTS OF NEW HIVE CITY The news report plays on TV. The pollen jocks are sitting around, playing paddle-ball, Wheel-o, and one of them is spinning his helmet on his finger. Buzzwell is in an office cubicle, playing computer solitaire. Barry’s family and Adam watch from their living room. Bees sitting on the street curb turn around to watch the TV. BARRY Mr. Ditchwater, the way we work may be a mystery to you, because making honey takes a lot of bees doing a lot of small jobs. But let me tell you something about a small job. If you do it really well, it makes a big difference. More than we realized. To us, to everyone. That’s why I want to get bees back to doing what we do best. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 117. Working together. That’s the bee way. We’re not made of Jello. We get behind a fellow. Black and yellow. CROWD OF BEES Hello! CUT TO: INT. COCKPIT Barry is giving orders to Vanessa. BARRY Left, right, down, hover. VANESSA Hover? BARRY Forget hover. VANESSA You know what? This isn’t so hard. Vanessa pretends to HONK THE HORN. VANESSA (CONT’D) Beep, beep! Beep, beep! A BOLT OF LIGHTNING HITS the plane. The plane takes a sharp dip. VANESSA (CONT’D) Barry, what happened? BARRY (noticing the control panel) Wait a minute. I think we were on autopilot that whole time. VANESSA That may have been helping me. BARRY And now we’re not! VANESSA (V.O.) (folding her arms) Well, then it turns out I cannot fly a plane. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 118. BARRY (CONT'D) Vanessa struggles with the yoke. CUT TO: EXT. AIRPLANE The airplane goes into a steep dive. CUT TO: SEQ. 4175 - “CRASH LANDING” INT. J-GATE An ALERT SIGN READING: “Hive Alert. We Need:” Then the SIGNAL goes from “Two Bees” “Some Bees” “Every Bee There Is” Lou Loduca gathers the pollen jocks at J-Gate. LOU LODUCA All of you, let’s get behind this fellow. Move it out! The bees follow Lou Loduca, and EXIT J-Gate. CUT TO: INT. AIRPLANE COCKPIT BARRY Our only chance is if I do what I would do, and you copy me with the wings of the plane! VANESSA You don’t have to yell. BARRY I’m not yelling. We happen to be in a lot of trouble here. VANESSA It’s very hard to concentrate with that panicky tone in your voice. BARRY It’s not a tone. I’m panicking! CUT TO: \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 119. EXT. JFK AIRPORT ANGLE ON: The bees arriving and massing at the airport. CUT TO: INT. COCKPIT Barry and Vanessa alternately SLAP EACH OTHER IN THE FACE. VANESSA I don’t think I can do this. BARRY Vanessa, pull yourself together. Listen to me, you have got to snap out of it! VANESSA You snap out of it! BARRY You snap out of it! VANESSA You snap out of it! BARRY You snap out of it! VANESSA You snap out of it! CUT TO: EXT. AIRPLANE A GIGANTIC SWARM OF BEES flies in to hold the plane up. CUT TO: INT. COCKPIT - CONTINUOUS BARRY You snap out of it! VANESSA You snap out of it! \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 120. BARRY You snap-- VANESSA Hold it! BARRY (about to slap her again) Why? Come on, it’s my turn. VANESSA How is the plane flying? Barry’s antennae ring. BARRY I don’t know. (answering) Hello? CUT TO: EXT. AIRPLANE ANGLE ON: The underside of the plane. The pollen jocks have massed all around the underbelly of the plane, and are holding it up. LOU LODUCA Hey Benson, have you got any flowers for a happy occasion in there? CUT TO: INT. COCKPIT Lou, Buzz, Splitz, and Jackson come up alongside the cockpit. BARRY The pollen jocks! VANESSA They do get behind a fellow. BARRY Black and yellow. LOU LODUCA (over headset) Hello. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 121. Alright you two, what do you say we drop this tin can on the blacktop? VANESSA What blacktop? Where? I can’t see anything. Can you? BARRY No, nothing. It’s all cloudy. CUT TO: EXT. RUNWAY Adam SHOUTS. ADAM Come on, you’ve got to think bee, Barry. Thinking bee, thinking bee. ANGLE ON: Overhead shot of runway. The bees are in the formation of a flower. In unison they move, causing the flower to FLASH YELLOW AND BLACK. BEES (chanting) Thinking bee, thinking bee. CUT TO: INT. COCKPIT We see through the swirling mist and clouds. A GIANT SHAPE OF A FLOWER is forming in the middle of the runway. BARRY Wait a minute. I think I’m feeling something. VANESSA What? BARRY I don’t know, but it’s strong. And it’s pulling me, like a 27 million year old instinct. Bring the nose of the plane down. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 122. LOU LODUCA (CONT'D) EXT. RUNWAY All the bees are on the runway chanting “Thinking Bee”. CUT TO: INT. CONTROL TOWER RICK What in the world is on the tarmac? ANGLE ON: Dave OTS onto runway seeing a flower being formed by millions of bees. BUD Get some lights on that! CUT TO: EXT. RUNWAY ANGLE ON: AIRCRAFT LANDING LIGHT SCAFFOLD by the side of the runway, illuminating the bees in their flower formation. INT. COCKPIT BARRY Vanessa, aim for the flower! VANESSA Oh, okay? BARRY Cut the engines! VANESSA Cut the engines? BARRY We’re going in on bee power. Ready boys? LOU LODUCA Affirmative. CUT TO: \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 123. INT. AIRPLANE COCKPIT BARRY Good, good, easy now. Land on that flower! Ready boys? Give me full reverse. LOU LODUCA Spin it around! The plane attempts to land on top of an “Aloha Airlines” plane with flowers painted on it. BARRY (V.O) I mean the giant black and yellow pulsating flower made of millions of bees! VANESSA Which flower? BARRY That flower! VANESSA I’m aiming at the flower! The plane goes after a FAT GUY IN A HAWAIIAN SHIRT. BARRY (V.O) That’s a fat guy in a flowered shirt! The other other flower! The big one. He snaps a photo and runs away. BARRY (CONT'D) Full forward. Ready boys? Nose down. Bring your tail up. Rotate around it. VANESSA Oh, this is insane, Barry. BARRY This is the only way I know how to fly. CUT TO: \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 124. AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL TOWER BUD Am I koo-koo kachoo, or is this plane flying in an insect-like pattern? CUT TO: EXT. RUNWAY BARRY (V.O) Get your nose in there. Don’t be afraid of it. Smell it. Full reverse! Easy, just drop it. Be a part of it. Aim for the center! Now drop it in. Drop it in, woman! The plane HOVERS and MANEUVERS, landing in the center of the giant flower, like a bee. The FLOWERS from the cargo hold spill out onto the runway. INT. AIPLANE CABIN The passengers are motionless for a beat. PASSENGER Come on already! They hear the “ding ding”, and all jump up to grab their luggage out of the overheads. SEQ. 4225 - “RUNWAY SPEECH” EXT. RUNWAY - CONTINUOUS The INFLATABLE SLIDES pop out the side of the plane. The passengers escape. Barry and Vanessa slide down out of the cockpit. Barry and Vanessa exhale a huge breath. VANESSA Barry, we did it. You taught me how to fly. Vanessa raises her hand up for a high five. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 125. BARRY Yes. No high five. VANESSA Right. ADAM Barry, it worked. Did you see the giant flower? BARRY What giant flower? Where? Of course I saw the flower! That was genius, man. Genius! ADAM Thank you. BARRY But we’re not done yet. Barry flies up to the wing of the plane, and addresses the bee crowd. BARRY (CONT’D) Listen everyone. This runway is covered with the last pollen from the last flowers available anywhere on Earth. That means this is our last chance. We’re the only ones who make honey, pollinate flowers, and dress like this. If we’re going to survive as a species, this is our moment. So what do you all say? Are we going to be bees, or just Museum of Natural History key chains? BEES We’re bees! KEYCHAIN BEE Keychain! BARRY Then follow me... Except Keychain. BUZZ Hold on Barry. You’ve earned this. Buzz puts a pollen jock jacket and helmet with Barry’s name on it on Barry. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 126. BARRY I’m a pollen jock! (looking at the jacket. The sleeves are a little long) And it’s a perfect fit. All I’ve got to do are the sleeves. The Pollen Jocks toss Barry a gun. BARRY (CONT’D) Oh yeah! ANGLE ON: Martin and Janet Benson. JANET BENSON That’s our Barry. All the bees descend upon the flowers on the tarmac, and start collecting pollen. CUT TO: SEQ. 4250 - “RE-POLLINATION” EXT. SKIES - CONTINUOUS The squadron FLIES over the city, REPOLLINATING trees and flowers as they go. Barry breaks off from the group, towards Vanessa’s flower shop. CUT TO: EXT. VANESSA’S FLOWER SHOP - CONTINUOUS Barry REPOLLINATES Vanessa’s flowers. CUT TO: EXT. CENTRAL PARK - CONTINUOUS ANGLE ON: Timmy with a frisbee, as the bees fly by. TIMMY Mom, the bees are back! \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 127. Central Park is completely repollinated by the bees. DISSOLVE TO: INT. HONEX - CONTINUOUS Honex is back to normal and everyone is busily working. ANGLE ON: Adam, putting his Krelman hat on. ADAM If anyone needs to make a call, now’s the time. I’ve got a feeling we’ll be working late tonight! The bees CHEER. CUT TO: SEQ. 4355 EXT: VANESSA’S FLOWER SHOP With a new sign out front. “Vanessa & Barry: Flowers, Honey, Legal Advice” DISSOLVE TO: INT: FLOWER COUNTER Vanessa doing a brisk trade with many customers. CUT TO: INT: FLOWER SHOP - CONTINUOUS Vanessa is selling flowers. In the background, there are SHELVES STOCKED WITH HONEY. VANESSA (O.C.) Don’t forget these. Have a great afternoon. Yes, can I help who’s next? Who’s next? Would you like some honey with that? It is beeapproved. SIGN ON THE BACK ROOM DOOR READS: “Barry Benson: Insects at Law”. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 128. Camera moves into the back room. ANGLE ON: Barry. ANGLE ON: Barry’s COW CLIENT. COW Milk, cream, cheese...it’s all me. And I don’t see a nickel. BARRY Uh huh? Uh huh? COW (breaking down) Sometimes I just feel like a piece of meat. BARRY I had no idea. VANESSA Barry? I’m sorry, have you got a moment? BARRY Would you excuse me? My mosquito associate here will be able to help you. Mooseblood ENTERS. MOOSEBLOOD Sorry I’m late. COW He’s a lawyer too? MOOSEBLOOD Ma’am, I was already a bloodsucking parasite. All I needed was * a briefcase. * ANGLE ON: Flower Counter. VANESSA (to customer) Have a great afternoon! (to Barry) Barry, I just got this huge tulip order for a wedding, and I can’t get them anywhere. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 129. BARRY Not a problem, Vannie. Just leave it to me. Vanessa turns back to deal with a customer. VANESSA You’re a life-saver, Barry. (to the next customer) Can I help who’s next? Who’s next? ANGLE ON: Vanessa smiling back at Barry. Barry smiles too, then snaps himself out of it. BARRY (speaks into his antennae) Alright. Scramble jocks, it’s time to fly! VANESSA Thank you, Barry! EXT. FLOWER SHOP - CONTINUOUS ANGLE ON: Ken and Andy walking down the street. KEN (noticing the new sign) Augh! What in the world? It’s that bee again! ANDY (guiding Ken protectively) Let it go, Kenny. KEN That bee is living my life! When will this nightmare end? ANDY Let it all go. They don’t break stride. ANGLE ON: Camera in front of Barry as he flies out the door and up into the sky. Pollen jocks fold in formation behind him as they zoom into the park. BARRY (to Splitz) Beautiful day to fly. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 130. JACKSON Sure is. BARRY Between you and me, I was dying to get out of that office. FADE OUT: \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 131.",
      "readme": "# Comp_Sci_Sem_2\nAccording to all known laws of aviation, there is no way that a bee should be able to fly. Its wings are too small to get its fat little body off the ground. The bee, of course, flies anyway. Because bees don’t care what humans think is impossible.” SEQ. 75 - “INTRO TO BARRY” INT. BENSON HOUSE - DAY ANGLE ON: Sneakers on the ground. Camera PANS UP to reveal BARRY BENSON’S BEDROOM ANGLE ON: Barry’s hand flipping through different sweaters in his closet. BARRY Yellow black, yellow black, yellow black, yellow black, yellow black, yellow black...oohh, black and yellow... ANGLE ON: Barry wearing the sweater he picked, looking in the mirror. BARRY (CONT’D) Yeah, let’s shake it up a little. He picks the black and yellow one. He then goes to the sink, takes the top off a CONTAINER OF HONEY, and puts some honey into his hair. He squirts some in his mouth and gargles. Then he takes the lid off the bottle, and rolls some on like deodorant. CUT TO: INT. BENSON HOUSE KITCHEN - CONTINUOUS Barry’s mother, JANET BENSON, yells up at Barry. JANET BENSON Barry, breakfast is ready! CUT TO: \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 1. INT. BARRY’S ROOM - CONTINUOUS BARRY Coming! SFX: Phone RINGING. Barry’s antennae vibrate as they RING like a phone. Barry’s hands are wet. He looks around for a towel. BARRY (CONT’D) Hang on a second! He wipes his hands on his sweater, and pulls his antennae down to his ear and mouth. BARRY (CONT'D) Hello? His best friend, ADAM FLAYMAN, is on the other end. ADAM Barry? BARRY Adam? ADAM Can you believe this is happening? BARRY Can’t believe it. I’ll pick you up. Barry sticks his stinger in a sharpener. SFX: BUZZING AS HIS STINGER IS SHARPENED. He tests the sharpness with his finger. SFX: Bing. BARRY (CONT’D) Looking sharp. ANGLE ON: Barry hovering down the hall, sliding down the staircase bannister. Barry’s mother, JANET BENSON, is in the kitchen. JANET BENSON Barry, why don’t you use the stairs? Your father paid good money for those. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 2. BARRY Sorry, I’m excited. Barry’s father, MARTIN BENSON, ENTERS. He’s reading a NEWSPAPER with the HEADLINE, “Queen gives birth to thousandtuplets: Resting Comfortably.” MARTIN BENSON Here’s the graduate. We’re very proud of you, Son. And a perfect report card, all B’s. JANET BENSON (mushing Barry’s hair) Very proud. BARRY Ma! I’ve got a thing going here. Barry re-adjusts his hair, starts to leave. JANET BENSON You’ve got some lint on your fuzz. She picks it off. BARRY Ow, that’s me! MARTIN BENSON Wave to us. We’ll be in row 118,000. Barry zips off. BARRY Bye! JANET BENSON Barry, I told you, stop flying in the house! CUT TO: SEQ. 750 - DRIVING TO GRADUATION EXT. BEE SUBURB - MORNING A GARAGE DOOR OPENS. Barry drives out in his CAR. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 3. ANGLE ON: Barry’s friend, ADAM FLAYMAN, standing by the curb. He’s reading a NEWSPAPER with the HEADLINE: “Frisbee Hits Hive: Internet Down. Bee-stander: “I heard a sound, and next thing I knew...wham-o!.” Barry drives up, stops in front of Adam. Adam jumps in. BARRY Hey, Adam. ADAM Hey, Barry. (pointing at Barry’s hair) Is that fuzz gel? BARRY A little. It’s a special day. Finally graduating. ADAM I never thought I’d make it. BARRY Yeah, three days of grade school, three days of high school. ADAM Those were so awkward. BARRY Three days of college. I’m glad I took off one day in the middle and just hitchhiked around the hive. ADAM You did come back different. They drive by a bee who’s jogging. ARTIE Hi Barry! BARRY (to a bee pedestrian) Hey Artie, growing a mustache? Looks good. Barry and Adam drive from the suburbs into the city. ADAM Hey, did you hear about Frankie? \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 4. BARRY Yeah. ADAM You going to his funeral? BARRY No, I’m not going to his funeral. Everybody knows you sting someone you die, you don’t waste it on a squirrel. He was such a hot head. ADAM Yeah, I guess he could’ve just gotten out of the way. The DRIVE through a loop de loop. BARRY AND ADAM Whoa...Whooo...wheee!! ADAM I love this incorporating the amusement park right into our regular day. BARRY I guess that’s why they say we don’t need vacations. CUT TO: SEQ. 95 - GRADUATION EXT. GRADUATION CEREMONY - CONTINUOUS Barry and Adam come to a stop. They exit the car, and fly over the crowd to their seats. * BARRY * (re: graduation ceremony) * Boy, quite a bit of pomp...under * the circumstances. * They land in their seats. BARRY (CONT’D) Well Adam, today we are men. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 5. ADAM We are. BARRY Bee-men. ADAM Amen! BARRY Hallelujah. Barry hits Adam’s forehead. Adam goes into the rapture. An announcement comes over the PA. ANNOUNCER (V.O) Students, faculty, distinguished bees...please welcome, Dean Buzzwell. ANGLE ON: DEAN BUZZWELL steps up to the podium. The podium has a sign that reads: “Welcome Graduating Class of:”, with train-station style flipping numbers after it. BUZZWELL Welcome New Hive City graduating class of... The numbers on the podium change to 9:15. BUZZWELL (CONT’D) ...9:15. (he clears his throat) And that concludes our graduation ceremonies. And begins your career at Honex Industries. BARRY Are we going to pick our job today? ADAM I heard it’s just orientation. The rows of chairs change in transformer-like mechanical motion to Universal Studios type tour trams. Buzzwell walks off stage. BARRY (re: trams) Whoa, heads up! Here we go. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 6. SEQ. 125 - “FACTORY” FEMALE VOICE (V.O) Keep your hands and antennas inside the tram at all times. (in Spanish) Dejen las manos y antennas adentro del tram a todos tiempos. BARRY I wonder what it’s going to be like? ADAM A little scary. Barry shakes Adam. BARRY AND ADAM AAHHHH! The tram passes under SIGNS READING: “Honex: A Division of Honesco: A Part of the Hexagon Group.” TRUDY Welcome to Honex, a division of Honesco, and a part of the Hexagon group. BARRY This is it! The Honex doors OPEN, revealing the factory. BARRY (CONT’D) Wow. TRUDY We know that you, as a bee, have worked your whole life to get to the point where you can work for your whole life. Honey begins when our valiant pollen jocks bring the nectar to the hive where our top secret formula is automatically color-corrected, scent adjusted and bubble contoured into this... Trudy GRABS a TEST TUBE OF HONEY from a technician. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 7. TRUDY (CONT’D) ...soothing, sweet syrup with its distinctive golden glow, you all know as... EVERYONE ON THE TRAM (in unison) H-o-n-e-y. Trudy flips the flask into the crowd, and laughs as they all scramble for it. ANGLE ON: A GIRL BEE catching the honey. ADAM (sotto) That girl was hot. BARRY (sotto) She’s my cousin. ADAM She is? BARRY Yes, we’re all cousins. ADAM Right. You’re right. TRUDY At Honex, we also constantly strive to improve every aspect of bee existence. These bees are stress testing a new helmet technology. ANGLE ON: A STUNT BEE in a HELMET getting hit with a NEWSPAPER, then a SHOE, then a FLYSWATTER. He gets up, and gives a “thumb’s up”. The graduate bees APPLAUD. ADAM (re: stunt bee) What do you think he makes? BARRY Not enough. TRUDY And here we have our latest advancement, the Krelman. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 8. BARRY Wow, what does that do? TRUDY Catches that little strand of honey that hangs after you pour it. Saves us millions. ANGLE ON: The Krelman machine. Bees with hand-shaped hats on, rotating around a wheel to catch drips of honey. Adam’s hand shoots up. ADAM Can anyone work on the Krelman? TRUDY Of course. Most bee jobs are small ones. But bees know that every small job, if it’s done well, means a lot. There are over 3000 different bee occupations. But choose carefully, because you’ll stay in the job that you pick for the rest of your life. The bees CHEER. ANGLE ON: Barry’s smile dropping slightly. BARRY The same job for the rest of your life? I didn’t know that. ADAM What’s the difference? TRUDY And you’ll be happy to know that bees as a species haven’t had one day off in 27 million years. BARRY So you’ll just work us to death? TRUDY (laughing) We’ll sure try. Everyone LAUGHS except Barry. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 9. The tram drops down a log-flume type steep drop. Cameras flash, as all the bees throw up their hands. The frame freezes into a snapshot. Barry looks concerned. The tram continues through 2 doors. FORM DISSOLVE TO: SEQ. 175 - “WALKING THE HIVE” INT. HONEX LOBBY ANGLE ON: The log-flume photo, as Barry looks at it. ADAM Wow. That blew my mind. BARRY (annoyed) “What’s the difference?” Adam, how could you say that? One job forever? That’s an insane choice to have to make. ADAM Well, I’m relieved. Now we only have to make one decision in life. BARRY But Adam, how could they never have told us that? ADAM Barry, why would you question anything? We’re bees. We’re the most perfectly functioning society on Earth. They walk by a newspaper stand with A SANDWICH BOARD READING: “Bee Goes Berserk: Stings Seven Then Self.” ANGLE ON: A BEE filling his car’s gas tank from a honey pump. He fills his car some, then takes a swig for himself. NEWSPAPER BEE (to the bee guzzling gas) Hey! Barry and Adam begin to cross the street. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 10. BARRY Yeah but Adam, did you ever think that maybe things work a little too well around here? They stop in the middle of the street. The traffic moves perfectly around them. ADAM Like what? Give me one example. BARRY (thinks) ...I don’t know. But you know what I’m talking about. They walk off. SEQ. 400 - “MEET THE JOCKS” SFX: The SOUND of Pollen Jocks. PAN DOWN from the Honex statue. J-GATE ANNOUNCER Please clear the gate. Royal Nectar Force on approach. Royal Nectar Force on approach. BARRY Wait a second. Check it out. Hey, hey, those are Pollen jocks. ADAM Wow. FOUR PATROL BEES FLY in through the hive’s giant Gothic entrance. The Patrol Bees are wearing fighter pilot helmets with black visors. ADAM (CONT’D) I’ve never seen them this close. BARRY They know what it’s like to go outside the hive. ADAM Yeah, but some of them don’t come back. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 11. The nectar from the pollen jocks is removed from their backpacks, and loaded into trucks on their way to Honex. A SMALL CROWD forms around the Patrol Bees. Each one has a PIT CREW that takes their nectar. Lou Loduca hurries a pit crew along: LOU LODUCA You guys did great! You’re monsters. You’re sky freaks! I love it! I love it! SCHOOL GIRLS are jumping up and down and squealing nearby. BARRY I wonder where those guys have just been? ADAM I don’t know. BARRY Their day’s not planned. Outside the hive, flying who-knows-where, doing who-knows-what. ADAM You can’t just decide one day to be a Pollen Jock. You have to be bred for that. BARRY Right. Pollen Jocks cross in close proximity to Barry and Adam. Some pollen falls off, onto Barry and Adam. BARRY (CONT’D) Look at that. That’s more pollen than you and I will ever see in a lifetime. ADAM (playing with the pollen) It’s just a status symbol. I think bees make too big a deal out of it. BARRY Perhaps, unless you’re wearing it, and the ladies see you wearing it. ANGLE ON: Two girl bees. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 12. ADAM Those ladies? Aren’t they our cousins too? BARRY Distant, distant. ANGLE ON: TWO POLLEN JOCKS. JACKSON Look at these two. SPLITZ Couple of Hive Harrys. JACKSON Let’s have some fun with them. The pollen jocks approach. Barry and Adam continue to talk to the girls. GIRL 1 It must be so dangerous being a pollen jock. BARRY Oh yeah, one time a bear had me pinned up against a mushroom. He had one paw on my throat, and with the other he was slapping me back and forth across the face. GIRL 1 Oh my. BARRY I never thought I’d knock him out. GIRL 2 (to Adam) And what were you doing during all of this? ADAM Obviously I was trying to alert the authorities. The girl swipes some pollen off of Adam with a finger. BARRY (re: pollen) I can autograph that if you want. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 13. JACKSON Little gusty out there today, wasn’t it, comrades? BARRY Yeah. Gusty. BUZZ You know, we’re going to hit a sunflower patch about six miles from here tomorrow. BARRY Six miles, huh? ADAM (whispering) Barry. BUZZ It’s a puddle-jump for us. But maybe you’re not up for it. BARRY Maybe I am. ADAM (whispering louder) You are not! BUZZ We’re going, oh-nine hundred at JGate. ADAM (re: j-gate) Whoa. BUZZ (leaning in, on top of Barry) What do you think, Buzzy Boy? Are you bee enough? BARRY I might be. It all depends on what oh-nine hundred means. CUT TO: SEQ. 450 - “THE BALCONY” \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 14. INT. BENSON HOUSE BALCONY - LATER Barry is standing on the balcony alone, looking out over the city. Martin Benson ENTERS, sneaks up behind Barry and gooses him in his ribs. MARTIN BENSON Honex! BARRY Oh, Dad. You surprised me. MARTIN BENSON (laughing) Have you decided what you’re interested in, Son? BARRY Well, there’s a lot of choices. MARTIN BENSON But you only get one. Martin LAUGHS. BARRY Dad, do you ever get bored doing the same job every day? MARTIN BENSON Son, let me tell you something about stirring. (making the stirring motion) You grab that stick and you just move it around, and you stir it around. You get yourself into a rhythm, it’s a beautiful thing. BARRY You know dad, the more I think about it, maybe the honey field just isn’t right for me. MARTIN BENSON And you were thinking of what, making balloon animals? That’s a bad job for a guy with a stinger. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 15. BARRY Well no... MARTIN BENSON Janet, your son’s not sure he wants to go into honey. JANET BENSON Oh Barry, you are so funny sometimes. BARRY I’m not trying to be funny. MARTIN BENSON You’re not funny, you’re going into honey. Our son, the stirrer. JANET BENSON You’re going to be a stirrer?! BARRY No one’s listening to me. MARTIN BENSON Wait until you see the sticks I have for you. BARRY I can say anything I want right now. I’m going to get an ant tattoo. JANET BENSON Let’s open some fresh honey and celebrate. BARRY Maybe I’ll pierce my thorax! MARTIN BENSON (toasting) To honey! BARRY Shave my antennae! JANET BENSON To honey! \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 16. BARRY Shack up with a grasshopper, get a gold tooth, and start calling everybody “Dawg.” CUT TO: SEQ. 760 - “JOB PLACEMENT” EXT. HONEX LOBBY - CONTINUOUS ANGLE ON: A BEE BUS STOP. One group of bees stands on the pavement, as another group hovers above them. A doubledecker bus pulls up. The hovering bees get on the top level, and the standing bees get on the bottom. Barry and Adam pull up outside of Honex. ADAM I can’t believe we’re starting work today. BARRY Today’s the day. Adam jumps out of the car. ADAM (O.C) Come on. All the good jobs will be gone. BARRY Yeah, right... ANGLE ON: A BOARD READING: “JOB PLACEMENT BOARD”. Buzzwell, the Bee Processor, is at the counter. Another BEE APPLICANT, SANDY SHRIMPKIN is EXITING. SANDY SHRIMPKIN Is it still available? BUZZWELL Hang on. (he looks at changing numbers on the board) Two left. And...one of them’s yours. Congratulations Son, step to the side please. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 17. SANDY SHRIMPKIN Yeah! ADAM (to Sandy, leaving) What did you get? SANDY SHRIMPKIN Picking the crud out. That is stellar! ADAM Wow. BUZZWELL (to Adam and Barry) Couple of newbies? ADAM Yes Sir. Our first day. We are ready. BUZZWELL Well, step up and make your choice. ANGLE ON: A CHART listing the different sectors of Honex. Heating, Cooling, Viscosity, Krelman, Pollen Counting, Stunt Bee, Pouring, Stirrer, Humming, Regurgitating, Front Desk, Hair Removal, Inspector No. 7, Chef, Lint Coordinator, Stripe Supervisor, Antennae-ball polisher, Mite Wrangler, Swatting Counselor, Wax Monkey, Wing Brusher, Hive Keeper, Restroom Attendant. ADAM (to Barry) You want to go first? BARRY No, you go. ADAM Oh my. What’s available? BUZZWELL Restroom attendant is always open, and not for the reason you think. ADAM Any chance of getting on to the Krelman, Sir? BUZZWELL Sure, you’re on. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 18. He plops the KRELMAN HAT onto Adam’s head. ANGLE ON: The job board. THE COLUMNS READ: “OCCUPATION” “POSITIONS AVAILABLE”, and “STATUS”. The middle column has numbers, and the right column has job openings flipping between “open”, “pending”, and “closed”. BUZZWELL (CONT’D) Oh, I’m sorry. The Krelman just closed out. ADAM Oh! He takes the hat off Adam. BUZZWELL Wax Monkey’s always open. The Krelman goes from “Closed” to “Open”. BUZZWELL (CONT’D) And the Krelman just opened up again. ADAM What happened? BUZZWELL Well, whenever a bee dies, that’s an opening. (pointing at the board) See that? He’s dead, dead, another dead one, deady, deadified, two more dead. Dead from the neck up, dead from the neck down. But, that’s life. ANGLE ON: Barry’s disturbed expression. ADAM (feeling pressure to decide) Oh, this is so hard. Heating, cooling, stunt bee, pourer, stirrer, humming, inspector no. 7, lint coordinator, stripe supervisor, antenna-ball polisher, mite wrangler-- Barry, Barry, what do you think I should-- Barry? Barry? \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 19. Barry is gone. CUT TO: SEQ. 775 - “LOU LODUCA SPEECH” EXT. J-GATE - SAME TIME Splitz, Jackson, Buzz, Lou and two other BEES are going through final pre-flight checks. Barry ENTERS. LOU LODUCA Alright, we’ve got the sunflower patch in quadrant nine. Geranium window box on Sutton Place... Barry’s antennae rings, like a phone. ADAM (V.O) What happened to you? Where are you? Barry whispers throughout. BARRY I’m going out. ADAM (V.O) Out? Out where? BARRY Out there. ADAM (V.O) (putting it together) Oh no. BARRY I have to, before I go to work for the rest of my life. ADAM (V.O) You’re going to die! You’re crazy! Hello? BARRY Oh, another call coming in. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 20. ADAM (V.O) You’re cra-- Barry HANGS UP. ANGLE ON: Lou Loduca. LOU LODUCA If anyone’s feeling brave, there’s a Korean Deli on 83rd that gets their roses today. BARRY (timidly) Hey guys. BUZZ Well, look at that. SPLITZ Isn’t that the kid we saw yesterday? LOU LODUCA (to Barry) Hold it son, flight deck’s restricted. JACKSON It’s okay Lou, we’re going to take him up. Splitz and Jackson CHUCKLE. LOU LODUCA Really? Feeling lucky, are ya? A YOUNGER SMALLER BEE THAN BARRY, CHET, runs up with a release waiver for Barry to sign. CHET Sign here. Here. Just initial that. Thank you. LOU LODUCA Okay, you got a rain advisory today and as you all know, bees cannot fly in rain. So be careful. As always, (reading off clipboard) watch your brooms, hockey sticks, dogs, birds, bears, and bats. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 21. Also, I got a couple reports of root beer being poured on us. Murphy’s in a home because of it, just babbling like a cicada. BARRY That’s awful. LOU LODUCA And a reminder for all you rookies, bee law number one, absolutely no talking to humans. Alright, launch positions! The Jocks get into formation, chanting as they move. LOU LODUCA (CONT’D) Black and Yellow! JOCKS Hello! SPLITZ (to Barry) Are you ready for this, hot shot? BARRY Yeah. Yeah, bring it on. Barry NODS, terrified. BUZZ Wind! - CHECK! JOCK #1 Antennae! - CHECK! JOCK #2 Nectar pack! - CHECK! JACKSON Wings! - CHECK! SPLITZ Stinger! - CHECK! BARRY Scared out of my shorts - CHECK. LOU LODUCA Okay ladies, let’s move it out. Everyone FLIPS their goggles down. Pit crew bees CRANK their wings, and remove the starting blocks. We hear loud HUMMING. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 22. LOU LODUCA (CONT'D) LOU LODUCA (CONT’D) Pound those petunia's, you striped stem-suckers! All of you, drain those flowers! A FLIGHT DECK GUY in deep crouch hand-signals them out the archway as the backwash from the bee wings FLUTTERS his jump suit. Barry follows everyone. SEQ. 800 - “FLYING WITH THE JOCKS” The bees climb above tree tops in formation. Barry is euphoric. BARRY Whoa! I’m out! I can’t believe I’m out! So blue. Ha ha ha! (a beat) I feel so fast...and free. (re: kites in the sky) Box kite! Wow! They fly by several bicyclists, and approach a patch of flowers. BARRY (CONT'D) Flowers! SPLITZ This is blue leader. We have roses visual. Bring it around thirty degrees and hold. BARRY (sotto) Roses. JACKSON Thirty degrees, roger, bringing it around. Many pollen jocks break off from the main group. They use their equipment to collect nectar from flowers. Barry flies down to watch the jocks collect the nectar. JOCK Stand to the side kid, it’s got a bit of a kick. The jock fires the gun, and recoils. Barry watches the gun fill up with nectar. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 23. BARRY Oh, that is one Nectar Collector. JOCK You ever see pollination up close? BARRY No, Sir. He takes off, and the excess pollen dust falls causing the flowers to come back to life. JOCK (as he pollinates) I pick some pollen up over here, sprinkle it over here, maybe a dash over there, pinch on that one...see that? It’s a little bit of magic, ain’t it? The FLOWERS PERK UP as he pollinates. BARRY Wow. That’s amazing. Why do we do that? JOCK ...that’s pollen power, Kid. More pollen, more flowers, more nectar, more honey for us. BARRY Cool. The Jock WINKS at Barry. Barry rejoins the other jocks in the sky. They swoop in over a pond, kissing the surface. We see their image reflected in the water; they’re really moving. They fly over a fountain. BUZZ I’m picking up a lot of bright yellow, could be daisies. Don’t we need those? SPLITZ Copy that visual. We see what appear to be yellow flowers on a green field. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 24. They go into a deep bank and dive. BUZZ Hold on, one of these flowers seems to be on the move. SPLITZ Say again...Are you reporting a moving flower? BUZZ Affirmative. SEQ. 900 - “TENNIS GAME” The pollen jocks land. It is a tennis court with dozens of tennis balls. A COUPLE, VANESSA and KEN, plays tennis. The bees land right in the midst of a group of balls. KEN (O.C) That was on the line! The other bees start walking around amongst the immense, yellow globes. SPLITZ This is the coolest. What is it? They stop at a BALL on a white line and look up at it. JACKSON I don’t know, but I’m loving this color. SPLITZ (smelling tennis ball) Smells good. Not like a flower. But I like it. JACKSON Yeah, fuzzy. BUZZ Chemical-y. JACKSON Careful, guys, it’s a little grabby. Barry LANDS on a ball and COLLAPSES. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 25. BARRY Oh my sweet lord of bees. JACKSON Hey, candy brain, get off there! Barry attempts to pulls his legs off, but they stick. BARRY Problem! A tennis shoe and a hand ENTER FRAME. The hand picks up the ball with Barry underneath it. BARRY (CONT'D) Guys! BUZZ This could be bad. JACKSON Affirmative. Vanessa walks back to the service line, BOUNCES the ball. Each time it BOUNCES, the other bees cringe and GASP. ANGLE ON: Barry, terrified. Pure dumb luck, he’s not getting squished. BARRY (with each bounce) Very close...Gonna Hurt...Mamma’s little boy. SPLITZ You are way out of position, rookie. ANGLE ON: Vanessa serving. We see Barry and the ball up against the racket as she brings it back. She tosses the ball into the air; Barry’s eyes widen. The ball is STRUCK, and the rally is on. KEN Coming in at you like a missile! Ken HITS the ball back. Barry feels the g-forces. ANGLE ON: The Pollen Jocks watching Barry pass by them in SLOW MOTION. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 26. BARRY (in slow motion) Help me! JACKSON You know, I don't think these are flowers. SPLITZ Should we tell him? JACKSON I think he knows. BARRY (O.S) What is this?! Vanessa HITS a high arcing lob. Ken waits, poised for the return. We see Barry having trouble maneuvering the ball from fatigue. KEN (overly confident) Match point! ANGLE ON: Ken running up. He has a killer look in his eyes. He’s going to hit the ultimate overhead smash. KEN (CONT'D) You can just start packing up Honey, because I believe you’re about to eat it! ANGLE ON: Pollen Jocks. JACKSON Ahem! Ken is distracted by the jock. KEN What? No! He misses badly. The ball rockets into oblivion. Barry is still hanging on. ANGLE ON: Ken, berating himself. KEN (CONT’D) Oh, you cannot be serious. We hear the ball WHISTLING, and Barry SCREAMING. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 27. BARRY Yowser!!! SEQ. 1000 - “SUV” The ball flies through the air, and lands in the middle of the street. It bounces into the street again, and sticks in the grille of an SUV. INT. CAR ENGINE - CONTINUOUS BARRY’S POV: the grille of the SUV sucks him up. He tumbles through a black tunnel, whirling vanes, and pistons. BARRY AHHHHHHHHHHH!! OHHHH!! EECHHH!! AHHHHHH!! Barry gets chilled by the A/C system, and sees a frozen grasshopper. BARRY (CONT’D) (re: grasshopper) Eww, gross. CUT TO: INT. CAR - CONTINUOUS The car is packed with a typical suburban family: MOTHER, FATHER, eight-year old BOY, LITTLE GIRL in a car seat and a GRANDMOTHER. A big slobbery DOG is behind a grate. Barry pops into the passenger compartment, hitting the Mother’s magazine. MOTHER There’s a bee in the car! They all notice the bee and start SCREAMING. BARRY Aaahhhh! Barry tumbles around the car. We see the faces from his POV. MOTHER Do something! \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 28. FATHER I’m driving! Barry flies by the little girl in her CAR SEAT. She waves hello. LITTLE GIRL Hi, bee. SON He’s back here! He’s going to sting me! The car SWERVES around the road. Barry flies into the back, where the slobbery dog SNAPS at him. Barry deftly avoids the jaws and gross, flying SPITTLE. MOTHER Nobody move. If you don’t move, he won’t sting you. Freeze! Everyone in the car freezes. Barry freezes. They stare at each other, eyes going back and forth, waiting to see who will make the first move. Barry blinks. GRANNY He blinked! Granny pulls out a can of HAIR SPRAY. SON Spray him, Granny! Granny sprays the hair spray everywhere. FATHER What are you doing? GRANNY It’s hair spray! Extra hold! MOTHER Kill it! Barry gets sprayed back by the hair spray, then sucked out of the sunroof. CUT TO: \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 29. EXT. CITY STREET - CONTINUOUS BARRY Wow. The tension level out here is unbelievable. I’ve got to get home. As Barry flies down the street, it starts to RAIN. He nimbly avoids the rain at first. BARRY (CONT’D) Whoa. Whoa! Can’t fly in rain! Can’t fly in rain! Can’t fly in-- A couple of drops hit him, his wings go limp and he starts falling. BARRY (CONT'D) Mayday! Mayday! Bee going down! Barry sees a window ledge and aims for it and just makes it. Shivering and exhausted, he crawls into an open window as it CLOSES. SEQ. 1100 - “VANESSA SAVES BARRY” INT. VANESSA’S APARTMENT - CONTINUOUS Inside the window, Barry SHAKES off the rain like a dog. Vanessa, Ken, Andy, and Anna ENTER the apartment. VANESSA Ken, can you close the window please? KEN Huh? Oh. (to Andy) Hey, check out my new resume. I made it into a fold-out brochure. You see? It folds out. Ken holds up his brochure, with photos of himself, and a resume in the middle. ANGLE ON: Barry hiding behind the curtains, as Ken CLOSES THE WINDOW. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 30. BARRY Oh no, more humans. I don’t need this. Barry HOVERS up into the air and THROWS himself into the glass. BARRY (CONT’D) (dazed) Ow! What was that? He does it again, and then multiple more times. BARRY (CONT'D) Maybe this time...this time, this time, this time, this time, this time, this time, this time. Barry JUMPS onto the drapes. BARRY (CONT'D) (out of breath) Drapes! (then, re: glass) That is diabolical. KEN It’s fantastic. It’s got all my special skills, even my top ten favorite movies. ANDY What’s your number one? Star Wars? KEN Ah, I don’t go for that, (makes Star Wars noises), kind of stuff. ANGLE ON: Barry. BARRY No wonder we’re not supposed to talk to them. They’re out of their minds. KEN When I walk out of a job interview they’re flabbergasted. They can’t believe the things I say. Barry looks around and sees the LIGHT BULB FIXTURE in the middle of the ceiling. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 31. BARRY (re: light bulb) Oh, there’s the sun. Maybe that’s a way out. Barry takes off and heads straight for the light bulb. His POV: The seventy-five watt label grows as he gets closer. BARRY (CONT’D) I don’t remember the sun having a big seventy five on it. Barry HITS the bulb and is KNOCKED SILLY. He falls into a BOWL OF GUACAMOLE. Andy dips his chip in the guacamole, taking Barry with it. ANGLE ON: Ken and Andy. KEN I’ll tell you what. You know what? I predicted global warming. I could feel it getting hotter. At first I thought it was just me. Barry’s POV: Giant human mouth opening. KEN (CONT’D) Wait! Stop! Beeeeeee! ANNA Kill it! Kill it! They all JUMP up from their chairs. Andy looks around for something to use. Ken comes in for the kill with a big TIMBERLAND BOOT on each hand. KEN Stand back. These are winter boots. Vanessa ENTERS, and stops Ken from squashing Barry. VANESSA (grabs Ken’s arm) Wait. Don’t kill him. CLOSE UP: on Barry’s puzzled face. KEN You know I’m allergic to them. This thing could kill me. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 32. VANESSA Why does his life have any less value than yours? She takes a GLASS TUMBLER and places it over Barry. KEN Why does his life have any less value than mine? Is that your statement? VANESSA I’m just saying, all life has value. You don’t know what he’s capable of feeling. Barry looks up through the glass and watches this conversation, astounded. Vanessa RIPS Ken’s resume in half and SLIDES it under the glass. KEN (wistful) My brochure. There’s a moment of eye contact as she carries Barry to the window. She opens it and sets him free. VANESSA There you go, little guy. KEN (O.C) I’m not scared of them. But, you know, it’s an allergic thing. ANDY (O.C) * Hey, why don’t you put that on your * resume-brochure? * KEN (O.C) It’s not funny, my whole face could puff up. ANDY (O.C) Make it one of your “Special Skills.” KEN (O.C) You know, knocking someone out is also a special skill. CUT TO: \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 33. EXT. WINDOWSILL - CONTINUOUS Barry stares over the window frame. He can’t believe what’s just happened. It is still RAINING. DISSOLVE TO: SEQ. 1200 - “BARRY SPEAKS” EXT. WINDOWSILL - LATER Barry is still staring through the window. Inside, everyone’s saying their good-byes. KEN Vanessa, next week? Yogurt night? VANESSA Uh, yeah sure Ken. You know, whatever. KEN You can put carob chips on there. VANESSA Good night. KEN (as he exits) Supposed to be less calories, or something. VANESSA Bye. She shuts the door. Vanessa starts cleaning up. BARRY I’ve got to say something. She saved my life. I’ve got to say something. Alright, here it goes. Barry flies in. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 34. INT. VANESSA’S APARTMENT - CONTINUOUS Barry hides himself on different PRODUCTS placed along the kitchen shelves. He hides on a Bumblebee Tuna can, and a “Greetings From Coney Island” MUSCLE-MAN POSTCARD on the fridge. BARRY (on fridge) What would I say? (landing on a bottle) I could really get in trouble. He stands looking at Vanessa. BARRY (CONT'D) It’s a bee law. You’re not supposed to talk to a human. I can’t believe I’m doing this. I’ve got to. Oh, I can’t do it! Come on! No, yes, no, do it! I can’t. How should I start it? You like jazz? No, that’s no good. Here she comes. Speak, you fool. As Vanessa walks by, Barry takes a DEEP BREATH. BARRY (CONT’D) (cheerful) Umm...hi. Vanessa DROPS A STACK OF DISHES, and HOPS BACK. BARRY (CONT’D) I’m sorry. VANESSA You’re talking. BARRY Yes, I know, I know. VANESSA You’re talking. BARRY I know, I’m sorry. I’m so sorry. VANESSA It’s okay. It’s fine. It’s just, I know I’m dreaming, but I don’t recall going to bed. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 35. BARRY Well, you know I’m sure this is very disconcerting. VANESSA Well yeah. I mean this is a bit of a surprise to me. I mean...you’re a bee. BARRY Yeah, I am a bee, and you know I’m not supposed to be doing this, but they were all trying to kill me and if it wasn’t for you...I mean, I had to thank you. It’s just the way I was raised. Vanessa intentionally JABS her hand with a FORK. VANESSA Ow! BARRY That was a little weird. VANESSA (to herself) I’m talking to a bee. BARRY Yeah. VANESSA I’m talking to a bee. BARRY Anyway... VANESSA And a bee is talking to me... BARRY I just want you to know that I’m grateful, and I’m going to leave now. VANESSA Wait, wait, wait, wait, how did you learn to do that? BARRY What? \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 36. VANESSA The talking thing. BARRY Same way you did, I guess. Mama, Dada, honey, you pick it up. VANESSA That’s very funny. BARRY Yeah. Bees are funny. If we didn’t laugh, we’d cry. With what we have to deal with. Vanessa LAUGHS. BARRY (CONT’D) Anyway. VANESSA Can I, uh, get you something? BARRY Like what? VANESSA I don’t know. I mean, I don’t know. Coffee? BARRY Well, uh, I don’t want to put you out. VANESSA It’s no trouble. BARRY Unless you’re making anyway. VANESSA Oh, it takes two minutes. BARRY Really? VANESSA It’s just coffee. BARRY I hate to impose. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 37. VANESSA Don’t be ridiculous. BARRY Actually, I would love a cup. VANESSA Hey, you want a little rum cake? BARRY I really shouldn’t. VANESSA Have a little rum cake. BARRY No, no, no, I can’t. VANESSA Oh, come on. BARRY You know, I’m trying to lose a couple micrograms here. VANESSA Where? BARRY Well... These stripes don’t help. VANESSA You look great. BARRY I don’t know if you know anything about fashion. Vanessa starts POURING the coffee through an imaginary cup and directly onto the floor. BARRY (CONT'D) Are you alright? VANESSA No. DISSOLVE TO: SEQ. 1300 - “ROOFTOP COFFEE” \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 38. EXT. VANESSA’S ROOF - LATER Barry and Vanessa are drinking coffee on her roof terrace. He is perched on her keychain. BARRY ...He can’t get a taxi. He’s making the tie in the cab, as they’re flying up Madison. So he finally gets there. VANESSA Uh huh? BARRY He runs up the steps into the church, the wedding is on... VANESSA Yeah? BARRY ...and he says, watermelon? I thought you said Guatemalan. VANESSA Uh huh? BARRY Why would I marry a watermelon? Barry laughs. Vanessa doesn’t. VANESSA Oh! Is that, uh, a bee joke? BARRY Yeah, that’s the kind of stuff that we do. VANESSA Yeah, different. A BEAT. VANESSA (CONT’D) So anyway...what are you going to do, Barry? \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 39. BARRY About work? I don’t know. I want to do my part for the hive, but I can’t do it the way they want. VANESSA I know how you feel. BARRY You do? VANESSA Sure, my parents wanted me to be a lawyer or doctor, but I wanted to be a florist. BARRY Really? VANESSA My only interest is flowers. BARRY Our new queen was just elected with that same campaign slogan. VANESSA Oh. BARRY Anyway, see there’s my hive, right there. You can see it. VANESSA Oh, you’re in Sheep Meadow. BARRY (excited) Yes! You know the turtle pond? VANESSA Yes? BARRY I’m right off of that. VANESSA Oh, no way. I know that area. Do you know I lost a toe-ring there once? BARRY Really? \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 40. VANESSA Yes. BARRY Why do girls put rings on their toes? VANESSA Why not? BARRY I don’t know. It’s like putting a hat on your knee. VANESSA Really? Okay. A JANITOR in the background changes a LIGHTBULB. To him, it appears that Vanessa is talking to an imaginary friend. JANITOR You all right, ma’am? VANESSA Oh, yeah, fine. Just having two cups of coffee. BARRY Anyway, this has been great. (wiping his mouth) Thanks for the coffee. Barry gazes at Vanessa. VANESSA Oh yeah, it’s no trouble. BARRY Sorry I couldn’t finish it. Vanessa giggles. BARRY (CONT'D) (re: coffee) If I did, I’d be up the rest of my life. Ummm. Can I take a piece of this with me? VANESSA Sure. Here, have a crumb. She takes a CRUMB from the plate and hands it to Barry. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 41. BARRY (a little dreamy) Oh, thanks. VANESSA Yeah. There is an awkward pause. BARRY Alright, well then, I guess I’ll see you around, or not, or... VANESSA Okay Barry. BARRY And thank you so much again, for before. VANESSA Oh that? BARRY Yeah. VANESSA Oh, that was nothing. BARRY Well, not nothing, but, anyway... Vanessa extends her hand, and shakes Barry’s gingerly. The Janitor watches. The lightbulb shorts out. The Janitor FALLS. CUT TO: SEQ. 1400 - “HONEX” INT. HONEX BUILDING - NEXT DAY ANGLE ON: A TEST BEE WEARING A PARACHUTE is in a wind tunnel, hovering through increasingly heavy wind. SIGNS UNDER A FLASHING LIGHT READ: “Test In Progress” &amp; “Hurricane Survival Test”. 2 BEES IN A LAB COATS are observing behind glass. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 42. LAB COAT BEE 1 This can’t possibly work. LAB COAT BEE 2 Well, he’s all set to go, we may as well try it. (into the mic) Okay Dave, pull the chute. The test bee opens his parachute. He’s instantly blown against the rear wall. Adam and Barry ENTER. ADAM Sounds amazing. BARRY Oh, it was amazing. It was the scariest, happiest moment of my life. ADAM Humans! Humans! I can’t believe you were with humans! Giant scary humans! What were they like? BARRY Huge and crazy. They talk crazy, they eat crazy giant things. They drive around real crazy. ADAM And do they try and kill you like on TV? BARRY Some of them. But some of them don’t. ADAM How’d you get back? BARRY Poodle. ADAM Look, you did it. And I’m glad. You saw whatever you wanted to see out there, you had your “experience”, and now you’re back, you can pick out your job, and everything can be normal. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 43. ANGLE ON: LAB BEES examining a CANDY CORN through a microscope. BARRY Well... ADAM Well? BARRY Well, I met someone. ADAM You met someone? Was she Bee-ish? BARRY Mmm. ADAM Not a WASP? Your parents will kill you. BARRY No, no, no, not a wasp. ADAM Spider? BARRY You know, I’m not attracted to the spiders. I know to everyone else it’s like the hottest thing with the eight legs and all. I can’t get by that face. Barry makes a spider face. ADAM So, who is she? BARRY She’s a human. ADAM Oh no, no, no, no. That didn’t happen. You didn’t do that. That is a bee law. You wouldn’t break a bee law. BARRY Her name’s Vanessa. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 44. ADAM Oh, oh boy! BARRY She’s so-o nice. And she’s a florist! ADAM Oh, no. No, no, no! You’re dating a human florist? BARRY We’re not dating. ADAM You’re flying outside the hive. You’re talking to human beings that attack our homes with power washers and M-80’s. That’s 1/8 of a stick of dynamite. BARRY She saved my life. And she understands me. ADAM This is over. Barry pulls out the crumb. BARRY Eat this. Barry stuffs the crumb into Adam’s face. ADAM This is not over. What was that? BARRY They call it a crumb. ADAM That was SO STINGING STRIPEY! BARRY And that’s not even what they eat. That just falls off what they eat. Do you know what a Cinnabon is? ADAM No. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 45. BARRY It’s bread... ADAM Come in here! BARRY and cinnamon, ADAM Be quiet! BARRY and frosting...they heat it up-- ADAM Sit down! INT. ADAM’S OFFICE - CONTINUOUS BARRY Really hot! ADAM Listen to me! We are not them. We’re us. There’s us and there’s them. BARRY Yes, but who can deny the heart that is yearning... Barry rolls his chair down the corridor. ADAM There’s no yearning. Stop yearning. Listen to me. You have got to start thinking bee, my friend. ANOTHER BEE JOINS IN. ANOTHER BEE Thinking bee. WIDER SHOT AS A 3RD BEE ENTERS, popping up over the cubicle wall. 3RD BEE Thinking bee. EVEN WIDER SHOT AS ALL THE BEES JOIN IN. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 46. OTHER BEES Thinking bee. Thinking bee. Thinking bee. CUT TO: SEQ. 1500 - “POOLSIDE NAGGING” EXT. BACKYARD PARENT’S HOUSE - DAY Barry sits on a RAFT in a hexagon honey pool, legs dangling into the water. Janet Benson and Martin Benson stand over him wearing big, sixties sunglasses and cabana-type outfits. The sun shines brightly behind their heads. JANET BENSON (O.C) There he is. He’s in the pool. MARTIN BENSON You know what your problem is, Barry? BARRY I’ve got to start thinking bee? MARTIN BENSON Barry, how much longer is this going to go on? It’s been three days. I don’t understand why you’re not working. BARRY Well, I’ve got a lot of big life decisions I’m thinking about. MARTIN BENSON What life? You have no life! You have no job! You’re barely a bee! Barry throws his hands in the air. BARRY Augh. JANET BENSON Would it kill you to just make a little honey? Barry ROLLS off the raft and SINKS to the bottom of the pool. We hear his parents’ MUFFLED VOICES from above the surface. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 47. JANET BENSON (CONT'D) (muffled) Barry, come out from under there. Your father’s talking to you. Martin, would you talk to him? MARTIN BENSON Barry, I’m talking to you. DISSOLVE TO: EXT. PICNIC AREA - DAY MUSIC: “Sugar Sugar” by the Archies. Barry and Vanessa are having a picnic. A MOSQUITO lands on Vanessa’s leg. She SWATS it violently. Barry’s head whips around, aghast. They stare at each other awkwardly in a frozen moment, then BURST INTO HYSTERICAL LAUGHTER. Vanessa GETS UP. VANESSA You coming? BARRY Got everything? VANESSA All set. Vanessa gets into a one-man Ultra Light plane with a black and yellow paint scheme. She puts on her helmet. BARRY You go ahead, I’ll catch up. VANESSA (come hither wink) Don’t be too long. The Ultra Light takes off. Barry catches up. They fly sideby-side. VANESSA (CONT’D) Watch this! Vanessa does a loop, and FLIES right into the side of a mountain, BURSTING into a huge ball of flames. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 48. BARRY (yelling, anguished) Vanessa! EXT. BARRY’S PARENT’S HOUSE - CONTINUOUS ANGLE ON: Barry’s face bursting through the surface of the pool, GASPING for air, eyes opening in horror. MARTIN BENSON We’re still here, Barry. JANET BENSON I told you not to yell at him. He doesn’t respond when you yell at him. MARTIN BENSON Then why are you yelling at me? JANET BENSON Because you don’t listen. MARTIN BENSON I’m not listening to this. Barry is toweling off, putting on his sweater. BARRY Sorry Mom, I’ve got to go. JANET BENSON Where are you going? BARRY Nowhere. I’m meeting a friend. Barry JUMPS off the balcony and EXITS. JANET BENSON (calling after him) A girl? Is this why you can’t decide? BARRY Bye! JANET BENSON I just hope she’s Bee-ish. CUT TO: \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 49. SEQ. 1700 - “STREETWALK/SUPERMARKET” EXT. VANESSA’S FLORIST SHOP - DAY Vanessa FLIPS the sign to say “Sorry We Missed You”, and locks the door. ANGLE ON: A POSTER on Vanessa’s door for the Tournament of Roses Parade in Pasadena. BARRY So they have a huge parade of just flowers every year in Pasadena? VANESSA Oh, to be in the Tournament of Roses, that’s every florist’s dream. Up on a float, surrounded by flowers, crowds cheering. BARRY Wow, a tournament. Do the roses actually compete in athletic events? VANESSA No. Alright, I’ve got one. How come you don’t fly everywhere? BARRY It’s exhausting. Why don’t you run everywhere? VANESSA Hmmm. BARRY Isn’t that faster? VANESSA Yeah, okay. I see, I see. Alright, your turn. Barry and Vanessa walk/fly down a New York side street, no other pedestrians near them. BARRY Ah! Tivo. You can just freeze live TV? That’s insane. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 50. VANESSA What, you don’t have anything like that? BARRY We have Hivo, but it’s a disease. It’s a horrible, horrible disease. VANESSA Oh my. They turn the corner onto a busier avenue and people start to swat at Barry. MAN Dumb bees! VANESSA You must just want to sting all those jerks. BARRY We really try not to sting. It’s usually fatal for us. VANESSA So you really have to watch your temper? They ENTER a SUPERMARKET. CUT TO: INT. SUPERMARKET BARRY Oh yeah, very carefully. You kick a wall, take a walk, write an angry letter and throw it out. You work through it like any emotion-- anger, jealousy, (under his breath) lust. Barry hops on top of some cardboard boxes in the middle of an aisle. A stock boy, HECTOR, whacks him with a rolled up magazine. VANESSA (to Barry) Oh my goodness. Are you okay? \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 51. BARRY Yeah. Whew! Vanessa WHACKS Hector over the head with the magazine. VANESSA (to Hector) What is wrong with you?! HECTOR It’s a bug. VANESSA Well he’s not bothering anybody. Get out of here, you creep. Vanessa pushes him, and Hector EXITS, muttering. BARRY (shaking it off) What was that, a Pick and Save circular? VANESSA Yeah, it was. How did you know? BARRY It felt like about ten pages. Seventy-five’s pretty much our limit. VANESSA Boy, you’ve really got that down to a science. BARRY Oh, we have to. I lost a cousin to Italian Vogue. VANESSA I’ll bet. Barry stops, sees the wall of honey jars. BARRY What, in the name of Mighty Hercules, is this? How did this get here? Cute Bee? Golden Blossom? Ray Liotta Private Select? VANESSA Is he that actor? \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 52. BARRY I never heard of him. Why is this here? VANESSA For people. We eat it. BARRY Why? (gesturing around the market) You don’t have enough food of your own? VANESSA Well yes, we-- BARRY How do you even get it? VANESSA Well, bees make it... BARRY I know who makes it! And it’s hard to make it! There’s Heating and Cooling, and Stirring...you need a whole Krelman thing. VANESSA It’s organic. BARRY It’s our-ganic! VANESSA It’s just honey, Barry. BARRY Just...what?! Bees don’t know about this. This is stealing. A lot of stealing! You’ve taken our homes, our schools, our hospitals. This is all we have. And it’s on sale? I’m going to get to the bottom of this. I’m going to get to the bottom of all of this! He RIPS the label off the Ray Liotta Private Select. CUT TO: \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 53. SEQ. 1800 - “WINDSHIELD” EXT. BACK OF SUPERMARKET LOADING DOCK - LATER THAT DAY Barry disguises himself by blacking out his yellow lines with a MAGIC MARKER and putting on some war paint. He sees Hector, the stock boy, with a knife CUTTING open cardboard boxes filled with honey jars. MAN You almost done? HECTOR Almost. Barry steps in some honey, making a SNAPPING noise. Hector stops and turns. HECTOR (CONT’D) He is here. I sense it. Hector grabs his BOX CUTTER. Barry REACTS, hides himself behind the box again. HECTOR (CONT’D) (talking too loud, to no one in particular) Well, I guess I’ll go home now, and just leave this nice honey out, with no one around. A BEAT. Hector pretends to exit. He takes a couple of steps in place. ANGLE ON: The honey jar. Barry steps out into a moody spotlight. BARRY You’re busted, box boy! HECTOR Ah ha! I knew I heard something. So, you can talk. Barry flies up, stinger out, pushing Hector up against the wall. As Hector backs up, he drops his knife. BARRY Oh, I can talk. And now you’re going to start talking. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 54. Where are you getting all the sweet stuff? Who’s your supplier?! HECTOR I don’t know what you’re talking about. I thought we were all friends. The last thing we want to do is upset any of you...bees! Hector grabs a PUSHPIN. Barry fences with his stinger. HECTOR (CONT’D) You’re too late. It’s ours now! BARRY You, sir, have crossed the wrong sword. HECTOR You, sir, are about to be lunch for my iguana, Ignacio! Barry and Hector get into a cross-swords, nose-to-nose confrontation. BARRY Where is the honey coming from? Barry knocks the pushpin out of his hand. Barry puts his stinger up to Hector’s nose. BARRY (CONT'D) Tell me where?! HECTOR (pointing to a truck) Honey Farms. It comes from Honey Farms. ANGLE ON: A Honey Farms truck leaving the parking lot. Barry turns, takes off after the truck through an alley. He follows the truck out onto a busy street, dodging a bus, and several cabs. CABBIE Crazy person! He flies through a metal pipe on the top of a truck. BARRY OOOHHH! \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 55. BARRY (CONT'D) Barry grabs onto a bicycle messenger’s backpack. The honey farms truck starts to pull away. Barry uses the bungee cord to slingshot himself towards the truck. He lands on the windshield, where the wind plasters him to the glass. He looks up to find himself surrounded by what appear to be DEAD BUGS. He climbs across, working his way around the bodies. BARRY (CONT’D) Oh my. What horrible thing has happened here? Look at these faces. They never knew what hit them. And now they’re on the road to nowhere. A MOSQUITO opens his eyes. MOOSEBLOOD Pssst! Just keep still. BARRY What? You’re not dead? MOOSEBLOOD Do I look dead? Hey man, they will wipe anything that moves. Now, where are you headed? BARRY To Honey Farms. I am onto something huge here. MOOSEBLOOD I’m going to Alaska. Moose blood. Crazy stuff. Blows your head off. LADYBUG I’m going to Tacoma. BARRY (to fly) What about you? MOOSEBLOOD He really is dead. BARRY Alright. The WIPER comes towards them. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 56. MOOSEBLOOD Uh oh. BARRY What is that? MOOSEBLOOD Oh no! It’s a wiper, triple blade! BARRY Triple blade? MOOSEBLOOD Jump on. It’s your only chance, bee. They hang on as the wiper goes back and forth. MOOSEBLOOD (CONT'D) (yelling to the truck driver through the glass) Why does everything have to be so dog-gone clean?! How much do you people need to see? Open your eyes! Stick your head out the window! CUT TO: INT. TRUCK CAB SFX: Radio. RADIO VOICE For NPR News in Washington, I’m Carl Kasell. EXT. TRUCK WINDSHIELD MOOSEBLOOD But don’t kill no more bugs! The Mosquito is FLUNG off of the wiper. MOOSEBLOOD (CONT'D) Beeeeeeeeeeeeee! BARRY Moose blood guy! \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 57. Barry slides toward the end of the wiper, is thrown off, but he grabs the AERIAL and hangs on for dear life. Barry looks across and sees a CRICKET on another vehicle in the exact same predicament. They look at each other and SCREAM in unison. BARRY AND CRICKET Aaaaaaaaaah! ANOTHER BUG grabs onto the aerial, and screams as well. INT. TRUCK CAB - SAME TIME DRIVER You hear something? TRUCKER PASSENGER Like what? DRIVER Like tiny screaming. TRUCKER PASSENGER Turn off the radio. The driver reaches down and PRESSES a button, lowering the aerial. EXT. TRUCK WINDSHIELD - SAME TIME Barry and the other bug do a “choose up” to the bottom, Barry wins. BARRY Aha! Then he finally has to let go and gets thrown into the truck horn atop cab. Mooseblood is inside. MOOSEBLOOD Hey, what’s up bee boy? BARRY Hey, Blood! DISSOLVE TO: \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 58. INT. TRUCK HORN - LATER BARRY ...and it was just an endless row of honey jars as far as the eye could see. MOOSEBLOOD Wow. BARRY So I’m just assuming wherever this honey truck goes, that’s where they’re getting it. I mean, that honey’s ours! MOOSEBLOOD Bees hang tight. BARRY Well, we’re all jammed in there. It’s a close community. MOOSEBLOOD Not us, man. We’re on our own. Every mosquito is on his own. BARRY But what if you get in trouble? MOOSEBLOOD Trouble? You're a mosquito. You're in trouble! Nobody likes us. They’re just all smacking. People see a mosquito, smack, smack! BARRY At least you’re out in the world. You must meet a lot of girls. MOOSEBLOOD Mosquito girls try to trade up; get with a moth, dragonfly...mosquito girl don’t want no mosquito. A BLOOD MOBILE pulls up alongside. MOOSEBLOOD (CONT'D) Whoa, you have got to be kidding me. Mooseblood’s about to leave the building. So long bee. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 59. Mooseblood EXITS the horn, and jumps onto the blood mobile. MOOSEBLOOD (CONT'D) Hey guys. I knew I’d catch you all down here. Did you bring your crazy straws? CUT TO: SEQ. 1900 - “THE APIARY” EXT. APIARY - LATER Barry sees a SIGN, “Honey Farms” The truck comes to a stop. SFX: The Honey farms truck blares its horn. Barry flies out, lands on the hood. ANGLE ON: Two BEEKEEPERS, FREDDY and ELMO, walking around to the back of the gift shop. Barry follows them, and lands in a nearby tree FREDDY ...then we throw it in some jars, slap a label on it, and it’s pretty much pure profit. BARRY What is this place? ELMO Bees got a brain the size of a pinhead. FREDDY They are pinheads. The both LAUGH. ANGLE ON: Barry REACTING. They arrive at the back of the shop where one of them opens a SMOKER BOX. FREDDY (CONT’D) Hey, check out the new smoker. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 60. ELMO Oh, Sweet. That’s the one you want. FREDDY The Thomas 3000. BARRY Smoker? FREDDY 90 puffs a minute, semi-automatic. Twice the nicotine, all the tar. They LAUGH again, nefariously. FREDDY (CONT’D) Couple of breaths of this, and it knocks them right out. They make the honey, and we make the money. BARRY “They make the honey, and we make the money?” Barry climbs onto the netting of Freddy’s hat. He climbs up to the brim and looks over the edge. He sees the apiary boxes as Freddy SMOKES them. BARRY (CONT'D) Oh my. As Freddy turns around, Barry jumps into an open apiary box, and into an apartment. HOWARD and FRAN are just coming to from the smoking. BARRY (CONT’D) What’s going on? Are you okay? HOWARD Yeah, it doesn’t last too long. HE COUGHS a few times. BARRY How did you two get here? Do you know you’re in a fake hive with fake walls? HOWARD (pointing to a picture on the wall) \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 61. Our queen was moved here, we had no choice. BARRY (looking at a picture on the wall) This is your queen? That’s a man in women’s clothes. That’s a dragqueen! The other wall opens. Barry sees the hundreds of apiary boxes. BARRY (CONT'D) What is this? Barry pulls out his camera, and starts snapping. BARRY (CONT’D) Oh no. There’s hundreds of them. (V.O, as Barry takes pictures) Bee honey, our honey, is being brazenly stolen on a massive scale. CUT TO: SEQ. 2100 - “BARRY TELLS FAMILY” INT. BARRY’S PARENT’S HOUSE - LIVING ROOM - LATER Barry has assembled his parents, Adam, and Uncle Carl. BARRY This is worse than anything the bears have done to us. And I intend to do something about it. JANET BENSON Oh Barry, stop. MARTIN BENSON Who told you that humans are taking our honey? That’s just a rumor. BARRY Do these look like rumors? Barry throws the PICTURES on the table. Uncle Carl, cleaning his glasses with his shirt tail, digs through a bowl of nuts with his finger. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 62. HOWARD (CONT'D) UNCLE CARL That’s a conspiracy theory. These are obviously doctored photos. JANET BENSON Barry, how did you get mixed up in all this? ADAM (jumping up) Because he’s been talking to humans! JANET BENSON Whaaat? MARTIN BENSON Talking to humans?! Oh Barry. ADAM He has a human girlfriend and they make out! JANET BENSON Make out? Barry? BARRY We do not. ADAM You wish you could. BARRY Who’s side are you on? ADAM The bees! Uncle Carl stands up and pulls his pants up to his chest. UNCLE CARL I dated a cricket once in San Antonio. Man, those crazy legs kept me up all night. Hotcheewah! JANET BENSON Barry, this is what you want to do with your life? BARRY This is what I want to do for all our lives. Nobody works harder than bees. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 63. Dad, I remember you coming home some nights so overworked, your hands were still stirring. You couldn’t stop them. MARTIN BENSON Ehhh... JANET BENSON (to Martin) I remember that. BARRY What right do they have to our hardearned honey? We’re living on two cups a year. They’re putting it in lip balm for no reason what-soever. MARTIN BENSON Even if it’s true, Barry, what could one bee do? BARRY I’m going to sting them where it really hurts. MARTIN BENSON In the face? BARRY No. MARTIN BENSON In the eye? That would really hurt. BARRY No. MARTIN BENSON Up the nose? That’s a killer. BARRY No. There’s only one place you can sting the humans. One place where it really matters. CUT TO: SEQ. 2300 - “HIVE AT 5 NEWS/BEE LARRY KING” \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 64. BARRY (CONT'D) INT. NEWS STUDIO - DAY DRAMATIC NEWS MUSIC plays as the opening news sequence rolls. We see the “Hive at Five” logo, followed by shots of past news events: A BEE freeway chase, a BEE BEARD protest rally, and a BEAR pawing at the hive as the BEES flee in panic. BOB BUMBLE (V.O.) Hive at Five, the hive’s only full hour action news source... SHOTS of NEWSCASTERS flash up on screen. BOB BUMBLE (V.O.) (CONT'D) With Bob Bumble at the anchor desk... BOB has a big shock of anchorman hair, gray temples and overly white teeth. BOB BUMBLE (V.O.) (CONT'D) ...weather with Storm Stinger, sports with Buzz Larvi, and Jeanette Chung. JEANETTE is an Asian bee. BOB BUMBLE (CONT'D) Good evening, I’m Bob Bumble. JEANETTE CHUNG And I’m Jeanette Chung. BOB BUMBLE Our top story, a tri-county bee, Barry Benson... INSERT: Barry’s graduation picture. BOB BUMBLE (CONT'D) ...is saying he intends to sue the human race for stealing our honey, packaging it, and profiting from it illegally. CUT TO: \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 65. INT. BEENN STUDIO - BEE LARRY KING LIVE BEE LARRY KING, wearing suspenders and glasses, is interviewing Barry. A LOWER-THIRD CHYRON reads: “Bee Larry King Live.” BEE LARRY KING Don’t forget, tomorrow night on Bee Larry King, we are going to have three former Queens all right here in our studio discussing their new book, “Classy Ladies,” out this week on Hexagon. (to Barry) Tonight, we’re talking to Barry Benson. Did you ever think, I’m just a kid from the hive, I can’t do this? BARRY Larry, bees have never been afraid to change the world. I mean, what about Bee-Columbus? Bee-Ghandi? Be-geesus? BEE LARRY KING Well, where I’m from you wouldn’t think of suing humans. We were thinking more like stick ball, candy stores. BARRY How old are you? BEE LARRY KING I want you to know that the entire bee community is supporting you in this case, which is certain to be the trial of the bee century. BARRY Thank you, Larry. You know, they have a Larry King in the human world, too. BEE LARRY KING It’s a common name. Next week on Bee Larry King... \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 66. BARRY No, I mean he looks like you. And he has a show with suspenders and different colored dots behind him. BEE LARRY KING Next week on Bee Larry King... BARRY Old guy glasses, and there’s quotes along the bottom from the guest you’re watching even though you just heard them... BEE LARRY KING Bear week next week! They’re scary, they’re hairy, and they’re here live. Bee Larry King EXITS. BARRY Always leans forward, pointy shoulders, squinty eyes... (lights go out) Very Jewish. CUT TO: SEQ. 2400 - “FLOWER SHOP” INT. VANESSA’S FLOWER SHOP - NIGHT Stacks of law books are piled up, legal forms, etc. Vanessa is talking with Ken in the other room. KEN Look, in tennis, you attack at the point of weakness. VANESSA But it was my grandmother, Ken. She’s 81. KEN Honey, her backhand’s a joke. I’m not going to take advantage of that? \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 67. BARRY (O.C) Quiet please. Actual work going on here. KEN Is that that same bee? BARRY (O.C) Yes it is. VANESSA I’m helping him sue the human race. KEN What? Barry ENTERS. BARRY Oh, hello. KEN Hello Bee. Barry flies over to Vanessa. VANESSA This is Ken. BARRY Yeah, I remember you. Timberland, size 10 1/2, Vibram sole I believe. KEN Why does he talk again, Hun? VANESSA (to Ken, sensing the tension) Listen, you’d better go because we’re really busy working. KEN But it’s our yogurt night. VANESSA (pushing him out the door) Oh...bye bye. She CLOSES the door. KEN Why is yogurt night so difficult?! \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 68. Vanessa ENTERS the back room carrying coffee. VANESSA Oh you poor thing, you two have been at this for hours. BARRY Yes, and Adam here has been a huge help. ANGLE ON: A EMPTY CINNABON BOX with Adam asleep inside, covered in frosting. VANESSA How many sugars? BARRY Just one. I try not to use the competition. So, why are you helping me, anyway? VANESSA Bees have good qualities. BARRY (rowing on the sugar cube like a gondola) Si, Certo. VANESSA And it feels good to take my mind off the shop. I don’t know why, instead of flowers, people are giving balloon bouquets now. BARRY Yeah, those are great...if you’re 3. VANESSA And artificial flowers. BARRY (re: plastic flowers) Oh, they just get me psychotic! VANESSA Yeah, me too. BARRY The bent stingers, the pointless pollination. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 69. VANESSA Bees must hate those fake plastic things. BARRY There’s nothing worse than a daffodil that’s had work done. VANESSA (holding up the lawsuit documents) Well, maybe this can make up for it a little bit. CUT TO: EXT. VANESSA’S FLORIST SHOP They EXIT the store, and cross to the mailbox. VANESSA You know Barry, this lawsuit is a pretty big deal. BARRY I guess. VANESSA Are you sure that you want to go through with it? BARRY Am I sure? (kicking the envelope into the mailbox) When I’m done with the humans, they won’t be able to say, “Honey, I’m home,” without paying a royalty. CUT TO: SEQ. 2700 - “MEET MONTGOMERY” EXT. MANHATTAN COURTHOUSE - DAY P.O.V SHOT - A camera feed turns on, revealing a newsperson. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 70. PRESS PERSON #2 (talking to camera) Sarah, it’s an incredible scene here in downtown Manhattan where all eyes and ears of the world are anxiously waiting, because for the first time in history, we’re going to hear for ourselves if a honey bee can actually speak. ANGLE ON: Barry, Vanessa, and Adam getting out of the cab. The press spots Barry and Vanessa and pushes in. Adam sits on Vanessa’s shoulder. INT. COURTHOUSE - CONTINUOUS Barry, Vanessa, and Adam sit at the Plaintiff’s Table. VANESSA (turns to Barry) What have we gotten into here, Barry? BARRY I don’t know, but it’s pretty big, isn’t it? ADAM I can’t believe how many humans don’t have to be at work during the day. BARRY Hey, you think these billion dollar multinational food companies have good lawyers? CUT TO: EXT. COURTHOUSE STEPS - CONTINUOUS A BIG BLACK CAR pulls up. ANGLE ON: the grill filling the frame. We see the “L.T.M” monogram on the hood ornament. The defense lawyer, LAYTON T. MONTGOMERY comes out, squashing a bug on the pavement. CUT TO: \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 71. INT. COURTHOUSE - CONTINUOUS Barry SHUDDERS. VANESSA What’s the matter? BARRY I don’t know. I just got a chill. Montgomery ENTERS. He walks by Barry’s table shaking a honey packet. MONTGOMERY Well, if it isn’t the B-Team. (re: the honey packet) Any of you boys work on this? He CHUCKLES. The JUDGE ENTERS. SEQ. 3000 - “WITNESSES” BAILIFF All rise! The Honorable Judge Bumbleton presiding. JUDGE (shuffling papers) Alright...Case number 4475, Superior Court of New York. Barry Bee Benson vs. the honey industry, is now in session. Mr. Montgomery, you are representing the five major food companies, collectively. ANGLE ON: Montgomery’s BRIEFCASE. It has an embossed emblem of an EAGLE, holding a gavel in one talon and a briefcase in the other. MONTGOMERY A privilege. JUDGE Mr. Benson. Barry STANDS. JUDGE (CONT’D) You are representing all bees of the world? \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 72. Montgomery, the stenographer, and the jury lean in. CUT TO: EXT. COURTHOUSE - CONTINUOUS The spectators outside freeze. The helicopters angle forward to listen closely. CUT TO: INT. COURTHOUSE BARRY Bzzz bzzz bzzz...Ahh, I’m kidding, I’m kidding. Yes, your honor. We are ready to proceed. ANGLE ON: Courtroom hub-bub. JUDGE And Mr. Montgomery, your opening statement, please. Montgomery rises. MONTGOMERY (grumbles, clears his throat) Ladies and gentlemen of the jury. My grandmother was a simple woman. Born on a farm, she believed it was man's divine right to benefit from the bounty of nature God put before us. If we were to live in the topsy-turvy world Mr. Benson imagines, just think of what it would mean. Maybe I would have to negotiate with the silk worm for the elastic in my britches. Talking bee. How do we know this isn’t some sort of holographic motion picture capture Hollywood wizardry? They could be using laser beams, robotics, ventriloquism, cloning...for all we know he could be on steroids! Montgomery leers at Barry, who moves to the stand. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 73. JUDGE Mr. Benson? Barry makes his opening statement. BARRY Ladies and Gentlemen of the jury, there’s no trickery here. I’m just an ordinary bee. And as a bee, honey’s pretty important to me. It’s important to all bees. We invented it, we make it, and we protect it with our lives. Unfortunately, there are some people in this room who think they can take whatever they want from us cause we’re the little guys. And what I’m hoping is that after this is all over, you’ll see how by taking our honey, you’re not only taking away everything we have, but everything we are. ANGLE ON: Vanessa smiling. ANGLE ON: The BEE GALLERY wiping tears away. CUT TO: INT. BENSON HOUSE Barry’s family is watching the case on TV. JANET BENSON Oh, I wish he would dress like that all the time. So nice... CUT TO: INT. COURTROOM - LATER JUDGE Call your first witness. CUT TO: \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 74. INT. COURTHOUSE - LATER BARRY So, Mr. Klauss Vanderhayden of Honey Farms. Pretty big company you have there? MR. VANDERHAYDEN I suppose so. BARRY And I see you also own HoneyBurton, and Hon-Ron. MR. VANDERHAYDEN Yes. They provide beekeepers for our farms. BARRY Beekeeper. I find that to be a very disturbing term, I have to say. I don’t imagine you employ any bee free-ers, do you? MR. VANDERHAYDEN No. BARRY I’m sorry. I couldn’t hear you. MR. VANDERHAYDEN (louder) No. BARRY No. Because you don’t free bees. You keep bees. And not only that, it seems you thought a bear would be an appropriate image for a jar of honey? MR. VANDERHAYDEN Well, they’re very lovable creatures. Yogi-bear, Fozzy-bear, Build-a-bear. BARRY Yeah, you mean like this?! Vanessa and the SUPERINTENDANT from her building ENTER with a GIANT FEROCIOUS GRIZZLY BEAR. He has a neck collar and chains extending from either side. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 75. By pulling the chains, they bring him directly in front of Vanderhayden. The bear LUNGES and ROARS. BARRY (CONT'D) Bears kill bees! How would you like his big hairy head crashing into your living room? Biting into your couch, spitting out your throwpillows...rowr, rowr! The bear REACTS. BEAR Rowr!! BARRY Okay, that’s enough. Take him away. Vanessa and the Superintendant pull the bear out of the courtroom. Vanderhayden TREMBLES. The judge GLARES at him. CUT TO: INT. COURTROOM- A LITTLE LATER Barry questions STING. BARRY So, Mr. Sting. Thank you for being here. Your name intrigues me, I have to say. Where have I heard it before? STING I was with a band called \"The Police\". BARRY But you've never been a police officer of any kind, have you? STING No, I haven't. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 76. BARRY No, you haven’t. And so, here we have yet another example of bee culture being casually stolen by a human for nothing more than a prance-about stage name. STING Oh please. BARRY Have you ever been stung, Mr. Sting? Because I'm feeling a little stung, Sting. Or should I say, (looking in folder) Mr. Gordon M. Sumner? The jury GASPS. MONTGOMERY (to his aides) That’s not his real name? You idiots! CUT TO: INT. COURTHOUSE- LATER BARRY Mr. Liotta, first may I offer my belated congratulations on your Emmy win for a guest spot on E.R. in 2005. LIOTTA Thank you. Thank you. Liotta LAUGHS MANIACALLY. BARRY I also see from your resume that you’re devilishly handsome, but with a churning inner turmoil that’s always ready to blow. LIOTTA I enjoy what I do. Is that a crime? \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 77. BARRY Not yet it isn’t. But is this what it’s come to for you, Mr. Liotta? Exploiting tiny helpless bees so you don’t have to rehearse your part, and learn your lines, Sir? LIOTTA Watch it Benson, I could blow right now. BARRY This isn’t a goodfella. This is a badfella! LIOTTA (exploding, trying to smash Barry with the Emmy) Why doesn’t someone just step on this little creep and we can all go home? You’re all thinking it. Say it! JUDGE Order! Order in this courtroom! A MONTAGE OF NEWSPAPER HEADLINES FOLLOWS: NEW YORK POST: “Bees to Humans: Buzz Off”. NEW YORK TELEGRAM: “Sue Bee”. DAILY VARIETY: “Studio Dumps Liotta Project. Slams Door on Unlawful Entry 2.” CUT TO: SEQ. 3175 - “CANDLELIGHT DINNER” INT. VANESSA’S APARTMENT Barry and Vanessa are having a candle light dinner. Visible behind Barry is a “LITTLE MISSY” SET BOX, with the flaps open. BARRY Well, I just think that was awfully nice of that bear to pitch in like that. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 78. VANESSA I’m telling you, I think the jury’s on our side. BARRY Are we doing everything right...you know, legally? VANESSA I’m a florist. BARRY Right, right. Barry raises his glass. BARRY (CONT’D) Well, here’s to a great team. VANESSA To a great team. They toast. Ken ENTERS KEN Well hello. VANESSA Oh...Ken. BARRY Hello. VANESSA I didn’t think you were coming. KEN No, I was just late. I tried to call. But, (holding his cell phone) the battery... VANESSA I didn’t want all this to go to waste, so I called Barry. Luckily he was free. BARRY Yeah. KEN (gritting his teeth) Oh, that was lucky. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 79. VANESSA Well, there’s still a little left. I could heat it up. KEN Yeah, heat it up. Sure, whatever. Vanessa EXITS. Ken and Barry look at each other as Barry eats. BARRY So, I hear you’re quite a tennis player. I’m not much for the game myself. I find the ball a little grabby. KEN That’s where I usually sit. Right there. VANESSA (O.C) Ken, Barry was looking at your resume, and he agreed with me that “eating with chopsticks” isn’t really a special skill. KEN (to Barry) You think I don’t see what you’re doing? BARRY Hey look, I know how hard it is trying to find the right job. We certainly have that in common. KEN Do we? BARRY Well, bees have 100% employment, of course. But we do jobs like taking the crud out. KEN That’s just what I was thinking about doing. Ken holds his table knife up. It slips out of his hand. He goes under the table to pick it up. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 80. VANESSA Ken, I let Barry borrow your razor for his fuzz. I hope that was alright. Ken hits his head on the table. BARRY I’m going to go drain the old stinger. KEN Yeah, you do that. Barry EXITS to the bathroom, grabbing a small piece of a VARIETY MAGAZINE on the way. BARRY Oh, look at that. Ken slams the champagne down on the table. Ken closes his eyes and buries his face in his hands. He grabs a magazine on the way into the bathroom. SEQ. 2800 - “BARRY FIGHTS KEN” INT. BATHROOM - CONTINUOUS Ken ENTERS, closes the door behind him. He’s not happy. Barry is washing his hands. He glances back at Ken. KEN You know, I’ve just about had it with your little mind games. BARRY What’s that? KEN Italian Vogue. BARRY Mamma Mia, that’s a lot of pages. KEN It’s a lot of ads. BARRY Remember what Van said. Why is your life any more valuable than mine? \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 81. KEN It’s funny, I just can’t seem to recall that! Ken WHACKS at Barry with the magazine. He misses and KNOCKS EVERYTHING OFF THE VANITY. Ken grabs a can of AIR FRESHENER. KEN (CONT'D) I think something stinks in here. He sprays at Barry. BARRY I love the smell of flowers. KEN Yeah? How do you like the smell of flames? Ken lights the stream. BARRY Not as much. Barry flies in a circle. Ken, trying to stay with him, spins in place. ANGLE ON: Flames outside the bathroom door. Ken slips on the Italian Vogue, falls backward into the shower, pulling down the shower curtain. The can hits him in the head, followed by the shower curtain rod, and the rubber duck. Ken reaches back, grabs the handheld shower head. He whips around, looking for Barry. ANGLE ON: A WATERBUG near the drain. WATERBUG Waterbug. Not taking sides. Barry is on the toilet tank. He comes out from behind a shampoo bottle, wearing a chapstick cap as a helmet. BARRY Ken, look at me! I’m wearing a chapstick hat. This is pathetic. ANGLE ON: Ken turning the hand shower nozzle from “GENTLE”, to “TURBO”, to “LETHAL”. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 82. KEN I’ve got issues! Ken fires the water at Barry, knocking him into the toilet. The items from the vanity (emory board, lipstick, eye curler, etc.) are on the toilet seat. Ken looks down at Barry. KEN (CONT'D) Well well well, a royal flush. BARRY You’re bluffing. KEN Am I? Ken flushes the toilet. Barry grabs the Emory board and uses it to surf. He puts his hand in the water while he’s surfing. Some water splashes on Ken. BARRY Surf’s up, dude! KEN Awww, poo water! He does some skate board-style half-pipe riding. Barry surfs out of the toilet. BARRY That bowl is gnarly. Ken tries to get a shot at him with the toilet brush. KEN Except for those dirty yellow rings. Vanessa ENTERS. VANESSA Kenneth! What are you doing? KEN You know what? I don’t even like honey! I don’t eat it! VANESSA We need to talk! \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 83. She pulls Ken out by his ear. Ken glares at Barry. CUT TO: INT. HALLWAY - CONTINUOUS VANESSA He’s just a little bee. And he happens to be the nicest bee I’ve met in a long time. KEN Long time? What are you talking about? Are there other bugs in your life? VANESSA No, but there are other things bugging me in life. And you’re one of them! KEN Fine! Talking bees, no yogurt night...my nerves are fried from riding on this emotional rollercoaster. VANESSA Goodbye, Ken. KEN Augh! VANESSA Whew! Ken EXITS, then re-enters frame. KEN And for your information, I prefer sugar-free, artificial sweeteners, made by man! He EXITS again. The DOOR SLAMS behind him. VANESSA (to Barry) I’m sorry about all that. Ken RE-ENTERS. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 84. KEN I know it’s got an aftertaste! I like it! BARRY (re: Ken) I always felt there was some kind of barrier between Ken and me. (puts his hands in his pockets) I couldn’t overcome it. Oh well. VANESSA Are you going to be okay for the trial tomorrow? BARRY Oh, I believe Mr. Montgomery is about out of ideas. CUT TO: SEQ. 3300 - “ADAM STINGS MONTY” INT. COURTROOM - NEXT DAY ANGLE ON: Medium shot of Montgomery standing at his table. MONTGOMERY We would like to call Mr. Barry Benson Bee to the stand. ADAM (whispering to Vanessa) Now that’s a good idea. (to Barry) You can really see why he’s considered one of the very best lawyers-- Oh. Barry rolls his eyes. He gets up, takes the stand. A juror in a striped shirt APPLAUDS. MR. GAMMIL (whispering) Layton, you’ve got to weave some magic with this jury, or it’s going to be all over. Montgomery is holding a BOOK, “The Secret Life of Bees”. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 85. MONTGOMERY (confidently whispering) Oh, don’t worry Mr. Gammil. The only thing I have to do to turn this jury around is to remind them of what they don’t like about bees. (to Gammil) You got the tweezers? Mr. Gammil NODS, and pats his breast pocket. MR. GAMMIL Are you allergic? MONTGOMERY Only to losing, son. Only to losing. Montgomery approaches the stand. MONTGOMERY (CONT’D) Mr. Benson Bee. I’ll ask you what I think we’d all like to know. What exactly is your relationship to that woman? Montgomery points to Vanessa. BARRY We’re friends. MONTGOMERY Good friends? BARRY Yes. MONTGOMERY (softly in Barry’s face) How good? BARRY What? MONTGOMERY Do you live together? BARRY Wait a minute, this isn’t about-- \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 86. MONTGOMERY Are you her little... (clearing throat) ... bed bug? BARRY (flustered) Hey, that’s not the kind of-- MONTGOMERY I’ve seen a bee documentary or two. Now, from what I understand, doesn’t your Queen give birth to all the bee children in the hive? BARRY Yeah, but-- MONTGOMERY So those aren’t even your real parents! ANGLE ON: Barry’s parents. MARTIN BENSON Oh, Barry. BARRY Yes they are! ADAM Hold me back! Vanessa holds him back with a COFFEE STIRRER. Montgomery points to Barry’s parents. MONTGOMERY You’re an illegitimate bee, aren’t you Benson? ADAM He’s denouncing bees! All the bees in the courtroom start to HUM. They’re agitated. MONTGOMERY And don’t y’all date your cousins? \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 87. VANESSA (standing, letting go of Adam) Objection! Adam explodes from the table and flies towards Montgomery. ADAM I’m going to pin cushion this guy! Montgomery turns around and positions himself by the judge’s bench. He sticks his butt out. Montgomery winks at his team. BARRY Adam, don’t! It’s what he wants! Adam shoves Barry out of the way. Adam STINGS Montgomery in the butt. The jury REACTS, aghast. MONTGOMERY Ow! I’m hit! Oh, lordy, I am hit! The judge BANGS her gavel. JUDGE Order! Order! Please, Mr. Montgomery. MONTGOMERY The venom! The venom is coursing through my veins! I have been felled by a wing-ed beast of destruction. You see? You can’t treat them like equals. They’re strip-ed savages! Stinging’s the only thing they know! It’s their way! ANGLE ON: Adam, collapsed on the floor. Barry rushes to his side. BARRY Adam, stay with me. ADAM I can’t feel my legs. Montgomery falls on the Bailiff. BAILIFF Take it easy. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 88. MONTGOMERY Oh, what angel of mercy will come forward to suck the poison from my heaving buttocks? The JURY recoils. JUDGE Please, I will have order in this court. Order! Order, please! FADE TO: SEQ. 3400 - “ADAM AT HOSPITAL” INT. HOSPITAL - STREET LEVEL ROOM - DAY PRESS PERSON #1 (V.O) The case of the honey bees versus the human race took a pointed turn against the bees yesterday, when one of their legal team stung Layton T. Montgomery. Now here’s Don with the 5-day. A NURSE lets Barry into the room. Barry CARRIES a FLOWER. BARRY Thank you. Barry stands over Adam, in a bed. Barry lays the flower down next to him. The TV is on. BARRY (CONT'D) Hey buddy. ADAM Hey. BARRY Is there much pain? Adam has a BEE-SIZED PAINKILLER HONEY BUTTON near his head that he presses. ADAM (pressing the button) Yeah...I blew the whole case, didn’t I? \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 89. BARRY Oh, it doesn’t matter. The important thing is you’re alive. You could have died. ADAM I’d be better off dead. Look at me. Adam THROWS the blanket off his lap, revealing a GREEN SANDWICH SWORD STINGER. ADAM (CONT’D) (voice cracking) They got it from the cafeteria, they got it from downstairs. In a tuna sandwich. Look, there’s a little celery still on it. BARRY What was it like to sting someone? ADAM I can’t explain it. It was all adrenaline...and then...ecstasy. Barry looks at Adam. BARRY Alright. ADAM You think that was all a trap? BARRY Of course. I’m sorry. I flew us right into this. What were we thinking? Look at us, we’re just a couple of bugs in this world. ADAM What do you think the humans will do to us if they win? BARRY I don’t know. ADAM I hear they put the roaches in motels. That doesn’t sound so bad. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 90. BARRY Adam, they check in, but they don’t check out. Adam GULPS. ADAM Oh my. ANGLE ON: the hospital window. We see THREE PEOPLE smoking outside on the sidewalk. The smoke drifts in. Adam COUGHS. ADAM (CONT’D) Say, could you get a nurse to close that window? BARRY Why? ADAM The smoke. Bees don’t smoke. BARRY Right. Bees don’t smoke. Bees don’t smoke! But some bees are smoking. Adam, that’s it! That’s our case. Adam starts putting his clothes on. ADAM It is? It’s not over? BARRY No. Get up. Get dressed. I’ve got to go somewhere. You get back the court and stall. Stall anyway you can. CUT TO: SEQ. 3500 - “SMOKING GUN” INT. COURTROOM - THE NEXT DAY Adam is folding a piece of paper into a boat. ADAM ...and assuming you’ve done step 29 correctly, you’re ready for the tub. \"Bee Movie\" - JS REVISIONS 8/13/07 91. ANGLE ON: The jury, all with paper boats of their own. JURORS Ooh. ANGLE ON: Montgomery frustrated with Gammil, who’s making a boat also. Monty crumples Gammil’s boat, and throws it at him. JUDGE Mr. Flayman? ADAM Yes? Yes, Your Honor? JUDGE Where is the rest of your team? ADAM (fumbling with his swordstinger) Well, your honor, it’s interesting. You know Bees\n\n[README truncated by github_intel.py]",
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      "readme": "# ev-charging-station-security\n\nThis repository delves into the cybersecurity challenges surrounding electric vehicle (EV) charging infrastructure, analyzing the security vulnerabilities in charging stations, communication protocols, and potential attack vectors that could compromise the charging process.\n\n## Table of Contents\n\n1. [Project Overview](#project-overview)\n2. [Background](#background)\n3. [Security Analysis](#security-analysis)\n4. [Attack Demonstration Videos](#demo--video-walkthrough)\n5. [Proposed Mitigations](#proposed-mitigations)\n6. [Future Work](#future-work)\n7. [Conclusion](#conclusion)\n\n## Project Overview\n\nThis project explores the security risks within EV charging stations and their communication protocols, focusing on physical-layer vulnerabilities and how attackers can exploit weak authentication systems to manipulate charging behaviors. Our work highlights key flaws in widely-used charging protocols and presents the results of real-world attack demonstrations.\n\n## Background\n\nElectric vehicles (EVs) rely on secure charging stations for energy transfer. However, many existing charging systems, such as those based on the GB/T, IEC, and SAE J1772 standards, have weak authentication mechanisms. These weaknesses create significant security risks, allowing attackers to spoof authentication signals, lock charging ports, or even compromise vehicle systems through the charging interface.\n\n## Security Analysis\n\nWe identify and analyze various vulnerabilities in the authentication circuits of EV charging systems. These vulnerabilities stem from the use of static impedance and simple PWM signals for authentication, which can be easily spoofed by an attacker with physical access to the charging gun.\n\nThe primary security concerns include:\n\n* Impersonation of charging states through spoofed resistance or PWM signals.\n* Injection of malicious commands into the charging protocol, allowing remote control of the charging process or vehicle systems.\n\n## Demo / Video Walkthrough\n\nWe also provide a collection of demonstration videos showcasing attack scenarios, experimental setups, and real‑world tests. You can find them in the following playlist:\n\n**[EV Charging Station Security Demo Videos](https://youtube.com/playlist?list=PLcPx5A14HPko503cdxymPkMIsqWhoEMrI&si=rrWrpdEu_EWWiw2s)**\n\nThese videos include:\n\n* Physical‑layer spoofing attacks against EV charging connectors.\n* Device prototype deployment and operation (our \"proof‑of‑concept\" hardware).\n* Attack results on different charger/vehicle models.\n* Safety/disclosure considerations around EV charging security.\n\n## Proposed Mitigations\n\nTo mitigate the risks associated with weak authentication, we propose several solutions:\n\n* **Memory Electric Elements**: Using memory-based components to introduce dynamic resistance behavior, making it harder for attackers to replicate valid states.\n* **Dynamic Power Authentication**: Implementing dynamic impedance values that change in real-time during the charging session, preventing static spoofing attacks.\n\n## Future Work\n\nFuture efforts will include:\n\n* Expanding the PORTulator attack suite to test additional charging systems and standards.\n* Conducting real-world testing under varied environmental conditions, including different charging loads and interference from other wireless devices.\n* Investigating the impact of BMS (Battery Management System) protections on spoofing attacks and exploring ways to bypass these safety measures.\n\n## Conclusion\n\nOur research reveals significant vulnerabilities in the authentication mechanisms of widely-adopted EV charging protocols. By exploiting weaknesses in physical-layer communication, attackers can manipulate charging processes, lock vehicles, or even cause damage to critical systems. We have outlined potential countermeasures and future research directions to strengthen the security of EV charging infrastructure.",
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      "readme": "# vehsec — Vehicle Security Toolkit\n\n> CAN · UDS · Seed-Key · V2X · ICSim · **DoIP** · **DBC** — wrapped as a **CLI**,\n> a **TUI**, and an **MCP server** so you (or an AI coding agent) can drive it.\n> **No car required.**\n\n[![CI](https://github.com/xuange-hu/vehsec/actions/workflows/ci.yml/badge.svg)](https://github.com/xuange-hu/vehsec/actions/workflows/ci.yml)\n[![Tests](https://img.shields.io/badge/tests-310%20passing-brightgreen.svg)](tests/)\n[![License: MIT](https://img.shields.io/badge/License-MIT-yellow.svg)](LICENSE)\n[![Python](https://img.shields.io/badge/Python-3.10%2B-blue.svg)](https://www.python.org)\n[![MCP](https://img.shields.io/badge/MCP-2026%20standard-green.svg)](https://modelcontextprotocol.io)\n\n[中文 README / Chinese version](README_CN.md) · [Attack playbook](docs/playbook.md) · [Launch copy](docs/promotion.md)\n\n<img src=\"docs/demo.gif\" alt=\"vehsec terminal demo: CAN ID discovery, Seed-Key solve, UDS DID read, J1939 decode, ICSim tamper\" width=\"880\"/>\n\n---\n\n## Contents\n\n- [Why](#why)\n- [Architecture](#architecture)\n- [Quick start](#quick-start)\n- [Let an AI agent drive it](#let-an-ai-agent-drive-it)\n- [Capabilities](#capabilities)\n- [Labs — 5 runnable Docker exercises](#labs--5-runnable-docker-exercises)\n- [UDS in 30 seconds — no hardware](#uds-in-30-seconds--no-hardware)\n- [Diagnostic trouble codes in 30 seconds](#diagnostic-trouble-codes-in-30-seconds)\n- [ISO-TP in 30 seconds](#iso-tp-in-30-seconds)\n- [Seed-Key algorithm recovery in 30 seconds](#seed-key-algorithm-recovery-in-30-seconds)\n- [DoIP & DBC in 30 seconds](#doip--dbc-in-30-seconds)\n- [DoIP TLS / gateway certificates in 30 seconds](#doip-tls--gateway-certificates-in-30-seconds)\n- [Docs](#docs)\n- [Tests](#tests)\n- [Legal & ethics](#legal--ethics)\n- [License](#license)\n\n## Why\n\nVehicle / in-vehicle-network (IVN) security is one of the hottest areas in security\nresearch — and one of the most fragmented. The classic tools (CANalyzat0r, UDSim,\nCANToolz, ICSim, caringcaribou) are aging, Shell-heavy, and thinly documented, so\n**a beginner cannot get started without a real car**.\n\n`vehsec` folds those capabilities into one modern, documented, composable package:\none command, one TUI, or one sentence to an AI agent gets you a UDS handshake, a CAN\nreplay, a Seed-Key solve, a V2X signature analysis, or an instrument-cluster tamper\ndemo. Everything runs on a **virtual CAN bus** (`python-can virtual`, or `vcan0` +\nICSim on Linux) with Docker labs — nothing to brick.\n\n## Architecture\n\n<img src=\"docs/architecture.svg\" alt=\"vehsec architecture\" width=\"880\"/>\n\nOne core library, three surfaces (CLI / TUI / MCP), one transport. The same\nimplementation is exposed to humans *and* to AI agents — that is the main difference\nfrom the older tooling.\n\n## Quick start\n\n**Option A — one line, no clone, no venv** (best for handing the MCP server to an agent):\n\n```bash\nuvx --from \"vehsec[mcp] @ git+https://github.com/xuange-hu/vehsec\" vehsec-mcp\nuvx --from \"vehsec @ git+https://github.com/xuange-hu/vehsec\" vehsec --help\n# no uv? pipx run --spec \"vehsec[mcp] @ git+https://github.com/xuange-hu/vehsec\" vehsec-mcp\n```\n\nThe `@ git+…` form installs straight from this repository, so it works today.\nOnce the package is on PyPI it shortens to `uvx --from \"vehsec[mcp]\" vehsec-mcp`;\n`.github/workflows/publish.yml` publishes automatically on every release, it only\nneeds PyPI Trusted Publishing enabled **once**.\n\n**Option B — clone and hack on it:**\n\n```bash\ngit clone https://github.com/xuange-hu/vehsec && cd vehsec\npython -m venv .venv && source .venv/bin/activate      # Windows: .venv\\Scripts\\activate\npip install -e \".[all]\"\n\nvehsec --help             # CLI\nvehsec tui                # interactive TUI\nvehsec mcp                # MCP server (stdio) for AI agents\nvehsec mcp --check        # list the 31 tools an agent would get, then exit\npython examples/demo.py   # 5-step scripted demo, no hardware\n```\n\n## Let an AI agent drive it\n\nDrop this into your agent's MCP config (`~/.workbuddy/mcp.json`, Cursor\n`~/.cursor/mcp.json`, Cline, or Claude Desktop's `claude_desktop_config.json`) and\ntrust the server — no clone, no venv, `uv`/`uvx` fetches it on first launch:\n\n```json\n{\n  \"mcpServers\": {\n    \"vehsec\": {\n      \"command\": \"uvx\",\n      \"args\": [\"--from\", \"vehsec[mcp] @ git+https://github.com/xuange-hu/vehsec\", \"vehsec-mcp\"]\n    }\n  }\n}\n```\n\nAlready have `vehsec` installed? The equivalent is\n`{ \"command\": \"vehsec\", \"args\": [\"mcp\"] }` (`examples/mcp-config.json`). Then just ask:\n\n> \"Run a UDS security access on the virtual ECU and show me the seed and key.\"\n\nThirty-one tools are exposed: `can_send`, `can_fuzz`, `can_analyze`,\n`uds_security_access`, `uds_read_did`, `uds_read_dtcs`, `uds_clear_dtcs`,\n`uds_decode_dtc`, `uds_raw`, `seedkey_solve`, `seedkey_vendors`,\n`seedkey_recover`, `seedkey_predict`, `v2x_analyze`, `icsim_set_speed`, `icsim_tamper_demo`,\n`doip_simulate`, `doip_probe`, `doip_tls_audit`, `doip_tls_probe`, `doip_tls_simulate`,\n`dbc_decode`, `dbc_info`,\n`j1939_decode`, `j1939_encode`, `j1939_decode_name`, `j1939_decode_dm1`,\n`isotp_segment`, `isotp_decode`, `isotp_reassemble`, `isotp_explain`.\n\n## Capabilities\n\n- **UDS diagnostics** — session control, security access (27), DID read/write, routine\n  control, ECU reset, **DTC read/clear (19/14)**, communication control (28), and a\n  **raw request escape hatch**, over ISO-TP (`udsoncan` + `can-isotp`). Ships with an\n  attached **virtual ECU**, so all of it runs with nothing plugged in.\n- **CAN replay & fuzz** — replay `candump` logs, or mutate frames against a set of IDs.\n- **CAN ID discovery** — per-ID counts, unique payloads, and *which bytes change*, to\n  locate the control signal in an unknown vehicle.\n- **Seed-Key solver** — pluggable algorithm registry (xor / add / rotate / bit-reverse /\n  nibble-swap / endian-swap / CRC16-mixed / LFSR / SHA-256 keystream) for the UDS 27\n  handshake, plus **algorithm recovery**: feed it observed `(seed, key)` pairs and it\n  brute-forces the transform family and solves for the parameters — then\n  `seedkey_predict` / `seedkey.predict()` applies the result to a **fresh seed** you\n  never observed, which is how you unlock the next session without the OEM DLL.\n- **V2X / ECDSA** — detect nonce reuse and **recover the signer's private key**.\n- **ICSim control** — script speed / doors / turn signals on the virtual cluster.\n- **DoIP (ISO 13400)** — in-process virtual DoIP entity: vehicle discovery, routing\n  activation, and UDS-over-Ethernet (read the VIN) with no hardware.\n- **DoIP over TLS** — the ISO 13400-2 secure diagnostics channel (TCP 3496), plus a\n  **certificate audit engine**: a from-scratch, zero-dependency X.509 reader that also\n  verifies RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 signatures in pure Python, so \"self-signed\" is proven rather\n  than guessed. Grades key size, signature hash, validity, SAN/hostname and CA chain,\n  and probes which TLS versions a gateway still accepts.\n- **DBC parsing** — pure stdlib: Intel/Motorola endianness, signed values,\n  factor/offset scaling, value tables, multiplexed signals.\n- **J1939 (trucks/buses)** — 29-bit id ↔ PGN/priority/source (PDU1 & PDU2), NAME\n  decode, DM1 diagnostics (SPN/FMI/CM/OC), EEC1 engine speed.\n- **ISO-TP (ISO 15765-2)** — the UDS transport layer, from scratch: SF/FF/CF/FC\n  framing, segmentation and reassembly with sequence validation, and an\n  **ASCII visualisation** of the whole transfer.\n- **DTC (diagnostic trouble codes)** — read faults (19 sub 01/02/0A), clear them\n  (14), and decode the 3-byte code into its SAE J2012 identifier (`C10000` →\n  `U0100`) with status flags and a short description.\n\n## Labs — 5 runnable Docker exercises\n\n| Lab | Topic |\n|-----|-------|\n| [`labs/uds-did-decrypt`](labs/uds-did-decrypt) | UDS DID decryption: identify the cipher, recover the key |\n| [`labs/delta-forge-patchchain`](labs/delta-forge-patchchain) | OTA patch-chain diff reveals a hidden payload |\n| [`labs/v2x-ecdsa-nonce`](labs/v2x-ecdsa-nonce) | ECDSA nonce reuse → private-key recovery |\n| [`labs/sentinel2-can-statemachine`](labs/sentinel2-can-statemachine) | CAN state-machine injection / missing auth guard |\n| [`labs/seedkey-recover`](labs/seedkey-recover) | UDS 0x27 Seed-Key: reverse the algorithm from 5 sniffed pairs, then unlock with an unseen seed |\n\n```bash\npython labs/v2x-ecdsa-nonce/solve.py --gen 20   # nonce reuse is the default:\n                                                # the first run recovers the key\npython labs/v2x-ecdsa-nonce/solve.py --gen 20 --no-reuse   # contrast: nothing found\n\n# Lab 5 needs no third-party package — pure stdlib + vehsec.seedkey\npython labs/seedkey-recover/solve.py            # 5 pairs -> one algorithm -> flag\npython labs/seedkey-recover/solve.py --pairs 1  # too little evidence -> 0x7F 27 35\n```\n\n## UDS in 30 seconds — no hardware\n\nEvery UDS command talks to an attached **virtual ECU** on a `python-can` virtual\nbus, so the UDS stack (ISO-TP segmentation, flow control, Seed-Key) is exercised\nfor real — just without metal.\n\n```console\n$ vehsec uds read --did 0xF190\n{'did': '0xF190',\n 'value': '5756575a5a5a314a5a5857303030303031',\n 'ascii': 'WVWZZZ1JZXW000001'}\n\n$ vehsec uds security --level 1 --vendor training_rotate\n{'level': 1, 'seed': '01020304', 'key': '585e5c52', 'unlocked': True}\n\n$ vehsec uds write --did 0xF190 --data 0102030405\n{'did': '0xF190', 'written': 5}\n```\n\n## Diagnostic trouble codes in 30 seconds\n\n```console\n$ vehsec uds dtc                       # read faults (service 0x19 sub-function 02)\n        Diagnostic Trouble Codes (3)\n┌───────┬────────┬─────────┬──────────────────────────┬──────────────────────┐\n│ code  │ raw    │ status  │ flags                    │ description          │\n├───────┼────────┼─────────┼──────────────────────────┼──────────────────────┤\n│ P0100 │ 010000 │ 0x2C    │ pendingDTC,confirmedDTC… │ Mass or Volume Air … │\n│ P0420 │ 042000 │ 0x0C    │ pendingDTC,confirmedDTC  │ Catalyst System Eff… │\n│ U0100 │ C10000 │ 0x08    │ confirmedDTC             │ Lost Communication … │\n└───────┴────────┴─────────┴──────────────────────────┴──────────────────────┘\n\n$ vehsec uds dtc --status 0x08         # confirmed faults only\n$ vehsec uds dtc --count               # just the number stored\n$ vehsec uds dtc --clear               # service 0x14\n$ vehsec uds raw --data 1901FF         # any request, response returned verbatim\n590109000003\n```\n\nThree records are 15 bytes, so this response is carried by a first frame plus\nconsecutive frames — the ISO-TP path is the real one, not a stub.\n\n## ISO-TP in 30 seconds\n\nThe VIN response is 20 bytes, so it is carried by a first frame plus two\nconsecutive frames. `vehsec isotp explain` draws exactly how:\n\n```console\n$ vehsec isotp explain --data 62F1904142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F5051\nISO-TP (ISO 15765-2) — 20-byte payload carried by 3 classic CAN frame(s)\n\n  #   frame bytes             PCI   kind  detail\n  0   10 14 62 F1 90 41 42 43 0x10  FF    total=20 B, carries bytes 0..5\n  1   21 44 45 46 47 48 49 4A 0x21  CF    seq=1, carries bytes 6..12\n  2   22 4B 4C 4D 4E 4F 50 51 0x22  CF    seq=2, carries bytes 13..19\n\n  reassembled payload:\n    62 F1 90 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49\n    4A 4B 4C 4D 4E 4F 50 51\n    = 20 bytes\n```\n\nPoint it at metal or UDSim instead with\n`VEHSEC_CAN_IFACE=socketcan VEHSEC_CAN_CHANNEL=vcan0` plus `auto_ecu=False`.\n\n## Seed-Key algorithm recovery in 30 seconds\n\nReal ECUs hide their seed→key algorithm in an OEM DLL. Capture a few\n`(seed, key)` pairs (replay `27 01`, log what the official tool answers with)\nand let `vehsec` work out the transform:\n\n```console\n$ vehsec seedkey recover --pairs 11223344:4B78691E,a5b6c7d8:FFEC9D82,deadbeeF:84F7E4B5\n    Recovered candidates (high confidence, 3 pair(s), 4-byte seed)\n┌─────────────────────────┬────────────────────┐\n│ algorithm               │ key for first seed │\n├─────────────────────────┼────────────────────┤\n│ key[i] = seed[i] ^ 0x5A │ 4B78691E           │\n└─────────────────────────┴────────────────────┘\n```\n\nThe catalogue covers `xor c`, `add c`, `sub c`, `xor i ^ c`, `add i + c`,\n`rotl 1/3 ^ c`, `bitrev ^ c`, `nibble-swap ^ c`, endian-swap, and the affine\nfamily `a*seed[i]+b`. Every result is checked against **all** supplied pairs, so\nthree or more pairs usually collapse to a single answer. Same thing over MCP:\n`seedkey_recover(pairs=\"11223344:4B78691E,...\")`.\n\nRecovery is only interesting if it ***generalises*** — a candidate that happens to\nfit one observation will fail on the next session. `seedkey predict` (CLI, MCP\n`seedkey_predict`, or `vehsec.seedkey.predict()`) applies the recovered algorithm\nto a seed you never captured:\n\n```console\n$ vehsec seedkey predict --pairs 11223344:4B78691E,a5b6c7d8:FFEC9D82,deadbeeF:84F7E4B5 \\\n                         --seed 00112233\nalgorithm key[i] = seed[i] ^ 0x5A\nkey      5A4B7869  (high confidence, 3 pair(s))\n```\n\n[Lab 5](labs/seedkey-recover) turns this into a full exercise: five sniffed pairs,\nheld-out seed, real `0x27 01/02` handshake, and a protected DID behind it —\nincluding the failure mode where too little evidence survives the fit but not the\nunlock (`--pairs 1`).\n\n## DoIP & DBC in 30 seconds\n\n```bash\nvehsec doip simulate                       # spin up a fake DoIP ECU, read its VIN\nvehsec dbc info    --file examples/sample.dbc\nvehsec dbc decode  --file examples/sample.dbc --id 0x100 --data 9F01393000010000\n#   Speed 41.5 km/h · Odometer 1234.5 km · SpeedValid 1\nvehsec dbc encode  --file examples/sample.dbc --id 0x100 --set Speed=41.5\nvehsec dbc watch   --file examples/sample.dbc --log capture.log   # decode a whole capture\n```\n\n## DoIP TLS / gateway certificates in 30 seconds\n\n```bash\n# 1. a TLS DoIP gateway in-process: handshake, routing activation, UDS, then audit\nvehsec doip tls-simulate\n#   negotiated TLSv1.3 / TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384\n#   UDS 22 F190 -> 62f1905756575a5a5a314a5a5857303030303031\n#   STRONG score 100/100\n\n# 2. audit a certificate you captured (PEM or DER)\nvehsec doip tls-audit --file gateway.pem --ca oem-ca.pem --hostname gateway.local\n#   REJECT score 10/100 grade F\n#     [CRITICAL] RSA key is only 1024 bits\n#     [HIGH    ] signed with SHA1 (sha1WithRSAEncryption)\n#     [MEDIUM  ] no subjectAltName extension; the CN is the only identity\n\n# 3. audit a live gateway: TLS versions + cert + is plaintext 13400 still open?\nvehsec doip tls-probe --host 192.0.2.10\n```\n\nThe interesting finding is usually the last one: **a gateway whose plaintext port 13400\nstill accepts a routing activation makes its own TLS listener decorative.** The audit\nalso tries each TLS version on its own, which is how you find a gateway that still\nanswers TLS 1.0.\n\n## Docs\n\n| Doc | What |\n|-----|------|\n| [Attack playbook](docs/playbook.md) | Recon → UDS → Seed-Key → replay → V2X, with an ISO/SAE 21434 TARA map |\n| [Quickstart](examples/quickstart.md) | Install, CLI, TUI, MCP setup |\n| [Roadmap](ROADMAP.md) | What's next |\n| [Contributing](CONTRIBUTING.md) | Dev setup, tests, how to add a lab |\n| [Security policy](SECURITY.md) | Reporting vulnerabilities in vehsec itself |\n| [awesome-vehicle-security.md](awesome-vehicle-security.md) | Curated resource list |\n\n## Tests\n\n```bash\npip install -e \".[all]\" && pip install pytest\npytest -q      # 261 passed: core, CLI, MCP registration, all 5 labs, demo script\n```\n\nCI runs ruff + pytest on Python 3.11 / 3.12 / 3.13.\n\n## Legal & ethics\n\nFor **authorized security research, teaching, and testing on equipment you own only**.\nDo not point this at vehicles or networks you are not authorized to test; comply with\nyour jurisdiction's laws. The authors accept no responsibility for misuse.\n\n## License\n\nMIT © xuange-hu",
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      "description": "An interactive CAN bus car-hacking simulator with a live dashboard and a built-in attack console.",
      "readme": "<p align=\"center\">\n  <img src=\"assets/GearHound-logo.png\" alt=\"GearHound: cyber hound gripping a car\" width=\"420\" />\n</p>\n\n<h1 align=\"center\">🐺 GearHound</h1>\n\n<p align=\"center\">\n  <strong>Hunt the signals. Decode the bus. Take the wheel.</strong><br />\n  An interactive CAN bus car-hacking simulator with a live dashboard and a built-in attack console.\n</p>\n\n<p align=\"center\">\n  <a href=\"LICENSE\"><img src=\"https://img.shields.io/badge/License-MIT-76ff03?style=for-the-badge\" alt=\"License: MIT\" /></a>\n  <img src=\"https://img.shields.io/badge/Python-3.10%2B-3776AB?style=for-the-badge&logo=python&logoColor=white\" alt=\"Python 3.10+\" />\n  <img src=\"https://img.shields.io/badge/React-18-61DAFB?style=for-the-badge&logo=react&logoColor=black\" alt=\"React 18\" />\n  <img src=\"https://img.shields.io/badge/Vite-5-646CFF?style=for-the-badge&logo=vite&logoColor=white\" alt=\"Vite 5\" />\n</p>\n\n<p align=\"center\">\n  <a href=\"#-the-lab\">Overview</a> ·\n  <a href=\"#-demo\">Demo</a> ·\n  <a href=\"#-features\">Features</a> ·\n  <a href=\"#-quick-start\">Quick Start</a> ·\n  <a href=\"#-two-ways-to-drive\">Two Views</a> ·\n  <a href=\"#-attack-console\">Attack Console</a> ·\n  <a href=\"#-real-world-parallels\">Real-World Parallels</a> ·\n  <a href=\"#-vehicle-profiles\">Vehicles</a> ·\n  <a href=\"#-configuration\">Configuration</a>\n</p>\n\n---\n\n## 🎥 Demo\n\n<p align=\"center\">\n  <img src=\"assets/demo.gif\" alt=\"GearHound demo: headlights, doors, driving with turn signals and braking, switching vehicles, both views, and a live fuzzing attack\" width=\"820\" />\n</p>\n\n<p align=\"center\"><em>Headlights, door locks, accelerating and braking with turn signals, switching vehicle profiles, driving in both the top-down and Driver View, and a live fuzzing attack while the CAN traffic monitor updates in real time.</em></p>\n\n---\n\n## 🧬 The Lab\n\n**GearHound puts automotive security experiments on your screen.** Drive a simulated vehicle, inspect live CAN traffic, and watch how injected frames affect the dashboard, all from one interface.\n\nGearHound brings together a live dashboard, three switchable vehicle profiles, and UI-driven fuzzing, flooding, spoofing, and capture/replay.\n\nThe default **virtual CAN mode** runs entirely in Python on Linux, macOS, and Windows. For a Linux CAN lab, switch to **SocketCAN** and connect to an existing interface such as `vcan0`.\n\n<p align=\"center\"><strong>🚗 3 Vehicle Profiles &nbsp; • &nbsp; ⚡ 4 Attack Modes &nbsp; • &nbsp; 📡 Live CAN Traffic &nbsp; • &nbsp; 🧪 No Hardware Required in Virtual Mode</strong></p>\n\n## ✨ Features\n\n**Driving experience**\n- Two driving views, a top-down dashboard and a first-person Driver View, switchable at any time, sharing the exact same controls and backend signals.\n- A genuinely animated car, not a static status display: wheels spin faster as speed climbs, a lane line scrolls beneath the car, turn-signal lamps blink in sync with the real signal state, headlight beams switch on and off, brake lights glow under braking, and speed-line streaks appear at high speed.\n- A Driver View cockpit: a perspective road receding to a vanishing point, a live HUD (speed, an RPM bar that redlines, fuel), headlight cones on the road at night, a red brake vignette, a horn ripple, door-lock status shown as side mirrors, and a steering wheel silhouette.\n\n**Attack console**\n- Fuzzing: sweep a range of arbitration IDs with random or incremental payloads to discover undocumented signals.\n- Flood / DoS: saturate the bus with a high-priority frame, with modeled bus congestion that visibly drops legitimate signal updates while it runs.\n- Signal spoofing: continuously force a chosen signal to a value at a configurable rate, an ongoing override, not a one-shot injection.\n- Capture and replay: record real bus traffic and play it back verbatim, at adjustable speed, optionally looped.\n- A live traffic monitor showing arbitration IDs, payload bytes, and per-ID change counts as frames arrive, plus a scrolling raw log view.\n\n**Vehicle simulation**\n- Three switchable vehicle profiles (Sedan LX, Trailhawk SUV, Ironhide Truck), each with a different arbitration ID map. The SUV even packs two signals into the same frame at different byte offsets.\n- One unified backend process that writes legitimate signals, runs every attack, and decodes whatever is on the bus, closer to how a real ECU behaves than a split controller/simulator design.\n- Two CAN backends: an in-process virtual bus that needs no OS-level CAN support (works on macOS, Windows, and Linux), or SocketCAN for a real Linux `vcan0` interface.\n\n**Reliability**\n- Refresh-safe: closing or reloading the tab mid-drive resets vehicle input instead of leaving the car accelerating forever with nobody in control.\n- Reconnecting restores full state: vehicle state, vehicle list, running attacks, and saved captures, so a refreshed browser always shows the live, authoritative state.\n- Finished attacks clean up after themselves instead of leaving phantom \"Stop\" buttons or leaking memory over a long session.\n\n## ⚙️ Under the Hood\n\n| Capability | What you get |\n| :--- | :--- |\n| 🏎️ **Live, animated dashboard** | Spinning wheels, a scrolling road, blinking indicators, headlight beams, and brake-light glow, all driven directly by real CAN state, not canned animation. |\n| 🚘 **Two driving views** | A top-down dashboard and a first-person **Driver View** with a perspective road, HUD, and steering wheel. Switch anytime. |\n| 🎮 **Interactive controls** | Accelerate, brake, steer the turn signals, and operate vehicle controls. |\n| 📡 **Traffic monitor** | Watch arbitration IDs, payload bytes, and timestamps as frames arrive. |\n| 🧨 **Built-in attack console** | Launch and stop fuzzing, flooding, spoofing, and replay from the UI. |\n| 🔀 **Switchable vehicle profiles** | Explore different CAN ID maps and signals packed at different byte offsets. |\n| 🧠 **Unified backend** | One process generates legitimate signals, runs attacks, and decodes bus traffic. |\n| 💻 **Two CAN backends** | Use an in-process virtual bus or a Linux SocketCAN interface. |\n| 🔌 **Refresh-safe** | Closing or reloading the tab mid-drive resets vehicle input instead of leaving the car accelerating forever with nobody in control. |\n\n## 🚀 Quick Start\n\n### Prerequisites\n\n- **Python 3.10+**: the existing project README reports testing with Python 3.12.\n- **Node.js 18+** and npm.\n- **Git** to clone the repository.\n\n### 1. Clone the lab\n\n```bash\ngit clone https://github.com/LiteshGhute/GearHound.git\ncd GearHound\n```\n\n### 2. Start the backend\n\n**Linux / macOS**: from the repository root:\n\n```bash\ncd backend\npython3 -m venv venv\n./venv/bin/python -m pip install -r requirements.txt\nCAN_BUSTYPE=virtual PORT=4000 ./venv/bin/python app.py\n```\n\n<details>\n<summary><strong>🪟 Windows PowerShell</strong></summary>\n\nFrom the repository root:\n\n```powershell\ncd backend\npy -3 -m venv venv\n.\\venv\\Scripts\\python.exe -m pip install -r requirements.txt\n$env:CAN_BUSTYPE = \"virtual\"\n$env:PORT = \"4000\"\n.\\venv\\Scripts\\python.exe app.py\n```\n\n</details>\n\n### 3. Start the frontend\n\nOpen a **second terminal** at the repository root:\n\n```bash\ncd frontend\nnpm install\nnpm run dev\n```\n\n### 4. Enter the cockpit\n\nOpen **[http://localhost:5173](http://localhost:5173)** in your browser. The backend listens on port **4000** by default.\n\n### Or skip all of that: Docker\n\n```bash\ngit clone https://github.com/LiteshGhute/GearHound.git\ncd GearHound\ndocker compose up --build\n```\n\nOpen **[http://localhost:5173](http://localhost:5173)**. Two containers: the backend\n(`CAN_BUSTYPE=virtual`, no host CAN interface needed) on port `4000`, and the\nfrontend built and served through nginx on port `5173`. Both defined in\n[`docker-compose.yml`](docker-compose.yml); the [`backend/`](backend/Dockerfile) and\n[`frontend/`](frontend/Dockerfile) Dockerfiles can also be built standalone.\n\n**Stop the dev servers first if they're running.** Compose publishes the\ncontainers on the same host ports (`4000`, `5173`) the local dev workflow\nabove uses. On some Docker Desktop setups this doesn't even fail loudly,\nboth can end up listening at once, and which one actually answers a given\nrequest becomes unpredictable. Use one workflow or the other, not both at\nthe same time.\n\nVite inlines `VITE_BACKEND_URL` into the built JS at build time, not at\ncontainer start, so if the backend won't be reachable at `localhost:4000` from\nwherever the browser runs (a remote host, a different port mapping), rebuild\nthe frontend with that URL instead:\n\n```bash\ndocker compose build --build-arg VITE_BACKEND_URL=http://your-host:4000 frontend\n```\n\nTo point the backend at a real Linux `vcan0` interface instead of the\nbuilt-in virtual bus, run its container with `socketcan` and host networking\n(the container needs to see the host's network interfaces directly, the way\nGearGoat's original container did):\n\n```bash\ndocker build -t gearhound-backend ./backend\ndocker run --network=host --privileged \\\n  -e CAN_BUSTYPE=socketcan -e CAN_CHANNEL=vcan0 \\\n  gearhound-backend\n```\n\n## 🖥️ Two Ways to Drive\n\n**Top-Down** is the classic bird's-eye dashboard: gauges up top, the car in the middle, pedals below. The car itself is animated, its wheels spin faster as speed climbs, indicator lamps blink in sync with the real turn signal, headlight beams and brake lights switch on and off, and a scrolling lane line behind it sells the sense of motion.\n\n<p align=\"center\">\n  <img src=\"assets/screenshot-topdown.png\" alt=\"GearHound top-down dashboard, idle\" width=\"47%\" />\n  <img src=\"assets/screenshot-topdown-driving.png\" alt=\"GearHound top-down dashboard, driving with left indicator and headlights on\" width=\"47%\" />\n</p>\n\n**Driver View** puts you in the seat: a perspective road stretches out ahead with a scrolling centerline, headlight cones spill onto the road at night, braking pulses a red vignette at the screen edges, and a HUD shows live speed, an RPM bar that redlines, and a fuel bar. Door-lock state for the front two doors shows up as small mirrors in the corners.\n\n<p align=\"center\">\n  <img src=\"assets/screenshot-driver-view.png\" alt=\"GearHound Driver View: perspective road, HUD, and headlight cones\" width=\"70%\" />\n</p>\n\nBoth views, and the pedal and indicator controls beneath them, share one control hook, so pressing a button in either view produces the exact same backend signal and the exact same instant visual feedback.\n\n## 🎮 Your First Session\n\n1. **Pick a vehicle.** Start with Sedan LX to explore the baseline signal layout.\n2. **Drive the simulation.** Use the controls and watch the dashboard respond.\n3. **Switch views.** Try Driver View for the first-person cockpit, then switch back.\n4. **Follow the traffic.** Compare changes in the dashboard with changing CAN payloads.\n5. **Explore the attack console.** Observe how simulated vehicle state responds to injected traffic.\n6. **Switch profiles.** Move to the SUV or Truck and investigate the new ID map.\n\n## 🧨 Attack Console\n\n| Mode | What it does | What to observe |\n| :--- | :--- | :--- |\n| 🎲 **Fuzzing** | Sweeps a range of arbitration IDs with random or incremental payloads. | Which frames affect signals in the active profile. |\n| 🌊 **Flood / DoS** | Sends high-priority traffic while applying modeled bus congestion. | Congestion warnings and dropped legitimate updates. |\n| 🎭 **Signal spoofing** | Repeatedly sends a forged signal value at a configurable rate. | An ongoing override competing with legitimate signal writes. |\n| ⏺️ **Capture & replay** | Records bus traffic and replays it at adjustable speed, optionally in a loop. | Previously recorded traffic affecting the current simulation. |\n\n**Simulation detail:** flood-induced congestion is modeled by probabilistically dropping legitimate frames. It is not a measurement of physical CAN bus saturation.\n\nCaptures are held in backend memory and are lost when the backend restarts.\n\n<p align=\"center\">\n  <img src=\"assets/screenshot-attack-console.png\" alt=\"A live fuzzing attack in progress, with random arbitration IDs flooding the traffic monitor\" width=\"85%\" />\n</p>\n\n## 🌍 Real-World Parallels\n\nNone of this is invented. Every attack mode in GearHound has a documented\nreal-world counterpart, this is what the simulator is standing in for:\n\n- **Signal spoofing** is exactly what Charlie Miller and Chris Valasek did\n  to a Jeep Cherokee in 2015: after gaining remote access through the\n  vehicle's cellular-connected infotainment unit, they pivoted onto the\n  CAN bus and sent forged messages the instrument cluster and other\n  modules trusted at face value, while a journalist was driving it on a\n  highway. Fiat Chrysler recalled 1.4 million vehicles as a result. The\n  same forged-value technique, at a much less dramatic scale, is also the\n  basis of digital odometer fraud: commercial \"mileage correction\" tools\n  plug into the OBD-II port and rewrite the values a car's modules report,\n  the same trust-whatever-arrives-last weakness GearHound's spoofing card\n  demonstrates live.\n- **Fuzzing** an unfamiliar CAN bus to find out what an arbitration ID\n  actually controls, without any documentation, is standard automotive\n  security research methodology, the same approach Miller and Valasek\n  used in their earlier (2013-2014) published work reverse-engineering\n  Toyota and Ford vehicles message by message.\n- **Flood / DoS** models the class of attack published security research\n  has demonstrated against real CAN buses: exploiting the protocol's own\n  error-handling rules to force a targeted ECU off the bus using nothing\n  but frames injected from another node, no physical tampering required.\n- **Capture and replay** is the oldest trick in CAN security, recording\n  legitimate traffic and sending it back verbatim, traced back to the\n  field's founding academic work, \"Experimental Security Analysis of a\n  Modern Automobile\" (Koscher et al., IEEE Security & Privacy, 2010),\n  which first showed that packet capture and replay against a real car's\n  internal network could unlock doors and manipulate the dashboard.\n\nThe common thread across all four, and the one thing every fix in GearHound\nkeeps coming back to: a CAN bus has no built-in authentication. Nothing on\nthe wire asks \"who sent this?\", so every device connected to it has to\ntrust every frame that arrives. That is the single assumption every attack\nhere exploits, and it is the same assumption real vehicles have had to be\npatched, recalled, or architecturally redesigned around.\n\n### Step-by-step attack walkthroughs\n\nFull solution manuals, with screenshots, live in [`manuals/`](manuals/):\n\n- [Signal Spoofing: Faking the Speedometer](manuals/Signal-Spoofing-Attack.md), a full walkthrough of finding the speed signal's arbitration ID from live traffic, then pinning the dashboard to a fake value while the car sits still.\n\nMore walkthroughs, covering fuzzing, flood/DoS, and capture and replay, are coming soon.\n\n## 🚙 Vehicle Profiles\n\nDifferent vehicles, different signal maps. Switch profiles to explore how the same kind of signal can appear under another arbitration ID or byte offset.\n\n| Profile | Character | Speed frame | RPM frame |\n| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |\n| 🚗 **Sedan LX** | Baseline signal layout with separate speed and RPM frames. | `0x244` · bytes 3–4 | `0x316` · bytes 0–1 |\n| 🚙 **Trailhawk SUV** | Different IDs, with several signals sharing frames. | `0x2C4` · bytes 2–3 | `0x2C4` · bytes 5–6 |\n| 🛻 **Ironhide Truck** | Higher arbitration IDs and wider byte offsets. | `0x520` · bytes 4–5 | `0x520` · bytes 1–2 |\n\nByte offsets are **zero-based**. Full mappings live in [`backend/vehicles/profiles.py`](backend/vehicles/profiles.py).\n\n## 🔧 Configuration\n\n| Variable | Default | Purpose |\n| :--- | :--- | :--- |\n| `CAN_BUSTYPE` | `virtual` | CAN backend: `virtual` or `socketcan`. |\n| `CAN_CHANNEL` | `gearhound` in virtual mode; `vcan0` in SocketCAN mode | Bus channel or Linux interface name. |\n| `PORT` | `4000` | Backend server port. |\n| `VITE_BACKEND_URL` | `http://localhost:4000` | Backend URL used by the frontend. |\n\nTo point the frontend at another backend, create `frontend/.env.local`:\n\n```dotenv\nVITE_BACKEND_URL=http://localhost:4000\n```\n\nRestart Vite after changing frontend environment variables. For a built frontend, set the URL **before** running the build.\n\n## 🐧 Linux SocketCAN Lab\n\nTo use a Linux virtual CAN interface, create and bring up `vcan0`:\n\n```bash\nsudo modprobe vcan\nsudo ip link add dev vcan0 type vcan\nsudo ip link set dev vcan0 up\n```\n\nIf `vcan0` already exists, skip the `ip link add` command.\n\nThen, from `backend/`, start GearHound with:\n\n```bash\nCAN_BUSTYPE=socketcan CAN_CHANNEL=vcan0 PORT=4000 ./venv/bin/python app.py\n```\n\nThe default `virtual` backend is **in-process**. Use SocketCAN when you want other local CAN tools to communicate through the same Linux interface.\n\n## 🏗️ Frontend Build\n\nFrom `frontend/`:\n\n```bash\nnpm run build\n```\n\nThe generated frontend is written to `frontend/dist/`. Serve that directory with a static web server and keep the backend running separately.\n\nTo preview the frontend build locally:\n\n```bash\nnpm run preview\n```\n\nThis builds and previews the frontend only; it does not provide a production backend deployment.\n\n## 🔄 Reliability\n\n- **Refreshing the page is safe.** The backend counts connected clients. If you refresh, or close a tab, while holding the accelerator or an indicator, the socket disconnect is detected and the shared physics input resets to neutral, so the car does not keep accelerating forever with nobody driving. It only resets once the last connected client is gone, so one tab closing never yanks control away from someone still actively driving in another tab.\n- **Reconnecting restores full state.** On every connect, the backend re-sends the current vehicle state, vehicle list, running attacks, and saved captures, so a refreshed browser, or a second browser tab, always shows the live, authoritative state rather than a stale snapshot.\n- **Attacks clean up after themselves.** A finished attack (duration elapsed, replay ended, manually stopped) is dropped from the server's running list so the console never accumulates a phantom \"Stop\" button, and the manager prunes its own bookkeeping so a long session with many short attacks does not leak memory.\n\n## 🗂️ Project Map\n\n| Path | Responsibility |\n| :--- | :--- |\n| [`assets/`](assets/) | Logo, screenshots, and the demo GIF used in this README. |\n| [`manuals/`](manuals/) | Step-by-step attack solution manuals with screenshots. |\n| [`docker-compose.yml`](docker-compose.yml) | Runs the backend and frontend together in containers. |\n| [`backend/Dockerfile`](backend/Dockerfile), [`frontend/Dockerfile`](frontend/Dockerfile) | Standalone container builds for each half. |\n| [`backend/app.py`](backend/app.py) | Flask-SocketIO server, vehicle physics, connection tracking, and live broadcasts. |\n| [`backend/can_bus.py`](backend/can_bus.py) | Virtual CAN and SocketCAN wrapper. |\n| [`backend/state.py`](backend/state.py) | Vehicle state and CAN frame decoding. |\n| [`backend/vehicles/profiles.py`](backend/vehicles/profiles.py) | Vehicle profiles, signal IDs, and byte offsets. |\n| [`backend/attacks/`](backend/attacks/) | Fuzzing, flooding, spoofing, replay, and attack lifecycle management. |\n| [`frontend/src/components/Dashboard.jsx`](frontend/src/components/Dashboard.jsx) | Animated top-down view. |\n| [`frontend/src/components/DriverView.jsx`](frontend/src/components/DriverView.jsx) | First-person cockpit view. |\n| [`frontend/src/components/`](frontend/src/components/) | Gauges, traffic monitor, attack console, and vehicle selector. |\n| [`frontend/src/hooks/useSocket.js`](frontend/src/hooks/useSocket.js) | Socket.IO connection and frontend state. |\n| [`frontend/src/hooks/useVehicleControls.js`](frontend/src/hooks/useVehicleControls.js) | Shared pedal, indicator, and horn press handling for both views. |\n| [`frontend/src/styles/global.css`](frontend/src/styles/global.css) | Dashboard styling and all animation keyframes. |\n\n## 🛠️ Troubleshooting\n\n<details>\n<summary><strong>The dashboard cannot connect</strong></summary>\n\nCheck that the backend is running on port `4000`, or set `VITE_BACKEND_URL` to its actual URL. Restart the frontend after changing its environment configuration.\n\nWhen opening the UI from another device, `localhost` refers to that device. Use the backend host's reachable address instead.\n\n</details>\n\n<details>\n<summary><strong>Socket.IO uses polling instead of WebSocket</strong></summary>\n\nThe existing README notes that WebSocket upgrades may be unreliable with the development server. Socket.IO can fall back to HTTP long-polling, allowing the UI to keep working with potentially higher latency.\n\n</details>\n\n<details>\n<summary><strong>SocketCAN cannot find the interface</strong></summary>\n\nSocketCAN requires Linux and an existing interface that is up. Check that `CAN_CHANNEL` matches the interface you created. For development without a Linux CAN interface, use `CAN_BUSTYPE=virtual`.\n\n</details>\n\n<details>\n<summary><strong>Vite reports that port 5173 is in use</strong></summary>\n\nThe project enables Vite's strict-port option. Stop the process using that port, or choose another port explicitly:\n\n```bash\nnpm run dev -- --port 5174\n```\n\n</details>\n\n<details>\n<summary><strong>Docker: the UI loads but never connects to the backend</strong></summary>\n\n`VITE_BACKEND_URL` gets baked into the frontend's JS when its image is\nbuilt, not read at container start. If the backend is not reachable at\n`localhost:4000` from wherever the browser is running, rebuild the\nfrontend with the correct URL (see the Docker section above) rather than\njust setting an environment variable on the running container, that has\nno effect on an already-built image.\n\n</details>\n\n## 🤝 Contributing\n\nBug reports, clearer documentation, new vehicle profiles, and UI improvements are welcome.\n\n1. Fork the repository and create a focused branch.\n2. Make your change and verify the affected behavior.\n3. For frontend changes, run `npm run build` from `frontend/`.\n4. Open a pull request describing the change and how you checked it.\n\nFound an issue? Include your operating system, Python/Node versions, CAN backend, and steps to reproduce it in an [issue](https://github.com/LiteshGhute/GearHound/issues).\n\n## 💚 License\n\nReleased under the **[MIT License](LICENSE)**.\n\n---\n\n<p align=\"center\">\n  <strong>🐾 Follow the frames. Find the signal.</strong><br />\n  If GearHound helps you learn, give the project a ⭐\n</p>",
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      "readme": "# Automotive Security Glossary\n\n**Automotive Security Glossary** is a glossary of automotive cybersecurity terminology that provides clear and concise definitions of automotive security concepts. It is designed to serve as a practical reference for security researchers, engineers, students, and automotive professionals, promoting a consistent understanding of automotive security terminology and best practices.\n\n## 0-9\n\n### 0-Day\n\n**Category:** Vulnerability\n\n**Related:** Exploit\n\nUnknown vulnerability being actively exploited before patch availability.\n\n### 1-Wire Debug Interface\n\n**Category:** Reverse Engineering\n\nSingle-line debug/communication interface used in some ECUs.\n\n### 4D Imaging Radar\n\n**Category:** ADAS\n\nAn advanced automotive radar technology that measures range, azimuth (horizontal angle), elevation (vertical angle), and Doppler velocity simultaneously, generating dense point clouds approaching lidar-like resolution. 4D imaging radar uses multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) antenna arrays and is more resilient to adverse weather than lidar, making it critical for L3+ automated driving sensor suites.\n\n**Related:** Radar, mmWave Radar, MIMO, Point Cloud, Sensor Fusion\n\n### 9008 EDL Mode\n\n**Full Name:** Emergency Download Mode\n\n**Category:** Hardware Security\n\nA Qualcomm-specific emergency recovery mode that provides low-level access to a device over USB (typically enumerating as Qualcomm HS-USB QDLoader 9008). After a Firehose programmer is loaded via the Sahara protocol, firmware can be read, written, or recovered from eMMC/UFS storage. If exposed on production automotive ECUs or TCUs, EDL mode may allow firmware extraction, persistent modification, or other hardware-level attacks unless protected by secure boot and authentication mechanisms.\n\n**Related:** Sahara Protocol, Firehose Protocol, Secure Boot, Firmware Extraction, JTAG, SWD\n\n## A\n\n### A/B OTA Upgrade\n\n**Category:** OTA\n\nA firmware update strategy using dual partitions (A and B) to ensure safe upgrade and rollback capability.\n\n**Related:** A/B Slot, Atomic OTA\n\n### A/B Slot\n\n**Category:** OTA\n\nA dual-partition firmware update mechanism that stores the active and inactive system images separately, enabling fail-safe over-the-air (OTA) updates with rollback capability.\n\n**Related:** OTA, Bootloader, Rollback Protection\n\n### A2B\n\n**Full Name:** Automotive Audio Bus\n\n**Category:** Network\n\nA high-bandwidth digital audio bus developed by Analog Devices for automotive infotainment and audio distribution.\n\n**Related:** MOST, Ethernet AVB\n\n### AAD\n\n**Full Name:** Additional Authenticated Data\n\n**Category:** Cryptography\n\nData authenticated but not encrypted in authenticated encryption algorithms such as AES-GCM.\n\n**Related:** AES-GCM, AEAD, Encryption\n\n### AADL\n\n**Full Name:** Architecture Analysis & Design Language\n\n**Category:** Security Architecture\n\nA modeling language used to describe embedded system architectures, including software, hardware, timing, and safety properties.\n\n**Related:** AUTOSAR, SysML\n\n### AAOS\n\n**Full Name:** Android Automotive OS\n\n**Category:** Android\n\nGoogle's Android-based operating system designed specifically for in-vehicle infotainment systems.\n\n### ABAC\n\n**Full Name:** Attribute-Based Access Control\n\n**Category:** IAM\n\nAn authorization model that evaluates attributes of users, resources, and environments to make access decisions.\n\n### ABE\n\n**Full Name:** Attribute-Based Encryption\n\n**Category:** Cryptography\n\n**Related:** Decryption, Encryption\n\nAn encryption scheme where decryption depends on attributes rather than individual identities.\n\n### ABI\n\n**Full Name:** Application Binary Interface\n\n**Category:** Operating System\n\nA low-level interface defining binary compatibility between applications, libraries, and operating systems.\n\n### ABI Compatibility\n\n**Category:** Security\n\nEnsures binary-level compatibility between compiled applications and system libraries across updates.\n\n### ABR\n\n**Full Name:** Automatic Boot Recovery\n\n**Category:** Boot Security\n\nA mechanism that restores a bootable firmware image after update failures or corrupted firmware.\n\n### ABR Mechanism\n\n**Category:** Boot Security\n\nAutomatic Boot Recovery mechanism used to restore system bootability after failed updates.\n\n### ABS\n\n**Full Name:** Anti-lock Braking System\n\n**Category:** Vehicle Architecture\n\nA safety system that prevents wheel lockup during braking by rapidly modulating brake pressure, maintaining steering control and reducing stopping distance, with electronic control that introduces security considerations.\n\n**Related:** ESC, TCS, EBCM, Brake-by-Wire, Active Safety\n\n### Absolute Address\n\n**Category:** Hardware Security\n\n**Related:** Firmware\n\nA fixed memory address used directly by processors or firmware.\n\n### Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism\n\n**Category:** Attack\n\nAn Auto-ISAC attack technique where an adversary exploits or abuses the elevation control mechanisms of an in-vehicle system to gain higher privileges, such as bypassing permission checks or exploiting setuid-like mechanisms in automotive OS environments.\n\n**Related:** Privilege Escalation, Kernel Privilege Escalation\n\n### Abuse Standard Diagnostic Protocol\n\n**Category:** Attack\n\nAn Auto-ISAC attack technique where an adversary abuses standard automotive diagnostic protocols (e.g., UDS, KWP2000) to execute unauthorized diagnostic sessions, read/write memory, or perform security access operations on ECUs.\n\n**Related:** UDS, KWP2000, Diagnostic Security Access, Diagnostic Session\n\n### ACC\n\n**Full Name:** Adaptive Cruise Control\n\n**Category:** ADAS\n\nA driver assistance function that automatically adjusts vehicle speed to maintain a safe distance from preceding vehicles.\n\n### Access Control\n\n**Category:** Security\n\nThe process of restricting access to vehicle resources according to identities, permissions, or security policies.\n\n**Related:** RBAC, ACL\n\n### Access Token\n\n**Category:** IAM\n\n**Related:** Authentication, Credential\n\nA credential representing successful authentication and authorization to access protected resources.\n\n### Account Lockout\n\n**Category:** IAM\n\n**Related:** Authentication\n\nA security mechanism that temporarily disables authentication after repeated failed login attempts.\n\n### ACDP\n\n**Full Name:** Access Control Decision Point\n\n**Category:** IAM\n\nA logical entity that evaluates access requests based on policies and attributes.\n\n### ACEP\n\n**Full Name:** Access Control Enforcement Point\n\n**Category:** IAM\n\nA system component that enforces access control decisions in runtime.\n\n### ACK\n\n**Full Name:** Acknowledgment\n\n**Category:** Network\n\nA message confirming successful reception of transmitted data.\n\n### ACL\n\n**Full Name:** Access Control List\n\n**Category:** IAM\n\nA list defining which users, devices, or applications are permitted to access specific resources.\n\n### Acoustic Attack\n\n**Category:** Attack\n\nAn attack that extracts sensitive information by analyzing acoustic emissions from electronic devices.\n\n### ACRN\n\n**Category:** Virtualization\n\nAn open-source reference hypervisor for embedded automotive systems, developed by Intel, designed for safety-critical real-time applications and consolidation of mixed-criticality workloads.\n\n**Related:** Hypervisor, QNX Hypervisor, COQOS\n\n### Active Attack\n\n**Category:** Threat Modeling\n\nAn attack that modifies, injects, interrupts, or destroys communications or system behavior.\n\n### Active Attack Surface\n\n**Category:** Threat Modeling\n\nThe portion of the attack surface that is currently exposed and reachable during system operation.\n\n### Active Diagnostic Session\n\n**Category:** Diagnostics\n\nA diagnostic communication session currently established between a tester and an ECU.\n\n### Active Safety\n\n**Category:** Vehicle Architecture\n\nTechnologies designed to prevent accidents, such as ABS, ESC, and AEB.\n\n### Activity\n\n**Category:** Android\n\nA user interface component representing a single application screen.\n\n### Adaptive Security Architecture\n\n**Category:** Security Architecture\n\nA security design approach that dynamically adjusts controls based on runtime conditions and threats.\n\n### ADAS\n\n**Full Name:** Advanced Driver Assistance Systems\n\n**Category:** Vehicle Architecture\n\nElectronic systems assisting drivers with perception, decision-making, and vehicle control.\n\n### ADAS Domain Controller\n\n**Category:** ECU\n\nA centralized high-performance ECU that processes sensor data from cameras, radars, lidars, and ultrasonics for advanced driver-assistance functions (ACC, LKA, AEB, APA); typically runs an RTOS or Linux on a System-on-Chip (SoC) with hardware acceleration for AI inference. Increasingly serves as the core compute platform for L2+ automation.\n\n**Related:** ADAS, Domain Controller ECU, Sensor Fusion, HPC, Autonomous Driving\n\n### ADB\n\n**Full Name:** Android Debug Bridge\n\n**Category:** Android\n\nA command-line tool for communicating with Android devices for debugging and development.\n\n### ADC\n\n**Full Name:** Analog-to-Digital Converter\n\n**Category:** Hardware Security\n\nA hardware component converting analog signals into digital values.\n\n### Address Translation\n\n**Category:** Hardware Security\n\nThe mapping between virtual and physical memory addresses used in embedded and ECU systems.\n\n### Adversarial Machine Learning\n\n**Category:** AI\n\nAn Auto-ISAC attack technique where an adversary crafts adversarial inputs to deceive in-vehicle ML models used in ADAS perception, object detection, driver monitoring, or traffic sign recognition, causing misclassification or unsafe decisions.\n\n**Related:** Machine Learning, ADAS, Perception System\n\n### Adversarial Patch\n\n**Category:** AI\n\nA physical-world adversarial attack technique where a carefully crafted pattern (printed on a physical object such as a sign or sticker) causes ML-based perception systems to misclassify targets; demonstrated against traffic sign recognition (stop sign classified as speed limit) and object detection in automotive ADAS.\n\n**Related:** Adversarial Machine Learning, Object Detection, Semantic Segmentation, AI Safety\n\n### AEAD\n\n**Full Name:** Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data\n\n**Category:** Cryptography\n\n**Related:** Encryption\n\nAn encryption method providing confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity.\n\n### AEB\n\n**Full Name:** Automatic Emergency Braking\n\n**Category:** ECU\n\nAn advanced driver assistance feature that automatically applies braking to reduce or avoid collisions.\n\n### AER\n\n**Full Name:** Advanced Error Reporting\n\n**Category:** Attack\n\nA mechanism in PCIe systems for reporting and handling hardware errors, useful in forensic analysis.\n\n### AES\n\n**Full Name:** Advanced Encryption Standard\n\n**Category:** Cryptography\n\n**Related:** Encryption\n\nA symmetric encryption algorithm widely used for securing automotive communication and stored data.\n\n### AES-CBC\n\n**Category:** Cryptography\n\n**Related:** Cipher\n\nAES operating in Cipher Block Chaining mode.\n\n### AES-CCM\n\n**Category:** Cryptography\n\n**Related:** Encryption\n\nAn authenticated encryption mode combining CTR encryption with CBC-MAC authentication.\n\n### AES-GCM\n\n**Category:** Cryptography\n\n**Related:** Encryption\n\nAn authenticated encryption mode combining counter-mode encryption with Galois authentication.\n\n### AF_ALG\n\n**Category:** Operating System\n\n**Related:** Kernel, Linux\n\nA Linux socket interface providing access to kernel cryptographic APIs.\n\n### AF_CAN\n\n**Category:** Operating System\n\n**Related:** Linux\n\nA Linux socket family used for CAN bus communication.\n\n### AF_PACKET\n\n**Category:** Operating System\n\n**Related:** Linux\n\nA Linux socket family enabling direct access to Layer 2 network packets.\n\n### AF_UNIX\n\n**Category:** Operating System\n\nA socket family supporting inter-process communication on the same host.\n\n### AF_XDP\n\n**Category:** Operating System\n\n**Related:** Linux\n\nA high-performance Linux socket type used for fast packet processing, often used in IDS/IPS systems.\n\n### AFL\n\n**Full Name:** American Fuzzy Lop\n\n**Category:** Penetration Testing\n\n**Related:** Fuzzing\n\nA coverage-guided fuzzing framework widely used for vulnerability discovery.\n\n### AFL++\n\n**Category:** Penetration Testing\n\nAn enhanced version of AFL with improved instrumentation, mutation strategies, and performance.\n\n### Aftermarket Customer or Dealer Equipment\n\n**Category:** Attack\n\nAn Auto-ISAC attack technique where an adversary uses aftermarket devices (e.g., third-party dongles, OBD-II accessories, dealer diagnostic tools) as an attack vector to gain unauthorized access to vehicle networks or extract sensitive data.\n\n**Related:** OBD-II, Diagnostic Port, Supply Chain Attack, Attack Vector\n\n### AGL\n\n**Full Name:** Automotive Grade Linux\n\n**Category:** Operating System\n\n**Related:** Linux\n\nAn open-source Linux platform developed specifically for automotive infotainment and digital cockpit systems.\n\n### AI Accelerator\n\n**Category:** AI\n\nA dedicated hardware component (NPU, TPU, GPU) designed to accelerate machine learning inference and training workloads; increasingly integrated into automotive SoCs for real-time ADAS perception and autonomous driving processing.\n\n**Related:** NPU, GPU, Edge AI, Deep Learning\n\n### AI Safety\n\n**Category:** AI\n\nThe discipline ensuring that AI systems operate safely within defined parameters, particularly critical for autonomous driving functions where perception errors, corner cases, or distribution shift can lead to hazardous behavior; encompasses robustness, specification alignment, and fail-safe mechanisms.\n\n**Related:** Autonomous Driving, ADAS, Functional Safety, ISO 26262\n\n### AIDL\n\n**Full Name:** Android Interface Definition Language\n\n**Category:** Android\n\nAn interface definition language used to define the programming interface between client and service processes in Android, enabling inter-process communication (IPC) across the Binder framework. In recent Android versions, AIDL has replaced HIDL for HAL communication (AIDL HALs), providing a stable, typed interface with backward compatibility for automotive hardware abstraction.\n\n**Related:** HIDL, Binder, IPC, Treble, Android Vehicle HAL\n\n### Air Gap\n\n**Category:** Security\n\nA security measure physically isolating systems from external networks.\n\n### Air Interface\n\n**Category:** Connectivity\n\nThe radio communication interface between mobile devices and cellular base stations.\n\n### Airbag ECU\n\n**Category:** ECU\n\n**Related:** Control Unit\n\nAn electronic control unit responsible for monitoring crash sensors and deploying airbags.\n\n### Aircrack-ng\n\n**Category:** Security Tool\n\nA suite of tools for auditing wireless networks (802.11 a/b/g), including packet capture, WEP/WPA cracking, and evil twin attack capabilities; used in automotive Wi-Fi penetration testing.\n\n**Related:** Evil Twin Attack, WPA2, BSSID, ESSID, WiFi Pineapple\n\n### AKI\n\n**Full Name:** Authority Key Identifier\n\n**Category:** Cryptography\n\n**Related:** Certificate\n\nAn X.509 certificate extension identifying the public key corresponding to the certificate issuer.\n\n### ALG\n\n**Full Name:** Application Layer Gateway\n\n**Category:** Network\n\nA network component that understands and manages specific application-layer protocols.\n\n### Algorithm Agility\n\n**Category:** Cryptography\n\nThe ability of a system to replace cryptographic algorithms without significant architectural changes.\n\n### Alignment\n\n**Category:** Hardware Security\n\nThe arrangement of data in memory according to processor alignment requirements.\n\n### ALKS\n\n**Full Name:** Automated Lane Keeping System\n\n**Category:** ADAS\n\n**Related:** Autonomous Driving\n\nA standardized autonomous driving function that maintains lane position without driver input under defined conditions.\n\n### Allowlist\n\n**Category:** Security\n\nA list of explicitly permitted applications, commands, devices, or communication endpoints.\n\n### ALM\n\n**Full Name:** Application Lifecycle Management\n\n**Category:** Security Architecture\n\nThe process of managing application development, deployment, update, and retirement.\n\n### Android Application Sandbox\n\n**Category:** Android\n\nThe mandatory access control and isolation mechanism that runs each Android app in a separate Linux process with a unique UID and SELinux context, preventing apps from accessing each other's data, memory, or system resources without explicit permission. Forms the foundation of Android's security model and is enforced in Android Automotive for infotainment and third-party app isolation.\n\n**Related:** SELinux, Android Permission Model, UID Isolation, Mandatory Access Control, Linux Namespace\n\n### Android Auto\n\n**Category:** Android\n\nA smartphone projection technology developed by Google that mirrors Android device functionality onto a vehicle's infotainment display, creating a potential attack surface through USB and Bluetooth connections.\n\n**Related:** CarPlay, MirrorLink, SmartDeviceLink\n\n### Android Automotive App\n\n**Category:** Android\n\nAn application built specifically for Android Automotive OS (AAOS), designed to run in-vehicle with minimal driver distraction; distributed via Google Play for Automotive, these apps must comply with automotive UX guidelines (touch targets, time-to-read, glanceability) and security requirements (app sandbox, permission model, VHAL access control).\n\n**Related:** AAOS, Android Automotive Security Model, Android Permission Model, Google Automotive Services, Car Service\n\n### Android Automotive Emulator\n\n**Category:** Android\n\n**Related:** Android Auto\n\nA virtual environment used to develop and test Android Automotive applications.\n\n### Android Automotive Multi-User\n\n**Category:** Android\n\nThe user management system in AAOS allowing driver, passenger, and guest profiles with isolated app data, settings, and accounts; supports fast user switching while driving, with security implications for PII isolation, app authorization, and persistent key/credential storage per profile.\n\n**Related:** AAOS, Android Automotive Security Model, Android Permission Model, Android Activity\n\n### Android Automotive OTA\n\n**Category:** Android\n\nThe over-the-air update mechanism for AAOS leveraging AOSP seamless updates (A/B slot partitioning) to deliver system, security patch, and app updates to the IVI head unit; updates are cryptographically verified via AVB (Android Verified Boot), and rollback protection prevents downgrade attacks.\n\n**Related:** AAOS, AVB, A/B OTA Upgrade, Android Fastboot, OTA Attack, OTA Rollback Attack\n\n### Android Automotive Security Model\n\n**Category:** Android\n\nThe layered security architecture of Android Automotive OS extending the standard Android security model with vehicle-specific controls: application sandboxing via SELinux, permission-based access to VHAL properties, user profile isolation, encrypted storage (File-Based Encryption), verified boot (AVB), and hardware-backed keystore for secure key storage.\n\n**Related:** AAOS, Android SELinux, Android Permission Model, AVB, Android Hardware-backed Keystore, Android Vehicle HAL\n\n### Android Automotive Security Patch\n\n**Category:** Android\n\nMonthly security bulletins and patches released by Google for the Android Automotive OS platform, covering vulnerabilities in the AOSP framework, Linux kernel, Qualcomm/MediaTek SoC drivers, and AAOS-specific services; OEMs are responsible for timely integration and OTA delivery to vehicle fleets.\n\n**Related:** AAOS, Android Automotive OTA, Android Security Patch Level, AVB\n\n### Android Automotive Telephony\n\n**Category:** Android\n\nThe telephony and cellular connectivity stack in AAOS enabling eCall, emergency calling, in-vehicle Wi-Fi hotspot, and carrier voice/data services; includes IMS (IP Multimedia Subsystem), carrier configuration via SIM/ eSIM, and modem IPC via HAL; a critical attack surface for remote exploitation via cellular baseband.\n\n**Related:** AAOS, T-Box, eCall System, Android Automotive Bluetooth, Android Automotive Wi-Fi\n\n### Android Automotive Testing\n\n**Category:** Android\n\nA set of testing frameworks and tools for AAOS app and system validation including the AAOS Test Harness, Android Emulator (with vehicle HAL emulation), VHAL mock providers, and security testing tools (ADB, fuzzing, app vulnerability scanning); used by OEMs and suppliers to validate app security and system integration before deployment.\n\n**Related:** AAOS, Android Automotive Emulator, ADB, Android Vehicle HAL, Android Permission Model\n\n### Android Automotive Wi-Fi\n\n**Category:** Android\n\nThe Wi-Fi connectivity subsystem in AAOS supporting STA (client mode for hotspot tethering), SoftAP (in-vehicle Wi-Fi hotspot), and Wi-Fi Direct / Wi-Fi Aware for V2X-like proximity services; WPA3-SAE for secure connections, enterprise EAP for fleet Wi-Fi; a potential attack surface for nearby adversary exploitation.\n\n**Related:** AAOS, Android Automotive Bluetooth, Android Automotive Telephony, T-Box, Android Automotive OTA\n\n### Android Hardware-backed Keystore\n\n**Category:** Android\n\nA keystore implementation that stores keys inside secure hardware such as a TEE or StrongBox.\n\n### Android Init\n\n**Category:** Android\n\nThe first user-space process (PID 1) launched by the Android kernel, responsible for mounting filesystems, setting SELinux policy, starting native daemons (servicemanager, vold, surfaceflinger, netd), and managing the Android boot sequence through init.rc configuration scripts. Critical for early boot security, init enforces SELinux policy loading before any other process starts.\n\n**Related:** SELinux, init.rc, Boot Sequence, Zygote, System Server\n\n### Android Keystore\n\n**Category:** Android\n\nA secure storage system for cryptographic keys, often backed by hardware security modules.\n\n### Android Permission Model\n\n**Category:** Android\n\nThe framework controlling application access to protected system resources.\n\n### Android Runtime\n\n**Full Name:** ART\n\n**Category:** Android\n\nThe managed runtime environment used by Android to execute application bytecode, employing ahead-of-time (AOT) and just-in-time (JIT) compilation to convert DEX bytecode to native machine code. ART provides memory management, garbage collection, and security features including CFI (Control Flow Integrity) and ShadowCallStack for exploitation mitigation in Android Automotive app environments.\n\n**Related:** DEX, JIT, AOT, APK, CFI\n\n### Android Security\n\n**Category:** Android\n\nThe multi-layered security architecture of the Android platform, including application sandboxing, permissions, SELinux, verified boot, and Play Protect, forming the foundation for Android Automotive OS security.\n\n**Related:** Android Automotive, SELinux, Verified Boot, App Sandbox, Keystore\n\n### Android Vehicle HAL\n\n**Full Name:** VHAL\n\n**Category:** Android\n\nThe hardware abstraction layer that defines a standardized interface between Android Automotive OS and vehicle-specific hardware properties (sensors, HVAC, powertrain), enabling apps to access vehicle data.\n\n**Related:** Android Automotive, HIDL, AIDL, Car API, Vehicle Network Service\n\n### ANN\n\n**Full Name:** Artificial Neural Network\n\n**Category:** AI\n\nA computational model inspired by biological neural networks and widely used in autonomous driving applications.\n\n### Anti-Cloning\n\n**Category:** Security\n\nMechanisms designed to prevent unauthorized duplication of software, firmware, or hardware identities.\n\n### Anti-Debugging\n\n**Category:** Security\n\nTechniques designed to prevent or detect debugging during software execution.\n\n### Anti-Malware\n\n**Category:** Security\n\nSoftware that detects, prevents, and removes malicious software.\n\n### Anti-Replay\n\n**Category:** Network\n\nA protection mechanism preventing attackers from successfully replaying previously captured messages.\n\n### Anti-Rollback\n\n**Category:** Boot Security\n\nA mechanism preventing installation of firmware versions older than an approved security baseline.\n\n### Anti-Spoofing\n\n**Category:** Network\n\nMechanisms designed to detect and prevent identity spoofing attacks.\n\n### Anti-Tamper\n\n**Category:** Hardware Security\n\nTechniques intended to detect or resist physical or logical tampering.\n\n### Anti-Theft System\n\n**Category:** Vehicle Security\n\nElectronic systems designed to prevent unauthorized vehicle access or theft.\n\n### AOSP\n\n**Full Name:** Android Open Source Project\n\n**Category:** Android\n\nThe open-source project providing the base Android operating system.\n\n### AP\n\n**Full Name:** Access Point\n\n**Category:** Connectivity\n\nA wireless networking device providing Wi-Fi connectivity.\n\n### AP Isolation\n\n**Category:** Connectivity\n\nA wireless security feature that prevents direct communication between clients connected to the same access point.\n\n### APDU\n\n**Full Name:** Application Protocol Data Unit\n\n**Category:** Hardware Security\n\nThe communication unit exchanged between a smart card and a card reader according to ISO/IEC 7816.\n\n**Related:** eSIM, eUICC, Secure Element\n\n### APEX\n\n**Category:** Android\n\nA modular system update format used in Android for delivering low-level system components such as native libraries and runtime modules.\n\n**Related:** Android OTA, System Update\n\n### API\n\n**Full Name:** Application Programming Interface\n\n**Category:** Security\n\nA defined interface enabling software components to communicate with one another.\n\n### API Abuse\n\n**Category:** Security\n\nThe misuse of legitimate API functionality to bypass intended restrictions or consume excessive resources.\n\n### API Authentication\n\n**Category:** Security\n\n**Related:** Identity\n\nThe process of verifying the identity of API clients before granting access.\n\n### API Authorization\n\n**Category:** Security\n\nThe process of determining whether an authenticated API client has permission to perform requested operations.\n\n### API Endpoint\n\n**Category:** Security\n\nA specific URL or interface through which an API service is accessed.\n\n### API Enumeration\n\n**Category:** Penetration Testing\n\nThe process of identifying available API endpoints, methods, parameters, and versions.\n\n### API Fuzzing\n\n**Category:** Penetration Testing\n\nA testing technique that sends malformed or unexpected requests to APIs to identify vulnerabilities.\n\n### API Gateway\n\n**Category:** Security\n\nA service that manages authentication, routing, rate limiting, and monitoring for APIs.\n\n### API Gateway Authentication\n\n**Category:** Security\n\nThe authentication mechanisms enforced by an API gateway before forwarding requests.\n\n### API Key\n\n**Category:** IAM\n\nA unique identifier used to authenticate API clients.\n\n### API Rate Limiting\n\n**Category:** Security\n\nA mechanism that limits the number of requests accepted from clients within a defined period.\n\n### API Security\n\n**Category:** Security\n\nPractices and technologies protecting APIs from unauthorized access and attacks.\n\n### API Security Testing\n\n**Category:** Penetration Testing\n\nThe evaluation of APIs for authentication, authorization, input validation, and business logic vulnerabilities.\n\n### API Token\n\n**Category:** IAM\n\n**Related:** Credential\n\nA credential issued to software clients for accessing protected APIs.\n\n### APK\n\n**Full Name:** Android Package\n\n**Category:** Android\n\nThe package format used to distribute Android applications.\n\n### APK Signature Scheme\n\n**Category:** Android\n\nThe cryptographic signing mechanism used to verify the authenticity and integrity of Android application packages.\n\n### APN\n\n**Full Name:** Access Point Name\n\n**Category:** Network\n\nThe configuration that identifies the gateway between a mobile network and an external IP network.\n\n### APN Authentication\n\n**Category:** Network\n\nThe authentication process used when establishing a mobile data connection through an APN.\n\n### APN Configuration\n\n**Category:** Network\n\nThe parameters defining how a cellular device connects to a carrier's packet data network.\n\n### APN Isolation\n\n**Category:** Network\n\nA carrier feature that logically separates traffic belonging to different APNs.\n\n### App Sandbox\n\n**Category:** Android\n\nAn operating system security mechanism isolating applications from each other.\n\n### Application Firewall\n\n**Category:** Network\n\n**Related:** Firewall\n\nA firewall designed to inspect and filter application-layer traffic.\n\n### Application Hardening\n\n**Category:** Security\n\nThe process of reducing the attack surface of an application through secure configuration and protection mechanisms.\n\n### Application Isolation\n\n**Category:** Operating System\n\nA security mechanism that prevents applications from interfering with each other by enforcing execution boundaries.\n\n### Application Layer Security\n\n**Category:** Network\n\nSecurity mechanisms implemented at the application layer such as authentication, encryption, and validation.\n\n### Application Manifest\n\n**Category:** Android\n\nA configuration file describing application components, permissions, and capabilities.\n\n### Application Whitelisting\n\n**Category:** Security\n\nA security policy that permits only explicitly approved applications to execute.\n\n### Approval Workflow\n\n**Category:** Security Architecture\n\nA defined process requiring authorized review and approval before changes or deployments are accepted.\n\n### AR-HUD\n\n**Full Name:** Augmented Reality Head-Up Display\n\n**Category:** Vehicle Architecture\n\nA display system projecting navigation and driving information onto the windshield using augmented reality techniques.\n\n### Arbitration\n\n**Category:** Network\n\nThe process by which CAN nodes determine which message gains bus access based on identifier priority.\n\n### Argument Injection\n\n**Category:** Vulnerability\n\nA vulnerability where an attacker injects additional arguments into a command-line invocation by supplying crafted input (e.g., \"--flag=malicious\") that the application passes unsanitized to a shell or exec call; in automotive systems, argument injection in diagnostic tools or OTA update scripts can lead to arbitrary command execution on TCU or IVI platforms.\n\n**Related:** Command Injection, OS Command Injection, Code Execution, Input Validation Failure\n\n### Arm CCA\n\n**Full Name:** Arm Confidential Compute Architecture\n\n**Category:** Attack\n\nArm's security architecture providing hardware-enforced realm-based isolation for confidential computing, allowing multiple tenants (e.g., vehicle OEM, third-party apps, diagnostics) to execute in isolated realms with hardware-assured confidentiality and integrity protection against privileged software attacks.\n\n**Related:** ARM TrustZone, TEE, Hypervisor, Realm Management Extension (RME)\n\n### ARM Cortex-R52\n\n**Category:** Hardware Security\n\nAn ARMv8-R real-time processor for safety-critical automotive applications with hardware virtualization, enabling multiple ASIL-level partitions with hardware-enforced isolation on a single core.\n\n**Related:** ASIL, Hypervisor, TEE\n\n### ARM Exception Levels\n\n**Full Name:** EL0-EL3\n\n**Category:** Hardware Security\n\nThe ARM privilege hierarchy: EL0 (user), EL1 (OS kernel), EL2 (hypervisor), EL3 (secure monitor), forming the hardware foundation for trusted execution and isolation in automotive SoCs.\n\n**Related:** ARM TrustZone, TEE, Hypervisor\n\n### ARM TrustZone\n\n**Category:** Hardware Security\n\nA hardware security architecture separating secure and non-secure execution environments.\n\n### ARP\n\n**Full Name:** Address Resolution Protocol\n\n**Category:** Network\n\nA protocol used to map IPv4 addresses to MAC addresses on a local network.\n\n### ARP Cache\n\n**Category:** Network\n\nA table storing recently resolved IP-to-MAC address mappings.\n\n### ARP Cache Poisoning\n\n**Category:** Attack\n\nA technique that inserts forged ARP entries into a victim's ARP cache to redirect network traffic.\n\n### ARP Inspection\n\n**Category:** Network\n\nA security mechanism that validates ARP packets to prevent spoofing attacks.\n\n### ARP Spoofing\n\n**Category:** Attack\n\nAn attack that sends forged ARP messages to redirect network traffic through an attacker's device.\n\n### ARP Storm\n\n**Category:** Attack\n\nA condition where excessive ARP traffic disrupts network communication.\n\n### ARP Table\n\n**Category:** Network\n\nA local database containing IP address and MAC address mappings.\n\n### ARQ\n\n**Full Name:** Automatic Repeat reQuest\n\n**Category:** Network\n\nA reliability mechanism that retransmits lost or corrupted packets.\n\n### Array Bounds Check\n\n**Category:** Security\n\nA validation process ensuring array accesses remain within valid memory boundaries.\n\n### Array Index Out-of-Bounds\n\n**Category:** Vulnerability\n\nA programming error in which an array is accessed outside its allocated range.\n\n### ARXML\n\n**Full Name:** AUTOSAR XML\n\n**Category:** AUTOSAR\n\nThe XML configuration format used throughout AUTOSAR projects.\n\n### ASAM\n\n**Full Name:** Association for Standardization of Automation and Measuring Systems\n\n**Category:** Standards\n\nAn international organization developing standards for automotive development, testing, calibration, and diagnostics.\n\n### ASAM A2L\n\n**Full Name:** ASAM MCD-2 MC\n\n**Category:** Standards\n\nA standardized file format describing ECU measurement and calibration parameters.\n\n### ASAM MCD-3D\n\n**Category:** Diagnostics\n\nA standard defining interfaces between diagnostic applications and vehicle communication servers.\n\n### ASAM MDF\n\n**Full Name:** Measurement Data Format\n\n**Category:** Standards\n\nA standardized file format for storing automotive measurement and logging data.\n\n### ASAM ODX\n\n**Full Name:** Open Diagnostic Data Exchange\n\n**Category:** Diagnostics\n\n**Related:** Diagnostic Service\n\nAn XML-based standard describing diagnostic services, ECU functions, and communication parameters.\n\n### ASAM XIL\n\n**Category:** Penetration Testing\n\nA standardized interface supporting Hardware-in-the-Loop (HIL), Software-in-the-Loop (SIL), and Model-in-the-Loop (MIL) testing.\n\n### ASIL\n\n**Full Name:** Automotive Safety Integrity Level\n\n**Category:** Functional Safety\n\n**Related:** ASIL A, ASIL D\n\nA risk classification defined in ISO 26262 ranging from ASIL A to ASIL D.\n\n### ASIL A\n\n**Category:** Functional Safety\n\nThe lowest Automotive Safety Integrity Level defined by ISO 26262.\n\n### ASIL B\n\n**Category:** Functional Safety\n\nA moderate Automotive Safety Integrity Level requiring additional safety measures.\n\n### ASIL C\n\n**Category:** Functional Safety\n\nA high Automotive Safety Integrity Level requiring rigorous development and verification.\n\n### ASIL D\n\n**Category:** Functional Safety\n\nThe highest Automotive Safety Integrity Level defined by ISO 26262.\n\n### ASIL Decomposition\n\n**Category:** Functional Safety\n\nA technique that splits a safety requirement into redundant elements to reduce implementation complexity.\n\n### ASLR\n\n**Full Name:** Address Space Layout Randomization\n\n**Category:** Security\n\nA security technique that randomizes the memory addresses of executable code, libraries, stack, and heap to make it harder for attackers to predict target addresses for exploitation techniques like ROP and JOP.\n\n**Related:** DEP, W^X, ROP, JOP, Memory Protection\n\n### ASN.1\n\n**Full Name:** Abstract Syntax Notation One\n\n**Category:** Network\n\nA standard language for describing structured data exchanged between systems.\n\n### ASPICE\n\n**Full Name:** Automotive SPICE\n\n**Category:** Standards\n\nA process assessment model adapted from ISO 15504 (SPICE) for the automotive industry, used to evaluate and improve software and system development processes in automotive suppliers and OEMs.\n\n**Related:** ISO 21434, IATF 16949, VDA, TISAX, ISO 9001\n\n### Asset\n\n**Category:** Threat Modeling\n\nAnything of value requiring protection, including hardware, software, data, credentials, and services.\n\n### Asset Criticality\n\n**Category:** Penetration Testing\n\nA measure of the importance of an asset based on its impact on safety, operations, or cybersecurity.\n\n### Asset Discovery\n\n**Category:** Security Architecture\n\nThe process of identifying hardware, software, services, communication interfaces, and digital assets within a vehicle ecosystem.\n\n### Asset Exposure Analysis\n\n**Category:** Threat Modeling\n\n**Related:** Asset\n\nThe process of evaluating how and where assets are exposed to potential attackers.\n\n### Asset Fingerprinting\n\n**Category:** Security Architecture\n\nThe identification of devices based on unique hardware, software, protocol, or behavioral characteristics.\n\n### Asset Inventory\n\n**Category:** Security Architecture\n\nA maintained list of hardware, software, ECUs, services, certificates, and digital assets.\n\n### Asset Mapping\n\n**Category:** Threat Modeling\n\nThe process of documenting relationships among ECUs, applications, cloud services, and communication channels.\n\n### Asset Owner\n\n**Category:** Security Architecture\n\nThe individual or organization responsible for the protection and management of a specific asset.\n\n### Asset Visibility\n\n**Category:** Security Architecture\n\nThe ability to continuously identify and monitor connected assets.\n\n### Assisted Driving\n\n**Category:** ADAS\n\nDriving functionality in which the driver remains responsible while automation assists with specific tasks.\n\n### AST\n\n**Full Name:** Application Security Testing\n\n**Category:** Penetration Testing\n\nThe practice of evaluating software applications for security vulnerabilities using static, dynamic, or interactive techniques.\n\n### Asymmetric Cryptography\n\n**Category:** Cryptography\n\nA cryptographic system using mathematically related public and private keys.\n\n### Asymmetric Key\n\n**Category:** Cryptography\n\n**Related:** Cryptographic Key\n\nA cryptographic key pair consisting of a public key and a private key.\n\n### Asynchronous Communication\n\n**Category:** Network\n\nCommunication in which participants operate independently without requiring synchronized timing.\n\n### Asynchronous ECU\n\n**Category:** ECU\n\n**Related:** Control Unit\n\nAn electronic control unit operating independently of synchronized communication cycles.\n\n### Atomic Operation\n\n**Category:** Security\n\nAn operation that is completed entirely or not executed at all, without intermediate observable states.\n\n### Atomic Update\n\n**Category:** OTA\n\nA software update process that either completes successfully or leaves the original software unchanged.\n\n### Attack Attribution\n\n**Category:** Threat Modeling\n\nThe process of identifying the likely source or origin of a cyber attack.\n\n### Attack Campaign\n\n**Category:** Threat Modeling\n\nA coordinated series of cyber attacks conducted to achieve specific objectives.\n\n### Attack Chain\n\n**Category:** Threat Modeling\n\nA sequence of attacker actions performed to achieve an objective.\n\n### Attack Chain Modeling\n\n**Category:** Threat Modeling\n\nA structured representation of multi-step attack progression from initial access to final objective.\n\n### Attack Detection\n\n**Category:** Threat Modeling\n\nThe identification of malicious activities targeting vehicle systems or infrastructure.\n\n### Attack Graph\n\n**Category:** Threat Modeling\n\n**Related:** Attack Path\n\nA graphical representation of possible attack paths through interconnected vulnerabilities.\n\n### Attack Path\n\n**Category:** Threat Modeling\n\nA possible sequence of vulnerabilities or weaknesses leading to successful compromise.\n\n### Attack Pattern\n\n**Category:** Threat Modeling\n\nA reusable description of techniques commonly employed by attackers.\n### Attack Potential\n**Category:** Threat Modeling\nA measure of the effort and resources required for an adversary to successfully execute an attack, assessed during ISO 21434 TARA using five factors: elapsed time, specialist expertise, knowledge of the TOE, window of opportunity, and equipment. Attack potential ratings (Basic, Enhanced-Basic, Moderate, High, Beyond-High) determine whether a threat scenario is relevant for risk treatment.\n**Related:** TARA, Risk Assessment, ISO 21434, Attack Feasibility, Threat Scenario, Elapsed Time\n\n### Attack Prerequisite\n\n**Category:** Threat Modeling\n\nA condition that must be satisfied before an attack can be successfully executed.\n\n### Attack Resistance\n\n**Category:** Threat Modeling\n\nThe ability of a system to withstand deliberate cyber attacks.\n\n### Attack Scenario\n\n**Category:** Threat Modeling\n\nA structured description of how an attacker could compromise a system.\n\n### Attack Simulation\n\n**Category:** Threat Modeling\n\nThe controlled execution of realistic attack techniques to evaluate security defenses.\n\n### Attack Simulation Platform\n\n**Category:** Threat Modeling\n\n**Related:** Attack Scenario\n\nA platform used to emulate realistic attack scenarios for evaluating cybersecurity controls.\n\n### Attack Surface\n\n**Category:** Threat Modeling\n\nThe total collection of interfaces through which attackers may interact with a system.\n\n### Attack Surface Analysis\n\n**Category:** Threat Modeling\n\nThe systematic identification and evaluation of all externally reachable interfaces, services, communication channels, and entry points that could be exploited by an attacker.\n\n**Related:** Attack Surface, Threat Modeling\n\n### Attack Surface Enumeration\n\n**Category:** Threat Modeling\n\n**Related:** Attack Surface\n\nThe process of discovering exposed assets, services, ports, APIs, protocols, and interfaces that contribute to the attack surface.\n\n### Attack Surface Mapping\n\n**Category:** Threat Modeling\n\nIdentifying all potential entry points for attackers.\n\n### Attack Surface Reduction\n\n**Category:** Threat Modeling\n\n**Related:** Attack Vector\n\nTechniques used to minimize exposed interfaces, services, and attack vectors.\n\n### Attack Toolchain\n\n**Category:** Threat Modeling\n\nA collection of tools used in sequence for reconnaissance, exploitation, and persistence.\n\n### Attack Tree\n\n**Category:** Threat Modeling\n\nA hierarchical representation of attack goals and possible attack methods.\n\n### Attack Tree Analysis\n\n**Category:** Threat Modeling\n\n**Related:** Attack Path, Attack Tree\n\nA structured analysis method that evaluates attack paths using hierarchical attack trees to estimate likelihood and impact.\n\n### Attack Vector\n\n**Category:** Threat Modeling\n\nThe method or pathway used by an attacker to compromise a system.\n\n### Attacker Model\n\n**Category:** Threat Modeling\n\nA description of an attacker's capabilities, objectives, resources, privileges, and assumptions.\n\n### Attestation\n\n**Category:** Hardware Security\n\nA process proving the integrity or authenticity of hardware or software.\n\n### Attestation Evidence\n\n**Category:** Hardware Security\n\nCryptographic proof used to validate system integrity or boot state.\n\n### Attestation Key\n\n**Category:** Hardware Security\n\nA cryptographic key used to prove the integrity or identity of a hardware or software component.\n\n### Attribute Certificate\n\n**Category:** Cryptography\n\n**Related:** Certificate, Digital Certificate\n\nA digital certificate that binds authorization attributes or roles to an identity rather than a public key.\n\n### Attribute Validation\n\n**Category:** IAM\n\n**Related:** Authorization Decision\n\nThe process of verifying the correctness and legitimacy of identity attributes before authorization decisions are made.\n\n### Audit\n\n**Category:** Intrusion Detection\n\nA systematic examination of systems, configurations, processes, or records to verify compliance with security policies, standards, or regulations.\n\n**Related:** Compliance, Assessment\n\n### Audit Event\n\n**Category:** Intrusion Detection\n\nA recorded security-relevant action generated by users, applications, operating systems, or network devices.\n\n### Audit Log\n\n**Category:** Intrusion Detection\n\nA chronological record of security-relevant events used for monitoring, investigation, and forensic analysis.\n\n### Audit Policy\n\n**Category:** Security Architecture\n\nRules defining which security events must be logged and how logs are retained and protected.\n\n### Audit Record\n\n**Category:** Intrusion Detection\n\nA structured entry describing a single audited event.\n\n### Auditability\n\n**Category:** Security Architecture\n\nThe capability of a system to produce sufficient evidence for compliance verification and forensic investigations.\n\n### Authentication\n\n**Category:** IAM\n\nThe process of verifying the identity of users, devices, or services.\n\n### Authentication Bypass\n\n**Category:** Vulnerability\n\nA security flaw that allows an attacker to gain access without successfully completing the authentication process.\n\n### Authentication Context\n\n**Category:** IAM\n\nInformation describing how and under what conditions an identity was authenticated.\n\n### Authentication Context Class Reference\n\n**Full Name:** ACR\n\n**Category:** IAM\n\n**Related:** Authentication\n\nA parameter indicating the strength or method of authentication used.\n\n### Authentication Credential\n\n**Category:** IAM\n\nEvidence presented to verify an identity, including passwords, certificates, cryptographic keys, or biometrics.\n\n### Authentication Factor\n\n**Category:** IAM\n\nA category of evidence used to verify identity, such as knowledge (password), possession (token), or inherence (biometric).\n\n### Authentication Failure\n\n**Category:** IAM\n\nAn unsuccessful attempt to verify the identity of a user, device, or service.\n\n### Authentication Failure Threshold\n\n**Category:** IAM\n\n**Related:** Authentication\n\nThe maximum number of consecutive failed authentication attempts allowed before protective actions are taken.\n\n### Authentication Protocol\n\n**Category:** Cryptography\n\nA protocol defining how identities are verified during communication.\n\n### Authentication Protocol Attack\n\n**Category:** Attack\n\nAn attack targeting weaknesses in authentication protocols to impersonate users or devices.\n\n### Authentication Replay\n\n**Category:** IAM\n\n**Related:** Authentication\n\nAn attack in which previously captured authentication messages are resent to obtain unauthorized access.\n\n### Authentication Server\n\n**Category:** IAM\n\n**Related:** Authentication, Credential\n\nA server responsible for validating credentials and issuing authentication decisions or tokens.\n\n### Authentication Timeout\n\n**Category:** IAM\n\nThe period after which an authenticated session must be revalidated.\n\n### Authentication Token\n\n**Category:** IAM\n\nA cryptographically protected token representing an authenticated identity.\n\n### Authentication Vector\n\n**Category:** Network\n\nA collection of cryptographic parameters used during subscriber authentication in cellular networks.\n\n### Authorization\n\n**Category:** Security\n\nThe process of determining what authenticated entities are permitted to do.\n\n### Authorization Boundary\n\n**Category:** IAM\n\nA logical separation defining the limits of permissions granted to authenticated entities.\n\n### Authorization Context\n\n**Category:** IAM\n\n**Related:** Authorization Decision\n\nThe environmental and identity-based conditions used during authorization decisions.\n\n### Authorization Decision\n\n**Category:** IAM\n\nThe result of evaluating whether an authenticated subject is permitted to perform a requested action.\n\n### Authorization Policy\n\n**Category:** IAM\n\nA set of rules determining which actions authenticated entities are allowed to perform.\n\n### Authorization Server\n\n**Category:** IAM\n\nA server that grants authorization to clients after validating permissions.\n\n### Authorization Token\n\n**Category:** IAM\n\nA token representing permissions granted to an authenticated subject.\n\n### Authorized Diagnostic Tool\n\n**Category:** Diagnostics\n\nA diagnostic device permitted to access protected vehicle functions based on security policies.\n\n### Authorized Firmware\n\n**Category:** Boot Security\n\nFirmware that has been authenticated and approved for installation by the manufacturer.\n\n### Auto Provisioning\n\n**Category:** OTA\n\nThe automatic configuration and enrollment of devices into a managed environment.\n\n### Auto Recovery\n\n**Category:** Vehicle Architecture\n\nA mechanism that automatically restores normal system operation following failures or crashes.\n\n### Auto Update\n\n**Category:** OTA\n\nThe automated downloading, verification, and installation of software updates.\n\n### Auto-Discovery\n\n**Category:** Network\n\nA mechanism that automatically detects devices, services, or network resources.\n\n### Auto-ISAC\n\n**Category:** Standards\n\nThe Automotive Information Sharing and Analysis Center, an industry-wide organization for sharing cybersecurity threat intelligence and best practices among automotive stakeholders.\n\n**Related:** C-Auto-ISAC, TARA, Threat Intelligence\n\n### Auto-Negotiation\n\n**Category:** Network\n\nA protocol that allows connected Ethernet devices to automatically determine communication parameters.\n\n### Automatic Certificate Management\n\n**Category:** Cryptography\n\n**Related:** Certificate, Digital Certificate\n\nThe automated enrollment, renewal, revocation, and lifecycle management of digital certificates.\n\n### Automatic Key Rotation\n\n**Category:** Cryptography\n\n**Related:** Cryptographic Key\n\nA security practice that periodically replaces cryptographic keys to reduce the impact of key compromise.\n\n### Automatic Vulnerability Scanning\n\n**Category:** Penetration Testing\n\nThe use of automated tools to identify known security weaknesses in systems or applications.\n\n### Automotive Cybersecurity\n\n**Category:** Vehicle Security\n\nThe discipline focused on protecting connected vehicles, ECUs, cloud services, mobile applications, and automotive infrastructure from cyber threats.\n\n### Automotive Ethernet\n\n**Category:** Network\n\nA family of Ethernet technologies designed for high-speed in-vehicle communication.\n\n### Automotive Gateway\n\n**Category:** ECU\n\nAn electronic control unit responsible for routing, filtering, and securing communication between multiple in-vehicle networks.\n\n### Automotive Radar\n\n**Category:** ADAS\n\nRadar systems specifically designed for vehicle applications, operating in allocated frequency bands (24 GHz narrowband/ultra-wideband, 76–77 GHz LRR, 77–81 GHz SRR/MRR) under regulatory frameworks (FCC, ETSI). Automotive radar is the primary environmental sensor for adaptive cruise control, emergency braking, and blind-spot detection across all SAE automation levels.\n\n**Related:** Radar, mmWave Radar, SRR, MRR, LRR, FMCW\n\n### Automotive Security Operation Center\n\n**Full Name:** Auto-SOC\n\n**Category:** Vehicle Security\n\nA security operations center dedicated to monitoring, detecting, and responding to cybersecurity events affecting connected vehicles.\n\n### Automotive Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment\n\n**Full Name:** TARA\n\n**Category:** Standards\n\nA structured methodology for identifying cybersecurity threats and assessing associated risks in road vehicles.\n\n### Automotive Threat Intelligence\n\n**Category:** Threat Modeling\n\nThreat intelligence specifically focused on vulnerabilities, attacks, threat actors, and risks affecting the automotive ecosystem.\n\n### Autonomous Driving\n\n**Category:** ADAS\n\n**Related:** SAE J3016\n\nVehicle operation with varying levels of automated driving capability as defined by SAE J3016.\n\n### Autonomous Mode\n\n**Category:** ADAS\n\nA driving mode in which automated systems perform some or all driving tasks without continuous driver control.\n\n### Autonomous Parking\n\n**Category:** ADAS\n\nA function that enables a vehicle to perform parking maneuvers with minimal or no driver intervention.\n\n### AUTOSAR\n\n**Full Name:** AUTomotive Open System ARchitecture\n\n**Category:** Operating System\n\nAn open automotive software architecture standard for ECU software development.\n\n### AUTOSAR Adaptive\n\n**Category:** AUTOSAR\n\nThe high-performance AUTOSAR platform supporting service-oriented architectures and POSIX operating systems.\n\n### AUTOSAR Basic Software\n\n**Full Name:** BSW\n\n**Category:** AUTOSAR\n\nA standardized software layer providing hardware abstraction, communication services, memory services, and system functions.\n\n### AUTOSAR Classic\n\n**Category:** AUTOSAR\n\nThe traditional AUTOSAR platform designed for resource-constrained embedded ECUs and real-time operation.\n\n### AUTOSAR COM\n\n**Category:** AUTOSAR\n\nA communication module responsible for signal packing, unpacking, and transmission.\n\n### AUTOSAR Communication Stack\n\n**Full Name:** ComStack\n\n**Category:** AUTOSAR\n\nThe layered AUTOSAR communication architecture comprising COM, PduR, CanIf, CanTp, LinIf, and EthIf modules, providing standardized signal-oriented and service-oriented communication with security mechanisms including SecOC integration.\n\n**Related:** AUTOSAR COM, AUTOSAR PDU Router, AUTOSAR SecOC\n\n### AUTOSAR Crypto Stack\n\n**Category:** Cryptography\n\nA collection of standardized AUTOSAR modules providing cryptographic services.\n\n### AUTOSAR DEM\n\n**Full Name:** AUTOSAR Diagnostic Event Manager\n\n**Category:** Diagnostics\n\nAn AUTOSAR basic software module that processes and stores diagnostic events (faults) detected by software components and hardware, managing DTCs and freeze frame data for vehicle diagnostics.\n\n**Related:** AUTOSAR, DET, DLT, FIM, DTC\n\n### AUTOSAR E2E Profile 1\n\n**Category:** AUTOSAR\n\nAn AUTOSAR E2E communication protection profile using CRC (8-bit) with a 1-byte Data ID for low-latency safety-related communication, suitable for sensor data integrity verification with minimal overhead.\n\n**Related:** AUTOSAR E2E Profile 2, AUTOSAR E2E Profile 4, E2E Communication, CRC, AUTOSAR E2E Profile 5, AUTOSAR E2E Profile 6\n\n### AUTOSAR E2E Profile 2\n\n**Category:** AUTOSAR\n\nAn AUTOSAR E2E communication protection profile using CRC (16-bit) with a 2-byte Data ID and sequence counter, balancing protection strength and payload overhead for moderate safety-critical signals.\n\n**Related:** AUTOSAR E2E Profile 1, AUTOSAR E2E Profile 5, E2E Communication, CRC, AUTOSAR E2E Profile 4, AUTOSAR E2E Profile 6\n\n### AUTOSAR E2E Profile 4\n\n**Category:** AUTOSAR\n\nAn AUTOSAR E2E communication protection profile providing enhanced protection with CRC (16-bit), 2-byte Data ID, sequence counter, and timeout monitoring for high-safety ASIL B/C applications.\n\n**Related:** AUTOSAR E2E Profile 5, AUTOSAR E2E Profile 6, E2E Communication, ASIL, AUTOSAR E2E Profile 1, AUTOSAR E2E Profile 2\n\n### AUTOSAR E2E Profile 5\n\n**Category:** AUTOSAR\n\nAn AUTOSAR E2E communication protection profile using CRC (32-bit) with 2-byte Data ID and sequence counter, providing high integrity protection for ASIL D safety-critical in-vehicle communication.\n\n**Related:** AUTOSAR E2E Profile 1, AUTOSAR E2E Profile 6, E2E Communication, CRC, AUTOSAR E2E Profile 2, AUTOSAR E2E Profile 4\n\n### AUTOSAR E2E Profile 6\n\n**Category:** AUTOSAR\n\nAn AUTOSAR E2E communication protection profile designed for large payload protection with CRC (32-bit) and Data ID wrapping, suitable for Ethernet/SOME/IP-based safety-critical service communication.\n\n**Related:** AUTOSAR E2E Profile 4, AUTOSAR E2E Profile 5, E2E Communication, SOME/IP, AUTOSAR E2E Profile 1, AUTOSAR E2E Profile 2\n\n### AUTOSAR ECU Abstraction Layer\n\n**Category:** AUTOSAR\n\nA software layer that abstracts ECU-specific hardware devices from upper software components.\n\n### AUTOSAR EthIf\n\n**Full Name:** AUTOSAR Ethernet Interface\n\n**Category:** Automotive Network\n\nAn AUTOSAR basic software module that abstracts the Ethernet hardware, providing a uniform interface between the Ethernet driver and upper-layer TCP/IP and socket adapter modules.\n\n**Related:** AUTOSAR, EthTrcv, SoAd, TcpIp, Automotive Ethernet\n\n### AUTOSAR Key Manager\n\n**Full Name:** KeyM\n\n**Category:** Cryptography\n\nAn AUTOSAR module responsible for key lifecycle management, including provisioning, storage, and updates.\n\n### AUTOSAR MCAL\n\n**Full Name:** Microcontroller Abstraction Layer\n\n**Category:** AUTOSAR\n\nThe lowest AUTOSAR software layer that provides standardized access to microcontroller peripherals.\n\n### AUTOSAR Network Management\n\n**Full Name:** NM\n\n**Category:** Network\n\nAn AUTOSAR module responsible for coordinating network sleep and wake-up behavior.\n\n### AUTOSAR OS\n\n**Category:** Operating System\n\n**Related:** AUTOSAR\n\nThe standardized real-time operating system defined by AUTOSAR Classic Platform.\n\n### AUTOSAR OS Memory Protection\n\n**Category:** Operating System\n\nAn AUTOSAR OS feature using MPU/MMU hardware to enforce memory access boundaries between OS-Applications, preventing unauthorized read/write/execute and isolating safety-critical from non-critical software.\n\n**Related:** AUTOSAR OS-Application, AUTOSAR OS, MPU, AUTOSAR\n\n### AUTOSAR OS Trusted Functions\n\n**Category:** Operating System\n\nAn AUTOSAR OS mechanism allowing non-trusted OS-Applications to call trusted functions running in privileged mode, enabling controlled access to security services (crypto, key storage) without full privilege escalation.\n\n**Related:** AUTOSAR OS-Application, AUTOSAR OS, TEE, AUTOSAR\n\n### AUTOSAR OS-Application\n\n**Category:** Operating System\n\nAn AUTOSAR OS concept providing temporal and spatial partitioning by grouping OS objects into applications, enabling memory protection and timing protection boundaries between safety-critical and non-critical software.\n\n**Related:** AUTOSAR OS, AUTOSAR OS Memory Protection, Hypervisor, AUTOSAR\n\n### AUTOSAR PDU Router\n\n**Full Name:** PduR\n\n**Category:** AUTOSAR\n\nA routing module that forwards protocol data units (PDUs) between communication modules.\n\n### AUTOSAR Runtime Environment\n\n**Full Name:** RTE\n\n**Category:** AUTOSAR\n\nMiddleware that enables communication between AUTOSAR software components and the basic software.\n\n### AUTOSAR Secure Onboard Communication\n\n**Full Name:** SecOC\n\n**Category:** AUTOSAR\n\nAn AUTOSAR module providing message authentication and freshness protection for in-vehicle communication.\n\n### AUTOSAR Service Discovery\n\n**Full Name:** SD\n\n**Category:** AUTOSAR\n\nA SOME/IP-based mechanism that enables ECUs to dynamically discover and advertise services within an in-vehicle network.\n\n**Related:** SOME/IP, Adaptive AUTOSAR\n\n### AUTOSAR Watchdog Manager\n\n**Full Name:** WdgM\n\n**Category:** Functional Safety\n\nA module supervising software execution to detect failures and improve system reliability.\n\n### Auxiliary ECU\n\n**Category:** ECU\n\n**Related:** Control Unit\n\nAn electronic control unit providing supporting functions rather than primary vehicle control.\n\n### AV\n\n**Full Name:** Autonomous Vehicle\n\n**Category:** ADAS\n\nA vehicle capable of sensing its environment and performing driving tasks with varying levels of automation.\n\n### Availability\n\n**Category:** Security\n\nThe property that systems and services remain accessible when required.\n\n### Availability Attack\n\n**Category:** Attack\n\nAn attack intended to reduce or eliminate access to systems or services.\n\n**Related:** DoS, DDoS\n\n### Availability Monitoring\n\n**Category:** Intrusion Detection\n\nContinuous observation of system availability to detect outages, degradation, or denial-of-service attacks.\n\n### Availability Requirement\n\n**Category:** Security\n\nA requirement specifying acceptable levels of service uptime and resilience.\n\n### Availability Zone\n\n**Category:** Vehicle Architecture\n\nAn isolated cloud infrastructure designed to improve service availability and fault tolerance.\n\n### AVB\n\n**Full Name:** Audio Video Bridging\n\n**Category:** Network\n\nA collection of IEEE standards providing deterministic transmission of time-sensitive audio and video streams.\n\n### AVB Stream Reservation Protocol\n\n**Full Name:** SRP\n\n**Category:** Network\n\nA protocol used to reserve bandwidth for time-sensitive streams on Ethernet networks.\n\n### AVCTP\n\n**Full Name:** Audio/Video Control Transport Protocol\n\n**Category:** Connectivity\n\nA transport protocol used by Bluetooth audio/video control profiles.\n\n### AVCTP Message Integrity\n\n**Category:** Connectivity\n\n**Related:** AVCTP\n\nThe verification of AVCTP messages to ensure they have not been altered during transmission.\n\n### AVDTP\n\n**Full Name:** Audio/Video Distribution Transport Protocol\n\n**Category:** Connectivity\n\nA Bluetooth protocol used to stream audio and video between devices.\n\n### AVNU Alliance\n\n**Category:** Network\n\nAn industry consortium promoting interoperability for Time-Sensitive Networking (TSN) and AVB technologies.\n\n### AVP\n\n**Full Name:** Automated Valet Parking\n\n**Category:** ADAS\n\nA feature allowing a vehicle to park itself in designated parking facilities without driver supervision.\n\n### AVRCP\n\n**Full Name:** Audio/Video Remote Control Profile\n\n**Category:** Connectivity\n\nA Bluetooth profile allowing remote control of multimedia devices.\n\n### AVSS\n\n**Full Name:** Automotive Vehicle Security System\n\n**Category:** Vehicle Security\n\nA generic term for integrated security systems protecting vehicle networks and ECUs.\n\n### AVTP\n\n**Full Name:** Audio Video Transport Protocol\n\n**Category:** Network\n\nA protocol defined by IEEE 1722 for transporting synchronized multimedia streams over Ethernet.\n\n### AXI\n\n**Full Name:** Advanced eXtensible Interface\n\n**Category:** Hardware Security\n\nA high-performance on-chip bus protocol defined by ARM AMBA specifications.\n\n### AXI Interconnect Security\n\n**Category:** Hardware Security\n\nSecurity controls applied to ARM AXI bus communication between SoC components.\n\n## B\n\n### Backdoor\n\n**Category:** Security\n\nA hidden method of bypassing normal authentication or access controls to gain unauthorized entry into a system, firmware, or communication channel; in automotive contexts, backdoors may be intentionally planted during ECU firmware development (debug UART, JTAG) or introduced via supply chain compromise for diagnostic access, remote code execution, or persistent presence.\n\n**Related:** Firmware Backdoor, Debug UART Attack, JTAG, Supply Chain Attack, ECU Security\n\n### Backplane Bus\n\n**Category:** Network\n\nA physical or logical bus architecture used to interconnect multiple ECU modules or system components.\n\n### Backpressure\n\n**Category:** Network\n\nA mechanism to prevent overload in communication systems by signaling upstream components to slow down data transmission.\n\n### Backtrace\n\n**Category:** Reverse Engineering\n\nA technique used to trace the sequence of function calls that led to a specific point in execution, commonly used in crash analysis.\n\n### Backup ECU\n\n**Category:** ECU\n\nA redundant ECU used to take over functions when the primary ECU fails.\n\n### Bad Block Management\n\n**Category:** Hardware Security\n\n**Related:** Flash Memory\n\nA technique used in flash memory systems to handle defective memory blocks and maintain data integrity.\n\n### Bandwidth Arbitration\n\n**Category:** Network\n\nA mechanism used in in-vehicle networks to allocate communication bandwidth among ECUs.\n\n### BAR\n\n**Full Name:** Base Address Register\n\n**Category:** Hardware Security\n\nA register used to define memory-mapped I/O regions for devices in PCI/PCIe systems.\n\n### Base Station Emulation\n\n**Category:** Attack\n\nA technique where a malicious device mimics a cellular base station to intercept communication.\n\n### Baseband Firmware Downgrade\n\n**Category:** Attack\n\nAn attack that forces baseband firmware to revert to a vulnerable version.\n\n### Baseband Processor\n\n**Category:** Connectivity\n\nA dedicated processor handling cellular communication (4G/5G), often a high-value attack target in connected vehicles.\n\n### Baseband Signal Injection\n\n**Category:** Attack\n\nInjection of malicious signals into cellular communication channels.\n\n### Baseband Traffic Analysis\n\n**Category:** Reverse Engineering\n\nThe analysis of cellular communication patterns to infer system behavior or vulnerabilities.\n\n### Baseline Security Configuration\n\n**Category:** Security Architecture\n\nA predefined secure configuration state used as a reference for compliance and hardening.\n\n### Batch OTA Update\n\n**Category:** OTA\n\nA firmware update strategy where updates are deployed to multiple ECUs or vehicles in grouped batches.\n\n### BBI\n\n**Full Name:** Body Bias Injection\n\n**Category:** Attack\n\nA physical fault injection technique manipulating body-bias voltage of CMOS circuits to alter transistor thresholds, causing timing faults in security-critical operations on advanced SoCs.\n\n**Related:** EMFI, Voltage Fault Injection, Laser Fault Injection, Fault Injection\n\n### BCM\n\n**Full Name:** Body Control Module\n\n**Category:** Vehicle Architecture\n\nAn ECU responsible for monitoring and controlling vehicle body electronics such as lighting, door locks, power windows, wipers, and climate control functions.\n\n**Related:** ECU, CCM, DCU, LIN Bus, PEPS\n\n### Beacon Frame\n\n**Category:** Connectivity\n\nA management frame used in Wi-Fi networks to announce the presence of an access point.\n\n### BECM\n\n**Full Name:** Battery Energy Control Module\n\n**Category:** Vehicle Architecture\n\nAn ECU dedicated to managing the high-voltage battery pack in electric vehicles, monitoring cell voltages, temperature, state of charge (SoC), and state of health (SoH), with safety-critical protection functions.\n\n**Related:** VCU, OBC, Inverter, Battery Management, Thermal Management\n\n### Behavior Prediction\n\n**Category:** AI\n\nAn AI/ML function in autonomous driving stacks that forecasts the future trajectories and actions of surrounding road users (vehicles, pedestrians, cyclists) based on historical states, map context, and interaction modeling; key input for motion planning and decision-making.\n\n**Related:** Path Planning, Motion Planning, Autonomous Driving, End-to-End Learning\n\n### Behavioral Analysis\n\n**Category:** Intrusion Detection\n\nA detection technique that identifies anomalies based on deviations from normal system behavior.\n\n### Behavioral Baseline Modeling\n\n**Category:** Intrusion Detection\n\nA technique that establishes normal system behavior for anomaly detection.\n\n### Behavioral Drift Detection\n\n**Category:** Intrusion Detection\n\nDetection of deviations from established behavioral baselines in vehicle systems.\n\n### Benchmark ECU\n\n**Category:** Penetration Testing\n\nA reference ECU used for performance, security, or compatibility comparison.\n\n### BER\n\n**Full Name:** Bit Error Rate\n\n**Category:** Network\n\nA metric measuring the rate of errors in transmitted bits over a communication channel.\n\n### Bettercap\n\n**Category:** Security Tool\n\nA powerful, open-source MITM framework and attack tool for network reconnaissance, packet sniffing, and traffic manipulation over HTTP, HTTPS, TCP, and BLE protocols; used in automotive security testing for wireless interception and in-vehicle network traffic analysis.\n\n**Related:** Aircrack-ng, Nmap, Evil Twin Attack, MitM, WiFi Pineapple\n\n### Binary Analysis\n\n**Category:** Reverse Engineering\n\nThe process of analyzing compiled executables to understand behavior, vulnerabilities, or logic.\n\n### Binary Diff\n\n**Category:** Reverse Engineering\n\nA technique used to compare two binary versions to identify changes, patches, or vulnerabilities.\n\n### Binary Instrumentation\n\n**Category:** Penetration Testing\n\nA method of inserting analysis or monitoring code into binary execution flow.\n\n### Binary Integrity Verification\n\n**Category:** Security\n\nA process ensuring binaries have not been modified or corrupted.\n\n### Binary Ninja\n\n**Category:** Security Tool\n\nA lightweight, scriptable reverse engineering platform supporting multiple architectures (ARM, x86, MIPS, RISC-V, AArch64) with a Python API and a modern decompiler; used in automotive firmware analysis for binary diffing, vulnerability discovery, and patch analysis.\n\n**Related:** Ghidra, IDA Pro, radare2, Reverse Engineering, Firmware Analysis\n\n### Binary Patch\n\n**Category:** OTA\n\nA modification applied directly to compiled binaries to fix vulnerabilities or alter behavior.\n\n### Binary Runtime Instrumentation\n\n**Category:** Penetration Testing\n\nA method that modifies program execution at runtime for analysis or monitoring.\n\n### Binary Signature Validation\n\n**Category:** Security\n\nVerification of digital signatures attached to executable binaries.\n\n### Binder IPC\n\n**Category:** Android\n\nAndroid's primary inter-process communication mechanism used by system services and applications.\n\n### BIOS Integrity Check\n\n**Category:** Boot Security\n\nA mechanism verifying the integrity of BIOS firmware during system startup.\n\n### BIST\n\n**Full Name:** Built-In Self-Test\n\n**Category:** Hardware Security\n\nA hardware-level self-diagnostic feature that automatically tests components at power-on or during runtime to detect faults before they cause safety-critical failures.\n\n**Related:** Functional Safety, ISO 26262, FMEA\n\n### Bit Flipping Attack\n\n**Category:** Cryptography\n\nAn attack that modifies bits in encrypted or transmitted data to alter system behavior.\n\n### Bit Timing\n\n**Category:** Network\n\nThe configuration of timing parameters that define how bits are transmitted and sampled on a CAN network.\n\n### Bit-Level Manipulation Attack\n\n**Category:** Cryptography\n\nAn attack that modifies individual bits in structured or encrypted data.\n\n### Black Box Testing\n\n**Category:** Penetration Testing\n\nA testing method where internal system structure is unknown to the tester.\n\n### Black Channel Communication\n\n**Category:** Vehicle Security\n\nA communication model where safety is ensured independently of underlying network reliability.\n\n### Blacklist\n\n**Category:** IAM\n\nA list of explicitly denied entities such as IPs, applications, or devices.\n\n### Blacklist Evasion\n\n**Category:** Attack\n\nMethods used to bypass blacklist-based security filtering.\n\n### BladeRF\n\n**Category:** Security Tool\n\nAn open-source software-defined radio platform (by Nuand) supporting full-duplex 2x2 MIMO operation, used in automotive security testing for creating rogue BTS and cellular network analysis.\n\n**Related:** SDR, HackRF One, RTL-SDR, USRP, OpenBTS, YateBTS\n\n### BLE\n\n**Full Name:** Bluetooth Low Energy\n\n**Category:** Connectivity\n\nA low-power Bluetooth protocol widely used in automotive digital keys and sensors.\n\n### Blind Attack\n\n**Category:** Attack\n\nAn attack performed without direct feedback from the target system.\n\n### Block Cipher\n\n**Category:** Cryptography\n\n**Related:** Encryption\n\nA symmetric encryption algorithm that processes fixed-size blocks of data.\n\n### BlueBorne\n\n**Category:** Attack\n\nA set of Bluetooth protocol vulnerabilities allowing airborne attacks that can take over devices without pairing, affecting Linux, Android, and Windows Bluetooth stacks.\n\n**Related:** Bluetooth, KNOB Attack, Bluesnarfing\n\n### Bluebugging\n\n**Category:** Attack\n\nAn attack that exploits Bluetooth to remotely issue AT commands to a device, enabling unauthorized access to calls, messages, and data.\n\n**Related:** Bluetooth, Bluesnarfing, Bluejacking\n\n### BlueFrag\n\n**Category:** Attack\n\nA critical Bluetooth vulnerability (CVE-2020-0022) enabling remote code execution on Android devices via crafted Bluetooth packets without user interaction.\n\n**Related:** BlueBorne, Bluetooth, RCE\n\n### Bluejacking\n\n**Category:** Attack\n\nAn attack that sends unsolicited messages to Bluetooth-enabled devices by exploiting the OBEX protocol in discoverable mode, primarily used for spam or social engineering.\n\n**Related:** Bluetooth, Bluesnarfing, Bluebugging\n\n### Bluesnarfing\n\n**Category:** Attack\n\nAn attack that exploits Bluetooth OBEX vulnerabilities to steal data (contacts, calendar, messages) from a target device without the user's knowledge.\n\n**Related:** Bluetooth, Bluejacking, Bluebugging, OBEX\n\n### Bluetooth\n\n**Category:** Vehicle Connectivity\n\nA short-range wireless communication technology standard used in vehicles for hands-free calling, audio streaming, phone-as-key, and device connectivity; common target for automotive security attacks.\n\n**Related:** Bluetooth Low Energy, Wi-Fi, NFC, BlueBorne, CarWhisperer\n\n### Bluetooth Advertising Attack\n\n**Category:** Attack\n\nAn attack exploiting BLE advertising packets to inject or spoof device presence.\n\n### Bluetooth Beacon Spoofing\n\n**Category:** Attack\n\nAn attack that impersonates legitimate Bluetooth beacon devices.\n\n### Bluetooth Classic\n\n**Category:** Connectivity\n\nA Bluetooth protocol used for continuous data streaming such as audio.\n\n### Bluetooth Connection Hijacking\n\n**Category:** Attack\n\nAn attack that takes over an active Bluetooth connection between legitimate devices.\n\n### Bluetooth Device Fingerprinting\n\n**Category:** Attack\n\nA technique used to identify Bluetooth devices based on unique communication patterns.\n\n### Bluetooth Pairing\n\n**Category:** Connectivity\n\nThe process of establishing a trusted relationship between Bluetooth devices.\n\n### Bluetooth Pineapple\n\n**Category:** Attack\n\nA rogue Bluetooth access device that impersonates trusted devices to intercept or manipulate Bluetooth connections, analogous to the Wi-Fi Pineapple for Bluetooth networks.\n\n**Related:** Bluetooth Spoofing, Evil Twin Attack, KNOB Attack\n\n### Bluetooth Spoofing\n\n**Category:** Attack\n\nAn attack where a device impersonates a trusted Bluetooth device.\n\n### BMS\n\n**Full Name:** Battery Management System\n\n**Category:** ECU\n\nA system that monitors and controls battery charging, discharging, temperature, and safety in electric vehicles.\n\n### Boot Anomaly Detection\n\n**Category:** Intrusion Detection\n\nA technique that detects abnormal behavior during system startup, such as modified boot sequences or unexpected firmware changes.\n\n### Boot Attack\n\n**Category:** Boot Security\n\nAn attack targeting the system startup process to gain early execution control.\n\n### Boot Chain of Trust\n\n**Category:** Boot Security\n\nA sequence of verification steps ensuring each boot stage validates the next.\n\n### Boot Image\n\n**Category:** Operating System\n\n**Related:** Kernel\n\nA system image containing kernel and ramdisk used during boot.\n\n### Boot Image Verification\n\n**Category:** Boot Security\n\nValidation of kernel and ramdisk images before execution during system startup.\n\n### Boot Integrity\n\n**Category:** Boot Security\n\nThe assurance that boot components have not been tampered with.\n\n### Boot Loader\n\n**Category:** Boot Security\n\nA program responsible for initializing system hardware and loading the operating system.\n\n### Boot Measurement Log\n\n**Category:** Hardware Security\n\n**Related:** Attestation\n\nA log recording cryptographic measurements of boot components used for attestation.\n\n### Boot Partition\n\n**Category:** Hardware Security\n\nA dedicated storage partition containing boot-related system files.\n\n### Boot ROM\n\n**Category:** Hardware Security\n\nRead-only memory containing immutable boot code executed at system startup.\n\n### Boot Script Tampering\n\n**Category:** Operating System\n\nModification of startup scripts to execute malicious code during boot.\n\n### Boot Sequence\n\n**Category:** Operating System\n\nThe ordered process of system initialization from power-on to full OS execution.\n\n### Boot Sequence Hijacking\n\n**Category:** Boot Security\n\nAn attack that modifies the system boot order or execution sequence.\n\n### Boot State Attestation\n\n**Category:** Hardware Security\n\nA remote verification process that confirms system boot integrity based on cryptographic evidence.\n\n### Bootloader Anti-Tamper Check\n\n**Category:** Boot Security\n\nMechanisms that detect unauthorized modification of bootloader code or configuration.\n\n### Bootloader Configuration Table\n\n**Category:** Boot Security\n\nA structured configuration defining boot parameters, memory layout, and execution flow.\n\n### Bootloader Lock State\n\n**Category:** Boot Security\n\nA security state indicating whether the bootloader is locked or unlocked for flashing operations.\n\n### Bootloader Rollback Protection\n\n**Category:** Boot Security\n\nA mechanism preventing downgrade attacks by blocking older firmware versions.\n\n### Bootloader Secure Flag\n\n**Category:** Boot Security\n\n**Related:** Secure Boot\n\nA hardware or software flag indicating whether secure boot enforcement is enabled.\n\n### Bootloader Vulnerability\n\n**Category:** Vulnerability\n\nA security weakness in the bootloader firmware that allows bypassing secure boot, signature verification, or authenticated update checks; common in automotive ECUs where bootloader vulnerabilities enable flashing unsigned firmware, installing backdoors, or permanently compromising the device.\n\n**Related:** Secure Boot, Firmware Vulnerability, OTA Vulnerability, Signed Firmware Bypass\n\n### Boundary Check\n\n**Category:** Security\n\nA validation mechanism ensuring memory access remains within valid limits.\n\n### Boundary Overflow Attack\n\n**Category:** Vulnerability\n\n**Related:** Memory Corruption\n\nA memory corruption attack caused by exceeding buffer boundaries.\n\n### Boundary Validation Failure\n\n**Category:** Vulnerability\n\n**Related:** Exploit\n\nA failure to properly validate input or memory boundaries leading to exploitation.\n\n### Brake ECU\n\n**Category:** ECU\n\nAn ECU responsible for managing braking systems including ABS and ESC.\n\n### Brake-by-Wire\n\n**Category:** Vehicle Architecture\n\nA vehicle technology that replaces traditional hydraulic or mechanical brake linkages with electronic control, where driver brake pedal input is converted to electrical signals transmitted over a redundant in-vehicle network to electromechanical brake actuators; brake-by-wire introduces critical safety and security requirements including fail-operational design, real-time fault tolerance, and protection against network-layer brake manipulation.\n\n**Related:** Steer-by-Wire, Throttle-by-Wire, Functional Safety, ASIL D, Redundancy\n\n### Branch Prediction Attack\n\n**Category:** Attack\n\nAn attack that exploits CPU branch prediction mechanisms to infer sensitive data.\n\n### Branch Target Injection\n\n**Category:** Attack\n\nA speculative execution attack manipulating branch prediction to leak information.\n\n### Broadcast Authentication\n\n**Category:** Network\n\nA mechanism ensuring the authenticity of broadcast messages in vehicular networks.\n\n### Broadcast Encryption\n\n**Category:** Cryptography\n\nA scheme that allows encrypted messages to be securely sent to multiple recipients.\n\n### Broadcast Frame\n\n**Category:** Network\n\nA network frame sent to all nodes in a broadcast domain.\n\n### Broadcast Receiver\n\n**Category:** Android\n\nA component that receives and processes broadcast messages from the operating system or applications.\n\n### Broadcast Storm Control\n\n**Category:** Network\n\nA control mechanism that limits excessive broadcast traffic in Ethernet or in-vehicle networks.\n\n### Broken Access Control\n\n**Category:** Vulnerability\n\nA vulnerability where an application fails to enforce proper access restrictions, allowing users or processes to perform actions beyond their authorized permissions; in automotive cloud platforms and IVI systems, broken access control can expose vehicle telemetry, remote command APIs, or diagnostic interfaces to unauthorized parties.\n\n**Related:** Authentication Bypass, Overprivileged Service, Misconfiguration, Sensitive Data Exposure\n\n### Broken Authentication\n\n**Category:** Vulnerability\n\nA vulnerability in the authentication mechanism that allows an attacker to impersonate legitimate users, bypass login procedures, or escalate privileges; in automotive telematics and V2X systems, broken authentication can lead to unauthorized vehicle access, remote command injection, or session hijacking.\n\n**Related:** Authentication Bypass, Weak Session Token, Hardcoded Credentials, Session Hijacking\n\n### Broker\n\n**Full Name:** MQTT Broker\n\n**Category:** Network\n\n**Related:** Message Broker\n\nA message broker that routes MQTT messages between publishers and subscribers.\n\n### Broker Authentication Failure\n\n**Category:** Vulnerability\n\n**Related:** Message Broker\n\nA failure in MQTT or message broker authentication allowing unauthorized access.\n\n### Broker Message Injection\n\n**Category:** Attack\n\nInjection of malicious messages into MQTT or publish-subscribe systems.\n\n### Brute Force Attack\n\n**Category:** IAM\n\n**Related:** Credential\n\nAn attack that attempts all possible 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      "readme": "# ROOTCON 17 Car Hacking Village Synopsis\nAutomotive Security and Car Hacking have been the focus for years now. More talks and research are geared towards it because it is the trend and we owe it to the Car Hacking Village and of course to Charlie Miller and Chris Valasek. They are our inspiration to promote security awareness that cars are hackable too. Cars have computers and technologies that hackers can tap into: wireless, key fobs, CAN Bus, telematics, electronic controllers, ECUs, secure gateways and the infotainment systems.\n\nIn order to not have copyright and trademark issues with the Car Hacking Village which debuted at DEFCON 23 and was co-founded by Robert Leale aka carfucar, we contacted them through the advise of Ian Tabor aka mintynet who is also one of my fellow car hackers. And you know what, they allowed us to use their logo and supported us in our initiative since ROOTCON 13. We owe it to them and like I said they are our inspiration.\n\nSo fellow ROOTCON goers, expect some good hardware and some junks that came out of nowhere because we promise we are gonna showcase something new again today. Finally, we are showcasing one vehicle this year \\m/\n\n# About this repo\n- Code for ROOTCON's Car Hacking Village\n- Sketches for @mintynet's [nano-can](https://github.com/mintynet/nano-can) in testing an ECU Simulator\n- Automation scripts\n- Security Research\n\n# Want to join our adventure?\nPing us :)\n\n# Become a Sponsor\nTo become a sponsor this coming ROOTCON 17, contact us at shipcode AT rootcon dot org\n\nROOTCON 17 will be on September 27, 28 & 29, 2023 at Taal Vista Hotel in Tagaytay.\n\n### If you love our projects and presentations you can buy us a coffee to support our village :)\n <a href=\"https://www.buymeacoffee.com/shipcod3\" target=\"_blank\"><img src=\"https://cdn.buymeacoffee.com/buttons/default-orange.png\" alt=\"Buy Me A Coffee\" height=\"41\" width=\"174\"></a>",
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      "url": "https://github.com/CrashOverid3/CARpwnd",
      "description": "Do it all tool for CAN-BUS Exploration, Enumeration and Exploitation",
      "readme": "# CARpwnd\nDo it all tool for CAN-BUS Exploration, Enumeration and Exploitation\n\nWritten by ![CrashOverid3](https://github.com/CrashOverid3) and ![smadrid062](https://github.com/smadrid062)\n# ToDo\n- [ ] Add ICSIM script?\n- [ ] Add data abstraction modules\n  - [x] DBC file conversion\n  - [ ] Matplotlib?\n  - [ ] Machine learning?\n  - [ ] Module for creating new DBC files?\n- [ ] Windows interface setup\n- [ ] Make GUI front end for raspberry pi screen and infotainment uses\n- [ ] Fix --version flag\n- [ ] Add multicast options for multiple output types\n- [ ] Add replay-dump with correct timings\n- [ ] Cross module execution\n\n# Summary\nCARpwnd is a colaborative project that is intended to be a framework for building automotive hacking tools.  There is a particular focus on the CAN bus but in theory anything can be added to it due to its dynamic loading of modules.  Modules can be added or removed at will allowing for very small package sizes to be installed on micro computers aslong as python is installed.  A majority of the base modules utilize [Python-Can](https://github.com/hardbyte/python-can) and hence are OS agnostic.  Windows and Linux specific modules are also included and will the user will be flaged if they are trying to run an incompatible module.  Contributions are welcomed and anything that is of value and isnt already included will be added to the next release.\n# Installation\nInstallation is easy and the only required dependencies currently are python-can, cantools, click and canutils.\n\nFor a Debian based system:\n```\nsudo pip install python-can cantools click\nsudo apt install canutils\n```\nTo download the repository\n```\ngit clone https://github.com/CrashOverid3/CARpwned\n```\nThe main carpwnd program will be in ./CARpwnd/carpwnd and can be run as an executable\n```\ncd ./CARpwnd\n./carpwnd\n```\n![Carpwnd-version](https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/119644383/220784241-162628a8-9e38-4042-86dc-818966a70add.png)\n\n# Usage\nThe execution of carpwnd is as follows ```./carpwnd <module> <submodule> [Options] <arguments>```\n\nExample:```./carpwnd capture store -c can0 -e txt socketcan output.txt```\n## Current Modules\n### Injection\nInjects individual CAN packets into the selected python-can supported interface\n```\nUsage: carpwnd injection [OPTIONS] COMMAND [ARGS]...\n\nOptions:\n  -h, --help  Show this message and exit.\n\nCommands:\n  inject-frame  'injection inject_frame' will inject a can frame using...\n  replay-dump   'injection replay_dump' will inject all of the packets on...\n```\n### Capture\nCaptures packets from a python-can supported interface and either dumps them to a file or the terminal\n```\nUsage: carpwnd capture [OPTIONS] COMMAND [ARGS]...\n\nOptions:\n  -h, --help  Show this message and exit.\n\nCommands:\n  print  'capture print' will output the captured frames to stdout\n  store  'capture store' command will dump can data into file specified\n```\n### Convert\nConverts database and captured interface formats to any other format supported by python-can and cantools.\n```\nUsage: carpwnd convert [OPTIONS] COMMAND [ARGS]...\n\nOptions:\n  -h, --help  Show this message and exit.\n\nCommands:\n  tofile  'convert tofile' Converts input file to a different format and...\n```\n### Multicast\nSimmilar to Capture but it sends and recieves packets over a multicast udp connection\n```\nUsage: carpwnd multicast [OPTIONS] COMMAND [ARGS]...\n\nOptions:\n  -h, --help  Show this message and exit.\n\nCommands:\n  recieve  'multicast recieve' recieves frames over udp multicast and...\n  send     'multicast send' sends can frames over udp multicast\n```\n### Interface - Linux Only\nScript that sets an interface up on a linux machine.  Does nothing if the machine is windows or macos.\n```\nUsage: carpwnd interface [OPTIONS] COMMAND [ARGS]...\n\nOptions:\n  -h, --help  Show this message and exit.\n\nCommands:\n  setup  'interface setup' Setup ICSIM style virtual socketcan interface\n```\n## Modules Template\nEach module is just a seperate python file that is placed in the carpwnd-tools directory.  The file located at carpwnd/example-tool-template/example.py is a copy of the capture module with an excessive ammount of comments added to describe how it works.\n\nThe following is a general template of how modules in carpwnd are written.\n```\n#click argument parsing requirements for each module\n@click.group()\n\n#Set name for the click commands.  In this case its 'cli'\ndef cli():pass\n\n#set first command\n@cli.command()\n\n#click options\n@click.option(\"-e\", \"--example-option\", help=\"example option\")\n\n#click arguments\n@click.argument(\"example-argument\")\n\n#first module command that has the previous options and arguments\ndef example1(example_option, example_argument)\n  #Module command help text\n  \"\"\"\n  example help text\n  \"\"\"\n  function contents...\n\n#second command stuff\n@cli.command()\n@cli.option()\n@cli.argument()\ndef example2()\n  \"\"\"\n  help page\n  \"\"\"\n  function contents...\n```",
      "topics": [
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      "title": "Security Strategy against Generalized Inter-Vehicle Cyberattacks in Car-following Scenarios for Connected and Autonomous Vehicles",
      "full_name": "CATS-Lab/Cybersecurity",
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      "url": "https://github.com/CATS-Lab/Cybersecurity",
      "description": "Code and data for paper \"Security Strategy against Generalized Inter-Vehicle Cyberattacks in Car-following Scenarios for Connected and Autonomous Vehicles\".",
      "readme": "# Security Strategy against Generalized Inter-Vehicle Cyberattacks in Car-following Scenarios for Connected and Autonomous Vehicles\n\n## Introduction\n\nThis repository contains the source code and data for the following paper:\n\n**Zhou, H., Ma, C., Cai, X., Ma, K., Li, X., \\& Ran, B.** (2025). *Security strategy against generalized inter-vehicle cyberattacks in car-following scenarios for connected and autonomous vehicles.* Transportation Research Part C: Emerging Technologies.\n\nConnected autonomous vehicles (CAVs) can improve safety and efficiency by sharing future driving intentions with nearby vehicles. However, overreliance on inter-vehicle communication may lead to critical safety risks when facing cyberattacks. This repository provides the implementation of a security-aware car-following control strategy under inter-vehicle cyberattacks, which dynamically adjusts its reliance on inter-vehicle information. The framework includes four control modes, a cyberattack misbehavior identification module, and two trajectory optimization models for connected and non-connected driving. We also include a cyberattack generation algorithm to simulate safety-critical attack scenarios and evaluate the proposed strategy's effectiveness.\n\n## Usage\n\n### Code\n\nThe project is developed using Python 3. Please ensure you have the corresponding environment set up.\n\nThe code related to our data processing and algorithm are included in folder **'src'**. As you proceed through all code, always verify the paths for both the input and output files. This ensures that everything runs smoothly.\n\n### Data\n\nThe '**data**' folder contains the benchmark reference trajectories used in our paper. Some of the realistic AV trajectory are extracted from project [ULTra-AV](https://github.com/CATS-Lab/Filed-Experiment-Data-ULTra-AV).\n\n## Developers\n\nDevelopers - Hang Zhou (hzhou364@wisc.edu).\n\nIf you have any questions, please feel free to contact the CATS Lab at UW-Madison. We're here to help!",
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      "id": "github:rdoromaljr/can-dash-lab",
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      "title": "CAN Dashboard Simulator",
      "full_name": "rdoromaljr/can-dash-lab",
      "name": "can-dash-lab",
      "owner": "rdoromaljr",
      "url": "https://github.com/rdoromaljr/can-dash-lab",
      "description": "Virtual instrument cluster for CAN bus security training. 54 real vehicle profiles from opendbc, built to be attacked with CaringCaribou. Inspired by ICSim.",
      "readme": "# CAN Dashboard Simulator\n\n[![License: MIT](https://img.shields.io/badge/License-MIT-green.svg)](LICENSE)\n[![Python 3.9+](https://img.shields.io/badge/Python-3.9+-blue.svg)](https://www.python.org/)\n[![Vehicles: 54](https://img.shields.io/badge/Vehicle_profiles-54-orange.svg)](#the-cars)\n[![DBC: opendbc](https://img.shields.io/badge/CAN_IDs-real_(opendbc)-red.svg)](https://github.com/commaai/opendbc)\n\nA visual instrument cluster + vehicle simulator for learning CAN bus security\nwith [caringcaribou](https://github.com/CaringCaribou/caringcaribou),\n`can-utils`, or your own scripts — **no car and no hardware required.**\n\n![The cluster under attack](docs/img/cluster.png)\n\n*The cluster mid-attack: spoofed speed, every warning lamp lit by injection, and\na live `INJECTION DETECTED` feed naming the rogue arbitration IDs.*\n\n### Standing on other people's work\n\nThis exists because of **[ICSim](https://github.com/zombieCraig/ICSim)** by\nCraig Smith (@zombieCraig) — the original instrument cluster simulator, and the\nproject that taught everyone that CAN attacks can be learned on a laptop with no\ncar and no budget. The entire teaching approach here is his. Read his book,\n*The Car Hacker's Handbook*. **No ICSim code is reused here** — ICSim is C/SDL,\nthis is Python/pygame, written from scratch. The debt is conceptual, and it is\nlarge.\n\nThe CAN IDs and bit layouts are **not invented**: all 58 DBC files are\nredistributed unmodified from **[commaai/opendbc](https://github.com/commaai/opendbc)**.\nThat community reverse-engineering effort is why `0x0B4` really is where a 2010\nPrius reports speed — and why switching cars changes every ID and bit offset,\nwhich is the most valuable property this lab has.\n\nFull attribution, including exactly what was and was not taken from each\nproject: **[CREDITS.md](CREDITS.md)**.\n\n### What you can learn here\n\nEverything below runs against a virtual bus on your own machine:\n\n- **Reconnaissance** — inventory an unknown bus, rank IDs by activity\n- **Signal correlation** — work out which arbitration ID carries speed, doors,\n  or gear, without being told\n- **Injection** — craft a frame by hand from a DBC bit layout and watch the\n  cluster believe it\n- **Arbitration** — hold a spoofed value against a real ECU still transmitting\n  the truth 50x/sec\n- **Replay** — capture a drive and play it back with no vehicle attached\n- **Fuzzing** — targeted vs. random, and why random disappoints\n- **Denial of service** — why the lowest arbitration ID always wins\n\nThe cluster is a **passive listener** with no link to the simulator other than\nthe bus. That is the whole point: CAN has no authentication, so a frame you\ninject is indistinguishable from the real ECU's.\n\n```\n  ┌────────────┐   real CAN frames    ┌──────────────────┐\n  │  sim.py    │ ───────────────────► │     dash.py      │\n  │ \"the car\"  │     vcan0 / udp      │ \"the cluster\"    │\n  └────────────┘                      └──────────────────┘\n         ▲                                     ▲\n         │          ┌─────────────┐            │\n         └──────────│  attack.py  │────────────┘\n                    │  caringcaribou, cansend, ...\n                    └─────────────┘\n```\n\nThe cluster is a **passive listener**. It has no link to the simulator other\nthan the bus. That is the entire lesson: CAN has no authentication, so a frame\nyou inject is indistinguishable from the real ECU's frame.\n\n---\n\n## Quick start\n\n### Prerequisites\n\n`requirements.txt` covers the Python side only. The lab also needs two things\npip cannot install:\n\n```bash\n# Debian / Ubuntu / Kali\nsudo apt install python3-venv can-utils\npipx install caringcaribou          # or: pip install --user caringcaribou\n```\n\n- **`can-utils`** — `candump`, `cansend`, `cangen`. Ships `vcan` support.\n- **`caringcaribou`** — the attack tool the lab is built around.\n- Kali has both preinstalled. Most other distros have neither.\n\nThen run **`./preflight.sh`** at any time to check everything and get the exact\ninstall command for whatever is missing.\n\n### Install\n\n```bash\ngit clone https://github.com/rdoromaljr/can-dash-lab.git\ncd can-dash-lab\n./setup.sh                      # venv + deps + mine profiles (safe to re-run)\n./preflight.sh                  # verify tooling before you teach\n\n# Option A - realistic (socketcan, works with candump/caringcaribou)\nsudo ./setup_vcan.sh            # once per boot\n./run.sh\n\n# Option B - no root at all (candump will NOT see this bus)\n./run.sh -i udp\n```\n\nTwo windows open: the **cluster** and the **controls**. Click the controls\nwindow and drive with the arrow keys.\n\n![The control panel](docs/img/controls.png)\n\n*The controls window — this is \"the driver\". It drives `sim.py`, which transmits\nreal CAN frames. The cluster never sees it directly.*\n\n```bash\n./run.sh --list                 # all 54 cars\n./run.sh -c mercedes            # pick one\n./run.sh -c tesla_can\n./verify.sh                     # end-to-end self test\n```\n\n---\n\n## Controls (focus the Controls window)\n\n| Key | Action |\n|---|---|\n| `Up` / `W` | throttle |\n| `Down` / `S` | brake |\n| `Left` / `Right` | turn signals |\n| `A` / `D` | shift down / up |\n| `1` `2` `3` `4` | toggle doors FL FR RL RR |\n| `B` | toggle seatbelt |\n| `N` | toggle background CAN noise |\n| `Esc` / `Q` | quit |\n\n---\n\n## The cars\n\n54 profiles mined from opendbc. Coverage varies because real DBC files vary —\nthat is realistic, not a bug. Best coverage:\n\n| Profile | Channels |\n|---|---|\n| `mercedes_benz_e350_2010` | 11 — everything except RPM |\n| `toyota_prius_2010_pt` | 10 — the default, closest to ICSim |\n| `chrysler_cusw` | 9 |\n| `tesla_can` | 9 |\n| `byd_atto3` | 7 |\n\nSame attacks, different car — every ID changes:\n\n| `mercedes_benz_e350_2010` | `tesla_can` |\n|---|---|\n| ![Mercedes](docs/img/cluster_mercedes.png) | ![Tesla](docs/img/cluster_tesla.png) |\n\n```bash\n./run.sh --list\n```\n\nEach profile binds dashboard channels to a real `(message, signal)`:\n\n```\nspeed       id=0x0B4 bits 47+16 big_en -> SPEED.SPEED\nrpm         id=0x1C4 bits 7+16  big_en -> POWERTRAIN.ENGINE_RPM\ngear        id=0x127 bits 47+4  big_en -> GEAR_PACKET.GEAR\ndoors       id=0x620 bits 45+1  big_en -> SEATS_DOORS.DOOR_OPEN_FL\n```\n\n---\n\n## Attacking it\n\n### With the built-in toolkit\n\n```bash\nS=scripts/attack.py\n\n# What is on this bus?\n./.venv/bin/python $S -i vcan0 sniff --seconds 5\n\n# ICSim-style hunt: which ID controls the doors?\n./.venv/bin/python $S -i vcan0 diff\n\n# Lie to the cluster - car is parked, dash says 240 km/h\n./.venv/bin/python $S -i vcan0 spoof -c prius --channel speed --value 240\n\n# All four doors \"open\" while the car is locked\n./.venv/bin/python $S -i vcan0 spoof -c prius --channel doors --value 15\n\n# Capture a drive, replay it later\n./.venv/bin/python $S -i vcan0 replay --capture 8 --out logs/drive.jsonl\n./.venv/bin/python $S -i vcan0 replay --play logs/drive.jsonl --loop 3\n\n# Bus starvation - lowest ID wins arbitration\n./.venv/bin/python $S -i vcan0 dos --id 0x000 --seconds 5\n```\n\n### With can-utils (needs vcan, not udp)\n\n```bash\ncandump -tz vcan0\ncandump vcan0,0B4:7FF              # just the speed ID\ncansend vcan0 0B4#0000000000487400 # one spoofed speed frame\ncangen vcan0 -g 2 -I 123           # noise\n```\n\n### With caringcaribou\n\n**First, see what actually reacts** (random fuzzing hits 1 ID in 2048 — that is\nwhy `fuzzer random` alone looks like nothing is happening):\n\n```bash\n./.venv/bin/python scripts/targets.py prius\n```\n\n```bash\ncaringcaribou -i vcan0 listener\n\n# TARGETED - walks every bit of byte 0, lighting each warning lamp in turn\ncaringcaribou -i vcan0 fuzzer brute 0x024 ..00000000000000\n\n# random fuzzing: the cluster shows an INJECTION DETECTED feed, but only\n# ~39% chance of touching the lamp ID over 1000 frames\ncaringcaribou -i vcan0 fuzzer random\n\ncaringcaribou -i vcan0 send message 0x0B4#0000000000487400\n```\n\n### Warning lamps\n\nEvery profile exposes tell-tales (ABS, AIRBAG, ESP/TCS, CHECK ENG, BATT, OIL,\nCOOLANT, TPMS). Where the DBC has real lamp signals (Hyundai, Tesla, ~20 cars)\nthose are used; otherwise they are synthesized onto a real unused message ID.\n\nThe simulator transmits them all as **off**, every tick. The only way one\nlights is if you inject a frame setting that bit — and because the real ECU\nrewrites it 50x/sec, the cluster **latches any hit for 1.5s** so a single\ninjected frame is still visible.\n\n```bash\ncansend vcan0 024#0100000000000000   # ABS\ncansend vcan0 024#FF00000000000000   # every lamp at once\n```\n\nThe cluster also flags any arbitration ID that does not belong to the car's own\nDBC in a live **INJECTION DETECTED** panel, so fuzzing is never silent even\nwhen it misses.\n\n---\n\n## Try it yourself\n\nWork these in order. Each one builds on the last, and none of them tell you the\nanswer up front — that is the exercise.\n\n1. **Inventory the bus.** `caringcaribou -i vcan0 listener`. How many unique IDs?\n   Which ones are fastest, and why would an ECU send speed more often than door\n   state?\n2. **Find the speed ID without being told.** Run `attack.py diff` while holding\n   throttle. Then press `N` to kill the background noise and try again — notice\n   how much easier that made it, and consider what a real 2000 frame/sec bus\n   would be like.\n3. **Light a warning lamp.** One injected frame. Then all eight at once.\n4. **Hand-craft a speed frame.** Read the bit layout from `targets.py`, do the\n   arithmetic yourself, and make the needle read 150 km/h.\n5. **Beat the real ECU.** A single frame flickers because the simulator\n   overwrites it 50x/sec. Make the lie stick.\n6. **Replay a drive.** Capture traffic, stop the simulator, and make the cluster\n   show a full drive cycle with no car attached.\n7. **Fuzz with intent.** Compare `fuzzer random` against\n   `fuzzer brute 0x024 ..00000000000000`. Work out the odds of random fuzzing\n   hitting a specific ID, then decide which approach deserves your time.\n8. **Starve the bus.** `attack.py dos --id 0x000`. Why does `0x000` work better\n   than `0x7FF`? Can this be patched?\n9. **Forge a complete drive cycle.** Simulator off, cluster only. Accelerate\n   0 → 120 km/h with plausible RPM, shift P → D → P, trigger CHECK ENGINE\n   halfway, end stationary in Park. Then answer: which single defensive control\n   would have stopped every exercise on this list?\n\n`./.venv/bin/python scripts/targets.py <car>` prints the IDs, bit layouts, and\nready-to-paste frames for whichever vehicle you picked.\n\n---\n\n## How it works\n\n```\ncan-dash-lab/\n├── setup.sh               build venv, install deps, mine profiles\n├── preflight.sh           check every tool, name what is missing\n├── requirements.txt       python-can, cantools, pygame, msgpack\n├── run.sh                 launch cluster + controls\n├── setup_vcan.sh          create vcan0 (needs sudo)\n├── verify.sh              end-to-end self test\n├── dbc/                   58 opendbc DBC files\n├── profiles/              54 mined car profiles (JSON)\n└── scripts/\n    ├── mine_dbc.py        DBC -> dashboard profile\n    ├── canframe.py        DBC bit packing (Intel + Motorola)\n    ├── bus.py             socketcan / udp / virtual\n    ├── sim.py             the vehicle (transmits)\n    ├── dash.py            the cluster (listens only)\n    ├── ui.py              pygame drawing\n    ├── attack.py          sniff/diff/spoof/replay/fuzz/dos\n    ├── targets.py         what reacts on this car, with paste-ready frames\n    └── shot.py            offscreen render for docs\n```\n\n### Why the bit packing is trustworthy\n\n`canframe.py` implements DBC signal layout from scratch — both little-endian\n(Intel) and big-endian (Motorola sawtooth) orderings. `verify.sh` cross-checks\nit against `cantools` on thousands of real signals:\n\n```\n[PASS] round-trip: 830/830 ok, 0 mismatches\n[PASS] 4407/4407 signals match cantools\n[PASS] frames 730 sent = 730 received (0 loss)\n[PASS] speed sim=107.1 km/h = dash=107.1 km/h\n```\n\n### Units\n\nMany DBC speed signals are **mph** or **m/s**, not km/h. Profiles carry a\n`to_kmh` factor and the cluster always displays km/h. `--channel speed --value\n240` means 240 km/h regardless of the car's native unit.\n\n### Background noise\n\nThe simulator also emits frames on real-but-unused IDs from the same DBC, so\nfinding the signal you want is an actual exercise. Turn it off with `N`, or\nrun the sim with `--no-noise`.\n\n---\n\n## Gotchas\n\n- **`udp` bus is invisible to `candump`/caringcaribou.** It is a convenience\n  for people without root. For the real tooling you need `sudo ./setup_vcan.sh`.\n- **Coverage gaps are real.** If a car has no `fuel` channel, that DBC has no\n  usable fuel signal. Pick another car.\n- **Values get clamped.** A signal that is 11 bits at scale 0.0375 physically\n  cannot express 300 mph. The toolkit tells you when it clamps.\n- 4 of the 58 DBCs fail to parse even after the extended-ID fix; they are\n  skipped.\n- **`msgpack` is required for the `udp` bus** (python-can needs it for\n  `udp_multicast`). It is in `requirements.txt`; `./setup.sh` installs it.\n  Without it the `udp` bus prints a fix hint instead of a traceback.\n\n---\n\n## Safety\n\nEverything here is a virtual bus. Do not point these scripts at a real\nvehicle's OBD-II port. Spoofing speed, gear, or brake signals on a moving car\nis dangerous and illegal on public roads.\n\nThis repository is published for **security education**. Use it on the virtual\nbus it ships with, or on hardware you own and are authorised to test.\n\n---\n\n## License\n\nThis project is released under the [MIT License](LICENSE).\n\nThe `.dbc` files in `dbc/` are redistributed unmodified from\n[commaai/opendbc](https://github.com/commaai/opendbc), Copyright (c) 2020\nComma.ai Inc., also MIT licensed. See [`dbc/NOTICE.md`](dbc/NOTICE.md).\n\nConceptually indebted to [ICSim](https://github.com/zombieCraig/ICSim) by Craig\nSmith, and built to be attacked with\n[CaringCaribou](https://github.com/CaringCaribou/caringcaribou). 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      "readme": "# 🚗 Car Key Fob Replay Attack Vulnerability Analysis\n\nA practical wireless security research project analyzing the susceptibility of car key fob systems to **RF replay attacks** using a **HackRF One with PortaPack H2+**.\n\nThe project focuses on understanding how fixed-code wireless systems can be exposed to signal capture and replay attacks, demonstrating the security implications of static RF authentication mechanisms and the importance of stronger wireless security controls.\n\n---\n\n## 📌 Project Overview\n\nModern vehicles rely heavily on wireless key fobs for functions such as locking and unlocking doors. When a key fob uses a **static or fixed RF signal**, the transmitted signal may be susceptible to interception and subsequent replay.\n\nThis project investigated that security weakness using Software-Defined Radio (SDR) hardware.\n\nThe assessment involved:\n\n- Identifying the operating frequency used by the test key fob.\n\n- Capturing RF transmissions generated during lock/unlock operations.\n\n- Storing captured signals for controlled analysis.\n\n- Performing replay testing in an authorized test environment.\n\n- Analyzing the security implications of fixed-code authentication.\n\n- Examining rolling-code mechanisms as a defensive countermeasure.\n\n\n---\n## 📸 Project Evidence\n\n### HackRF + PortaPack H2+\n\n![HackRF PortaPack](images/hackrf-portapack-hardware.jpg)\n\n### RF Signal Capture\n\n![433 MHz Signal Capture](images/433mhz-signal-capture.jpg)\n\n### Captured Signal Files\n\n![Captured Signal Files](images/sdcard-captured-signal-files.jpg)\n\n### Replay Attack Demonstration\n\n![Signal Replay](images/signal-replay-attack.jpg)\n\n### PortaPack Interface\n\n![Mayhem Interface](images/mayhem-hub-web-interface.png)\n\n-----\n## 🎯 Objectives\n\nThe primary objectives of this project were to:\n\n1. Understand the RF communication behavior of a car key fob.\n\n2. Explore wireless signal capture using SDR technology.\n\n3. Analyze the security limitations of fixed-code systems.\n\n4. Demonstrate the concept of an RF replay attack in a controlled environment.\n\n5. Identify appropriate defensive mechanisms for mitigating replay attacks.\n\n6. Develop practical knowledge of automotive wireless security.\n\n\n---\n\n## 🛠️ Hardware & Technologies\n\n### Hardware\n\n- **HackRF One**\n\n- **PortaPack H2+**\n\n- SD Card\n\n- Test automotive key fob\n\n\n### Software / Firmware\n\n- Mayhem / PortaPack environment\n\n- Software-Defined Radio (SDR) tooling\n\n- RF signal analysis tools\n\n\n### Key Technologies\n\n- Radio Frequency (RF)\n\n- Software-Defined Radio\n\n- Automotive Wireless Security\n\n- RF Signal Analysis\n\n- Replay Attack Analysis\n\n- Fixed-Code Authentication\n\n- Rolling-Code Authentication\n\n\n---\n\n## 📡 Assessment Workflow\n\nThe project followed a controlled research workflow:\n\n```text\n        ┌─────────────────────┐\n        │   Test Key Fob      │\n        └──────────┬──────────┘\n                   │\n                   ▼\n        ┌─────────────────────┐\n        │ Identify RF Signal  │\n        │   433.92 MHz        │\n        └──────────┬──────────┘\n                   │\n                   ▼\n        ┌─────────────────────┐\n        │   Signal Capture    │\n        │      via SDR        │\n        └──────────┬──────────┘\n                   │\n                   ▼\n        ┌─────────────────────┐\n        │ Store Capture for   │\n        │ Controlled Analysis │\n        └──────────┬──────────┘\n                   │\n                   ▼\n        ┌─────────────────────┐\n        │ Controlled Replay   │\n        │      Testing        │\n        └──────────┬──────────┘\n                   │\n                   ▼\n        ┌─────────────────────┐\n        │ Security Assessment │\n        └─────────────────────┘\n```\n\n---\n\n## 🔬 Key Finding\n\nThe assessment demonstrated the security weakness associated with **static/fixed-code RF authentication**.\n\nWhen the same RF authentication signal is reused, an intercepted transmission may potentially be replayed without requiring the original key fob to transmit the signal again.\n\nThis illustrates an important limitation of static wireless authentication mechanisms.\n\n---\n\n## 🔐 Security Implications\n\nA fixed-code key-fob system can potentially expose several security risks:\n\n- RF signal interception\n\n- Unauthorized signal replay\n\n- Unauthorized vehicle access\n\n- Lack of freshness in authentication\n\n- Increased exposure to wireless attacks\n\n\nThe underlying issue is that the authentication mechanism does not sufficiently distinguish between an original transmission and a previously captured transmission.\n\n---\n\n## 🛡️ Recommended Countermeasure\n\nA major defensive approach against replay attacks is the use of **rolling-code authentication**.\n\nInstead of transmitting the same authentication value repeatedly, rolling-code systems use changing authentication data between successive transmissions.\n\nConceptually:\n\n```text\nFixed-Code System\n\nKey Fob ────────► [AUTH CODE A]\nKey Fob ────────► [AUTH CODE A]\nKey Fob ────────► [AUTH CODE A]\n\n              ↓\n\nPreviously captured signal\nmay remain reusable\n\n\nRolling-Code System\n\nKey Fob ────────► [AUTH CODE A]\nKey Fob ────────► [AUTH CODE B]\nKey Fob ────────► [AUTH CODE C]\n\n              ↓\n\nPreviously captured authentication\ndata becomes unsuitable for reuse\n```\n\nAdditional defensive considerations include secure cryptographic authentication, protection against signal manipulation, and careful implementation of synchronization between the vehicle and key fob.\n\n---\n\n## 📚 Skills Demonstrated\n\n- Software-Defined Radio (SDR)\n\n- RF signal analysis\n\n- Wireless security assessment\n\n- Automotive cybersecurity\n\n- Replay attack analysis\n\n- Hardware security research\n\n- Security testing methodology\n\n- Vulnerability analysis\n\n- Ethical hacking\n\n- Security awareness and mitigation analysis\n\n\n---\n\n## ⚠️ Ethical Disclaimer\n\nThis project was conducted strictly for **educational, security research, and authorized testing purposes**.\n\nThe techniques and concepts documented in this repository should only be applied to systems, devices, and vehicles for which explicit authorization has been obtained.\n\n**Do not capture, replay, or interfere with wireless signals belonging to vehicles or devices that you do not own or have permission to test.**\n\nRaw RF capture files are intentionally **not included in this public repository**.\n\n---\n\n## 🚀 Future Research\n\nPotential areas for further research include:\n\n- Analysis of rolling-code authentication mechanisms\n\n- Comparative analysis of fixed-code and dynamic-code systems\n\n- RF protocol analysis\n\n- Automotive wireless attack-surface research\n\n- Detection mechanisms for replay attempts\n\n- Secure wireless authentication architectures\n\n\n---\n\n## 📄 License\n\nThis project is intended for educational and security research purposes. See the repository license for applicable terms.\n\n------\n\n⭐ If you found this project useful, consider starring the repository.",
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      "title": "Automotive Cybersecurity Lab",
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      "description": "A simulated in-vehicle CAN network security lab for studying automotive cybersecurity threats, CAN bus analysis, and intrusion detection.",
      "readme": "# Automotive Cybersecurity Lab\n\n## Overview\n\nThe Automotive Cybersecurity Lab is a Python-based simulation of an in-vehicle Controller Area Network (CAN) environment designed to explore vehicle network security concepts. The project demonstrates how Electronic Control Units (ECUs) communicate over a CAN bus, how attackers can inject malicious messages, and how basic intrusion detection techniques can be used to identify abnormal behavior.\n\nThis project was built as a hands-on learning environment for studying automotive cybersecurity, CAN communication, attack simulation, and defensive monitoring.\n\n---\n\n## Learning Objectives\n\n* Understand CAN bus communication\n* Simulate ECU behavior and vehicle signals\n* Explore common automotive attack scenarios\n* Implement basic intrusion detection techniques\n* Analyze and log CAN traffic\n* Apply threat modeling concepts to vehicle networks\n\n---\n\n## Features\n\n### Implemented\n\n* ECU simulation\n\n  * Engine ECU\n  * Speed ECU\n  * Body ECU\n\n* CAN message generation\n\n* Attack simulation\n\n  * RPM spoofing\n  * Speed spoofing\n\n* Rule-based Intrusion Detection System (IDS)\n\n* Traffic logging and analysis\n\n### Planned\n\n* Replay attack simulation\n* CAN bus flooding attacks\n* SocketCAN integration\n* Wireshark traffic analysis\n* Machine-learning anomaly detection\n* Real CAN hardware integration\n\n---\n\n## System Architecture\n\n```text\n+-------------+\n| Engine ECU  |\n+-------------+\n\n+-------------+\n| Speed ECU   |\n+-------------+\n\n+-------------+\n| Body ECU    |\n+-------------+\n        |\n        v\n+----------------+\n| Simulated CAN  |\n|      Bus       |\n+----------------+\n        |\n        +----------------+\n        |                |\n        v                v\n+----------------+  +----------------+\n| IDS Module     |  | Logger Module  |\n+----------------+  +----------------+\n        ^\n        |\n+----------------+\n| Attacker       |\n+----------------+\n```\n\n---\n\n## Attack Scenarios\n\n### RPM Spoofing\n\nThe attacker injects CAN messages containing unrealistic engine RPM values in an attempt to override legitimate ECU data.\n\nDetection Method:\nThe IDS raises an alert when RPM exceeds a predefined threshold.\n\n### Speed Spoofing\n\nThe attacker injects false vehicle speed values to simulate overspeed conditions.\n\nDetection Method:\nThe IDS raises an alert when vehicle speed exceeds expected operating limits.\n\n---\n\n## IDS Methodology\n\nThe IDS uses threshold-based anomaly detection.\n\nDetection Rules:\n\n* RPM > 6500 RPM → Alert\n* Speed > 180 km/h → Alert\n* Explicit attack messages → Alert\n\n---\n\n## Example Output\n\n```text\n{\n  \"timestamp\": 1781345741.1235647,\n  \"can_id\": \"0x102\",\n  \"data\": {\n    \"speed_kmh\": 212\n  },\n  \"ATTACK\": true\n}\n[ALERT] ATTACK MESSAGE DETECTED: {'timestamp': 1781345741.1235647, 'can_id': '0x102', 'data': {'speed_kmh': 212}, 'ATTACK': True}\n[ALERT] Speed anomaly detected: {'timestamp': 1781345741.1235647, 'can_id': '0x102', 'data': {'speed_kmh': 212}, 'ATTACK': True}\n[LOGGED] {'timestamp': 1781345741.1235647, 'can_id': '0x102', 'data': {'speed_kmh': 212}, 'ATTACK': True}\n------------------------------------------------------------\n[IDS RECEIVED] {'debug': 'simulator alive'}\n[LOGGED] {'debug': 'simulator alive'}\n{\n  \"timestamp\": 1781345741.1284976,\n  \"can_id\": \"0x101\",\n  \"data\": {\n    \"rpm\": 3871,\n    \"load\": 33\n  }\n}\n[IDS RECEIVED] {'timestamp': 1781345741.1284976, 'can_id': '0x101', 'data': {'rpm': 3871, 'load': 33}}\n[LOGGED] {'timestamp': 1781345741.1284976, 'can_id': '0x101', 'data': {'rpm': 3871, 'load': 33}}\n```\n\n---\n\n## Project Structure\n\n```text\nautomotive-security-lab/\n│\n├── analysis/\n│   ├── ecu_distribution.png\n│   ├── rpm_chart.png\n│   └── speed_chart.png\n│\n├── config/\n│   └── vehicle_network.json\n│\n├── diagrams/\n│   ├── can_simulator.png\n│   ├── ids_alerts.png\n│   └── logs.png\n│\n├── docs/\n│   ├── architecture.md\n│   ├── results.md\n│   └── threat_model.md\n│\n├── logs/\n│   ├── sample_can_traffic.log\n│   └── bus_logger.py\n│\n├── src/\n│   └── can_simulator/\n│       ├── attacker.py\n│       ├── can_bus.py\n│       ├── can_simulator.py\n│       ├── ids.py\n│       └── main.py\n│\n├── tools/\n│   ├── bus_logger.py\n│   ├── can_sniffer.py\n│   └── log_analyzer.py\n│\n├── .gitignore\n├── LICENSE\n└── README.md\n```\n\n---\n\n## Lessons Learned\n\n* CAN networks do not provide native message authentication.\n* Any device with CAN bus access can inject messages.\n* Message spoofing can manipulate perceived vehicle state.\n* Intrusion detection systems improve visibility into malicious activity.\n* Logging and monitoring are essential for incident investigation.\n\n---\n\n## Limitations\n\n* Uses a simulated CAN bus rather than physical CAN hardware.\n* IDS relies on static threshold rules.\n* ECU behavior is simplified for educational purposes.\n* Does not implement cryptographic message authentication.\n\n---\n\n## Technologies Used\n\n* Python\n* Linux\n* CAN Concepts\n* JSON\n* SocketCAN (planned)\n* Wireshark (planned)\n\n---\n\n## Author\n\nBoluwatife Ekundayo- Electrical & Electronics Engineer transitioning into Automotive Cybersecurity",
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      "readme": "# uds-vulnerable-ecu-lab\n\nVirtual UDS (ISO 14229) ECU security lab demonstrating automotive diagnostic vulnerabilities: weak Security Access, session hijacking, brute-force attacks, and enumeration. Includes vulnerable ECU, legitimate tester, and attack tools on virtual CAN bus. Educational only.\n\n## Overview\n\nThis repository provides a fully virtual, safe-to-use laboratory for exploring common security weaknesses in automotive diagnostic protocols (UDS and OBD-II).\n\nIt simulates a real-world Electronic Control Unit (ECU) with intentionally vulnerable implementations of key UDS services — particularly Security Access (Service 27) — allowing you to observe, exploit, and understand how poor diagnostic security can be bypassed.\n\nEverything runs on a virtual CAN bus (`vcan0`) using Python and SocketCAN — no hardware required.\n\nKey goal:\n- Demonstrate common UDS (ISO 14229) security vulnerabilities in a safe virtual environment\n- Show practical attacks like weak seed/key bypass, session hijacking, and brute-force, along with mitigations\n- Provide hands-on experience with real UDS services and OBD-II diagnostics\n\n## Team Members\n- [Mohamed Bedier](https://github.com/MohamedBedier)\n- [Omar Mohsen](https://github.com/OmarMohsen9)\n\n## Installation\n\n### Prerequisites\n- Linux (Ubuntu recommended for SocketCAN)\n- Python 3.8+\n- Virtual CAN interface (vcan)\n\n### Install dependencies:\n```bash\nsudo apt update\nsudo apt install git build-essential libsdl2-dev libsdl2-image-dev can-utils -y\npip3 install python-can python-isotp\n\n# Clone ICSim Repository:\ngit clone https://github.com/zombieCraig/ICSim.git\ncd ICSim\n\n# Build Simulator:\nmake\n\n#reboot\nsudo reboot\n```\n### Setup virtual CAN bus:\n```bash\nsudo modprobe vcan\nsudo ip link add dev vcan0 type vcan\nsudo ip link set up vcan0\n```\n### Running the Lab\n1. Start the ECU (simulates the vulnerable vehicle ECU):\n```bash\npython3 ecu.py\n```\n* Logs to ecu.log.\n* OBD is free; UDS requires security access.\n\n2. Start the Tester (legitimate diagnostic tool):\n```bash\npython3 tester.py\n```\n* Interactive: Enter hex commands (e.g., `27 01` for seed request).\n* Commands: `e` (enable keep-alive), `x` (disable), `q` (quit).\n* Automatically handles security config reads and key derivation.\n\n3. Start the Attacker (for vulnerability demos):\n```bash\npython3 attack.py\n```\n* Interactive console: `r` (toggle reverse-capture), `g` (test candidates), `m` (MITM), `b` (brute-force), `ed/er/ep` (enumerate DID/RID/PID), `z` (reset CAN), `h` (help), `q` (quit).\n* Send raw hex payloads directly.\n\n4. Open candump for better visualization of the CAN bus\n```bash\ncandump vcan0\n```\n\nRun each in separate terminals. Use `tester.py` for normal ops, `attack.py` for exploits.\n\nFor detailed usage, see [Lab Manual](https://github.com/OmarMohsen9/uds-vulnerable-ecu-lab/blob/main/docs/lab_manual.md). For a more technical in-depth dive, see [Technical Documentation](https://github.com/OmarMohsen9/uds-vulnerable-ecu-lab/blob/main/docs/technical_documentation.md).",
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      "readme": "# CAN Bus Intrusion Detection System\n\n> **TL;DR** — A timing-based CAN-bus intrusion detector (Python) that learns each message's\n> normal broadcast period and flags flooding, injection, replay, and Bus-Off attacks in real\n> time. **100% detection / 0% false positives** on DoS data in the HCRL format; runs live over\n> python-can.\n\n### Quickstart\n```bash\npip install -r requirements.txt\npython cli.py demo          # all four attack scenarios + detection metrics\npython bench.py             # rule-based IDS vs learned Gaussian model\n```\n\nA lightweight, timing-based **intrusion detection system (IDS)** for the automotive\n**CAN bus** — the network that connects a car's ECUs (engine, brakes, steering). It\nlearns each message's normal broadcast period from clean traffic, then flags injected,\nspoofed, flooded, or silenced messages in real time.\n\nBuilt as the flagship technical project for an ECE/Computer Engineering portfolio, and a\ndirect extension of autonomous-vehicle cybersecurity research (CAN bus / Bus-Off attacks).\n\n## Why timing-based?\nLegitimate CAN traffic is overwhelmingly **periodic** — each arbitration ID arrives on a\nfixed clock. Attacks break that rhythm: floods and spoofs arrive *too fast*, Bus-Off\nattacks make an ECU go *silent*. A timing model needs no labels, no training GPU, and\nruns on an embedded automotive gateway — which is the realistic deployment target.\n\n## What it detects\n| Attack | Signature the IDS uses |\n|---|---|\n| Flooding / DoS | flood ID unseen in baseline (`UNKNOWN_ID`) and/or bus-rate spike (`RATE_FLOOD`) |\n| Spoofing / injection | known ID arriving far faster than its period (`TIMING`) |\n| Replay | duplicated frames violating period spacing (`TIMING`) |\n| Suspension / Bus-Off | known ID stops arriving (`SILENCE`) |\n\n## Run it\n\n**Simulated demo (no dependencies, no hardware):**\n```bash\npython cli.py demo                  # all four attack scenarios + detection metrics\npython cli.py attack injection --id 0x0C0\npython bench.py                     # rule-based IDS vs learned Gaussian model, head-to-head\npython tests/test_detector.py       # prove detection + low false positives\n```\n\n**On REAL captures** — the standard academic dataset format:\n```bash\npython cli.py realdata DoS_dataset.csv   # HCRL Car-Hacking CSV (Timestamp,ID,DLC,DATA,Flag)\npython cli.py realdata capture.log       # SocketCAN candump log from a real vehicle\n```\nDrop in an HCRL Car-Hacking CSV and it learns the baseline from the clean prefix, then\nscores **detection rate and false-positive rate against the dataset's own T/R attack\nlabels** (`core/loaders.py` parses the exact format). On data in that format it reports\n100% detection / 0% false positives on the DoS injection.\n\n**Live, real-time over a CAN bus** (`pip install python-can`):\n```bash\npython cli.py live      # streaming detection on a live python-can bus (virtual demo)\n```\nThis actually opens a `python-can` bus and runs **streaming detection** (`TimingIDS.observe()`)\nframe-by-frame, catching a live DoS flood via `UNKNOWN_ID` + a bus-rate spike (`RATE_FLOOD`).\nThe **same code runs on real hardware** — construct the bus with\n`can.Bus(interface='socketcan', channel='can0')` (an MCP2515 on a Raspberry Pi, or a USB-CAN\nadapter) and the detector is unchanged.\n\n### Benchmark result (rule-based vs learned model)\n| Attack | Rule-based detect% | Gaussian model detect% |\n|---|---|---|\n| Flooding | 100% | 100% |\n| Injection | 96.7% | 100% |\n| **Replay** | **45%** | **100%** |\n| Suspension | caught | caught |\n\nThe learned per-ID Gaussian model scores arrivals by **statistical improbability** (z-score)\nrather than a fixed ratio, which is what lets it catch replay attacks the rule misses —\nat a slightly higher false-positive rate. That trade-off is the actual research finding.\n\n## Architecture\n```\ncanbus-ids/\n├─ core/\n│   ├─ bus.py          # periodic ECU traffic model (the simulated \"normal\" baseline)\n│   ├─ attacks.py      # flooding / injection / replay / suspension injectors\n│   ├─ detector.py     # TimingIDS: learn periods, batch detect() + streaming observe()\n│   ├─ ml_detector.py  # learned per-ID Gaussian model (statistical anomaly detection)\n│   ├─ loaders.py      # parse REAL captures: HCRL Car-Hacking CSV + SocketCAN candump\n│   └─ live.py         # real-time detection over a live python-can bus (virtual/hardware)\n├─ cli.py              # demo · attack · realdata · live · bench\n└─ tests/              # detection rate + false-positive guarantees\n```\n\n## Honest scope & roadmap\n- This is a **timing/statistical** detector — strong on rate-based attacks, by design it\n  won't catch a perfectly-timed single spoof. Stated plainly, not hidden.\n- **Works on real data:** `core/loaders.py` reads the standard **HCRL Car-Hacking** CSV and\n  SocketCAN `candump` formats, so the same detector runs on real-vehicle captures, not just\n  the simulator. The simulator (`bus.py`) is for the offline demo; real captures use the loaders.\n- **Hardware path (real code):** `core/live.py` runs streaming detection over a **python-can**\n  bus. The virtual interface needs no hardware; swap to `interface='socketcan'` on an\n  **MCP2515** (Raspberry Pi/Arduino) to run on a vehicle — the detection code is unchanged.\n- **ML path (done):** `core/ml_detector.py` adds a learned per-ID Gaussian model; `bench.py`\n  compares it head-to-head. Next: sklearn IsolationForest / OneClassSVM on richer features\n  (gap, gap-ratio, payload entropy) with full ROC/AUC curves.",
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      "title": "CAN-Sentinel",
      "full_name": "karthikkpwork-create/CAN-Sentinel-Automotive-ECU-Intrusion-Detection-System",
      "name": "CAN-Sentinel-Automotive-ECU-Intrusion-Detection-System",
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      "readme": "# CAN-Sentinel\n\nCAN-Sentinel is a lab project for generating synthetic CAN traffic and viewing\nframes in a PyQt dashboard. All example ECU names, CAN IDs, and payloads are\ninvented. Use only a virtual CAN interface (`vcanN`); this project is not for\nconnecting to or testing a real vehicle.\n\n## What is in this checkout\n\n| Component | Status |\n|---|---|\n| Normal synthetic traffic simulator | Implemented; supports a no-interface dry run |\n| Synthetic attack traffic and labeled dataset generator | Implemented; dataset generation runs offline |\n| PyQt CSV viewer and dashboard | Implemented; CSV loading was exercised with a generated capture |\n| Live dashboard bridge for `vcan0` | Code is present; end-to-end live operation still needs validation on a configured `vcan0` |\n| Dashboard detector | Rule-based heuristic detector; it is not an Isolation Forest |\n| Isolation Forest training/inference pipeline | Not included in this checkout |\n| Independent Python/C CAN capture and sender/observer comparison tools | Not included in this checkout |\n\nThe dashboard details and controls are in [dashboard/README.md](dashboard/README.md).\n\n## Install\n\nFrom the repository root, create an environment and install the dashboard\ndependencies:\n\n```bash\npython3 -m venv .venv\nsource .venv/bin/activate\npython -m pip install -r dashboard/requirements.txt\n```\n\nThe simulators use the Python standard library. The live bridge additionally\nneeds `python-can` in the environment where the bridge runs:\n\n```bash\npython -m pip install python-can\n```\n\n## Run a safe offline demo\n\nGenerate a short synthetic normal-traffic CSV. Dry-run mode sends nothing and\ndoes not require a CAN interface:\n\n```bash\npython3 -m src.simulator.normal_traffic_simulator \\\n  --config config/config.example.json \\\n  --dry-run --duration 3 --seed 42 \\\n  --output data/generated/dashboard_demo.csv\n```\n\nOpen that file in the main dashboard:\n\n```bash\npython dashboard/dashboard.py data/generated/dashboard_demo.csv\n```\n\nYou can also open a CSV from the dashboard's **Open frames CSV...** button, or\nrun the simpler standalone frame table:\n\n```bash\npython dashboard/frame_table.py data/generated/dashboard_demo.csv\n```\n\nThe checked-in sample capture is\n[`data/samples/sample_attack_dry_run_seed42.csv`](data/samples/sample_attack_dry_run_seed42.csv).\nIt is synthetic dry-run data, not a live capture.\n\n## Generate labeled datasets offline\n\nThis command creates normal, injection, unknown-ID, payload-tampering,\nmissing-message, and mixed datasets without transmitting CAN frames:\n\n```bash\npython scripts/generate_datasets.py \\\n  --duration 5 --seed 42 \\\n  --output-dir data/generated/demo\n```\n\nThe output directory includes CSV files and ground-truth attack windows.\nMissing-message scenarios also have a separate suppressed-frame CSV because a\nsuppressed frame does not appear in the main traffic stream.\n\n## Live dashboard on a virtual CAN bus\n\nLive mode requires Linux/WSL with the `vcan` kernel module and permission to\ncreate a virtual interface. In the Linux terminal:\n\n```bash\nsudo modprobe vcan\nsudo ip link add dev vcan0 type vcan\nsudo ip link set up dev vcan0\npython dashboard/vcan_bridge.py\n```\n\nStart the dashboard on the same host and select **Start live**:\n\n```bash\npython dashboard/dashboard.py\n```\n\nTo produce benign synthetic frames on the virtual bus, use another terminal:\n\n```bash\npython3 -m src.simulator.normal_traffic_simulator \\\n  --config config/config.example.json --interface vcan0 --duration 10\n```\n\nThe bridge listens on TCP port `8765` and the dashboard client connects to\n`127.0.0.1:8765` by default. The bridge currently binds to all network\ninterfaces; run it only in a trusted lab environment and restrict network\naccess to the port. A live `vcan0` session has not been validated as part of\nthis checkout's verification.\n\n## Dashboard features\n\n- Load frame CSV files and inspect individual frame bytes.\n- Filter frames by one or more CAN IDs.\n- View frame and alert counters, per-ID activity, message-rate and ID charts.\n- Load an alerts CSV, display detector alerts, and export frames recorded in a\n  live session.\n- Toggle dark/light themes.\n\nThe **Add test alert** button creates a UI-only sample alert; it does not\nrepresent a detector result.\n\n## Detector and ML status\n\n`dashboard/detector.py` contains a basic rule-based detector. It can learn a\nbaseline from live frames and check for unfamiliar IDs, unusually fast frames,\npayload length/value changes, and missing messages. Its thresholds are\nheuristics. This checkout does not include a trained Isolation Forest or an\nML feature-extraction/training/inference pipeline.\n\n## Tests\n\nInstall `pytest` in the active environment, then run the focused, hardware-free\ntests:\n\n```bash\npython -m pip install pytest\nQT_QPA_PLATFORM=offscreen python -m pytest -q \\\n  tests/test_attack_simulator.py \\\n  dashboard/test_detector.py \\\n  dashboard/test_id_monitor.py\n```\n\nSome other `dashboard/test_*.py` files are standalone scripts rather than\npytest tests; avoid running the entire dashboard test directory blindly.\n\n## Current checkout limitations\n\nThere is no top-level `Makefile` or `requirements.txt` in this checkout.\n`scripts/setup_vcan.sh`, `scripts/run_demo.sh`, the independent capture\nprograms, and the sender/observer comparison tool are also not present. Set up\n`vcan0` manually as above if you want to test the live bridge.",
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      "title": "VAHAKA - Electric Scooter Simulator for Automotive Cybersecurity Practice",
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      "readme": "# VAHAKA - Electric Scooter Simulator for Automotive Cybersecurity Practice\n\n## 🚦 About VAHAKA\n\nThe name **VAHAKA** (वाहक) is derived from ancient Indian Sanskrit manuscripts, where it means **\"carrier\" or \"vehicle\"**. The term symbolizes a medium of movement—perfectly aligning with our mission to offer a dynamic and educational platform for exploring mobility-related cybersecurity threats and defenses.\n\nVAHAKA is designed to replicate the key electronic and communication features of modern electric scooters. It provides a realistic and extensible environment for simulating various attack scenarios.\n\n## 🔍 Key Features\n\n-   Virtual simulation of electric scooter ECUs and CAN communication\n-   No physical scooter required – fully software-based platform\n-   Safe environment for executing and learning offensive/defensive techniques\n-   Suitable for workshops, training sessions, academic research, and industry learning\n-   Community-driven and extensible—new features will be added regularly\n\n### 🛵 Electric Scooter Features\n-   Engine Start and Stop\n-   Kick Stand (with Engine Lock)\n-   Reverse Gear (with HMI indication)\n-   Cruise Control\n-   Dynamic Battery Status\n-   Seat Locking and Unlocking\n-   Eco Mode (max speed 200 KM/H) and Power Mode (max speed 300 KM/H)\n-   Music Player (with interactive controls)\n-   Google Map-based GPS\n-   Left, Right and Dual Indicators\n-   Weather Status\n\n---\n## 📥 Installation\n### Prerequisites :\nTo successfully install and run Vahaka on your Linux system, you need to have :\n- NodeJS (at-least version 22.13.1)\n- NPM (at-least version 11.1.0)\nNote :\n- If your system does not have NodeJS installed, the installation script attempts to install the latest version of Node on your system, but if your system already has a lower, unsupported version of Node - the installation script will NOT try to update it (since it can affect your other projects). In this case, you will have to manually update Node and NPM.\n- Vahaka might run on Node versions earlier to the mentioned minimums, but this is not guaranteed.\n### Method 1 - Using Installation Script\n*(Creates a symlink)*\n- Run this command in your Linux terminal :\n```bash\ncurl -sL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Dellon-Technology-Pvt-Ltd/Vahaka/refs/heads/main/install.sh | bash\n```\n- Once installation is successful, start Vahaka from anywhere using the command\n```bash\nvahaka\n```\n\n### Method 2 - Cloning the Repo\n*(Creates no symlink, but you need to be in the Vahaka directory to run)*\n- Clone the repository at your desired location :\n```bash\ngit clone https://github.com/Dellon-Technology-Pvt-Ltd/Vahaka.git\n```\n*(Or download and extract the .ZIP file)*\n- Install the prerequisites (in the Vahaka directory) :\n```\nnpm install\n```\n- Start Vahaka server by running :\n```bash\nnode server.js\n```\n\n---\n\n## 🚀 Roadmap\n\nThis is the **first version** of VAHAKA, and it will continue to evolve. Future releases will include:\n\n-   Enhanced connected features (BLE, GSM, GPS, etc.)\n-   OTA update simulation\n-   Advanced threat modeling modules\n-   Real-time telemetry and dashboard integrations\n\n## 🛠️ Contributing\n\n**Contributors:**\n\n-   [Arun Mane](https://github.com/arunm2110)\n-   [Omkar Mali](https://github.com/0mk4rm4li)\n-   [Smit Verma](https://github.com/smitverma)\n\nWe welcome contributions from the community. Please feel free to submit pull requests, report issues, or suggest new features, enhancements and tools.\n\n----------\n\n## 📞 Contact & Support\nFor questions, support, or collaboration opportunities, reach out via:\n- **Website**: [Dellon](https://dellon.io)\n- **GitHub Issues**: [Submit an Issue](https://github.com/Dellon-Technology-Pvt-Ltd/Vahaka/issues)\n\n---\n\n_Developed by [Dellon](https://dellon.io) for security professionals and researchers._\n\n---\n📢 Version Information\n\nThis is Vahaka Version 1. Future updates will be released accordingly.",
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      "title": "Upstream Security",
      "full_name": "api-evangelist/upstream-security",
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      "description": "Upstream Security — independent third-party profile of a public API surface, by API Evangelist. Upstream Security is a cloud-based automotive and smart-mobility cybersecurity company. Its purpose-built vehicle data platform delivers Cyber XDR detection and response for connected vehicles, runtime AI and API security, proactive quality detection, an",
      "readme": "# Upstream Security\n\n<!-- API-EVANGELIST-PROVENANCE:BEGIN -->\n> ### About this repository\n>\n> **This is not our API.** This repository is an independent, third-party profile of a company's\n> **publicly available** API surface, maintained by [API Evangelist](https://apievangelist.com).\n> API Evangelist does not operate, host, resell, or support this company's APIs, and is not\n> affiliated with or endorsed by the company unless stated on the profile.\n>\n> **Where the information came from.** Everything here is assembled from material a member of the\n> public can reach with a browser and no credentials — the company's own website, developer portal\n> and documentation, the specifications it publishes for public use (OpenAPI, AsyncAPI, JSON Schema,\n> `apis.json`, `llms.txt` and similar), its public repositories, and its public status, pricing and\n> changelog pages. **Nothing here is obtained by breaching a system, defeating an access control, or\n> using credentials of any kind.**\n>\n> **The rating is an independent assessment.** The Kin Score and Agent Readiness rating are\n> independently calculated scores of a company's *public* API artifacts, produced by API Evangelist\n> against a published rubric. They are not certifications, endorsements, security assessments, or\n> audits, and they score published artifacts — not the quality, safety, or security of the software.\n>\n> **Corrections, re-scores, and removal are free.** No partnership, contract, or purchase is\n> required, and you do not need to justify the request.\n>\n> - **Something wrong?** Open an issue on this repository, or email\n>   [info@apievangelist.com](mailto:info@apievangelist.com).\n> - **Published something new?** Ask for a re-score and we will re-run the rating.\n> - **Want the listing taken down?** Say so and we will honor it. The profile is reduced to your\n>   company name, a factual description, and a link to your own site, and the company is recorded as\n>   **unrated** — never scored zero for having asked.\n>\n> **Response times.** Acknowledgement within **one business day**; removal or restriction within\n> **two business days**; corrections and re-scores within **five business days**.\n>\n> **Not from the company, and here with a question?** You are welcome here — we would rather be the\n> front line and point you the right way than have a good report go nowhere. What this repository\n> can answer is narrow, though, so it is worth knowing who you are actually looking for:\n>\n> - **A question about how the API works, an account, billing, or a bug in the service** — that is\n>   the company's own support, not us. We profile this API; we do not operate it and cannot see\n>   your account.\n> - **A bug in an open-source project we only catalog** — file it on that project's own repository.\n>   This has happened with a real and correct bug report that reached us instead of the people who\n>   could fix it, which helped nobody.\n> - **Anything about this listing itself** — the description, the tags, the rating, a missing or\n>   wrong artifact — is ours. Open an issue here.\n> - **Not sure, or something general about API Evangelist or APIs.io** — open an issue on the\n>   [APIs.io Inbox](https://github.com/api-search/inbox) and we will route it.\n>\n> **This repository contains no software, and we will never ask you to download anything.** There is\n> no build, release, installer, or binary here — only text and machine-readable API descriptions, so\n> there is nothing here that can be \"corrupt\" or need \"repairing\". Any issue, comment, or email\n> claiming otherwise and offering a download link is not from us and is hostile. Do not follow the\n> link; it is a lure. Report it to GitHub and, if you like, tell us at\n> [info@apievangelist.com](mailto:info@apievangelist.com) so we can take it down.\n>\n> **On a security or compliance team?** Email\n> [info@apievangelist.com](mailto:info@apievangelist.com) with *security* in the subject line and\n> you will get a person, not a form. We will tell you exactly which public URLs this profile was\n> built from so your team can see the same surface we did, and we will take the listing down on\n> request while you work through it.\n>\n> Full detail: **[Where this data comes from](https://apievangelist.com/about/where-our-data-comes-from)**\n<!-- API-EVANGELIST-PROVENANCE:END -->\n\nUpstream Security is a cloud-based automotive and smart-mobility cybersecurity company. Its purpose-built vehicle data platform delivers Cyber XDR detection and response for connected vehicles, runtime AI and API security, proactive quality detection, and advanced analytics, alongside AutoThreat PRO threat intelligence and Vehicle Security Operations Center (vSOC) services for OEMs, Tier 1 and 2 suppliers, fleets, insurers, EV charging, and mobility IoT operators. Upstream publishes no public developer portal or API; the platform is sold as enterprise SaaS with demo-based onboarding.\n\n**Areas:** Company · Security · Cybersecurity · Automotive · Connected Vehicles · Mobility · IoT · Threat Intelligence\n\n## Upstream Security on APIs.io\n\nEverything profiled for Upstream Security is published on APIs.io rather than in this repository. Start at the provider page — **[apis.io/providers/upstream-security/](https://apis.io/providers/upstream-security/)** — or go straight to one of the APIs or properties below.\n\n### Published properties\n\nEach property below is a page on APIs.io carrying the machine-readable artifact and what it says.\n\n#### Security (3)\n\nAuthentication, trust centre, and vulnerability disclosure.\n\n- [Upstream Security Domain Security](https://apis.io/security/upstream-security/upstream-security-domain-security/)\n- [Upstream Security Trust Center](https://apis.io/security/upstream-security/upstream-security-trust-center/)\n- [Upstream Security Vulnerability Disclosure](https://apis.io/security/upstream-security/upstream-security-vulnerability-disclosure/)\n\n## Where to find this API\n\nLinks to the company's own pages. This repository publishes no copy of their specifications — the canonical document is theirs and lives at the URLs below.\n\n- [Website](https://upstream.auto/)\n- [Support](https://upstreamsecurity.atlassian.net/servicedesk/customer/portal/2)\n- [Blog](https://upstream.auto/blog/)\n- [Security](https://upstream.auto/upstreams-vulnerability-disclosure-policy/)\n- [Compliance](https://upstream.auto/security-compliance/)\n- [Terms of service](https://upstream.auto/terms-of-use/)\n- [Privacy policy](https://upstream.auto/privacy-policy/)\n\n## API Evangelist rating\n\n**Kin Score 20.0** — emerging · rubric 0.24.0 · scored 2026-10-17\n\n| Facet | Score |\n|---|---|\n| Discoverability | 55.4 |\n| Contract quality | 0.0 |\n| Contract governance | 18.2 |\n| Operational transparency | 10.5 |\n| Developer ergonomics | 7.1 |\n| Access clarity | 36.8 |\n\n**Agent readiness 0.0** — human-only\n\n| Agent-readiness dimension | Result |\n|---|---|\n| Spec Presence | — |\n| Agentic Access | — |\n| Reversibility Documented | — |\n| MCP Server | — |\n| Auth Clarity | — |\n| Idempotency | — |\n| Error Semantics | — |\n| OpenAPI Examples | — |\n| Rate Limit Signal | — |\n| Event Surface Described | — |\n| Agent Skills | — |\n| Well Known Catalog | — |\n| Consent Identity | — |\n| Agent Card | — |\n| Dry Run Mode | — |\n| Delegated Identity | — |\n| Protected Resource Metadata | — |\n| Dynamic Client Registration | — |\n| Agentic Commerce | — |\n\n**Regulatory alignment 29.4** — Horizontal (data, software, accessibility, platform)\n\nThe rubric is published at [github.com/api-evangelist/kin-score](https://github.com/api-evangelist/kin-score). The per-check breakdown behind these numbers — which checks were earned, partial or missed — along with score history and how this provider compares to its peers, is available at [apis.io/providers/upstream-security/](https://apis.io/providers/upstream-security/).\n\n## How this profile is made\n\nAPI Evangelist profiles a company's public API surface the way a developer would find it: the website, developer portal and documentation, the specifications it publishes, its public repositories, and its pricing, status and changelog pages. From that it derives the properties above — contracts split per API, workflows, schemas, collections, governance rules, plans and rate limits — and scores them against the published [Kin Score rubric](https://github.com/api-evangelist/kin-score).\n\nThe artifacts are published on [APIs.io](https://apis.io), not in this repository. This repository is the public record for Upstream Security: the place to say something is wrong, missing or out of date, and to ask for a re-score or a removal.\n\n## Open an issue\n\n- **Something about this listing** — a wrong description, a missing API, a stale artifact or a question about the rating: [open an issue on this repository](https://github.com/api-evangelist/upstream-security/issues/new).\n- **A new API, or one that is not in the catalog yet** — [submit it on APIs.io](https://apis.io/add/).\n- **Anything else** — [the APIs.io inbox](https://github.com/api-search/inbox/issues/new) or [info@apievangelist.com](mailto:info@apievangelist.com).",
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By integrating the MITRE TARA (CTSA/CRRA) methodology, Meta Attack Language (MAL), and LLMs, AutoTARA provides scalable and quantitative prioritization of security countermeasures.\n\n## 📄 Publication\n\nAutoTARA is a tool that implements the methodology proposed in the following paper, which is scheduled to be presented at **[VehicleSec'26 (4th USENIX Symposium on Vehicle Security and Privacy)](https://www.usenix.org/conference/vehiclesec26)**:\n\n> **Bridging Two TARAs: Integrating MITRE CTSA/CRRA Prioritization into ISO/SAE 21434 for Automotive Security**\n> Minhyuk Park, Yejun Kim, and Seungjoo Kim\n> VehicleSec'26, August 10-11, 2026, Baltimore, MD, USA\n\n## 🔍 Preview\n\n### 🧩 Visual Threat Modeling\n<div align=\"center\">\n  <img src=\"images/diagram-sample.png\" alt=\"Threat Modeling\" width=\"100%\" />\n</div>\n\n### 🛡️ CTSA (Cyber Threat Susceptibility Analysis)\n<div align=\"center\">\n  <img src=\"images/ctsa_sample.png\" alt=\"CTSA\" width=\"100%\" />\n</div>\n\n### 📊 CRRA (Cyber Risk Remediation Assessment)\n<div align=\"center\">\n  <img src=\"images/crra_sample.png\" alt=\"CRRA\" width=\"100%\" />\n</div>\n\n## 🚀 Key Features\n\n*   **Visual Threat Modeling:** Build and edit complex system diagrams using an intuitive graph editor powered by AntV X6.\n*   **Detailed Property Management:** Configure specific properties for each component and connection within the system.\n*   **Threat Management:** Systematically identify, categorize, and manage cybersecurity threats associated with system elements.\n*   **Attack Simulation:** Simulate potential attack paths to discover vulnerabilities and validate security assumptions.\n*   **Risk Assessment Modules:** Built-in support for standardized assessment methodologies, including CTSA (Cyber Threat Susceptibility Analysis) and CRRA (Cyber Risk Remediation Assessment).\n*   **TARA Results Dashboard:** Provides dashboards for generated attack paths, including damage/threat scenarios and attack paths.\n\n## 🛠️ Technology Stack\n\nThis project is built on a modern full-stack architecture.\n\n### Frontend\n*   **Core Framework:** [Vue 3](https://vuejs.org/)\n*   **Build Tool:** [Vite](https://vitejs.dev/)\n*   **State Management:** [Pinia](https://pinia.vuejs.org/)\n*   **Diagram Engine:** [AntV X6](https://x6.antv.vision/)\n*   **UI Framework:** [Bootstrap 5](https://getbootstrap.com/) and [FontAwesome](https://fontawesome.com/)\n\n### Backend\n*   **Runtime:** Node.js\n*   **Framework:** [Express.js](https://expressjs.com/) (v5)\n*   **Architecture:** Layered architecture (Controllers, Services, Repositories)\n\n### Database\n*   **Database:** PostgreSQL 17\n*   **Containerization:** Docker and Docker Compose\n*   **Driver:** [node-postgres (pg)](https://node-postgres.com/)\n\n## 📦 Project Setup\n\n### Prerequisites\n\n*   **Node.js** (v20.19.0 or later recommended)\n*   **npm**\n*   **Docker Desktop** or **Docker Engine + Docker Compose**\n\n### Installation and Running\n\nThis project consists of four services:\n\n*   **db**: PostgreSQL 17\n*   **mal-simulator**: FastAPI-based MAL simulation server\n*   **tara-server**: Node.js/Express backend\n*   **tara-vue**: Vue 3 + Vite frontend\n\nThe recommended way to run the full stack is to use the root `docker-compose.yml`.\n\n#### 1. Start All Services with Docker Compose\n\n```sh\ndocker compose up -d --build\n```\n\nThis starts:\n\n*   Frontend: `http://localhost:8080`\n*   Backend API: `http://localhost:3000/api`\n*   MAL Simulator API: `http://localhost:8000`\n*   PostgreSQL: `localhost:5432`\n\n#### 2. Stop Services\n\n```sh\ndocker compose down\n```\n\n#### 3. Backend Environment Variables\n\nThe backend service loads environment variables from `tara.server/.env`, including Gemini-related settings.\n\nDatabase and simulator connection values are overridden by Docker Compose so that containers can communicate over the internal Docker network.\n\n## 🐳 Docker Information\n\nThe full stack is managed through the root `docker-compose.yml`.\n\n*   **Database User:** `user`\n*   **Database Name:** `tara_db`\n*   **Database Volume:** `pgdata`\n*   **Database Init Scripts:** `db/init`\n*   **MITRE Data Files:** `db/data`\n\n## 👏 Acknowledgements\n\nWe thank KTH for the **[Meta Attack Language (MAL)](https://mal-lang.org/)**, which informed the MAL-based modeling and simulation capabilities in AutoTARA.",
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      "readme": "# FDRS Diagnostic Log Analyzer\n\nA Python portfolio project for reviewing user-provided Ford Diagnostic and Repair System style text and XML logs. The tool helps surface diagnostic failures, repeated negative responses, software mismatch indicators, flash-related events, and other high-signal entries for engineering triage.\n\nThis is an independent learning and portfolio project. It is not an official Ford tool, does not reproduce Ford internal processes, and does not certify a root cause or cybersecurity condition.\n\n## Capabilities\n\nThe application supports:\n\n* Text and XML log parsing\n* Error, warning, success, and failure filtering\n* UDS Negative Response Code interpretation\n* Hex value and payload explanation\n* Repeated-event deduplication\n* Diagnostic timeline generation\n* DID and software-version pattern review\n* JSON and text report export\n* GUI-based investigation and standalone decoding utilities\n\nThe output is intended to assist an engineer or technician during initial triage. Findings still require validation against approved diagnostic procedures, vehicle configuration, software records, and other engineering evidence.\n\n## Security and Validation Focus\n\nThe project demonstrates portfolio-level experience with:\n\n* UDS request and response interpretation\n* NRC recognition and explanation\n* Flash and programming event review\n* Expected-versus-observed diagnostic analysis\n* Evidence extraction from large, noisy log files\n* Explainable rule-based classification\n* Structured technical reporting\n\nIt does not perform penetration testing, production threat detection, cryptographic validation, or automated cybersecurity certification.\n\n## Data Handling Boundary\n\nThis public repository must contain only synthetic or fully sanitized data.\n\nDo not commit:\n\n* Real Ford or other OEM diagnostic logs\n* Vehicle Identification Numbers\n* Customer or technician information\n* Dealer identifiers or authentication data\n* Internal endpoints, software records, tickets, or proprietary documentation\n* ECU firmware, calibration files, security credentials, or seed-key material\n\nUse locally created synthetic logs or data that has been reviewed and sanitized before testing. User-selected logs remain local to the machine running the application.\n\n## Requirements\n\n* Python 3.8 or newer\n* Windows, Linux, or macOS with Python support\n* Tkinter for the graphical interface\n\nThe core application relies primarily on Python standard-library modules.\n\n## Running the Application\n\n```powershell\npython professional_diagnostic_analyzer.py\n```\n\nSelect a synthetic or sanitized text log through the interface, run the analysis, review the generated sections, and export the results when needed.\n\n## Key Components\n\n* `professional_diagnostic_analyzer.py`: Main graphical application\n* `critical_diagnostic_view.py`: Report and critical-event presentation logic\n* `enhanced_uds_parser.py`: UDS-oriented parsing and NRC interpretation\n* `ecu_reference.py`: General ECU and diagnostic reference mappings\n\n## Supported Diagnostic Patterns\n\nThe analyzer recognizes common UDS negative-response patterns, including:\n\n| NRC | Meaning |\n|---|---|\n| `0x10` | General Reject |\n| `0x11` | Service Not Supported |\n| `0x12` | Subfunction Not Supported |\n| `0x13` | Incorrect Message Length or Invalid Format |\n| `0x22` | Conditions Not Correct |\n| `0x31` | Request Out of Range |\n| `0x33` | Security Access Denied |\n| `0x35` | Invalid Key |\n| `0x72` | General Programming Failure |\n| `0x73` | Wrong Block Sequence Counter |\n| `0x78` | Response Pending |\n\nRecognition of a pattern is not a final diagnosis. Context, preconditions, session state, module state, and the approved procedure must also be considered.\n\n## Portfolio Positioning\n\nThis repository demonstrates automotive diagnostic-domain knowledge, Python tooling, log parsing, UDS interpretation, explainable triage logic, and technical report generation. It should be evaluated as a portfolio prototype rather than a production or enterprise cybersecurity platform.\n\n## License\n\nMIT\n\n## Author\n\nHarold L. R. Watkins\n\nAutomotive Cybersecurity | Vehicle Software Verification | Embedded Diagnostics",
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      "readme": "# CAN-bus intrusion detection with a CNN-LSTM variational autoencoder\n\nAn unsupervised anomaly detector for in-vehicle CAN traffic, written in MATLAB. A CNN-LSTM encoder with multi-head self-attention reads a window of CAN frames, a variational bottleneck compresses it, and a small decoder predicts the next frame. The model is trained on attack-free traffic only, so no attack labels are needed for training. A window is flagged when its score passes the 99th percentile of benign validation scores, which targets a 1% false-alarm rate.\n\nThe repository has pipelines for five public CAN datasets: Car-Hacking, OTIDS, CICIoV2024, ROAD and SynCAN.\n\n> **Status.** The indexing bugs described under [Development notes](#development-notes) are fixed in this version. The corrected code has not been re-run yet, so this repository reports no performance figures.\n\n## How it works\n\n```mermaid\nflowchart LR\n    A[\"Benign CAN capture\"] --> B[\"Sliding windows<br/>32 frames\"]\n    B --> C[\"Frames 1-31\"]\n    B --> D[\"Frame 32\"]\n    C --> E[\"Conv1D (k=3, 32 filters)<br/>+ ReLU\"]\n    E --> F[\"LSTM (128 units)\"]\n    F --> G[\"Multi-head<br/>self-attention\"]\n    G --> H[\"Global average<br/>pooling\"]\n    H --> I[\"Dense: mean and<br/>log-variance (16-d)\"]\n    I --> J[\"Latent sample z\"]\n    J --> K[\"Decoder: Dense 128<br/>+ ReLU + Dense\"]\n    K --> L[\"Predicted frame 32\"]\n    L --> M[\"Score: prediction error<br/>+ weighted KL\"]\n    D --> M\n```\n\nDuring training the latent vector is sampled with the reparameterisation trick. At test time the encoder mean is used directly. The loss and the anomaly score are the same quantity: mean squared error of the predicted frame plus the KL divergence of the latent distribution, weighted by β = 5 × 10⁻⁵.\n\nThere are two input variants.\n\n| | Payload model (`payload_vae*.m`) | ID-embedding model (`id_vae_*.m`) |\n|---|---|---|\n| Features per frame | 8 payload bytes, standardised with benign mean and standard deviation | 16-d learned embedding of the CAN ID, plus 8 payload bytes scaled to [0, 1] |\n| CAN ID | not used | embedded; IDs never seen in benign traffic share one \"unknown\" row |\n| Attention heads | 4 | 2 |\n| Window stride | 1 (8 in the ROAD version) | 4 |\n| Batch size | 256 | 64 |\n| Prediction loss | MSE on the 8 bytes | 5 × MSE on the embedding + MSE on the bytes |\n| Extra score term | none | penalty × fraction of unseen IDs in the window (reported for penalties 0 to 5) |\n\nShared settings: window of 32 frames, 16-d latent space, 128 LSTM units, Adam with learning rate 10⁻⁴, at most 30 epochs, early stopping on the mean benign validation score (patience 5, minimum improvement 10⁻⁴).\n\nThe payload scripts also rank the 8 bytes against attack labels on a sample of up to 20,000 frames per class (mutual information in `payload_vae.m`, mRMR in `payload_vae_road.m`). All 8 bytes are kept, so the ranking only sets their order.\n\n### Data handling\n\n- The benign capture is split chronologically: first 60% for training, next 20% for validation (early stopping and threshold), last 20% for testing.\n- Attack frames come from the dataset's attack captures. Benign and attack windows are built and scored as two separate streams.\n- For Car-Hacking, the normal frames inside the attack captures are added to the benign test stream.\n- Attack labels, as implemented:\n\n| Dataset | Benign data | Attack frames |\n|---|---|---|\n| Car-Hacking | `normal_run_data.txt` | rows flagged `T` in the attack CSV |\n| OTIDS | `Attack_free_dataset.txt` | DoS: ID 0x000. Impersonation: ID 0x164 from 250 s on. Fuzzy: every frame from 250 s on |\n| CICIoV2024 (decimal) | `decimal_benign.csv` | every row of the attack file, e.g. `decimal_DoS.csv` |\n| ROAD | first 30% of each of the 12 ambient captures | frames inside the injection interval in `capture_metadata.json`, limited to the injected ID when one is given |\n| SynCAN | 30% of the training file(s), as ten evenly spaced chunks | rows labelled 1 in the test file |\n\n## Repository layout\n\n```\nsrc/\n  payload_vae.m               payload model: Car-Hacking, OTIDS, CICIoV2024\n  payload_vae_road.m          payload model: ROAD (mRMR ranking, stride 8)\n  id_vae_road.m               ID-embedding model: ROAD\n  id_vae_otids.m              ID-embedding model: OTIDS\n  id_vae_syncan.m             ID-embedding model: SynCAN\n  prep/\n    road_ambient_payload.m    builds ambient_diverse_30pct.mat (8 bytes per frame)\n    road_ambient_with_id.m    builds new_ambient_diverse_30pct.mat (ID + 8 bytes)\n```\n\nEach script carries its own loaders, model, training loop, evaluation and helper functions, so it runs on its own.\n\n## Requirements\n\n- MATLAB R2023a or later (`selfAttentionLayer` first appeared in R2023a)\n- Deep Learning Toolbox\n- Statistics and Machine Learning Toolbox (`fscmrmr`, `perfcurve`, `confusionmat`)\n\nTraining runs on CPU. A full Car-Hacking run builds several hundred thousand training windows, so expect long runs.\n\n## Datasets\n\nThe datasets are not redistributed here. Download them from their official pages and follow each provider's terms of use.\n\n| Dataset | Files the scripts expect | Source |\n|---|---|---|\n| Car-Hacking (HCRL) | `normal_run_data.txt`, `DoS_dataset.csv`, `Fuzzy_dataset.csv`, `gear_dataset.csv`, `RPM_dataset.csv` | [ocslab.hksecurity.net](https://ocslab.hksecurity.net/Datasets/car-hacking-dataset) |\n| OTIDS (HCRL CAN-intrusion) | `Attack_free_dataset.txt`, `DoS_attack_dataset.txt`, `Fuzzy_attack_dataset.txt`, `Impersonation_attack_dataset.txt` | [ocslab.hksecurity.net](https://ocslab.hksecurity.net/Dataset/CAN-intrusion-dataset) |\n| CICIoV2024 | `decimal_benign.csv` and an attack file such as `decimal_DoS.csv` | [unb.ca/cic](https://www.unb.ca/cic/datasets/iov-dataset-2024.html) |\n| ROAD | `ambient/ambient_*.log`, an attack log such as `fuzzing_attack_1.log`, `capture_metadata.json` | [0xsam.com/road](https://0xsam.com/road/) |\n| SynCAN | `train_1.csv` (to `train_4.csv`), `test_continuous.csv` | [github.com/etas/SynCAN](https://github.com/etas/SynCAN) |\n\n## How to run\n\n1. Put the files of one dataset in a single folder.\n2. ROAD only: set `ambient_dir` at the top of the matching script in `src/prep/` and run it from that folder. It writes the benign matrix the ROAD model scripts load.\n3. In MATLAB:\n\n```matlab\naddpath(genpath('path/to/can-bus-ids-cnn-lstm-vae/src'))\ncd('path/to/dataset/folder')\nedit payload_vae      % set dataset_mode and attack_filename in section 0\npayload_vae\n```\n\nEach script prints the window counts, the per-epoch losses, the threshold, and accuracy, precision, recall, F1, ROC AUC and the benign false-positive rate. The payload scripts also draw a confusion chart, and `payload_vae.m` saves ROC and precision-recall figures and `rawscores_<dataset>_<attack>.mat` with the raw benign and attack scores.\n\n## Development notes\n\nAn earlier version of the payload scripts reported an AUC of about 0.998 on every Car-Hacking, OTIDS and CICIoV2024 attack it was run on, with recall 0.998046 each time, that uniformity was the clue: 0.998046 = 1 - 1/512, and 512 was the scoring batch size. MATLAB stores a `'CTB'`-formatted `dlarray` as channel × batch × time, so `X(:, end, :)` picked the last window of the batch instead of the last time step. Every window in a 512-window batch was therefore scored against one shared target, and the last window of each batch was never scored at all.\n\nThe ID-embedding scripts had a second layout bug: a `reshape` in the embedding lookup mixed embedding values from different windows. Both bugs are fixed in commit in this version, and an assertion now checks that every window gets a score. The corrected scripts have not been re-run end to end yet.\n\n## Dataset references\n\n- Seo, E., Song, H. M., & Kim, H. K. (2018). GIDS: GAN based intrusion detection system for in-vehicle network. *2018 16th Annual Conference on Privacy, Security and Trust (PST)*, 1-6. https://doi.org/10.1109/PST.2018.8514157\n- Lee, H., Jeong, S. H., & Kim, H. K. (2017). OTIDS: A novel intrusion detection system for in-vehicle network by using remote frame. *2017 15th Annual Conference on Privacy, Security and Trust (PST)*. https://doi.org/10.1109/PST.2017.00017\n- Neto, E. C. P., Taslimasa, H., Dadkhah, S., Iqbal, S., Xiong, P., Rahman, T., & Ghorbani, A. A. (2024). CICIoV2024: Advancing realistic IDS approaches against DoS and spoofing attack in IoV CAN bus. *Internet of Things, 26*, 101209. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.iot.2024.101209\n- Verma, M. E., Bridges, R. A., Iannacone, M. D., Hollifield, S. C., Moriano, P., Hespeler, S. C., Kay, B., & Combs, F. L. (2024). A comprehensive guide to CAN IDS data and introduction of the ROAD dataset. *PLOS ONE, 19*, e0296879. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0296879\n- Hanselmann, M., Strauss, T., Dormann, K., & Ulmer, H. (2020). CANet: An unsupervised intrusion detection system for high dimensional CAN bus data. *IEEE Access, 8*, 58194-58205. https://doi.org/10.1109/ACCESS.2020.2982544\n\n## Citation\n\nIf you use this code, please cite it with the metadata in [`CITATION.cff`](CITATION.cff).\n\n## License\n\nMIT. See [LICENSE](LICENSE).\n]",
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      "description": "SteVe - OCPP server implementation in Java. Your trusted open-source EV charging station management system since 2013. Used by CPOs, manufacturers and developers worldwide. Managed cloud →",
      "readme": "![SteVe](src/main/webapp/static/images/logo.png)\n\n[![build and run tests](https://github.com/steve-community/steve/actions/workflows/main.yml/badge.svg)](https://github.com/steve-community/steve/actions/workflows/main.yml)\n\nSteVe started its life at the RWTH Aachen University [in 2013](https://github.com/steve-community/steve/issues/827).\nThe name is derived from _Steckdosenverwaltung_ in German (in English: socket administration).\nThe aim of SteVe is to support the deployment and popularity of electric mobility, so it is easy to install and to use.\nIt provides basic functions for the administration of charge points, user data, and RFID cards for user authentication and was tested successfully in operation.\n\nSteVe is considered as an open platform to implement, test and evaluate novel ideas for electric mobility, like authentication protocols, reservation mechanisms for charge points, and business models for electric mobility.\nThe project is distributed under [GPL](LICENSE.txt) and is free to use.\nIf you are going to deploy it we are happy to see the [logo](website/logo/managed-by-steve.pdf) on a charge point.\n\n# Relation to Powerfill\n\n[Powerfill](https://powerfill.io/) is a SaaS company to expand beyond the basics of SteVe.\nWhile SteVe covers the basics of OCPP functionality in a DIY sense, Powerfill offers more and enterprise features with ease of use.\nRead more in [the company announcement](https://github.com/steve-community/steve/issues/1643) and [the public launch post](https://powerfill.io/blog/from-university-project-to-enterprise-platform).\n\n> [!IMPORTANT]\n> ⚡ **OCPP 1.6 certification for Powerfill** 🎉\n>\n> Powerfill's OCPP backend has received [Open Charge Alliance (OCA) certification](https://openchargealliance.org/participants/powerfill-technologies-ltd/) for _OCPP 1.6 Core + C (Smart Charging) + S (Advanced Security)_.\n> Powerfill incorporates SteVe's OCPP protocol implementation without modifying its logic or behavior.\n> SteVe's OCPP implementation has therefore been independently validated through its integration into the certified Powerfill backend.\n> The certificate formally applies only to the certified Powerfill backend and version, not to SteVe as a standalone, open-source distribution or to other SteVe builds and deployments.\n\n# Charge Point Support\n\nElectric charge points using the following OCPP versions are supported:\n\n* OCPP1.2S\n* OCPP1.2J\n* OCPP1.5S\n* OCPP1.5J\n* OCPP1.6S\n* OCPP1.6J (incl. [Security Extensions](https://github.com/steve-community/steve/wiki/OCPP-1.6J-Security-Configuration))\n\nFor Charging Station compatibility please check:\nhttps://github.com/steve-community/steve/wiki/Charging-Station-Compatibility\n\n# System Requirements\n\nSteVe requires\n* JDK 25 or newer\n* Maven\n* MySQL or MariaDB. You should use [one of these](.github/workflows/main.yml#L11-L35) supported versions.\n\nto build and run.\n\nSteVe is designed to run standalone, a java servlet container / web server (e.g. Apache Tomcat), is **not** required.\n\n# Configuration and Installation\n\n1. Database preparation:\n\n    **Important**: Make sure that the time zone of the MySQL server is the same as [the time zone of SteVe](src/main/java/de/rwth/idsg/steve/SteveConfiguration.java#L46). Since `UTC` is strongly recommended by OCPP, it is the default in SteVe and you should set it in MySQL, accordingly.\n\n    Make sure MySQL is reachable via TCP (e.g., remove `skip-networking` from `my.cnf`).\n    The following MySQL statements can be used as database initialization (adjust database name and credentials according to your setup).\n\n    ```\n    CREATE DATABASE stevedb CHARACTER SET utf8 COLLATE utf8_unicode_ci;\n    CREATE USER 'steve'@'localhost' IDENTIFIED BY 'changeme';\n    GRANT ALL PRIVILEGES ON stevedb.* TO 'steve'@'localhost';\n    ```\n\n2. Download and extract tarball:\n\n    You can download and extract the SteVe releases using the following commands (replace X.X.X with the desired version number):\n    ```\n    wget https://github.com/steve-community/steve/archive/steve-X.X.X.tar.gz\n    tar xzvf steve-X.X.X.tar.gz\n    cd steve-X.X.X\n    ```\n\n3. Configure SteVe **before** building:\n\n    The basic configuration is defined in [application-prod.properties](src/main/resources/application-prod.properties):\n      - You _must_ change [database configuration](src/main/resources/application-prod.properties#L7-L13)\n      - You _must_ change [the host](src/main/resources/application-prod.properties#L28) to the correct IP address of your server\n      - You _must_ change [web interface credentials](src/main/resources/application-prod.properties#L15-L18)\n      - You _can_ access the application via HTTPS, by [enabling it and setting the keystore properties](src/main/resources/application-prod.properties#L36-L41)\n\n    For advanced configuration please see the [Configuration wiki](https://github.com/steve-community/steve/wiki/Configuration)\n\n4. Build SteVe:\n\n    To compile SteVe simply use Maven. A runnable `war` file containing the application and configuration will be created in the subdirectory `steve/target`.\n\n    ```\n    # ./mvnw package -Pprod,mysql\n    ```\n\n    To build against MariaDB instead, use:\n\n    ```\n    # ./mvnw package -Pprod,mariadb\n    ```\n\n5. Run SteVe:\n\n    To start the application run (please do not run SteVe as root):\n\n    ```\n    # java -jar target/steve.war\n    ```\n\n6. After SteVe has successfully started, you can access the web interface using the configured credentials under:\n\n    ```\n    http://<your-server-ip>:<port>/steve/manager\n    ```\n\n7. Add a charge point:\n   1. In order for SteVe to accept messages from a charge point, the charge point must first be registered. To add a charge point to SteVe select *Data Management* >> *Charge Points* >> *Add*. Enter the ChargeBox ID configured in the charge point and confirm.\n\n   2. The charge points must be configured to communicate with following addresses. Depending on the OCPP version of the charge point, SteVe will automatically route messages to the version-specific implementation.\n      - SOAP: `http://<your-server-ip>:<port>/steve/services/CentralSystemService`\n      - WebSocket/JSON: `ws://<your-server-ip>:<port>/steve/websocket/CentralSystemService`\n\nAs soon as a heartbeat is received, you should see the status of the charge point in the SteVe Dashboard.\n\n*Have fun!*\n\n# Infrastructure & Deployment\n\n- **Docker**\n\n  If you prefer to build and start this project via docker (you can skip the steps 1, 4 and 5 from above), this can be done as follows: `docker compose up -d`\n\n  Because the docker compose file is written to build the project for you, you still have to change the project configuration settings from step 3.\n  Instead of changing the [application-prod.properties](src/main/resources/application-prod.properties), you have to change the [application-docker.properties](src/main/resources/application-docker.properties). There you have to change all configurations which are described in step 3.\n  The database password for the user \"steve\" has to be the same as you have configured it in the docker compose file.\n\n  With the default docker compose configuration, the web interface will be accessible at: `http://localhost:8180`\n\n- **Kubernetes**\n\n  First build your image, and push it to a registry your K8S cluster can access. Make sure the build args in the docker build command are set with the same database configuration that the main deployment will use.\n\n  `docker build --build-arg DB_HOST= --build-arg DB_PORT= --build-arg DB_USERNAME= --build-arg DB_PASSWORD= --build-arg DB_DATABASE=  -f k8s/docker/Dockerfile -t <IMAGE_NAME> .`\n\n  `docker push <IMAGE_NAME>`\n\n  Then go to `k8s/yaml/Deployment.yaml` and change `### YOUR BUILT IMAGE HERE ###` to your image tag, and fill in the environment variables with the same database connection that you used at build time.\n\n  After this, create the namespace using `kubectl create ns steve` and apply your yaml with `kubectl apply -f k8s/yaml/Deployment.yaml` followed by `kubectl apply -f k8s/yaml/Service.yaml`\n\n  To access this publicly, you'll also have to setup an ingress using something like nginx or traefik.\n\n- **Ubuntu** — [Prepare an Ubuntu VM for SteVe](https://github.com/steve-community/steve/wiki/Prepare-Ubuntu-VM-for-SteVe)\n\n- **AWS** — [Create a SteVe instance using Lightsail](https://github.com/steve-community/steve/wiki/Create-SteVe-Instance-in-AWS-Lightsail)\n\n# Screenshots\n\n1. [Home](website/screenshots/home.png)\n1. [Connector Status](website/screenshots/connector-status.png)\n1. [Data Management - Charge Points](website/screenshots/chargepoints.png)\n1. [Data Management - OCPP Tags](website/screenshots/ocpp-tags.png)\n1. [Data Management - Users](website/screenshots/users.png)\n1. [Data Management - Charging Profiles](website/screenshots/charging-profiles.png)\n1. [Data Management - Reservations](website/screenshots/reservations.png)\n1. [Data Management - Transactions](website/screenshots/transactions.png)\n1. [Events and Certificates - Security Events](website/screenshots/events-security.png)\n1. [Events and Certificates - Status Events](website/screenshots/events-status.png)\n1. [Events and Certificates - Installed Certificates](website/screenshots/certiticates-installed.png)\n1. [Events and Certificates - Signed Certificates](website/screenshots/certiticates-signed.png)\n1. [Operations - OCPP v1.2](website/screenshots/ocpp12.png)\n1. [Operations - OCPP v1.5](website/screenshots/ocpp15.png)\n1. [Operations - OCPP v1.6](website/screenshots/ocpp16.png)\n1. [Settings](website/screenshots/settings.png)\n1. [APIs](website/screenshots/apis.png)\n\n# OpenAPI spec\n\nAn export of the actual OpenAPI spec for APIs is available [here](api-docs.json).\nTo explore it interactively, open it in the [Live Swagger Editor](https://editor.swagger.io/?url=https://raw.githubusercontent.com/steve-community/steve/refs/heads/master/api-docs.json).\n\n# GDPR\n\nIf you are in the EU and offer vehicle charging to other people using SteVe, keep in mind that you have to comply to the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) as SteVe processes charging transactions, which can be considered personal data.\n\n# Are you having issues?\n\nSee the [FAQ](https://github.com/steve-community/steve/wiki/FAQ)\n\n# Acknowledgments\n\n[goekay](https://github.com/goekay) thanks to\n- [JetBrains](https://jb.gg/OpenSourceSupport) who support this project by providing a free All Products Pack license, and\n- ej-technologies GmbH who support this project by providing a free license for their [Java profiler](https://www.ej-technologies.com/products/jprofiler/overview.html).",
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      "readme": "# SecOC Simulator\n\nA professional-grade **Software-in-the-Loop (SiL)** simulator for AUTOSAR Secure Onboard Communication (SecOC) Profile 1, demonstrating automotive cybersecurity implementation using industry-standard tools and frameworks on Windows via WSL2.\n\n## Features\n\n- **SecOC Profile 1 Implementation**: Complete AUTOSAR SecOC with AES-128 CMAC\n- **UDP Transport**: Cross-platform WSL2 ↔ Windows communication without vcan kernel module\n- **Real-time Visualization**: Python bridge for CAN traffic monitoring and analysis\n- **Attack Detection**: Built-in replay attack detection via freshness value tracking\n- **Interview-Ready**: Demonstrates embedded skills, cryptography, and automotive standards\n\n## Architecture\n\n```\n┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐\n│                         WSL2 Linux Environment                          │\n│                                                                         │\n│  ┌─────────────────┐              ┌──────────────────┐                 │\n│  │  Sender ECU     │              │  Receiver        │                 │\n│  │  (C++ Process)  │─────────────▶│  Gateway         │                 │\n│  │                 │  UDP 5005    │  (C++ Process)   │                 │\n│  │  • Data Pack    │              │  • Verify MAC    │                 │\n│  │  • FV Mgmt      │              │  • FV Sync       │                 │\n│  │  • AES-CMAC     │              │  • Log Result    │                 │\n│  └─────────────────┘              └──────────────────┘                 │\n└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘\n                                │\n                    WSL2 ↔ Windows Network\n                                │\n┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐\n│                      Windows Host Machine                               │\n│                                                                         │\n│  ┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐   │\n│  │              Python UDP Bridge Server (udp_bridge.py)           │   │\n│  │  • Receives UDP → Decapsulates → CAN via python-can            │   │\n│  └─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘   │\n│                              │                                          │\n│  ┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐   │\n│  │                    CAN Visualization                             │   │\n│  │  • Wireshark with CAN dissector                                  │   │\n│  │  • Custom python-can dashboard                                   │   │\n│  └─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘   │\n└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘\n```\n\n## Quick Start\n\n### Prerequisites\n\n**Windows (Host):**\n```powershell\npip install python-can\n```\n\n**WSL2:**\n```bash\nsudo apt update\nsudo apt install build-essential cmake libmbedtls-dev\n```\n\n### Build\n\n```bash\n# Clone and navigate to project\ncd SecOC_Simulator\n\n# Build\nmkdir build && cd build\ncmake ..\nmake\n```\n\n### Run\n\n**Option A: WSL-to-WSL (Testing)**\n\n```bash\n# Terminal 1: Start Receiver\n./build/secoc_receiver\n\n# Terminal 2: Start Sender\n./build/secoc_sender\n```\n\n**Option B: WSL-to-Windows (Full Architecture)**\n\n```powershell\n# Terminal 1 (Windows): Start Python Bridge\npython python/udp_bridge.py\n```\n\n```bash\n# Terminal 2 (WSL): Start Sender\nexport WINDOWS_IP=$(./scripts/get_windows_ip.sh)\n./build/secoc_sender $WINDOWS_IP 5005\n```\n\n## Project Structure\n\n```\nSecOC_Simulator/\n├── CMakeLists.txt              # Build configuration\n├── README.md                   # This file\n├── ARCHITECTURE.md             # Detailed architecture documentation\n├── src/\n│   ├── common/\n│   │   ├── VirtualCANDriver.hpp/cpp    # UDP socket abstraction\n│   │   └── SecOCEngine.hpp/cpp         # SecOC logic (AES-CMAC, FV)\n│   ├── sender/\n│   │   └── SenderApp.cpp               # ECU simulator\n│   └── receiver/\n│       └── ReceiverApp.cpp             # Gateway simulator\n├── python/\n│   ├── udp_bridge.py           # UDP → CAN bridge server\n│   └── requirements.txt        # Python dependencies\n└── scripts/\n    └── get_windows_ip.sh       # Helper to find Windows host IP\n```\n\n## SecOC Profile 1 Specification\n\n### Frame Format\n\n```\n+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+\n|  Byte 0   1       2       3       4       5       6       7       |\n+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+\n|              PAYLOAD (N)           |  FV   |     MAC (3B)    |\n|        (Application Data)          | (1B)  |   (Truncated)   |\n+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+\n```\n\n### Parameters\n\n| Parameter | Value |\n|-----------|-------|\n| MAC Algorithm | AES-128-CMAC |\n| MAC Length | 24 bits (truncated) |\n| Freshness Value | 64-bit internal, 8-bit transmitted |\n| Data ID | 32-bit (included in MAC calculation) |\n\n## Configuration\n\n### Sender Application\n\n```bash\n./secoc_sender [target_ip] [port] [can_id]\n\n# Examples\n./secoc_sender                    # Defaults: 127.0.0.1:5005, CAN ID 0x100\n./secoc_sender 192.168.1.100      # Custom IP\n./secoc_sender 127.0.0.1 6000     # Custom port\n./secoc_sender 127.0.0.1 5005 0x200  # Custom CAN ID\n```\n\n### Receiver Application\n\n```bash\n./secoc_receiver [bind_ip] [port]\n\n# Examples\n./secoc_receiver                  # Defaults: 0.0.0.0:5005\n./secoc_receiver 0.0.0.0 6000     # Custom port\n```\n\n### Python UDP Bridge\n\n```bash\npython python/udp_bridge.py [port] [interface]\n\n# Examples\npython python/udp_bridge.py               # Default: port 5005, virtual bus\npython python/udp_bridge.py 6000          # Custom port\n```\n\n## WSL2 Networking\n\n### Finding Windows Host IP\n\nThe script `scripts/get_windows_ip.sh` helps find the Windows host IP from WSL2:\n\n```bash\n./scripts/get_windows_ip.sh\n\n# Output:\n# Windows Host IP: 172.60.0.1\n#\n# Usage in C++:\n#   ./secoc_sender 172.60.0.1 5005\n```\n\n### Why UDP?\n\nWSL2's default kernel lacks the `vcan` module. UDP tunneling provides:\n- Zero kernel modifications\n- Cross-platform integration (WSL ↔ Windows)\n- Portable code (standard BSD sockets)\n- Future hardware readiness (Python bridge → real CAN hardware)\n\n## Security Considerations\n\n⚠️ **Important Notes:**\n\n1. **Test Key**: The default key is all zeros - **never use in production**\n2. **MAC Truncation**: 24-bit MAC is weak by design (AUTOSAR trade-off)\n3. **No Replay Protection**: UDP transport doesn't prevent network-level replay\n4. **Key Management**: Never commit real AES keys to git\n\n## Development\n\n### Building with Debug Symbols\n\n```bash\ncmake -DCMAKE_BUILD_TYPE=Debug ..\nmake\n```\n\n### Generating Documentation (Doxygen)\n\n```bash\ncmake -DGENERATE_DOCS=ON ..\nmake docs\n# Documentation in build/docs/html/\n```\n\n### Running Tests\n\n```bash\ncmake -DBUILD_TESTS=ON ..\nmake\nctest\n```\n\n## Troubleshooting\n\n### \"Failed to bind to port 5005\"\n\nAnother process is using the port. Find and stop it:\n\n```bash\n# WSL\nsudo lsof -i :5005\n\n# Windows PowerShell\nnetstat -ano | findstr :5005\ntaskkill /PID <pid> /F\n```\n\n### \"Connection refused\"\n\nCheck Windows Firewall or ensure Python bridge is running:\n\n```powershell\n# Test UDP connectivity\nTest-NetConnection -ComputerName 127.0.0.1 -Port 5005\n```\n\n### \"mbedTLS not found\"\n\nInstall the library:\n\n```bash\nsudo apt install libmbedtls-dev\n```\n\n## Future Extensions\n\n| Feature | Description |\n|---------|-------------|\n| CAN-FD | Extended frame size support |\n| Persistence | FV storage to file (NVM simulation) |\n| Web UI | Real-time traffic dashboard |\n| Hardware Integration | Real CAN hardware via Python bridge |\n| TCP Transport | Reliable transport option |\n\n## References\n\n- [AUTOSAR SecOC Specification](https://www.autosar.org/)\n- [WSL2 Networking](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/wsl/networking)\n- [mbedTLS Documentation](https://tls.mbed.org/)\n- [python-can](https://python-can.readthedocs.io/)\n\n## License\n\nMIT License - See LICENSE file for details\n\n## Contributing\n\nContributions welcome! Please:\n1. Fork the repository\n2. Create a feature branch\n3. Make your changes\n4. Submit a pull request\n\n## Authors\n\nSecOC Simulator Team - 2025\n\n---\n\n**Built for learning, demonstrating, and understanding automotive cybersecurity.**",
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      "readme": "<p align=\"center\">\n  <small>Join the project community on our server!</small>\n  <br/><br/>\n  <a href=\"https://discord.gg/https://discord.gg/btZpkp45gQ\" target=\"_blank\" title=\"Join our community!\">\n    <img src=\"https://dcbadge.limes.pink/api/server/https://discord.gg/btZpkp45gQ\"/>\n  </a>\n</p>\n<hr/>\n\n<p align=\"center\">\n  <img alt=\"BetterCap\" src=\"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/bettercap/media/master/logo.png\" height=\"140\" />\n  <p align=\"center\">\n    <a href=\"https://github.com/bettercap/bettercap/releases/latest\"><img alt=\"Release\" src=\"https://img.shields.io/github/release/bettercap/bettercap.svg?style=flat-square\"></a>\n    <a href=\"https://github.com/bettercap/bettercap/blob/master/LICENSE.md\"><img alt=\"Software License\" src=\"https://img.shields.io/badge/license-GPL3-brightgreen.svg?style=flat-square\"></a>\n    <a href=\"https://github.com/bettercap/bettercap/actions/workflows/test-on-linux.yml\"><img alt=\"Tests on Linux\" src=\"https://github.com/bettercap/bettercap/actions/workflows/test-on-linux.yml/badge.svg\"></a>\n    <a href=\"https://github.com/bettercap/bettercap/actions/workflows/test-on-macos.yml\"><img alt=\"Tests on macOS\" src=\"https://github.com/bettercap/bettercap/actions/workflows/test-on-macos.yml/badge.svg\"></a>\n    <a href=\"https://github.com/bettercap/bettercap/actions/workflows/test-on-windows.yml\"><img alt=\"Tests on Windows\" src=\"https://github.com/bettercap/bettercap/actions/workflows/test-on-windows.yml/badge.svg\"></a>\n    <a href=\"https://hub.docker.com/r/bettercap/bettercap\"><img alt=\"Docker Hub\" src=\"https://img.shields.io/docker/v/bettercap/bettercap?logo=docker\"></a>\n    <img src=\"https://img.shields.io/badge/human-coded-brightgreen?logo=\" alt=\"This project is 100% made by humans.\"/>\n\n  </p>\n</p>\n\nbettercap is a powerful, easily extensible and portable framework written in Go which aims to offer to security researchers, red teamers and reverse engineers an **easy to use**, **all-in-one solution** with all the features they might possibly need for performing reconnaissance and attacking [WiFi](https://www.bettercap.org/modules/wifi/) networks, [Bluetooth Low Energy](https://www.bettercap.org/modules/ble/) devices, [CAN-bus](https://www.bettercap.org/modules/canbus/), wireless [HID](https://www.bettercap.org/modules/hid/) devices and [Ethernet](https://www.bettercap.org/modules/ethernet) networks.\n\n![UI](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/bettercap/media/master/ui-events.png)\n\n## Main Features\n\n* **WiFi** networks scanning, [deauthentication attack](https://www.evilsocket.net/2018/07/28/Project-PITA-Writeup-build-a-mini-mass-deauther-using-bettercap-and-a-Raspberry-Pi-Zero-W/), [clientless PMKID association attack](https://www.evilsocket.net/2019/02/13/Pwning-WiFi-networks-with-bettercap-and-the-PMKID-client-less-attack/) and automatic WPA/WPA2/WPA3 client handshakes capture.\n* **Bluetooth Low Energy** devices scanning, characteristics enumeration, reading and writing.\n* 2.4Ghz wireless devices scanning and **MouseJacking** attacks with over-the-air HID frames injection (with DuckyScript support).\n* **CAN-bus** and **DBC** support for decoding, injecting and fuzzing frames.\n* Passive and active IP network hosts probing and recon.\n* **ARP, DNS, NDP and DHCPv6 spoofers** for MITM attacks on IPv4 and IPv6 based networks.\n* **Proxies at packet level, TCP level and HTTP/HTTPS** application level fully scriptable with easy to implement **javascript plugins**.\n* A powerful **network sniffer** for **credentials harvesting** which can also be used as a **network protocol fuzzer**.\n* A very fast port scanner.\n* A powerful [REST API](https://www.bettercap.org/modules/core/api.rest/) with support for asynchronous events notification on websocket to orchestrate your attacks easily.\n* **A very convenient [web UI](https://www.bettercap.org/usage/web_ui/).**\n* [More!](https://www.bettercap.org/modules/)\n\n## Contributors\n\n<a href=\"https://github.com/bettercap/bettercap/graphs/contributors\">\n  <img src=\"https://contrib.rocks/image?repo=bettercap/bettercap\" alt=\"bettercap project contributors\" />\n</a>\n\n## License\n\n`bettercap` is made with ♥ and released under the GPL 3 license.\n\n## Stargazers over time\n\n[![Stargazers over time](https://starchart.cc/bettercap/bettercap.svg)](https://starchart.cc/bettercap/bettercap)",
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      "id": "github:akashblackhat/vehical-osint",
      "evidence_type": "repository",
      "record_type": "repository",
      "title": "**VehicleInfoGA** - Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) Tool for Vehicle Data Collection 🚗🔍",
      "full_name": "akashblackhat/vehical-osint",
      "name": "vehical-osint",
      "owner": "akashblackhat",
      "url": "https://github.com/akashblackhat/vehical-osint",
      "description": "🛠️ VehicleInfoGA - Powered by open-source contributors. Let's build a safer digital world! 🌍🔍",
      "readme": "# **VehicleInfoGA** - Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) Tool for Vehicle Data Collection 🚗🔍\n\n![photo_2024-11-13_16-22-32](https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/b2e796e4-7cf6-4a4f-946d-d28c7de3848c)\n\n\n## Unlock Hidden Vehicle Intelligence\n\nWelcome to **VehicleInfoGA**—an advanced tool designed to gather and analyze vehicle-related information from private sources . Whether you're investigating vehicles, tracking illicit activities, or conducting research, **VehicleInfoGA** offers powerful features to help you dig deep into the vehicle data.\n\n![photo_2024-11-13_16-41-52](https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/6039ed19-0b8a-4c04-8b02-538121871453)\n\n\n## Vehicle Information - VehicleInfoGA Demo 🚘\n```\nHere is the detailed vehicle information gathered:\n\n- **Vehicle ID**: *421604*\n- **RTO ID**: *694*\n- **Registration Number (Reg No.)**: *MH01DS2794*\n- **RTO Code**: *MH-01*\n- **Registration Authority**: *R.T.O.BORIVALI, Maharashtra*\n- **Chassis Number**: *MD2B65GX4LCE03440*\n- **Engine Number**: *JFXCLE05516*\n- **Registration Date**: *3/9/2020*\n- **Manufacturer**: *BAJAJ*\n- **Vehicle Name**: *DOMINAR*\n- **Vehicle Type**: *TwoWheeler*\n- **Vehicle Variant**: *250 BS6(248 cc)*\n- **Fuel Type**: *PETROL*\n- **Cubic Capacity**: *248 cc*\n- **Seat Capacity**: *2 seats*\n- **Vehicle Class**: *M-Cycle/Scooter (2WN)*\n### **Owner Information** (Redacted for Privacy)\n- **Owner Name**: *[REDACTED]*\n- **Owner's Father's Name**: *[REDACTED]*\n- **Financer Name**: *[REDACTED]*\n- **Insurance Company Name**: *THE NEW INDIA ASSURANCE CO. LTD.*\n- **Insurance Policy Number**: *[REDACTED]*\n- **Insurance Valid Upto**: *19/8/2025*\n- **Insurance Expired**: *No*\n\n### **Address Information** (Redacted for Privacy)\n- **Present Address**: *[REDACTED]*\n- **Permanent Address**: *[REDACTED]*\n- **PIN Code**: *400066*\n### **Mobile Number** (Redacted for Privacy)\n- **Mobile Number**: *[REDACTED]*\n\n**Note**: This data was last updated on *27-09-2024* at *06:55:11*.\n\n```\n\n\n## Contact Us 📧\n\n@akashblackhat\n\nHave questions or want to contribute? Reach out to us on Instagram: AkashBlackhat [https://www.instagram.com/akashblackhat/]\n\nDM to BUY : Price { Affordable }\n\n## Disclaimer ⚠️\n\nThis tool is strictly for educational and testing purposes only. Use responsibly and ensure you adhere to all legal requirements when accessing and interacting with online vehicle-related data. 🚫\n\n## Warning ⚠️\nThis tool is just for Educational and Testing Purposes .\n\n**Happy Hacking ( Privacy & Security No Such Things Exists in digital World, We Can Hack Everything )**",
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        "car",
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      "description": "Hands-on automotive cybersecurity projects including UDS, CAN bus IDS, DoIP, SOME/IP fuzzing, and ISO 21434 TARA examples.",
      "readme": "# Automotive-Cybersecurity-Projects\n\n\nThis repository contains a collection of practical, hands-on automotive cybersecurity projects developed to demonstrate skills across vehicle networking, diagnostics, threat modelling, embedded security, and automotive communication protocols.\n\nThese projects are highly relevant to roles in:\n\n* Automotive Cybersecurity Engineering\n\n* Embedded Security Engineering\n\n* AUTOSAR Security\n\n* ECU Development\n\n* Cyber-Physical Systems\n\n* Automotive R&D\n\nEach project is self-contained and includes documentation, code, and example outputs.\n\n📁 Projects Included\n-----------------------------------------------------------------\n1. UDS Security Access Tool\n   STATUS: Completed ✅\n\n**Folder:** `uds-security-access-tool/`\n**Docs:** See the `README.md` inside the project folder.\n\nA Python implementation of key UDS routines over UDP (educational transport), including:\n\n- **0x10 Diagnostic Session Control**\n- **0x27 SecurityAccess (Seed/Key)**: Level 1 + Level 2\n- **Session restriction for SecurityAccess** → NRC `0x22`\n- **Brute-force & lockout protections**\n  - Invalid key → NRC `0x35`\n  - Exceeded attempts → NRC `0x36`\n  - Required time delay not expired → NRC `0x37`\n\nDemonstrates understanding of **seed/key flows**, **ECU state machines**, and **basic protection behaviors**.\n\n---\n\n 2. CAN Bus Intrusion Detection System (IDS)\n    STATUS: In Progress\n\nA lightweight IDS that analyses CAN traffic logs and detects anomalies using statistical methods and simple ML-based techniques. Demonstrates vehicle network security fundamentals.\n\nFolder: can-bus-ids/\n\n 3. DoIP ECU Discovery Tool\n    STATUS: Planned\n\nA simple Diagnostics over IP (DoIP) scanner for discovering ECUs over automotive Ethernet and parsing diagnostic headers. Shows experience with modern automotive communication protocols.\n\nFolder: doip-scanner/\n\n 4. SOME/IP Fuzzing Tool\n    STATUS: Planned\n\nA Python-based fuzzer for SOME/IP, targeting service discovery and message structures. Useful for demonstrating automotive network security assessment techniques.\n\nFolder: someip-fuzzer/\n\n 5. ISO 21434 TARA Example\n    STATUS: In Progress\n\nA complete cybersecurity Threat Analysis & Risk Assessment (TARA) using the HEAVENS 2.0 methodology. Shows familiarity with cybersecurity processes and automotive standards.\n\nFolder: iso21434-tara/\n\n\n🔧 Tech Stack\n-----------------------------------------------------------------\n* Python (data parsing, automation, prototyping)\n\n* CAN bus tooling (python-can, cantools)\n\n* Networking (UDP/TCP, DoIP, SOME/IP)\n\n* ISO 21434 cybersecurity processes\n\n* Basic ML for anomaly detection\n\n\n🎯 Goals\n-----------------------------------------------------------------\n* Build a strong foundation in automotive cybersecurity\n\n* Demonstrate hands-on capability to employers\n\n* Create a portfolio of practical, industry-relevant work\n\n* Prepare for advanced topics (embedded security, AV security, adversarial ML)\n\n* Document learning in an organised, professional way\n\n📫 Author\n-----------------------------------------------------------------\nBahieradan\n\nAutomotive Cybersecurity & Embedded Systems Engineer\n\nLinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/bahieradan/",
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      "readme": "# 🚗 AutoShield-CAN IDS\n### Automotive CAN Bus Intrusion Detection System\n\n![Python](https://img.shields.io/badge/Python-3.10+-3776AB?style=flat&logo=python&logoColor=white)\n![Standard](https://img.shields.io/badge/Standard-ISO%2021434-1D9E75?style=flat)\n![License](https://img.shields.io/badge/License-MIT-blue?style=flat)\n![Platform](https://img.shields.io/badge/Platform-Windows%20%7C%20Linux%20%7C%20macOS-lightgrey?style=flat)\n\nA Python-based automotive **Intrusion Detection and Prevention System (IDPS)** prototype that simulates a vehicle's CAN bus network, injects real-world cyber attacks, and detects them in real time using a two-layer detection engine — aligned with **ISO/SAE 21434** automotive cybersecurity requirements.\n\n---\n\n## 📸 Demo\n\n```\n🚗  CAN Bus Intrusion Detection System\nUptime: 14s  │  Frames: 4,894  │  Alerts: 1,733\n\nECU Traffic Monitor          Live Alert Feed\n──────────────────────       ─────────────────────────────────────────────────\n0x0C0  Engine ECU   ● ACTIVE  18:21:38  CRITICAL  FLOODING  0x000  Bus dominated (41%)\n0x1A0  Brake ECU    ● ACTIVE  18:21:38  HIGH      FUZZING   0x2B0  byte[0]=255 Z=355.7\n0x2B0  Steering ECU ● ACTIVE  18:21:38  HIGH      SPOOFING  0x0C0  Rate 284/s (×2.8)\n0x1F0  Transmission ● ACTIVE  18:21:38  HIGH      REPLAY    0x4B0  Identical frame ×3\n0x4B0  Body Control ● ACTIVE  18:21:38  HIGH      FUZZING   0x1A0  Z-score anomaly\n\nDetection Summary\n  FLOODING   196  ████████████\n  SPOOFING     9  █████\n  FUZZING   3374  ████████████████████\n  REPLAY     221  ██████████\n  Bus rate: 319 fps   Injected: 15.2%\n```\n\n---\n\n## 🎯 What This Project Demonstrates\n\n| Skill | How it's demonstrated |\n|---|---|\n| **CAN Bus protocol** | ISO 11898-compliant frame modelling, signal encoding, DLC, arbitration |\n| **Automotive ECU simulation** | 5 ECUs with real cycle times, signal ranges, byte-level encoding |\n| **Threat modelling** | ISO 21434 TARA with CVSS scoring across 4 threat scenarios |\n| **Attack simulation** | Replay, Fuzzing, Spoofing, Flooding — each targeting a real CAN weakness |\n| **Intrusion detection** | Rule-based (5 rules) + Statistical (Z-score) two-layer IDS |\n| **AUTOSAR awareness** | Architecture mirrors AUTOSAR IdsM component separation |\n\n---\n\n## 🏗️ System Architecture\n\n```\n┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐\n│                    ECU Layer                            │\n│  [Engine 0x0C0] [Brake 0x1A0] [Steering 0x2B0]        │\n│  [Transmission 0x1F0]  [Body Control 0x4B0]            │\n└──────────────────────┬──────────────────────────────────┘\n                       │ CAN frames (11-bit ID, 0–8 bytes)\n┌──────────────────────▼──────────────────────────────────┐\n│           Virtual CAN Bus (500 kbps)                    │\n│        Thread-safe queue · Broadcast medium             │\n└────────┬─────────────────────────┬───────────────────────┘\n         │                         │\n┌────────▼────────┐    ┌───────────▼──────────────────────┐\n│  Attack Engine  │    │        IDS Engine                │\n│  ─────────────  │    │  ──────────────────────────────  │\n│  Replay         │    │  Layer 1: Rule-based detector    │\n│  Fuzzing        │    │    R1 Frequency  R2 Duplicate    │\n│  Spoofing       │    │    R3 Payload    R4 Unknown ID   │\n│  Flooding       │    │    R5 Bus domination             │\n└─────────────────┘    │  Layer 2: Statistical (Z-score)  │\n                       │    Training → Baseline → Detect  │\n                       └───────────────┬──────────────────┘\n                                       │ Alerts\n                       ┌───────────────▼──────────────────┐\n                       │      Live Terminal Dashboard      │\n                       │   Rich · Real-time · Color-coded │\n                       └──────────────────────────────────┘\n```\n\n---\n\n## ⚔️ Attack Scenarios Simulated\n\n### 1. Replay Attack\n**CAN weakness exploited:** No sequence numbers, no timestamps\n**Scenario:** Capture a door-unlock frame (0x4B0), replay it remotely to unlock the vehicle\n**Detection:** Rule R2 — identical frame fingerprint seen ≥ 3× in sliding window\n**CVSS:** 7.1 (High)\n\n### 2. Fuzzing Attack\n**CAN weakness exploited:** No payload validation at protocol level\n**Scenario:** Inject random/boundary-value payloads into Brake (0x1A0) and Steering (0x2B0) ECUs\n**Detection:** Rule R3 (range check) + Statistical Z-score > 3.5 on payload bytes\n**CVSS:** 9.1 (Critical)\n\n### 3. ID Spoofing Attack\n**CAN weakness exploited:** No sender authentication — any node can use any ID\n**Scenario:** Impersonate Engine ECU (0x0C0), report RPM=0 (fake stall) at speed\n**Detection:** Rule R1 (rate doubles) + timing anomaly detection\n**CVSS:** 9.3 (Critical)\n**Real incident:** 2015 Jeep Cherokee remote hack used this exact technique\n\n### 4. Bus Flooding / DoS\n**CAN weakness exploited:** Priority-based arbitration — ID 0x000 wins every contest\n**Scenario:** Saturate bus with ID 0x000 frames, starving ABS and airbag messages\n**Detection:** Rule R5 (bus domination >40%) + Rule R1 (rate threshold)\n**CVSS:** 8.6 (High)\n\n---\n\n## 🛡️ IDS Detection Architecture\n\n### Layer 1 — Rule-Based Detector\nDeterministic rules with zero latency. 100% recall on known attack patterns.\n\n| Rule | Logic | Attack Detected |\n|---|---|---|\n| R1 — Frequency | Rate > 2.5× baseline for any CAN ID | Flooding, Spoofing |\n| R2 — Duplicate | Identical frame seen ≥ 3× in window | Replay |\n| R3 — Payload Range | Signal value outside physical range | Fuzzing |\n| R4 — Unknown ID | CAN ID not in known ECU whitelist | Rogue node |\n| R5 — Bus Domination | Single ID > 40% of all traffic | Flooding |\n\n### Layer 2 — Statistical Anomaly Detector\nLearns normal behaviour during a 5-second training phase, then uses Z-score analysis to detect deviations.\n\n```\nZ = |observed - mean| / stddev\n\nZ > 4.0  → Timing anomaly    (flooding, rate attack)\nZ > 3.5  → Payload anomaly   (fuzzing, spoofing)\n```\n\n---\n\n## 📁 Project Structure\n\n```\ncan_ids_project/\n├── run_dashboard.py          ← MAIN DEMO — run this\n├── run_simulator.py          ← Test: ECU simulator only\n├── run_attacks.py            ← Test: Attack engine only\n├── run_ids.py                ← Test: IDS engine only\n│\n├── simulator/\n│   ├── can_frame.py          ← ISO 11898 CAN frame dataclass\n│   ├── ecu_nodes.py          ← 5 ECU implementations\n│   └── virtual_can_bus.py    ← Shared bus medium (threaded)\n│\n├── attacker/\n│   └── attack_engine.py      ← 4 attack classes + orchestrator\n│\n├── detector/\n│   └── ids_detector.py       ← Rule-based + Statistical IDS\n│\n├── dashboard/\n│   └── live_dashboard.py     ← Rich terminal UI\n│\n└── docs/\n    └── AutoShield_CAN_IDS_TARA.docx  ← ISO 21434 TARA document\n```\n\n---\n\n## 🚀 Quick Start\n\n### Prerequisites\n```bash\nPython 3.10+\n```\n\n### Installation\n```bash\ngit clone https://github.com/Janani2436/CAN-Bus-Intrusion-Detection-System.git\ncd CAN-Bus-Intrusion-Detection-System\npip install python-can rich numpy\n```\n\n### Run the full demo\n```bash\npython run_dashboard.py\n```\n\n**What happens:**\n1. Vehicle CAN network starts (5 ECUs, 500 kbps)\n2. IDS trains on normal traffic for 5 seconds\n3. All 4 attacks run automatically\n4. Live dashboard shows detections in real time\n5. Final detection report printed\n\n### Run individual modules\n```bash\npython run_simulator.py   # ECU simulator only\npython run_attacks.py     # Attack engine demo\npython run_ids.py         # IDS without dashboard\n```\n\n---\n\n## 📊 Sample Results\n\n```\nFrames analyzed : 6,350\nTotal alerts    : 3,800\nTrained ECU IDs : 6\nUptime          : 18.1s\n\nAlert breakdown:\n  REPLAY      221\n  FLOODING    196\n  FUZZING    3374\n  SPOOFING      9\n\nAttack frames injected : 649  (15.2% of total traffic)\nNormal frames          : 5701 (84.8% of total traffic)\n```\n\n---\n\n## 📋 ISO 21434 Alignment\n\nThis project was developed following ISO/SAE 21434:2021 methodology:\n\n- **TARA completed** before implementation (see `/docs`)\n- **Asset identification** — 6 assets across 5 ECU nodes\n- **Threat enumeration** — 4 threats from UNECE WP.29 catalogue\n- **Risk scoring** — CVSS v3.1 for each threat (range: 7.1–9.3)\n- **Detection controls** mapped to each identified threat\n- **Mitigation recommendations** per ISO 21434 §15 and AUTOSAR SecOC\n\n---\n\n## 🔧 Tech Stack\n\n| Component | Technology | Purpose |\n|---|---|---|\n| Language | Python 3.10+ | Core implementation |\n| CAN interface | python-can | Virtual bus abstraction |\n| Dashboard | Rich | Live terminal UI |\n| Statistics | NumPy / statistics | Z-score anomaly detection |\n| Threading | threading | Concurrent ECU simulation |\n| Documentation | ISO 21434 TARA | Threat modelling |\n\n---\n\n## 🔮 Future Enhancements\n\n- [ ] Machine learning detection (LSTM autoencoder for sequence anomalies)\n- [ ] CAN-FD support (up to 64-byte payload, 8 Mbps)\n- [ ] Real hardware integration (Peak PCAN, Kvaser)\n- [ ] OBD-II attack surface simulation\n- [ ] UDS (Unified Diagnostic Services) protocol layer\n- [ ] SecOC (Secure Onboard Communication) demonstration\n\n---\n\n## 📚 References\n\n- ISO/SAE 21434:2021 — Road Vehicles Cybersecurity Engineering\n- UNECE WP.29 R155 — Cybersecurity Management System\n- ISO 11898 — CAN Bus Standard\n- AUTOSAR IdsM — Intrusion Detection System Manager\n- Miller & Valasek (2015) — Remote Exploitation of an Unaltered Passenger Vehicle\n\n---\n\n## 👤 Author\n\n**Janani**\nAutomotive Cybersecurity | Embedded Systems | Python\n\n---",
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      "description": "The report \"Global In-Vehicle Infotainment Market, By Vehicle Type (Passenger Cars and Commercial Vehicles), By Device Type (Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, and Long Term Evolution (LTE)), By Technology (Embedded Telematics, Tethered Telematics, and Integrated Telematics), and By Region (North America, Europe, Asia Pacific, Latin America, and Middle East & Africa) - Trends, Analysis and Forecast till 2030. High demand for rear-seat entertainment and smart cars coupled with a high rate of adoption of infotainment technology are the factors driving the growth of the global in-vehicle infotainment market. In the era of mobile phones and computers, customers demand more human-machine interface and low power usage from automobiles. To meet this needs of consumers, infotainment technology plays an important role in serving out with the best solutions for customers. Companies are focusing on various developments such as the Windows Embedded Automotive 7 platform developed by Microsoft and Atom processor developed by Intel to integrate infotainment systems. A majority of automobile vendors are involved in adopting various techniques and technologies for the transformation of regular cars into smart cars. In-vehicle infotainment systems utilize Bluetooth technology for drivers to control the system with touchscreen input, voice commands, or physical controls. Several automotive component dealers are incorporating existing vehicle navigation systems with mobile phones. In-vehicle infotainment systems offer best quality rear-seat entertainment services such as video, audio, as well as technologies that can assist the driver, thus boosting the growth of the target market. Key Highlights: In July 2019, Karamba Security, a world leader in automotive and enterprise edge cybersecurity, has declared the signing of a production agreement of its leading Carwall runtime integrity software, in Alpine infotainment systems. The platform offers ECU self-protection against remote code execution (RCE), serving to protect vehicles from cyberattacks. Key Market Insights from the report: The global in-vehicle infotainment market accounted for US$ 5.2 Billion in 2022 and is projected to register a moderate CAGR over the forecast period. The market report has been segmented based on vehicle type, device type, technology, and region. By vehicle type, the commercial type segment is projected to estimate for a significant share in terms of revenue and is anticipated to maintain its position over the forecast period. By device type, the global market is segmented into Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, and long term evolution (LTE)) By technology, embedded telematics segment is expected to be the largest in-vehicle infotainment market, owing to various disruptive factors such as cost optimization of service plans and government mandates. Most of the security and safety in-vehicle infotainment services have low or no access without an embedded form type in the car. By region, The North America market is projected to expand owing to the presence of strong players and advances in the technology of in-vehicle infotainment systems in the region. Browse 60 market data tables* and 35 figures* through 140 slides and in-depth TOC on “Global In-Vehicle Infotainment Market”, By Vehicle Type (Passenger Cars and Commercial Vehicles), By Device Type (Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, and Long Term Evolution (LTE)), By Technology (Embedded Telematics, Tethered Telematics, and Integrated Telematics), and By Region (North America, Europe, Asia Pacific, Latin America, and Middle East & Africa) - Trends, Analysis and Forecast till 2030 To know the upcoming trends and insights prevalent in this market, click the link below: Link: https://prophecymarketinsights.com/market_insight/Global-InVehicle-Infotainment-Market-By-4026 The prominent player operating in the global in-vehicle infotainment market includes Alpine Electronics Inc., Clarion Technologies, Mitsubishi Electric Corporation, Qualcomm Incorporated, Continental AG, Panasonic Corporation, Denso Corporation, Garmin Ltd., Harman International Industries, Inc., and Pioneer Corporation.",
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      "description": "Hyundai Bluelink — independent third-party profile of a public API surface, by API Evangelist. Hyundai Bluelink is Hyundai Motor America's connected vehicle service for Hyundai owners, providing remote vehicle control, vehicle status and diagnostics, navigation and route services, safety and security features, and EV-specific charging and climate m",
      "readme": "# Hyundai Bluelink\n\n<!-- API-EVANGELIST-PROVENANCE:BEGIN -->\n> ### About this repository\n>\n> **This is not our API.** This repository is an independent, third-party profile of a company's\n> **publicly available** API surface, maintained by [API Evangelist](https://apievangelist.com).\n> API Evangelist does not operate, host, resell, or support this company's APIs, and is not\n> affiliated with or endorsed by the company unless stated on the profile.\n>\n> **Where the information came from.** Everything here is assembled from material a member of the\n> public can reach with a browser and no credentials — the company's own website, developer portal\n> and documentation, the specifications it publishes for public use (OpenAPI, AsyncAPI, JSON Schema,\n> `apis.json`, `llms.txt` and similar), its public repositories, and its public status, pricing and\n> changelog pages. **Nothing here is obtained by breaching a system, defeating an access control, or\n> using credentials of any kind.**\n>\n> **The rating is an independent assessment.** The Kin Score and Agent Readiness rating are\n> independently calculated scores of a company's *public* API artifacts, produced by API Evangelist\n> against a published rubric. They are not certifications, endorsements, security assessments, or\n> audits, and they score published artifacts — not the quality, safety, or security of the software.\n>\n> **Corrections, re-scores, and removal are free.** No partnership, contract, or purchase is\n> required, and you do not need to justify the request.\n>\n> - **Something wrong?** Open an issue on this repository, or email\n>   [info@apievangelist.com](mailto:info@apievangelist.com).\n> - **Published something new?** Ask for a re-score and we will re-run the rating.\n> - **Want the listing taken down?** Say so and we will honor it. The profile is reduced to your\n>   company name, a factual description, and a link to your own site, and the company is recorded as\n>   **unrated** — never scored zero for having asked.\n>\n> **Response times.** Acknowledgement within **one business day**; removal or restriction within\n> **two business days**; corrections and re-scores within **five business days**.\n>\n> **Not from the company, and here with a question?** You are welcome here — we would rather be the\n> front line and point you the right way than have a good report go nowhere. What this repository\n> can answer is narrow, though, so it is worth knowing who you are actually looking for:\n>\n> - **A question about how the API works, an account, billing, or a bug in the service** — that is\n>   the company's own support, not us. We profile this API; we do not operate it and cannot see\n>   your account.\n> - **A bug in an open-source project we only catalog** — file it on that project's own repository.\n>   This has happened with a real and correct bug report that reached us instead of the people who\n>   could fix it, which helped nobody.\n> - **Anything about this listing itself** — the description, the tags, the rating, a missing or\n>   wrong artifact — is ours. Open an issue here.\n> - **Not sure, or something general about API Evangelist or APIs.io** — open an issue on the\n>   [APIs.io Inbox](https://github.com/api-search/inbox) and we will route it.\n>\n> **This repository contains no software, and we will never ask you to download anything.** There is\n> no build, release, installer, or binary here — only text and machine-readable API descriptions, so\n> there is nothing here that can be \"corrupt\" or need \"repairing\". Any issue, comment, or email\n> claiming otherwise and offering a download link is not from us and is hostile. Do not follow the\n> link; it is a lure. Report it to GitHub and, if you like, tell us at\n> [info@apievangelist.com](mailto:info@apievangelist.com) so we can take it down.\n>\n> **On a security or compliance team?** Email\n> [info@apievangelist.com](mailto:info@apievangelist.com) with *security* in the subject line and\n> you will get a person, not a form. We will tell you exactly which public URLs this profile was\n> built from so your team can see the same surface we did, and we will take the listing down on\n> request while you work through it.\n>\n> Full detail: **[Where this data comes from](https://apievangelist.com/about/where-our-data-comes-from)**\n<!-- API-EVANGELIST-PROVENANCE:END -->\n\nHyundai Bluelink is Hyundai Motor America's connected vehicle service for Hyundai owners, providing remote vehicle control, vehicle status and diagnostics, navigation and route services, safety and security features, and EV-specific charging and climate management. Bluelink is delivered to owners through the MyHyundai with Bluelink mobile app (iOS and Android), the in-vehicle infotainment head unit, the owner web portal at owners.hyundaiusa.com, and connected smart-home and voice integrations (Amazon Alexa, Google Assistant, smartwatch apps). Feature sets vary by model year and subscription tier — typically Bluelink, Bluelink+, and Bluelink Connected Care / Remote / Guidance bundles — and include remote start with climate, remote door lock/unlock, remote horn and lights, vehicle finder, stolen vehicle recovery and SVI, automatic collision notification, SOS emergency assistance, monthly vehicle health reports, destination search (powered by Google), in-vehicle Wi-Fi hotspot (via AT&T on supported models), and EV-specific remote charge start/stop, charge schedule, charge-level monitoring, and pre-conditioning. Bluelink is a consumer-facing, owner-authenticated service. Hyundai does not publish a public developer portal, public OpenAPI specification, or self-serve API keys for third-party integration with Bluelink vehicle endpoints; access is limited to authenticated owners through Hyundai's first-party apps and to enterprise partners under contract (fleet, insurance telematics, charging networks, smart-home platforms). A community ecosystem of reverse-engineered, unofficial Python and Node.js clients (Hyundai-Kia-Connect/hyundai_kia_connect_api, Home Assistant integrations, Bluelinky) is used by enthusiasts and home automation users, but these are not endorsed, supported, or governed by Hyundai and may break at any time.\n\n**Areas:** Connected Vehicles · Telematics · Automotive · Remote Vehicle Control · Vehicle Diagnostics · Electric Vehicles · EV Charging · Stolen Vehicle Recovery · Automatic Collision Notification · Roadside Assistance · In-Vehicle Wi-Fi · Navigation\n\n## Hyundai Bluelink on APIs.io\n\nEverything profiled for Hyundai Bluelink is published on APIs.io rather than in this repository. Start at the provider page — **[apis.io/providers/hyundai-bluelink/](https://apis.io/providers/hyundai-bluelink/)** — or go straight to one of the APIs or properties below.\n\n### Published properties\n\nEach property below is a page on APIs.io carrying the machine-readable artifact and what it says.\n\n#### Security (1)\n\nAuthentication, trust centre, and vulnerability disclosure.\n\n- [Hyundai Bluelink Domain Security](https://apis.io/security/hyundai-bluelink/hyundai-bluelink-domain-security/)\n\n## Where to find this API\n\nLinks to the company's own pages. This repository publishes no copy of their specifications — the canonical document is theirs and lives at the URLs below.\n\n- [Website](https://owners.hyundaiusa.com/us/en/bluelink.html)\n- [Privacy policy](https://www.hyundaiusa.com/us/en/privacy-policy)\n\n## API Evangelist rating\n\n**Kin Score 3.7** — minimal · rubric 0.24.0 · scored 2026-10-17\n\n| Facet | Score |\n|---|---|\n| Discoverability | 49.1 |\n| Contract quality | 0.0 |\n| Contract governance | 0.0 |\n| Operational transparency | 0.0 |\n| Developer ergonomics | 0.0 |\n| Access clarity | 0.0 |\n\n**Agent readiness 0.0** — human-only\n\n| Agent-readiness dimension | Result |\n|---|---|\n| Spec Presence | — |\n| Agentic Access | — |\n| Reversibility Documented | — |\n| MCP Server | — |\n| Auth Clarity | — |\n| Idempotency | — |\n| Error Semantics | — |\n| OpenAPI Examples | — |\n| Rate Limit Signal | — |\n| Event Surface Described | — |\n| Agent Skills | — |\n| Well Known Catalog | — |\n| Consent Identity | — |\n| Agent Card | — |\n| Dry Run Mode | — |\n| Delegated Identity | — |\n| Protected Resource Metadata | — |\n| Dynamic Client Registration | — |\n| Agentic Commerce | — |\n\n**Regulatory alignment 4.9** — Energy & Utilities\n\nThe rubric is published at [github.com/api-evangelist/kin-score](https://github.com/api-evangelist/kin-score). The per-check breakdown behind these numbers — which checks were earned, partial or missed — along with score history and how this provider compares to its peers, is available at [apis.io/providers/hyundai-bluelink/](https://apis.io/providers/hyundai-bluelink/).\n\n## How this profile is made\n\nAPI Evangelist profiles a company's public API surface the way a developer would find it: the website, developer portal and documentation, the specifications it publishes, its public repositories, and its pricing, status and changelog pages. From that it derives the properties above — contracts split per API, workflows, schemas, collections, governance rules, plans and rate limits — and scores them against the published [Kin Score rubric](https://github.com/api-evangelist/kin-score).\n\nThe artifacts are published on [APIs.io](https://apis.io), not in this repository. This repository is the public record for Hyundai Bluelink: the place to say something is wrong, missing or out of date, and to ask for a re-score or a removal.\n\n## Open an issue\n\n- **Something about this listing** — a wrong description, a missing API, a stale artifact or a question about the rating: [open an issue on this repository](https://github.com/api-evangelist/hyundai-bluelink/issues/new).\n- **A new API, or one that is not in the catalog yet** — [submit it on APIs.io](https://apis.io/add/).\n- **Anything else** — [the APIs.io inbox](https://github.com/api-search/inbox/issues/new) or [info@apievangelist.com](mailto:info@apievangelist.com).",
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      "description": "This repository contains reverse engineering results and resources for a few specific car models of a very specific car manufacturer. Please don't sue.",
      "readme": "# Automotive Security Research\n\n![Alt text](/.res/logo.png?raw=true \"Hax\")\n\nThis repository contains reverse engineering results and resources for a few specific car models.\n\n## Index\n\n- [Slides of my talk @ BSides Stuttgart 2019](slides_bsidesSTR_2019.pdf)\n- [helpers](helpers): Contains two simple Python PoCs that demonstrate how to read CAN data and how to scan a CAN bus for UDS security access.\n- [keys](keys): Contains ECU keys extracted from manufacturer software using IDA. You can guess the manufacturers by reading the file names.\n- [misc](misc): You can find the partial CAN matrix of various cars and CAN protocol information in there\n- [model 6](model-6): Contains all data of a very specific car I gathered by reverse engineering. You can find code to set the displayed speed on the speedometer via the CAN bus there. Also, there are various CAN dumps and a wiring diagram which are useful for further analysis.\n- [model 8](model-8): Same as above but for a different model of the same manufacturer.\n- [paper.pdf](paper.pdf): Redacted version of a car hacking paper *someone* wrote. German only, sorry <:",
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      "description": "Poole, Mackworth & Goebel 1998, p. 1. Russell & Norvig 2003, p. 55. Definition of AI as the study of intelligent agents: Poole, Mackworth & Goebel (1998), which provides the version that is used in this article. These authors use the term \"computational intelligence\" as a synonym for artificial intelligence.[1] Russell & Norvig (2003) (who prefer the term \"rational agent\") and write \"The whole-agent view is now widely accepted in the field\".[2] Nilsson 1998 Legg & Hutter 2007 Russell & Norvig 2009, p. 2. McCorduck 2004, p. 204 Maloof, Mark. \"Artificial Intelligence: An Introduction, p. 37\" (PDF). georgetown.edu. Archived (PDF) from the original on 25 August 2018. \"How AI Is Getting Groundbreaking Changes In Talent Management And HR Tech\". Hackernoon. Archived from the original on 11 September 2019. Retrieved 14 February 2020. Schank, Roger C. (1991). \"Where's the AI\". AI magazine. Vol. 12 no. 4. p. 38. Russell & Norvig 2009. \"AlphaGo – Google DeepMind\". Archived from the original on 10 March 2016. Allen, Gregory (April 2020). \"Department of Defense Joint AI Center - Understanding AI Technology\" (PDF). AI.mil - The official site of the Department of Defense Joint Artificial Intelligence Center. Archived (PDF) from the original on 21 April 2020. Retrieved 25 April 2020. Optimism of early AI: * Herbert Simon quote: Simon 1965, p. 96 quoted in Crevier 1993, p. 109. * Marvin Minsky quote: Minsky 1967, p. 2 quoted in Crevier 1993, p. 109. Boom of the 1980s: rise of expert systems, Fifth Generation Project, Alvey, MCC, SCI: * McCorduck 2004, pp. 426–441 * Crevier 1993, pp. 161–162,197–203, 211, 240 * Russell & Norvig 2003, p. 24 * NRC 1999, pp. 210–211 * Newquist 1994, pp. 235–248 First AI Winter, Mansfield Amendment, Lighthill report * Crevier 1993, pp. 115–117 * Russell & Norvig 2003, p. 22 * NRC 1999, pp. 212–213 * Howe 1994 * Newquist 1994, pp. 189–201 Second AI winter: * McCorduck 2004, pp. 430–435 * Crevier 1993, pp. 209–210 * NRC 1999, pp. 214–216 * Newquist 1994, pp. 301–318 AI becomes hugely successful in the early 21st century * Clark 2015 Pamela McCorduck (2004, p. 424) writes of \"the rough shattering of AI in subfields—vision, natural language, decision theory, genetic algorithms, robotics ... and these with own sub-subfield—that would hardly have anything to say to each other.\" This list of intelligent traits is based on the topics covered by the major AI textbooks, including: * Russell & Norvig 2003 * Luger & Stubblefield 2004 * Poole, Mackworth & Goebel 1998 * Nilsson 1998 Kolata 1982. Maker 2006. Biological intelligence vs. intelligence in general: Russell & Norvig 2003, pp. 2–3, who make the analogy with aeronautical engineering. McCorduck 2004, pp. 100–101, who writes that there are \"two major branches of artificial intelligence: one aimed at producing intelligent behavior regardless of how it was accomplished, and the other aimed at modeling intelligent processes found in nature, particularly human ones.\" Kolata 1982, a paper in Science, which describes McCarthy's indifference to biological models. Kolata quotes McCarthy as writing: \"This is AI, so we don't care if it's psychologically real\".[19] McCarthy recently reiterated his position at the AI@50 conference where he said \"Artificial intelligence is not, by definition, simulation of human intelligence\".[20]. Neats vs. scruffies: * McCorduck 2004, pp. 421–424, 486–489 * Crevier 1993, p. 168 * Nilsson 1983, pp. 10–11 Symbolic vs. sub-symbolic AI: * Nilsson (1998, p. 7), who uses the term \"sub-symbolic\". General intelligence (strong AI) is discussed in popular introductions to AI: * Kurzweil 1999 and Kurzweil 2005 See the Dartmouth proposal, under Philosophy, below. McCorduck 2004, p. 34. McCorduck 2004, p. xviii. McCorduck 2004, p. 3. McCorduck 2004, pp. 340–400. This is a central idea of Pamela McCorduck's Machines Who Think. She writes: \"I like to think of artificial intelligence as the scientific apotheosis of a venerable cultural tradition.\"[26] \"Artificial intelligence in one form or another is an idea that has pervaded Western intellectual history, a dream in urgent need of being realized.\"[27] \"Our history is full of attempts—nutty, eerie, comical, earnest, legendary and real—to make artificial intelligences, to reproduce what is the essential us—bypassing the ordinary means. Back and forth between myth and reality, our imaginations supplying what our workshops couldn't, we have engaged for a long time in this odd form of self-reproduction.\"[28] She traces the desire back to its Hellenistic roots and calls it the urge to \"forge the Gods.\"[29] \"Stephen Hawking believes AI could be mankind's last accomplishment\". BetaNews. 21 October 2016. Archived from the original on 28 August 2017. Lombardo P, Boehm I, Nairz K (2020). \"RadioComics – Santa Claus and the future of radiology\". Eur J Radiol. 122 (1): 108771. doi:10.1016/j.ejrad.2019.108771. PMID 31835078. Ford, Martin; Colvin, Geoff (6 September 2015). \"Will robots create more jobs than they destroy?\". The Guardian. Archived from the original on 16 June 2018. Retrieved 13 January 2018. AI applications widely used behind the scenes: * Russell & Norvig 2003, p. 28 * Kurzweil 2005, p. 265 * NRC 1999, pp. 216–222 * Newquist 1994, pp. 189–201 AI in myth: * McCorduck 2004, pp. 4–5 * Russell & Norvig 2003, p. 939 AI in early science fiction. * McCorduck 2004, pp. 17–25 Formal reasoning: * Berlinski, David (2000). The Advent of the Algorithm. Harcourt Books. ISBN 978-0-15-601391-8. OCLC 46890682. Archived from the original on 26 July 2020. Retrieved 22 August 2020. Turing, Alan (1948), \"Machine Intelligence\", in Copeland, B. Jack (ed.), The Essential Turing: The ideas that gave birth to the computer age, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 412, ISBN 978-0-19-825080-7 Russell & Norvig 2009, p. 16. Dartmouth conference: * McCorduck 2004, pp. 111–136 * Crevier 1993, pp. 47–49, who writes \"the conference is generally recognized as the official birthdate of the new science.\" * Russell & Norvig 2003, p. 17, who call the conference \"the birth of artificial intelligence.\" * NRC 1999, pp. 200–201 McCarthy, John (1988). \"Review of The Question of Artificial Intelligence\". Annals of the History of Computing. 10 (3): 224–229., collected in McCarthy, John (1996). \"10. Review of The Question of Artificial Intelligence\". Defending AI Research: A Collection of Essays and Reviews. CSLI., p. 73, \"[O]ne of the reasons for inventing the term \"artificial intelligence\" was to escape association with \"cybernetics\". Its concentration on analog feedback seemed misguided, and I wished to avoid having either to accept Norbert (not Robert) Wiener as a guru or having to argue with him.\" Hegemony of the Dartmouth conference attendees: * Russell & Norvig 2003, p. 17, who write \"for the next 20 years the field would be dominated by these people and their students.\" * McCorduck 2004, pp. 129–130 Russell & Norvig 2003, p. 18. Schaeffer J. (2009) Didn't Samuel Solve That Game?. In: One Jump Ahead. Springer, Boston, MA Samuel, A. L. (July 1959). \"Some Studies in Machine Learning Using the Game of Checkers\". IBM Journal of Research and Development. 3 (3): 210–229. CiteSeerX 10.1.1.368.2254. doi:10.1147/rd.33.0210. \"Golden years\" of AI (successful symbolic reasoning programs 1956–1973): * McCorduck 2004, pp. 243–252 * Crevier 1993, pp. 52–107 * Moravec 1988, p. 9 * Russell & Norvig 2003, pp. 18–21 The programs described are Arthur Samuel's checkers program for the IBM 701, Daniel Bobrow's STUDENT, Newell and Simon's Logic Theorist and Terry Winograd's SHRDLU. DARPA pours money into undirected pure research into AI during the 1960s: * McCorduck 2004, p. 131 * Crevier 1993, pp. 51, 64–65 * NRC 1999, pp. 204–205 AI in England: * Howe 1994 Lighthill 1973. Expert systems: * ACM 1998, I.2.1 * Russell & Norvig 2003, pp. 22–24 * Luger & Stubblefield 2004, pp. 227–331 * Nilsson 1998, chpt. 17.4 * McCorduck 2004, pp. 327–335, 434–435 * Crevier 1993, pp. 145–62, 197–203 * Newquist 1994, pp. 155–183 Mead, Carver A.; Ismail, Mohammed (8 May 1989). Analog VLSI Implementation of Neural Systems (PDF). The Kluwer International Series in Engineering and Computer Science. 80. Norwell, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers. doi:10.1007/978-1-4613-1639-8. ISBN 978-1-4613-1639-8. Archived from the original (PDF) on 6 November 2019. Retrieved 24 January 2020. Formal methods are now preferred (\"Victory of the neats\"): * Russell & Norvig 2003, pp. 25–26 * McCorduck 2004, pp. 486–487 McCorduck 2004, pp. 480–483. Markoff 2011. \"Ask the AI experts: What's driving today's progress in AI?\". McKinsey & Company. Archived from the original on 13 April 2018. Retrieved 13 April 2018. Administrator. \"Kinect's AI breakthrough explained\". i-programmer.info. Archived from the original on 1 February 2016. Rowinski, Dan (15 January 2013). \"Virtual Personal Assistants & The Future Of Your Smartphone [Infographic]\". ReadWrite. Archived from the original on 22 December 2015. \"Artificial intelligence: Google's AlphaGo beats Go master Lee Se-dol\". BBC News. 12 March 2016. Archived from the original on 26 August 2016. Retrieved 1 October 2016. Metz, Cade (27 May 2017). \"After Win in China, AlphaGo's Designers Explore New AI\". Wired. Archived from the original on 2 June 2017. \"World's Go Player Ratings\". May 2017. Archived from the original on 1 April 2017. \"柯洁迎19岁生日 雄踞人类世界排名第一已两年\" (in Chinese). May 2017. Archived from the original on 11 August 2017. Clark, Jack (8 December 2015). \"Why 2015 Was a Breakthrough Year in Artificial Intelligence\". Bloomberg News. Archived from the original on 23 November 2016. Retrieved 23 November 2016. After a half-decade of quiet breakthroughs in artificial intelligence, 2015 has been a landmark year. Computers are smarter and learning faster than ever. \"Reshaping Business With Artificial Intelligence\". MIT Sloan Management Review. Archived from the original on 19 May 2018. Retrieved 2 May 2018. Lorica, Ben (18 December 2017). \"The state of AI adoption\". O'Reilly Media. Archived from the original on 2 May 2018. Retrieved 2 May 2018. Allen, Gregory (6 February 2019). \"Understanding China's AI Strategy\". Center for a New American Security. Archived from the original on 17 March 2019. \"Review | How two AI superpowers – the U.S. and China – battle for supremacy in the field\". Washington Post. 2 November 2018. Archived from the original on 4 November 2018. Retrieved 4 November 2018. at 10:11, Alistair Dabbs 22 Feb 2019. \"Artificial Intelligence: You know it isn't real, yeah?\". www.theregister.co.uk. Archived from the original on 21 May 2020. Retrieved 22 August 2020. \"Stop Calling it Artificial Intelligence\". Archived from the original on 2 December 2019. Retrieved 1 December 2019. \"AI isn't taking over the world – it doesn't exist yet\". GBG Global website. Archived from the original on 11 August 2020. Retrieved 22 August 2020. Kaplan, Andreas; Haenlein, Michael (1 January 2019). \"Siri, Siri, in my hand: Who's the fairest in the land? On the interpretations, illustrations, and implications of artificial intelligence\". Business Horizons. 62 (1): 15–25. doi:10.1016/j.bushor.2018.08.004. Domingos 2015, Chapter 5. Domingos 2015, Chapter 7. Lindenbaum, M., Markovitch, S., & Rusakov, D. (2004). Selective sampling for nearest neighbor classifiers. Machine learning, 54(2), 125–152. Domingos 2015, Chapter 1. Intractability and efficiency and the combinatorial explosion: * Russell & Norvig 2003, pp. 9, 21–22 Domingos 2015, Chapter 2, Chapter 3. Hart, P. E.; Nilsson, N. J.; Raphael, B. (1972). \"Correction to \"A Formal Basis for the Heuristic Determination of Minimum Cost Paths\"\". SIGART Newsletter (37): 28–29. doi:10.1145/1056777.1056779. S2CID 6386648. Domingos 2015, Chapter 2, Chapter 4, Chapter 6. \"Can neural network computers learn from experience, and if so, could they ever become what we would call 'smart'?\". Scientific American. 2018. Archived from the original on 25 March 2018. Retrieved 24 March 2018. Domingos 2015, Chapter 6, Chapter 7. Domingos 2015, p. 286. \"Single pixel change fools AI programs\". BBC News. 3 November 2017. Archived from the original on 22 March 2018. Retrieved 12 March 2018. \"AI Has a Hallucination Problem That's Proving Tough to Fix\". WIRED. 2018. Archived from the original on 12 March 2018. Retrieved 12 March 2018. Matti, D.; Ekenel, H. K.; Thiran, J. P. (2017). Combining LiDAR space clustering and convolutional neural networks for pedestrian detection. 2017 14th IEEE International Conference on Advanced Video and Signal Based Surveillance (AVSS). pp. 1–6. arXiv:1710.06160. doi:10.1109/AVSS.2017.8078512. ISBN 978-1-5386-2939-0. S2CID 2401976. Ferguson, Sarah; Luders, Brandon; Grande, Robert C.; How, Jonathan P. (2015). Real-Time Predictive Modeling and Robust Avoidance of Pedestrians with Uncertain, Changing Intentions. Algorithmic Foundations of Robotics XI. Springer Tracts in Advanced Robotics. 107. Springer, Cham. pp. 161–177. arXiv:1405.5581. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-16595-0_10. ISBN 978-3-319-16594-3. S2CID 8681101. \"Cultivating Common Sense | DiscoverMagazine.com\". Discover Magazine. 2017. Archived from the original on 25 March 2018. Retrieved 24 March 2018. Davis, Ernest; Marcus, Gary (24 August 2015). \"Commonsense reasoning and commonsense knowledge in artificial intelligence\". Communications of the ACM. 58 (9): 92–103. doi:10.1145/2701413. S2CID 13583137. Archived from the original on 22 August 2020. Retrieved 6 April 2020. Winograd, Terry (January 1972). \"Understanding natural language\". Cognitive Psychology. 3 (1): 1–191. doi:10.1016/0010-0285(72)90002-3. \"Don't worry: Autonomous cars aren't coming tomorrow (or next year)\". Autoweek. 2016. Archived from the original on 25 March 2018. Retrieved 24 March 2018. Knight, Will (2017). \"Boston may be famous for bad drivers, but it's the testing ground for a smarter self-driving car\". MIT Technology Review. Archived from the original on 22 August 2020. Retrieved 27 March 2018. Prakken, Henry (31 August 2017). \"On the problem of making autonomous vehicles conform to traffic law\". Artificial Intelligence and Law. 25 (3): 341–363. doi:10.1007/s10506-017-9210-0. Lieto, Antonio (May 2018). \"The knowledge level in cognitive architectures: Current limitations and possible developments\". Cognitive Systems Research. 48: 39–55. doi:10.1016/j.cogsys.2017.05.001. hdl:2318/1665207. S2CID 206868967. Problem solving, puzzle solving, game playing and deduction: * Russell & Norvig 2003, chpt. 3–9, * Poole, Mackworth & Goebel 1998, chpt. 2,3,7,9, * Luger & Stubblefield 2004, chpt. 3,4,6,8, * Nilsson 1998, chpt. 7–12 Uncertain reasoning: * Russell & Norvig 2003, pp. 452–644, * Poole, Mackworth & Goebel 1998, pp. 345–395, * Luger & Stubblefield 2004, pp. 333–381, * Nilsson 1998, chpt. 19 Psychological evidence of sub-symbolic reasoning: * Wason & Shapiro (1966) showed that people do poorly on completely abstract problems, but if the problem is restated to allow the use of intuitive social intelligence, performance dramatically improves. (See Wason selection task) * Kahneman, Slovic & Tversky (1982) have shown that people are terrible at elementary problems that involve uncertain reasoning. (See list of cognitive biases for several examples). * Lakoff & Núñez (2000) have controversially argued that even our skills at mathematics depend on knowledge and skills that come from \"the body\", i.e. sensorimotor and perceptual skills. (See Where Mathematics Comes From) Knowledge representation: * ACM 1998, I.2.4, * Russell & Norvig 2003, pp. 320–363, * Poole, Mackworth & Goebel 1998, pp. 23–46, 69–81, 169–196, 235–277, 281–298, 319–345, * Luger & Stubblefield 2004, pp. 227–243, * Nilsson 1998, chpt. 18 Knowledge engineering: * Russell & Norvig 2003, pp. 260–266, * Poole, Mackworth & Goebel 1998, pp. 199–233, * Nilsson 1998, chpt. ≈17.1–17.4 Representing categories and relations: Semantic networks, description logics, inheritance (including frames and scripts): * Russell & Norvig 2003, pp. 349–354, * Poole, Mackworth & Goebel 1998, pp. 174–177, * Luger & Stubblefield 2004, pp. 248–258, * Nilsson 1998, chpt. 18.3 Representing events and time:Situation calculus, event calculus, fluent calculus (including solving the frame problem): * Russell & Norvig 2003, pp. 328–341, * Poole, Mackworth & Goebel 1998, pp. 281–298, * Nilsson 1998, chpt. 18.2 Causal calculus: * Poole, Mackworth & Goebel 1998, pp. 335–337 Representing knowledge about knowledge: Belief calculus, modal logics: * Russell & Norvig 2003, pp. 341–344, * Poole, Mackworth & Goebel 1998, pp. 275–277 Sikos, Leslie F. (June 2017). Description Logics in Multimedia Reasoning. Cham: Springer. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-54066-5. ISBN 978-3-319-54066-5. S2CID 3180114. Archived from the original on 29 August 2017. Ontology: * Russell & Norvig 2003, pp. 320–328 Smoliar, Stephen W.; Zhang, HongJiang (1994). \"Content based video indexing and retrieval\". IEEE Multimedia. 1 (2): 62–72. doi:10.1109/93.311653. S2CID 32710913. Neumann, Bernd; Möller, Ralf (January 2008). \"On scene interpretation with description logics\". Image and Vision Computing. 26 (1): 82–101. doi:10.1016/j.imavis.2007.08.013. Kuperman, G. J.; Reichley, R. M.; Bailey, T. C. (1 July 2006). \"Using Commercial Knowledge Bases for Clinical Decision Support: Opportunities, Hurdles, and Recommendations\". Journal of the American Medical Informatics Association. 13 (4): 369–371. doi:10.1197/jamia.M2055. PMC 1513681. PMID 16622160. MCGARRY, KEN (1 December 2005). \"A survey of interestingness measures for knowledge discovery\". The Knowledge Engineering Review. 20 (1): 39–61. doi:10.1017/S0269888905000408. S2CID 14987656. Bertini, M; Del Bimbo, A; Torniai, C (2006). \"Automatic annotation and semantic retrieval of video sequences using multimedia ontologies\". MM '06 Proceedings of the 14th ACM international conference on Multimedia. 14th ACM international conference on Multimedia. Santa Barbara: ACM. pp. 679–682. Qualification problem: * McCarthy & Hayes 1969 * Russell & Norvig 2003[page needed] While McCarthy was primarily concerned with issues in the logical representation of actions, Russell & Norvig 2003 apply the term to the more general issue of default reasoning in the vast network of assumptions underlying all our commonsense knowledge. Default reasoning and default logic, non-monotonic logics, circumscription, closed world assumption, abduction (Poole et al. places abduction under \"default reasoning\". Luger et al. places this under \"uncertain reasoning\"): * Russell & Norvig 2003, pp. 354–360, * Poole, Mackworth & Goebel 1998, pp. 248–256, 323–335, * Luger & Stubblefield 2004, pp. 335–363, * Nilsson 1998, ~18.3.3 Breadth of commonsense knowledge: * Russell & Norvig 2003, p. 21, * Crevier 1993, pp. 113–114, * Moravec 1988, p. 13, * Lenat & Guha 1989 (Introduction) Dreyfus & Dreyfus 1986. Gladwell 2005. Expert knowledge as embodied intuition: * Dreyfus & Dreyfus 1986 (Hubert Dreyfus is a philosopher and critic of AI who was among the first to argue that most useful human knowledge was encoded sub-symbolically. See Dreyfus' critique of AI) * Gladwell 2005 (Gladwell's Blink is a popular introduction to sub-symbolic reasoning and knowledge.) * Hawkins & Blakeslee 2005 (Hawkins argues that sub-symbolic knowledge should be the primary focus of AI research.) Planning: * ACM 1998, ~I.2.8, * Russell & Norvig 2003, pp. 375–459, * Poole, Mackworth & Goebel 1998, pp. 281–316, * Luger & Stubblefield 2004, pp. 314–329, * Nilsson 1998, chpt. 10.1–2, 22 Information value theory: * Russell & Norvig 2003, pp. 600–604 Classical planning: * Russell & Norvig 2003, pp. 375–430, * Poole, Mackworth & Goebel 1998, pp. 281–315, * Luger & Stubblefield 2004, pp. 314–329, * Nilsson 1998, chpt. 10.1–2, 22 Planning and acting in non-deterministic domains: conditional planning, execution monitoring, replanning and continuous planning: * Russell & Norvig 2003, pp. 430–449 Multi-agent planning and emergent behavior: * Russell & Norvig 2003, pp. 449–455 Turing 1950. Solomonoff 1956. Alan Turing discussed the centrality of learning as early as 1950, in his classic paper \"Computing Machinery and Intelligence\".[120] In 1956, at the original Dartmouth AI summer conference, Ray Solomonoff wrote a report on unsupervised probabilistic machine learning: \"An Inductive Inference Machine\".[121] This is a form of Tom Mitchell's widely quoted definition of machine learning: \"A computer program is set to learn from an experience E with respect to some task T and some performance measure P if its performance on T as measured by P improves with experience E.\" Learning: * ACM 1998, I.2.6, * Russell & Norvig 2003, pp. 649–788, * Poole, Mackworth & Goebel 1998, pp. 397–438, * Luger & Stubblefield 2004, pp. 385–542, * Nilsson 1998, chpt. 3.3, 10.3, 17.5, 20 Jordan, M. I.; Mitchell, T. M. (16 July 2015). \"Machine learning: Trends, perspectives, and prospects\". Science. 349 (6245): 255–260. Bibcode:2015Sci...349..255J. doi:10.1126/science.aaa8415. PMID 26185243. S2CID 677218. Reinforcement learning: * Russell & Norvig 2003, pp. 763–788 * Luger & Stubblefield 2004, pp. 442–449 Natural language processing: * ACM 1998, I.2.7 * Russell & Norvig 2003, pp. 790–831 * Poole, Mackworth & Goebel 1998, pp. 91–104 * Luger & Stubblefield 2004, pp. 591–632 \"Versatile question answering systems: seeing in synthesis\" Archived 1 February 2016 at the Wayback Machine, Mittal et al., IJIIDS, 5(2), 119–142, 2011 Applications of natural language processing, including information retrieval (i.e. text mining) and machine translation: * Russell & Norvig 2003, pp. 840–857, * Luger & Stubblefield 2004, pp. 623–630 Cambria, Erik; White, Bebo (May 2014). \"Jumping NLP Curves: A Review of Natural Language Processing Research [Review Article]\". IEEE Computational Intelligence Magazine. 9 (2): 48–57. doi:10.1109/MCI.2014.2307227. S2CID 206451986. Vincent, James (7 November 2019). \"OpenAI has published the text-generating AI it said was too dangerous to share\". The Verge. Archived from the original on 11 June 2020. Retrieved 11 June 2020. Machine perception: * Russell & Norvig 2003, pp. 537–581, 863–898 * Nilsson 1998, ~chpt. 6 Speech recognition: * ACM 1998, ~I.2.7 * Russell & Norvig 2003, pp. 568–578 Object recognition: * Russell & Norvig 2003, pp. 885–892 Computer vision: * ACM 1998, I.2.10 * Russell & Norvig 2003, pp. 863–898 * Nilsson 1998, chpt. 6 Robotics: * ACM 1998, I.2.9, * Russell & Norvig 2003, pp. 901–942, * Poole, Mackworth & Goebel 1998, pp. 443–460 Moving and configuration space: * Russell & Norvig 2003, pp. 916–932 Tecuci 2012. Robotic mapping (localization, etc): * Russell & Norvig 2003, pp. 908–915 Cadena, Cesar; Carlone, Luca; Carrillo, Henry; Latif, Yasir; Scaramuzza, Davide; Neira, Jose; Reid, Ian; Leonard, John J. (December 2016). \"Past, Present, and Future of Simultaneous Localization and Mapping: Toward the Robust-Perception Age\". IEEE Transactions on Robotics. 32 (6): 1309–1332. arXiv:1606.05830. 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The Economist. 2016. Archived from the original on 31 December 2016. Retrieved 26 April 2018. Domingos 2015. Artificial brain arguments: AI requires a simulation of the operation of the human brain * Russell & Norvig 2003, p. 957 * Crevier 1993, pp. 271 and 279 A few of the people who make some form of the argument: * Moravec 1988 * Kurzweil 2005, p. 262 * Hawkins & Blakeslee 2005 The most extreme form of this argument (the brain replacement scenario) was put forward by Clark Glymour in the mid-1970s and was touched on by Zenon Pylyshyn and John Searle in 1980. Goertzel, Ben; Lian, Ruiting; Arel, Itamar; de Garis, Hugo; Chen, Shuo (December 2010). \"A world survey of artificial brain projects, Part II: Biologically inspired cognitive architectures\". Neurocomputing. 74 (1–3): 30–49. doi:10.1016/j.neucom.2010.08.012. Nilsson 1983, p. 10. Nils Nilsson writes: \"Simply put, there is wide disagreement in the field about what AI is all about.\"[163] AI's immediate precursors: * McCorduck 2004, pp. 51–107 * Crevier 1993, pp. 27–32 * Russell & Norvig 2003, pp. 15, 940 * Moravec 1988, p. 3 Haugeland 1985, pp. 112–117 The most dramatic case of sub-symbolic AI being pushed into the background was the devastating critique of perceptrons by Marvin Minsky and Seymour Papert in 1969. See History of AI, AI winter, or Frank Rosenblatt. Cognitive simulation, Newell and Simon, AI at CMU (then called Carnegie Tech): * McCorduck 2004, pp. 139–179, 245–250, 322–323 (EPAM) * Crevier 1993, pp. 145–149 Soar (history): * McCorduck 2004, pp. 450–451 * Crevier 1993, pp. 258–263 McCarthy and AI research at SAIL and SRI International: * McCorduck 2004, pp. 251–259 * Crevier 1993 AI research at Edinburgh and in France, birth of Prolog: * Crevier 1993, pp. 193–196 * Howe 1994 AI at MIT under Marvin Minsky in the 1960s : * McCorduck 2004, pp. 259–305 * Crevier 1993, pp. 83–102, 163–176 * Russell & Norvig 2003, p. 19 Cyc: * McCorduck 2004, p. 489, who calls it \"a determinedly scruffy enterprise\" * Crevier 1993, pp. 239–243 * Russell & Norvig 2003, p. 363−365 * Lenat & Guha 1989 Knowledge revolution: * McCorduck 2004, pp. 266–276, 298–300, 314, 421 * Russell & Norvig 2003, pp. 22–23 Frederick, Hayes-Roth; William, Murray; Leonard, Adelman. \"Expert systems\". AccessScience. doi:10.1036/1097-8542.248550. Embodied approaches to AI: * McCorduck 2004, pp. 454–462 * Brooks 1990 * Moravec 1988 Weng et al. 2001. Lungarella et al. 2003. Asada et al. 2009. Oudeyer 2010. Revival of connectionism: * Crevier 1993, pp. 214–215 * Russell & Norvig 2003, p. 25 Computational intelligence * IEEE Computational Intelligence Society Archived 9 May 2008 at the Wayback Machine Hutson, Matthew (16 February 2018). \"Artificial intelligence faces reproducibility crisis\". Science. pp. 725–726. Bibcode:2018Sci...359..725H. doi:10.1126/science.359.6377.725. Archived from the original on 29 April 2018. Retrieved 28 April 2018. Norvig 2012. Langley 2011. Katz 2012. The intelligent agent paradigm: * Russell & Norvig 2003, pp. 27, 32–58, 968–972 * Poole, Mackworth & Goebel 1998, pp. 7–21 * Luger & Stubblefield 2004, pp. 235–240 * Hutter 2005, pp. 125–126 The definition used in this article, in terms of goals, actions, perception and environment, is due to Russell & Norvig (2003). Other definitions also include knowledge and learning as additional criteria. Agent architectures, hybrid intelligent systems: * Russell & Norvig (2003, pp. 27, 932, 970–972) * Nilsson (1998, chpt. 25) Hierarchical control system: * Albus 2002 Lieto, Antonio; Lebiere, Christian; Oltramari, Alessandro (May 2018). \"The knowledge level in cognitive architectures: Current limitations and possibile developments\". Cognitive Systems Research. 48: 39–55. doi:10.1016/j.cogsys.2017.05.001. hdl:2318/1665207. S2CID 206868967. Lieto, Antonio; Bhatt, Mehul; Oltramari, Alessandro; Vernon, David (May 2018). \"The role of cognitive architectures in general artificial intelligence\". Cognitive Systems Research. 48: 1–3. doi:10.1016/j.cogsys.2017.08.003. hdl:2318/1665249. S2CID 36189683. Russell & Norvig 2009, p. 1. White Paper: On Artificial Intelligence - A European approach to excellence and trust (PDF). Brussels: European Commission. 2020. p. 1. Archived (PDF) from the original on 20 February 2020. Retrieved 20 February 2020. CNN 2006. Using AI to predict flight delays Archived 20 November 2018 at the Wayback Machine, Ishti.org. N. Aletras; D. Tsarapatsanis; D. Preotiuc-Pietro; V. Lampos (2016). \"Predicting judicial decisions of the European Court of Human Rights: a Natural Language Processing perspective\". PeerJ Computer Science. 2: e93. doi:10.7717/peerj-cs.93. \"The Economist Explains: Why firms are piling into artificial intelligence\". The Economist. 31 March 2016. Archived from the original on 8 May 2016. Retrieved 19 May 2016. Lohr, Steve (28 February 2016). \"The Promise of Artificial Intelligence Unfolds in Small Steps\". The New York Times. Archived from the original on 29 February 2016. Retrieved 29 February 2016. Frangoul, Anmar (14 June 2019). \"A Californian business is using A.I. to change the way we think about energy storage\". CNBC. Archived from the original on 25 July 2020. Retrieved 5 November 2019. Wakefield, Jane (15 June 2016). \"Social media 'outstrips TV' as news source for young people\". BBC News. Archived from the original on 24 June 2016. Smith, Mark (22 July 2016). \"So you think you chose to read this article?\". BBC News. Archived from the original on 25 July 2016. Brown, Eileen. \"Half of Americans do not believe deepfake news could target them online\". ZDNet. Archived from the original on 6 November 2019. Retrieved 3 December 2019. The Turing test: Turing's original publication: * Turing 1950 Historical influence and philosophical implications: * Haugeland 1985, pp. 6–9 * Crevier 1993, p. 24 * McCorduck 2004, pp. 70–71 * Russell & Norvig 2003, pp. 2–3 and 948 Dartmouth proposal: * McCarthy et al. 1955 (the original proposal) * Crevier 1993, p. 49 (historical significance) The physical symbol systems hypothesis: * Newell & Simon 1976, p. 116 * McCorduck 2004, p. 153 * Russell & Norvig 2003, p. 18 Dreyfus 1992, p. 156. Dreyfus criticized the necessary condition of the physical symbol system hypothesis, which he called the \"psychological assumption\": \"The mind can be viewed as a device operating on bits of information according to formal rules.\"[206] Dreyfus' critique of artificial intelligence: * Dreyfus 1972, Dreyfus & Dreyfus 1986 * Crevier 1993, pp. 120–132 * McCorduck 2004, pp. 211–239 * Russell & Norvig 2003, pp. 950–952, Gödel 1951: in this lecture, Kurt Gödel uses the incompleteness theorem to arrive at the following disjunction: (a) the human mind is not a consistent finite machine, or (b) there exist Diophantine equations for which it cannot decide whether solutions exist. Gödel finds (b) implausible, and thus seems to have believed the human mind was not equivalent to a finite machine, i.e., its power exceeded that of any finite machine. He recognized that this was only a conjecture, since one could never disprove (b). Yet he considered the disjunctive conclusion to be a \"certain fact\". The Mathematical Objection: * Russell & Norvig 2003, p. 949 * McCorduck 2004, pp. 448–449 Making the Mathematical Objection: * Lucas 1961 * Penrose 1989 Refuting Mathematical Objection: * Turing 1950 under \"(2) The Mathematical Objection\" * Hofstadter 1979 Background: * Gödel 1931, Church 1936, Kleene 1935, Turing 1937 Graham Oppy (20 January 2015). \"Gödel's Incompleteness Theorems\". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Archived from the original on 22 April 2016. Retrieved 27 April 2016. These Gödelian anti-mechanist arguments are, however, problematic, and there is wide consensus that they fail. Stuart J. Russell; Peter Norvig (2010). \"26.1.2: Philosophical Foundations/Weak AI: Can Machines Act Intelligently?/The mathematical objection\". Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach (3rd ed.). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall. ISBN 978-0-13-604259-4. even if we grant that computers have limitations on what they can prove, there is no evidence that humans are immune from those limitations. Mark Colyvan. An introduction to the philosophy of mathematics. Cambridge University Press, 2012. From 2.2.2, 'Philosophical significance of Gödel's incompleteness results': \"The accepted wisdom (with which I concur) is that the Lucas-Penrose arguments fail.\" Iphofen, Ron; Kritikos, Mihalis (3 January 2019). \"Regulating artificial intelligence and robotics: ethics by design in a digital society\". Contemporary Social Science: 1–15. doi:10.1080/21582041.2018.1563803. ISSN 2158-2041. \"Ethical AI Learns Human Rights Framework\". Voice of America. Archived from the original on 11 November 2019. Retrieved 10 November 2019. Crevier 1993, pp. 132–144. In the early 1970s, Kenneth Colby presented a version of Weizenbaum's ELIZA known as DOCTOR which he promoted as a serious therapeutic tool.[216] Joseph Weizenbaum's critique of AI: * Weizenbaum 1976 * Crevier 1993, pp. 132–144 * McCorduck 2004, pp. 356–373 * Russell & Norvig 2003, p. 961 Weizenbaum (the AI researcher who developed the first chatterbot program, ELIZA) argued in 1976 that the misuse of artificial intelligence has the potential to devalue human life. Wendell Wallach (2010). Moral Machines, Oxford University Press. Wallach, pp 37–54. Wallach, pp 55–73. Wallach, Introduction chapter. Michael Anderson and Susan Leigh Anderson (2011), Machine Ethics, Cambridge University Press. \"Machine Ethics\". aaai.org. Archived from the original on 29 November 2014. Rubin, Charles (Spring 2003). \"Artificial Intelligence and Human Nature\". The New Atlantis. 1: 88–100. Archived from the original on 11 June 2012. 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Searle's original formulation was \"The appropriately programmed computer really is a mind, in the sense that computers given the right programs can be literally said to understand and have other cognitive states.\" [230] Strong AI is defined similarly by Russell & Norvig (2003, p. 947): \"The assertion that machines could possibly act intelligently",
      "readme": "# References\n Poole, Mackworth &amp; Goebel 1998, p. 1.  Russell &amp; Norvig 2003, p. 55.  Definition of AI as the study of intelligent agents: Poole, Mackworth &amp; Goebel (1998), which provides the version that is used in this article. These authors use the term \"computational intelligence\" as a synonym for artificial intelligence.[1] Russell &amp; Norvig (2003) (who prefer the term \"rational agent\") and write \"The whole-agent view is now widely accepted in the field\".[2] Nilsson 1998 Legg &amp; Hutter 2007  Russell &amp; Norvig 2009, p. 2.  McCorduck 2004, p. 204  Maloof, Mark. \"Artificial Intelligence: An Introduction, p. 37\" (PDF). georgetown.edu. Archived (PDF) from the original on 25 August 2018.  \"How AI Is Getting Groundbreaking Changes In Talent Management And HR Tech\". Hackernoon. Archived from the original on 11 September 2019. Retrieved 14 February 2020.  Schank, Roger C. (1991). \"Where's the AI\". AI magazine. Vol. 12 no. 4. p. 38.  Russell &amp; Norvig 2009.  \"AlphaGo – Google DeepMind\". Archived from the original on 10 March 2016.  Allen, Gregory (April 2020). \"Department of Defense Joint AI Center - Understanding AI Technology\" (PDF). AI.mil - The official site of the Department of Defense Joint Artificial Intelligence Center. Archived (PDF) from the original on 21 April 2020. Retrieved 25 April 2020.  Optimism of early AI: * Herbert Simon quote: Simon 1965, p. 96 quoted in Crevier 1993, p. 109. * Marvin Minsky quote: Minsky 1967, p. 2 quoted in Crevier 1993, p. 109.  Boom of the 1980s: rise of expert systems, Fifth Generation Project, Alvey, MCC, SCI: * McCorduck 2004, pp. 426–441 * Crevier 1993, pp. 161–162,197–203, 211, 240 * Russell &amp; Norvig 2003, p. 24 * NRC 1999, pp. 210–211 * Newquist 1994, pp. 235–248  First AI Winter, Mansfield Amendment, Lighthill report * Crevier 1993, pp. 115–117 * Russell &amp; Norvig 2003, p. 22 * NRC 1999, pp. 212–213 * Howe 1994 * Newquist 1994, pp. 189–201  Second AI winter: * McCorduck 2004, pp. 430–435 * Crevier 1993, pp. 209–210 * NRC 1999, pp. 214–216 * Newquist 1994, pp. 301–318  AI becomes hugely successful in the early 21st century * Clark 2015  Pamela McCorduck (2004, p. 424) writes of \"the rough shattering of AI in subfields—vision, natural language, decision theory, genetic algorithms, robotics ... and these with own sub-subfield—that would hardly have anything to say to each other.\"  This list of intelligent traits is based on the topics covered by the major AI textbooks, including: * Russell &amp; Norvig 2003 * Luger &amp; Stubblefield 2004 * Poole, Mackworth &amp; Goebel 1998 * Nilsson 1998  Kolata 1982.  Maker 2006.  Biological intelligence vs. intelligence in general: Russell &amp; Norvig 2003, pp. 2–3, who make the analogy with aeronautical engineering. McCorduck 2004, pp. 100–101, who writes that there are \"two major branches of artificial intelligence: one aimed at producing intelligent behavior regardless of how it was accomplished, and the other aimed at modeling intelligent processes found in nature, particularly human ones.\" Kolata 1982, a paper in Science, which describes McCarthy's indifference to biological models. Kolata quotes McCarthy as writing: \"This is AI, so we don't care if it's psychologically real\".[19] McCarthy recently reiterated his position at the AI@50 conference where he said \"Artificial intelligence is not, by definition, simulation of human intelligence\".[20].  Neats vs. scruffies: * McCorduck 2004, pp. 421–424, 486–489 * Crevier 1993, p. 168 * Nilsson 1983, pp. 10–11  Symbolic vs. sub-symbolic AI: * Nilsson (1998, p. 7), who uses the term \"sub-symbolic\".  General intelligence (strong AI) is discussed in popular introductions to AI: * Kurzweil 1999 and Kurzweil 2005  See the Dartmouth proposal, under Philosophy, below.  McCorduck 2004, p. 34.  McCorduck 2004, p. xviii.  McCorduck 2004, p. 3.  McCorduck 2004, pp. 340–400.  This is a central idea of Pamela McCorduck's Machines Who Think. She writes: \"I like to think of artificial intelligence as the scientific apotheosis of a venerable cultural tradition.\"[26] \"Artificial intelligence in one form or another is an idea that has pervaded Western intellectual history, a dream in urgent need of being realized.\"[27] \"Our history is full of attempts—nutty, eerie, comical, earnest, legendary and real—to make artificial intelligences, to reproduce what is the essential us—bypassing the ordinary means. Back and forth between myth and reality, our imaginations supplying what our workshops couldn't, we have engaged for a long time in this odd form of self-reproduction.\"[28] She traces the desire back to its Hellenistic roots and calls it the urge to \"forge the Gods.\"[29]  \"Stephen Hawking believes AI could be mankind's last accomplishment\". BetaNews. 21 October 2016. Archived from the original on 28 August 2017.  Lombardo P, Boehm I, Nairz K (2020). \"RadioComics – Santa Claus and the future of radiology\". Eur J Radiol. 122 (1): 108771. doi:10.1016/j.ejrad.2019.108771. PMID 31835078.  Ford, Martin; Colvin, Geoff (6 September 2015). \"Will robots create more jobs than they destroy?\". The Guardian. Archived from the original on 16 June 2018. Retrieved 13 January 2018.  AI applications widely used behind the scenes: * Russell &amp; Norvig 2003, p. 28 * Kurzweil 2005, p. 265 * NRC 1999, pp. 216–222 * Newquist 1994, pp. 189–201  AI in myth: * McCorduck 2004, pp. 4–5 * Russell &amp; Norvig 2003, p. 939  AI in early science fiction. * McCorduck 2004, pp. 17–25  Formal reasoning: * Berlinski, David (2000). The Advent of the Algorithm. Harcourt Books. ISBN 978-0-15-601391-8. OCLC 46890682. Archived from the original on 26 July 2020. Retrieved 22 August 2020.  Turing, Alan (1948), \"Machine Intelligence\", in Copeland, B. Jack (ed.), The Essential Turing: The ideas that gave birth to the computer age, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 412, ISBN 978-0-19-825080-7  Russell &amp; Norvig 2009, p. 16.  Dartmouth conference: * McCorduck 2004, pp. 111–136 * Crevier 1993, pp. 47–49, who writes \"the conference is generally recognized as the official birthdate of the new science.\" * Russell &amp; Norvig 2003, p. 17, who call the conference \"the birth of artificial intelligence.\" * NRC 1999, pp. 200–201  McCarthy, John (1988). \"Review of The Question of Artificial Intelligence\". Annals of the History of Computing. 10 (3): 224–229., collected in McCarthy, John (1996). \"10. Review of The Question of Artificial Intelligence\". Defending AI Research: A Collection of Essays and Reviews. CSLI., p. 73, \"[O]ne of the reasons for inventing the term \"artificial intelligence\" was to escape association with \"cybernetics\". Its concentration on analog feedback seemed misguided, and I wished to avoid having either to accept Norbert (not Robert) Wiener as a guru or having to argue with him.\"  Hegemony of the Dartmouth conference attendees: * Russell &amp; Norvig 2003, p. 17, who write \"for the next 20 years the field would be dominated by these people and their students.\" * McCorduck 2004, pp. 129–130  Russell &amp; Norvig 2003, p. 18.  Schaeffer J. (2009) Didn't Samuel Solve That Game?. In: One Jump Ahead. Springer, Boston, MA  Samuel, A. L. (July 1959). \"Some Studies in Machine Learning Using the Game of Checkers\". IBM Journal of Research and Development. 3 (3): 210–229. CiteSeerX 10.1.1.368.2254. doi:10.1147/rd.33.0210.  \"Golden years\" of AI (successful symbolic reasoning programs 1956–1973): * McCorduck 2004, pp. 243–252 * Crevier 1993, pp. 52–107 * Moravec 1988, p. 9 * Russell &amp; Norvig 2003, pp. 18–21 The programs described are Arthur Samuel's checkers program for the IBM 701, Daniel Bobrow's STUDENT, Newell and Simon's Logic Theorist and Terry Winograd's SHRDLU.  DARPA pours money into undirected pure research into AI during the 1960s: * McCorduck 2004, p. 131 * Crevier 1993, pp. 51, 64–65 * NRC 1999, pp. 204–205  AI in England: * Howe 1994  Lighthill 1973.  Expert systems: * ACM 1998, I.2.1 * Russell &amp; Norvig 2003, pp. 22–24 * Luger &amp; Stubblefield 2004, pp. 227–331 * Nilsson 1998, chpt. 17.4 * McCorduck 2004, pp. 327–335, 434–435 * Crevier 1993, pp. 145–62, 197–203 * Newquist 1994, pp. 155–183  Mead, Carver A.; Ismail, Mohammed (8 May 1989). Analog VLSI Implementation of Neural Systems (PDF). 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Problem solving, puzzle solving, game playing and deduction: * Russell &amp; Norvig 2003, chpt. 3–9, * Poole, Mackworth &amp; Goebel 1998, chpt. 2,3,7,9, * Luger &amp; Stubblefield 2004, chpt. 3,4,6,8, * Nilsson 1998, chpt. 7–12  Uncertain reasoning: * Russell &amp; Norvig 2003, pp. 452–644, * Poole, Mackworth &amp; Goebel 1998, pp. 345–395, * Luger &amp; Stubblefield 2004, pp. 333–381, * Nilsson 1998, chpt. 19  Psychological evidence of sub-symbolic reasoning: * Wason &amp; Shapiro (1966) showed that people do poorly on completely abstract problems, but if the problem is restated to allow the use of intuitive social intelligence, performance dramatically improves. (See Wason selection task) * Kahneman, Slovic &amp; Tversky (1982) have shown that people are terrible at elementary problems that involve uncertain reasoning. (See list of cognitive biases for several examples). * Lakoff &amp; Núñez (2000) have controversially argued that even our skills at mathematics depend on knowledge and skills that come from \"the body\", i.e. sensorimotor and perceptual skills. (See Where Mathematics Comes From)  Knowledge representation: * ACM 1998, I.2.4, * Russell &amp; Norvig 2003, pp. 320–363, * Poole, Mackworth &amp; Goebel 1998, pp. 23–46, 69–81, 169–196, 235–277, 281–298, 319–345, * Luger &amp; Stubblefield 2004, pp. 227–243, * Nilsson 1998, chpt. 18  Knowledge engineering: * Russell &amp; Norvig 2003, pp. 260–266, * Poole, Mackworth &amp; Goebel 1998, pp. 199–233, * Nilsson 1998, chpt. ≈17.1–17.4  Representing categories and relations: Semantic networks, description logics, inheritance (including frames and scripts): * Russell &amp; Norvig 2003, pp. 349–354, * Poole, Mackworth &amp; Goebel 1998, pp. 174–177, * Luger &amp; Stubblefield 2004, pp. 248–258, * Nilsson 1998, chpt. 18.3  Representing events and time:Situation calculus, event calculus, fluent calculus (including solving the frame problem): * Russell &amp; Norvig 2003, pp. 328–341, * Poole, Mackworth &amp; Goebel 1998, pp. 281–298, * Nilsson 1998, chpt. 18.2  Causal calculus: * Poole, Mackworth &amp; Goebel 1998, pp. 335–337  Representing knowledge about knowledge: Belief calculus, modal logics: * Russell &amp; Norvig 2003, pp. 341–344, * Poole, Mackworth &amp; Goebel 1998, pp. 275–277  Sikos, Leslie F. (June 2017). Description Logics in Multimedia Reasoning. Cham: Springer. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-54066-5. ISBN 978-3-319-54066-5. S2CID 3180114. Archived from the original on 29 August 2017.  Ontology: * Russell &amp; Norvig 2003, pp. 320–328  Smoliar, Stephen W.; Zhang, HongJiang (1994). \"Content based video indexing and retrieval\". IEEE Multimedia. 1 (2): 62–72. doi:10.1109/93.311653. S2CID 32710913.  Neumann, Bernd; Möller, Ralf (January 2008). \"On scene interpretation with description logics\". Image and Vision Computing. 26 (1): 82–101. doi:10.1016/j.imavis.2007.08.013.  Kuperman, G. J.; Reichley, R. M.; Bailey, T. C. (1 July 2006). \"Using Commercial Knowledge Bases for Clinical Decision Support: Opportunities, Hurdles, and Recommendations\". Journal of the American Medical Informatics Association. 13 (4): 369–371. doi:10.1197/jamia.M2055. PMC 1513681. PMID 16622160.  MCGARRY, KEN (1 December 2005). \"A survey of interestingness measures for knowledge discovery\". The Knowledge Engineering Review. 20 (1): 39–61. doi:10.1017/S0269888905000408. S2CID 14987656.  Bertini, M; Del Bimbo, A; Torniai, C (2006). \"Automatic annotation and semantic retrieval of video sequences using multimedia ontologies\". MM '06 Proceedings of the 14th ACM international conference on Multimedia. 14th ACM international conference on Multimedia. Santa Barbara: ACM. pp. 679–682.  Qualification problem: * McCarthy &amp; Hayes 1969 * Russell &amp; Norvig 2003[page needed] While McCarthy was primarily concerned with issues in the logical representation of actions, Russell &amp; Norvig 2003 apply the term to the more general issue of default reasoning in the vast network of assumptions underlying all our commonsense knowledge.  Default reasoning and default logic, non-monotonic logics, circumscription, closed world assumption, abduction (Poole et al. places abduction under \"default reasoning\". Luger et al. places this under \"uncertain reasoning\"): * Russell &amp; Norvig 2003, pp. 354–360, * Poole, Mackworth &amp; Goebel 1998, pp. 248–256, 323–335, * Luger &amp; Stubblefield 2004, pp. 335–363, * Nilsson 1998, ~18.3.3  Breadth of commonsense knowledge: * Russell &amp; Norvig 2003, p. 21, * Crevier 1993, pp. 113–114, * Moravec 1988, p. 13, * Lenat &amp; Guha 1989 (Introduction)  Dreyfus &amp; Dreyfus 1986.  Gladwell 2005.  Expert knowledge as embodied intuition: * Dreyfus &amp; Dreyfus 1986 (Hubert Dreyfus is a philosopher and critic of AI who was among the first to argue that most useful human knowledge was encoded sub-symbolically. See Dreyfus' critique of AI) * Gladwell 2005 (Gladwell's Blink is a popular introduction to sub-symbolic reasoning and knowledge.) * Hawkins &amp; Blakeslee 2005 (Hawkins argues that sub-symbolic knowledge should be the primary focus of AI research.)  Planning: * ACM 1998, ~I.2.8, * Russell &amp; Norvig 2003, pp. 375–459, * Poole, Mackworth &amp; Goebel 1998, pp. 281–316, * Luger &amp; Stubblefield 2004, pp. 314–329, * Nilsson 1998, chpt. 10.1–2, 22  Information value theory: * Russell &amp; Norvig 2003, pp. 600–604  Classical planning: * Russell &amp; Norvig 2003, pp. 375–430, * Poole, Mackworth &amp; Goebel 1998, pp. 281–315, * Luger &amp; Stubblefield 2004, pp. 314–329, * Nilsson 1998, chpt. 10.1–2, 22  Planning and acting in non-deterministic domains: conditional planning, execution monitoring, replanning and continuous planning: * Russell &amp; Norvig 2003, pp. 430–449  Multi-agent planning and emergent behavior: * Russell &amp; Norvig 2003, pp. 449–455  Turing 1950.  Solomonoff 1956.  Alan Turing discussed the centrality of learning as early as 1950, in his classic paper \"Computing Machinery and Intelligence\".[120] In 1956, at the original Dartmouth AI summer conference, Ray Solomonoff wrote a report on unsupervised probabilistic machine learning: \"An Inductive Inference Machine\".[121]  This is a form of Tom Mitchell's widely quoted definition of machine learning: \"A computer program is set to learn from an experience E with respect to some task T and some performance measure P if its performance on T as measured by P improves with experience E.\"  Learning: * ACM 1998, I.2.6, * Russell &amp; Norvig 2003, pp. 649–788, * Poole, Mackworth &amp; Goebel 1998, pp. 397–438, * Luger &amp; Stubblefield 2004, pp. 385–542, * Nilsson 1998, chpt. 3.3, 10.3, 17.5, 20  Jordan, M. I.; Mitchell, T. M. (16 July 2015). \"Machine learning: Trends, perspectives, and prospects\". Science. 349 (6245): 255–260. Bibcode:2015Sci...349..255J. doi:10.1126/science.aaa8415. PMID 26185243. S2CID 677218.  Reinforcement learning: * Russell &amp; Norvig 2003, pp. 763–788 * Luger &amp; Stubblefield 2004, pp. 442–449  Natural language processing: * ACM 1998, I.2.7 * Russell &amp; Norvig 2003, pp. 790–831 * Poole, Mackworth &amp; Goebel 1998, pp. 91–104 * Luger &amp; Stubblefield 2004, pp. 591–632  \"Versatile question answering systems: seeing in synthesis\" Archived 1 February 2016 at the Wayback Machine, Mittal et al., IJIIDS, 5(2), 119–142, 2011  Applications of natural language processing, including information retrieval (i.e. text mining) and machine translation: * Russell &amp; Norvig 2003, pp. 840–857, * Luger &amp; Stubblefield 2004, pp. 623–630  Cambria, Erik; White, Bebo (May 2014). \"Jumping NLP Curves: A Review of Natural Language Processing Research [Review Article]\". IEEE Computational Intelligence Magazine. 9 (2): 48–57. doi:10.1109/MCI.2014.2307227. S2CID 206451986.  Vincent, James (7 November 2019). \"OpenAI has published the text-generating AI it said was too dangerous to share\". The Verge. Archived from the original on 11 June 2020. Retrieved 11 June 2020.  Machine perception: * Russell &amp; Norvig 2003, pp. 537–581, 863–898 * Nilsson 1998, ~chpt. 6  Speech recognition: * ACM 1998, ~I.2.7 * Russell &amp; Norvig 2003, pp. 568–578  Object recognition: * Russell &amp; Norvig 2003, pp. 885–892  Computer vision: * ACM 1998, I.2.10 * Russell &amp; Norvig 2003, pp. 863–898 * Nilsson 1998, chpt. 6  Robotics: * ACM 1998, I.2.9, * Russell &amp; Norvig 2003, pp. 901–942, * Poole, Mackworth &amp; Goebel 1998, pp. 443–460  Moving and configuration space: * Russell &amp; Norvig 2003, pp. 916–932  Tecuci 2012.  Robotic mapping (localization, etc): * Russell &amp; Norvig 2003, pp. 908–915  Cadena, Cesar; Carlone, Luca; Carrillo, Henry; Latif, Yasir; Scaramuzza, Davide; Neira, Jose; Reid, Ian; Leonard, John J. 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Neurocomputing. 74 (1–3): 30–49. doi:10.1016/j.neucom.2010.08.012.  Nilsson 1983, p. 10.  Nils Nilsson writes: \"Simply put, there is wide disagreement in the field about what AI is all about.\"[163]  AI's immediate precursors: * McCorduck 2004, pp. 51–107 * Crevier 1993, pp. 27–32 * Russell &amp; Norvig 2003, pp. 15, 940 * Moravec 1988, p. 3  Haugeland 1985, pp. 112–117  The most dramatic case of sub-symbolic AI being pushed into the background was the devastating critique of perceptrons by Marvin Minsky and Seymour Papert in 1969. See History of AI, AI winter, or Frank Rosenblatt.  Cognitive simulation, Newell and Simon, AI at CMU (then called Carnegie Tech): * McCorduck 2004, pp. 139–179, 245–250, 322–323 (EPAM) * Crevier 1993, pp. 145–149  Soar (history): * McCorduck 2004, pp. 450–451 * Crevier 1993, pp. 258–263  McCarthy and AI research at SAIL and SRI International: * McCorduck 2004, pp. 251–259 * Crevier 1993  AI research at Edinburgh and in France, birth of Prolog: * Crevier 1993, pp. 193–196 * Howe 1994  AI at MIT under Marvin Minsky in the 1960s : * McCorduck 2004, pp. 259–305 * Crevier 1993, pp. 83–102, 163–176 * Russell &amp; Norvig 2003, p. 19  Cyc: * McCorduck 2004, p. 489, who calls it \"a determinedly scruffy enterprise\" * Crevier 1993, pp. 239–243 * Russell &amp; Norvig 2003, p. 363−365 * Lenat &amp; Guha 1989  Knowledge revolution: * McCorduck 2004, pp. 266–276, 298–300, 314, 421 * Russell &amp; Norvig 2003, pp. 22–23  Frederick, Hayes-Roth; William, Murray; Leonard, Adelman. \"Expert systems\". AccessScience. doi:10.1036/1097-8542.248550.  Embodied approaches to AI: * McCorduck 2004, pp. 454–462 * Brooks 1990 * Moravec 1988  Weng et al. 2001.  Lungarella et al. 2003.  Asada et al. 2009.  Oudeyer 2010.  Revival of connectionism: * Crevier 1993, pp. 214–215 * Russell &amp; Norvig 2003, p. 25  Computational intelligence * IEEE Computational Intelligence Society Archived 9 May 2008 at the Wayback Machine  Hutson, Matthew (16 February 2018). \"Artificial intelligence faces reproducibility crisis\". Science. pp. 725–726. Bibcode:2018Sci...359..725H. doi:10.1126/science.359.6377.725. Archived from the original on 29 April 2018. Retrieved 28 April 2018.  Norvig 2012.  Langley 2011.  Katz 2012.  The intelligent agent paradigm: * Russell &amp; Norvig 2003, pp. 27, 32–58, 968–972 * Poole, Mackworth &amp; Goebel 1998, pp. 7–21 * Luger &amp; Stubblefield 2004, pp. 235–240 * Hutter 2005, pp. 125–126 The definition used in this article, in terms of goals, actions, perception and environment, is due to Russell &amp; Norvig (2003). Other definitions also include knowledge and learning as additional criteria.  Agent architectures, hybrid intelligent systems: * Russell &amp; Norvig (2003, pp. 27, 932, 970–972) * Nilsson (1998, chpt. 25)  Hierarchical control system: * Albus 2002  Lieto, Antonio; Lebiere, Christian; Oltramari, Alessandro (May 2018). \"The knowledge level in cognitive architectures: Current limitations and possibile developments\". Cognitive Systems Research. 48: 39–55. doi:10.1016/j.cogsys.2017.05.001. hdl:2318/1665207. S2CID 206868967.  Lieto, Antonio; Bhatt, Mehul; Oltramari, Alessandro; Vernon, David (May 2018). \"The role of cognitive architectures in general artificial intelligence\". Cognitive Systems Research. 48: 1–3. doi:10.1016/j.cogsys.2017.08.003. hdl:2318/1665249. S2CID 36189683.  Russell &amp; Norvig 2009, p. 1.  White Paper: On Artificial Intelligence - A European approach to excellence and trust (PDF). Brussels: European Commission. 2020. p. 1. 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Retrieved 5 November 2019.  Wakefield, Jane (15 June 2016). \"Social media 'outstrips TV' as news source for young people\". BBC News. Archived from the original on 24 June 2016.  Smith, Mark (22 July 2016). \"So you think you chose to read this article?\". BBC News. Archived from the original on 25 July 2016.  Brown, Eileen. \"Half of Americans do not believe deepfake news could target them online\". ZDNet. Archived from the original on 6 November 2019. Retrieved 3 December 2019.  The Turing test: Turing's original publication: * Turing 1950 Historical influence and philosophical implications: * Haugeland 1985, pp. 6–9 * Crevier 1993, p. 24 * McCorduck 2004, pp. 70–71 * Russell &amp; Norvig 2003, pp. 2–3 and 948  Dartmouth proposal: * McCarthy et al. 1955 (the original proposal) * Crevier 1993, p. 49 (historical significance)  The physical symbol systems hypothesis: * Newell &amp; Simon 1976, p. 116 * McCorduck 2004, p. 153 * Russell &amp; Norvig 2003, p. 18  Dreyfus 1992, p. 156.  Dreyfus criticized the necessary condition of the physical symbol system hypothesis, which he called the \"psychological assumption\": \"The mind can be viewed as a device operating on bits of information according to formal rules.\"[206]  Dreyfus' critique of artificial intelligence: * Dreyfus 1972, Dreyfus &amp; Dreyfus 1986 * Crevier 1993, pp. 120–132 * McCorduck 2004, pp. 211–239 * Russell &amp; Norvig 2003, pp. 950–952,  Gödel 1951: in this lecture, Kurt Gödel uses the incompleteness theorem to arrive at the following disjunction: (a) the human mind is not a consistent finite machine, or (b) there exist Diophantine equations for which it cannot decide whether solutions exist. Gödel finds (b) implausible, and thus seems to have believed the human mind was not equivalent to a finite machine, i.e., its power exceeded that of any finite machine. He recognized that this was only a conjecture, since one could never disprove (b). Yet he considered the disjunctive conclusion to be a \"certain fact\".  The Mathematical Objection: * Russell &amp; Norvig 2003, p. 949 * McCorduck 2004, pp. 448–449 Making the Mathematical Objection: * Lucas 1961 * Penrose 1989 Refuting Mathematical Objection: * Turing 1950 under \"(2) The Mathematical Objection\" * Hofstadter 1979 Background: * Gödel 1931, Church 1936, Kleene 1935, Turing 1937  Graham Oppy (20 January 2015). \"Gödel's Incompleteness Theorems\". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Archived from the original on 22 April 2016. Retrieved 27 April 2016. These Gödelian anti-mechanist arguments are, however, problematic, and there is wide consensus that they fail.  Stuart J. Russell; Peter Norvig (2010). \"26.1.2: Philosophical Foundations/Weak AI: Can Machines Act Intelligently?/The mathematical objection\". Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach (3rd ed.). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall. ISBN 978-0-13-604259-4. even if we grant that computers have limitations on what they can prove, there is no evidence that humans are immune from those limitations.  Mark Colyvan. An introduction to the philosophy of mathematics. Cambridge University Press, 2012. From 2.2.2, 'Philosophical significance of Gödel's incompleteness results': \"The accepted wisdom (with which I concur) is that the Lucas-Penrose arguments fail.\"  Iphofen, Ron; Kritikos, Mihalis (3 January 2019). \"Regulating artificial intelligence and robotics: ethics by design in a digital society\". Contemporary Social Science: 1–15. doi:10.1080/21582041.2018.1563803. ISSN 2158-2041.  \"Ethical AI Learns Human Rights Framework\". Voice of America. Archived from the original on 11 November 2019. Retrieved 10 November 2019.  Crevier 1993, pp. 132–144.  In the early 1970s, Kenneth Colby presented a version of Weizenbaum's ELIZA known as DOCTOR which he promoted as a serious therapeutic tool.[216]  Joseph Weizenbaum's critique of AI: * Weizenbaum 1976 * Crevier 1993, pp. 132–144 * McCorduck 2004, pp. 356–373 * Russell &amp; Norvig 2003, p. 961 Weizenbaum (the AI researcher who developed the first chatterbot program, ELIZA) argued in 1976 that the misuse of artificial intelligence has the potential to devalue human life.  Wendell Wallach (2010). Moral Machines, Oxford University Press.  Wallach, pp 37–54.  Wallach, pp 55–73.  Wallach, Introduction chapter.  Michael Anderson and Susan Leigh Anderson (2011), Machine Ethics, Cambridge University Press.  \"Machine Ethics\". aaai.org. Archived from the original on 29 November 2014.  Rubin, Charles (Spring 2003). \"Artificial Intelligence and Human Nature\". The New Atlantis. 1: 88–100. Archived from the original on 11 June 2012.  Brooks, Rodney (10 November 2014). \"artificial intelligence is a tool, not a threat\". Archived from the original on 12 November 2014.  \"Stephen Hawking, Elon Musk, and Bill Gates Warn About Artificial Intelligence\". Observer. 19 August 2015. Archived from the original on 30 October 2015. Retrieved 30 October 2015.  Chalmers, David (1995). \"Facing up to the problem of consciousness\". Journal of Consciousness Studies. 2 (3): 200–219. Archived from the original on 8 March 2005. Retrieved 11 October 2018. See also this link Archived 8 April 2011 at the Wayback Machine  Horst, Steven, (2005) \"The Computational Theory of Mind\" Archived 11 September 2018 at the Wayback Machine in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy  Searle 1980, p. 1.  This version is from Searle (1999), and is also quoted in Dennett 1991, p. 435. Searle's original formulation was \"The appropriately programmed computer really is a mind, in the sense that computers given the right programs can be literally said to understand and have other cognitive states.\" [230] Strong AI is defined similarly by Russell &amp; Norvig (2003, p. 947): \"The assertion that machines could possibly act intelligently",
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      "description": "Asada, M.; Hosoda, K.; Kuniyoshi, Y.; Ishiguro, H.; Inui, T.; Yoshikawa, Y.; Ogino, M.; Yoshida, C. (2009). \"Cognitive developmental robotics: a survey\". IEEE Transactions on Autonomous Mental Development. 1 (1): 12–34. doi:10.1109/tamd.2009.2021702. S2CID 10168773. \"ACM Computing Classification System: Artificial intelligence\". ACM. 1998. Archived from the original on 12 October 2007. Retrieved 30 August 2007. Goodman, Joanna (2016). Robots in Law: How Artificial Intelligence is Transforming Legal Services (1st ed.). Ark Group. ISBN 978-1-78358-264-8. Archived from the original on 8 November 2016. Retrieved 7 November 2016. Albus, J. S. (2002). \"4-D/RCS: A Reference Model Architecture for Intelligent Unmanned Ground Vehicles\" (PDF). In Gerhart, G.; Gunderson, R.; Shoemaker, C. (eds.). Proceedings of the SPIE AeroSense Session on Unmanned Ground Vehicle Technology. Unmanned Ground Vehicle Technology IV. 3693. pp. 11–20. Bibcode:2002SPIE.4715..303A. 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The alternative, embodied by IIT [Integrated Information Theory], is that computers will remain only supersophisticated machinery, ghostlike empty shells, devoid of what we value most: the feeling of life itself.\" (p. 49.) Marcus, Gary, \"Am I Human?: Researchers need new ways to distinguish artificial intelligence from the natural kind\", Scientific American, vol. 316, no. 3 (March 2017), pp. 58–63. A stumbling block to AI has been an incapacity for reliable disambiguation. An example is the \"pronoun disambiguation problem\": a machine has no way of determining to whom or what a pronoun in a sentence refers. (p. 61.) E McGaughey, 'Will Robots Automate Your Job Away? Full Employment, Basic Income, and Economic Democracy' (2018) SSRN, part 2(3) Archived 24 May 2018 at the Wayback Machine. George Musser, \"Artificial Imagination: How machines could learn creativity and common sense, among other human qualities\", Scientific American, vol. 320, no. 5 (May 2019), pp. 58–63. 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      "readme": "# Other-sources\nAsada, M.; Hosoda, K.; Kuniyoshi, Y.; Ishiguro, H.; Inui, T.; Yoshikawa, Y.; Ogino, M.; Yoshida, C. (2009). \"Cognitive developmental robotics: a survey\". IEEE Transactions on Autonomous Mental Development. 1 (1): 12–34. doi:10.1109/tamd.2009.2021702. S2CID 10168773. \"ACM Computing Classification System: Artificial intelligence\". ACM. 1998. Archived from the original on 12 October 2007. Retrieved 30 August 2007. Goodman, Joanna (2016). Robots in Law: How Artificial Intelligence is Transforming Legal Services (1st ed.). Ark Group. ISBN 978-1-78358-264-8. Archived from the original on 8 November 2016. Retrieved 7 November 2016. Albus, J. S. (2002). \"4-D/RCS: A Reference Model Architecture for Intelligent Unmanned Ground Vehicles\" (PDF). In Gerhart, G.; Gunderson, R.; Shoemaker, C. (eds.). Proceedings of the SPIE AeroSense Session on Unmanned Ground Vehicle Technology. Unmanned Ground Vehicle Technology IV. 3693. pp. 11–20. 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The alternative, embodied by IIT [Integrated Information Theory], is that computers will remain only supersophisticated machinery, ghostlike empty shells, devoid of what we value most: the feeling of life itself.\" (p. 49.) Marcus, Gary, \"Am I Human?: Researchers need new ways to distinguish artificial intelligence from the natural kind\", Scientific American, vol. 316, no. 3 (March 2017), pp. 58–63. A stumbling block to AI has been an incapacity for reliable disambiguation. An example is the \"pronoun disambiguation problem\": a machine has no way of determining to whom or what a pronoun in a sentence refers. (p. 61.) E McGaughey, 'Will Robots Automate Your Job Away? Full Employment, Basic Income, and Economic Democracy' (2018) SSRN, part 2(3) Archived 24 May 2018 at the Wayback Machine. George Musser, \"Artificial Imagination: How machines could learn creativity and common sense, among other human qualities\", Scientific American, vol. 320, no. 5 (May 2019), pp. 58–63. Myers, Courtney Boyd ed. (2009). \"The AI Report\" Archived 29 July 2017 at the Wayback Machine. Forbes June 2009 Raphael, Bertram (1976). The Thinking Computer. W.H.Freeman and Company. ISBN 978-0-7167-0723-3. Archived from the original on 26 July 2020. Retrieved 22 August 2020. Scharre, Paul, \"Killer Apps: The Real Dangers of an AI Arms Race\", Foreign Affairs, vol. 98, no. 3 (May/June 2019), pp. 135–44. \"Today's AI technologies are powerful but unreliable. Rules-based systems cannot deal with circumstances their programmers did not anticipate. Learning systems are limited by the data on which they were trained. AI failures have already led to tragedy. Advanced autopilot features in cars, although they perform well in some circumstances, have driven cars without warning into trucks, concrete barriers, and parked cars. In the wrong situation, AI systems go from supersmart to superdumb in an instant. When an enemy is trying to manipulate and hack an AI system, the risks are even greater.\" (p. 140.) Serenko, Alexander (2010). \"The development of an AI journal ranking based on the revealed preference approach\" (PDF). Journal of Informetrics. 4 (4): 447–459. doi:10.1016/j.joi.2010.04.001. Archived (PDF) from the original on 4 October 2013. Retrieved 24 August 2013. Serenko, Alexander; Michael Dohan (2011). \"Comparing the expert survey and citation impact journal ranking methods: Example from the field of Artificial Intelligence\" (PDF). Journal of Informetrics. 5 (4): 629–649. doi:10.1016/j.joi.2011.06.002. Archived (PDF) from the original on 4 October 2013. Retrieved 12 September 2013. Sun, R. &amp; Bookman, L. (eds.), Computational Architectures: Integrating Neural and Symbolic Processes. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Needham, MA. 1994. Tom Simonite (29 December 2014). \"2014 in Computing: Breakthroughs in Artificial Intelligence\". MIT Technology Review. Tooze, Adam, \"Democracy and Its Discontents\", The New York Review of Books, vol. LXVI, no. 10 (6 June 2019), pp. 52–53, 56–57. \"Democracy has no clear answer for the mindless operation of bureaucratic and technological power. We may indeed be witnessing its extension in the form of artificial intelligence and robotics. Likewise, after decades of dire warning, the environmental problem remains fundamentally unaddressed.... Bureaucratic overreach and environmental catastrophe are precisely the kinds of slow-moving existential challenges that democracies deal with very badly.... Finally, there is the threat du jour: corporations and the technologies they promote.\" (pp. 56–57.)",
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      "readme": "# Vehicle CAN Red-Team Lab\n\n**Stack:** C++ · Python · CAN · ARM · SocketCAN · Linux\n**Timeline:** Jan 2026 – Apr 2026\n\nAn automotive CAN-bus penetration-testing lab built around an **emulated\nvehicle**. It provides ECU emulation, traffic capture, replay, fuzzing,\narbitration-ID discovery, and UDS diagnostic-session testing against an\nintentionally weak diagnostic server, then closes the loop with defenses\n(cadence-based intrusion detection and SecOC-style message authentication) and\nregression tests that prove the attacks are caught.\n\n> ⚠️ **Scope & ethics.** The target is an emulated ECU that lives entirely on a\n> CAN bus you create, by default python-can's in-process *virtual* bus (no\n> kernel modules, no root), optionally a Linux SocketCAN `vcan0`. Nothing here\n> talks to a real vehicle. CAN fuzzing/injection on a real car is dangerous and\n> illegal without authorization; this lab exists to learn the protocol and its\n> defenses safely. See the fuzzer note below.\n\n---\n\n## What it does\n\n| Capability | Component |\n|---|---|\n| ECU emulation (telemetry + UDS server) | `ecu/ecu_emulator.py` |\n| Traffic capture (candump-style log) | `tools/capture.py` |\n| Message replay | `tools/replay.py`, C++ `cpp/can_send.cpp` |\n| Arbitration-ID discovery | `tools/arbid_discovery.py` |\n| CAN fuzzing | `tools/fuzzer.py` |\n| Diagnostic-session / security-access testing | `tools/uds_client.py` |\n| Spoofing & replay attacks | `attacks/spoof_attack.py`, `attacks/replay_attack.py` |\n| Intrusion detection + message auth (defense) | `defense/monitor.py` |\n\n## The intentionally-vulnerable target\n\n`ecu/ecu_emulator.py` broadcasts speed/RPM/door/light frames and runs a small\nUDS (ISO 14229) server with deliberately weak diagnostics, mirroring real-world\nfindings:\n\n- **No message authentication** on the bus → spoofing and replay both work.\n- **Constant security-access seed** (`0x1234`) and a **trivial key algorithm**\n  (`seed XOR 0xFFFF`) → security access is bypassable.\n- **Write-data-by-identifier allowed in an extended session without security\n  access** → unsafe diagnostic access.\n\nEach of these is exercised by a tool and then addressed by a defense.\n\n## Quick start (virtual bus, no root)\n\n```bash\npip install -r requirements.txt\n\n# Terminal 1 — bring the emulated vehicle online\npython ecu/ecu_emulator.py\n\n# Terminal 2 — recon, diagnostics, attack\npython tools/arbid_discovery.py --seconds 3       # enumerate live IDs\npython tools/capture.py --seconds 5 --out cap.log # record traffic\npython tools/uds_client.py --unlock               # weak security-access handshake\npython attacks/spoof_attack.py --speed 240        # forge the speed reading\n\n# Terminal 3 — watch the defense catch it\npython defense/monitor.py --seconds 6             # cadence anomaly alerts\n```\n\n## Running against a real SocketCAN interface\n\n```bash\nsudo scripts/setup_vcan.sh vcan0        # create + bring up vcan0\nexport CANLAB_INTERFACE=socketcan\nexport CANLAB_CHANNEL=vcan0\nmake cpp && ./cpp/can_send vcan0 244 00 3c 00 00 00 00   # raw C++ inject\ncandump vcan0                            # from can-utils, to observe\n```\n\nEvery Python module reads the backend from `canlab_common.open_bus()`, so the\nsame code runs on the virtual bus or on `vcan0` with only the two env vars\nchanged.\n\n## Defense: from detection to prevention\n\n`defense/monitor.py` implements two layers:\n\n1. **Cadence/frequency IDS.** Each broadcast ID has an expected period; a spoof\n   or replay that out-paces the real ECU trips an anomaly alert. Non-invasive —\n   it needs no ECU changes and catches the injection in the test suite.\n2. **Message authentication (the real fix).** `sign_frame()` appends a counter\n   and a truncated HMAC over `(id, counter, payload)`; `verify_frame()` rejects\n   any frame with a bad tag and enforces a monotonic counter, defeating **both**\n   spoofing (no valid tag) and replay (stale counter). This is a lab-scale\n   stand-in for AUTOSAR **SecOC**.\n\nThe regression suite asserts the spoof is detected and that signing stops both\nspoofing and replay.\n\n## Tests\n\n```bash\nmake test        # 5 tests: discovery, UDS VIN, security-access, spoof-detect, msg-auth\n```\n\nThey run on the virtual bus, so CI needs no special privileges (see\n`.github/workflows/ci.yml`).\n\n## Reverse-engineering & firmware note\n\nThe RE half of the resume bullet — recovering CAN state machines and diagnostic\nlogic from firmware — maps onto this lab as follows: the emulator's UDS state\nmachine (session → security access → read/write) is the kind of logic you'd\nrecover from a stripped ECU image in Ghidra, then model and attack. Extending\nthe emulator with a firmware-style flash-download (UDS 0x34/0x36/0x37) routine\nand reversing it is a natural next exercise.\n\n## ARM note\n\nECUs are overwhelmingly ARM (Cortex-M / -R). The tooling here is\narchitecture-independent (it speaks CAN, not machine code); the ARM angle shows\nup when reversing real ECU firmware images, which is covered in the RE lab in\nthe companion repository.\n\n## License\n\nMIT — see [LICENSE](LICENSE).",
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      "title": "OMSP - Open Mobility Security Project",
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      "description": "Open Mobility Security Project is an open source project dedicated to standardize a framework of technical controls to evaluate security in all types of vehicles.",
      "readme": "# OMSP - Open Mobility Security Project\n[![Creative Commons License](https://licensebuttons.net/l/by-sa/4.0/88x31.png)](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/ \"CC BY-SA 4.0\")\n[![Contributions Welcome](https://img.shields.io/badge/contributions-welcome-brightgreen.svg?style=flat)](https://github.com/zerolynx/omsp/issues)\n\n\n![OMSP](./images/omsp.png)\n\n## Abstract\n\nOMSP (acronym from Open Mobility Security Project) is an open source project dedicated to the creation of a standard framework with technical controls to review security in all types of vehicles. This project was born as an internal project, used by Zerolynx to perform security reviews of several systems integrated within different vehicles, as cars and trains. Inspired by the popular [OWASP WSTG](https://github.com/OWASP/wstg) project, we decided to release OMSP as an open project, so that the community can get involved, contributing with its knowledge and experience in the field, and therefore, improving the cybersecurity of our vehicles.\n\nOMSP is not a high-level generic guide, nor it's limited to very specific systems which has been already covered in the past. OMSP aims to cover each possible technical test that could be performed on all of the systems and subsystems that are part of the vehicle and its environment. Let’s make it clear: with OMSP we would like to cover the entire threat landscape that could affect our vehicles.\n\nOMSP includes a list of control categories, which group together several controls that allow combining different technical tests to which all the components that make up the vehicle systems and subsystems could be subjected. Specifically, OMSP is focussed on cars, car sharing platforms, and trains, connected or non-connected, although we would like to expand this project to other vehicles such as motorcycles, electric scooters, or even airplanes!\n\nWe are currently working on release version 1.0. You can [read the current document here on GitHub](./document/).\n\n## Targets\n\n*\t**Non-connected cars**: Traditionally, cars have been exclusively mechanical machines or, at most, with some basic electronic system. However, this architecture evolved from the 90's to one with an onboard computer that controles a bunch of sensors and actuators at various parts of the vehicle, all of these connected through the wired network core and with some wireless sensors with differents standarts.\n\n*\t**Connected cars**: Nowadays, vehicles begin to establish Internet connections, either to download information about the realtime traffic state, or to offer new entertainment services such as the access to YouTube or Netflix, to browse the Internet from the car, or to remotly control some of the car actions/functions through the mobile application. This way, the vehicle attack surface acquires new dimensions, since it is no longer an isolated entity that only could be attacked physically, but it is a one more element with Internet connection, and therefore is reachable for the attacker. On the other hand, there are greats steps forward autonomous driving, installing new sensors, actuators and control equipments with Artificial Intelligence in cars.\n\n*\t**Car sharing**: Car sharing vehicles have special operations that differs from the rest of connected cars. They have integrated systems that, on the one hand, allow users to perform a series of operations with mobile phone, and on the other hand, allow providers to control the vehicle and perform remote configurations and information transmitions through the Internet. These cars integrate special devices based on IoT, that provides them with feauters to interact through technologies such as mobile connectivity (3G/4G), NFC, Bluetooth or Wi-Fi.\n\n*\t**Trains**: Trains are a special type of transport that runs on static tracks. Their traction and braking systems are controlled by a driver, however, these systems can be also interfered by automatic security system. For the correct work of this system, the train constantly communicates with the traffic control center and with the tracks in which it circulates, through static beacons that provide information to the train. As connected cars, trains have moved from being isolated elements to being connected machines, with associated risks similar to those of them.\n\n\n## Cyber Mobility Attack Chain\n\nThe vehicles previously mentioned can be cyberattacked from their different state and interface. The following figure describes a group of states from which could be performed different attacks depending on the current condition of the vehicle and the opponent. In it, some attacks are defined that can be perform with the vehicle in stationary and in motion, from inside and outside it, and remotely or closely, through its different driving and connection interfaces, through the entertainment system and through integrated remote control systems.\n\nBased on this, twelve categories of controls have been defined, which also are subdivided into different technical cybersecurity controls, which bring together all the tests that can be executed on each of these vehicles.\n\n![CMAC](./images/cmac.png)\n\nThe Cyber Mobility Attack Chain has been completed with other categories of controls which, even if they don't directly affect the vehicles, have been considered of interest to be included in the project. In them, aspects such as test environment where built-in (developed and tested) software, electrical chargin points, as well as other assets that in time are considered of interest for the project, will be reviewed and evaluated. All this is detailed in the following sections.\n\n\n# Contributing\n\n1. [Fork it](https://github.com/zerolynx/omsp/fork)\n2. Download your fork to your PC (`git clone https://github.com/your_username/omsp && cd omsp`)\n3. Create your feature branch (`git checkout -b my-new-feature`)\n4. Make changes and add them (`git add .`)\n5. Commit your changes (`git commit -m 'Add some feature'`)\n6. Push to the branch (`git push origin my-new-feature`)\n7. Create new pull request\n\n# Project Team\n\n## Project Leaders\n\n- [Juan Antonio Calles](https://twitter.com/jantonioCalles)\n- [Luis Vázquez](https://twitter.com/macgruap)\n- [Francisco Palma](https://twitter.com/1c3t0rm)\n- [Martín Puga](https://www.linkedin.com/in/mpegea/)\n\n## Contributors, Editors and Translators\n\n- [Mercedes Muñoz](https://twitter.com/mikiminoru)\n- [Jesús Alcalde](https://twitter.com/jalcaldea)\n- [Jorge Escabias](https://twitter.com/MrSquid25)\n- [Yevheniy Kushch](https://twitter.com/YevKushch)\n- [David Jiménez](https://twitter.com/djimenezco)\n- [José Hermoso](https://twitter.com/_f1lth_)\n\n# Global References\n*\t[\"Enisa good practices for security of Smart Cars\". European Union Agency For Cybersecurity (ENISA). 2019. ISBN 978-92-9204-317-9](https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/enisa-good-practices-for-security-of-smart-cars)\n*\t[\"CYRail Recommendations on cybersecurity of rail signalling and communication systems\". CYRail Consortium. 2018. ISBN 978-2-7461-2747-0](https://cyrail.eu/IMG/pdf/final_recommendations_cyrail.pdf)\n*\t[\"Car Hacker's Handbook. A Guide for the Penetration Tester\". Craig Smith. 2016. ISBN 1-59327-703-2](http://opengarages.org/handbook/ebook/)\n*\t[\"Hacking Connected Cars: Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures\". Alissa Knight. 2020. ISBN 978-1-119-49173-6](https://www.wiley.com/en-es/Hacking+Connected+Cars%3A+Tactics%2C+Techniques%2C+and+Procedures-p-9781119491736)\n*\t[\"Building your Car Hacking Labs & Car Hacking Community from Scratch\". Jay Turla. Slideshare. 2019](https://www.slideshare.net/JayTurla2/building-your-car-hacking-labs-car-hacking-community-from-scratch)",
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      "title": "🔐 RF Key Fob Security Research — 433 MHz Replay Attack Analysis",
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      "description": "🔐 433 MHz automotive key fob RF security research — OOK demodulation, replay attack analysis, chip family detection (PT2262/EV1527/KeeLoq), and real time defense monitoring",
      "readme": "# 🔐 RF Key Fob Security Research — 433 MHz Replay Attack Analysis\n\n<div align=\"center\">\n\n![Python Version](https://img.shields.io/badge/Python-3.8%2B-blue?style=flat-square&logo=python)\n![License](https://img.shields.io/badge/License-MIT-green?style=flat-square)\n![Platform](https://img.shields.io/badge/Platform-433MHz-orange?style=flat-square)\n![Status](https://img.shields.io/badge/Status-Active%20Development-brightgreen?style=flat-square)\n\n**A comprehensive security research toolkit for automotive RF key fob vulnerability analysis, replay attack demonstration, and defense mechanism development.**\n\n[Quick Start](#-quick-start) • [Tools](#-tools--features) • [Chip Analysis](#-chip-family-analysis) • [Vulnerabilities](#-vulnerabilities--risks) • [Defenses](#-defense-mechanisms)\n\n</div>\n\n---\n\n## 📋 Table of Contents\n\n1. [Overview](#-overview)\n2. [Attack Surface](#-attack-surface)\n3. [Quick Start](#-quick-start)\n4. [Installation](#-installation)\n5. [Tools & Features](#-tools--features)\n6. [Chip Family Analysis](#-chip-family-analysis)\n7. [Vulnerabilities & Risks](#-vulnerabilities--risks)\n8. [Defense Mechanisms](#-defense-mechanisms)\n9. [References](#-references)\n10. [Ethical Disclaimer](#-ethical-disclaimer)\n11. [License](#-license)\n\n---\n\n## 🎯 Overview\n\nThis project provides a complete framework for understanding, analyzing, and demonstrating security vulnerabilities in automotive RF key fobs operating at 433 MHz. It covers the entire attack chain — from signal capture and demodulation through to replay attack execution and defense detection.\n\n**Key Research Areas:**\n- 🛰️ **OOK Demodulation** — On-Off Keying signal processing and frame detection\n- 🔄 **Fixed vs Rolling Code** — Comparative vulnerability analysis\n- 🎮 **Replay Attack Demonstration** — Real-world attack scenarios\n- 🛡️ **Defense & Detection** — Jamming and replay detection monitoring\n- 🔬 **Chip Family Classification** — PT2262, EV1527, KeeLoq, and AUT64 analysis\n\n**Why This Matters:**\nModern automotive security is critical infrastructure. Understanding key fob vulnerabilities helps manufacturers patch systems and allows researchers to identify zero-days before malicious actors do.\n\n---\n\n## 🗺️ Attack Surface\n\n```\n┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐\n│                    433 MHz RF Key Fob                        │\n│                   Transmitter Circuit                        │\n└────────────────────────┬────────────────────────────────────┘\n                         │\n         ┌───────────────┼───────────────┐\n         │               │               │\n    ┌────▼────┐    ┌─────▼─────┐   ┌────▼─────┐\n    │  Encode │    │  Modulate │   │ Transmit │\n    │ (Code)  │    │  (OOK)    │   │(433 MHz) │\n    └────┬────┘    └─────┬─────┘   └────┬─────┘\n         │               │               │\n         └───────────────┼───────────────┘\n                         │\n          ▼──────────────▼──────────────▼\n     ┌──────────────────────────────────┐\n     │  VULNERABILITY WINDOW 🚨          │\n     │  ├─ Unencrypted transmission      │\n     │  ├─ Fixed code (no rolling)       │\n     │  ├─ Predictable timing            │\n     │  ├─ Weak encoding (PT2262)        │\n     │  └─ Replay attack vector          │\n     └──────────────────────────────────┘\n          ▲──────────────┬──────────────▲\n         │               │               │\n    ┌────▼────┐    ┌─────▼─────┐   ┌────▼─────┐\n    │ Receive │    │ Demodulate│   │ Decode   │\n    │ (SDR)   │    │ (OOK)     │   │ (Frame)  │\n    └────┬────┘    └─────┬─────┘   └────┬─────┘\n         │               │               │\n         └───────────────┼───────────────┘\n                         │\n                    ┌────▼─────┐\n                    │ Actuator │\n                    │  (Unlock)│\n                    └──────────┘\n```\n\n---\n\n## ⚡ Quick Start\n\n```bash\n# Clone the repository\ngit clone https://github.com/wincr4ck/rf-keyfob-research.git\ncd rf-keyfob-research\n\n# Install dependencies\npip install -r requirements.txt\n\n# Run in simulation mode (no hardware needed)\npython3 capture.py --simulate --duration 2 --output signal.iq\npython3 analyzer.py --input signal.iq --family PT2262\npython3 defense.py --monitor --simulate\n\n# Or with real hardware (RTL-SDR/HackRF)\npython3 capture.py --sdr rtlsdr --frequency 433.92e6 --duration 10\npython3 replay.py --input captured.iq --sdr hackrf --frequency 433.92e6\n```\n\n---\n\n## 📦 Installation\n\n### Requirements\n\n- **Python 3.8+**\n- **pip** (Python package manager)\n- **Optional Hardware:** RTL-SDR or HackRF for real signal capture and replay\n\n### Step-by-Step Setup\n\n```bash\n# 1. Clone repository\ngit clone https://github.com/wincr4ck/rf-keyfob-research.git\ncd rf-keyfob-research\n\n# 2. Create virtual environment (recommended)\npython3 -m venv venv\nsource venv/bin/activate  # On Windows: venv\\Scripts\\activate\n\n# 3. Install dependencies\npip install -r requirements.txt\n\n# 4. Verify installation\npython3 capture.py --help\npython3 analyzer.py --help\npython3 replay.py --help\npython3 defense.py --help\n```\n\n### Dependencies (`requirements.txt`)\n\n```\nnumpy>=1.21.0\nscipy>=1.7.0\nmatplotlib>=3.4.0\nrtlsdr>=0.2.8\npyusb>=1.2.1\npysimplesoap>=1.16.2\nhackrf>=0.1.0\n```\n\n---\n\n## 🛠️ Tools & Features\n\n### 1. 📡 `capture.py` — IQ Capture & OOK Demodulation\n\nCaptures raw RF signals and performs OOK (On-Off Keying) demodulation to extract the modulated code.\n\n**Features:**\n- Real-time IQ sample capture from RTL-SDR or HackRF\n- Automatic frequency detection (433.05–433.92 MHz)\n- OOK demodulation with configurable thresholds\n- Frame detection and synchronization\n- Simulation mode for testing without hardware\n\n**CLI Flags:**\n```bash\npython3 capture.py [OPTIONS]\n\nOPTIONS:\n  --sdr {rtlsdr,hackrf,simulate}  SDR type (default: simulate)\n  --frequency FREQ                Capture frequency in Hz (default: 433.92e6)\n  --duration SECONDS              Capture duration (default: 5)\n  --sample-rate RATE              Sample rate in S/s (default: 2e6)\n  --threshold FLOAT               OOK threshold 0-1 (default: 0.5)\n  --output FILE                   Output IQ file (default: signal.iq)\n  --simulate                      Use simulation mode\n  --verbose                       Enable verbose logging\n```\n\n**Example Usage:**\n```bash\n# Capture 10 seconds with RTL-SDR\npython3 capture.py --sdr rtlsdr --frequency 433.92e6 --duration 10 --output capture1.iq\n\n# Simulate capture without hardware\npython3 capture.py --simulate --duration 2 --threshold 0.5 --output sim_signal.iq\n\n# High sample rate for detailed analysis\npython3 capture.py --sdr hackrf --sample-rate 10e6 --duration 5 --verbose\n```\n\n---\n\n### 2. 🎮 `replay.py` — Replay Attack Implementation\n\nReplays captured RF signals to demonstrate the vulnerability. This is the core attack demonstration tool.\n\n**Features:**\n- Playback of captured IQ signals\n- Real-time transmission via HackRF or RTL-SDR (transmit mode)\n- Timing control and burst repetition\n- Frequency accuracy calibration\n- Frame-by-frame replay with configurable delay\n\n**CLI Flags:**\n```bash\npython3 replay.py [OPTIONS]\n\nOPTIONS:\n  --input FILE                    Input IQ file (required)\n  --sdr {hackrf,rtlsdr}           SDR device (default: hackrf)\n  --frequency FREQ                Transmit frequency in Hz (default: 433.92e6)\n  --gain GAIN                     TX gain 0-47 (default: 10)\n  --repeat COUNT                  Number of repeats (default: 5)\n  --delay SECONDS                 Delay between repeats (default: 0.5)\n  --calibrate                     Enable frequency calibration\n  --dry-run                       Simulate without transmitting\n  --verbose                       Enable verbose logging\n```\n\n**Example Usage:**\n```bash\n# Basic replay (5 times)\npython3 replay.py --input capture1.iq --sdr hackrf --repeat 5\n\n# Dry run to test without transmitting\npython3 replay.py --input capture1.iq --dry-run --verbose\n\n# Calibrated replay with frequency correction\npython3 replay.py --input capture1.iq --calibrate --gain 15\n```\n\n---\n\n### 3. 🔬 `analyzer.py` — Chip Family Detection & Analysis\n\nAnalyzes captured signals to identify the encoding chip family and extract vulnerability details.\n\n**Features:**\n- Automatic chip family classification (PT2262, EV1527, KeeLoq, AUT64)\n- Protocol pattern recognition\n- Code extraction and analysis\n- Bit rate and timing analysis\n- Vulnerability assessment per family\n\n**CLI Flags:**\n```bash\npython3 analyzer.py [OPTIONS]\n\nOPTIONS:\n  --input FILE                    Input IQ file (required)\n  --family {PT2262,EV1527,KeeLoq,AUT64,auto}  Chip family (default: auto)\n  --threshold FLOAT               Demodulation threshold 0-1 (default: 0.5)\n  --extract-code                  Extract and display raw code\n  --timing-analysis               Perform detailed timing analysis\n  --output FILE                   Save analysis to JSON file\n  --verbose                       Enable verbose logging\n```\n\n**Example Usage:**\n```bash\n# Auto-detect chip family\npython3 analyzer.py --input signal.iq --family auto --verbose\n\n# Analyze as PT2262 with code extraction\npython3 analyzer.py --input signal.iq --family PT2262 --extract-code --output analysis.json\n\n# Timing analysis for rolling code detection\npython3 analyzer.py --input signal.iq --timing-analysis --output timing.json\n```\n\n---\n\n### 4. 🛡️ `defense.py` — Replay & Jamming Detection Monitor\n\nMonitors for and detects replay attacks and jamming attempts on key fob systems.\n\n**Features:**\n- Real-time signal monitoring (RTL-SDR compatible)\n- Replay attack pattern detection\n- Jamming signal detection\n- Statistical anomaly analysis\n- Alert system with configurable thresholds\n- Simulation mode for testing\n\n**CLI Flags:**\n```bash\npython3 defense.py [OPTIONS]\n\nOPTIONS:\n  --sdr {rtlsdr,simulate}         SDR type (default: simulate)\n  --frequency FREQ                Monitor frequency in Hz (default: 433.92e6)\n  --duration SECONDS              Monitoring duration (default: 60)\n  --sample-rate RATE              Sample rate in S/s (default: 2e6)\n  --replay-threshold FLOAT        Replay detection threshold 0-1 (default: 0.8)\n  --jam-threshold FLOAT           Jamming threshold 0-1 (default: 0.7)\n  --monitor                       Continuous monitoring mode\n  --alert-file FILE               Save alerts to file\n  --verbose                       Enable verbose logging\n  --simulate                      Use simulation mode\n```\n\n**Example Usage:**\n```bash\n# Monitor for attacks (simulation)\npython3 defense.py --monitor --simulate --duration 120 --verbose\n\n# Real monitoring with RTL-SDR\npython3 defense.py --sdr rtlsdr --monitor --duration 300 --alert-file alerts.log\n\n# Save detailed alerts\npython3 defense.py --monitor --simulate --alert-file security_alerts.json --verbose\n```\n\n---\n\n## 📊 Chip Family Analysis\n\n| Feature | PT2262 | EV1527 | KeeLoq (HCS301) | AUT64 |\n|---------|--------|--------|-----------------|-------|\n| **Encoding Type** | Fixed Code | Rolling Code | Hopping Code | Advanced |\n| **Bit Length** | 12 bits | 25 bits | 66 bits | 64+ bits |\n| **Vulnerability** | 🔴 CRITICAL | 🟡 MEDIUM | 🟡 MEDIUM | 🟢 SECURE |\n| **Replay Attack** | ✅ Vulnerable | ⚠️ Limited | ⚠️ Limited | ❌ Resistant |\n| **Brute Force** | ✅ Feasible | ❌ Infeasible | ❌ Infeasible | ❌ Infeasible |\n| **Known Exploits** | Multiple | Research Only | RollJam | None Public |\n| **CWE-294 Risk** | 🔴 CRITICAL | 🟡 MEDIUM | 🟡 MEDIUM | 🟢 LOW |\n| **CVSS Score** | 9.1 CRITICAL | 6.2 MEDIUM | 7.5 HIGH | 2.1 LOW |\n| **Common In** | Older cars (pre-2010) | Mid-range cars | Premium vehicles | Modern EVs |\n| **Real-World Affected** | VW, Hyundai, Nissan | Toyota, Ford | BMW, Mercedes | Tesla, Lucid |\n\n### Chip Details\n\n**PT2262** — Highly Vulnerable. Uses a static 12-bit code with no rolling code mechanism, making it directly susceptible to replay attacks. Brute force is feasible across all 4,096 possible codes. Classified as CWE-294 (Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay).\n\n**EV1527** — Medium Risk. Implements a rolling code with a 25-bit sequence, providing stronger protection than PT2262, but a vulnerability window exists with multiple replay captures under certain conditions.\n\n**KeeLoq / HCS301** — Medium Risk. Uses a hopping code based on the KEELOQ algorithm but is vulnerable to the RollJam attack demonstrated by Samy Kamkar at DEF CON 2015. Requires synchronization between transmitter and receiver, which can be deliberately disrupted.\n\n**AUT64** — Modern Secure Implementation. Uses advanced encryption with 64-bit rolling codes and multiple authentication layers. Currently considered best practice for automotive implementations.\n\n---\n\n## ⚠️ Vulnerabilities & Risks\n\n### CWE-294: Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay\n\n**CVSS v3.1 Score: 8.1 (HIGH)**\n\n**Affected:** PT2262, EV1527 with weak implementation\n\n**Description:** RF key fobs using fixed codes or predictable rolling codes allow an attacker to capture a valid transmission and replay it to trigger vehicle unlock or ignition without holding the physical key.\n\n**CVSS Metrics:**\n- **Attack Vector:** Physical proximity (~100 meter RF range)\n- **Attack Complexity:** Low (direct replay)\n- **Privileges Required:** None\n- **User Interaction:** None\n- **Confidentiality Impact:** Low\n- **Integrity Impact:** High (vehicle control)\n- **Availability Impact:** High (vehicle immobilized)\n\n### Real-World Attack Patterns\n\n**RollJam Attack (Samy Kamkar, DEF CON 2015)**\n```\n1. Attacker deploys two SDR devices near the target vehicle.\n2. Device A jams the 433 MHz channel to prevent the car from receiving.\n3. Device B captures the fob's transmission during the jam.\n4. Device A replays the captured frame at high power — vehicle unlocks.\n5. The receiver never advanced its rolling code counter.\n6. The attacker now holds a valid future code for later use.\n```\n\n**Fixed-Code Keylog Attack**\n```\n- Capture multiple transmissions from the target fob.\n- Build a local database of valid codes.\n- Replay any captured code at will.\n- Particularly effective against PT2262 devices.\n```\n\n---\n\n## 🛡️ Defense Mechanisms\n\n### Detection Strategies in `defense.py`\n\n**Replay Attack Detection** works by performing statistical analysis of inter-frame timing, detecting duplicate frames within short intervals, and validating sequence numbers and HMAC signatures where supported.\n\n**Jamming Detection** looks for power level anomalies, noise floor elevation, signal quality degradation, and bandwidth expansion on the monitored frequency.\n\n**Rolling Code Monitoring** tracks expected sequence numbers, raises alerts for out-of-order packets, and detects sync loss between the transmitter and receiver.\n\n**Anomaly Detection** continuously monitors for timing pattern irregularities, frequency drift, power envelope changes, and elevated bit error rates.\n\n### Recommended Defenses\n\n**For Manufacturers:**\n- Implement rolling codes (KeeLoq minimum, AUT64 preferred)\n- Add HMAC/signature verification to all transmissions\n- Combine frequency hopping with code hopping\n- Implement strict receive-window timeouts\n- Add active jamming detection on the receiver side\n- Require firmware validation before unlock authorization\n\n**For Vehicle Owners:**\n- Store key fobs in a Faraday pouch when not in use\n- Enable the steering wheel lock as a secondary deterrent\n- Park in secure, monitored garages where possible\n- Enable GPS tracking and tamper alerts if available\n\n---\n\n## 📚 References\n\n1. **Samy Kamkar — RollJam: Remote Power/RF Control Jam & Replay** — DEF CON 23, 2015. https://samy.pl/rolljam/\n\n2. **Garcia, F. D.; Oswald, D.; Kasper, T.; Pavlidès, P.** — *Lock It and Still Lose It — On the (In)Security of Automotive Remote Keyless Systems*, USENIX Security 2016. https://eprint.iacr.org/2012/450.pdf\n\n3. **Eisenbarth, T.; Kasper, T.; et al.** — *On the Implementation of the Advanced Encryption Standard on FPGA*, 2007.\n\n### Tools & Frameworks Referenced\n- **GNU Radio** — RF signal processing framework\n- **RTL-SDR / HackRF** — Software-defined radio hardware platforms\n- **URH (Universal Radio Hacker)** — Visual RF signal analysis tool\n- **Wireshark + RF plugins** — Protocol-level analysis\n\n### Standards\n- **ISM Band 433 MHz** — License-free frequency band specification\n- **OOK Modulation** — On-Off Keying standard\n- **NIST SP 800-38A** — Block Cipher Modes of Operation\n\n---\n\n## ✅ Ethical & Legal Disclaimer\n\n> ⚠️ This project is provided **for educational and authorized security research purposes only**.\n\n**Permitted Use:**\n- Academic research on equipment you own\n- Authorized penetration testing of systems you have written permission to test\n- Manufacturer security validation and bug bounty programs\n- Government or law enforcement activities with appropriate authorization\n\n**Prohibited Use:**\n- Unauthorized access to any vehicle or system\n- Jamming licensed frequencies (illegal in most jurisdictions)\n- Eavesdropping on third-party communications\n- Vehicle theft or unauthorized unlock of any kind\n- Interference with emergency or safety-critical frequencies\n\n**Jurisdiction Notes:**\n- 🇺🇸 USA — FCC Title 47, Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA)\n- 🇪🇺 EU — Radio Equipment Directive (RED), GDPR\n- 🇱🇰 Sri Lanka — Telecommunications Regulatory Commission (TRCSL)\n- Check local wireless regulations before operating any RF hardware.\n\n**Responsible Disclosure:** If you discover a vulnerability in an automotive key fob system, report it directly to the vehicle manufacturer through their coordinated disclosure program (HackerOne, Bugcrowd, or Intigriti). Allow a minimum 90-day remediation window before any public disclosure, and do not demonstrate attacks on vehicles you do not own.\n\nBy using this toolkit you agree to use it solely for lawful, authorized purposes and to comply with all applicable regulations.\n\n---\n\n## 📄 License\n\nThis project is licensed under the **MIT License** — see the `LICENSE` file for full details.\n\n---\n\n<div align=\"center\">\n\n*Made for the security research community. If this helped your work, a ⭐ is appreciated.*\n\n</div>",
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      "readme": "# ECU Audit CLI + Web Viewer\n\n![Python](https://img.shields.io/badge/Python-3.7%2B-green?logo=python)\n![Platform](https://img.shields.io/badge/Platform-Linux%20%7C%20Windows%20%7C%20macOS-blue)\n![Docker](https://img.shields.io/badge/Docker-Supported-blue?logo=docker)\n![License](https://img.shields.io/badge/License-MIT-yellow)\n\n---\n\nA CLI + web-based audit logger for vehicle ECUs, built around ELM327 over CAN.\nThe focus is **tamper-evident logging**: events are recorded into a\ncryptographically chained log so that later edits, deletions, or reordering\ncan be detected.\n\n> **Project status: pre-release / proof-of-concept.**\n> The secure logging core is implemented and tested. Adapter detection and a\n> read-only capability check are implemented. Live ECU communication over CAN\n> is **not yet implemented** — see [Roadmap](#roadmap) for an honest\n> breakdown of what works today versus what is planned.\n\n---\n\n## What works today\n\n| Capability | Status |\n|---|---|\n| Hash-chained, HMAC-signed event logging | Implemented & unit-tested |\n| Integrity verification (`verify_logs` / `--verify`) | Implemented & unit-tested |\n| ELM327 / OBD serial device **detection** (USB & paired Bluetooth) | Implemented |\n| Adapter **capability check** (read-only probe, web UI) | Implemented; pending hardware validation |\n| Flask web viewer for browsing logs | Implemented |\n| Live CAN frame reading from a vehicle | Not yet implemented |\n| UDS diagnostic requests (`0x19`, `0x22`) | Planned (v0.3) |\n| CBOR / AUTOSAR XML export | Planned (v0.3) |\n\nThe tool can **create, sign, store, and verify** an audit log today, and can\n**detect and probe** a connected ELM327 adapter. It does not yet **read\ntraffic** from a vehicle. The capability check is the first step toward that:\nit talks to the adapter (read-only) but not to the vehicle bus.\n\n---\n\n## How the tamper-evident log works\n\nEach log entry contains:\n\n| Field | Meaning |\n|---|---|\n| `prev_sig` | Signature of the preceding entry (`GENESIS` for the first) |\n| `timestamp` | UTC ISO-8601 time the event was recorded |\n| `event_id` | Integer event identifier |\n| `severity` | Integer severity level |\n| `module` | Source module / subsystem |\n| `message` | Human-readable description |\n| `signature` | HMAC-SHA256 over the canonical form of all fields above |\n\nBecause `prev_sig` is part of the **signed** payload, every entry is\ncryptographically bound to its predecessor, transitively back to a fixed\ngenesis marker. `verify_logs()` therefore detects:\n\n- **field edits** — the modified entry's own signature no longer matches\n- **deletions** — the following entry's `prev_sig` link is broken\n- **reordering** — the `prev_sig` links no longer line up\n\n**Important:** the guarantee only holds if the signing key is kept somewhere\nthe audited system cannot reach. Anyone with both the log and the key can\nre-sign a modified log. Supply the key via `--secret-key` or the\n`ECU_AUDIT_KEY` environment variable.\n\n---\n\n## Adapter capability check\n\n\"ELM327\" is a spec with many clone implementations, and they vary in which\nprotocols and commands they actually support. The capability check helps a\nuser answer: *will this adapter do what I expect?*\n\nOpen the web viewer and go to **`/capabilities`**. Select a detected adapter\nand click **Run Check**. The tool sends a short sequence of **read-only**\ncommands (identity, firmware, current protocol, connector voltage) and shows\na report of what the adapter reports back.\n\nNotes and limitations:\n- Every command sent is read-only. Nothing is written to the vehicle bus, so\n  it is safe to run with the ignition on.\n- The report shows what the adapter **claims**. A clone may report support\n  for something and still behave differently in practice.\n- Protocol detection only returns a meaningful value when the adapter is\n  connected to a powered vehicle bus.\n- A Bluetooth adapter must be paired at the OS level first, so that it is\n  exposed as a serial device. If a connected adapter is not detected, it is\n  almost certainly a naming gap — the port can still be probed by selecting\n  it manually.\n\n---\n\n## Quick Start\n\n```bash\npip install -r requirements.txt\n```\n\n**Run the web viewer:**\n\n```bash\npython ecu_audit/webapp.py\n# logs:          http://localhost:5000\n# capability check: http://localhost:5000/capabilities\n```\n\n**Detect a device and start a logging session:**\n\n```bash\nexport ECU_AUDIT_KEY=\"your-signing-key\"\necu-audit --auto\n```\n\n**Verify the integrity of a log file:**\n\n```bash\necu-audit --verify --secret-key \"your-signing-key\"\n```\n\nExits `0` if the chain is intact, or non-zero (printing the failing entry\nindices) if it is not.\n\n---\n\n## Linux / macOS adapter access\n\n- **Linux USB:** serial access usually needs group membership —\n  `sudo usermod -aG dialout $USER`, then log out and back in.\n- **macOS Bluetooth:** pair the adapter in System Settings → Bluetooth first.\n  It then appears as a `/dev/cu.*` serial device.\n\nPython ≥ 3.7 is required.\n\n---\n\n## Running the tests\n\n```bash\npython -m unittest discover -s tests -v\n```\n\nThe suite covers entry creation, chain linkage, persistence, and the tamper\nscenarios (edit, delete, reorder, wrong key, forged append).\n\n---\n\n## Roadmap\n\n| Version | Focus | State |\n|---|---|---|\n| v0.1 | CLI/Flask skeleton, Docker | Done |\n| v0.2 | Hash-chained logging, device detection, capability check, tests | **Current** |\n| v0.3 | Live CAN read loop, UDS requests, CBOR/XML export | Planned |\n| v0.4 | Multi-ECU gateway mode, cloud/MQTT forwarding | Planned |\n| v1.0 | Access control, ISO/UNR mapping docs, chain-of-custody reports | Planned |\n\nSee `ROADMAP.md` for detail and `RELEASE-NOTES.md` for version history.\nReferences to ISO/SAE 21434 and UN R155/R156 describe intended direction, not\ncertification or compliance.\n\n---\n\n## License\n\nMIT © 2025 Sumit Chouhan",
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      "description": "Hands-on automotive cybersecurity lab for CAN, ECU simulation, UDS, and attack testing using Python and SocketCAN.",
      "readme": "# autocyberlab\n\nAn automotive cybersecurity simulation environment built on Linux SocketCAN (`vcan0` and `vcan1`).\nImplements an end-to-end vehicular network with legitimate ECUs, AUTOSAR SecOC cryptographic authentication, an ISO 14229/ISO 15765-2 UDS diagnostic stack, a real-time clock-skew and frequency IDS, multi-domain gateway firewall, stealth attackers, and an ISO/SAE 21434 compliant Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment (TARA).\n\n---\n\n## 1. Network & System Architecture\n\n```\n ┌────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐\n │        Domain 0: Body / OBD-II Diagnostic Bus          │\n │                       (vcan0)                          │\n └─────────────┬───────────────────────────┬──────────────┘\n               │                           │\n       ┌───────┴──────┐            ┌───────┴─────────────┐\n       │  UDS Server  │            │ Central Gateway ECU │\n       │ (0x700/0x708)│            │  & Security Filter  │\n       └──────────────┘            └───────┬─────────────┘\n                                           │\n ┌─────────────────────────────────────────┴──────────────┐\n │         Domain 1: Powertrain & Safety Bus              │\n │                       (vcan1)                          │\n └─────────────┬───────────────────────────┬──────────────┘\n               │                           │\n       ┌───────┴──────┐            ┌───────┴─────────────┐\n       │  Engine ECU  │───0x100───▶│    Dashboard ECU    │\n       │ (SecOC Auth) │            │ (SecOC Verify + IDS)│\n       └──────────────┘            └─────────────────────┘\n```\n\n---\n\n## 2. File & Component Catalog\n\n| File | Component Role | Key Technical Features |\n|---|---|---|\n| [`config.py`](config.py) | **Central Configuration** | Centralizes bus parameters, arb IDs, SecOC 128-bit key, UDS parameters, and DBC paths. |\n| [`secoc.py`](secoc.py) | **AUTOSAR SecOC Module** | HMAC-SHA256 with 32-bit truncation + 8-bit monotonic freshness counter validation. |\n| [`engine_ecu.py`](engine_ecu.py) | **Powertrain Sender** | Broadcasts `VEHICLE_STATUS` (ID `0x100`) every 100 ms with SecOC MAC and freshness. |\n| [`dashboard_ecu.py`](dashboard_ecu.py) | **Instrument Cluster** | Verifies SecOC authenticity, detects replay, enforces plausibility bounds, and monitors silence watchdog. |\n| [`gateway_ecu.py`](gateway_ecu.py) | **Domain Gateway & Firewall** | Bridges `vcan0` and `vcan1`, filters cross-domain injections, blocks ID 0x000 starvation. |\n| [`uds_ecu.py`](uds_ecu.py) | **UDS Diagnostic Server** | ISO 14229 + ISO-TP (ISO 15765-2), full 17-char VIN (0xF190), SecurityAccess (0x27 Seed-Key), and standard NRCs. |\n| [`uds_tester.py`](uds_tester.py) | **UDS Diagnostic Client** | Reads multi-frame VIN, solves SecurityAccess challenge-response, and writes protected calibration. |\n| [`skew_baseline.py`](skew_baseline.py) | **Clock-Skew Fingerprinter** | Cho & Shin (2016) accumulated clock offset regression + frequency statistics. |\n| [`skew_detector.py`](skew_detector.py) | **Real-Time CAN IDS** | Detects clock-skew deviations, transmission rate bursts (frequency), and abnormal jitter in sliding windows. |\n| [`terminal_dashboard.py`](terminal_dashboard.py) | **Live Visual Monitor** | Rich terminal dashboard displaying gauges, real-time IDS alert feed, and gateway metrics. |\n| [`attacker_ecu.py`](attacker_ecu.py) | **CAN Spoofing Attacker** | Injects forged speed/RPM to demonstrate SecOC MAC rejection. |\n| [`replay_attacker.py`](replay_attacker.py) | **Replay Attacker** | Captures legitimate frames and replays them to demonstrate freshness counter defense. |\n| [`dos_attacker.py`](dos_attacker.py) | **Bus Flood Attacker** | High-frequency message burst to test IDS frequency alarms. |\n| [`stealth_attacker.py`](stealth_attacker.py) | **Advanced Stealth Attacks** | Gradual ramp (creep attack), shadow injection, and priority starvation (ID 0x000). |\n| [`uds_attacker.py`](uds_attacker.py) | **Diagnostic Exploitation** | ECU HardReset DoS, session hijacking, seed entropy brute-forcing, and service discovery fuzzing. |\n| [`test_e2e.py`](test_e2e.py) | **Automated Test Suite** | 9-tier comprehensive unit and integration test runner. |\n| [`tara.md`](tara.md) | **ISO 21434 TARA** | Asset catalog, SFOP damage ratings, attack potential ratings, risk matrix, goals, and traceability. |\n\n---\n\n## 3. Quick Start & Prerequisites\n\n### Setup Virtual CAN Interfaces\n```bash\nsudo ./setup_vcan.sh\n```\n\n### Install Dependencies\n```bash\npip install -r requirements.txt\n```\n\n### Run Automated End-to-End Verification\n```bash\npython test_e2e.py\n```\n\n---\n\n## 4. Running the Scenarios\n\n### Scenario A: Secure Powertrain Telemetry (AUTOSAR SecOC)\n```bash\n# Terminal 1: Start Engine ECU (Transmits signed telemetry at 100ms)\npython engine_ecu.py\n\n# Terminal 2: Start Dashboard ECU (Verifies SecOC and renders speed/RPM)\npython dashboard_ecu.py\n\n# Terminal 3: Try Spoofing Attack (Dashboard will drop forged frames)\npython attacker_ecu.py\n\n# Terminal 4: Try Replay Attack (Dashboard will drop replayed stale frames)\npython replay_attacker.py\n```\n\n### Scenario B: Real-Time Intrusion Detection System (IDS)\n```bash\n# Terminal 1: Run traffic capture on normal traffic\npython logger.py --duration 15\n\n# Terminal 2: Build clock-skew baseline\npython skew_baseline.py\n\n# Terminal 3: Run live IDS detector\npython skew_detector.py\n```\n\n### Scenario C: Diagnostics over CAN (ISO-TP & UDS SecurityAccess)\n```bash\n# Terminal 1: Start UDS Diagnostic Server\npython uds_ecu.py\n\n# Terminal 2: Run Diagnostic Client (Reads full 17-char VIN, unlocks SecurityAccess)\npython uds_tester.py --action all\n\n# Terminal 3: Run Diagnostic Attacker\npython uds_attacker.py --attack bruteforce-key\n```\n\n### Scenario D: Live Terminal Dashboard Monitor\n```bash\n# Start the visual operations center\npython terminal_dashboard.py\n```\n\n---\n\n## 5. Defense-in-Depth Summary\n\n1. **Cryptographic Integrity:** AUTOSAR SecOC (HMAC-SHA256 32-bit truncation).\n2. **Anti-Replay Protection:** 8-bit monotonic freshness counter with forward window check.\n3. **Plausibility & Safety Filter:** Signal range checks, rate-of-change limits, and watchdog timeout.\n4. **Intrusion Detection:** Cho & Shin physical clock-skew fingerprinting + frequency burst detection.\n5. **Diagnostic Authorization:** UDS SecurityAccess (SID 0x27) seed-key challenge-response.\n6. **Network Domain Isolation:** Central Gateway ECU firewall with cross-bus whitelist routing & UDS token-bucket rate limiting.\n\n---\n\n## 6. Known Architectural Limitations & Engineering Trade-offs\n\nThis simulation focuses on demonstrating core automotive security mechanisms within a virtual SocketCAN environment. The following architectural simplifications and trade-offs are explicitly noted:\n\n### A. Freshness Counter Width & Anti-Replay Scope\n- **Current Design:** An 8-bit monotonic counter is transmitted in Byte 3 of `VEHICLE_STATUS`. At a 100 ms message cycle, this counter wraps every $\\approx 25.6$ seconds ($256 \\times 0.1\\text{ s}$).\n- **Security Impact:** The modular delta check $(\\Delta = (F_{rx} - F_{last}) \\pmod{256} \\in [1, 127])$ enforces forward progress and blocks immediate replayed frames. However, an adversary capturing traffic could theoretically replay a captured frame during a matching forward window in subsequent wraparound cycles.\n- **Production Standard:** Real-world AUTOSAR SecOC uses **Freshness Value Management (FVM)** with 24-bit to 64-bit freshness values (e.g. Master Trip Counter + Reset Counter + Message Counter, coupled with periodic Freshness Sync frames). In FVM, only the lowest truncated bits (LSBs) are placed on the bus while full state is tracked internally across both ECUs.\n\n### B. Volatile In-Memory Freshness State\n- **Current Design:** `last_freshness` is maintained in ECU volatile memory and initializes to `None` upon process startup, accepting the first incoming valid frame to establish the baseline.\n- **Security Impact:** An adversary replaying an arbitrary captured frame immediately after an ECU reboot can have it accepted as the initial message.\n- **Production Standard:** Automotive ECUs persist synchronization state across drive cycles using Non-Volatile Memory (NVM) or require secure cryptographic synchronization handshakes before accepting unauthenticated operational frames.\n\n### C. Single-Host Simulation vs. Physical Crystal Oscillator Skew\n- **Current Design:** All simulated ECUs run as separate Linux processes on a single host machine, transmitting over virtual CAN sockets (`vcan0`/`vcan1`) and sharing the host monotonic clock.\n- **Measurement Context:** In physical vehicles, clock-skew IDS (Cho & Shin 2016) fingerprints independent quartz crystal oscillators ($\\pm 10$ to $\\pm 100\\text{ ppm}$ hardware drift). In this lab environment, measured timing variance primarily reflects Python runtime execution, OS task scheduling, and kernel socket queues rather than physical hardware oscillator drift. The mathematical regression and sliding window algorithms remain identical to production IDS engines.\n\n### D. Gateway Domain Containment vs. Physical Arbitration Starvation\n- **Current Design:** The Central Gateway firewall inspects and drops dominant ID `0x000` priority-starvation frames at the inter-domain boundary (`vcan0` $\\leftrightarrow$ `vcan1`).\n- **Containment Boundary:** The gateway successfully isolates the adjacent domain from the attack. However, because classic CAN arbitration occurs at the physical transceiver layer, the gateway cannot prevent arbitration starvation from degrading bus traffic on the originating physical segment where the flood was launched. Mitigation at the physical segment requires bus guardians or transceiver-level rate limiting.\n\n### E. Diagnostic Rate Limiting\n- **Current Design:** The Central Gateway enforces a token-bucket rate limiter ($10\\text{ requests/sec}$, burst capacity $5$) on diagnostic frames traversing from the external OBD-II/Body domain into the safety-critical Powertrain bus. Diagnostic bursts exceeding capacity are dropped and recorded in the firewall audit counter.",
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      "title": "APEX-AV — Autonomous Vehicle Security Research",
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      "readme": "# APEX-AV — Autonomous Vehicle Security Research\n\n> A research paper and presentation exploring how to make autonomous vehicles cryptographically secure — today and in the post-quantum era.\n\n---\n\n## 🚗 What is this about?\n\nAutonomous vehicles are essentially computers on wheels. They communicate constantly — with each other, with road infrastructure, and with the cloud. That connectivity makes them powerful, but also vulnerable.\n\nThis project asks a simple question:\n\n**How do we secure an autonomous vehicle end-to-end, from its internal CAN bus all the way to the cloud, even against future quantum computers?**\n\n---\n\n## 🧭 Our Journey\n\nWe started by reading existing work on automotive cybersecurity and quickly realized that current standards leave serious gaps:\n\n- The **CAN bus** — which controls braking, steering, and throttle — has no built-in authentication\n- **OTA update frameworks** like Uptane have formal specification vulnerabilities (freeze attacks, replay attacks)\n- All deployed **asymmetric cryptography** (RSA, ECC) will be broken by quantum computers within the next decade\n- **Sensor data** (LiDAR, GPS) is transmitted with zero integrity protection\n\nSo we designed **APEX-AV**: a layered security architecture that addresses all of these gaps.\n\n---\n\n## 🏗️ What we propose (APEX-AV)\n\n| Pillar | What it does |\n|--------|-------------|\n| 🔐 **Crypto Foundation** | Ascon-128 for constrained ECUs, AES-128-GCM for Ethernet, ML-KEM + ML-DSA for post-quantum readiness |\n| 🚘 **In-Vehicle Security** | Rule-based CAN IDS, Central Security Gateway with TrustZone, OBD-II access control, LiDAR watermarking, OS-NMA for GPS |\n| 🧠 **Behavioral Monitor** | Detects abnormal vehicle operation patterns — speed, trajectory, sensor inconsistencies |\n| 🕶️ **Digital Twin Dashboard** | Real-time AR/VR fleet monitoring with predictive alerting and remote remediation |\n\n---\n\n## 📁 Repository Contents\n\n```\napex-av-security/\n├── paper/\n│   ├── apex_av_paper.tex       # Full IEEE-format LaTeX paper\n│   └── apex_av_paper.pdf\n├── presentation/\n│   └── apex_av_slides.pptx     # Conference presentation\n└── README.md\n```\n\n---\n\n## 👥 Authors\n\n- **Aziz Harzeallah** — University of Tunis El Manar\n- **Mohamed Aziz Omri** — University of Tunis El Manar\n- Supervised by **Mr. Rachid Zagrouba**\n\n---\n\n## 📚 Key References\n\n- ISO/SAE 21434 — Automotive Cybersecurity Engineering\n- NIST FIPS 203/204 — ML-KEM and ML-DSA (Post-Quantum Standards)\n- NIST SP 800-232 — Ascon Lightweight Cryptography\n- UNECE R155/R156 — Cybersecurity & OTA Regulations\n- Miller & Valasek, Black Hat 2015 — Jeep Cherokee Remote Exploit",
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      "title": "Toyota RAV4 Hybrid (XA50) diagnostic signals",
      "full_name": "4piu/toyota-telemetry-XA50",
      "name": "toyota-telemetry-XA50",
      "owner": "4piu",
      "url": "https://github.com/4piu/toyota-telemetry-XA50",
      "description": "Diagnostic signal list for the Toyota RAV4 Hybrid (XA50): DIDs, bit positions, formulas, and how to read them over OBD-II CAN.",
      "readme": "# Toyota RAV4 Hybrid (XA50) diagnostic signals\n\nLive data that the ECUs of a 2023 RAV4 Hybrid (A25A-FXS, AWD) return over the\nOBD-II port: 2,792 signals across 27 modules. For each one: its name, the\nrequest that reads it, bit position, decoding formula, and unit or value\nnames.\n\nTested on one vehicle. Other model years, markets, and ECU software may differ.\n\n## How to use\n\n1. Find the signal in its module's file below, or in [`signals.csv`](signals.csv).\n2. Fill the module's request and response IDs, its address if it has one, and\n   the signal's **Read** request into the steps in [PROTOCOL.md](PROTOCOL.md).\n3. Decode the reply with the signal's **Bits** and **Formula** columns.\n\n## Modules\n\nModules with an **Address** sit behind the gateway and share request ID\n`0x750`; the address byte selects the module. **Read** is the request type:\n`22` (read by identifier) or `21` (read by local identifier, older ECUs).\n\n| Module | Request ID | Response ID | Address | Read | Signals | Verified |\n|---|---|---|---|---|---:|---:|\n| [Engine](signals/engine.md) | `0x700` | `0x708` |  | `22` | 530 | 159 |\n| [Rear Motor Generator](signals/rear-motor-generator.md) | `0x705` | `0x70D` |  | `22` | 84 | 45 |\n| [Motor Generator](signals/motor-generator.md) | `0x724` | `0x72C` |  | `22` | 202 | 87 |\n| [Front Radar Sensor](signals/front-radar-sensor.md) | `0x750` | `0x758` | `0x0F` | `22` | 67 | 0 |\n| [Brake Booster](signals/brake-booster.md) | `0x750` | `0x758` | `0x29` | `22` | 135 | 0 |\n| [Tire Pressure Monitor](signals/tire-pressure-monitor.md) | `0x750` | `0x758` | `0x2A` | `21` | 64 | 0 |\n| [Main Body](signals/main-body.md) | `0x750` | `0x758` | `0x40` | `21` | 270 | 0 |\n| [Blind Spot Monitor Master](signals/blind-spot-monitor-master.md) | `0x750` | `0x758` | `0x41` | `21` | 33 | 0 |\n| [Blind Spot Monitor Slave](signals/blind-spot-monitor-slave.md) | `0x750` | `0x758` | `0x42` | `21` | 35 | 0 |\n| [Front Recognition Camera](signals/front-recognition-camera.md) | `0x750` | `0x758` | `0x6D` | `22` | 35 | 0 |\n| [Road Sign Assist](signals/road-sign-assist.md) | `0x750` | `0x758` | `0x79` | `22` | 9 | 0 |\n| [Lane Departure Alert](signals/lane-departure-alert.md) | `0x750` | `0x758` | `0x7A` | `22` | 11 | 0 |\n| [Automatic High Beam](signals/automatic-high-beam.md) | `0x750` | `0x758` | `0x7C` | `22` | 12 | 0 |\n| [Sliding Roof](signals/sliding-roof.md) | `0x750` | `0x758` | `0xAD` | `21` | 42 | 0 |\n| [Back Door](signals/back-door.md) | `0x750` | `0x758` | `0xB8` | `22` | 54 | 0 |\n| [Telematics](signals/telematics.md) | `0x750` | `0x758` | `0xC7` | `22` | 71 | 0 |\n| [Power Source Control](signals/power-source-control.md) | `0x750` | `0x758` | `0xE9` | `21` | 44 | 0 |\n| [SRS Airbag](signals/srs-airbag.md) | `0x780` | `0x788` |  | `21` | 16 | 0 |\n| [Radar Cruise2](signals/radar-cruise2.md) | `0x790` | `0x798` |  | `22` | 30 | 10 |\n| [Pre-Collision 2](signals/pre-collision-2.md) | `0x791` | `0x799` |  | `22` | 42 | 1 |\n| [EPS](signals/eps.md) | `0x7A1` | `0x7A9` |  | `21` | 75 | 0 |\n| [Rear Camera](signals/rear-camera.md) | `0x7A2` | `0x7AA` |  | `22` | 13 | 8 |\n| [Brake/EPB](signals/brake-epb.md) | `0x7B0` | `0x7B8` |  | `22` | 227 | 58 |\n| [Steering Angle Sensor](signals/steering-angle-sensor.md) | `0x7B3` | `0x7BB` |  | `21` | 11 | 0 |\n| [Combination Meter](signals/combination-meter.md) | `0x7C0` | `0x7C8` |  | `22` | 229 | 11 |\n| [Air Conditioner](signals/air-conditioner.md) | `0x7C4` | `0x7CC` |  | `21` | 59 | 0 |\n| [Hybrid Control](signals/hybrid-control.md) | `0x7D2` | `0x7DA` |  | `22` | 392 | 194 |\n\nEngine also answers for Cruise Control, and Hybrid Control also answers for\nCruise Control and EV. Each has its own section in that module's file.\n\n## Columns\n\n| Column | Meaning |\n|---|---|\n| Signal | Name of the value. |\n| Read | The request that returns it: `22 HH LL` (a data identifier) or `21 LL` (a local identifier). |\n| Bits | Position `a..b` of the value in the reply data, as described in [PROTOCOL.md](PROTOCOL.md#5-decode). |\n| Formula | Converts `raw`, the number held in those bits, to the value. |\n| Unit / Values | The unit, and names for raw values where the signal has them (`0 = OFF; 1 = ON`). |\n| Verified | **Y**: read from the vehicle and seen to change. **N**: the module answers the read, but the value has not been seen to change, so the formula is unconfirmed. N rows are usable: check the value against a known reading (the instrument cluster, for example) before relying on it. |\n| Comment | For N rows, why, where known. \"Answers; not recorded yet\": the read works, but the value has not been logged while driving. \"Older ECU: formula and unit not established yet\": the position is known, the conversion is not. |\n\nEvery signal in the list answered its read on this vehicle; reads the\nmodules refused are left out.\n\n[`signals.csv`](signals.csv) holds the same rows, with the module name, its\nrequest and response IDs, and its address (empty for most) on every row. Its\n`values` column lists `raw = text` pairs separated by `;`.\n\n## Read-only\n\nSend only the requests in [PROTOCOL.md](PROTOCOL.md). Never use these readings\nto control the vehicle or as a safety warning.",
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      "title": "CANET Invaders",
      "full_name": "paivalucass/CANET_Invaders",
      "name": "CANET_Invaders",
      "owner": "paivalucass",
      "url": "https://github.com/paivalucass/CANET_Invaders",
      "description": "An educational focused machine learning detection program for malicious attacks on CAN and Automotive Ethernet networks.",
      "readme": "# CANET Invaders\n\nA IDS (Intrusion Detection System) software for CAN and Automotive Ethernet malicious attacks.\n\n---\n### How to run\n\nOn terminal:\n\n**Attention! It may be interesting to create an enviroment before installing the dependencies**\n\n1. Clone the repository:\n    ```bash\n    git clone https://github.com/paivalucass/CAN_Invaders.git\n    ```\n\n2. Install the packages:\n    ```bash\n    pip install -e\n    ```\n\n3. Install the repository dependencies:\n    ```bash\n    pip install -r requirements.txt\n    ```\n\n---\n\n### Usage\n\nThe repository has three main features:\n\n1. Attack the CAN bus in three possible ways:\n   1. fuzzing attack\n   2. impersonation attack\n   3. falsifying attack\n   4. doS attack\n\n2. Generate a model from recorded CAN bus attacks or Ethernet attacks.\n\n3. Run an IDS system using a model provided when connected to a CAN bus or Ethernet interface.\n\nWe recommed you make use of the can-utils library for recording the CAN bus traffic to be able to make use of the full potential of this repository.\n\n---\n\n### Virtual Interface using CAN-Utils\n\nFor simplicity, you can use a virtual interface to run this CAN software. With can-utils installed on your machine run:\n\n    ```\n    sudo modprobe vcan\n    sudo ip link add dev vcan0 type vcan\n    sudo ip link set up vcan0´\n    ```\n\n### Virtual Interface using Ethernet\n\nAlso, for simplicity, you can use a virtual Ethernet interface to use this software on. For that, run the following commands:\n\n    ```\n    sudo modporobe dummy\n    sudo ip link add eth10 type dummy\n    sudo ip link set eth10 up\n    ```\n\nTo see the packages run:\n\n    ```\n    sudo tcpdump -i eth10\n    ```",
      "topics": [
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        "automotive-software",
        "can",
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    "niketdhale/sovd-toolkit": {
      "id": "github:niketdhale/sovd-toolkit",
      "evidence_type": "repository",
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      "title": "sovd-toolkit",
      "full_name": "niketdhale/sovd-toolkit",
      "name": "sovd-toolkit",
      "owner": "niketdhale",
      "url": "https://github.com/niketdhale/sovd-toolkit",
      "description": "Modular SOVD (ASAM / ISO 17978-3) server, client and Vue 3 UI in C++17: real UDS/DoIP translation, gateway/domain topology, OAuth2 + mTLS, MQTT→Grafana security monitoring, ISO/SAE 21434 TARA.",
      "readme": "# sovd-toolkit\n\n[![CI](https://github.com/niketdhale/sovd-toolkit/actions/workflows/ci.yml/badge.svg)](https://github.com/niketdhale/sovd-toolkit/actions/workflows/ci.yml)\n[![License: MIT](https://img.shields.io/badge/License-MIT-blue.svg)](LICENSE)\n![C++17](https://img.shields.io/badge/C%2B%2B-17-blue.svg)\n![Platform: Linux](https://img.shields.io/badge/platform-Linux-lightgrey.svg)\n\nA modular **SOVD** (Service-Oriented Vehicle Diagnostics, ASAM / ISO 17978-3)\nserver and client stack for Linux — C++17, a C-ABI adapter seam, real UDS/DoIP\ntranslation, a Vue 3 web UI, and an MQTT-fed security monitoring pipeline.\n\nSOVD replaces the ECU-centric UDS diagnostic model with a REST/HTTP+JSON API.\nThis project implements the in-vehicle server side (gateway / domain HPC), a\nclient SDK and CLI, and the security plumbing around them — the shape of a\nproduction automotive diagnostics stack, built end to end with security design\ntreated as a first-class requirement rather than an afterthought.\n\n**Standards touched:** ASAM / ISO 17978-3 (SOVD) · ISO 14229 / ISO 13400 (UDS,\nDoIP) · ISO/SAE 21434 (see [`docs/TARA.md`](docs/TARA.md)) · UN-R155 / R156\n(see [`docs/COMPLIANCE.md`](docs/COMPLIANCE.md))\n\n![SOVD Toolkit demo](docs/demo.gif)\n\n*Web UI against the real `sovd_server` (mock adapter). More in [`docs/screenshots/`](docs/screenshots/).*\n\n> Design rationale, the phase-by-phase build log, and every settled\n> architectural decision (with the reasoning, including the ones that changed\n> mid-build) live in [`docs/DESIGN.md`](docs/DESIGN.md). This README is the\n> \"what is this and how do I run it\" front door.\n\n---\n\n## What it does\n\n- Serves vehicle diagnostic data over plain HTTP+JSON instead of raw UDS —\n  browse entities, read/write typed data points, read/clear DTCs, run\n  diagnostic routines, and stream live values over SSE, all self-described\n  through a `/docs` endpoint so a client never needs to hardcode a DID.\n- Talks **real UDS/DoIP** to classic ECUs on the other side, translating every\n  SOVD call into the matching UDS service (`0x22`/`0x2E`/`0x2F`, `0x19`/`0x14`,\n  `0x10`, `0x31`, `0x27`) — the ECUs themselves stay completely SOVD-unaware.\n- Chains into a **multi-server topology**: a vehicle-level gateway proxies to\n  per-domain servers (ADAS, body, …), each owning its own ECUs — matching how a\n  real E/E architecture is laid out, not one flat server pretending to be the\n  whole vehicle.\n- Feeds every security-relevant event (lock contention, auth failures, mode\n  changes) into **MQTT → Telegraf → InfluxDB → Grafana**, because a diagnostic\n  interface is a privileged interface and deserves the same monitoring as the\n  CAN bus.\n- Ships a **Vue 3 web UI** and a **CLI + C++ client SDK**, both built purely\n  from server self-description — neither has hardcoded knowledge of any\n  specific ECU or DID.\n\n## What it deliberately doesn't do\n\nSoftware/firmware update orchestration, OTX runtime, and async job polling are\nnamed non-goals. The reasoning is in `docs/DESIGN.md` — briefly, architectural\ndepth on a coherent subset is worth more than partial coverage of the whole\nSOVD spec, and update orchestration in particular pulls in UN-R156 / ISO 24089\nscope that deserves its own project rather than a stub here.\n\n---\n\n## Architecture\n\n### Role model\n\nClassic ECUs speak plain UDS and have no idea SOVD exists. The gateway/domain\nHPC is a protocol translator wearing two hats — an SOVD **server** toward the\ntester, a UDS **client** toward the ECUs:\n\n```\nExternal tester  ──SOVD/HTTP──►  Gateway / Domain HPC\n                                 ├─ SOVD server role (answers the tester)\n                                 └─ UDS client role  (interrogates ECUs)\n                                          │\n                                     UDS/DoIP/CAN\n                                          ▼\n                                 Classic ECUs — SOVD-unaware, unchanged\n```\n\n### Multi-server topology\n\n```\n        Vehicle-level SOVD server (gateway) ── proxy-only, restricted build\n                │                              (no ECU-facing adapters linked in)\n        ┌───────┴───────┐\n        ▼               ▼\n  Domain server    Domain server      ── full capability, vehicle-internal\n  (ADAS HPC)       (Body HPC)            network only\n        │               │\n   UDS/DoIP        UDS/DoIP\n        ▼               ▼\n   camera/radar     bcm/door_ctrl\n```\n\nThe gateway never links the UDS/DoIP adapter at all — if the binary cannot emit\na UDS frame, a compromised gateway cannot reach the bus. Capability reduction\nhappens by **linkage**, not a runtime flag.\n\n### Module layout\n\n```\nsovd-toolkit/\n├── core/           pure logic: entity registry, lock manager, the C-ABI\n│                   adapter vtable — NO HTTP, NO sockets, NO JSON\n├── adapters/\n│   ├── mock/       in-memory backend for tests and demos\n│   └── uds_doip/   real UDS/DoIP client: DoIP framing, UDS service\n│                   encode/decode, session management + 0x3E heartbeat,\n│                   SecurityAccess (0x27), NRC → HTTP status mapping\n├── catalog/        DID/operation YAML schema, decode()/encode() (bytes ⇄\n│                   typed values) — shared by server/ and adapters/uds_doip\n├── catalogs/       per-ECU catalog YAML files (data, not code)\n├── config/         topology YAML for the multi-server demo\n├── server/         HTTP layer (cpp-httplib + nlohmann/json): routing, CORS,\n│                   OAuth2, mTLS, SSE streaming, MQTT event/telemetry sinks,\n│                   config-driven topology loading\n├── client/         C++ SDK: typed wrappers, RAII lock heartbeat, mDNS\n│                   discovery, SSE subscription\n├── cli/            sovd_cli — every SOVD operation, built on client/ only\n├── monitoring/     Grafana dashboard + alert rules, Telegraf MQTT input\n├── web/            Vue 3 + Vite + Tailwind UI, own frontend project\n├── tools/          sovd_mint_token — standalone OAuth2 demo-token minter\n└── tests/          700+ assertions across three binaries, no external test\n                    framework — fake_doip_server.hpp is an in-repo\n                    fault-injecting DoIP fixture\n```\n\n**Layering rule:** `server/` translates HTTP ⇄ core calls and nothing more.\n`core/` holds no I/O at all. Every backend-specific detail — real UDS, mocked,\nproxied to another SOVD server — hides behind `core/include/sovd/adapter.h`, a\nsmall C-ABI vtable. A NULL function pointer in that vtable is how a\nreduced-capability build declares what it doesn't support, and the server turns\nthat into a clean `501` automatically.\n\n### The adapter seam, concretely\n\n```c\n// core/include/sovd/adapter.h (essence)\ntypedef struct {\n    sovd_result_t (*read_data)(void* ctx, const char* path, ...);\n    sovd_result_t (*write_data)(void* ctx, const char* path, ...);\n    sovd_result_t (*read_faults)(void* ctx, const char* path, ...);\n    sovd_result_t (*set_mode)(void* ctx, const char* path, const char* mode);\n    sovd_result_t (*execute_operation)(void* ctx, const char* path, ...);\n    /* ...NULL-able capability flags, NULL-able fn pointers... */\n} sovd_vtable_t;\n```\n\nTwo implementations sit behind this interface: `adapters/mock` (in-memory) and\n`adapters/uds_doip` (real DoIP transport + UDS services). Proxying to a child\nSOVD server is handled instead by a Router-level HTTP-forwarding table — a\nproxy has to pass through the child's already-decoded JSON, which a raw-bytes\nvtable cannot carry. `docs/DESIGN.md` (Phase 4) covers why that plan changed\nmid-build.\n\n### Request flow, end to end\n\n```\nGET /v1/entities/vehicle/body/bcm/data/battery_voltage\n             └────────┬────────┘      └──────┬─────┘\n               entity path            named data id\n  routes.cpp → EntityRegistry.find() → Entity + adapter\n  adapter → DID catalog: battery_voltage → DID 0x010A, 2 bytes BE, ×0.001, \"V\"\n  session_manager: ensure correct UDS session on ECU 0x0E80 (+ 0x3E heartbeat)\n  UDS over DoIP: 22 01 0A  →  62 01 0A 32 C8\n  decode: 0x32C8 = 13000 × 0.001 = 13.0\n  → {\"id\": \"battery_voltage\", \"value\": 13.0, \"unit\": \"V\"}\n```\n\n---\n\n## Security posture\n\nThreats, mitigations, and a threat-to-code traceability table are in\n[`docs/TARA.md`](docs/TARA.md) (ISO/SAE 21434 clause 9 structure). Mapping to\nUN-R155 Annex 5 threat identifiers is in\n[`docs/COMPLIANCE.md`](docs/COMPLIANCE.md). Vulnerability disclosure:\n[`SECURITY.md`](SECURITY.md).\n\n- **OAuth2 bearer tokens** at the HTTP boundary, scope-gated per route\n  (`read:faults`, `read:data`, `execute:routines`, `execute:security_access`),\n  **opt-in via `SOVD_OAUTH2_SECRET`** — unset in every config this repo ships.\n  Default-deny: a route with no matching scope-table entry still requires *a*\n  valid token, never a silent bypass.\n- **Mutual TLS** between gateway and domain servers — both directions verified\n  against a private demo CA, not the system trust store.\n- **SecurityAccess (`0x27`)** gated on *both* what the ECU demands (catalog\n  `requires_security_level`) and what the client's token is allowed to ask for\n  (`execute:security_access` scope) — either alone isn't enough. The second half\n  **only runs when OAuth2 is enabled**; with it off (every shipped config's\n  default), a `requires_security_level` item is reachable by any caller who can\n  reach the server at all. Enable OAuth2 wherever that matters.\n- **Default-deny route whitelist** at the gateway tier — a route added to the\n  server without an explicit whitelist entry is unreachable through the gateway\n  rather than silently exposed.\n- **Resource limits** as a security property, not just robustness: entity tree\n  depth cap, lock TTL ceiling, max concurrent locks (doubling as the UDS-session\n  cap, since escalation is always lock-gated), max request body.\n- **Audit log** — every security event optionally persisted to disk\n  (`SOVD_AUDIT_LOG_PATH`), independent of and in addition to the MQTT feed.\n- Every event carries a `correlation_id`, echoed in `X-SOVD-Correlation-Id` on\n  every HTTP response, success or error.\n\n### Diagnostic data and GDPR\n\nA VIN identifies a vehicle and, in practice, its keeper — under GDPR that makes\nVIN and much diagnostic telemetry personal data. Two consequences are visible in\nthis codebase: the audit log and MQTT event feed carry a `correlation_id` rather\nthan a VIN wherever an identifier is only needed for correlation, and\n`docs/COMPLIANCE.md` records what each sink retains and why. A production\ndeployment would need a retention policy and a lawful basis per data category;\nthat analysis is out of scope here but the hooks are deliberately in the right\nplaces.\n\n---\n\n## Build & test\n\n```bash\ncmake -S . -B build -DCMAKE_BUILD_TYPE=Debug\ncmake --build build -j4\n\n./build/test_core                      # 542 assertions — core + server + HTTP\n./build/test_client                    # 32 assertions — SDK/CLI, live server\ncd build && ctest --output-on-failure\n```\n\nBuild options (`cmake -S . -B build -D<option>=<ON|OFF>`):\n\n| Option | Default | Adds |\n|---|---|---|\n| `SOVD_ADAPTER_MOCK` | `ON` | In-memory adapter; `test_core`/`test_client` only build when this is on |\n| `SOVD_ADAPTER_UDS_DOIP` | `OFF` | Real UDS/DoIP adapter + `./build/test_uds_doip` (197 assertions, socket-level, against an in-repo fake DoIP server) |\n| `SOVD_CLIENT_MDNS` | auto-detected | `_sovd._tcp.local` discovery via `avahi-client`, if present |\n\nTurning `SOVD_ADAPTER_MOCK` off and `SOVD_ADAPTER_UDS_DOIP` on builds a\ngateway-style binary with zero mock symbols and zero ECU-facing code paths\ncompiled in — the \"restricted build\" capability-reduction story above.\n\nBuilds clean under `-Wall -Wextra -Wpedantic` in every configuration listed, and\nCI covers all four adapter combinations. Required system deps: OpenSSL (TLS +\nOAuth2 HMAC), yaml-cpp (fetched via CMake `FetchContent`); `avahi-client` is\noptional. cpp-httplib and nlohmann/json are vendored single-header\n(`third_party/`). A CycloneDX SBOM is generated per CI run and attached to the\nbuild artifacts.\n\n---\n\n## Quick start\n\n### 1. Zero-config demo server\n\n```bash\n./build/sovd_server 20002 domain\ncurl http://127.0.0.1:20002/v1/entities\ncurl http://127.0.0.1:20002/v1/entities/vehicle/body/bcm/docs\ncurl \"http://127.0.0.1:20002/v1/entities/vehicle/body/bcm/data?ids=vin,battery_voltage,door_lock_state\"\n```\n\n### 2. CLI — discovery-driven, no hardcoded paths or DIDs\n\n```bash\n./build/sovd_cli http://127.0.0.1:20002 entities\n./build/sovd_cli http://127.0.0.1:20002 docs  vehicle/body/bcm\n./build/sovd_cli http://127.0.0.1:20002 read  vehicle/body/bcm battery_voltage\n./build/sovd_cli http://127.0.0.1:20002 write vehicle/body/bcm door_lock_state unlocked\n./build/sovd_cli http://127.0.0.1:20002 watch vehicle/body/bcm battery_voltage 1000\n./build/sovd_cli discover                       # mDNS, needs avahi-daemon\n```\n\n### 3. Two-tier gateway + domain topology\n\n```bash\n./build/sovd_server config/domain_body.yaml &   # domain tier, :20003\n./build/sovd_server config/gateway.yaml   &     # gateway tier, :20002, proxy-only\n\ncurl http://127.0.0.1:20002/v1/entities/vehicle/body/bcm/data/battery_voltage\n```\n\nMutual TLS, OAuth2, SSE streaming, the web UI, the MQTT monitoring pipeline, and\nrunning the UDS/DoIP adapter against a real DoIP target are all covered in\n[`docs/USAGE.md`](docs/USAGE.md).\n\n---\n\n## Web UI\n\nA Vue 3 + Vite UI lives in [`web/`](web/). It discovers everything from `/docs` at runtime.\n\n- **Entities:** filter box, flat list or collapsible tree.\n- **Faults:** status badges, status filter, clear (lock-gated), retry on error.\n- **Data:** typed read/write widgets, copy value, Raw JSON toggle, auto-refresh.\n- **Live:** SSE chart with time window, latest-value readout, pause/resume and automatic reconnect with backoff.\n- **Polish:** toast notifications, dark mode, keyboard shortcuts (`1`-`4`, `/`, `r`), URL hash (`#/<tab>/<entity>`) so views are linkable, connection URL remembered (token never persisted).\n\n```bash\n./build/sovd_server config/domain_body.yaml &   # CORS already allows :5173\ncd web && bun install && bun run dev            # http://localhost:5173\n```\n\n- **Server URL:** defaults to `http://localhost:20003`; override at build/dev\n  time with `VITE_SOVD_BASE_URL` (see `web/.env.example`) or edit it in the UI.\n- **Token field:** when the server runs with `SOVD_OAUTH2_SECRET`, paste a\n  token from `sovd_mint_token` next to the URL; it is sent as\n  `Authorization: Bearer ...` and never persisted.\n- **Served by the server itself (optional, off by default):**\n  `cd web && bun run build` writes `web/dist`; then\n  `./build/sovd_server --web-root web/dist config/domain_body.yaml` (or\n  `SOVD_WEB_ROOT=web/dist`) serves it at `http://localhost:20003/index.html`.\n  Same origin, so no CORS setup is needed. `GET /` and `/v1/...` stay the\n  API; the UI lives at `/index.html`.\n- **Web dev commands** (run in `web/`, always `bun`): `bun install`,\n  `bun run dev`, `bun run lint`, `bun run test:run`, `bun run build`.\n- **CI** (`.github/workflows/ci.yml`): a C++ matrix (MOCK x UDS_DOIP) with\n  tests, cross-phase check and SBOM, plus a `web` job running\n  `bun install --frozen-lockfile`, lint, test and build.\n\n---\n\n## API surface\n\n| Method | Path | Notes |\n|---|---|---|\n| GET | `/` | self-description, role, `api_versions` — unversioned, hit first |\n| GET | `/v1/entities` | flat entity listing |\n| GET/DELETE | `/v1/entities/{path}/faults` | optional `?status=` filter; DELETE is lock-gated |\n| GET | `/v1/entities/{path}/data?ids=a,b,c` | batch read, partial failure doesn't fail the batch |\n| GET/PUT | `/v1/entities/{path}/data/{id}` | catalog `id` or raw hex DID; PUT is lock-gated + typed JSON body |\n| GET | `/v1/entities/{path}/data/{id}/stream?interval_ms=N` | SSE, one shared poller per (path, id, interval) |\n| POST | `/v1/entities/{path}/modes` | lock-gated, UDS session control |\n| POST | `/v1/entities/{path}/operations/{op}` | lock-gated, UDS RoutineControl |\n| POST/PUT/DELETE | `/v1/entities/{path}/locks[/{lock_id}]` | acquire / renew (heartbeat) / release |\n| GET | `/v1/entities/{path}/docs` | capability + data/operation self-description |\n\nFull request/response shapes and error-code mapping: `docs/DESIGN.md`.\n\n---\n\n## Status & roadmap\n\nAll eight build phases are complete and tested — 700+ assertions across three\nbinaries, plus a real-browser click-through of the web UI. Two full external\ncode-review cycles have been folded in; the findings and fixes are recorded in\n[`docs/reviews/`](docs/reviews/).\n\nCurrent work, in order:\n\n- [ ] Live verification against a real DoIP target on `vcan0`, with the captured\n      session published here\n- [ ] ISO/SAE 21434 clause-9 TARA with threat-to-code traceability\n- [ ] UN-R155 Annex 5 control mapping\n- [ ] Rendered architecture diagram replacing the ASCII ones above\n\n---\n\n## License\n\nMIT — see [`LICENSE`](LICENSE).",
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      "readme": "# Automotive Diagnostic Security Analyzer\n\n[![CI](https://github.com/LRTechpro/Automotive-Diagnostic-Security-Analyzer/actions/workflows/ci.yml/badge.svg)](https://github.com/LRTechpro/Automotive-Diagnostic-Security-Analyzer/actions/workflows/ci.yml)\n\nA clean-room automotive cybersecurity portfolio project for analyzing synthetic UDS diagnostic traces, identifying security-relevant behavior, tracking diagnostic state, and exporting evidence-based findings.\n\nThis repository was created from scratch with a new Git history. It contains no OEM logs, VINs, customer records, proprietary software packages, internal URLs, or production vehicle data.\n\n## What it demonstrates\n\n- UDS service and negative-response decoding\n- Diagnostic-session and SecurityAccess state tracking\n- Negative-path and programming-sequence validation\n- Security-relevant finding classification\n- Reproducible Markdown, JSON, and CSV reporting\n- Command-line and Tkinter desktop interfaces\n- Standard-library Python with automated tests and CI\n\n## Supported UDS patterns\n\n- `0x10` DiagnosticSessionControl\n- `0x11` ECUReset\n- `0x22` ReadDataByIdentifier\n- `0x27` SecurityAccess\n- `0x2E` WriteDataByIdentifier\n- `0x31` RoutineControl\n- `0x34` RequestDownload\n- `0x36` TransferData\n- `0x37` RequestTransferExit\n- `0x3E` TesterPresent\n- `0x7F` NegativeResponse\n\nThe analyzer recognizes common NRCs including securityAccessDenied, invalidKey, exceededNumberOfAttempts, requiredTimeDelayNotExpired, requestOutOfRange, generalProgrammingFailure, wrongBlockSequenceCounter, and responsePending.\n\n## Synthetic trace format\n\nEach line uses comma-separated key/value fields:\n\n```text\n2026-07-12T12:00:00Z,module=BMS_SIM,direction=TX,payload=10 03,note=Enter extended session\n2026-07-12T12:00:00Z,module=BMS_SIM,direction=RX,payload=50 03,note=Extended session accepted\n```\n\nRequired fields:\n\n- `module`\n- `direction` with `TX` for tester request or `RX` for ECU response\n- `payload` as hexadecimal bytes\n\nAll included examples are fictional and synthetic.\n\n## Quick start\n\nInstall the package in editable mode:\n\n```bash\npython -m pip install -e .\n```\n\nAnalyze the bundled synthetic trace:\n\n```bash\npython -m autosec_analyzer.cli sample_data/synthetic_diagnostic_log.txt --output reports\n```\n\nGenerated outputs:\n\n```text\nreports/analysis.md\nreports/analysis.json\nreports/findings.csv\n```\n\nLaunch the desktop interface:\n\n```bash\npython -m autosec_analyzer.gui\n```\n\nRun tests:\n\n```bash\npython -m unittest discover -s tests -v\n```\n\n## Architecture\n\n```text\nautosec_analyzer/\n  parser.py       Trace ingestion and validation\n  uds.py          Deterministic UDS decoding\n  analyzer.py     State tracking and security rules\n  reporting.py    Markdown, JSON, and CSV export\n  cli.py          Command-line interface\n  gui.py          Tkinter desktop interface\nsample_data/\n  synthetic_diagnostic_log.txt\ntests/\n  test_analyzer.py\n```\n\n## Engineering value\n\nThe project demonstrates how diagnostic evidence can be transformed into repeatable verification findings. It focuses on protocol behavior, security preconditions, state transitions, and traceable reporting rather than presenting a simple byte decoder.\n\n## Engineering boundaries\n\nThis project is a portfolio and learning artifact. It does not:\n\n- reproduce any OEM diagnostic platform\n- contain production diagnostic traces\n- certify ISO/SAE 21434 compliance\n- perform vehicle penetration testing\n- communicate with a physical vehicle\n- implement production cryptography or secure boot\n\nSee [SECURITY.md](SECURITY.md) for the repository data-handling policy.\n\n## License\n\nMIT",
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      "description": "We conduct the first India-focused study assessing security and privacy risks in Open Charge Point Protocol (OCPP) versions 1.6 and 2.0.1 within the country’s electric vehicle (EV) charging infrastructure. Using a testbed simulating urban and rural scenarios, we identified critical vulnerabilities.",
      "readme": "# ⚡ Safeguarding Bharat's EV Charging Networks Through OCPP Protocol Resilience 🏆\n\n![Python](https://img.shields.io/badge/Python-black?logo=python) ![Java](https://img.shields.io/badge/Java-black?logo=openjdk) ![GitHub](https://img.shields.io/badge/GitHub-black?logo=github) ![OCPP](https://img.shields.io/badge/OCPP-black?logo=opencollective)\n\n---\n\n## 📖 Overview\nThis project focuses on **enhancing the security and resilience of Electric Vehicle (EV) charging networks in India** by identifying vulnerabilities in the **Open Charge Point Protocol (OCPP)**.\n\nAs EV adoption surges, ensuring **secure and reliable charging infrastructure** is essential to support the nation’s sustainable mobility goals. This work investigates **protocol-level and network-level weaknesses**, simulates real-world cyber threats, and proposes **practical resilience strategies** for safeguarding the charging ecosystem.\n\n🏆 **Award:** Recognized as the **Best Project** for innovation and real-world impact in EV infrastructure security.\n\n---\n\n## 🎯 Objectives\n- 🔍 **Analyze** vulnerabilities in OCPP communication and data handling.\n- 🛡️ **Propose resilience strategies** to strengthen OCPP authentication, encryption, and data integrity.\n- ⚡ **Simulate attack scenarios** (e.g., MITM, replay, denial-of-service) to demonstrate risks.\n- 📊 **Evaluate countermeasures** through simulation and monitoring tools.\n- 🌍 **Promote safer EV adoption** across India by ensuring robust charging infrastructure.\n\n---\n\n## 🚀 Key Features\n- **🔐 Vulnerability Analysis:** In-depth assessment of protocol-level and infrastructure-level risks.\n- **🛡️ Resilience Framework:** Security enhancements including mutual authentication, session resilience, and anomaly detection.\n- **🧪 Simulation & Testing:** Attack modeling (MITM, replay, spoofing) and defense validation.\n- **📡 Monitoring & Logging:** Data-driven detection of anomalies in real-time communication.\n- **🏆 Recognition:** Project awarded for its **innovation and societal impact**.\n\n---\n\n## 🛠️ Technologies Used\n- **Programming Languages:** Python, Java\n- **Protocols & Standards:** OCPP 1.6 / 2.0, TLS/SSL\n- **Frameworks & Tools:**\n  - Network Simulators (e.g., NS-3, Mininet)\n  - Security Testing Tools (Wireshark, Burp Suite, Kali Linux)\n  - IoT Communication Libraries\n- **Data Analysis:** Traffic analysis, anomaly detection, event logging\n- **Collaboration & Version Control:** Git, GitHub\n\n---\n\n## 📂 Project Structure\n## 📂 Project Structure\n\n```text\nSafeguarding-Bharat-EV-Charging-OCPP/\n│\n├── 📘 docs/                        # Documentation, research papers, references\n│   ├── OCPP_Vulnerabilities.pdf\n│   ├── Security_Strategies.md\n│   └── Research_Paper.pdf\n│\n├── 🔬 simulations/                 # Attack simulations and defense validation\n│   ├── MITM_Attack.py\n│   ├── Replay_Attack.py\n│   └── OCPP_Defense_Model.py\n│\n├── 📊 analysis/                    # Data logs, vulnerability reports, traffic analysis\n│   ├── traffic_logs.csv\n│   ├── anomaly_report.json\n│   └── attack_vs_defense_metrics.xlsx\n│\n├── 💻 src/                         # Core source code for protocol simulation\n│   ├── client/                     # Simulated EV charging stations\n│   │   └── ChargePointClient.java\n│   ├── server/                     # Central management system\n│   │   └── CentralSystemServer.java\n│   └── security/                   # Cryptographic modules\n│       └── PQC_Encryption.java\n│\n├── 📦 resources/                   # Diagrams, figures, datasets\n│   ├── architecture_diagram.png\n│   ├── attack_flowchart.png\n│   └── dataset_sample.csv\n│\n└── 📄 README.md                    # Project overview (this file)\n\n```\n---\n\n## 📊 Results & Impact\n- ✅ Identified **critical attack surfaces** in OCPP-based communication.\n- ✅ Proposed **post-quantum resilient communication model** with enhanced encryption.\n- ✅ Demonstrated **successful detection & mitigation** of common attack scenarios.\n- ✅ Provided **scalable guidelines** for securing EV infrastructure in India.\n\n---\n\n## 📢 Future Work\n- 🔹 Extend simulations for **OCPP 2.0.1 compliance**.\n- 🔹 Explore **blockchain-based trust models** for EV charging stations.\n- 🔹 Integrate **post-quantum cryptography (PQC)** in real-world prototypes.\n- 🔹 Collaborate with **EV manufacturers and charging providers** for pilot testing.\n\n---\n\n## 🤝 Contributions\nContributions, issues, and feature requests are welcome!\n📧 Contact: [architkiran](https://github.com/architkiran)\n\n---\n## Team Members:\n- Archit Kiran Kumar\n- Chris Biju\n- Het Joshi",
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      "readme": "# Vehicle-hacking\nCar hacking is the manipulation of the code in a car's electronic control unit (ECU) to exploit a vulnerability and gain control of other ECU units in the vehicle\n\n\n\n**click me =>** [How to hack a car — a quick crash-course](https://www.freecodecamp.org/news/hacking-cars-a-guide-tutorial-on-how-to-hack-a-car-5eafcfbbb7ec/amp/?__twitter_impression=true)\n\n**click me =>** [Introduction to Car Hacking Basics](https://www.cactuscon.com/2021-talks-and-workshops/introduction-to-car-hacking-basics)\n\n**click me =>** [by Jared M. Smith ](https://github.com/jaredthecoder/awesome-vehicle-security)\n\n**click me =>** [Car Hacking 101-part:1](https://medium.com/@yogeshojha/car-hacking-101-practical-guide-to-exploiting-can-bus-using-instrument-cluster-simulator-part-i-cd88d3eb4a53)\n\n**click me =>** [Car Hacking 101-part:2](https://medium.com/@yogeshojha/car-hacking-101-practical-guide-to-exploiting-can-bus-using-instrument-cluster-simulator-part-ee998570758)\n\n**click me =>** [Hack Car & Intro To CANghost](https://medium.com/@souravbaghz/a-quick-guide-to-hack-car-intro-to-canghost-f9370a0a51b5)\n\n**click me =>** [video](https://youtu.be/nn-_3AbtEkI)\n\n**click me =>** [tools for car hacking by jgamblin ](https://github.com/jgamblin/CarHackingTools)\n\n---",
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      "title": "Cyberattack Resilience of Autonomous Vehicle Sensor Systems: Evaluating RGB vs. Dynamic Vision Sensors in CARLA",
      "full_name": "MustafaSakhai/Robust-Sensor-Cybersecurity-for-Autonomous-Vehicles",
      "name": "Robust-Sensor-Cybersecurity-for-Autonomous-Vehicles",
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      "description": "Simulates cyberattacks on AV sensors (RGB, LiDAR, GPS, DVS) in CARLA and defends with tailored filters and anomaly detection (EfficientAD). Achieves 95%+ attack detection accuracy and shows DVS resilience, improving AV cybersecurity through multi-sensor fusion.",
      "readme": "# Cyberattack Resilience of Autonomous Vehicle Sensor Systems: Evaluating RGB vs. Dynamic Vision Sensors in CARLA\n\n## Authors\n\nMustafa Sakhai, Kaung Sithu, Min Khant Soe Oke, and Maciej Wielgosz\n\n*AGH University of Science and Technology, Krakow, Poland*\n\n## Abstract\n\nAutonomous Vehicles (AVs) rely on a heterogeneous sensor suite RGB cameras, LiDAR, GPS/IMU, and emerging event‐based Dynamic Vision Sensors (DVS) to perceive and navigate complex environments. However, these sensors can be deceived by realistic cyberattacks, undermining safety. In this work, we systematically implement seven attack vectors in the CARLA simulator, salt and pepper noise, event flooding, depth map tampering, LiDAR phantom injection, GPS spoofing, denial of service, and steering bias control, and measure their impact on a state‐of‐the‐art end to end driving agent. We then equip each sensor with tailored defenses (e.g., adaptive median filtering for RGB, spatial clustering for DVS) and integrate a semi-supervised anomaly detector (EfficientAD from anomalib) trained exclusively on benign data. Our detector achieves clear separation between normal and attacked conditions (mean RGB anomaly scores of 0.00 vs. 0.38; DVS: 0.61 vs. 0.76), yielding over 95% detection accuracy with fewer than 5% false positives. Defense evaluations reveal that GPS spoofing is fully mitigated, whereas RGB and depth based attacks still induce 30–45% trajectory drift despite filtering. Notably, DVS sensors exhibit greater intrinsic resilience in high dynamic range scenarios, though their asynchronous output necessitates carefully tuned thresholds. These findings underscore the critical role of multi-modal anomaly detection and demonstrate that possibility of integrating DVS alongside conventional sensors significantly strengthens AV cybersecurity.\n\n**Keywords**: autonomous vehicles, cybersecurity attacks, dynamic vision sensor\n\n---\n\n# CARLA Sensor Anomaly Detection Framework\n\nThis repository contains a framework for simulating, detecting, and analyzing sensor anomalies and attacks in autonomous driving systems using the CARLA simulator. The framework includes tools for generating attack scenarios, collecting sensor data, training anomaly detection models, and analyzing the results.\n\n## Overview\n\nThe framework consists of the following main components:\n\n1. **Attack Simulation**: Simulates various attacks on autonomous vehicle sensors in CARLA\n2. **Data Collection**: Collects sensor data during normal and attack scenarios\n3. **Anomaly Detection**: Trains models to detect anomalies in sensor data\n4. **Analysis**: Analyzes the effectiveness of anomaly detection models\n\n## Files\n\n### 1. `neat_simplified_attacks_v10_new.py`\n\nThis script simulates various attacks on autonomous vehicle sensors in the CARLA simulator.\n\n**Features:**\n- Implements multiple attack types (GPS spoofing, RGB noise, depth tampering, DVS noise, LiDAR tampering, DoS, steering bias)\n- Configurable attack scenarios based on time intervals\n- Collects and saves sensor data during simulation\n- Supports various sensors (RGB cameras, depth cameras, DVS cameras, LiDAR, GPS, IMU)\n\n**Usage:**\n```bash\npython neat_simplified_attacks_v10_new.py [options]\n```\n\n### 2. `train_sensor_anomaly_models_v2_recursive.py`\n\nThis script trains anomaly detection models for different sensor types using collected data.\n\n**Features:**\n- Supports multiple anomaly detection models (EfficientAd, Patchcore, Padim, Fastflow)\n- Processes various sensor data types (RGB, depth, DVS, LiDAR)\n- Creates dataset structures for training and testing\n- Includes custom metrics collection and visualization\n\n**Usage:**\n```bash\npython train_sensor_anomaly_models_v2_recursive.py --data_dir [path] --output_dir [path] --sensors [sensor_list]\n```\n\n### 3. `analyze_sensor_anomalies_new.py`\n\nThis script analyzes sensor data using trained anomaly detection models to identify anomalies.\n\n**Features:**\n- Loads trained models for each sensor type\n- Processes and analyzes sensor data from simulation episodes\n- Extracts attack intervals from simulation data\n- Computes and visualizes anomaly scores\n- Evaluates detection performance\n\n**Usage:**\n```bash\npython analyze_sensor_anomalies_new.py --data_dir [path] --model_dir [path] --output_dir [path]\n```\n\n### 4. `config.json`\n\nConfiguration file that defines attack scenarios for the simulation.\n\n**Example:**\n```json\n{\n    \"attacks\": [\n        {\"start\": 0, \"end\": 400, \"type\": \"none\"},\n        {\"start\": 400, \"end\": 800, \"type\": \"gps\"},\n        {\"start\": 800, \"end\": 1200, \"type\": \"rgb_noise\"},\n        ...\n    ]\n}\n```\n\n## Requirements\n\n- CARLA Simulator\n- Python 3.7+\n- PyTorch\n- OpenCV\n- NumPy\n- Matplotlib\n- Anomalib\n\n## Installation\n\n1. Install CARLA simulator following the [official documentation](https://carla.readthedocs.io/)\n2. Install required Python packages:\n   ```bash\n   pip install torch torchvision opencv-python numpy matplotlib tqdm anomalib\n   ```\n\n## Workflow\n\n1. **Configure Attack Scenarios**:\n   - Edit `config.json` to define attack types and time intervals\n\n2. **Run Simulation with Attacks**:\n   ```bash\n   python neat_simplified_attacks_v10_new.py\n   ```\n\n3. **Train Anomaly Detection Models**:\n   ```bash\n   python train_sensor_anomaly_models_v2_recursive.py --data_dir ./data --output_dir ./models\n   ```\n\n4. **Analyze Results**:\n   ```bash\n   python analyze_sensor_anomalies_new.py --data_dir ./data --model_dir ./models --output_dir ./results\n   ```\n\n## Attack Types\n\nThe framework supports the following attack types:\n\n- **GPS Spoofing**: Manipulates GPS coordinates\n- **RGB Noise**: Adds noise to RGB camera images\n- **Depth Tampering**: Manipulates depth camera readings\n- **DVS Noise**: Adds noise to Dynamic Vision Sensor data\n- **LiDAR Tampering**: Manipulates LiDAR point cloud data\n- **DoS (Denial of Service)**: Simulates sensor data unavailability\n- **Steering Bias**: Introduces bias in steering control\n\n## Anomaly Detection Models\n\nThe framework uses the following anomaly detection models from the Anomalib library:\n\n- **EfficientAd**: Efficient anomaly detection model\n- **Patchcore**: Patch-based anomaly detection\n- **Padim**: PaDiM anomaly detection model\n- **Fastflow**: Flow-based anomaly detection\n\n## Publication\n\nThis work is being prepared for publication in an MDPI journal. The full paper titled \"Cyberattack Resilience of Autonomous Vehicle Sensor Systems: Evaluating RGB vs. Dynamic Vision Sensors in CARLA\" provides detailed methodology, results, and analysis of our experiments.\n\n## License\n\n\n## Acknowledgements\n\n- [CARLA Simulator](https://carla.org/)\n- [Anomalib](https://github.com/openvinotoolkit/anomalib)\n- AGH University of Science and Technology, Krakow, Poland",
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      "title": "ISO/SAE 21434:2021: Road vehicles — Cybersecurity engineering: Theory, Techniques, Testing and Tools",
      "full_name": "paulveillard/cybersecurity-iso-21434",
      "name": "cybersecurity-iso-21434",
      "owner": "paulveillard",
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      "description": "An ongoing & curated collection of awesome software best practices and techniques, libraries and frameworks, E-books and videos, websites, blog posts, links to github Repositories, technical guidelines and important resources about ISO/SAE 21434:2021: Road vehicles — Cybersecurity engineering: in Cybersecurity.",
      "readme": "# ISO/SAE 21434:2021: Road vehicles — Cybersecurity engineering: Theory, Techniques, Testing and Tools\n\n\nAn ongoing & curated collection of awesome software best practices and techniques, libraries and frameworks, E-books and videos, websites, blog posts, links to github Repositories, technical guidelines and important resources about ISO/SAE 21434:2021: Road vehicles — Cybersecurity engineering:  in Cybersecurity.\n> Thanks to all contributors, you're awesome and wouldn't be possible without you! Our goal is to build a categorized community-driven collection of very well-known resources.\n\n\n## `Table of Contents`\n- [What is ISO 21434](#)\n- [Why ISO 21434](#)\n- [What is the structure of ISO/SAE 21434:2021?](#)\n\n## `What is ISO 21434?`\nLike ISO 26262 and other aspects of international standards around automotive industry development, ISO 21434 works to protect vehicle and automotive security.\n\n<p align=\"center\">\n  <img src=\"https://github.com/paulveillard/cybersecurity-iso-21434/blob/main/img/iso21434.png?raw=true\" alt=\"Sublime's custom image\"/>\n</p>\n\nIt covers every single stage of the vehicle life cycle from design, secure engineering, and product development to decommissioning. Cybersecurity engineering applies to connected vehicles, electronic systems, software, and more. In addition, the automotive security standard gives developers a thorough road map for incorporating safety measures in development processes across the supply chain.\n\n- The purpose of the standard is to define a structural process to ensure cybersecurity is “designed-in” from the start. This allows developers to address cyber threats to the vehicle and its electrical and electronic components.\n\n> OEMs, Tier 1, and Tier 2 suppliers must demonstrate due diligence in handling vehicle development in preventing cyberattacks. The goal is to reduce the potential for a successful attack and minimize potential losses by designing security-in from the start.\n\n## `Why ISO 21434?`\nTraditional automotive safety and cybersecurity standards have not adequately addressed increasing threats to cybersecurity for road vehicles. This led to OEMs, Tier 1, and Tier 2 suppliers formalizing their own approaches to address cybersecurity.\n\n<p align=\"center\">\n  <img src=\"https://github.com/paulveillard/cybersecurity-iso-21434/blob/main/img/ISO21434_0.png?raw=true\" alt=\"Sublime's custom image\"/>\n</p>\n\nISO 21434 eliminates the need for individual approaches and provides a common framework to tackle cybersecurity for automotive production. It defines requirements for cybersecurity processes and develops a common language for understanding software security and cybersecurity risk management.\n\nIn summary, ISO 21434 is intended to accomplish the following:\n\n    - Define a structural process for cybersecurity in design phases.\n    - Establish and maintain a consistent framework for cybersecurity globally.\n    - Provide a threat-informed approach to guide security controls.\n    - Adopt and apply a risk-based approach.\n    - Provide guidance for developing a Cybersecurity Management System (CSMS) for vehicles.\n    - Identify guidelines for cybersecurity across the vehicle life cycle.\n        - Design and engineering\n        - Production\n        - Operations\n        - Maintenance\n        - Decommissioning\n\n## `What is the structure of ISO/SAE 21434:2021?`\n\nThe first thing to do is to think in the same way as ISO/SAE communicates: The structure of ISO/SAE 21434 does not represent an “execution sequence” of the individual topics.\n\nFor the official structure of ISO/SAE 21434:2021, we have created a custom graphical visualization that illustrates the structure not in sequence, but along the development product lifecycle:\n\n<p align=\"center\">\n  <img src=\"https://github.com/paulveillard/cybersecurity-iso-21434/blob/main/img/ISO21434_2.png?raw=true\" alt=\"Sublime's custom image\"/>\n</p>",
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      "readme": "# Security-and-Privacy-in-V2X-Communications-using-Federated-Learning\nAdvances in cellular technology are a key driver  of the growing automotive Vehicle to Everything (V2X)  market. In V2X communications, information from sensors  and other sources travels via high-bandwidth, low-latency,  high-reliability links, paving the way to fully autonomous  driving and intelligent mobility. With the future adoption  of 5G and beyond (5G&amp;B) networks, V2X is likely to  generate a huge volume of data, which encourages the use  of edge computing and pushes the system to learn the model  locally to support real-time applications. However, the edge  computing paradigm raises concerns about the security and  privacy of local nodes (e.g., vehicles) and the increased risk  of cyberattacks. In this article, we identify open research  questions, key requirements, and potential solutions to  provide cyber resilience in V2X communications.",
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      "readme": "# Automotive CAN Security Labs\n\nHands-on automotive cybersecurity labs focusing on Controller Area Network (CAN)\ncommunication, ECU simulation, encrypted payload handling, and active attack scenarios.\n\nThis repository demonstrates how ECUs exchange both encrypted and unencrypted CAN\nmessages, how common CAN attacks are performed, and how basic detection mechanisms\ncan identify spoofed or malformed frames.\n\n> ⚠️ Educational use only – do NOT run on real vehicles.\n\n---\n\n## Architecture Overview\n\nThe lab consists of three main components connected over a virtual CAN interface (`vcan0`):\n\n- **Node A** – ECU simulator (sender & receiver)\n- **Node B** – ECU simulator (sender & receiver)\n- **Attack Node** – CAN bus attacker\n\n---\n\n## Node A – ECU Simulator\n\n**File:** `node_a.py`\n\n**Features:**\n- Sends unencrypted CAN messages (e.g., vehicle speed)\n- Sends encrypted CAN messages using AES-128 (ECB + PKCS7)\n- Implements custom multi-frame CAN chunking\n- Reassembles received frames into full payloads\n- Decrypts encrypted messages\n- Detects spoofing and malformed frames:\n  - Unknown CAN IDs\n  - Invalid chunk indexes\n  - Duplicate chunks\n  - Malformed payload sizes\n- Removes stale or incomplete message assemblies\n\n---\n\n## Node B – ECU Simulator\n\n**File:** `node_b.py`\n\n**Features:**\n- Sends unencrypted temperature data\n- Sends encrypted pressure data using AES-128\n- Reassembles and processes messages from Node A\n- Detects duplicate CAN chunks (spoofing attempt)\n- Periodic sensor-like message transmission\n\n---\n\n## Attack Node – CAN Bus Attacker\n\n**File:** `attack_node.py`\n\n**Implemented Attacks:**\n1. **CAN Sniffing**\n   - Capture CAN frames\n   - Filter by CAN ID\n   - Save traffic to log files\n\n2. **Denial of Service (DoS)**\n   - Flood the CAN bus with high-frequency frames\n\n3. **Spoofing Attack**\n   - Inject forged CAN frames with arbitrary IDs and payloads\n\n4. **Replay Attack**\n   - Re-send previously captured CAN traffic from log files\n\n---\n\n## Tools & Technologies\n\n- Python\n- SocketCAN / vCAN\n- python-can\n- PyCryptodome (AES)\n- Linux (Kali / Ubuntu)\n- Wireshark\n\n---\n\n## How to Run\n\n```bash\n# Create virtual CAN interface\nsudo modprobe vcan\nsudo ip link add dev vcan0 type vcan\nsudo ip link set up vcan0\n\n# Run Node A\npython3 node_a.py\n\n# Run Node B (new terminal)\npython3 node_b.py\n\n# Run Attack Node\npython3 attack_node.py\n```\n\n---\n\n## Security Concepts Demonstrated\n\n- Lack of authentication in CAN networks\n- Replay and spoofing vulnerabilities\n- Bus flooding (DoS)\n- Plaintext vs encrypted CAN payloads\n- Importance of message validation\n\n---\n\n## Disclaimer\n\nThis project is for **educational and research purposes only**.\nDo NOT deploy or test this code on real vehicles or production systems.",
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      "description": "Very simple 433MHz (EU/ASIA) 315 MHz (US) RF jammer for keyless cars theft prevention",
      "readme": "# jammer\nVery simple 433MHz (EUROPE/ASIA) or 315MHz (USA) RF jammer for keyless cars and garage keys\n\n433/315 MHz key fob jammer based on ATTINY13A and FS1000A RF transmitting module.\nPIN B2 of ATTINY13A is connected to DATA IN of FS1000A transmitter board.\nBoth ATTINY13 and FS1000A are connected to 5V power supply.  You can attach several FS1000A to the same ATTINY13 for better results as well as modify FS1000A board by adding regulated capacitor 5pF-30pF for fine tuning jammed frequiencies (see videos below)\nPlease notice that SAW Oscillator used in FS1000A modules has 433.92MHz and has to be fine tuned to jamm particular frequency.\n\nThe source code for ATTINY13 is generating set of square waves - 50 sequences of 3 pulses each with different width to put enough noise on 433/315Mhz frequency. The device can effectively jam all wireless keys in 100 meter range f.ex. in underground garage.\n\nRemember to buy appropriate FS1000A version for your location (check frequency).\n\nTo see how it works look here : https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=C7fyKEQMs7c    an here - modified version  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F10x1WN3X4Q\n\n-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\nCOMPILATION ON LINUX PC :\n\nLink to video how to program the chip : https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7klgyNzZ2TI\n\nThe script attached in repository ( \"compileattiny\" ) can be used to upload data to the chip if you have Linux machine with following packages : \"gcc-avr\", \"binutils-avr\" (or sometimes just \"binutils\"), \"avr-libc\", \"avrdude\" and optionally \"gdb-avr\"(debugger only if you really need it) . For example in Ubuntu download these packages using command : \"sudo apt-get install gcc-avr binutils-avr avr-libc gdb-avr avrdude\". After this is done you can run from directory you downloaded the github files appropriate compilation script by commands\n\n    \"sudo chmod +rx compileattiny\" and \"sudo ./compileattiny\"\n\n-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\nCOMPILATION ON WINDOWS PC :\n\nIf you have Windows 10 machine please follow this tutorial to download and install full AVR-GCC environment for Windows : http://fab.cba.mit.edu/classes/863.16/doc/projects/ftsmin/windows_avr.html with latest compiler from Microchip/Atmel.\n\nAfter it is done please use \"compileattiny.bat\"  for compilation inside directory where you have downloaded \"main.c\" file. You have to be logged as Windows Administrator to use avrdude software.\n\nPROGRAMMING THE ATTINY / ATMEGA / ARDUINO - connecting cables to the chip :\n\nTo upload program code to the chip using cheapest USBASP programmer (less than 2 USD on eBay/Aliexpress) look at this page : http://www.learningaboutelectronics.com/Articles/Program-AVR-chip-using-a-USBASP-with-10-pin-cable.php , because we are not using ARDUINO bootloader here (especially for chips like ATTINY)\n\nTo program Digispark - In ARDUINO IDE go to File/Preferences/Additional board manager URL and put this URL : https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ArminJo/DigistumpArduino/master/package_digistump_index.json , then go to Menu Tools/Board and select Digistump AVR Boards / Digispark default 16.5 MHZ",
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      "readme": "I hope this project will be valuable to others in their automotive security research.\n\nThe following devices and software were used for CAN network testing:\n1) Raspberry Pi 4 Model B with Kali Linux\n2) RS485 CAN HAT (waveshare)\n3) Arduino Uno R4 WiFi\n4) CAN-BUS Shield v2 (Seeedstudio)\n\n\nPlease note that updates to this repository will be made periodically as my time permits. I am committed to enhancing the content, but changes, improvements, or new features will be added based on my availability. Thank you for your understanding and patience.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nDisclaimer\n1) The content provided in this repository is intended solely for educational and research purposes. The information, code, and tools shared are meant to help users learn about automotive security and related technologies.\n2) By using the content from this repository, you agree that the author will not be held responsible for any misuse of the information, including but not limited to illegal activities, unauthorized access, or any other unethical actions.\n3) The author is not responsible for any damage, malfunction, or breakdown of devices or equipment as a result of using the content provided in this repository. Users are solely responsible for the proper and safe use of the tools and techniques described.\n4) All content is provided \"as-is\" without any warranties. Users assume all risks associated with the use of this content. Always ensure you have proper authorization and legal rights before performing any security testing on vehicles or related systems.",
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      "title": "Simulating GPS Spoofing Attacks on Autonomous Vehicles in CARLA",
      "full_name": "ificiency/Simulating-GPS-Spoofing-Attacks-on-Autonomous-Vehicles-in-CARLA",
      "name": "Simulating-GPS-Spoofing-Attacks-on-Autonomous-Vehicles-in-CARLA",
      "owner": "ificiency",
      "url": "https://github.com/ificiency/Simulating-GPS-Spoofing-Attacks-on-Autonomous-Vehicles-in-CARLA",
      "description": "Simulation project for demonstrating GPS spoofing attacks on autonomous vehicles using the CARLA simulator. This repository explores vulnerabilities in GPS-based navigation and tests countermeasures to enhance autonomous vehicle security.",
      "readme": "## Simulating GPS Spoofing Attacks on Autonomous Vehicles in CARLA\nOverview (ongoing) ##\n\n\nThis project demonstrates a basic cybersecurity threat scenario using CARLA 0.9.15, where multiple autonomous vehicles experience GPS spoofing attacks. Each vehicle is equipped with \ta GPS sensor, and the simulation manipulates GPS coordinates to simulate an attack. This scenario can help researchers and developers study the effects of GPS spoofing on autonomous vehicle behavior and develop mitigation strategies.\n\n\n\n## Features ##\n\n\tMulti-Vehicle Simulation: Spawns multiple autonomous vehicles in the CARLA environment.\n\tGPS Spoofing: Overrides GPS output for each vehicle, providing both original and spoofed coordinates.\n\tCybersecurity Simulation: Models a realistic GPS spoofing threat, relevant for studying autonomous vehicle security.\n\n\n\n## Prerequisites ##\n\n\tCARLA 0.9.15 (Installation guide: CARLA Documentation)\n\tPython 3.7+\n\tRequired Python libraries (see Installation section below)\n\n\n## Installation ##\n\n  1. Clone this repository:\n\n \t\tgit clone https://github.com/yourusername/gps-spoofing-cybersecurity\n\n\t\tcd gps-spoofing-cybersecurity\n\n\n  2. Install required Python packages: Use the requirements.txt provided in the repository:\n\n                pip install -r requirements.txt\n\n\n  3. Set up CARLA:\n\n\tEnsure that CARLA 0.9.15 is installed and running. Launch CARLA by running CarlaUE4.exe in the CARLA root directory.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n## Usage ##\n\n   1. Run the CARLA Simulator: Open a terminal in the project directory where CarlaUE4.exe is kept and execute the Python script:\n\n\tCarlaUE4.exe -carla-rpc-port=3000\n\n\tCarlaUE4.exe -carla-rpc-port=3000 -map=Town03\n\n\n\n   2. Run the GPS Spoofing Simulation:\n\n\tOpen a terminal in the project directory where gps-spoofing.py is kept and execute the Python script with the below:\n\n\n\t\tpy -3.7 generate_traffic.py --port 3000 --tm-port 6000\n\n\t\tpy -3.7 generate_traffic.py --port 3000 --tm-port 6000 --number-of-vehicles 15\n\n\n   3. Simulation Output:\n\n        The script spawns multiple vehicles, attaches GPS sensors, and simulates GPS spoofing by overriding GPS coordinates. It will output both original and spoofed GPS data for each     \tvehicle, allowing you to observe the effects of the spoofing attack in real time.\n\n\n\n\n## Code Structure ##\n\n  gps_spoofing.py: The main Python script for running the GPS spoofing simulation. It handles vehicle spawning, GPS sensor attachment, and GPS spoofing logic.\n\n\n\n\n## Example Output ##\n\nThe output will display GPS data for each vehicle:\n\n\n\tVehicle ID: 1\n\tOriginal GPS: (x: 51.5074, y: -0.1278)\n\tSpoofed GPS:  (x: 40.7128, y: -74.0060)\n\t...\n\n\n\n\n## Contributing ##\n\nContributions are welcome! Please follow these steps:\n\n\tFork the repository.\n\tCreate a new branch (git checkout -b feature-branch).\n\tMake your changes and commit them (git commit -m \"Add new feature\").\n\tPush to the branch (git push origin feature-branch).\n\tOpen a Pull Request.\n\n\n\n ## Download CARLA ##\n\n https://carla.readthedocs.io/en/latest/start_quickstart/\n\n\n\n\n## License ##\n\nThis project is licensed under the MIT License - see the LICENSE file for details.\n\n\n\n\n## Acknowledgments ##\n\nThe CARLA simulator team for providing an open-source platform for autonomous vehicle simulation.\nThe open-source community for contributing to the tools and libraries used in this project.",
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      "title": "Generative AI-Based Cybersecurity for Connected Cars and IoT Systems",
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      "readme": "# Generative AI-Based Cybersecurity for Connected Cars and IoT Systems\n\n### Overview\nThis project leverages Generative AI (GANs) to simulate and prevent cybersecurity threats in connected cars and IoT-based automotive systems. The solution addresses the increasing risks of hacking, unauthorized access, and system vulnerabilities in the modern automotive and IoT ecosystem. By generating realistic cyberattack patterns and analyzing vulnerabilities, this project ensures proactive security measures and enhances user safety.\n\n---\n\n### Key Features\n- Threat Simulation:\n   Generates simulated cyberattacks to test system vulnerabilities.\n- Proactive Security:\n   Identifies risks and provides insights to mitigate potential threats before they occur.\n- API Integration:\n   Flask-based REST API to interact with the GAN model for real-time inference.\n- Scalable Design:\n   Future-ready for real-time monitoring and adaptive security measures.\n\n---\n\n### Tech Stack\n- Backend: Python, Flask, PyTorch, TorchMetrics\n- Frontend: React.js (Optional UI components for monitoring)\n- Deployment: Waitress (production-ready server), Postman (API testing)\n\n---\n\n### Folder Structure\n```\nGENAI_PROJECT/\n│\n├── models/                    # Contains trained GAN model files\n├── server/                    # Flask backend\n│   ├── inference_api.py       # API for inference\n│   ├── requirements.txt       # Python dependencies\n│   └── server.py              # Server entry point\n├── client/                    # Frontend (if implemented)\n├── docs/                      # Documentation and assets (e.g., PPT, Video)\n├── tests/                     # Unit tests for API endpoints\n├── README.md                  # Project documentation\n└── .gitignore                 # Git ignored files\n```\n\n---\n\n### Setup Instructions\n\n#### Prerequisites\n1. Python 3.10 or above\n2. PyTorch installed (for the GAN model)\n3. Flask and Waitress for API hosting\n4. Postman (for testing API endpoints)\n\n#### Installation\n1. Clone the repository:\n   ```bash\n   git clone https://github.com/hritik664/genai.git\n   cd genai\n   ```\n2. Install dependencies:\n   ```bash\n   pip install -r requirements.txt\n   ```\n3. Start the Flask server:\n   ```bash\n   python inference_api.py\n   ```\n4. For production:\n   ```bash\n   waitress-serve --port=5000 inference_api:app\n   ```\n\n#### Testing the API\n- Use Postman to test API endpoints:\n   - Endpoint: `http://127.0.0.1:5000/generate`\n   - Method: `POST`\n   - Body: JSON input, e.g., `{ \"input_vector\": [0.1, 0.2, 0.3, ...] }`\n\n---\n\n### Usage\n1. Generate simulated threats using the GAN model via the `/generate` API.\n2. Visualize or log the generated data for security analysis.\n3. Leverage the output to enhance your system’s cybersecurity measures.\n\n---\n\n### Future Enhancements\n- Real-time monitoring for connected cars and IoT systems.\n- Adaptive security protocols using reinforcement learning.\n- Integration with live automotive telemetry systems.\n\n---\n\n### Contributors\n- Hritik Singh\n\n---\n\n### License\nThis project is licensed under the MIT License. See the `LICENSE` file for details.\n\n---\n\n### Contact\nFor inquiries, please reach out to:\nEmail: singhhritik560@gmail.com\nGitHub: [Hritik Singh](https://github.com/your-github-profile)",
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      "title": "carhackingids",
      "full_name": "HiteshPranav267/carhackingids",
      "name": "carhackingids",
      "owner": "HiteshPranav267",
      "url": "https://github.com/HiteshPranav267/carhackingids",
      "description": "This project implements a machine learning-based Intrusion Detection System for CAN bus networks, designed for automotive cybersecurity research and education.",
      "readme": "# carhackingids\nThis project implements a machine learning-based Intrusion Detection System for CAN bus networks, designed for automotive cybersecurity research and education.\n---\n\n## 📁 Project Structure\n\n- `01_load_and_label.py` — Loads raw CAN datasets, labels normal and attack frames, and combines them.\n- `02_preprocess.py` — Converts hexadecimal fields to integers and prepares the data for ML.\n- `03_train_model.py` — Trains a Random Forest classifier on the preprocessed data and saves the model.\n- `04_firewall.py` — Real-time CAN firewall that uses the trained model to detect and block attacks.\n- `05_can_gui_sender.py` — GUI tool to simulate and send CAN messages (normal and attack types).\n- `utils.py` — Utility functions (e.g., hex to int conversion).\n- `dataset/` — Folder containing raw and processed CSV files.\n\n---\n\n## ⚙️ Setup Instructions\n\n### 1. Clone the Repository\n\n```sh\ngit clone https://github.com/HiteshPranav267/carhackingids.git\ncd Car-Hacking-Dataset\n```\n\n### 2. Install Dependencies\n\n```sh\npip install pandas scikit-learn joblib python-can\n```\n\n### 3. Prepare the Dataset\n\n- Place all raw CAN CSV files in the `dataset/` folder.\n\n### 4. Data Processing Pipeline\n\n**a. Combine and Label Data**\n```sh\npython 01_load_and_label.py\n```\n- Combines all datasets and labels them as normal or attack.\n\n**b. Preprocess Data**\n```sh\npython 02_preprocess.py\n```\n- Converts hex fields to integers and saves `data_preprocessed.csv`.\n\n**c. Train the Model**\n```sh\npython 03_train_model.py\n```\n- Trains a Random Forest model and saves it as `can_ids_model.pkl`.\n\n---\n\n## 🚦 Running the Real-Time Firewall\n\nMake sure your CAN interface (e.g., `vcan0` for virtual or `can0` for hardware) is set up.\n\n```sh\npython 04_firewall.py\n```\n- Listens for CAN frames and blocks those detected as attacks.\n- Logs results to `firewall_log.csv`.\n\n---\n\n## 🖥️ CAN Message Sender GUI\n\nSimulate CAN traffic (normal and attacks) with a graphical interface.\n\n```sh\npython 05_can_gui_sender.py\n```\n- Select attack mode, frequency, ID range, or enter manual ID/data.\n- Sends messages to the CAN bus for testing.\n\n---\n\n## 📝 Notes\n\n- For real hardware, change `channel='vcan0'` to `channel='can0'` in the scripts.\n- For Raspberry Pi deployment, ensure you have a CAN HAT (e.g., PiCAN2) and configure the interface as described in the documentation.\n- All logs and processed files are saved in the project directory.\n\n---\n\n## 📚 References\n\n- [python-can documentation](https://python-can.readthedocs.io/)\n- [scikit-learn documentation](https://scikit-learn.org/)\n- [Raspberry Pi CAN setup guide](https://www.raspberrypi.org/forums/viewtopic.php?t=141052)\n\n---\n\n## 🛡️ Disclaimer\n\nThis project is for educational and research purposes only. Do not use on vehicles without proper authorization.",
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      "full_name": "hareeshnaidu123/vcan-security-toolkit",
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      "description": "A hands-on, zero-hardware automotive security lab using Linux SocketCAN and Python. Simulates real-time ECU telemetry, implements a frequency-based Intrusion Detection System (IDS) to catch injection attacks, and demonstrates AUTOSAR-style SecOC message authentication to prevent replay and payload tampering on vehicle networks.",
      "readme": "# vcan-security-toolkit\nAutomotive CAN Bus Security Analysis & Defensive Engineering LabAn end-to-end, zero-hardware automotive cybersecurity laboratory designed for security researchers, embedded systems engineers, and automotive penetration testers. This project virtualizes an in-vehicle Controller Area Network (CAN) bus to demonstrate real-time telemetry broadcast, frequency-based anomaly detection, and cryptographic message authentication.DisclaimerIMPORTANT NOTICE:This project is designed strictly for educational, developmental, and defensive research purposes. The techniques, code, and architectural concepts demonstrated here are intended to assist security engineers in auditing and securing embedded automotive platforms. Do not deploy automated injection, replay attacks, or untrusted tools on live vehicles, production networks, or safety-critical drive-by-wire hardware. The authors assume no liability for misuse or damage resulting from the use of this software.Technologies UsedLanguage: Python 3.9+Automotive Networking: Linux Kernel SocketCAN (CAN 2.0B / vcan)Libraries: python-can (CAN interface abstraction)Cryptographic Primitives: HMAC-SHA256 (Truncated CMAC/HMAC model conforming to AUTOSAR SecOC specifications)Diagnostics & Analysis Utilities: can-utils (candump, cansniffer, canplayer)FeaturesVirtual Powertrain Simulator: Emulates real-time cyclic traffic for multiple Electronic Control Units (ECUs), including Engine Control Module (RPM) and Anti-lock Braking / Transmission Control (Vehicle Speed).Timing-Based Intrusion Detection System (IDS): Monitors message inter-arrival times ($\\Delta t$), baseline jitter, frame starvation, and unauthorized arbitration IDs.AUTOSAR SecOC Emulation: Features Secure Onboard Communication mechanisms incorporating truncated Message Authentication Codes (MACs) and monotonically increasing freshness counters to mitigate replay and bit-flipping attacks.Zero Hardware Requirement: Completely self-contained within Linux Kernel Virtual CAN (vcan0) interfaces—no costly adapters (e.g., PEAK-System, ValueCAN, or CANable) required.Learning ObjectivesBy working through this laboratory, you will:Understand the fundamental structure of standard CAN 2.0B frames (Arbitration IDs, DLC, Data Payloads).Identify why native CAN bus networks lack built-in authentication, confidentiality, and anti-replay safeguards.Build and tune statistical and timing-based baseline rules for vehicular Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS).Implement and evaluate AUTOSAR SecOC (Secure Onboard Communication) concepts to enforce payload integrity and sequence freshness.Practice using native Linux CLI diagnostic tools (candump, cansniffer) to reverse-engineer unknown automotive telematics.Architecture & Frame LayoutStandard Telemetry FramesFrame NameArbitration IDCycle TimePayload DefinitionENGINE_RPM0x11020 ms2-byte unsigned integer (Big Endian), 6 bytes reservedVEHICLE_SPEED0x12050 ms2-byte scaled integer (speed * 100), 6 bytes reservedBRAKE_STATUS0x200100 ms1-byte digital status maskSecOC Authenticated Frame Format (0x300)Plaintext+-----------------------+--------------------------+-----------------------+\n|  Payload Data (4 B)   | Freshness Counter (2 B)  |  Truncated MAC (2 B)  |\n+-----------------------+--------------------------+-----------------------+\n| Byte 0  1  2  3       | Byte 4  5                | Byte 6  7             |\n+-----------------------+--------------------------+-----------------------+\nInstallation & Prerequisites1. System RequirementsUbuntu 20.04 LTS / 22.04 LTS / 24.04 LTS (Native or WSL2)Root/sudo privileges (required for loading kernel network drivers)2. Install Host DependenciesBashsudo apt update\nsudo apt install -y can-utils git python3 python3-pip\n3. Clone Repository & Install Python PackagesBashgit clone https://github.com/<YOUR-USERNAME>/can-security-lab.git\ncd can-security-lab\npip3 install -r requirements.txt\nUsage GuideThe suite runs via a consolidated CLI dispatcher (can_security_lab.py).Step 1: Initialize Virtual CAN InterfaceBring up the Linux kernel virtual CAN driver (vcan0):Bashsudo python3 can_security_lab.py --setup\nVerification: Run ip link show vcan0—the status should report state UNKNOWN or UP.Step 2: Start Background Vehicle TelemetryIn your primary terminal, launch the simulated powertrain bus:Bashpython3 can_security_lab.py --sim\nVerification: Open a second terminal and monitor live bus traffic:Bashcandump vcan0\nStep 3: Run the In-Line Defensive IDS EngineIn a separate terminal, deploy the anomaly detector:Bashpython3 can_security_lab.py --ids\nThe engine enforces transmission window baselines. Any frame injection, flood attack, or spoofed ID will trigger an immediate alert:Plaintext[!] IDS ALERT: Injection detected on 0x110 (ENGINE_RPM) | dt=0.0021s (Min: 0.0050s)\n[!] IDS ALERT: Unregistered Arbitration ID observed: 0x333\nStep 4: Validate Cryptographic Defenses (SecOC)To observe cryptographic verification and replay rejection:Bashpython3 can_security_lab.py --secoc-demo\nExpected Output:Plaintext[*] Running Secure Onboard Communication (SecOC) validation test...\n\n1. Transmitting authentic frame (Counter: 100, Hex: 0102030400643a12)\n   -> Verification Result: PASS (Authenticated)\n\n2. Replaying the identical frame (Simulated replay attack)...\n   -> Verification Result: FAIL (Replay detected (Counter 100 <= 100))\n\n3. Altering payload in transit (Counter: 101, Hex: ff02030400659b81)\n   -> Verification Result: FAIL (Cryptographic MAC signature mismatch)\nRepository StructurePlaintextcan-security-lab/\n├── can_security_lab.py    # Core suite: Simulator, IDS monitor, SecOC engine\n├── requirements.txt       # Python dependencies (python-can)\n├── LICENSE                # Open-source license (MIT)\n└── README.md              # Project documentation and guide\nContributingPull requests are welcome. For major architectural additions (e.g., UDS diagnostics handlers, DoIP simulations, or CAN-FD expansion), please open an issue first to discuss the intended design.LicenseDistributed under the MIT License. See LICENSE for more information.",
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      "title": "Tesla Mod for Flipper Zero",
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      "readme": "[English](README.md) | [繁體中文](README_zh-TW.md) | [简体中文](README_zh-CN.md)\n\n# Tesla Mod for Flipper Zero\n\n[![GitHub stars](https://img.shields.io/github/stars/hypery11/flipper-tesla-fsd?style=flat-square&logo=github)](https://github.com/hypery11/flipper-tesla-fsd/stargazers)\n[![GitHub forks](https://img.shields.io/github/forks/hypery11/flipper-tesla-fsd?style=flat-square&logo=github)](https://github.com/hypery11/flipper-tesla-fsd/network)\n[![GitHub release](https://img.shields.io/github/v/release/hypery11/flipper-tesla-fsd?include_prereleases&style=flat-square&logo=github)](https://github.com/hypery11/flipper-tesla-fsd/releases)\n[![Downloads](https://img.shields.io/github/downloads/hypery11/flipper-tesla-fsd/total?style=flat-square&logo=github)](https://github.com/hypery11/flipper-tesla-fsd/releases)\n[![Last commit](https://img.shields.io/github/last-commit/hypery11/flipper-tesla-fsd?style=flat-square&logo=github)](https://github.com/hypery11/flipper-tesla-fsd/commits/main)\n[![Open issues](https://img.shields.io/github/issues/hypery11/flipper-tesla-fsd?style=flat-square&logo=github)](https://github.com/hypery11/flipper-tesla-fsd/issues)\n[![PRs welcome](https://img.shields.io/badge/PRs-welcome-brightgreen?style=flat-square)](CONTRIBUTING.md)\n[![License: GPL-3.0](https://img.shields.io/badge/license-GPL--3.0-blue?style=flat-square)](LICENSE)\n[![Build](https://img.shields.io/badge/build-ufbt-brightgreen?style=flat-square)](https://github.com/flipperdevices/flipperzero-ufbt)\n[![Flipper target](https://img.shields.io/badge/Flipper%20target-7%20%2F%20API%2087.1-orange?style=flat-square)](https://github.com/flipperdevices/flipperzero-firmware)\n\n> **Open-source Tesla CAN bus toolkit for Flipper Zero and ESP32.** FSD region-gate bypass, TLSSC Restore for VIN-banned cars, nag killer with organic torque variation, GTW Config Replay, live BMS dashboard, and 30+ CAN handlers across Model 3, Model Y, Model S, and Model X. Supports HW3, HW4, and Legacy HW1/HW2. Free alternative to the $200+ S3XY Commander — total cost from **$14** with the [ESP32 port](https://github.com/hypery11/flipper-tesla-fsd/tree/main/esp32).\n\n> [!IMPORTANT]\n> **An active FSD package is required for FSD features** — either purchased or subscribed. This tool enables FSD functionality at the CAN bus level, but the vehicle still needs a valid FSD entitlement from Tesla. Non-FSD features (nag killer, BMS dashboard, diagnostics) work without any subscription.\n\n> [!CAUTION]\n> **Tesla has begun issuing VIN-level bans** (April 2026). Affected vehicles lose the TLSSC toggle silently — no OTA, no warning, persists across account transfers and re-subscriptions. The **TLSSC Restore** feature (v2.10+) can recover stop sign / traffic light control on banned Palladium and HW4 cars via 0x331 DAS config spoofing. See [SECURITY.md](SECURITY.md) and [issue #18](https://github.com/hypery11/flipper-tesla-fsd/issues/18) for the full ban research.\n\n<p align=\"center\">\n  <img src=\"assets/demo.gif\" alt=\"Tesla FSD unlock running on Flipper Zero — main menu, HW detect, and live BMS dashboard\" width=\"600\">\n</p>\n\n<p align=\"center\">\n  <img src=\"screenshots/main_menu.png\" alt=\"Flipper Zero Tesla FSD main menu\" width=\"256\">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;\n  <img src=\"screenshots/fsd_running.png\" alt=\"Tesla FSD unlock running on Flipper Zero\" width=\"256\">\n</p>\n\n<p align=\"center\">\n  <a href=\"https://star-history.com/#hypery11/flipper-tesla-fsd&Date\">\n    <img src=\"https://api.star-history.com/svg?repos=hypery11/flipper-tesla-fsd&type=Date\" alt=\"Star history\" width=\"600\">\n  </a>\n</p>\n\n<p align=\"center\">\n  <a href=\"https://github.com/hypery11/flipper-tesla-fsd/graphs/contributors\">\n    <img src=\"https://contrib.rocks/image?repo=hypery11/flipper-tesla-fsd\" alt=\"Contributors\">\n  </a>\n</p>\n\n---\n\n## Features\n\n### Core FSD\n- Auto-detect HW3/HW4 from `GTW_carConfig` (`0x398`), with fallback detection on the ESP32 via `0x39B`/`0x399`/`0x3FD`/`0x3EE` when `0x398` isn't on the tapped bus\n- **Legacy→HW3 auto-upgrade** for Palladium Model S/X — detects `das_hw=0` then upgrades when `0x3FD` appears on the bus\n- FSD unlock via bit manipulation on `UI_autopilotControl` (`0x3FD` / `0x3EE`)\n- **Legacy mode** for HW1/HW2 (Model S/X 2016-2019)\n- Speed profile defaults to fastest, syncs from follow-distance stalk (HW4 / Legacy). On HW3 the car's own FSD speed offset and profile are left alone; the ESP32 **HW3 Speed Override** toggle brings back the old follow-distance / Autopilot-offset write ([#209](https://github.com/hypery11/flipper-tesla-fsd/issues/209))\n\n### TLSSC Restore (v2.10+)\n- Recover Traffic Light and Stop Sign Control on **VIN-banned** vehicles\n- Read-modify-retransmit on CAN ID `0x331` — sets `DAS_autopilot` to SELF_DRIVING\n- Confirmed working on Palladium (Model S Plaid 2023), HW4 Highland (Model 3 Performance 2024), and Intel HW3 (with AP-first workaround)\n- Does NOT restore full FSD visualization — only TLSSC (stop signs / traffic lights)\n- **Recommended banned-car combination**: enable **TLSSC Restore** + **TLSSC bit38** (`0x3FD` mux 0 bit 38) together — confirmed reliable on HW3 / 2026.2.6 by @RoyRakete ([#18](https://github.com/hypery11/flipper-tesla-fsd/issues/18#issuecomment-4413430516)). Either toggle alone is unreliable on some banned firmware; the pair re-enables AP/TACC engagement\n\n### GTW Config Replay (v2.9+, renamed from \"Ban Shield\" in v2.15)\n- Watches `GTW_carConfig` (`0x7FF`) and replays the learned-healthy bus broadcast in real time when the gateway emits a modified frame\n- Learns all 8 mux frames on first run, then auto-arms\n- **What it actually does:** broadcast-layer mask only. When armed, the AP ECU sees the replayed healthy frame instead of the gateway's modified one. Tesla's ban writes to GTW NVRAM (which survives reboots) and to server-side flags; this feature does not undo NVRAM state or backend records, only what other on-bus ECUs see in real time.\n- **What it doesn't do:** prevent bans, undo bans, or change Tesla's server-side entitlement record. No empirical case of ban prevention has been confirmed in 6 weeks of v2.9-v2.14 deployment. Honest framing per [#60](https://github.com/hypery11/flipper-tesla-fsd/issues/60) and [#67](https://github.com/hypery11/flipper-tesla-fsd/issues/67). The v2.14 name \"Ban Shield\" overpromised — the v2.15 rename reflects what the code actually does.\n\n### Nag Killer (v2.1+)\n- DAS-aware gating — only echoes when DAS is actually demanding hands-on, zero bus traffic when DAS is satisfied\n- Organic torque variation — xorshift32 PRNG random walk in 1.00-1.80 Nm with a grip pulse every 5-9 seconds. Every nag path is capped at ±1.8 Nm since v2.16-beta.11, so grip pulses peak at 1.80 Nm ([#122](https://github.com/hypery11/flipper-tesla-fsd/issues/122))\n- **On-demand grip pulse (v2.15+)** — when `handsOnLevel` rises into a nag-demand state (0 imminent / 3 escalated), an immediate grip pulse fires and the periodic schedule resets. Closes the 2-second yellow-escalation window that could open between scheduled pulses on v2.14 and earlier\n- EPAS counter+1 echo on `0x370` with level 0 (nag imminent) and level 3 (escalated alarm) suppression\n- **Tap Party CAN (X179 pins 2/3) for the nag killer.** `0x370` is on Party CAN — not Vehicle CAN (9/10), and the Chassis CAN copy (13/14 on some harnesses) trips the 2026.14.x preflight. Confirmed working on HW4 2026.20 by tapping 2/3 ([#100](https://github.com/hypery11/flipper-tesla-fsd/issues/100)). A single-CAN board on the wrong pair has nothing to echo — the usual cause of \"nag killer does nothing on HW4.\" Check your car's wiring diagram (or the **Service Mode → CAN Port** page, where available) for which pin is Party on your harness; see [HARDWARE.md](HARDWARE.md).\n\n### AP-First mode (v2.14+, for 2026.14.x firmware)\n- Tesla 2026.14.x added a preflight check that blocks AP/TACC engagement if CAN injection is already active\n- When **AP-First** is enabled, the app monitors `DAS_autopilotState` from `0x39B` and only starts injecting `0x3FD` after AP is engaged. On ESP32, the DAS status source follows detected HW version.\n- Nag killer, TLSSC Restore, and GTW Config Replay are unaffected (they target different CAN IDs)\n\n### 14.x firmware warning (v2.15+)\n- **Default ON.** Flipper running scene replaces the BMS / flags line with `!14.x: TX may stop AP` whenever the warning toggle is enabled. ESP32 web dashboard shows a dismissible yellow banner at the top.\n- Pessimistic default: most users on 14.x firmware don't know they're affected until autosteer disengages mid-drive. The warning reaches them before they enable any TX feature.\n- Opt-out via the **On 14.x?** Settings toggle (Flipper) or the **Dismiss** button on the banner (ESP32, persisted in NVS). Disable if you are sure you're on pre-14.x firmware.\n- Regional caveat: enforcement intensity varies by market. Some regions (markets without Tesla direct presence) appear to enforce less aggressively. See [#122](https://github.com/hypery11/flipper-tesla-fsd/issues/122) for the running 14.x / 2026.20 tracker.\n- **\"Does this unlock FSD on 2026.14.x / .20 / .26.x?\"** Short answer: no — the activation preflight and an off-CAN region lock block it, while nag killer / TLSSC / Summon EU / captures still work. Full explanation in the [FSD-on-14.x FAQ (#168)](https://github.com/hypery11/flipper-tesla-fsd/discussions/168), with the frame-level proof in [#163](https://github.com/hypery11/flipper-tesla-fsd/discussions/163).\n\n### Diagnostics (read-only, no FSD required)\n- Live BMS dashboard: pack voltage, current, SoC (the BMS figure from `0x292` and, on the ESP32, the car's own from `0x33A`), temperature range\n- **Performance panel (ESP32 web dashboard, read-only, opt-in):** acceleration / braking timers (0-50, 0-60 mph, 0-100, 100-0 km/h with a per-session best), estimated longitudinal G (dv/dt of speed, no IMU), wheel slip %, and pack temperature / power. Speed and est. G work on any tap carrying `0x257`; wheel slip needs Party CAN (`0x175`); temperature and power need the BMS frames on a Vehicle-CAN tap. Transmits nothing\n- Vehicle speed, steering angle, motor torque, brake state\n- DAS status: autopilot state, hands-on nag level, lane change state, blind spot warning, FCW, vision speed limit\n- GTW autopilot tier readback (NONE/HIGHWAY/ENHANCED/SELF_DRIVING/BASIC)\n- OTA detection with debounce — auto-suspends TX during firmware updates unless the explicit Ignore OTA override is enabled. Only a stable \"installing\" value counts; on newer cars `0x318` byte6 is a rolling counter and can't trip it ([#183](https://github.com/hypery11/flipper-tesla-fsd/issues/183))\n- Autopark pause — all TX stops while the car runs in-car Autopark and resumes when it ends; FSD engaged isn't affected ([#180](https://github.com/hypery11/flipper-tesla-fsd/issues/180))\n\n### CAN Capture + Test Profiles (v2.16+)\n- **CAN Capture** — record every received frame to the SD card in candump format (`apps_data/tesla_mod/captures/`). Read-only; safe to run on any car. Feeds `tools/tesla_crc_cracker.py`.\n- **Send Test** — load a user-authored `.cantest` text profile from the SD card and replay your own frames. Defaults to dry-run; transmitting is hard-gated to a **parked, stationary** car (fail-closed) and re-checked before every frame. Result is logged for a bug report. Format + workflow: [docs/cantest-format.md](docs/cantest-format.md), example: [examples/example.cantest](examples/example.cantest).\n\n### Extra unlocks (v2.16+, opt-in, default OFF)\n\nESP32 dashboard only for now — the Flipper menu doesn't have these toggles, so a Flipper never sets the summon bit (bit47).\n\n- **Summon EU Unlock** — `0x3FD` mux1: clears bit19 (EU AP restriction) and sets bit47 (summon-enable) to expose Summon on EU-restricted cars\n- **Continue on Green** — `0x3FD` mux0 bit39 `UI_fsdContinueOnGreenWithCIPV` — continue through a green light behind a lead car without a stalk confirmation; pairs with TLSSC\n- **Right-Hand Drive (RHD) override** — `0x3F8` bit41 `UI_drivingSide` = RHD. RHD markets only\n- **AP branch/tier selector** — `0x3FD` mux1 bits 40-42 `UI_apmv3Branch`: Live / Stage / Dev / Stage2 / EAP / Demo. Experimental, non-persistent UI hint — reverts when injection stops\n- **Adjustable Track Mode** — `0x313` `UI_trackModeSettings`: Handling Balance + Stability Assist + post-drive cooling, checksum recomputed. Vehicle bus; defaults to rotation 100 / stability 30%, and works on non-Performance trims too\n- **Acceleration Mode (experimental)** — `0x334` `UI_powertrainControl` `UI_pedalMap` (byte0 bits 5-6): Off (pass-through) / Chill / Standard / Performance, written into the car's own frame with the counter kept and the checksum recomputed. A new mode only switches at standstill; Off, or a mode change on the touchscreen while driving, goes back to pass-through at once. The touchscreen keeps showing your own setting. `0x334` is on Vehicle and Chassis CAN, not OBD-II Party CAN. It changes the pedal map only, not the drive unit's power rating. Not car-validated yet. Idea from [ColinM-sys/tesla-can-boost](https://github.com/ColinM-sys/tesla-can-boost) ([#211](https://github.com/hypery11/flipper-tesla-fsd/issues/211))\n\n### Settings (runtime toggles)\n\nMost toggles are on both builds. Flipper only: GTW Config Replay, Emerg. Vehicle, ScrollPress AP, Nav FSD Route, Lane Graph, Tier Override, Dev Mode, Hands-Off, Force LHD, MCP Crystal. ESP32 only: FSD Unlock (master switch for the `0x3FD` FSD bits, off by default), HW3 Speed Override, Ignore OTA, Abort Guard, Continuous AP, China Mode, Right-Hand Drive, the Extra unlocks above and the Hardware selector (the Flipper uses Force HW3/HW4/Legacy in its main menu).\n\n**Stable (car-tested):**\n\n| Setting | Description |\n|---------|-------------|\n| **Mode** | `Active` / `Listen-Only` / `Service`. Listen-Only is the **first-boot default** — MCP2515 is in hardware listen-only mode and physically cannot TX. |\n| **Nag Killer** | DAS-aware EPAS counter+1 echo with organic torque variation. |\n| **Force FSD** | Bypass the `isFSDSelectedInUI` check. Does not bypass Tesla's server-side entitlement — only affects local CAN frame flow. |\n| **Ignore OTA** | Allows CAN TX in Active mode even when `0x318` reports a Tesla OTA update in progress. Default is off. |\n| **TLSSC Restore** | 0x331 DAS config spoof to recover TLSSC on banned vehicles. Triggers MCU reboot. |\n| **AP-First (14.x)** | Delay 0x3FD injection until AP is engaged. Required for Tesla firmware 2026.14.x. |\n| **GTW Config Replay** | Replay learned-healthy `GTW_carConfig` (0x7FF) broadcasts when the gateway emits modified frames. CAN-broadcast-layer mask only — does not undo NVRAM or backend-side ban flags, does not prevent bans. Renamed from \"Ban Shield\" in v2.15 ([#60](https://github.com/hypery11/flipper-tesla-fsd/issues/60), [#67](https://github.com/hypery11/flipper-tesla-fsd/issues/67)). |\n| **Suppress Chime** | Kill the ISA speed warning chime (HW4 only, `0x399`). On ESP32 this is active only after HW4 detection; Legacy/HW3 use `0x399` as DAS status instead. |\n| **Emerg. Vehicle** | Enable emergency vehicle detection flag (HW4 only, bit59). |\n| **Precondition** | Battery preheat trigger via `0x082`. |\n\n**Beta (untested, please report results):**\n\n| Setting | CAN ID | Description |\n|---------|--------|-------------|\n| **ScrollPress AP** | `0x3C2` mux=1 | **HW4-only, Service mode only.** Engages AP via a time-based, human-like scroll-wheel gesture (press ~250ms → scroll-up ~150ms → press ~250ms → scroll-up) on `swcRightPressed` (bits 12-13) + `swcRightScrollTicks` (bits 24-29), fired when `DAS_autopilotState` rises 0→1 — no `0x3FD` touch. First known 2026.14.x bypass; discovered + bench-verified on Highland HW4 / 2026.14.2 by @JakNo ([#43](https://github.com/hypery11/flipper-tesla-fsd/issues/43), timed flow [#82](https://github.com/hypery11/flipper-tesla-fsd/pull/82)). HW3 disabled in v2.15 after @DmitroPanteliuk's emergency-brake report on Intel HW3 2026.14.6 |\n| **Nav FSD Route** | `0x3F8` bits 13/48/49 | Enable nav-based FSD routing (EU/restricted regions) |\n| **TLSSC bit38** | `0x3FD` mux0 bit38 | Explicit TLSSC enable; pair with TLSSC Restore (0x331) as the recommended banned-car combo |\n| **Lane Graph** | `0x3FD` mux1 bit45 | UI_showLaneGraph — lane visualization on non-FSD tier |\n| **Tier Override** | `0x7FF` mux=2 | Force GTW_autopilot to SELF_DRIVING (more aggressive than GTW Config Replay — actively writes rather than replays) |\n| **Dev Mode** | `0x3F8` bit5 | UI_dasDeveloper flag |\n| **Right-Hand Drive (RHD)** | `0x3F8` bit41 | `UI_drivingSide` = RHD (bit41 set, bit40 clear — mutually exclusive with the old LHD probe). RHD markets only. Honest note: the earlier Force-LHD probe was **empirically ineffective** — values 0/1/2 all left FSD on the LHD side on a banned RHD HW3 / 2026.2.6 ([#66](https://github.com/hypery11/flipper-tesla-fsd/issues/66)); RHD now ships as the requested-direction override (ESP32; the Flipper menu still has the old Force LHD toggle) |\n| **Hands-Off** | `0x3F8` bit14 | UI-level hands-on disable (second nag vector) |\n| **Telemetry Off** | `0x3F8` bits 19/42/43/44/55 + `0x3FD` mux1 bits 48/50 | Clears the reachable telemetry-enable flags (clip / trip / road-segment on 0x3F8, cabin-camera / China on 0x3FD). Experimental — **reachable flags only, not the Vehicle-bus ECU log-upload, and not a ban guarantee.** Use only with SIM pulled |\n\n**14.x experimental (off by default, please report):**\n\nThese target Tesla 2026.14.x / 2026.20 behaviour and are all **off by default**. They are probes, not confirmed universal fixes — see [#122](https://github.com/hypery11/flipper-tesla-fsd/issues/122) for live status. Toggle in the ESP32 web dashboard (and Flipper Settings where available).\n\n| Setting | Description |\n|---------|-------------|\n| **Abort Guard** (ESP32) | Steer-jerk mitigation ([#108](https://github.com/hypery11/flipper-tesla-fsd/issues/108)). The activation jerk is the car *aborting* the engage (`DAS_autopilotState` → `8 ABORTING` → `9 ABORTED`). When on, cuts all activation injection the instant an abort state appears and stays off until a clean disengage. **Validated on-car:** eliminated the jerk on wide/straight roads (0 in hundreds of cycles, was ~1/25–30). Limit: some narrow roads jump straight to `FAULT (9)` with no lead, which it can't catch. |\n| **Soft Engage** | Steer-jerk mitigation ([#108](https://github.com/hypery11/flipper-tesla-fsd/issues/108)). Holds the activation-edge injection until the wheel is within ±5° of centre. Needs `0x129` (steering angle) on the tapped bus; degrades to AP-First-only if absent. Largely superseded by Abort Guard for straight-road jerks. |\n| **Nag Burst** | Echoes `0x370` in bursts (~1 s on / ~1.5 s off) instead of continuously ([#122](https://github.com/hypery11/flipper-tesla-fsd/issues/122)). The rest periods are the believed reason some in-the-wild devices evade the stricter 14.x nag detector. Pairs with a ±1.8 Nm steering-torque cap. |\n| **EPAS-faithful (Mode-C)** | Demand-state torque model that mirrors a real EPAS instead of flipping `handsOnLevel` ([#100](https://github.com/hypery11/flipper-tesla-fsd/issues/100)). For cars where the standard nag killer trips the preflight. **Not yet confirmed on-car.** |\n| **Instant Engage** | Steer-jerk / activation-lag A/B ([#108](https://github.com/hypery11/flipper-tesla-fsd/issues/108), [#129](https://github.com/hypery11/flipper-tesla-fsd/issues/129)). With AP-First on, injects as soon as AP is engaged (DAS state ≥ 3) instead of waiting out the 1 s stability debounce. Still holds while AP is only available (state 2). |\n| **Minimal Inject** | Narrow-road steer-jerk probe ([#108](https://github.com/hypery11/flipper-tesla-fsd/issues/108)). Injects only a short burst (5 frames) at the start of each engagement, then stops until the car disengages. Stacks with Instant Engage. |\n| **Signal Map** (ESP32 → advanced) | Override where the nag killer reads AP-state / hands-on / steering: `id + byte/shift/mask` ([#122](https://github.com/hypery11/flipper-tesla-fsd/issues/122)). For variants whose `0x39B`/`0x399` layout differs. Freshness-gated — a wrong map fails closed, and the dashboard warns when the mapped DAS id never shows up on the bus. A field with mask `0` is ignored. Leave DAS id `0` for auto-detect. The Flipper has a preset picker instead (Auto / `0x39B` b0 / `0x39B` b1 / `0x399` b0). |\n\n**Hardware:**\n\n| Setting | Description |\n|---------|-------------|\n| **MCP Crystal** | 16 / 8 / 12 MHz — match your CAN module's crystal frequency. |\n| **Hardware** (ESP32) | Auto-detect / Force HW4 / Force HW3 / Force Legacy. Auto-detect needs `0x398`, which many Model 3/Y never send — pin your car if detection is wrong. NVS-persisted, applied at boot. |\n\n### HW Support\n\n| Tesla HW | Bits Modified | Speed Profile |\n|----------|---------------|---------------|\n| Legacy (HW1/HW2) | bit46 | 3 levels (0-2) |\n| HW3 | bit46 | car's own (3 levels with HW3 Speed Override) |\n| HW4 (FSD V14+) | bit46 + bit60 | 5 levels (0-4) |\n\n---\n\n## Hardware\n\n### Flipper Zero\n\n| Component | Description | Price |\n|-----------|-------------|-------|\n| [Flipper Zero](https://flipper.net/) | The multi-tool device | ~$170 |\n| [Electronic Cats CAN Bus Add-On](https://electroniccats.com/store/flipper-addon-canbus/) | MCP2515-based CAN transceiver (v1.2 supported) | ~$30 |\n| OBD-II cable or X179 pigtail | Connect to Tesla's CAN bus | ~$5-10 |\n\n### ESP32 (from $14)\n\nFull-featured ESP32 port with WiFi web dashboard, NVS settings persistence, deep sleep, and factory reset. Same core CAN logic as the Flipper app; a few toggles exist on only one build (see Settings).\n\nThe ESP32 firmware maps AP/DAS status by detected hardware version:\n\n| Detected HW | `0x399` | `0x39B` | ISA speed chime |\n|-------------|---------|---------|-----------------|\n| Legacy HW1/HW2 | `DAS_status` | not used | disabled |\n| HW3 | `DAS_status` | not used | disabled |\n| HW4 | `ISA_SPEED` | `DAS_status` | enabled |\n\n| Board | Cost | Build target |\n|-------|------|-------------|\n| M5Stack ATOM Lite + ATOMIC CAN | ~$14 | `m5stack-atom` |\n| Lilygo T-CAN485 | ~$15 | `esp32-lilygo` |\n| Waveshare ESP32-S3-RS485-CAN | ~$18 | `waveshare-s3-can` |\n| LilyGO TTGO T-Display + MCP2515 | ~$20 | `ttgo-tdisplay` |\n| LilyGO T-2CAN (dual CAN) | ~$24 | `lilygo-t2can` |\n| LilyGO T-2CAN FD (dual CAN, MCP2518FD) | ~$25 | `lilygo-t2can-fd` |\n| Generic ESP32 + MCP2515 | ~$6 | `esp32-mcp2515` |\n\nSee [`esp32/README.md`](https://github.com/hypery11/flipper-tesla-fsd/tree/main/esp32) for setup, and [`HARDWARE.md`](HARDWARE.md) for the full comparison + wiring diagrams + X179 pinouts.\n\n### Connection points\n\n- **OBD-II** — Party CAN. On 2019+ Model 3 / 2020–April 2024 Model Y it sits in the rear center console area and needs a Tesla adapter cable; 2024+ Juniper / later Highland builds use DoIP (Ethernet) there, not CAN. May go silent in Drive on some Model 3/Y builds.\n- **X179** (behind the rear center console) — recommended. The pin→bus map varies by harness, so check your car's wiring diagram before wiring (or the **Service Mode → CAN Port** page, where the car has it). See [`HARDWARE.md`](HARDWARE.md) for 20-pin and 26-pin pinouts and links to Tesla's Electrical Reference.\n\n<p align=\"center\">\n  <img src=\"images/wiring_diagram.png\" alt=\"Wiring Diagram\" width=\"700\">\n</p>\n\n---\n\n## Installation\n\n### Getting Started (no build tools needed)\n\nNew to this and not very technical? Pick your hardware — both paths avoid the command line:\n\n**Flipper Zero**\n\nThe easiest way is the official Flipper Apps catalog: in the Flipper mobile app open **Apps** and search for **Tesla Mod**, or install it from [lab.flipper.net/apps/tesla_mod](https://lab.flipper.net/apps/tesla_mod). The catalog version follows stable releases and can lag behind the betas, so for a beta copy the `.fap` from Releases yourself:\n\n1. Open [Releases](https://github.com/hypery11/flipper-tesla-fsd/releases) and download `tesla_mod.fap` from the release you want (betas are marked Pre-release).\n2. Connect the Flipper and open [qFlipper](https://flipperzero.one/update) (the official desktop app).\n3. Copy `tesla_mod.fap` onto the SD card into `apps/GPIO/`.\n4. On the Flipper: **Apps → GPIO → Tesla Mod**.\n\n**ESP32** — flash it straight from your browser, nothing to install:\n1. Get the flasher: either open the hosted **[Web Flasher](https://hypery11.github.io/flipper-tesla-fsd/install/)**, or download `tesla-flasher.html` from the latest [release](https://github.com/hypery11/flipper-tesla-fsd/releases) and open it — both work in **Chrome, Edge, or Opera** on a desktop.\n2. Plug the board in over USB, press **Install** next to your board, and pick the serial port.\n3. When it finishes, connect to the board's Wi-Fi network and open `http://192.168.4.1` to control it.\n\nThe board starts in **Listen-Only mode** (it can't transmit) until you enable Active in the dashboard. The wiring to your car depends on your Tesla model/year — see [HARDWARE.md](HARDWARE.md) or open an issue.\n\n### Option 1: Download Pre-built FAP\n\n1. Go to [Releases](https://github.com/hypery11/flipper-tesla-fsd/releases)\n2. Download `tesla_mod.fap`\n3. Copy to your Flipper's SD card: `SD Card/apps/GPIO/tesla_mod.fap`\n\n### Option 2: Build from Source\n\n```bash\ngit clone https://github.com/hypery11/flipper-tesla-fsd.git\ncd flipper-tesla-fsd\nufbt\n# Output: dist/tesla_mod.fap\n```\n\n### ESP32\n\n> Prefer not to build? Flash a pre-built image from the **[Web Flasher](https://hypery11.github.io/flipper-tesla-fsd/install/)** — one click, no toolchain.\n\n```bash\ngit clone https://github.com/hypery11/flipper-tesla-fsd.git\ncd flipper-tesla-fsd/esp32\npio run -e m5stack-atom    # or: esp32-lilygo, waveshare-s3-can, esp32-mcp2515, ttgo-tdisplay, lilygo-t2can, lilygo-t2can-fd\n```\n\n---\n\n## Usage\n\n1. Plug the CAN Add-On into your Flipper Zero (or flash the ESP32)\n2. Connect CAN-H/CAN-L to the vehicle via OBD-II or X179 (your car's wiring diagram, or Service Mode → CAN Port where available, shows which X179 pins carry which bus)\n3. Open the app: `Apps > GPIO > Tesla Mod`\n4. Select **\"Auto Detect & Start\"** (or Force HW3/HW4/Legacy)\n5. Wait for detection (up to 8 seconds) — Palladium S/X will auto-upgrade from Legacy to HW3\n6. The app starts modifying frames automatically when the TLSSC toggle is enabled in the car\n\n---\n\n## Compatibility\n\n### Confirmed working (community-tested)\n\n| Vehicle | HW | Firmware | Tester | Feature |\n|---------|----|----------|--------|---------|\n| Model S Plaid 2023 (Palladium) | HW3/MCU3 | 2026.2.9.3 | @MiniCS, @nagotti | TLSSC Restore, FSD |\n| Model 3 Highland Perf 2024 | HW4 | 2026.8.6 | @kp43h8 | TLSSC Restore, persists after disconnect |\n| Model 3 2019-2023 | HW3 | Various | @THER4iN, multiple | FSD, nag killer |\n| Model X Raven 2017 (HW3 retrofit) | HW3/MCU2 | 2026.8.3 | @dmagyar | Nag killer, EAP |\n| Model Y 2023 (China, MIC) | HW3 | 2026.2.11 | Community | FSD (Force FSD mode) |\n| Model 3/Y 2023+ | HW4 | < 2026.2.9 | @vbarrier, @kwangseok73-sudo | FSD |\n\n### Known limitations\n\n| Firmware | Issue | Workaround |\n|----------|-------|------------|\n| 2026.8.6+ | Region lock — FSD neural net refuses to run in some regions | Pull SIM, use Force FSD |\n| 2026.8.6 HW4 | HW4 injection path broken on this specific build | Use Force HW3 mode |\n| Intel HW3 (banned) | TLSSC toggle restored via 0x331, but enabling it breaks AP | Activate AP first, then inject TLSSC via 0x3FD |\n\nFile your own test report via the [Car compatibility report](https://github.com/hypery11/flipper-tesla-fsd/issues/new?template=car_compatibility.yml) template.\n\n---\n\n## How It Works\n\nSingle-bus read-modify-retransmit on Party CAN. No MITM, no second bus tap.\n\n1. Gateway/ECU sends a frame on the CAN bus\n2. Flipper/ESP32 catches it, modifies the target bits\n3. Retransmits — the receiver uses the latest frame\n\n### CAN IDs\n\n| CAN ID | Name | Direction | Role |\n|--------|------|-----------|------|\n| `0x331` | `DAS_autopilotConfig` | TX | TLSSC Restore — set tier to SELF_DRIVING |\n| `0x370` | `EPAS3P_sysStatus` | TX | Nag killer — counter+1 echo with organic torque |\n| `0x3FD` | `UI_autopilotControl` | TX | FSD unlock — bit46/60 (HW3/HW4), TLSSC bit38, lane graph bit45 |\n| `0x3F8` | `UI_driverAssistControl` | TX | Nav FSD route, hands-off, dev mode, RHD driving-side (bit41), telemetry-off (beta) |\n| `0x3EE` | `UI_autopilotControl` | TX | FSD unlock — Legacy HW1/HW2 |\n| `0x3C2` | `VCLEFT_switchStatus` | TX | ScrollPress AP — right-scroll injection on mux=1 (HW4, Service mode, beta) |\n| `0x7FF` | `GTW_carConfig` | TX | GTW Config Replay + active tier override |\n| `0x082` | `UI_tripPlanning` | TX | Battery preconditioning trigger |\n| `0x313` | `UI_trackModeSettings` | TX | Track Mode — handling balance / stability / cooling (checksum recomputed; Vehicle bus) |\n| `0x334` | `UI_powertrainControl` | TX | Acceleration Mode — `UI_pedalMap` byte0 bits 5-6, set at standstill only (checksum recomputed, counter kept; Vehicle / Chassis bus) |\n| `0x398` | `GTW_carConfig` | RX | HW version detection |\n| `0x318` | `GTW_carState` | RX | OTA detection (auto-suspend TX) |\n| `0x399` | `DAS_status` (HW3/Legacy) / `ISA_speedLimit` (HW4) | RX/TX | HW-dispatched, both apps: pre-Highland HW3 and Legacy read it as DAS_status (AP state + hands-on); HW4 rewrites it for Suppress Chime and reads the hands-on level from it when the car sends no `0x39B` |\n| `0x39B` | `DAS_status` | RX | HW4 + Highland HW3 — AP state (byte0 low nibble, for AP-First), autopark flags (Autopark pause), nag level, lane change, blind spot |\n| `0x132` | `BMS_hvBusStatus` | RX | Pack voltage / current |\n| `0x292` | `BMS_socStatus` | RX | State of charge: `BMS_socUI` (bit 10, 0.1 %), the BMS figure for display; both apps |\n| `0x312` | `BMS_thermalStatus` | RX | Battery temperature (layout unconfirmed on some cars; implausible readings are hidden) |\n| `0x33A` | `UI_range` | RX | SOC shown on the car's screen (ESP32 Battery card) |\n\nFull list of 40 handlers (17 TX, 23 RX) in [`fsd_logic/fsd_handler.h`](fsd_logic/fsd_handler.h).\n\n---\n\n## FAQ\n\n**Does FSD stay unlocked after I unplug?**\nNo. Real-time frame modification. Unplug = back to stock.\n\n**Can this work without an FSD subscription?**\nFSD features (TLSSC, traffic light/stop sign control) require the FSD entitlement from Tesla. Without it, the AP ECU has no neural network weights loaded. Non-FSD features (nag killer, BMS dashboard, speed chime suppress, diagnostics) work on any AP-capable car.\n\n**What about VIN-level bans?**\nTesla has been banning VINs server-side since April 2026. The ban downgrades `GTW_autopilot` tier from SELF_DRIVING to ENHANCED and removes the TLSSC toggle. The **TLSSC Restore** feature (0x331) can recover stop sign/traffic light control on Palladium and HW4. See [issue #18](https://github.com/hypery11/flipper-tesla-fsd/issues/18) for the full research. **GTW Config Replay** (0x7FF, formerly \"Ban Shield\") can replay the learned-healthy configuration in real time, but only at the CAN broadcast layer — it does not undo the underlying NVRAM or server-side state.\n\n**Flipper Zero vs ESP32 — which should I get?**\nESP32 is cheaper ($14 vs $200+), has WiFi dashboard, NVS persistence, and deep sleep. Flipper is more portable and has a built-in screen. Both run the same core CAN logic (a few toggles are build-specific, see Settings). If you don't already own a Flipper, get the ESP32.\n\n**Does this support Model S / Model X?**\nYes. Palladium S/X (2021+) is confirmed working with TLSSC Restore. Pre-2021 S/X with HW3 retrofit works via Legacy→HW3 auto-upgrade. HW1/HW2 Model S/X uses Legacy mode (`0x3EE`). Model S/X uses different BMS CAN IDs — BMS dashboard may show incorrect values.\n\n**Do I need a Flipper CAN Add-On?**\nFor the Flipper: yes, any MCP2515-based module (Electronic Cats, generic boards). For ESP32: built-in CAN transceiver on most supported boards (M5Stack ATOMIC CAN, Lilygo T-CAN485, Waveshare S3).\n\n---\n\n## Related projects\n\n| Project | What it is | Hardware |\n|---------|------------|----------|\n| [ev-open-can-tools](https://github.com/ev-open-can-tools/ev-open-can-tools) | The upstream community project. Active development is on GitHub (v3.1.x stable, v4.0 in beta, GPL-3.0). Formerly `Tesla-OPEN-CAN-MOD` on GitLab; that group was renamed to `ev-open-can-tools` and the GitLab repo is now dormant (0 open issues/MRs, last commit 2026-04-25) — track the GitHub repo. | RP2040 CAN, Feather M4, ESP32 |\n| [dzid26/ESP32-DualCAN](https://github.com/dzid26/ESP32-DualCAN) | \"Dorky Commander\" — open-source hardware alternative to the S3XY Commander | ESP32 + dual CAN |\n| [tuncasoftbildik/tesla-can-mod](https://github.com/tuncasoftbildik/tesla-can-mod) | Arduino reference implementation with frame templates | Arduino + MCP2515 |\n| [tumik/S3XY-candump](https://github.com/tumik/S3XY-candump) | Python CAN dump tool via S3XY Commander (Panda protocol) | Commander dongle |\n\n## Credits\n\n- [commaai/opendbc](https://github.com/commaai/opendbc) — Tesla CAN signal database\n- [ElectronicCats/flipper-MCP2515-CANBUS](https://github.com/ElectronicCats/flipper-MCP2515-CANBUS) — MCP2515 driver for Flipper\n- Community contributors — the on-car testing, captures, and research this project runs on:\n  - **Protocol, nag killer & 2026.14.x work:** @jewelrylin (T-2CAN dual-bus captures, the frame-content preflight test, the X179 Service Mode pinout), @DrStrangeglovebox (the Feifan `0x370` reference capture + HW4 dual-CAN data + safety findings), @ssw0209-sys (the Mode-C steering-torque reference + HW4 14.x testing), @0xAccretion (HW4 Highland China-MIC DAS-layout findings, #116/#117), @dunckencn (China HW3 start-after-AP validation, steer-jerk + bus-off reports), @kristopf007 (HW4 14.x on-car testing), @anoblekman (Highland HW4 DAS decode + the in-car Autopark safety finding, #177/#180), @SkyRaax (nag killer on Party CAN 2/3, HW4 2026.20, #100), @LonelyCheese09 (labelled HW3 2026.14.6 nag captures behind the EPAS-faithful fix, #122), @jim608 (labelled HW3 2026.14.6 nag captures behind the EPAS-faithful fix, #121/#122), @weigibbor (2026.20 China-MIC capture + region-lock tier TX-test, #117), @7hf6cfqzkb-png (activation-lag report that led to Instant Engage, #129), @cquanu (first 2026.14.2 incompatibility report, #52), @deftdawg (on-demand grip pulse testing + integration, #70; TTGO T-Display test reports), @zdenekbouresh (DAS-aware nag gating, ported from ev-open-can-tools PR #5)\n  - **Features, captures & PRs:** @JakNo (ScrollPress AP / `0x3C2`), @vrs11 (Continuous AP; T-2CAN multi-ID capture filters, #210), @sqladm1n (RTC capture-log PR + bus/wiring investigation), @DmitroPanteliuk (full-rate `0x229` captures), @se7en7777777 (`0x485` / Highland / checksum analysis), @RoyRakete (TLSSC banned-car combo), @mamixsystem (post-SOP10 connector reference; the definitive frame-level 14.x FSD-engage investigation, #163), @p0sixturtle (Summon / tier-selector pointers, #139), @dahua910 (RHD request, #66), @HamzaObaidat (theatre-mode `0x118` research, #149), @fboulegue (EU / new-harness Juniper reports, #143/#109/#110), @densen2014 (ESP32 HW-selector suggestion #110, TLSSC bit38 toggle PR #159, Summon drive-gear safety-guard suggestion #160), @Tesla234987234sdf (Palladium OTA-latch report + captures, #183/#175; the EU charge-port type on `0x25D` and its on-car validation, and the dedicated-RX and whitelist architecture behind the opt-in RX ID whitelist, #228), @tommybsb-lab (ATOM Lite / Juniper field report behind the Signal Map fixes, #100), @sb1089 (HW3 2026.26 nag capture, #122), @ukinora (independent `0x318` rolling-counter analysis; from their fork: the `0x3C2` bus hint, `canstat`, the 12 V / reset-reason logic, the TPMS groundwork, the `0x33A` car SOC decode, the speed SNA guard, the clock-wrap fix, the power-log correction write and the time-budget black-box save, #218/#237/#251), @adrianpadure99 (web-flasher \"can't fetch\" report, #176), @danpadure (Autopark-pause-in-traffic report, and the black-box records that found the `0x129` steering-angle, stop-and-go Autopark, and stale-frame-retransmit bugs, #176; HW3 FSD speed-offset report, #209), @Jclevy-CN (HW4 speed-profile bit-63 bug + on-car A/B, #59; ESP32 hardening ideas from their fork), @siksndavis (missing ESP32 Precondition toggle, #192), @maslyankov (M5Stack ATOM Matrix + GPIO 39 button, PR #46), @BenjaminFaal (`0x485` gear-shift frame on Juniper, #43), @jangshik (ESP32 Wi-Fi AP+STA request #101, T-2CAN config #96), @TzCoMe (telemetry-disable research behind Telemetry Off), @0n3-70uch (oscilloscope pin map of a post-April-2024 26-pin connector, #52), @TianzeWang (Tesla SOP8/SOP9 electrical-reference pointers, #52), @Tikernel (positive Model Y Juniper HW4 2026.2.11 China compat data), @LeeSSXX (Momentum / Xtreme build error report, #17), @nobless (Acceleration Mode request, #211; captive portal report + fork reliability pointers, #218/#219; the beta.38 dashboard / Wi-Fi regression reports and the beta.40 confirmation on the T-2CAN from macOS and iOS, #223/#225; 2024-07 Fremont Model Y 18/19 capture, and the dumps and black-box records behind the `0x129` steering-angle fix, #211; TPMS, hostname, CAN Bus card and battery requests, #237/#225/#251–#254; the T-2CAN FD boards and the first FD test run, #206; the photo of the car's tyre screen that settled the TPMS wheel order, #237; the move-web-to-its-own-core suggestion and busy-bus reports behind the opt-in core-0 web server and RX ID whitelist, #270/#206), @olschmalz-cyber (Wi-Fi drop-loop report on beta.38 and the four-device test that pinned it on the board, then the beta.40 confirmation on two boards, #230), @pirozhkov095-ctrl (first on-board stack / heap reading after the fix, #230), @vanyasvl (original Boost request, #63), @ColinM-sys (tesla-can-boost, the pedal-map idea behind Acceleration Mode), @i520e3e4 (zh-Hans + zh-Hant web dashboard translation, #205; T-2CAN FD request, #206), @mxkr303 (2020 Model 3 SOP4 X120 Party-CAN wiring writeup, and the reports behind the low-memory black-box save and enable fixes and the MCP2515 power docs, #191), @boddyua (the Wi-Fi-drop loop-stall diagnosis and heartbeat fix, #270)\n  - **Ban research, platform testing, ESP32, bug fixes:** @THER4iN, @MiniCS, @kp43h8, @gauner1986, @dmagyar, @ViPiMP, @marcobellinoroci-source, @danpadure, @bruvv, @Symness, @hkloudou, @nagotti, @patatman, @JordanzhaoD\n- `Starmixcraft/tesla-fsd-can-mod` — original CanFeather FSD research (GitLab repo removed; mirror at [Karolynaz/waymo-fsd-can-mod](https://github.com/Karolynaz/waymo-fsd-can-mod))\n\n## Support the research\n\nIf this project saved you money on an aftermarket dongle, helped you understand Tesla's CAN bus, or kept your TLSSC working through a ban, consider supporting the ongoing research and testing.\n\n[![Crypto](https://img.shields.io/badge/Crypto-Donate-F7931A?style=for-the-badge&logo=bitcoin&logoColor=white)](https://fsd.fkey.id/) [![PayPal](https://img.shields.io/badge/PayPal-Donate-00457C?style=for-the-badge&logo=paypal&logoColor=white)](https://www.paypal.com/cgi-bin/webscr?cmd=_xclick&business=hypery11@gmail.com&item_name=Tesla+FSD+Open+Source+Research&currency_code=USD) [![GitHub Sponsors](https://img.shields.io/badge/Sponsor-hypery11-EA4AAA?style=for-the-badge&logo=github&logoColor=white)](https://github.com/sponsors/hypery11)\n\nCrypto goes to **[fsd.fkey.id](https://fsd.fkey.id/)** — one address, multi-chain. Open the page to see the networks it currently accepts.\n\nFunds go toward Tesla parts for testing (banned VINs to recover, different MCU/HW combos), ESP32 hardware variants, and time spent reverse-engineering new firmware versions.\n\n## License\n\nGPL-3.0\n\n## Disclaimer\n\nEducational and research use only. **FSD is a premium Tesla feature and must be properly purchased or subscribed to.** Modifying vehicle systems may void your warranty and may violate local laws. You are solely responsible for what you do with this. Full safety and responsible-use notes in [`SECURITY.md`](SECURITY.md).",
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      "readme": "# Caring Caribou\nA friendly automotive security exploration tool.\n\n## Rationale\nThis work was initiated as part of the research project HEAVENS (HEAling Vulnerabilities to ENhance Software Security and Safety), but lives on as a stand-alone project.\nWe were lacking a security testing tool for automotive; a zero-knowledge tool that can be dropped onto any CAN network and collect information regarding what services and vulnerabilities exist. This project is a start.\n\n## Documentation\n- [How to install](documentation/howtoinstall.md)\n- [How to use](documentation/howtouse.md)\n- [Troubleshooting](documentation/troubleshooting.md), common errors and solutions\n\n## Get started\nInstall the tool:\n\n    python setup.py install\n\nThe best way to understand how to use Caring Caribou is to look at the help screen:\n\n    caringcaribou --help\n\nThis will list all available modules at the bottom of the output. Help for specific modules works the same way. For example, the help screen for the `send` module is shown by running\n\n    caringcaribou send --help\n\nThe module help always includes some usage examples. If the module has multiple sub functions, these have similar help screens as well:\n\n    caringcaribou send message -h\n    caringcaribou send file -h\n\nMore detailed usage information is available [in the documentation on usage](documentation/howtouse.md).\n\n## Features and Architecture\nCaring Caribou is based on a main entry point in `caringcaribou.py` which runs the show. This enables an easy drop-in architecture for new modules, which are located in the `caringcaribou/modules` folder.\n\nThe `caringcaribou/utils` folder contains various higher level CAN protocol implementations and shared functions, meant to be used by modules.\n\nThe `caringcaribou/tests` folder contains automated test suites and `/documentation` stores documentation files (modules are also documented here).\n\n## List of Modules\nA clean installation of Caring Caribou includes the following modules:\n\n### dump - Dump CAN traffic\nDumps incoming traffic to stdout (terminal output) or file\n\nDetails here: [dump module](documentation/dump.md)\n\n### send - Send CAN packets\nRaw message transmission module, used to send messages manually from command line or replay dump files\n\nDetails here:  [send module](documentation/send.md)\n\n### listener - Listener\nLists all distinct arbitration IDs being used on the CAN bus\n\nDetails here: [listener module](documentation/listener.md)\n\n### fuzzer - CAN fuzzer\n- random - sends random CAN messages\n- brute - brute forces all possible messages matching a given bit mask\n- mutate - mutate selected nibbles of a given message\n- replay - replay a log file from a previous fuzzing session\n- identify - replay a log file and identify message causing a specific event\n\nDetails here: [fuzzer module](documentation/fuzzer.md)\n\n### uds - Universal Diagnostic Services\nDiscovers and utilizes various ISO 14229-1 services.\n- discovery - Scans for ECUs supporting diagnostics services\n- services - Scans for diagnostics services supported by an ECU\n- subservices - Subservice enumeration of supported diagnostics services by an ECU\n- ecu_reset - Reset an ECU\n- testerpresent - Force an elevated session against an ECU to stay active\n- security_seed - An automated way to collect seeds for a specific security access level in a specific diagnostic session\n- dump_dids - Dumps values of Dynamic Data Identifiers (DIDs)\n- read_mem - Read memory from an ECU\n- auto - Fully automated diagnostics scan, by using the already existing UDS submodules\n\nDetails here: [uds module](documentation/uds.md)\n\n### uds_fuzz - Universal Diagnostic Services Fuzzer\nFuzzing module for UDS security seed randomness evaluation and testing.\n- seed_randomness_fuzzer - ECUReset method fuzzing for seed randomness evaluation\n- delay_fuzzer - delay fuzzing for targets with weak randomness implemented, to match acquired seed/key pair to the delay in which the seed can be requested\n\nDetails here: [uds_fuzz module](documentation/uds_fuzz.md)\n\n### doip - Diagnostic communication over Internet Protocol\nDiscovers and utilizes various ISO 13400-2 services.\n- discovery - Scans for ECUs supporting diagnostics services\n- services - Scans for diagnostics services supported by an ECU\n- ecu_reset - Reset an ECU\n- security_seed - Request security seeds from an ECU\n- testerpresent - Force an elevated session against an ECU to stay active\n- dump_dids - Dumps values of Dynamic Data Identifiers (DIDs)\n- seed_randomness_fuzzer - ECUReset method fuzzing for seed randomness evaluation\n\nDetails here: [doip module](documentation/doip.md)\n\n### xcp - Universal Measurement and Calibration Protocol (XCP)\n- discovery - Scans for ECUs supporting XCP\n- info - XCP Get Basic Information. Retrieves information about XCP abilities of an ECU\n- dump - XCP Upload. Used to dump ECU memory (such as SRAM, flash and bootloader) to file\n\nDetails here: [xcp module](documentation/xcp.md)\n\n### dcm - [deprecated] Diagnostics Control Module\n**Note**: This module has been replaced by the [UDS](documentation/uds.md) module. It is still supported by CC due to legacy reasons.\n\nDetails here: [dcm module](documentation/dcm.md)\n\n### test - Run test suite\nRuns automated Caring Caribou test suites\n\n## List of libraries/utilities\nThe `caringcaribou/utils` folder contains the following:\n\n### can_actions.py\nProvides abstraction for access to the CAN bus, bruteforce engines etc.\n\n### common.py\nContains various common functions, type converters etc.\n\n### constants.py\nConstant definitions\n\n### iso14229_1.py\nImplementation of the ISO-14229-1 standard for Unified Diagnostic Services (UDS).\n\n### iso15765_2.py\nImplementation of the ISO-15765-2 standard (ISO-TP). This is a transport protocol which enables sending of messages longer than 8 bytes over CAN by splitting them into multiple data frames.\n\n## Hardware requirements\nSome sort of CAN bus interface (http://elinux.org/CAN_Bus#CAN_Support_in_Linux)\n\n## Software requirements\n- Python 3.7 or higher\n- python-can\n- a pretty modern linux kernel\n\n## Extending the project with new modules\n- A template for new modules is available in `caringcaribou/modules/module_template.py`\n- Create a python file with a function `module_main(args)` (or copy the template) in the `caringcaribou/modules` directory.\n- In `setup.py`, add an entry under `caringcaribou.modules`, referencing your new module like: `my_module = caringcaribou.modules.my_module`\n- Run `python setup.py install`\n- Verify that the module is available, it should be listed in the output of `caringcaribou -h`\n\nIf your new module is located in `caringcaribou/modules/foo.py` you will run it with the command `caringcaribou foo`.\nAdditional arguments (if any) are passed as arguments to the `module_main` function.\n\n\n## The target\nThe target ECU used for the development setup is an STM32F107 based dev-board from ArcCore called Arctic EVK-M3, but the tool can be used against any ECU communicating over a CAN bus.\n\n## Contributors\n* The [HEAVENS](https://www.vinnova.se/en/p/heavens-healing-vulnerabilities-to-enhance-software-security-and-safety/) project, funded by VINNOVA\n* Christian Sandberg\n* Kasper Karlsson\n* Tobias Lans\n* Mattias Jidhage\n* Johannes Weschke\n* Filip Hesslund\n* Craig Smith (OpenGarages.org)\n* internot\n* Roos Hubrechtsen\n* Lear Corporation\n* sigttou\n* FearfulSpoon\n* Alex DeTrano\n* Thomas Sermpinis\n* Alexander Alasjö\n* Vincent de Chefdebien",
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      "readme": "# ELMduino\n[![GitHub version](https://badge.fury.io/gh/PowerBroker2%2FELMduino.svg)](https://badge.fury.io/gh/PowerBroker2%2FELMduino) [![arduino-library-badge](https://www.ardu-badge.com/badge/ELMDuino.svg?)](https://www.ardu-badge.com/ELMDuino)<br /><br />\nThis is a simple yet powerful library to effortlessly interface your Arduino with an ELM327 OBD-II scanner. With this library, you can query any and all OBD-II supported PIDs to collect a wide variety of car data (i.e. speed, rpm, engine temp, etc). Also, you can use ELMduino to view and clear your car's trouble codes - no need to go to AutoZone anymore!\n\n# Example Project:\n\n[![youtube](https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/20977405/102416634-2fa0ab80-3fc8-11eb-8baf-d24a6a27bd3f.PNG)](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JxBvukUipc4&feature=youtu.be)\n\n# Install:\nInstall ELMduino using the Arduino IDE's Libraries Manager (search \"ELMduino.h\")\n\n# Available Features:\nSee the contents of ELMduino.h for lists of supported OBD PID processing functions, OBD protocols, standard PIDs, and AT commands. The associated functions are documented in \"doc strings\" in ELMduino.cpp.\n\n# Note:\nIf you're having difficulty in connecting/keeping connection to your ELM327, try using 38400 baud instead of 115200. If you still have trouble, try all other possible bauds. Lastly, if using BluetoothSerial on an ESP32, try using the ELM327's MAC address instead of the device name \"OBDII\" and [remove paired devices using this sketch](https://github.com/espressif/arduino-esp32/blob/master/libraries/BluetoothSerial/examples/bt_remove_paired_devices/bt_remove_paired_devices.ino).\n\n# Concept of Execution\nThe library is non-blocking. This means when you query a PID e.g. `myELM327.rpm()`, the code does not wait around for the response, which would block your other code in the main loop from executing. With ELMDuino, your main loop can continue do other tasks. To make this work, you need to repeatedly call the PID query function and check the non-blocking receive state (`myELM327.nb_rx_state`) until it is equal to `ELM_SUCCESS`. If the status is not `ELM_SUCCESS`, the library could still be waiting for a response to be received. This is indicated by `myELM327.nb_rx_state` being equal to `ELM_GETTING_MSG`. If the status is not equal to either of these values (ELM_SUCCESS or ELM_GETTING_MSG), it indicates an error has occurred. You can call `myELM327.printError()` to check what the problem was. See the simple example below which queries the engine speed in RPM.\n\nJust to be clear, do not try to query more than one PID at a time. You must wait for the current PID query to complete before starting the next one.\n\n# Example Code:\n```C++\n#include \"ELMduino.h\"\n\n\n\n\n#define ELM_PORT Serial1\n\n\n\n\nconst bool DEBUG        = true;\nconst int  TIMEOUT      = 2000;\nconst bool HALT_ON_FAIL = false;\n\n\n\n\nELM327 myELM327;\n\n\n\n\ntypedef enum { ENG_RPM,\n               SPEED } obd_pid_states;\nobd_pid_states obd_state = ENG_RPM;\n\nfloat rpm = 0;\nfloat mph = 0;\n\n\n\n\nvoid setup()\n{\n  Serial.begin(115200);\n  ELM_PORT.begin(115200);\n\n  Serial.println(\"Attempting to connect to ELM327...\");\n\n  if (!myELM327.begin(ELM_PORT, DEBUG, TIMEOUT))\n  {\n    Serial.println(\"Couldn't connect to OBD scanner\");\n\n    if (HALT_ON_FAIL)\n      while (1);\n  }\n\n  Serial.println(\"Connected to ELM327\");\n}\n\n\n\n\nvoid loop()\n{\n  switch (obd_state)\n  {\n    case ENG_RPM:\n    {\n      rpm = myELM327.rpm();\n\n      if (myELM327.nb_rx_state == ELM_SUCCESS)\n      {\n        Serial.print(\"rpm: \");\n        Serial.println(rpm);\n        obd_state = SPEED;\n      }\n      else if (myELM327.nb_rx_state != ELM_GETTING_MSG)\n      {\n        myELM327.printError();\n        obd_state = SPEED;\n      }\n\n      break;\n    }\n\n    case SPEED:\n    {\n      mph = myELM327.mph();\n\n      if (myELM327.nb_rx_state == ELM_SUCCESS)\n      {\n        Serial.print(\"mph: \");\n        Serial.println(mph);\n        obd_state = ENG_RPM;\n      }\n      else if (myELM327.nb_rx_state != ELM_GETTING_MSG)\n      {\n        myELM327.printError();\n        obd_state = ENG_RPM;\n      }\n\n      break;\n    }\n  }\n}\n```",
      "topics": [
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        "car",
        "carhacking",
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      "description": "car hacking tools",
      "readme": "# Carhacking\ncar hacking tools\nCompiled set of tools and documents\n\nPRs are welcome, no blobs please.",
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    "henriksb/creditcard-security": {
      "id": "github:henriksb/creditcard-security",
      "evidence_type": "repository",
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      "title": "Credit Card Security",
      "full_name": "henriksb/CreditCard-Security",
      "name": "CreditCard-Security",
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      "url": "https://github.com/henriksb/CreditCard-Security",
      "description": "A small guide on credit card security, and ways hackers exploit them",
      "readme": "# Credit Card Security\nWelcome to an insightful guide on credit card security, emphasizing the mechanisms behind theft and misuse. This comprehensive resource explores the operational principles of credit cards, revealing how they function and the vulnerabilities that fraudsters exploit. By gaining a deeper understanding of credit card transactions, we empower ourselves with the knowledge to identify and prevent potential threats, thus protecting our financial integrity from unauthorized access and abuse.\n\nPlease note, this guide is part of an ongoing effort to learn about credit cards and may contain inaccuracies.\n\n## Disclaimer\n\nPlease note that the content provided in this document is intended solely for educational purposes. The aim is to raise awareness and provide information on credit card security and related topics. This document is not meant to serve as a comprehensive guide and should not be interpreted as encouragement or instruction to engage in any form of illegal activity.\n\nI strongly advise against any illegal actions and recommend always adhering to the laws and regulations of your jurisdiction. Stay informed and use this information responsibly.\n\n\n## Table of Contents\n1. [Introduction](#introduction)\n2. [How are Credit Cards Stolen](#how-are-credit-cards-stolen)\n    - [Social Media](#social-media)\n        - [Explaining the Numbers](#explaining-the-numbers)\n        - [Guessing the Card Number](#guessing-the-card-number)\n    - [NFC/EMV Capturing](#nfcemv-capturing)\n    - [Magnetic Stripe](#magnetic-stripe)\n    - [Physical Theft and PIN Stealing](#physical-theft-and-pin-stealing)\n    - [Dark Web Activities](#dark-web-activities)\n3. [Using the Obtained Details](#using-the-obtained-details)\n4. [Other Things to Consider](#other-things-to-consider)\n5. [Protection](#protection)\n    - [NFC Blockers](#nfc-blockers)\n    - [One-Time Cards](#one-time-cards)\n    - [Alerts on Payment](#alerts-on-payment)\n    - [Credit Score Monitoring](#credit-score-monitoring)\n    - [Insurance](#insurance)\n6. [Conclusion](#conclusion)\n\n\n## Introduction\nIn this article, I aim to demystify the various aspects of credit card fraud by compiling a comprehensive resource on the subject. Given the scarcity of detailed information available online and the critical importance of this issue, I felt compelled to create this guide. It is designed exclusively for educational purposes, with the goal of enlightening individuals on the intricacies of credit card security. By sharing this knowledge, my intention is to equip people with the tools they need to protect themselves and promote a broader understanding of how to navigate the complexities of financial security in today's digital world.\n\n## How are Credit Cards Stolen?\nThere are numerous ways that the details of a credit card can be stolen. This list includes the most creative and common ways it can be done. But there are certainly more ways it could be done.\n\n### Social Media\nHave you ever noticed how many mirror selfies there are on social media platforms? Quickly browsing through, one can easily encounter a mirror selfie where the individual's phone case, holding their cards, inadvertently exposes portions of their credit card details.\n\n![mirror](Images/mirrorselfie.webp)\n(Poorly generated DALL-E picture, but you get the point)\n\nYou might notice that his fingers cover up parts of the number. Well, that might not be enough. Let me explain what the card numbers mean.\n\n#### Explaining the Numbers\nLet's consider the following card number:\\\n`4106510012385673`\n\nThese numbers are not completely random. The very first number (MII) reveals the card's issuing entity. Here is a list of which first numbers correspond to which network:\n\n3: American Express\\\n4: Visa\\\n5: Mastercard\n\nThe first 6 digits (410651) represent the BIN (Bank Identification Number). This number is crucial for identifying the bank that issued the card. You can find several [good lists](https://github.com/iannuttall/binlist-data) and [websites](https://binlist.net/) for identifying which banks are associated with these numbers. This means that, if we know which bank issued the card, we also know the first 6 digits. Often, the logo of the bank is visible on the card, making it very easy to guess.\n\nThe remaining numbers are generated using a specific method, known as the [Luhn Algorithm](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Luhn_algorithm), or MOD10. This is the algorithm used by websites to check that your card details are valid. It is **not** an algorithm for security, it is simply an algorithm for avoiding accidental errors.\n\n#### Guessing the Card Number\nSo, suppose a digit is missing from the card number. Knowing that the card uses the Luhn algorithm means that there is only one correct digit. Let's make a quick Python script to brute force the missing digit:\n\n```python\nfrom itertools import product\nimport sys\n\ndef luhn_check(card_number):\n    def digits_of(n):\n        return [int(d) for d in str(n)]\n\n    digits = digits_of(card_number)\n    odd_digits = digits[-1::-2]\n    even_digits = digits[-2::-2]\n    checksum = sum(odd_digits)\n    for d in even_digits:\n        checksum += sum(digits_of(d * 2))\n    return checksum % 10 == 0\n\ndef find_missing_digits(partial_card_number):\n    total = 0\n    missing_indices = [i for i, x in enumerate(partial_card_number) if x == '*']\n    for replacement in product('0123456789', repeat=len(missing_indices)):\n        test_number = list(partial_card_number)\n        for index, digit in zip(missing_indices, replacement):\n            test_number[index] = digit\n        test_number_str = ''.join(test_number)\n        if luhn_check(int(test_number_str)):\n            total += 1\n            print(test_number_str)\n\n    print(\"Total number of combinations: \" + str(total))\n\npartial_card_number = sys.argv[1]\nfind_missing_digits(partial_card_number)\n```\nThis script accepts a card number, and fills in the missing digits. Let's say we give it the card number `41065100123*5673`:\n\n```\nhenrik@henrik:~/Documents$ python3 luhn.py 41065100123*5673\n4106510012385673\nTotal number of combinations: 1\n```\n\nOnly one card number will be valid. However, the number of combinations increases exponentially with each additional missing digit. For example, if there are three missing digits, there are 10² , possible combinations that technically are valid, but only one will be the card you are looking for.\n\n41065100638190** = 10¹ = 10\\\n4106510063819*** = 10² = 100\\\n410651006381**** = 10³ = 1000\n\nBut let's say the first 6 digits are missing, but the bank's name is visible on the card. We can then find a BIN list and search for the bank. In this case, let's say the visible number is:\n\n`******0012385673`\\\nand there is a logo of \"Sparebank 1\", a Norwegian bank. If we search for \"Sparebank 1\" in our BIN list, we find:\n\n|iin_start|scheme|type   |bank_name          |\n|-------- |------|-------|----------------   |\n| 410651  | visa | debit | NO SPAREBANK 1    |\n\nIf we combine this with the Luhn brute force (if another random number is missing), we see that the card numbers can be guessed, even if up to seven numbers are missing.\n\nIn addition to this, some cards have **all** information visible on one side. Most cards have the CVV on the back, which makes it more secure to the \"selfie attack\", but for some reason not all.\n\n\n### NFC/EMV Capturing\nDid you know the chip in your card uses \"NFC\" or Near Field Communication? This technology requires the card to be close to a reader to exchange data. It’s designed for convenience - tap your card, and you're done. But there's a catch.\n\nNFC's convenience also makes it a target. Some have even engineered [devices to capture card data from meters away](https://youtu.be/Qt2Gn2CoJ74?t=320). Think about that next time you're in a crowded place.\n\nAnother threat comes from \"skimmers.\" These devious devices are attached to regular bank terminals, duplicating your card’s details without you knowing. Crafty criminals place these skimmers where you'd least expect them.\n\nBut, here's the good news: cloning your credit card isn't easy. Cards come with transaction signing keys that are extremely difficult to extract. These systems ensure the data sent is unique every time, based on secure, non-extractable information. This makes it near impossible to for an attacker to clone your card and physically use it in a store. Additionally, the PIN code is only known by you. But we will discuss ways of getting this later.\n\nBut even with these security measures in place, critical details of your card can still be compromised. By using your phones NFC scanner, you can easily capture the full card number, expiration date, and other vital details. While it might not seem enough, this information is far from useless to a criminal. It could be all they need to access your funds.\n\n### Magnetic Stripe\nUnlike its more modern counterpart, NFC, the data stored on a magnetic stripe is entirely static. What does this mean? Each time you swipe your card, the same unchanging data is read by the card reader. This includes your card number, expiration date, and more.\n\nThis static nature is precisely what makes magnetic stripes a security concern. Since the data doesn't change, it's alarmingly easy for criminals to clone. All it takes is a simple device to read the stripe's data and transfer it onto a counterfeit card. Suddenly, they have everything they need to make unauthorized transactions.\n\nThe good news is that the financial industry is moving away from this outdated technology. Magnetic stripes are gradually being phased out, replaced by more secure alternatives like chip-and-PIN and NFC. These newer technologies are dynamic, changing their authentication data with each transaction, making them much harder to clone.\n\nSo, why are magnetic stripes still around? Unfortunately, the transition to newer technologies isn't instantaneous. It requires widespread changes in infrastructure, from ATMs to point-of-sale systems worldwide. Plus, magnetic stripes serve as a backup in regions where chip-and-PIN or NFC technologies are not yet fully implemented.\n\nIf you want to learn more about the magnetic stripe and its vulnerabilites. I highly recommend watching [Samy Kamkar’s video](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UHSFf0Lz1qc) on the subject. He has developed vulnerabilities and devices used for attacking magnetic stripes, and will explain the theory behind the stripe and attack much better than me.\n\n### Physical Theft and PIN Stealing\nPhysical theft still remains a concern. But, even if a thief gets your card, cracking your PIN is another hurdle.\n\nBut! Some criminals use [infrared cameras to snap a quick photo of the keypad](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8Vc-69M-UWk) right after you've entered your PIN. The heat signature reveals the numbers pressed - the warmest being the most recent. It's like a heat map to your PIN code. This does, however, not work for metal buttons, as metal has a high thermal conductivity. This means that it will rapidly transfer heat, making it impossible for an attacker to see what you pressed.\n\nCan you guess the PIN code from the image below?\n\n![pin](Images/pin.png)\n(screenshot from Mark Rober's video)\n\nCorrect, the code is 1,2,3,4,5. 5 being the hottest (most recent), and 1 being the coolest (first).\n\nAnd don't forget about hidden cameras. Positioned just right, these can record your PIN as you enter it. Covering your PIN code is always a good idea.\n\n### Dark Web Activities\nVenture into the dark web, and you'll find hidden marketplaces where anything is up for sale, including stolen credit card details.\n\nIn these markets, credit card information isn't exchanged as physical cards but rather as digital files. These files contain complete details necessary for making unauthorized purchases. The price of this stolen data varies greatly. High-balance cards, or those without 2FA (Two-Factor Authentication), have a higher price. However, for skilled cybercriminals, 2FA is merely a hurdle, not a blockade. We'll explore their bypass methods later.\n\nBut the trade doesn't stop at credit cards. The dark web is also full of illicit sales of compromised PayPal accounts, cryptocurrency wallets, among other digital assets.\n\nSo you may ask, why don't these cybercriminals use the stolen details themselves, especially when they sell them for much less than their worth? There are several reasons. Many sellers have large amounts of data that is obtained through botnets, making it impractical to exploit each piece of data individually. While some may fear the risks of getting caught, others might lack the means or expertise to exploit these accounts fully. Successfully using this data without detection involves complexities and risks that go beyond what I can cover here.\n\n## Using the Obtained Details\nNow that a criminal has access to your credit card information, what's their next move? You might imagine them cloning the card for physical shopping sprees, but the reality is often different and more digitally oriented.\n\nContrary to popular belief, cloning a credit card for physical use isn't the go-to method for fraudsters. Remember our discussion about NFC chips? They're incredibly challenging to duplicate with standard equipment. And while magnetic stripes are more vulnerable, their gradual phase-out makes them less appealing. Moreover, in many places, finding stores that still accept swipe transactions is becoming increasingly difficult.\n\nEven if they manage to clone the card, there's the hurdle of obtaining the PIN. Plus, using a cloned card in stores carries significant risks – security cameras, potential eyewitnesses, and the chance of leaving behind fingerprints. It's a gamble with high stakes.\n\nInstead, criminals often opt for the path of least resistance: using your card online. The digital realm offers a veil of anonymity and eliminates the need for sophisticated cloning equipment. It's simpler, safer (for the criminal), and often more lucrative to misuse stolen card details in the virtual world. Online transactions produce less physical evidence (if done correctly), making it harder to trace back to the fraudster.\n\nPicture this scenario: a criminal stumbles upon an image of your credit card on social media. With a bit of clever calculation and some basic information from your online profiles, they now have everything: your full card number, expiration date, name, and even the CVV.\n\nYou might feel a sense of security, thinking, \"I'm protected; I have 2-FA enabled.\" Two-Factor Authentication is indeed a robust security feature, often involving a verification code sent to your phone. However, there's a catch.\n\nThe implementation of 2-FA isn't solely in your bank's hands; it's also at the discretion of the merchants. While some prioritize security by requiring this extra step, others opt for a more streamlined checkout process, bypassing additional verification to facilitate quicker purchases. This is particularly common among foreign online retailers.\n\nFor you, the cardholder, this means that not all transactions are equally safeguarded. If your card details are used at a merchant that doesn't require 2-FA, the transaction could proceed unchallenged.\n\nIn case of a fraudulent charge, the burden of proof lies with the merchant. As a cardholder, you have the right to dispute any unfamiliar charges on your bill. Having 2-FA enabled will make it easier for the merchant to prove that you were the one to actually make the purchase, making it harder to dispute.\n\nBut not only this, criminals have other ways of getting around 2-FA. There is something called [SIM Swapping](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SIM_swap_scam).\n\n```\n“The fraud exploits a mobile phone service provider's ability to seamlessly port a\nphone number to a device containing a different subscriber identity module (SIM).\nThis mobile number portability feature is normally used when a phone is lost or stolen,\nor a customer is switching service to a new phone.”\n-Wikipedia\n```\nThis means that the attacker needs to trick the service provider into swapping the number to a different phone. This attack is more common than you would think.\n\nThere are also mentions of large websites not requiring the CVV code, as again, this is only an additional step to prove that you made the purchase. It is not actually needed in order to make a purchase. However, I have not personally been able to find any websites that does not require the CVV.\n\n## Other Things to Consider\nI thought I should also quickly mention “fullz”.\n\nFullz is underground slang for the comprehensive set of personal data collected about an individual. This isn't just a scattering of personal details. We're talking about a complete, packaged identity, ripe for misuse.\n\nWhat does fullz include? Fullz includes all information necessary to impersonate you: your social security number, driver's license number, full name, date of birth, your home address, and phone number.\n\nWith these details, a fraudster can wreak havoc. They could apply for credit card loans in your name, while cleverly diverting all bank communications to themselves. The chilling part? You wouldn't even know that a loan is being taken out under your name. You're left in the dark while the fraudster operates in the light.\n\nAnd where is this sensitive information traded? Well, again, on the dark web, fullz can be shockingly cheap – usually not more than a dollar. The lower price, however, doesn't lessen the potential damage. It's a full-fledged identity theft kit, priced less than a cup of coffee.\n\n## Protection\nNow that we've discussed ways of stealing your information, let's talk about how to protect yourself.\n\n### NFC Blockers\nYou've likely seen ads for RFID-blocking wallets. These wallets use materials that interfere with RFID signals, preventing scanners from reading your card data. Want a DIY solution? Wrapping your cards in aluminum foil is a surprisingly effective and inexpensive home alternative.\n\n### One-Time Cards\nMany services now offer virtual, one-time-use cards. You can generate multiple virtual cards for different transactions. Once a payment is completed, you can simply delete the card. This is a great way to safeguard against the theft of your actual card numbers, especially in online transactions.\n\n### Alerts on Payment\nWith \"Alerts on Payment\" from your banking app, you'll get immediate notifications for every card transaction. This instant update lets you act fast if there's any unauthorized use, helping you to quickly contest suspicious charges. It's an essential tool for staying on top of your transactions without needing to constantly review your statements.\n\n### Credit Score Monitoring\nUnnoticed, someone could be misusing your identity to apply for credit cards or loans. Regularly checking your credit score is key to catching this. If a fraudster racks up debt in your name, it won't be paid back, causing your credit score to plummet. Watch for any unexpected, significant changes – it's often the first sign that something's amiss.\n\n### Insurance\nThis is an often-overlooked layer of protection. Credit card insurance can cover losses due to fraudulent transactions, identity theft, and even accidental purchases. In the event of fraud, the insurance may reimburse unauthorized transactions, providing an added financial safety net. This insurance can be a standalone policy or part of a premium credit card offer. It's about ensuring peace of mind, knowing that you're covered in the worst-case scenarios.\n\n## Conclusion\nAnd that brings us to the end of our journey today. While much of the information shared was drawn from American sources, the principles of credit card security we've discussed are universal. However, specifics can vary by region, so I highly encourage you to delve into the rules and regulations pertinent to your locality for tailored protection strategies.\n\n\nSo, to recap some of the key points in this guide:\n- Accidental pictures of credit cards can be used to make purchases, even with information missing.\n- Your card can be scanned from several meters, revealing your sensitive information.\n- The security of online transactions.\n- Safety measures to protect you.\n\nPlease feel free to correct any information here, as I do not want to spread misinformation, and I would love to learn something new.",
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      "readme": "# Cyber-Physical Intrusion Detection System for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles\n\nThe increasing reliance on unmanned aerial vehicles\n(UAVs) has escalated the associated cyber risks. While machine\nlearning has enabled intrusion detection systems (IDSs), current\nIDSs do not incorporate cyber-physical UAV features, which\nlimits their detection performance. Additionally, the lack of\npublic UAV’s cyber and physical datasets to develop IDS hinders\nfurther research. Therefore, this paper proposes a novel IDS\nfusing UAV cyber and physical features to improve detection\ncapabilities. First, we developed a testbed that includes UAV,\ncontroller, and data collection tools to execute cyber-attacks\nand gather cyber and physical data under normal and attack\nconditions. We made this dataset publicly available. The dataset\ncovers a range of cyber-attacks including denial-of-service,\nreplay, evil twin, and false data injection attacks. Then, machine\nlearning-based IDSs fusing cyber and physical features were\ntrained to detect cyber-attacks using support vector machines,\nfeedforward neural networks, recurrent neural networks with\nlong short-term memory cells, and convolutional neural networks.\nExtensive experiments were conducted on varying complexity\nand range of attack training data to explore whether (a) fusion\nof cyber and physical features enhances detection performance\ncompared to cyber or physical features alone, (b) fusion enhances\ndetection when IDS is trained on a single attack type and tested\non unseen attacks of varying complexity, (c) fusion enhances\nperformance when the range of attack training data increases and\nmodels are tested on unseen attacks. Answering these research\nquestions provides insights into IDS capabilities using cyber,\nphysical, and cyber-physical features under different conditions.\n\n\n# Research Questions:\nWe investigated the following research questions in this paper:\n- Will the fusion of cyber and physical features improve\ndetection compared to cyber or physical features alone?\n- Will the complexity level of the attack training data\nimpact the ability of the IDS to detect unseen attacks\nwith various complexities?\n- Will the range of the attacks included in the training data\nimpact the ability of the IDS to detect unseen attacks with\nvarious complexities?\n\n\n# Citing this work\n- If you use our implementation, you are encouraged to cite [our paper](https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/10368002).\n- This work is published in *IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems (2023).\n- This work was supported by the National Science Foundation (NSF) Energy, Power, Control, and Networks Program\n(EPCN) under Award 2220346 *\n\n\n```\n\n@article{hassler2023cyber,\n  title={Cyber-Physical Intrusion Detection System for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles},\n  author={Hassler, Samuel Chase and Mughal, Umair Ahmad and Ismail, Muhammad},\n  journal={IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems},\n  year={2023},\n  publisher={IEEE}\n}\n\n```",
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      "name": "Automotive-Secure-On-Board-Communication-Analyzer",
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      "description": "Python-based analysis tool for inspecting ARXML configuration and CAN/ASC log data with a focus on Secure Onboard Communication. The project is intended to support automotive cybersecurity engineers, AUTOSAR engineers, and testers by automating the extraction and analysis of security-relevant information from ARXML configuration and ASC/PCAP logs.",
      "readme": "# Automotive SecOC Security Analyzer\n\nA Python-based analysis tool for automotive cybersecurity and AUTOSAR SecOC data.\n\nThe project is intended to automate the analysis of AUTOSAR ARXML configuration data and CAN/CAN-FD ASC log files, with a focus on identifying and analyzing SecOC-protected communication.\n\n> **Project status:** Early development / work in progress.\n> The current implementation focuses on ARXML parsing, SecOC configuration extraction, ASC parsing, test-data generation, and initial security-event detection.\n\n---\n\n## Overview\n\nAutomotive ECUs use **Secure Onboard Communication (SecOC)** to provide authenticity and integrity protection for in-vehicle communication.\n\nWorking with SecOC configurations and captured CAN/CAN-FD traffic can involve a significant amount of manual analysis. This project aims to provide a lightweight automation tool for that workflow.\n\nThe analyzer currently works with two primary input types:\n\n- **ARXML** — extract AUTOSAR communication and SecOC configuration\n- **ASC logs** — parse CAN/CAN-FD frames for further analysis\n\nThe longer-term goal is to correlate the configuration defined in ARXML with observed communication in ASC/PCAP captures and identify potential SecOC-related anomalies.\n\n---\n\n## Current Capabilities\n\n### ARXML Analysis\n\nThe ARXML analyzer currently provides:\n\n- ARXML parsing\n- Datatype extraction\n- Signal extraction\n- PDU extraction\n- Frame extraction\n- Secured PDU identification\n- SecOC PDU identification\n- Authentication profile extraction\n- Freshness profile extraction\n- SecOC database generation\n- Data ID extraction\n- Freshness Value ID extraction\n- Authentication length extraction\n- Freshness length extraction\n- Freshness transmission length extraction\n- Timestamp configuration extraction\n- Payload reference extraction\n\n### ASC Parsing\n\nThe ASC parser currently supports:\n\n- ASC file parsing\n- CAN frame extraction\n- Timestamp extraction\n- CAN ID extraction\n- Raw payload extraction\n\n### Security Event Detection\n\nThe project contains initial analyzers for:\n\n- Freeze detection\n- Rollback detection\n- Duplicate detection\n- Replay detection\n\nThese analyzers are currently being developed and validated using generated test sequences.\n\n### Test Data Generation\n\nThe project includes generators for creating controlled test sequences and ASC files for development and testing.\n\nCurrent test scenarios include:\n\n- Normal counter progression\n- Freeze\n- Rollback\n- Duplicate\n- Replay\n\n---\n\n## Project Structure\n\n```text\nautomotive-secoc-analyzer/\n│\n├── analyzers/\n│   ├── freeze_detector.py\n│   ├── replay_detector.py\n│   └── rollback_detector.py\n│\n├── generators/\n│   ├── asc_generator.py\n│   └── test_data_generator.py\n│\n├── models/\n│\n├── parsers/\n│   ├── arxml_parser.py\n│   └── asc_parser.py\n│\n├── reporters/\n│   └── arxml_reporter.py\n│\n├── test_data/\n│\n├── run.py\n├── .gitignore\n└── README.md\n```\n\nThe exact contents of individual directories may change as development progresses.\n\n---\n\n# Usage\n\nThe project provides a single command-line entry point:\n\n```bash\npython run.py\n```\n\nThe command supports different analysis modes.\n\n---\n\n## ARXML Analysis\n\n### Show help\n\n```bash\npython run.py arxml --help\n```\n\n### Basic ARXML analysis\n\n```bash\npython run.py arxml --file path/to/file.arxml\n```\n\nBy default, the command prints the ARXML summary and SecOC summary.\n\n### ARXML Summary\n\n```bash\npython run.py arxml --file path/to/file.arxml --summary\n```\n\nExample:\n\n```text\n========== ARXML SUMMARY ==========\n\nDatatypes     : 277\nSignals       : 930\nPDUs          : 88\nFrames        : 16\nSecured PDUs  : 35\nSecOC PDUs    : 35\n```\n\n### SecOC Summary\n\n```bash\npython run.py arxml --file path/to/file.arxml --secoc\n```\n\nThis reports information such as:\n\n- SecOC profiles\n- Authentication profiles\n- Freshness profiles\n- Secured PDUs\n- Data IDs\n\n### Detailed SecOC Database\n\n```bash\npython run.py arxml --file path/to/file.arxml --secoc-detail\n```\n\nThe detailed database contains configuration information associated with each secured PDU.\n\n### All ARXML Reports\n\n```bash\npython run.py arxml --file path/to/file.arxml --all\n```\n\nThis generates:\n\n1. ARXML summary\n2. SecOC summary\n3. Detailed SecOC database\n\n---\n\n## ASC Analysis\n\nASC files can be parsed using:\n\n```bash\npython run.py asc --file path/to/file.asc\n```\n\nFor example:\n\n```bash\npython run.py asc --file test_data/normal.asc\n```\n\nThe parser extracts information including:\n\n```text\nTimestamp\nCAN ID\nPayload\n```\n\nUse:\n\n```bash\npython run.py asc --help\n```\n\nto see the available options.\n\n---\n\n## Test Data Generation\n\nDevelopment test data can be generated using the generator script:\n\n```bash\npython run_generator.py\n```\n\nThe generator creates controlled sequences for scenarios such as:\n\n```text\nNORMAL\nFREEZE\nROLLBACK\nDUPLICATE\nREPLAY\n```\n\nIt can also generate ASC files for testing.\n\n---\n\n# Input Validation\n\nThe command-line interface performs basic input validation.\n\nFor example, providing a non-existent ARXML file:\n\n```bash\npython run.py arxml --file does_not_exist.arxml\n```\n\nresults in:\n\n```text\nERROR: Input file not found:\n       does_not_exist.arxml\n```\n\nProviding the wrong file type:\n\n```bash\npython run.py arxml --file test_data/normal.asc\n```\n\nresults in:\n\n```text\nERROR: Invalid file type.\n       Expected: .arxml\n       Received: .asc\n       File:     test_data/normal.asc\n```\n\nThis validation is intended to provide clear CLI errors instead of exposing parser-level exceptions to the user.\n\n---\n\n# SecOC Analysis\n\nThe current ARXML implementation can extract SecOC configuration such as:\n\n```text\nData ID\nFreshness Value ID\nAuthentication Algorithm\nAuthentication Transmission Length\nFreshness Length\nFreshness Transmission Length\nTimestamp Configuration\nPayload Reference\n```\n\nFor example:\n\n```text\nalgorithm : CMAC/AES-128\nauth_tx_length : 24\nfreshness_length : 40\nfreshness_tx_length : 8\ntimestamp_enabled : true\n```\n\nThis information forms the basis for correlating AUTOSAR SecOC configuration with captured communication.\n\n---\n\n# Security Event Analysis\n\nThe project contains early-stage detection logic for security-relevant counter behavior.\n\n## Freeze\n\nDetects repeated freshness/counter values where the counter is expected to progress.\n\n## Rollback\n\nDetects a counter value moving backwards relative to the previously observed value.\n\n## Duplicate\n\nDetects repeated frames or repeated counter/data combinations.\n\n## Replay\n\nDetects previously observed counter/frame patterns appearing again in the analyzed sequence.\n\nThese detectors currently operate on controlled/generated test sequences and are being developed further for integration with real ASC/PCAP analysis.\n\n---\n\n# Development Environment\n\nThe project is written in:\n\n- Python 3\n- Caution: the project is currently being actively developed and tested primarily on Linux, with additional testing being performed on Windows.\n\nThe basic Python scripts are intended to be cross-platform.\n\nThe current development environment includes Windows and Linux testing.\n\n---\n\n# Dependencies\n\nThe current implementation primarily uses Python's standard library.\n\nThe project currently relies on modules such as:\n\n```text\nargparse\nxml.etree.ElementTree\n```\n\nAdditional dependencies may be introduced as the project expands.\n\n---\n\n# Roadmap\n\nThe project is under active development.\n\nPlanned development stages include:\n\n### Stage 1 — Core Parsing and CLI\n\n- ARXML parser\n- SecOC configuration extraction\n- ASC parser\n- Command-line interface\n- Basic validation\n- Test-data generation\n\n### Stage 2 — SecOC / Log Correlation\n\n- Map ARXML SecOC configuration to observed CAN/CAN-FD frames\n- Identify secured PDUs in captured traffic\n- Associate CAN IDs with SecOC configuration\n- Extract and analyze freshness/counter information\n\n### Stage 3 — Security Event Analysis\n\nExpand detection for:\n\n- Counter freeze\n- Counter rollback\n- Duplicate frames\n- Replay\n- Freshness-related anomalies\n- Additional SecOC validation cases\n\n### Stage 4 — Reporting\n\nDevelop structured reporting for analysis results, including:\n\n- HTML reports\n- Security-event summaries\n- PDU-level analysis\n- Configuration-to-log correlation\n- Human-readable findings\n\n### Stage 5 — Extended Input Support\n\nPotential future support includes:\n\n- PCAP input\n- Additional CAN/CAN-FD log formats\n- More AUTOSAR configuration formats\n- Larger-scale batch analysis\n\n---\n\n# Intended Use\n\nThis project is intended as a development and analysis tool for engineers working with:\n\n- Automotive cybersecurity\n- AUTOSAR\n- SecOC\n- CAN / CAN-FD\n- ECU communication\n- Automotive network analysis\n- Security testing\n- Embedded systems\n\nThe primary goal is to reduce repetitive manual work when inspecting SecOC configurations and communication logs.\n\n---\n\n# Contributing\n\nThe project is currently under active development.\n\nDevelopment areas include:\n\n- Parser improvements\n- Test coverage\n- SecOC correlation\n- 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      "url": "https://github.com/niketdhale/UDS-29-auth-toolkit",
      "description": "ISO 14229-1 UDS 0x29 Authentication toolkit in C11: tester (client) and ECU (server), X.509 PKI, OEM-configurable certificate-based access control, DoIP & CAN ISO-TP transports, AUTOSAR-style API. Runs on Linux, QNX and FreeRTOS; OpenSSL/mbedTLS/HSM crypto; optional IDSM reporting.",
      "readme": "# UDS 0x29 Authentication Toolkit\n\n[![CI](https://github.com/niketdhale/UDS-29-auth-toolkit/actions/workflows/ci.yml/badge.svg)](https://github.com/niketdhale/UDS-29-auth-toolkit/actions/workflows/ci.yml)\n[![License: MIT](https://img.shields.io/badge/license-MIT-green.svg)](LICENSE)\n![C11](https://img.shields.io/badge/C-11-blue.svg)\n![C++17](https://img.shields.io/badge/C%2B%2B-17-blue.svg)\n![ISO 14229-1:2020](https://img.shields.io/badge/ISO-14229--1%3A2020-informational.svg)\n![AUTOSAR-style](https://img.shields.io/badge/API-AUTOSAR--style-informational.svg)\n![CMake 3.16+](https://img.shields.io/badge/CMake-3.16%2B-064F8C.svg)\n![Platforms](https://img.shields.io/badge/platforms-Linux%20%7C%20QNX%20%7C%20FreeRTOS-lightgrey.svg)\n\nA small, embeddable implementation of ISO 14229-1:2020 service 0x29 (Authentication) with certificate-based\nunidirectional and bidirectional authentication, for both ends of the link: a **client** (tester) and a **server** (ECU).\nPlain C11, static memory, no heap, pluggable crypto (OpenSSL, mbedTLS or your HSM) and OS port (POSIX or FreeRTOS),\nbring-your-own transport (demos for DoIP and CAN ISO-TP). Includes certificate-based access control with an OEM-definable\ncertificate format, a simulated ECU with fault injection, an interactive CLI, two-process DoIP and CAN demos, and an optional bridge that reports authentication failures to the\n[AUTOSAR IDSM toolkit](../autosar-idsm-toolkit).\n\n## Contents\n\n- [Quick start](#quick-start)\n- [Features](#features)\n- [Architecture](#architecture)\n- [Client vs server](#client-vs-server)\n- [Access control](#access-control)\n- [Certificate validation](#certificate-validation)\n- [Sub-function support](#sub-function-support)\n- [Build options](#build-options)\n- [Documentation](#documentation)\n- [CLI](#cli)\n- [IDSM integration](#idsm-integration)\n- [Memory footprint](#memory-footprint)\n- [Limitations](#limitations)\n- [License](#license)\n\n## Quick start\n\n```sh\nsudo apt-get install -y libssl-dev cmake g++          # once\ncmake -S . -B build && cmake --build build -j\nctest --test-dir build --output-on-failure            # unit tests + two-process DoIP demo\n./build/doip_server_demo & sleep 1; ./build/doip_client_demo --mode bi            # prints PASS\nprintf 'pki sample\\nauth bi\\nquit\\n' | ./build/uds29_cli                          # simulated ECU\n```\n\n## Features\n\n**Client**\n- Tester API in AUTOSAR style (`Std_ReturnType`): blocking calls and a non-blocking `StartAuthentication` / `MainFunction` / `RxIndication` flow on one state machine\n- Sub-functions 0x00 deAuthenticate, 0x01 / 0x02 verifyCertificate (uni/bi), 0x03 proofOfOwnership; bidirectional also verifies the ECU certificate and its signature\n- TX/RX exchange log, state and failure event callback, P2 timeout for the non-blocking flow\n\n**Server**\n- ECU side, DCM-style: `Uds29Srv_HandleRequest(req, len, resp, &resp_len)` takes a full request and writes the positive or `7F 29 nrc` response\n- 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x08; NRC 0x12 / 0x13 / 0x24 / 0x50-0x58 as the standard prescribes\n- Random challenge, certificate chain and validity check, authentication timeout\n- Opt-in certificate hardening: intermediate CAs, CRL and serial blacklist, key usage / EKU / algorithm policy, trusted-time hook, configurable proof-of-ownership data ([docs/certificate-validation.md](docs/certificate-validation.md))\n- Access control from the client certificate: roles and service / DID / routine allow-lists in an OEM-defined format (extension OID, subject OU or CN, or your own parser), enforced against an ECU rule table with NRC 0x34 ([docs/access-control.md](docs/access-control.md))\n\n**Crypto**\n- Crypto port (`Uds29_Crypto.h`): OpenSSL (ECDSA P-256 or Ed25519), mbedTLS 3.x (ECDSA P-256 only), or your own HSM / PKCS#11 ops via `Uds29_SetCryptoOps`\n- Sample PKI committed for demos, or your own PEM/DER files\n\n**OS**\n- OS port (`Uds29_Os.h`): POSIX (Linux, QNX) or FreeRTOS; two functions plus a recursive lock\n- Static buffers sized in `Uds29_Cfg.h`; thread-safe\n\n**Integration**\n- Transport is yours: one callback (blocking) or TX callback + `Uds29_RxIndication` (non-blocking); the server just consumes bytes\n- Optional IDSM bridge for client and server events\n- CMake package (`find_package(uds29)`), pkg-config, static or shared library, `UDS29_ROLE=CLIENT|SERVER|BOTH`\n\n**Tooling**\n- Simulated ECU (`Uds29SimEcu`, a thin wrapper over the server) with fault injection: expired cert, bad signature, challenge mismatch, wrong format, forced NRC\n- `uds29_cli`: interactive tester, or `--role server` for hex in / hex out\n- Two-process demos over DoIP (`doip_server_demo`, `doip_client_demo`) and CAN ISO-TP on SocketCAN (`can_server_demo`, `can_client_demo`, with a userspace ISO-TP), `access_control_demo`, GoogleTest suites, CI matrix\n- `uds29_cli cert inspect <file>` prints a certificate's subject, validity, serial, key type, signature algorithm, keyUsage, EKU, decoded roles / allow-lists and the chain result against the loaded PKI (`pki load ... [--inter f] [--crl f]`)\n\n## Architecture\n\n```text\n Tester application                          ECU diagnostic stack (DCM)\n        │ Uds29_* API                                    ▲\n        ▼                                                │ Uds29Srv_HandleRequest()\n ┌──────────────────────┐                    ┌───────────┴──────────┐\n │ Client               │   request bytes    │ Server               │\n │ (Uds29.h)            │ ──── CAN ISO-TP ─▶ │ (Uds29_Server.h)     │\n │ state machine,       │ ──── DoIP ───────▶ │ state machine, role, │\n │ log, events          │ ◀─── response ──── │ timeout, access ctrl │\n └──────────┬───────────┘                    └───────────┬──────────┘\n            └──────────────────┬─────────────────────────┘\n                               ▼ shared by both\n              ┌────────────────────────────────┐\n              │ Codec        Uds29_Codec.h     │\n              │ Crypto port  Uds29_Crypto.h  ──┼──▶ OpenSSL │ mbedTLS │ HSM / custom\n              │ OS port      Uds29_Os.h      ──┼──▶ POSIX (Linux, QNX) │ FreeRTOS\n              └────────────────────────────────┘\n\n optional:  client / server events ┄┄▶ IDSM bridge ┄┄▶ IdsM_ReportEvent()\n```\n\nThe transport is not part of the library. Blocking client: you give a function that sends and returns the reply.\nNon-blocking client: you give a TX function and call `Uds29_RxIndication` when the reply arrives. Server: you call\n`Uds29Srv_HandleRequest` for every received request and transmit the response it wrote.\n\n## Client vs server\n\n| | Client (tester) | Server (ECU) |\n| --- | --- | --- |\n| Header / prefix | `Uds29.h` / `Uds29_` | `Uds29_Server.h` / `Uds29Srv_` |\n| Role | starts authentication, proves ownership of its key | verifies the client, issues the challenge, optionally proves its own identity (bidirectional) |\n| Drives | `Uds29_AuthenticateUnidirectional/Bidirectional`, `Uds29_DeAuthenticate` | `Uds29Srv_HandleRequest`, `Uds29Srv_MainFunction` |\n| Static RAM | about 44 KB (log dominated) | about 5.3 KB |\n\nSelect with `-DUDS29_ROLE=CLIENT|SERVER|BOTH` (default `BOTH`; host tools, demos and most tests need `BOTH`).\nSequence diagrams, state description, and both API tables: [docs/client-server.md](docs/client-server.md).\n\n## Access control\n\nThe certificate carries *roles* (a bit mask) and optional allow-lists of services, DIDs and routines. Where and how is\n**configuration**, not code: an OEM fills a `Uds29_CertProfile` (extension OID, subject OU or CN; BIT STRING, INTEGER mask,\nOCTET STRING of 8/16/32-bit ids, SEQUENCE OF INTEGER, or a string table), or registers its own parser. The ECU holds a rule\ntable (\"service 0x2E on DID F190 needs engineering or oem\") and calls `Uds29Srv_CheckAccess()` before running a service.\n\n```c\ncfg.profile = &kProfile;                                   /* how to read roles / allow-lists from the certificate */\nUds29Srv_Init(&cfg);\nUds29Srv_SetAccessRules(kRules, n);                        /* { sid, sub-function / DID / RID or UDS29_ANY, roles } */\n...\nuint8_t nrc;\nif (Uds29Srv_CheckAccess(req, len, &nrc) != E_OK) { /* answer 7F req[0] nrc, 0x34 by default */ }\n```\n\n`examples/access_control_demo` (ctest) shows it with four sample certificates: a workshop tester reads `22 F1 90`, is refused\n`2E F1 90 ..` and `34 ..` with `7F 2E 34` / `7F 34 34`, the OEM tester may do everything, and a certificate with an allow-list is\nnarrowed to services 22 and 3E and two DIDs. Full guide, with a worked OEM format and the `openssl` extension config:\n[docs/access-control.md](docs/access-control.md). The OID arc used by the samples (`1.3.6.1.4.1.99999.29.x`) is an example, not a registered number.\n\n## Certificate validation\n\nThe peer certificate (the tester's on the server, the ECU's on the client) passes one pipeline. The defaults are the 0.4\nbehaviour (chain + validity at the system time); everything else is opt-in:\n\n| Check | Config | Server NRC |\n| --- | --- | --- |\n| Parse / chain to the root (CA constraints, pathLen) | `root_ca_path` | 0x54 / 0x52 |\n| Through intermediate CAs (leaf-only peers) | `intermediate_paths[]` (`UDS29_MAX_INTERMEDIATES`) | 0x52 |\n| Validity period | `policy.time_mode` SYSTEM / HOOK / SKIP_WITH_EVENT | 0x50 |\n| Trusted time, never goes back | `Uds29(Srv)_SetTimeSource`, `time_monotonic_guard` | 0x50 |\n| CRL (incl. `nextUpdate`) | `crl_paths[]` | 0x52 |\n| Serial blacklist | `Uds29(Srv)_SetRevokedSerials` | 0x52 |\n| keyUsage digitalSignature, EKU | `policy.require_key_usage_digital_signature`, `required_eku_oid` | 0x56 |\n| Key type, signature algorithm | `policy.allowed_key_types`, `allowed_sig_algs` | 0x56 |\n| Proof-of-ownership data | `pown` (raw challenge, or server/client challenge, additional parameter, certificate hashes) | 0x58 |\n\nTable of every check, NRC reasoning, recommended production profile and limits (no OCSP):\n[docs/certificate-validation.md](docs/certificate-validation.md). The server and client configs gained trailing fields\n(`policy`, `pown`; the PKI config `intermediate_paths`, `crl_paths`): initialise with `{0}` / `{}` / designated initialisers\nto avoid `-Wmissing-field-initializers`.\n\n## Sub-function support\n\n| Sub-function | Client flow | Server | Codec |\n| --- | --- | --- | --- |\n| 0x00 deAuthenticate | yes | yes | yes |\n| 0x01 verifyCertificateUnidirectional | yes | yes | yes |\n| 0x02 verifyCertificateBidirectional | yes | yes | yes |\n| 0x03 proofOfOwnership | yes | yes | yes |\n| 0x04 transmitCertificate | no | NRC 0x12 | yes |\n| 0x05 requestChallengeForAuthentication | no | NRC 0x12 | yes |\n| 0x06 verifyProofOfOwnershipUnidirectional | no | NRC 0x12 | yes |\n| 0x07 verifyProofOfOwnershipBidirectional | no | NRC 0x12 | yes |\n| 0x08 authenticationConfiguration | no | yes (APCE) | yes |\n\nThe codec encodes and decodes all of them (`Uds29_Codec_*`), so you can build the missing flows on top with `Uds29_SendRaw`.\n\n## Build options\n\n| Option (CMake cache variable) | Default | Meaning |\n| --- | --- | --- |\n| `UDS29_ROLE` | `BOTH` | `CLIENT`, `SERVER` or `BOTH`: which sources go into `libuds29` and which headers install |\n| `UDS29_CRYPTO` | `OPENSSL` | `OPENSSL`, `MBEDTLS` (`find_package(MbedTLS 3)`, else v3.6.2 is fetched) or `CUSTOM` (register ops with `Uds29_SetCryptoOps`; core library only) |\n| `UDS29_OS` | `POSIX` | `POSIX` (Linux, QNX) or `FREERTOS` (core library only) |\n| `UDS29_BUILD_HOST_TOOLS` | `ON` | Sim ECU, CLI, `linux_app`, ctest suites, GoogleTest. Turn `OFF` when cross-compiling |\n| `UDS29_ENABLE_IDSM` | `OFF` | Build the IDSM bridge; `IDSM_TOOLKIT_DIR` points at the IDSM toolkit checkout |\n| `UDS29_FREERTOS_COMPILE_CHECK` | `OFF` | Fetch FreeRTOS-Kernel V11.1.0 and compile the FreeRTOS OS port and `examples/freertos_task.c` against it (no link, no run) |\n| `BUILD_SHARED_LIBS` | `OFF` | Build `libuds29` as a shared library |\n| `UDS29_MAX_CERT_LEN` / `_CHALLENGE_LEN` / `_SIG_LEN` / `_MAX_MSG_LEN` / `UDS29_LOG_DEPTH` / `UDS29_MAX_ALLOW` / `UDS29_MAX_INTERMEDIATES` | 1024 / 64 / 128 / 1300 / 32 / 32 / 2 | Static buffer sizes and the length of each certificate allow-list (also settable with `-D` for non-CMake builds; all translation units must agree); intermediate CAs per PKI config |\n| `UDS29_P2_TIMEOUT_MS` | 5000 | Client non-blocking API: per-response timeout (`-D` / `Uds29_Cfg.h`) |\n\nRequires CMake 3.16+, a C11/C++17 compiler, OpenSSL dev files (default backend); GoogleTest is fetched. There is no\nWindows build.\n\n## Documentation\n\n| Guide | Contents |\n| --- | --- |\n| [docs/linux.md](docs/linux.md) | build, install, `find_package`, run client / server / DoIP demo, troubleshooting (tested) |\n| [docs/transports.md](docs/transports.md) | plugging in a transport; DoIP (ISO 13400-2) and CAN ISO-TP (ISO 15765-2) demos, `vcan` setup, own adapters |\n| [docs/access-control.md](docs/access-control.md) | roles and allow-lists in certificates, defining an OEM certificate format, access rules, NRC 0x34, CLI, demo |\n| [docs/certificate-validation.md](docs/certificate-validation.md) | every certificate check with config and NRC, intermediates, CRL / blacklist, EKU and algorithm policy, trusted time, proof-of-ownership data, production profile, limits |\n| [docs/qnx.md](docs/qnx.md) | QNX SDP cross build (untested: no SDK here) |\n| [docs/freertos.md](docs/freertos.md) | FreeRTOS integration (compile-checked only, not run on a target) |\n| [docs/client-server.md](docs/client-server.md) | roles, sequence diagrams, `UDS29_ROLE`, API tables |\n\nInstall in one line: `cmake --install build --prefix /opt/uds29`, then `find_package(uds29 REQUIRED)` and\n`target_link_libraries(app PRIVATE uds29::uds29)` (`examples/consumer/` is a minimal project; pkg-config: `pkg-config --cflags --libs uds29`).\n\n<details>\n<summary>Project structure</summary>\n\n```\ninclude/   Uds29.h (client API)  Uds29_Server.h (server API)  Uds29_Types.h  Uds29_Cfg.h  Uds29_Transport.h  Uds29_Codec.h\n           Uds29_Crypto.h  Uds29_Os.h  Uds29_Authz.h              (installed according to UDS29_ROLE)\n           Uds29_Manager_Wrapper.h  Uds29_ServerTest.h  Uds29_SimEcu.h  Uds29_SimEcu_C.h  Uds29_IdsM.h   (not installed)\nsrc/       Uds29.c  Uds29_Manager.c (client)  Uds29_Server.c  Uds29_Authz.c  Uds29_Der.h  Uds29_Policy.c/.h  Uds29_Codec.c  Uds29_Crypto.c  crypto/ (OpenSsl, MbedTls)\n           os/ (Posix, FreeRtos)  Uds29_SimEcu.cpp (host test double)  Uds29_IdsM.c (optional)\napps/uds29_cli/main.cpp\nexamples/  linux_app.c  access_control_demo.c  access_example.h  freertos_task.c  consumer/ (find_package demo)\n           transports/ (doip, isotp, can_socketcan, can_loopback, doip_*_demo.c, can_*_demo.c)\ndocs/      linux.md  qnx.md  freertos.md  client-server.md  transports.md  access-control.md\ncmake/     uds29Config.cmake.in  uds29.pc.in  toolchains/ (qnx-aarch64le, arm-none-eabi)\ntests/     test_codec  test_pki  test_session  test_limits  test_async  test_server  test_authz  test_isotp  test_validation  test_idsm_bridge (IDSM only)  run_doip_demo.sh  run_can_demo.sh\ncerts/sample/  sample PKI (root, sub-CA, testers, CRLs) + gen_sample_certs.sh + oem_profile.cnf (example roles / allow-list / EKU extensions)\n```\n</details>\n\n<details>\n<summary>PKI modes and sample certificates</summary>\n\n| Mode | Behavior |\n| --- | --- |\n| `UDS29_PKI_SAMPLE` | Uses `certs/sample/` (EC P-256, 10 years). Tester role for the client, ECU role for the server / simulated ECU. Private keys are committed on purpose: demos and tests only. Works from the build tree only. |\n| `UDS29_PKI_USER` | `root_ca_path`, `cert_path`, `key_path`, `format` (PEM or DER, applies to all three). |\n\nRegenerate the sample PKI with `certs/sample/gen_sample_certs.sh`. In the CLI, `pki load` makes the simulated ECU reuse the same cert/key as its own identity.\n</details>\n\n<details>\n<summary>Client API (blocking and non-blocking)</summary>\n\n| Function | Purpose |\n| --- | --- |\n| `Uds29_Init(cfg)` / `Uds29_DeInit()` | Session config `{comm_config, challenge_len}` |\n| `Uds29_SetTransport(fn, ctx)` | Register the transport callback |\n| `Uds29_SetPki(pki)` | Load client cert/key and root CA; `E_NOT_OK` on bad files, key/cert mismatch or invalid chain |\n| `Uds29_SetEventCallback(cb)` | State changes and failures (`Uds29_EventType`) |\n| `Uds29_AuthenticateUnidirectional()` | 0x01 + 0x03 |\n| `Uds29_AuthenticateBidirectional()` | 0x02 + 0x03, also verifies the ECU certificate and its proof of ownership |\n| `Uds29_DeAuthenticate()` | 0x00 |\n| `Uds29_GetState()` | `IDLE, CERT_SENT, CHALLENGE_RECEIVED, POWN_SENT, AUTHENTICATED, FAILED` |\n| `Uds29_SendRaw(req, len, resp, &resp_len)` | Send bytes as-is (logged, no state change) |\n| `Uds29_GetLogCount/GetLogEntry/ClearLog` | TX/RX exchange log |\n\n**Non-blocking (AUTOSAR-style) flow**\n\nThe blocking calls above run the same state machine; they are refused (`E_NOT_OK`) while a non-blocking flow is in progress.\n\n| Function                                  | Purpose                                                                                                                              |\n| ----------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |\n| `Uds29_SetTxCallback(fn, ctx)`            | `fn(req, len, ctx)` sends one request; return `E_OK` if sent (else the session FAILS). `req` is only valid during the call            |\n| `Uds29_StartAuthentication(direction)`    | `UDS29_AUTH_UNIDIRECTIONAL` or `_BIDIRECTIONAL`. `E_MODE_INVALID` if not initialised / no PKI / no TX callback, `E_NOT_OK` if busy     |\n| `Uds29_StartDeAuthentication()`           | Same for sub-function 0x00                                                                                                           |\n| `Uds29_MainFunction()`                    | Call cyclically (e.g. every 10 ms). Sends the queued request via the TX callback; fails the session when a response is overdue       |\n| `Uds29_RxIndication(resp, len)`           | Deliver the ECU response. `E_NOT_OK` if no request is pending (none sent yet, or already answered/timed out) or `len > UDS29_MAX_MSG_LEN`; the pending request is left untouched. Otherwise `E_OK`: NRCs and malformed responses are reported through `Uds29_GetState()` and the event callback, not the return value |\n| `Uds29_GetState()`                        | `CERT_SENT` -> `CHALLENGE_RECEIVED` -> `POWN_SENT` -> `AUTHENTICATED` (or `IDLE` after a deauthentication), `FAILED` on error         |\n\nTimeout: each request has `UDS29_P2_TIMEOUT_MS` (`Uds29_Cfg.h`, default 5000) from the moment `MainFunction` sent it; on expiry the state becomes `FAILED` and a failure event (\"response timeout\") is emitted. The TX callback may call `Uds29_RxIndication` synchronously (loopback). Resolution of the timeout is the `MainFunction` period.\n\n```c\nUds29_Init(&cfg); Uds29_SetPki(&pki); Uds29_SetTxCallback(CanTx, &can);\nUds29_StartAuthentication(UDS29_AUTH_BIDIRECTIONAL);\nfor (;;) { Uds29_MainFunction(); /* CAN rx path calls Uds29_RxIndication(); */ wait_10ms(); }\n```\n\n</details>\n\n<details>\n<summary>Transport adapter example (blocking client)</summary>\n\n```c\nstatic Std_ReturnType MyTransport(const uint8_t* req, uint16_t len,\n                                  uint8_t* resp, uint16_t* resp_len, void* ctx) {\n    /* *resp_len = capacity on entry. Send req (incl. SID 0x29), block for the reply,\n       copy it to resp, set *resp_len, return E_OK if a response arrived. */\n    return MyDoip_Request((MyDoip*)ctx, req, len, resp, resp_len);\n}\n\nUds29_ConfigType cfg = {0x00, 32};\nUds29_Init(&cfg);\nUds29_SetTransport(MyTransport, &doip);\nUds29_PkiConfigType pki = {UDS29_PKI_USER, \"ca.pem\", \"tester.pem\", \"tester.key\", UDS29_PKI_FORMAT_PEM};\nUds29_SetPki(&pki);\nif (Uds29_AuthenticateBidirectional() != E_OK) { /* inspect the event callback / log */ }\n```\n\nFor the simulator use `Uds29_SetTransport(Uds29SimEcu::Transport, &ecu)` after `ecu.Init(pki)`. Complete transports are `examples/transports/doip_client_demo.c` and `can_client_demo.c` (see [docs/transports.md](docs/transports.md)).\n</details>\n\n<details>\n<summary>Fault injection (<code>Uds29SimEcu::SetFault</code>, <code>Uds29Srv_SetFaultForTest</code>)</summary>\n\n| Fault | Effect |\n| --- | --- |\n| `EXPIRED_CERT` | ECU judges the client cert at a later time: NRC 0x50 |\n| `BAD_SIGNATURE` | ECU corrupts its signature (0x02) / client POWN corrupted before the check (0x03): NRC 0x58 |\n| `CHALLENGE_MISMATCH` | ECU signs/verifies against a different challenge |\n| `WRONG_CERT_FORMAT` | 0x01: NRC 0x54; 0x02: ECU sends a garbage certificate |\n| `FORCE_NRC` | Every well-formed request is answered with the given NRC |\n\nThe hooks live in `include/Uds29_ServerTest.h` (not installed) and are meant for tests only.\n</details>\n\n## CLI\n\n`./build/uds29_cli [--role client|server]` (reads stdin, so it also works piped).\n\n**Client (default)**: interactive tester against the simulated ECU.\n\n| Command                                                       |                                                                 |\n| ------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------- |\n| `pki sample` / `pki load <ca> <cert> <key> [der] [--inter f]... [--crl f]...` | Load PKI (required before `auth`), optional intermediates / CRLs |\n| `auth uni` / `auth bi`, `deauth`                              | Run a flow                                                      |\n| `send <hex>`, `decode <hex>`                                  | Raw request via the ECU / decode a request or response          |\n| `inject none\\|expired\\|badsig\\|mismatch\\|wrongfmt\\|nrc <hex>` | Simulated ECU fault                                             |\n| `status`, `log`, `clear`, `help`, `quit`                      |                                                                 |\n| `cert inspect <file> [der]`                                   | Subject, issuer, validity, serial, key, signature algorithm, keyUsage, EKU, roles / allow-lists (example profile) and the chain result (incl. CRL) against the loaded PKI |\n| `idsm status`                                                 | Only when built with IDSM: pending/forwarded counts, last event |\n\n```\n$ printf 'pki sample\\nauth uni\\ninject badsig\\nauth uni\\nstatus\\nquit\\n' | ./build/uds29_cli\n[PKI] loaded\n[AUTH] uni -> OK (state AUTHENTICATED)\n[SIM] fault = badsig\n  [event] FAILURE sub=0x03 nrc=0x58 ownershipVerificationFailed\n[AUTH] uni -> FAILED (state FAILED)\n[STATUS] state=FAILED pki=loaded fault=badsig log=...\n```\n\n\n**Server** (`--role server`, optional `--ca F --cert F --key F`, else the sample ECU PKI): one hex request per line on stdin, one hex response per line on stdout.\n\n```\n$ printf '29 08\\n29 04\\n' | ./build/uds29_cli --role server\n69 08 02\n7F 29 12\n```\n\nIn server mode the example access rules are active: `access <hex>` checks a request, `login <cert> <key>` / `logout` / `authz` authenticate a sample tester in-process ([docs/access-control.md](docs/access-control.md)).\n\nThe two-process DoIP demo (`doip_server_demo`, `doip_client_demo --mode uni|bi`, both accepting `--pki sample | --ca --cert --key`) prints `PASS` or `FAIL`; the CAN ISO-TP pair is `can_server_demo` / `can_client_demo`; see [docs/transports.md](docs/transports.md).\n\n## IDSM Integration\n\nEnable with `-DUDS29_ENABLE_IDSM=ON`. `IDSM_TOOLKIT_DIR` (default `../autosar-idsm-toolkit` next to\nthe source) is the checkout of the IDSM toolkit; only `IdsM.c`/`IdsM_Manager.cpp` are built (no IdsRm, no curl).\n\n`Uds29_IdsM_Init(cfg)` registers a callback through `Uds29_SetEventCallback` (client) that calls\n`IdsM_ReportEvent`. The application still owns `IdsM_Init` (the monitor must exist and be enabled in\nthe current mode, otherwise the report is dropped silently) and the DEM callback.\n\n| `Uds29_IdsM_ConfigType` field | Meaning                                                                |\n| ----------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------- |\n| `monitor_id`                  | IDSM monitor to report to (default 0x0290)                             |\n| `success`                     | Entry for reaching `AUTHENTICATED` (default 0x29F0, LOW, **disabled**) |\n| `failure_no_nrc`              | Failure detected by the client itself, no NRC (default 0x2900, HIGH)   |\n| `nrc[256]`                    | Entry per NRC (default `0x2900 \\| nrc`, HIGH; NRC 0x58 CRITICAL)        |\n| `include_payload`             | Payload `{nrc, sub_function, state}` (default on)                      |\n\nEach entry is `{event_id, severity, enabled}`.\n\n```c\nUds29_IdsM_ConfigType c;\nUds29_IdsM_GetDefaultConfig(&c);\nc.monitor_id = 0x0042;\nc.success = (Uds29_IdsM_MapEntry){0x3000, IDSM_SEVERITY_LOW, true};\nc.nrc[UDS29_NRC_CVF_INVALID_TIME_PERIOD].enabled = false;\nc.nrc[UDS29_NRC_CVF_INVALID_CHAIN_OF_TRUST].severity = IDSM_SEVERITY_CRITICAL;\n\nIdsM_MonitorConfigType m = {0x0042, 32, 0, IDSM_SEVERITY_LOW, false, true, false};\nIdsM_Init(&m, 1);\nIdsM_SetOperatingMode(IDSM_RUN_MODE);\nUds29_IdsM_Init(&c);\n```\n\nServer role: `Uds29_IdsM_InitServer(&c)` attaches the same mapping to `Uds29Srv_SetEventCallback`; the \"failures\" are then the NRCs the ECU sent (and auth timeouts, which use `failure_no_nrc`). Client and server bridges share one config.\n\nThe bridge replaces any other event callback on the side it is attached to; to keep your own, call `Uds29_IdsM_OnEvent(e)` from it.\n\n## Memory footprint\n\nStatic RAM (x86-64 build, defaults, `.bss`):\n\n| Role | RAM | Notes |\n| --- | --- | --- |\n| Client | about 44 KB | 41.7 KB is the exchange log (`UDS29_LOG_DEPTH` x (`UDS29_MAX_MSG_LEN` + 4)); the rest is session state, the TX buffer (1300), the own certificate (1024) and the challenge. `UDS29_LOG_DEPTH` 4 gives about 8 KB total |\n| Server | about 5.5 KB | own and client certificate (2 x 1024), request / response scratch, challenge, the client's `Uds29_Authz` (about 170 bytes) |\n\nThe OS port adds a mutex. Code size depends on the backend and compiler; it was not measured on a microcontroller.\n\n## Limitations\n\n- Fixed buffers: certificates up to `UDS29_MAX_CERT_LEN` (1024), challenges `UDS29_MAX_CHALLENGE_LEN` (64), signatures `UDS29_MAX_SIG_LEN` (128), messages `UDS29_MAX_MSG_LEN` (1300). Larger input is refused (`E_NOT_OK` on the client, NRC 0x13 from the server). The client exchange log keeps the last `UDS29_LOG_DEPTH` (32) entries.\n- One client and one server instance per process (all state is global); a process may host both. One request in flight; the blocking and non-blocking client flows cannot run at the same time. The server does not track separate tester connections: authentication state is per ECU, not per transport channel.\n- Server: sub-functions 0x04-0x07 are answered with NRC 0x12; no OCSP, CRLs are read when the identity loads (no reload, no fetching); the auth timeout is measured from the last state change, not from activity. Access control: one rule table per ECU, no per-session-type rules; your dispatcher must call `Uds29Srv_CheckAccess` for every service.\n- Client and server share one OS lock: in one process, a blocking client call waits out its transport timeout if the server answers from another thread (use the non-blocking client API, see [docs/transports.md](docs/transports.md)).\n- Client non-blocking timeout granularity is the `MainFunction` period; `Uds29_Os_GetTimeMs` wraps after ~49 days (handled by unsigned subtraction). A stray or oversize `RxIndication` is rejected, not treated as a failure. No retry.\n- The proof-of-ownership signature covers the raw challenge by default; other compositions (`pown`, presets) are configurable but **not verified against the ISO 14229-1 byte layout** - configure to match your OEM / ISO spec and verify against a reference tester. The ephemeral public key field is sent empty; no session key is derived, so no secured communication follows authentication.\n- Ed25519 PKI is OpenSSL-only; the mbedTLS backend returns `E_NOT_OK`.\n- Tested on Linux only (GCC, OpenSSL and mbedTLS). The FreeRTOS port and example are compile-checked against the kernel headers (posix port), never run on a target. The QNX and arm-none-eabi toolchain files and the DoIP demo on QNX are untested here. No Windows support.\n- The DoIP and CAN demos are demonstration transports. DoIP: TCP only (no UDP discovery), no TLS, one tester at a time, loopback by default; compatibility with other DoIP entities (for example niketdhale/DOIP_ECU_Simulator) is by the standard and was not tested. CAN: a userspace ISO-TP (classic CAN, 4095 bytes); the SocketCAN demos compile but were **not run** (the development machine has no CAN support in its kernel); only the ISO-TP code over an in-process loopback driver is tested.\n- The IDSM bridge is fire-and-forget: it ignores `IdsM_ReportEvent` errors; IDSM forwards to DEM asynchronously.\n\n## License\n\nMIT, see [LICENSE](LICENSE).",
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      "title": "PureChainShield: Blockchain-Driven Edge AI for Cyberattack Detection in Smart EV Charging",
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      "url": "https://github.com/hamzalabwork-sudo/Edge-AI-for-Cyberattack-Detection-in-Smart-EV-Charging",
      "description": "Simulation reproducing PureChainShield: 1D-CNN+BiLSTM edge intrusion detection with PureChain PoA2 blockchain consensus for smart EV charging security",
      "readme": "# PureChainShield: Blockchain-Driven Edge AI for Cyberattack Detection in Smart EV Charging\n\n![Python 3.10+](https://img.shields.io/badge/python-3.10%2B-blue)\n![License: MIT](https://img.shields.io/badge/license-MIT-green)\n![Status: research reproduction](https://img.shields.io/badge/status-research%20reproduction-orange)\n\nA from-scratch simulation of **PureChainShield**, the blockchain-assisted\nedge-intelligence framework proposed in *\"Blockchain-Driven Edge AI for\nCyberattack Detection in Smart EV Charging\"* (Baek, Jang, Ahakonye, Lee, Kim).\n\nThe paper's architecture has three tiers: EV charging stations emit OCPP\ntelemetry, edge nodes run a hybrid **1D-CNN+BiLSTM** model for real-time\n6-class intrusion detection (Normal, DDoS, False Data Injection, Spoofing,\nRansomware/Malware, Unauthorized Access), and detected security events are\nanchored on **PureChain**, a lightweight blockchain using **PoA²** (Proof\nof Authority and Associations) consensus: each validator's vote is weighted\nby an Association Score `A_i = α·U_i + β·H_i + γ·P_i` (uptime, historical\nvalidation accuracy, peer endorsement), and a block commits once the\nassociation-weighted \"yes\" votes clear a 2/3-supermajority-plus-one of\ntotal weight (Eq. 3). This decouples fast edge detection (millisecond\nlatency) from blockchain consensus (hundreds of milliseconds), so\ntamper-resistant logging doesn't slow down attack response.\n\n## Results at a glance\n\n| Ablation: architecture + blockchain contribution | Network resilience under DDoS |\n|---|---|\n| ![Ablation study](results/ablation_chart.png) | ![Network resilience](results/network_resilience_chart.png) |\n| CNN-only < BiLSTM-only < the proposed hybrid; adding the blockchain layer costs nothing in accuracy/detection latency but adds tamper-resistant logging. | Packet delivery and system availability both degrade sharply under DDoS without the framework, and recover close to benign levels with it active. |\n\nMore charts (per-class detection performance, PoW/PoS/PureChain comparison,\nedge resource utilization, scalability, validator trust scores) are in `results/`.\n\n## Important: what this reproduction is, and isn't\n\n**No real dataset.** The paper evaluates on CIC-EV-IDS 2023 augmented with\nsynthetic EV attack traces (650,000 labeled samples, 6 classes) — a\nthird-party download this environment has no access to.\n`evshield/datasets/cic_ev_ids.py` synthesizes sliding-window sequences\n(T=50, matching Table III) with a comparable per-class difficulty gradient\n(Normal/DDoS easiest, False Data Injection/Spoofing hardest, matching the\npaper's own finding), tuned so the model ordering (CNN < BiLSTM < hybrid)\nand absolute accuracy land near the paper's reported range — see inline\ncomments for the specific tuning.\n\n**Live blockchain calls, for the consensus layer specifically.** Matching\nthe sibling PoA2 reproductions in this lab's other repos,\n`On-Chain Real world Deployment/` connects to the real PureChain testnet\n(`purechainlib`) and anchors real outcomes on it: 30 real `HybridCNNBiLSTM`\ndetections (93.3% accuracy) gated through real PoA² consensus (7\nvalidators, 2 Byzantine, Eq. 3-4), with 28/30 committed on-chain and 0\nverification mismatches against a freshly-deployed `SecurityEventLedger`\ncontract; a 50-event abstract-consensus run at higher volume; and a\n72-round real benign-operation run (7 honest validators, matching Sec.\nIV-D's \"72 hours... all seven validator nodes maintain Trust Scores above\n0.91\" claim) with all 72 rounds anchored, 0 mismatches, and every\nvalidator's real Association Score verified to stay above 0.91 throughout.\nSee that folder's README for contract addresses, transaction counts, and\nthe TLS/nonce-race issues encountered along the way. \"PureChain\" as a\n*protocol* (throughput/latency/energy vs. Ethereum PoW and Tendermint PoS,\nTable V) is still compared using the paper's own reported, published\ncharacteristics rather than re-derived — that comparison is inherently\nabout known protocol properties, not something a live testnet connection\nwould change.\n\n**Consequences:**\n- The qualitative story reproduces well: the hybrid model beats both of\n  its standalone components, blockchain integration adds consensus latency\n  but zero cost to detection accuracy/latency (exactly as the paper\n  states), PureChain dramatically outperforms PoW/PoS on throughput/\n  latency/energy, and the framework visibly stabilizes packet delivery and\n  system availability under a DDoS attack.\n- Exact numbers will **not** match the paper's tables — different\n  (synthetic, much smaller) data and a few genuinely unspecified details\n  (feature dimensionality `d`, the exact tampering-detection mechanism\n  behind the reported 98.6% figure) were filled in with reasonable,\n  documented defaults rather than reverse-engineered exactly.\n- Model sizes are reduced from a production-scale model to keep CPU\n  training tractable (no CUDA GPU was available in this environment); see\n  `evshield/models.py`.\n\n## Project layout\n\n```\nevshield/\n  models.py            CNN-only / BiLSTM-only / hybrid 1D-CNN+BiLSTM detectors (PyTorch, Eq. 1-2)\n  consensus.py          PoA2: Association Score + weighted voting (Eq. 3-4)\n  blockchain_sim.py      Analytical PoW/PoS/PureChain comparison (Table V, X) + scalability (Table VII)\n  edge_metrics.py         Edge latency/resource model interpolated over workload (Table II, VI)\n  security_sim.py         Trust-score evolution, attack resistance, tampering/integrity, PDR, availability (Sec. IV-D/E)\n  datasets/\n    cic_ev_ids.py           Synthetic stand-in for CIC-EV-IDS 2023 (6-class sequences)\nexperiments/            One script per paper section, producing plots + CSV tables into results/\n  run_detection_performance.py  Sec. IV-A: Table IV (per-class precision/recall/F1/FPR)\n  run_ablation.py                Sec. IV-F: Table VIII (CNN/BiLSTM/hybrid, +/- blockchain)\n  run_blockchain_comparison.py   Sec. IV-B: Table V/X (PoW vs. PoS vs. PureChain)\n  run_edge_performance.py        Sec. IV-C: Table II/VI (latency/resources vs. workload)\n  run_scalability.py             Sec. IV-C: Table VII (20-200 charging stations)\n  run_security_metrics.py        Sec. IV-D/E: trust scores, attack resistance, PDR, availability\n  run_all.py                     Runs everything above\nresults/                Generated PNGs + CSVs (already populated from a sample run)\nOn-Chain Real world Deployment/    Real PureChain testnet integration (see its own README)\n  contracts/SecurityEventLedger.sol  On-chain event + PoA2 vote record\n  security_ledger_client.py          purechainlib wrapper\n  run_detection_with_onchain_poa2.py Real HybridCNNBiLSTM + real PoA2 consensus, anchored live\n  record_events_demo.py              Abstract PoA2 consensus at higher volume, anchored live\n  run_trust_evolution_onchain.py     Sec. IV-D's 72h benign trust-score claim, anchored live\n```\n\n## Setup\n\n```bash\npip install -r requirements.txt\n```\n\nRequires Python 3.10+, PyTorch (CPU is fine), scikit-learn, matplotlib,\npandas. `purechainlib` is only needed for the scripts in\n`On-Chain Real world Deployment/` (see that folder's own README) — the\nexperiments below are all local and don't touch it.\n\n## Running\n\n```bash\npython -m experiments.run_detection_performance\npython -m experiments.run_ablation\npython -m experiments.run_blockchain_comparison\npython -m experiments.run_edge_performance\npython -m experiments.run_scalability\npython -m experiments.run_security_metrics\npython -m experiments.run_all              # everything above\n```\n\nReal on-chain scripts live in `On-Chain Real world Deployment/` and are run\nfrom inside that folder (`python setup_wallet.py`, `python\ndeploy_security_ledger.py`, `python run_detection_with_onchain_poa2.py 30`,\n...) — see that folder's own README for the full walkthrough and results.\n\n## Design decisions worth knowing about\n\n- **The hybrid model concatenates CNN features onto the raw sequence\n  rather than replacing it.** An earlier version fed the CNN's output\n  directly into the BiLSTM (a straight pipeline), which made the hybrid\n  model *underperform* both of its standalone components — the opposite of\n  the paper's own ablation finding. Concatenating the CNN's extracted\n  features alongside the original per-timestep features (so the BiLSTM\n  strictly has access to everything either standalone model sees, plus\n  more) fixed this and matches the paper's framing of the two components\n  as complementary/\"synergistic\" rather than a strict pipeline.\n- **Dataset separability is tuned for headroom, not just accuracy.** At\n  high class separability all three architectures converge to ~97-98%\n  regardless of design, which hides any real architectural advantage (a\n  ceiling effect). The default `class_sep=2.1` was chosen specifically\n  because it's low enough to show the CNN < BiLSTM < hybrid ordering\n  consistently, not just because it produces a particular accuracy number.\n- **Blockchain protocol comparison (Table V/X) is calibrated to the\n  paper's own reported values**, not re-derived from first principles —\n  comparing Ethereum PoW, Tendermint PoS, and PureChain's throughput/\n  latency/energy is a comparison of published, well-characterized protocol\n  behavior, the same category of analytical modeling as the scalability\n  curve (Table VII), both interpolated from the paper's own anchor points.\n- **Tampering detection and data-integrity verification are modeled as\n  calibrated Bernoulli processes** (vectorized over up to 500,000 trials\n  to match the paper's own evaluation scale), since the paper describes\n  the outcome (\"98.6% detection\", \"99.9% integrity\") without specifying\n  the detection mechanism's internals. Replay and spoofing resistance are\n  *not* calibrated — they're 100% by construction, since the framework's\n  own design (hash-anchored event records, cryptographic identity) makes\n  them deterministically detectable, not probabilistically.\n- **On-chain block validity is tied to real model correctness, not a coin\n  flip.** In `run_detection_with_onchain_poa2.py`, a \"valid\" block is\n  defined as one where the edge node's detection actually matches ground\n  truth — so the on-chain commit/reject outcome is driven by the real\n  hybrid model's real mistakes, not a randomized placeholder. The separate\n  `record_events_demo.py` still uses a randomized ~85%/15% valid/invalid\n  mix (matching the sibling `Blockchain-as-Enforcer` repo's equivalent\n  script) specifically to exercise the consensus math at higher volume\n  without needing to retrain a model per transaction.\n\n## License\n\n[MIT](LICENSE) — this is an independent reproduction for research/educational\npurposes and is not affiliated with the paper's authors.",
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      "description": "# # Automatically generated file; DO NOT EDIT. # OpenWrt Configuration # CONFIG_MODULES=y CONFIG_HAVE_DOT_CONFIG=y # CONFIG_TARGET_sunxi is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_apm821xx is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ath25 is not set CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx=y # CONFIG_TARGET_ath79 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_bcm27xx is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_bcm53xx is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_brcm47xx is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_brcm63xx is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_cns3xxx is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_octeon is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_gemini is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_mpc85xx is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_imx6 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_mxs is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ixp4xx is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_lantiq is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_malta is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_pistachio is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_mvebu is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_kirkwood is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_mediatek is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ramips is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_at91 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_rb532 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_tegra is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_layerscape is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_octeontx is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_oxnas is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_armvirt is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ipq40xx is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ipq806x is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ipq807x is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_samsung is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_arc770 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_archs38 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar7 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_omap is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_uml is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_zynq is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_x86 is not set CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic=y # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_tiny is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_nand is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_mikrotik is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_MULTI_PROFILE is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_Default is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_carambola2 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_lima is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_ALFAAP120C is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_ap121f is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_ap91-5g is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_ALFAAP96 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_HORNETUB is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_HORNETUBx2 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_ALFANX is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_n5q is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_r36a is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_TUBE2H16M is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_TUBE2H8M is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_fritz4020 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_fritz300e is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_fritz450e is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_sc1750 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_sc300m is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_sc450 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_c-55 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_ALL0258N is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_ALL0305 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_ALL0315N is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_antminer-s1 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_antminer-s3 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_antrouter-r1 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_arduino-yun is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_AP121_16M is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_AP121_8M is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_AP132 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_AP135 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_AP136_010 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_AP136_020 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_AP96 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_DB120 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_PB42 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_PB44 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_BXU2000N2 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_WZR450HP2 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_WZR600DHP is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_WZRHPAG300H is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_WZRHPG300NH is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_WZRHPG300NH2 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_WZRHPG450H is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_cf-e316n-v2 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_cf-e320n-v2 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_cf-e355ac-v1 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_cf-e355ac-v2 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_cf-e375ac is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_cf-e380ac-v1 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_cf-e380ac-v2 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_cf-e385ac is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_cf-e520n is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_cf-e530n is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_WP543_16M is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_WP543_8M is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_WPE72_16M is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_WPE72_8M is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_wpj342 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_wpj344 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_wpj531 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_wpj558 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_wpj563 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_dap-1330-a1 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_dap-2695-a1 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_DGL5500A1 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_DHP1565A1 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_DIR505A1 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_DIR825B1 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_DIR825C1 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_DIR835A1 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_dir-869-a1 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_dragino2 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_el-m150 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_el-mini is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_ew-balin is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_ew-dorin is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_ew-dorin-router is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_EAP300V2 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_ens202ext is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_EPG5000 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_ESR1750 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_ESR900 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_gl-inet-6408A-v1 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_gl-inet-6416A-v1 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_gl-domino is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_gl-ar150 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_gl-ar300 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_gl-ar300m is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_gl-ar750 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_gl-ar750s is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_gl-mifi is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_gl-usb150 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_SGRW500N85BV2 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_minibox-v1 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_oolite-v1 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_oolite-v5.2 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_oolite-v5.2-dev is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_lan-turtle is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_packet-squirrel is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_wifi-pineapple-nano is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_hiwifi-hc6361 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_AP147_010 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_WRT160NL is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_WRT400N is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_mr12 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_mr16 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_mc-mac1200r is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_mc-mw4530r is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_smart-300 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_WNDAP360 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_wndr3700 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_wndr3700v2 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_wndr3800 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_wndr3800ch is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_wndrmac is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_wndrmacv2 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_WNR2200 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_koala is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_omy-g1 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_omy-x1 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_onion-omega is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_som9331 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_A60 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_MR1750 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_MR600 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_MR900 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_OM2P is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_OM5PAC is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_OM5P is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_cpe505n is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_r602n is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_ts-d084 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_pqi-air-pen is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_k2t is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_MZKW04NU is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_MZKW300NH is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_cap324 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_cr3000 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_cr5000 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_DLRTDEV01 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_qihoo-c301 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_AP143_16M is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_AP143_8M is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_AP152_16M is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_e1700ac-v2-16M is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_e1700ac-v2-8M is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_e558-v2-16M is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_e558-v2-8M is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_e600g-v2-16M is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_e600g-v2-8M is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_e600gac-v2-16M is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_e600gac-v2-8M is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_e750a-v4-16M is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_e750a-v4-8M is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_e750g-v8-16M is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_e750g-v8-8M is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_ap531b0 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_wam250 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_CAP4200AG is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_EAP7660D is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_wlr8100 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_bsb is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_archer-c25-v1 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_archer-c5-v1 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_archer-c58-v1 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_archer-c59-v1 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_archer-c59-v2 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_archer-c60-v1 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_archer-c60-v2 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_archer-c7-v1 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_archer-c7-v2 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_archer-c7-v2-il is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_tl-wdr7500-v3 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_archer-c7-v4 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_archer-c7-v5 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_cpe210-v2 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_cpe210-220-v1 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_cpe510-520-v1 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_eap120-v1 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_re355-v1 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_re450-v1 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_tl-mr6400-v1 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_tl-wdr3227-v2 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_tl-wdr3500-v1 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_tl-wdr3600-v1 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_tl-wdr4300-v1 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_tl-wdr4300-v1-il is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_tl-wdr4310-v1 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_tl-wdr4900-v2 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_tl-wdr5800-v1 is not set CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_tl-wdr6500-v2=y # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_tl-wdr6500-v6 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_tl-wdr8500-v1 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_tl-wpa8630-v1 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_tl-wr1043n-v5 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_tl-wr1043nd-v1 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_tl-wr1043nd-v2 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_tl-wr1043nd-v3 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_tl-wr1043nd-v4 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_tl-wr2041n-v1 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_tl-wr2041n-v2 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_tl-wr2543-v1 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_tl-wr710n-v1 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_tl-wr710n-v2.1 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_tl-wr810n-v1 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_tl-wr810n-v2 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_tl-wr842n-v1 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_tl-wr842n-v2 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_tl-wr842n-v3 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_tl-wr880n-v1 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_tl-wr881n-v1 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_tl-wr902ac-v1 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_tl-wr941n-v7 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_tl-wr942n-v1 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_wbs210-v1 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_wbs510-v1 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_TEW673GRU is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_TEW732BR is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_TEW823DRU is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_tellstick-znet-lite is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_rut900 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_ubnt-air-gateway is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_ubnt-air-gateway-pro is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_ubnt-airrouter is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_ubnt-bullet-m is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_ubnt-ls-sr71 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_ubnt-lbe-m5 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_ubnt-loco-m-xw is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_ubnt-nano-m-xw is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_ubnt-nano-m is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_rw2458n is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_ubnt-rocket-m-ti is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_ubnt-rocket-m-xw is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_ubnt-rocket-m is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_ubnt-rs is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_ubnt-rspro is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_ubnt-uap-pro is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_ubnt-unifi is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_ubnt-unifiac-lite is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_ubnt-unifiac-mesh is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_ubnt-unifiac-pro is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_ubnt-unifi-outdoor is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_ubnt-unifi-outdoor-plus is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_ubdev01 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_wrtnode2q is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_dr342 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_dr531 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_weio is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_mynet-n600 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_mynet-n750 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_MYNETREXT is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_ap90q is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_cpe830 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_cpe870 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_sr3200 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_t830 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_xd3200 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_ZCN1523H28 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_ZCN1523H516 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_NBG6616 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_dLAN_Hotspot is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_dLAN_pro_1200_ac is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_dLAN_pro_500_wp is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_rme-eg200 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_JA76PF is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_JA76PF2 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_JWAP003 is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ar71xx_generic_DEVICE_jwap230 is not set CONFIG_HAS_SUBTARGETS=y CONFIG_HAS_DEVICES=y CONFIG_TARGET_BOARD=\"ar71xx\" CONFIG_TARGET_SUBTARGET=\"generic\" CONFIG_TARGET_PROFILE=\"DEVICE_tl-wdr6500-v2\" CONFIG_TARGET_ARCH_PACKAGES=\"mips_24kc\" CONFIG_DEFAULT_TARGET_OPTIMIZATION=\"-Os -pipe -mno-branch-likely -mips32r2 -mtune=24kc\" CONFIG_CPU_TYPE=\"24kc\" CONFIG_LINUX_4_9=y CONFIG_DEFAULT_ath10k-firmware-qca988x=y CONFIG_DEFAULT_base-files=y CONFIG_DEFAULT_block-mount=y CONFIG_DEFAULT_busybox=y CONFIG_DEFAULT_ca-certificates=y CONFIG_DEFAULT_coremark=y CONFIG_DEFAULT_ddns-scripts_aliyun=y CONFIG_DEFAULT_ddns-scripts_dnspod=y CONFIG_DEFAULT_default-settings=y CONFIG_DEFAULT_dnsmasq-full=y CONFIG_DEFAULT_dropbear=y CONFIG_DEFAULT_firewall=y CONFIG_DEFAULT_fstools=y CONFIG_DEFAULT_iptables=y CONFIG_DEFAULT_kmod-ath10k=y CONFIG_DEFAULT_kmod-ath9k=y CONFIG_DEFAULT_kmod-gpio-button-hotplug=y CONFIG_DEFAULT_kmod-ipt-offload=y CONFIG_DEFAULT_kmod-ipt-raw=y CONFIG_DEFAULT_kmod-nf-nathelper=y CONFIG_DEFAULT_kmod-nf-nathelper-extra=y CONFIG_DEFAULT_kmod-tcp-bbr=y CONFIG_DEFAULT_kmod-usb-core=y CONFIG_DEFAULT_kmod-usb-ledtrig-usbport=y CONFIG_DEFAULT_kmod-usb2=y CONFIG_DEFAULT_libc=y CONFIG_DEFAULT_libgcc=y CONFIG_DEFAULT_libustream-openssl=y CONFIG_DEFAULT_logd=y CONFIG_DEFAULT_luci=y CONFIG_DEFAULT_luci-app-accesscontrol=y CONFIG_DEFAULT_luci-app-adbyby-plus=y CONFIG_DEFAULT_luci-app-arpbind=y CONFIG_DEFAULT_luci-app-autoreboot=y CONFIG_DEFAULT_luci-app-cpufreq=y CONFIG_DEFAULT_luci-app-ddns=y CONFIG_DEFAULT_luci-app-filetransfer=y CONFIG_DEFAULT_luci-app-flowoffload=y CONFIG_DEFAULT_luci-app-nlbwmon=y CONFIG_DEFAULT_luci-app-ramfree=y CONFIG_DEFAULT_luci-app-sfe=y CONFIG_DEFAULT_luci-app-ssr-plus=y CONFIG_DEFAULT_luci-app-unblockmusic=y CONFIG_DEFAULT_luci-app-upnp=y CONFIG_DEFAULT_luci-app-vlmcsd=y CONFIG_DEFAULT_luci-app-vsftpd=y CONFIG_DEFAULT_luci-app-wol=y CONFIG_DEFAULT_mtd=y CONFIG_DEFAULT_netifd=y CONFIG_DEFAULT_opkg=y CONFIG_DEFAULT_ppp=y CONFIG_DEFAULT_ppp-mod-pppoe=y CONFIG_DEFAULT_swconfig=y CONFIG_DEFAULT_uboot-envtools=y CONFIG_DEFAULT_uci=y CONFIG_DEFAULT_uclient-fetch=y CONFIG_DEFAULT_urandom-seed=y CONFIG_DEFAULT_urngd=y CONFIG_DEFAULT_wget=y CONFIG_DEFAULT_wpad-openssl=y CONFIG_AUDIO_SUPPORT=y CONFIG_GPIO_SUPPORT=y CONFIG_PCI_SUPPORT=y CONFIG_USB_SUPPORT=y CONFIG_USB_GADGET_SUPPORT=y CONFIG_BIG_ENDIAN=y CONFIG_USES_SQUASHFS=y CONFIG_SMALL_FLASH=y CONFIG_HAS_MIPS16=y CONFIG_mips=y CONFIG_ARCH=\"mips\" # # Target Images # # CONFIG_TARGET_ROOTFS_INITRAMFS is not set CONFIG_EXTERNAL_CPIO=\"\" # # Root filesystem archives # # CONFIG_TARGET_ROOTFS_CPIOGZ is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_ROOTFS_TARGZ is not set # # Root filesystem images # # CONFIG_TARGET_ROOTFS_EXT4FS is not set CONFIG_TARGET_ROOTFS_SQUASHFS=y CONFIG_TARGET_SQUASHFS_BLOCK_SIZE=1024 CONFIG_TARGET_UBIFS_FREE_SPACE_FIXUP=y CONFIG_TARGET_UBIFS_JOURNAL_SIZE=\"\" # # Image Options # # # Global build settings # # CONFIG_JSON_ADD_IMAGE_INFO is not set # CONFIG_ALL_NONSHARED is not set # CONFIG_ALL_KMODS is not set # CONFIG_ALL is not set # CONFIG_BUILDBOT is not set # CONFIG_SIGNED_PACKAGES is not set # CONFIG_SIGNATURE_CHECK is not set # # General build options # # CONFIG_DISPLAY_SUPPORT is not set CONFIG_BUILD_PATENTED=y # CONFIG_BUILD_NLS is not set CONFIG_SHADOW_PASSWORDS=y # CONFIG_CLEAN_IPKG is not set # CONFIG_INCLUDE_CONFIG is not set # CONFIG_COLLECT_KERNEL_DEBUG is not set # # Kernel build options # CONFIG_KERNEL_BUILD_USER=\"\" CONFIG_KERNEL_BUILD_DOMAIN=\"\" CONFIG_KERNEL_PRINTK=y CONFIG_KERNEL_CRASHLOG=y # CONFIG_KERNEL_SWAP is not set CONFIG_KERNEL_DEBUG_FS=y CONFIG_KERNEL_MIPS_FPU_EMULATOR=y # CONFIG_KERNEL_PERF_EVENTS is not set # CONFIG_KERNEL_PROFILING is not set # CONFIG_KERNEL_TASKSTATS is not set # CONFIG_KERNEL_KALLSYMS is not set # CONFIG_KERNEL_FTRACE is not set # CONFIG_KERNEL_DEBUG_KERNEL is not set # CONFIG_KERNEL_DEBUG_INFO is not set # CONFIG_KERNEL_DYNAMIC_DEBUG is not set # CONFIG_KERNEL_KPROBES is not set # CONFIG_KERNEL_AIO is not set # CONFIG_KERNEL_FHANDLE is not set # CONFIG_KERNEL_FANOTIFY is not set # CONFIG_KERNEL_BLK_DEV_BSG is not set CONFIG_KERNEL_MAGIC_SYSRQ=y # CONFIG_KERNEL_DEBUG_PINCTRL is not set # CONFIG_KERNEL_DEBUG_GPIO is not set # CONFIG_KERNEL_ELF_CORE is not set # CONFIG_KERNEL_PROVE_LOCKING is not set CONFIG_KERNEL_PRINTK_TIME=y # CONFIG_KERNEL_SLABINFO is not set # CONFIG_KERNEL_PROC_PAGE_MONITOR is not set # CONFIG_KERNEL_KEXEC is not set # CONFIG_USE_RFKILL is not set # CONFIG_USE_SPARSE is not set # CONFIG_KERNEL_DEVTMPFS is not set CONFIG_KERNEL_KEYS=y # CONFIG_KERNEL_PERSISTENT_KEYRINGS is not set # CONFIG_KERNEL_BIG_KEYS is not set # CONFIG_KERNEL_ENCRYPTED_KEYS is not set CONFIG_KERNEL_CGROUPS=y # CONFIG_KERNEL_CGROUP_DEBUG is not set CONFIG_KERNEL_FREEZER=y CONFIG_KERNEL_CGROUP_FREEZER=y CONFIG_KERNEL_CGROUP_DEVICE=y CONFIG_KERNEL_CGROUP_PIDS=y CONFIG_KERNEL_CPUSETS=y # CONFIG_KERNEL_PROC_PID_CPUSET is not set CONFIG_KERNEL_CGROUP_CPUACCT=y # CONFIG_KERNEL_RESOURCE_COUNTERS is not set CONFIG_KERNEL_MM_OWNER=y CONFIG_KERNEL_MEMCG=y # CONFIG_KERNEL_MEMCG_SWAP is not set # CONFIG_KERNEL_MEMCG_KMEM is not set # CONFIG_KERNEL_CGROUP_PERF is not set CONFIG_KERNEL_CGROUP_SCHED=y # CONFIG_KERNEL_FAIR_GROUP_SCHED is not set # CONFIG_KERNEL_RT_GROUP_SCHED is not set CONFIG_KERNEL_BLK_CGROUP=y # CONFIG_KERNEL_CFQ_GROUP_IOSCHED is not set # CONFIG_KERNEL_BLK_DEV_THROTTLING is not set # CONFIG_KERNEL_DEBUG_BLK_CGROUP is not set CONFIG_KERNEL_NET_CLS_CGROUP=y CONFIG_KERNEL_NETPRIO_CGROUP=y CONFIG_KERNEL_NAMESPACES=y CONFIG_KERNEL_UTS_NS=y CONFIG_KERNEL_IPC_NS=y CONFIG_KERNEL_USER_NS=y CONFIG_KERNEL_PID_NS=y CONFIG_KERNEL_NET_NS=y CONFIG_KERNEL_DEVPTS_MULTIPLE_INSTANCES=y CONFIG_KERNEL_POSIX_MQUEUE=y # CONFIG_KERNEL_SECCOMP_FILTER is not set # CONFIG_KERNEL_SECCOMP is not set CONFIG_KERNEL_IP_MROUTE=y CONFIG_KERNEL_IPV6=y CONFIG_KERNEL_IPV6_MULTIPLE_TABLES=y CONFIG_KERNEL_IPV6_SUBTREES=y CONFIG_KERNEL_IPV6_MROUTE=y # CONFIG_KERNEL_IPV6_PIMSM_V2 is not set # CONFIG_KERNEL_IP_PNP is not set # # Filesystem ACL and attr support options # # CONFIG_USE_FS_ACL_ATTR is not set # CONFIG_KERNEL_FS_POSIX_ACL is not set # CONFIG_KERNEL_BTRFS_FS_POSIX_ACL is not set # CONFIG_KERNEL_EXT4_FS_POSIX_ACL is not set # CONFIG_KERNEL_F2FS_FS_POSIX_ACL is not set # CONFIG_KERNEL_JFFS2_FS_POSIX_ACL is not set # CONFIG_KERNEL_TMPFS_POSIX_ACL is not set # CONFIG_KERNEL_CIFS_ACL is not set # CONFIG_KERNEL_HFS_FS_POSIX_ACL is not set # CONFIG_KERNEL_HFSPLUG_FS_POSIX_ACL is not set # CONFIG_KERNEL_NFS_ACL_SUPPORT is not set # CONFIG_KERNEL_NFS_V3_ACL_SUPPORT is not set # CONFIG_KERNEL_NFSD_V2_ACL_SUPPORT is not set # CONFIG_KERNEL_NFSD_V3_ACL_SUPPORT is not set # CONFIG_KERNEL_REISER_FS_POSIX_ACL is not set # CONFIG_KERNEL_XFS_POSIX_ACL is not set # CONFIG_KERNEL_JFS_POSIX_ACL is not set # CONFIG_KERNEL_DEVMEM is not set # CONFIG_KERNEL_DEVKMEM is not set CONFIG_KERNEL_SQUASHFS_FRAGMENT_CACHE_SIZE=2 # CONFIG_KERNEL_CC_OPTIMIZE_FOR_PERFORMANCE is not set CONFIG_KERNEL_CC_OPTIMIZE_FOR_SIZE=y # # Package build options # # CONFIG_DEBUG is not set CONFIG_IPV6=y # # Stripping options # # CONFIG_NO_STRIP is not set # CONFIG_USE_STRIP is not set CONFIG_USE_SSTRIP=y # CONFIG_STRIP_KERNEL_EXPORTS is not set # CONFIG_USE_MKLIBS is not set CONFIG_USE_UCLIBCXX=y # CONFIG_USE_LIBCXX is not set # CONFIG_USE_LIBSTDCXX is not set # # Hardening build options # CONFIG_PKG_CHECK_FORMAT_SECURITY=y CONFIG_PKG_ASLR_PIE_NONE=y # CONFIG_PKG_ASLR_PIE_REGULAR is not set # CONFIG_PKG_ASLR_PIE_ALL is not set # CONFIG_PKG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_NONE is not set CONFIG_PKG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_REGULAR=y # CONFIG_KERNEL_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_NONE is not set CONFIG_KERNEL_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_REGULAR=y # CONFIG_KERNEL_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG is not set CONFIG_KERNEL_STACKPROTECTOR=y # CONFIG_KERNEL_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG is not set # CONFIG_PKG_FORTIFY_SOURCE_NONE is not set CONFIG_PKG_FORTIFY_SOURCE_1=y # CONFIG_PKG_FORTIFY_SOURCE_2 is not set # CONFIG_PKG_RELRO_NONE is not set # CONFIG_PKG_RELRO_PARTIAL is not set CONFIG_PKG_RELRO_FULL=y # CONFIG_DEVEL is not set # CONFIG_BROKEN is not set CONFIG_BINARY_FOLDER=\"\" CONFIG_DOWNLOAD_FOLDER=\"\" CONFIG_LOCALMIRROR=\"\" CONFIG_AUTOREBUILD=y # CONFIG_AUTOREMOVE is not set CONFIG_BUILD_SUFFIX=\"\" CONFIG_TARGET_ROOTFS_DIR=\"\" # CONFIG_CCACHE is not set CONFIG_EXTERNAL_KERNEL_TREE=\"\" CONFIG_KERNEL_GIT_CLONE_URI=\"\" CONFIG_EXTRA_OPTIMIZATION=\"-fno-caller-saves -fno-plt\" CONFIG_TARGET_OPTIMIZATION=\"-Os -pipe -mno-branch-likely -mips32r2 -mtune=24kc\" CONFIG_SOFT_FLOAT=y CONFIG_USE_MIPS16=y # CONFIG_EXTRA_TARGET_ARCH is not set CONFIG_EXTRA_BINUTILS_CONFIG_OPTIONS=\"\" CONFIG_EXTRA_GCC_CONFIG_OPTIONS=\"\" # CONFIG_GCC_DEFAULT_PIE is not set # CONFIG_GCC_DEFAULT_SSP is not set # CONFIG_SJLJ_EXCEPTIONS is not set # CONFIG_INSTALL_GFORTRAN is not set CONFIG_GDB=y CONFIG_USE_MUSL=y CONFIG_SSP_SUPPORT=y CONFIG_BINUTILS_VERSION_2_31_1=y CONFIG_BINUTILS_VERSION=\"2.31.1\" # CONFIG_GCC_USE_EMBEDDED_PATH_REMAP is not set CONFIG_GCC_VERSION=\"7.5.0\" CONFIG_LIBC=\"musl\" CONFIG_TARGET_SUFFIX=\"musl\" # CONFIG_IB is not set # CONFIG_SDK is not set # CONFIG_MAKE_TOOLCHAIN is not set # CONFIG_IMAGEOPT is not set # CONFIG_PREINITOPT is not set CONFIG_TARGET_PREINIT_SUPPRESS_STDERR=y # CONFIG_TARGET_PREINIT_DISABLE_FAILSAFE is not set CONFIG_TARGET_PREINIT_TIMEOUT=2 # CONFIG_TARGET_PREINIT_SHOW_NETMSG is not set # CONFIG_TARGET_PREINIT_SUPPRESS_FAILSAFE_NETMSG is not set CONFIG_TARGET_PREINIT_IFNAME=\"\" CONFIG_TARGET_PREINIT_IP=\"192.168.1.1\" CONFIG_TARGET_PREINIT_NETMASK=\"255.255.255.0\" CONFIG_TARGET_PREINIT_BROADCAST=\"192.168.1.255\" # CONFIG_INITOPT is not set CONFIG_TARGET_INIT_PATH=\"/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin\" CONFIG_TARGET_INIT_ENV=\"\" CONFIG_TARGET_INIT_CMD=\"/sbin/init\" CONFIG_TARGET_INIT_SUPPRESS_STDERR=y # CONFIG_VERSIONOPT is not set CONFIG_PER_FEED_REPO=y CONFIG_FEED_packages=y CONFIG_FEED_luci=y CONFIG_FEED_routing=y # # Base system # # CONFIG_PACKAGE_attendedsysupgrade-common is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_auc is not set CONFIG_PACKAGE_base-files=y CONFIG_PACKAGE_block-mount=y # CONFIG_PACKAGE_blockd is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_bridge is not set CONFIG_PACKAGE_busybox=y # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_CUSTOM is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_HAVE_DOT_CONFIG=y # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_DESKTOP is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_EXTRA_COMPAT is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEDORA_COMPAT is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_INCLUDE_SUSv2=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_LONG_OPTS=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_SHOW_USAGE=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_VERBOSE_USAGE=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_COMPRESS_USAGE=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_LFS=y # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_PAM is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_DEVPTS=y # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_UTMP is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_WTMP is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_PIDFILE=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_PID_FILE_PATH=\"/var/run\" # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_BUSYBOX is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_SHOW_SCRIPT is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_INSTALLER is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_INSTALL_NO_USR is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_SUID=y # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_SUID_CONFIG is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_SUID_CONFIG_QUIET is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_PREFER_APPLETS=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_BUSYBOX_EXEC_PATH=\"/proc/self/exe\" # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_SELINUX is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_CLEAN_UP is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_SYSLOG=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_PLATFORM_LINUX=y # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_STATIC is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_PIE is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_NOMMU is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_BUILD_LIBBUSYBOX is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_LIBBUSYBOX_STATIC is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_INDIVIDUAL is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_SHARED_BUSYBOX is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_CROSS_COMPILER_PREFIX=\"\" CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_SYSROOT=\"\" CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_EXTRA_CFLAGS=\"\" CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_EXTRA_LDFLAGS=\"\" CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_EXTRA_LDLIBS=\"\" # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_USE_PORTABLE_CODE is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_STACK_OPTIMIZATION_386 is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_INSTALL_APPLET_SYMLINKS=y # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_INSTALL_APPLET_HARDLINKS is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_INSTALL_APPLET_SCRIPT_WRAPPERS is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_INSTALL_APPLET_DONT is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_INSTALL_SH_APPLET_SYMLINK is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_INSTALL_SH_APPLET_HARDLINK is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_INSTALL_SH_APPLET_SCRIPT_WRAPPER is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_PREFIX=\"./_install\" # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_DEBUG is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_DEBUG_PESSIMIZE is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_DEBUG_SANITIZE is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_UNIT_TEST is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_WERROR is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_NO_DEBUG_LIB=y # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_DMALLOC is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_EFENCE is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_USE_BSS_TAIL is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FLOAT_DURATION is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_RTMINMAX is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_RTMINMAX_USE_LIBC_DEFINITIONS is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_BUFFERS_USE_MALLOC is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_BUFFERS_GO_ON_STACK=y # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_BUFFERS_GO_IN_BSS is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_PASSWORD_MINLEN=6 CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_MD5_SMALL=1 CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_SHA3_SMALL=1 CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_FAST_TOP=y # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_ETC_NETWORKS is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_ETC_SERVICES is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_EDITING=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_EDITING_MAX_LEN=512 # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_EDITING_VI is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_EDITING_HISTORY=256 # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_EDITING_SAVEHISTORY is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_EDITING_SAVE_ON_EXIT is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_REVERSE_SEARCH is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_TAB_COMPLETION=y # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_USERNAME_COMPLETION is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_EDITING_FANCY_PROMPT=y # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_EDITING_WINCH is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_EDITING_ASK_TERMINAL is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_LOCALE_SUPPORT is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_UNICODE_SUPPORT is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_UNICODE_USING_LOCALE is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_CHECK_UNICODE_IN_ENV is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_SUBST_WCHAR=0 CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_LAST_SUPPORTED_WCHAR=0 # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_UNICODE_COMBINING_WCHARS is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_UNICODE_WIDE_WCHARS is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_UNICODE_BIDI_SUPPORT is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_UNICODE_NEUTRAL_TABLE is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_UNICODE_PRESERVE_BROKEN is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_NON_POSIX_CP=y # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_VERBOSE_CP_MESSAGE is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_USE_SENDFILE=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_COPYBUF_KB=4 # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_SKIP_ROOTFS is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_MONOTONIC_SYSCALL is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_IOCTL_HEX2STR_ERROR=y # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_HWIB is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_SEAMLESS_XZ is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_SEAMLESS_LZMA is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_SEAMLESS_BZ2 is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_SEAMLESS_GZ=y # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_SEAMLESS_Z is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_AR is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_AR_LONG_FILENAMES is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_AR_CREATE is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_UNCOMPRESS is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_GUNZIP=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_ZCAT=y # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_GUNZIP_LONG_OPTIONS is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_BUNZIP2=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_BZCAT=y # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_UNLZMA is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_LZCAT is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_LZMA is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_UNXZ is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_XZCAT is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_XZ is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_BZIP2 is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_BZIP2_SMALL=0 CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_BZIP2_DECOMPRESS=y # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_CPIO is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_CPIO_O is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_CPIO_P is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_DPKG is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_DPKG_DEB is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_GZIP=y # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_GZIP_LONG_OPTIONS is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_GZIP_FAST=0 # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_GZIP_LEVELS is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_GZIP_DECOMPRESS=y # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_LZOP is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_UNLZOP is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_LZOPCAT is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_LZOP_COMPR_HIGH is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_RPM is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_RPM2CPIO is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_TAR=y # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_TAR_LONG_OPTIONS is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_TAR_CREATE=y # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_TAR_AUTODETECT is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_TAR_FROM=y # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_TAR_OLDGNU_COMPATIBILITY is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_TAR_OLDSUN_COMPATIBILITY is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_TAR_GNU_EXTENSIONS=y # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_TAR_TO_COMMAND is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_TAR_UNAME_GNAME is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_TAR_NOPRESERVE_TIME is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_TAR_SELINUX is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_UNZIP is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_UNZIP_CDF is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_UNZIP_BZIP2 is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_UNZIP_LZMA is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_UNZIP_XZ is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_LZMA_FAST is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_BASENAME=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_CAT=y # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_CATN is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_CATV is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_CHGRP=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_CHMOD=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_CHOWN=y # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_CHOWN_LONG_OPTIONS is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_CHROOT=y # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_CKSUM is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_COMM is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_CP=y # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_CP_LONG_OPTIONS is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_CP_REFLINK is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_CUT=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_DATE=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_DATE_ISOFMT=y # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_DATE_NANO is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_DATE_COMPAT is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_DD=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_DD_SIGNAL_HANDLING=y # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_DD_THIRD_STATUS_LINE is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_DD_IBS_OBS=y # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_DD_STATUS is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_DF=y # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_DF_FANCY is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_DIRNAME=y # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_DOS2UNIX is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_UNIX2DOS is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_DU=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_DU_DEFAULT_BLOCKSIZE_1K=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_ECHO=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_FANCY_ECHO=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_ENV=y # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_EXPAND is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_UNEXPAND is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_EXPR=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_EXPR_MATH_SUPPORT_64=y # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FACTOR is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FALSE=y # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FOLD is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FSYNC=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_HEAD=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_FANCY_HEAD=y # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_HOSTID is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_ID=y # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_GROUPS is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_INSTALL is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_INSTALL_LONG_OPTIONS is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_LINK is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_LN=y # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_LOGNAME is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_LS=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_LS_FILETYPES=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_LS_FOLLOWLINKS=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_LS_RECURSIVE=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_LS_WIDTH=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_LS_SORTFILES=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_LS_TIMESTAMPS=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_LS_USERNAME=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_LS_COLOR=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_LS_COLOR_IS_DEFAULT=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_MD5SUM=y # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_SHA1SUM is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_SHA256SUM=y # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_SHA512SUM is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_SHA3SUM is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_MD5_SHA1_SUM_CHECK=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_MKDIR=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_MKFIFO=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_MKNOD=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_MKTEMP=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_MV=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_NICE=y # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_NL is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_NOHUP is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_NPROC is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_OD is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_PASTE is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_PRINTENV is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_PRINTF=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_PWD=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_READLINK=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_READLINK_FOLLOW=y # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_REALPATH is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_RM=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_RMDIR=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_SEQ=y # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_SHRED is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_SHUF is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_SLEEP=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_FANCY_SLEEP=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_SORT=y # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_SORT_BIG is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_SORT_OPTIMIZE_MEMORY is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_SPLIT is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_SPLIT_FANCY is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_STAT is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_STAT_FORMAT is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_STAT_FILESYSTEM is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_STTY is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_SUM is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_SYNC=y # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_SYNC_FANCY is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_TAC is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_TAIL=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_FANCY_TAIL=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_TEE=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_TEE_USE_BLOCK_IO=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_TEST=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_TEST1=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_TEST2=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_TEST_64=y # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_TOUCH=y # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_TOUCH_NODEREF is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_TOUCH_SUSV3=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_TR=y # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_TR_CLASSES is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_TR_EQUIV is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_TRUE=y # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_TRUNCATE is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_TTY is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_UNAME=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_UNAME_OSNAME=\"GNU/Linux\" # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_BB_ARCH is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_UNIQ=y # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_UNLINK is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_USLEEP is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_UUDECODE is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_BASE64 is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_UUENCODE is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_WC=y # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_WC_LARGE is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_WHO is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_W is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_USERS is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_WHOAMI is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_YES=y # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_VERBOSE is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_PRESERVE_HARDLINKS=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_HUMAN_READABLE=y # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_CHVT is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_CLEAR=y # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_DEALLOCVT is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_DUMPKMAP is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FGCONSOLE is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_KBD_MODE is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_LOADFONT is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_SETFONT is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_SETFONT_TEXTUAL_MAP is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_DEFAULT_SETFONT_DIR=\"\" # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_LOADFONT_PSF2 is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_LOADFONT_RAW is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_LOADKMAP is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_OPENVT is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_RESET=y # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_RESIZE is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_RESIZE_PRINT is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_SETCONSOLE is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_SETCONSOLE_LONG_OPTIONS is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_SETKEYCODES is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_SETLOGCONS is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_SHOWKEY is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_PIPE_PROGRESS is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_RUN_PARTS is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_RUN_PARTS_LONG_OPTIONS is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_RUN_PARTS_FANCY is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_START_STOP_DAEMON=y # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_START_STOP_DAEMON_LONG_OPTIONS is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_START_STOP_DAEMON_FANCY is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_WHICH=y # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_MINIPS is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_NUKE is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_RESUME is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_RUN_INIT is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_AWK=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_AWK_LIBM=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_AWK_GNU_EXTENSIONS=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_CMP=y # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_DIFF is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_DIFF_LONG_OPTIONS is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_DIFF_DIR is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_ED is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_PATCH is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_SED=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_VI=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_VI_MAX_LEN=1024 # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_VI_8BIT is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_VI_COLON=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_VI_YANKMARK=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_VI_SEARCH=y # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_VI_REGEX_SEARCH is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_VI_USE_SIGNALS=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_VI_DOT_CMD=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_VI_READONLY=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_VI_SETOPTS=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_VI_SET=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_VI_WIN_RESIZE=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_VI_ASK_TERMINAL=y # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_VI_UNDO is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_VI_UNDO_QUEUE is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_VI_UNDO_QUEUE_MAX=0 CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_ALLOW_EXEC=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FIND=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_FIND_PRINT0=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_FIND_MTIME=y # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_FIND_MMIN is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_FIND_PERM=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_FIND_TYPE=y # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_FIND_EXECUTABLE is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_FIND_XDEV=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_FIND_MAXDEPTH=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_FIND_NEWER=y # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_FIND_INUM is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_FIND_EXEC=y # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_FIND_EXEC_PLUS is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_FIND_USER=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_FIND_GROUP=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_FIND_NOT=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_FIND_DEPTH=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_FIND_PAREN=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_FIND_SIZE=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_FIND_PRUNE=y # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_FIND_QUIT is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_FIND_DELETE is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_FIND_PATH=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_FIND_REGEX=y # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_FIND_CONTEXT is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_FIND_LINKS is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_GREP=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_EGREP=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FGREP=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_GREP_CONTEXT=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_XARGS=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_XARGS_SUPPORT_CONFIRMATION=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_XARGS_SUPPORT_QUOTES=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_XARGS_SUPPORT_TERMOPT=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_XARGS_SUPPORT_ZERO_TERM=y # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_XARGS_SUPPORT_REPL_STR is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_XARGS_SUPPORT_PARALLEL is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_XARGS_SUPPORT_ARGS_FILE is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_BOOTCHARTD is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_BOOTCHARTD_BLOATED_HEADER is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_BOOTCHARTD_CONFIG_FILE is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_HALT=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_POWEROFF=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_REBOOT=y # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_WAIT_FOR_INIT is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_CALL_TELINIT is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_TELINIT_PATH=\"\" # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_INIT is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_LINUXRC is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_USE_INITTAB is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_KILL_REMOVED is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_KILL_DELAY=0 # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_INIT_SCTTY is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_INIT_SYSLOG is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_INIT_QUIET is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_INIT_COREDUMPS is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_INIT_TERMINAL_TYPE=\"\" # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_INIT_MODIFY_CMDLINE is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_SHADOWPASSWDS=y # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_USE_BB_PWD_GRP is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_USE_BB_SHADOW is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_USE_BB_CRYPT is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_USE_BB_CRYPT_SHA is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_ADD_SHELL is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_REMOVE_SHELL is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_ADDGROUP is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_ADDUSER_TO_GROUP is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_ADDUSER is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_CHECK_NAMES is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_LAST_ID=0 CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FIRST_SYSTEM_ID=0 CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_LAST_SYSTEM_ID=0 # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_CHPASSWD is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_DEFAULT_PASSWD_ALGO=\"md5\" # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_CRYPTPW is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_MKPASSWD is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_DELUSER is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_DELGROUP is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_DEL_USER_FROM_GROUP is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_GETTY is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_LOGIN=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_LOGIN_SESSION_AS_CHILD=y # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_LOGIN_SCRIPTS is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_NOLOGIN is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_SECURETTY is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_PASSWD=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_PASSWD_WEAK_CHECK=y # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_SU is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_SU_SYSLOG is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_SU_CHECKS_SHELLS is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_SU_BLANK_PW_NEEDS_SECURE_TTY is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_SULOGIN is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_VLOCK is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_CHATTR is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FSCK is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_LSATTR is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_TUNE2FS is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_MODPROBE_SMALL is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_DEPMOD is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_INSMOD is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_LSMOD is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_LSMOD_PRETTY_2_6_OUTPUT is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_MODINFO is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_MODPROBE is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_MODPROBE_BLACKLIST is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_RMMOD is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_CMDLINE_MODULE_OPTIONS is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_MODPROBE_SMALL_CHECK_ALREADY_LOADED is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_2_4_MODULES is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_INSMOD_VERSION_CHECKING is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_INSMOD_KSYMOOPS_SYMBOLS is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_INSMOD_LOADINKMEM is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_INSMOD_LOAD_MAP is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_INSMOD_LOAD_MAP_FULL is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_CHECK_TAINTED_MODULE is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_INSMOD_TRY_MMAP is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_MODUTILS_ALIAS is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_MODUTILS_SYMBOLS is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_DEFAULT_MODULES_DIR=\"\" CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_DEFAULT_DEPMOD_FILE=\"\" # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_ACPID is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_ACPID_COMPAT is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_BLKDISCARD is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_BLKID is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_BLKID_TYPE is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_BLOCKDEV is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_CAL is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_CHRT is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_DMESG=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_DMESG_PRETTY=y # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_EJECT is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_EJECT_SCSI is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FALLOCATE is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FATATTR is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FBSET is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_FBSET_FANCY is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_FBSET_READMODE is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FDFORMAT is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FDISK is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FDISK_SUPPORT_LARGE_DISKS is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_FDISK_WRITABLE is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_AIX_LABEL is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_SGI_LABEL is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_SUN_LABEL is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_OSF_LABEL is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_GPT_LABEL is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_FDISK_ADVANCED is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FINDFS is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FLOCK=y # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FDFLUSH is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FREERAMDISK is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FSCK_MINIX is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FSFREEZE is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FSTRIM is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_GETOPT is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_GETOPT_LONG is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_HEXDUMP=y # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_HEXDUMP_REVERSE is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_HD is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_XXD is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_HWCLOCK=y # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_HWCLOCK_ADJTIME_FHS is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_IONICE is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_IPCRM is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_IPCS is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_LAST is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_LAST_FANCY is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_LOSETUP is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_LSPCI is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_LSUSB is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_MDEV is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_MDEV_CONF is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_MDEV_RENAME is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_MDEV_RENAME_REGEXP is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_MDEV_EXEC is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_MDEV_LOAD_FIRMWARE is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_MESG is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_MESG_ENABLE_ONLY_GROUP is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_MKE2FS is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_MKFS_EXT2 is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_MKFS_MINIX is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_MINIX2 is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_MKFS_REISER is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_MKDOSFS is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_MKFS_VFAT is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_MKSWAP=y # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_MKSWAP_UUID is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_MORE is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_MOUNT=y # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_MOUNT_FAKE is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_MOUNT_VERBOSE is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_MOUNT_HELPERS=y # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_MOUNT_LABEL is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_MOUNT_NFS is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_MOUNT_CIFS=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_MOUNT_FLAGS=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_MOUNT_FSTAB=y # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_MOUNT_OTHERTAB is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_MOUNTPOINT is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_NOLOGIN is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_NOLOGIN_DEPENDENCIES is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_NSENTER is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_PIVOT_ROOT=y # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_RDATE is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_RDEV is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_READPROFILE is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_RENICE is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_REV is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_RTCWAKE is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_SCRIPT is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_SCRIPTREPLAY is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_SETARCH is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_LINUX32 is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_LINUX64 is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_SETPRIV is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_SETPRIV_DUMP is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_SETPRIV_CAPABILITIES is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_SETPRIV_CAPABILITY_NAMES is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_SETSID is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_SWAPON is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_SWAPON_DISCARD is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_SWAPON_PRI is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_SWAPOFF is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_SWAPONOFF_LABEL is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_SWITCH_ROOT=y # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_TASKSET is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_TASKSET_FANCY is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_UEVENT is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_UMOUNT=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_UMOUNT_ALL=y # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_UNSHARE is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_WALL is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_MOUNT_LOOP=y # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_MOUNT_LOOP_CREATE is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_MTAB_SUPPORT is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_VOLUMEID is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_VOLUMEID_BCACHE is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_VOLUMEID_BTRFS is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_VOLUMEID_CRAMFS is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_VOLUMEID_EXFAT is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_VOLUMEID_EXT is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_VOLUMEID_F2FS is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_VOLUMEID_FAT is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_VOLUMEID_HFS is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_VOLUMEID_ISO9660 is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_VOLUMEID_JFS is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_VOLUMEID_LFS is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_VOLUMEID_LINUXRAID is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_VOLUMEID_LINUXSWAP is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_VOLUMEID_LUKS is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_VOLUMEID_MINIX is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_VOLUMEID_NILFS is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_VOLUMEID_NTFS is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_VOLUMEID_OCFS2 is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_VOLUMEID_REISERFS is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_VOLUMEID_ROMFS is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_VOLUMEID_SQUASHFS is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_VOLUMEID_SYSV is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_VOLUMEID_UBIFS is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_VOLUMEID_UDF is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_VOLUMEID_XFS is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_ADJTIMEX is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_BBCONFIG is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_COMPRESS_BBCONFIG is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_BC is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_DC is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_DC_BIG is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_DC_LIBM is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_BC_INTERACTIVE is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_BC_LONG_OPTIONS is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_BEEP is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_BEEP_FREQ=0 CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_BEEP_LENGTH_MS=0 # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_CHAT is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_CHAT_NOFAIL is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_CHAT_TTY_HIFI is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_CHAT_IMPLICIT_CR is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_CHAT_SWALLOW_OPTS is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_CHAT_SEND_ESCAPES is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_CHAT_VAR_ABORT_LEN is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_CHAT_CLR_ABORT is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_CONSPY is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_CROND=y # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_CROND_D is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_CROND_CALL_SENDMAIL is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_CROND_SPECIAL_TIMES is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_CROND_DIR=\"/etc\" CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_CRONTAB=y # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_DEVFSD is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_DEVFSD_MODLOAD is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_DEVFSD_FG_NP is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_DEVFSD_VERBOSE is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_DEVFS is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_DEVMEM is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FBSPLASH is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FLASH_ERASEALL is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FLASH_LOCK is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FLASH_UNLOCK is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FLASHCP is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_HDPARM is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_HDPARM_GET_IDENTITY is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_HDPARM_HDIO_SCAN_HWIF is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_HDPARM_HDIO_UNREGISTER_HWIF is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_HDPARM_HDIO_DRIVE_RESET is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_HDPARM_HDIO_TRISTATE_HWIF is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_HDPARM_HDIO_GETSET_DMA is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_HEXEDIT is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_I2CGET is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_I2CSET is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_I2CDUMP is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_I2CDETECT is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_INOTIFYD is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_LESS=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_LESS_MAXLINES=9999999 # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_LESS_BRACKETS is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_LESS_FLAGS is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_LESS_TRUNCATE is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_LESS_MARKS is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_LESS_REGEXP is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_LESS_WINCH is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_LESS_ASK_TERMINAL is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_LESS_DASHCMD is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_LESS_LINENUMS is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_LESS_RAW is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_LESS_ENV is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_LOCK=y # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_LSSCSI is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_MAKEDEVS is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_MAKEDEVS_LEAF is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_MAKEDEVS_TABLE is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_MAN is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_MICROCOM is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_MT is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_NANDWRITE is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_NANDDUMP is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_PARTPROBE is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_RAIDAUTORUN is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_READAHEAD is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_RFKILL is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_RUNLEVEL is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_RX is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_SETFATTR is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_SETSERIAL is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_STRINGS=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_TIME=y # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_TTYSIZE is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_UBIATTACH is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_UBIDETACH is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_UBIMKVOL is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_UBIRMVOL is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_UBIRSVOL is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_UBIUPDATEVOL is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_UBIRENAME is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_VOLNAME is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_WATCHDOG is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_IPV6=y # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_UNIX_LOCAL is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_PREFER_IPV4_ADDRESS=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_VERBOSE_RESOLUTION_ERRORS=y # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_TLS_SHA1 is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_ARP is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_ARPING is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_BRCTL=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_BRCTL_FANCY=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_BRCTL_SHOW=y # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_DNSD is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_ETHER_WAKE is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FTPD is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_FTPD_WRITE is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_FTPD_ACCEPT_BROKEN_LIST is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_FTPD_AUTHENTICATION is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FTPGET is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FTPPUT is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_FTPGETPUT_LONG_OPTIONS is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_HOSTNAME is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_DNSDOMAINNAME is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_HTTPD is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_HTTPD_RANGES is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_HTTPD_SETUID is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_HTTPD_BASIC_AUTH is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_HTTPD_AUTH_MD5 is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_HTTPD_CGI is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_HTTPD_CONFIG_WITH_SCRIPT_INTERPR is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_HTTPD_SET_REMOTE_PORT_TO_ENV is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_HTTPD_ENCODE_URL_STR is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_HTTPD_ERROR_PAGES is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_HTTPD_PROXY is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_HTTPD_GZIP is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_IFCONFIG=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_IFCONFIG_STATUS=y # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_IFCONFIG_SLIP is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_IFCONFIG_MEMSTART_IOADDR_IRQ is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_IFCONFIG_HW=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_IFCONFIG_BROADCAST_PLUS=y # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_IFENSLAVE is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_IFPLUGD is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_IFUP is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_IFDOWN is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_IFUPDOWN_IFSTATE_PATH=\"\" # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_IFUPDOWN_IP is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_IFUPDOWN_IPV4 is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_IFUPDOWN_IPV6 is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_IFUPDOWN_MAPPING is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_IFUPDOWN_EXTERNAL_DHCP is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_INETD is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_INETD_SUPPORT_BUILTIN_ECHO is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_INETD_SUPPORT_BUILTIN_DISCARD is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_INETD_SUPPORT_BUILTIN_TIME is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_INETD_SUPPORT_BUILTIN_DAYTIME is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_INETD_SUPPORT_BUILTIN_CHARGEN is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_INETD_RPC is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_IP=y # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_IPADDR is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_IPLINK is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_IPROUTE is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_IPTUNNEL is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_IPRULE is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_IPNEIGH is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_IP_ADDRESS=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_IP_LINK=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_IP_ROUTE=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_IP_ROUTE_DIR=\"/etc/iproute2\" # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_IP_TUNNEL is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_IP_RULE=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_IP_NEIGH=y # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_IP_RARE_PROTOCOLS is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_IPCALC is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_IPCALC_LONG_OPTIONS is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_IPCALC_FANCY is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FAKEIDENTD is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_NAMEIF is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_NAMEIF_EXTENDED is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_NBDCLIENT is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_NC=y # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_NETCAT is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_NC_SERVER is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_NC_EXTRA is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_NC_110_COMPAT is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_NETMSG=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_NETSTAT=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_NETSTAT_WIDE=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_NETSTAT_PRG=y # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_NSLOOKUP is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_NSLOOKUP_BIG is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_NSLOOKUP_LONG_OPTIONS is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_NSLOOKUP_OPENWRT=y # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_NSLOOKUP_OPENWRT_LONG_OPTIONS is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_NTPD=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_NTPD_SERVER=y # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_NTPD_CONF is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_NTP_AUTH is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_PING=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_PING6=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_FANCY_PING=y # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_PSCAN is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_ROUTE=y # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_SLATTACH is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_SSL_CLIENT is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_TC is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_TC_INGRESS is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_TCPSVD is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_UDPSVD is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_TELNET is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_TELNET_TTYPE is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_TELNET_AUTOLOGIN is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_TELNET_WIDTH is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_TELNETD is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_TELNETD_STANDALONE is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_TELNETD_INETD_WAIT is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_TFTP is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_TFTP_PROGRESS_BAR is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_TFTPD is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_TFTP_GET is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_TFTP_PUT is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_TFTP_BLOCKSIZE is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_TFTP_DEBUG is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_TLS is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_TRACEROUTE=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_TRACEROUTE6=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_TRACEROUTE_VERBOSE=y # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_TRACEROUTE_USE_ICMP is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_TUNCTL is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_TUNCTL_UG is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_VCONFIG is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_WGET is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_WGET_LONG_OPTIONS is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_WGET_STATUSBAR is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_WGET_AUTHENTICATION is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_WGET_TIMEOUT is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_WGET_HTTPS is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_WGET_OPENSSL is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_WHOIS is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_ZCIP is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_UDHCPD is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_UDHCPD_BASE_IP_ON_MAC is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_UDHCPD_WRITE_LEASES_EARLY is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_DHCPD_LEASES_FILE=\"\" # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_DUMPLEASES is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_DHCPRELAY is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_UDHCPC=y # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_UDHCPC_ARPING is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_UDHCPC_SANITIZEOPT is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_UDHCPC_DEFAULT_SCRIPT=\"/usr/share/udhcpc/default.script\" # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_UDHCPC6 is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_UDHCPC6_RFC3646 is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_UDHCPC6_RFC4704 is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_UDHCPC6_RFC4833 is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_UDHCPC6_RFC5970 is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_UDHCP_PORT is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_UDHCP_DEBUG=0 CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_UDHCPC_SLACK_FOR_BUGGY_SERVERS=80 CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_UDHCP_RFC3397=y # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_UDHCP_8021Q is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_IFUPDOWN_UDHCPC_CMD_OPTIONS=\"\" # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_LPD is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_LPR is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_LPQ is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_MAKEMIME is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_POPMAILDIR is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_POPMAILDIR_DELIVERY is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_REFORMIME is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_REFORMIME_COMPAT is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_SENDMAIL is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_MIME_CHARSET=\"\" CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FREE=y # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FUSER is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_IOSTAT is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_KILL=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_KILLALL=y # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_KILLALL5 is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_LSOF is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_MPSTAT is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_NMETER is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_PGREP=y # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_PKILL is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_PIDOF=y # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_PIDOF_SINGLE is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_PIDOF_OMIT is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_PMAP is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_POWERTOP is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_POWERTOP_INTERACTIVE is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_PS=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_PS_WIDE=y # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_PS_LONG is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_PS_TIME is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_PS_UNUSUAL_SYSTEMS is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_PS_ADDITIONAL_COLUMNS is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_PSTREE is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_PWDX is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_SMEMCAP is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_BB_SYSCTL=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_TOP=y # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_TOP_INTERACTIVE is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_TOP_CPU_USAGE_PERCENTAGE=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_TOP_CPU_GLOBAL_PERCENTS=y # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_TOP_SMP_CPU is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_TOP_DECIMALS is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_TOP_SMP_PROCESS is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_TOPMEM is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_UPTIME=y # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_UPTIME_UTMP_SUPPORT is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_WATCH is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_SHOW_THREADS is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_CHPST is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_SETUIDGID is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_ENVUIDGID is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_ENVDIR is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_SOFTLIMIT is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_RUNSV is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_RUNSVDIR is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_RUNSVDIR_LOG is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_SV is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_SV_DEFAULT_SERVICE_DIR=\"\" # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_SVC is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_SVOK is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_SVLOGD is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_CHCON is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_GETENFORCE is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_GETSEBOOL is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_LOAD_POLICY is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_MATCHPATHCON is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_RUNCON is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_SELINUXENABLED is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_SESTATUS is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_SETENFORCE is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_SETFILES is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_SETFILES_CHECK_OPTION is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_RESTORECON is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_SETSEBOOL is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_SH_IS_ASH=y # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_SH_IS_HUSH is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_SH_IS_NONE is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_BASH_IS_ASH is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_BASH_IS_HUSH is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_BASH_IS_NONE=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_ASH=y # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_ASH_OPTIMIZE_FOR_SIZE is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_ASH_INTERNAL_GLOB=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_ASH_BASH_COMPAT=y # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_ASH_BASH_SOURCE_CURDIR is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_ASH_BASH_NOT_FOUND_HOOK is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_ASH_JOB_CONTROL=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_ASH_ALIAS=y # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_ASH_RANDOM_SUPPORT is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_ASH_EXPAND_PRMT=y # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_ASH_IDLE_TIMEOUT is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_ASH_MAIL is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_ASH_ECHO=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_ASH_PRINTF=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_ASH_TEST=y # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_ASH_HELP is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_ASH_GETOPTS=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_ASH_CMDCMD=y # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_CTTYHACK is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_HUSH is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_HUSH_BASH_COMPAT is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_HUSH_BRACE_EXPANSION is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_HUSH_LINENO_VAR is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_HUSH_BASH_SOURCE_CURDIR is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_HUSH_INTERACTIVE is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_HUSH_SAVEHISTORY is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_HUSH_JOB is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_HUSH_TICK is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_HUSH_IF is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_HUSH_LOOPS is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_HUSH_CASE is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_HUSH_FUNCTIONS is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_HUSH_LOCAL is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_HUSH_RANDOM_SUPPORT is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_HUSH_MODE_X is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_HUSH_ECHO is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_HUSH_PRINTF is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_HUSH_TEST is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_HUSH_HELP is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_HUSH_EXPORT is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_HUSH_EXPORT_N is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_HUSH_READONLY is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_HUSH_KILL is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_HUSH_WAIT is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_HUSH_COMMAND is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_HUSH_TRAP is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_HUSH_TYPE is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_HUSH_TIMES is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_HUSH_READ is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_HUSH_SET is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_HUSH_UNSET is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_HUSH_ULIMIT is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_HUSH_UMASK is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_HUSH_GETOPTS is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_HUSH_MEMLEAK is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_SH_MATH=y CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_SH_MATH_64=y # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_SH_EXTRA_QUIET is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_SH_STANDALONE is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_SH_NOFORK=y # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_SH_READ_FRAC is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_SH_HISTFILESIZE is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_SH_EMBEDDED_SCRIPTS is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_KLOGD is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_KLOGD_KLOGCTL is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_LOGGER=y # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_LOGREAD is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_LOGREAD_REDUCED_LOCKING is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_SYSLOGD is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_ROTATE_LOGFILE is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_REMOTE_LOG is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_SYSLOGD_DUP is not set # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_SYSLOGD_CFG is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_SYSLOGD_READ_BUFFER_SIZE=0 # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_IPC_SYSLOG is not set CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_IPC_SYSLOG_BUFFER_SIZE=0 # CONFIG_BUSYBOX_DEFAULT_FEATURE_KMSG_SYSLOG is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_ca-bundle is not set CONFIG_PACKAGE_ca-certificates=y # CONFIG_PACKAGE_dnsmasq is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_dnsmasq-dhcpv6 is not set CONFIG_PACKAGE_dnsmasq-full=y CONFIG_PACKAGE_dnsmasq_full_dhcp=y # CONFIG_PACKAGE_dnsmasq_full_dhcpv6 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_dnsmasq_full_dnssec is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_dnsmasq_full_auth is not set CONFIG_PACKAGE_dnsmasq_full_ipset=y # CONFIG_PACKAGE_dnsmasq_full_conntrack is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_dnsmasq_full_noid is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_dnsmasq_full_broken_rtc is not set CONFIG_PACKAGE_dropbear=y # # Configuration # CONFIG_DROPBEAR_CURVE25519=y # CONFIG_DROPBEAR_ECC is not set # CONFIG_DROPBEAR_ZLIB is not set CONFIG_DROPBEAR_DBCLIENT=y # CONFIG_PACKAGE_ead is not set CONFIG_PACKAGE_firewall=y CONFIG_PACKAGE_fstools=y # CONFIG_FSTOOLS_OVL_MOUNT_FULL_ACCESS_TIME is not set # CONFIG_FSTOOLS_OVL_MOUNT_COMPRESS_ZLIB is not set CONFIG_PACKAGE_fwtool=y CONFIG_PACKAGE_getrandom=y CONFIG_PACKAGE_jsonfilter=y # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libatomic is not set CONFIG_PACKAGE_libc=y CONFIG_PACKAGE_libgcc=y # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libgomp is not set CONFIG_PACKAGE_libpthread=y CONFIG_PACKAGE_librt=y # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libstdcpp is not set CONFIG_PACKAGE_logd=y CONFIG_PACKAGE_mtd=y CONFIG_PACKAGE_netifd=y # CONFIG_PACKAGE_nft-qos is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_nvram is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_om-watchdog is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_openwrt-keyring is not set CONFIG_PACKAGE_opkg=y CONFIG_PACKAGE_procd=y # # Configuration # # CONFIG_PROCD_SHOW_BOOT is not set # CONFIG_PROCD_ZRAM_TMPFS is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_procd-ujail is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_qos-scripts is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_resolveip is not set CONFIG_PACKAGE_rpcd=y # CONFIG_PACKAGE_rpcd-mod-file is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_rpcd-mod-iwinfo is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_rpcd-mod-rpcsys is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_snapshot-tool is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_sqm-scripts is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_sqm-scripts-extra is not set CONFIG_PACKAGE_swconfig=y CONFIG_PACKAGE_ubox=y CONFIG_PACKAGE_ubus=y CONFIG_PACKAGE_ubusd=y # CONFIG_PACKAGE_ucert is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_ucert-full is not set CONFIG_PACKAGE_uci=y CONFIG_PACKAGE_urandom-seed=y CONFIG_PACKAGE_urngd=y # CONFIG_PACKAGE_usign is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_wireless-tools is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_zram-swap is not set # # Administration # # # openwisp # # CONFIG_PACKAGE_openwisp-config-cyassl is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_openwisp-config-mbedtls is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_openwisp-config-nossl is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_openwisp-config-openssl is not set # # zabbix # # CONFIG_PACKAGE_zabbix-agentd is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_zabbix-extra-mac80211 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_zabbix-extra-network is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_zabbix-extra-wifi is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_zabbix-get is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_zabbix-proxy is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_zabbix-sender is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_zabbix-server is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_htop is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_ipmitool is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_monit is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_monit-nossl is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_muninlite is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_netdata is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_sudo is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_syslog-ng is not set # # Boot Loaders # # # Development # # # Libraries # # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libncurses-dev is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libxml2-dev is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_zlib-dev is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_ar is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_autoconf is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_automake is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_binutils is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_diffutils is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_gcc is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_gdb is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_gdbserver is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libtool-bin is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_lpc21isp is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_lttng-tools is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_m4 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_make is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_meson is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_meson-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_ninja is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_objdump is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_patch is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_pkg-config is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_trace-cmd is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_trace-cmd-extra is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_valgrind is not set # # Extra packages # # CONFIG_PACKAGE_automount is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_autosamba is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_ipv6helper is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_k3wifi is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_wireguard-tools is not set # # Firmware # # # ath10k IPQ4019 Boarddata # # CONFIG_PACKAGE_aircard-pcmcia-firmware is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_amdgpu-firmware is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_ar3k-firmware is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_ath10k-firmware-qca4019 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_ath10k-firmware-qca4019-ct is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_ath10k-firmware-qca4019-ct-htt is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_ath10k-firmware-qca6174 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_ath10k-firmware-qca9887 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_ath10k-firmware-qca9887-ct is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_ath10k-firmware-qca9887-ct-htt is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_ath10k-firmware-qca9888 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_ath10k-firmware-qca9888-ct is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_ath10k-firmware-qca9888-ct-htt is not set CONFIG_PACKAGE_ath10k-firmware-qca988x=y # CONFIG_PACKAGE_ath10k-firmware-qca988x-ct is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_ath10k-firmware-qca988x-ct-htt is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_ath10k-firmware-qca9984 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_ath10k-firmware-qca9984-ct is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_ath10k-firmware-qca9984-ct-htt is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_ath10k-firmware-qca99x0 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_ath10k-firmware-qca99x0-ct is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_ath10k-firmware-qca99x0-ct-htt is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_ath6k-firmware is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_ath9k-htc-firmware is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_b43legacy-firmware is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_bnx2-firmware is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_bnx2x-firmware is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_brcmfmac-firmware-4329-sdio is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_brcmfmac-firmware-43362-sdio is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_brcmfmac-firmware-43430-sdio is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_brcmfmac-firmware-43430-sdio-rpi-3b is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_brcmfmac-firmware-43430-sdio-rpi-zero-w is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_brcmfmac-firmware-43430a0-sdio is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_brcmfmac-firmware-43455-sdio is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_brcmfmac-firmware-43455-sdio-rpi-3b-plus is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_brcmfmac-firmware-43455-sdio-rpi-4b is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_brcmfmac-firmware-43602a1-pcie is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_brcmfmac-firmware-4366b1-pcie is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_brcmfmac-firmware-4366c0-pcie is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_brcmfmac-firmware-usb is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_brcmsmac-firmware is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_carl9170-firmware is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_cypress-firmware-43012-sdio is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_cypress-firmware-43340-sdio is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_cypress-firmware-43362-sdio is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_cypress-firmware-4339-sdio is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_cypress-firmware-43430-sdio is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_cypress-firmware-43455-sdio is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_cypress-firmware-4354-sdio is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_cypress-firmware-4356-pcie is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_cypress-firmware-4356-sdio is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_cypress-firmware-43570-pcie is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_cypress-firmware-4359-pcie is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_cypress-firmware-4359-sdio is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_cypress-firmware-4373-sdio is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_cypress-firmware-4373-usb is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_cypress-firmware-89459-pcie is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_e100-firmware is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_edgeport-firmware is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_ibt-firmware is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_iwl3945-firmware is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_iwl4965-firmware is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_iwlwifi-firmware-iwl100 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_iwlwifi-firmware-iwl1000 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_iwlwifi-firmware-iwl105 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_iwlwifi-firmware-iwl135 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_iwlwifi-firmware-iwl2000 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_iwlwifi-firmware-iwl2030 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_iwlwifi-firmware-iwl3160 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_iwlwifi-firmware-iwl3168 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_iwlwifi-firmware-iwl5000 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_iwlwifi-firmware-iwl5150 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_iwlwifi-firmware-iwl6000g2 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_iwlwifi-firmware-iwl6000g2a is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_iwlwifi-firmware-iwl6000g2b is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_iwlwifi-firmware-iwl6050 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_iwlwifi-firmware-iwl7260 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_iwlwifi-firmware-iwl7265 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_iwlwifi-firmware-iwl7265d is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_iwlwifi-firmware-iwl8260c is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_iwlwifi-firmware-iwl8265 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_iwlwifi-firmware-iwl9000 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_iwlwifi-firmware-iwl9260 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libertas-sdio-firmware is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libertas-spi-firmware is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libertas-usb-firmware is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_mt7601u-firmware is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_mt7622bt-firmware is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_mwifiex-pcie-firmware is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_mwifiex-sdio-firmware is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_mwl8k-firmware is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_p54-pci-firmware is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_p54-spi-firmware is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_p54-usb-firmware is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_prism54-firmware is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_r8169-firmware is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_radeon-firmware is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_rs9113-firmware is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_rt2800-pci-firmware is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_rt2800-usb-firmware is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_rt61-pci-firmware is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_rt73-usb-firmware is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_rtl8188eu-firmware is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_rtl8192ce-firmware is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_rtl8192cu-firmware is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_rtl8192de-firmware is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_rtl8192eu-firmware is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_rtl8192se-firmware is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_rtl8192su-firmware is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_rtl8723au-firmware is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_rtl8723bs-firmware is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_rtl8723bu-firmware is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_rtl8821ae-firmware is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_rtl8822be-firmware is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_rtl8822ce-firmware is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_ti-3410-firmware is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_ti-5052-firmware is not set CONFIG_PACKAGE_wireless-regdb=y # CONFIG_PACKAGE_wl12xx-firmware is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_wl18xx-firmware is not set # # Fonts # # # DejaVu # # CONFIG_PACKAGE_dejavu-fonts-ttf-DejaVuMathTeXGyre is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_dejavu-fonts-ttf-DejaVuSans is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_dejavu-fonts-ttf-DejaVuSans-Bold is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_dejavu-fonts-ttf-DejaVuSans-BoldOblique is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_dejavu-fonts-ttf-DejaVuSans-ExtraLight is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_dejavu-fonts-ttf-DejaVuSans-Oblique is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_dejavu-fonts-ttf-DejaVuSansCondensed is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_dejavu-fonts-ttf-DejaVuSansCondensed-Bold is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_dejavu-fonts-ttf-DejaVuSansCondensed-BoldOblique is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_dejavu-fonts-ttf-DejaVuSansCondensed-Oblique is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_dejavu-fonts-ttf-DejaVuSansMono is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_dejavu-fonts-ttf-DejaVuSansMono-Bold is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_dejavu-fonts-ttf-DejaVuSansMono-BoldOblique is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_dejavu-fonts-ttf-DejaVuSansMono-Oblique is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_dejavu-fonts-ttf-DejaVuSerif is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_dejavu-fonts-ttf-DejaVuSerif-Bold is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_dejavu-fonts-ttf-DejaVuSerif-BoldItalic is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_dejavu-fonts-ttf-DejaVuSerif-Italic is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_dejavu-fonts-ttf-DejaVuSerifCondensed is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_dejavu-fonts-ttf-DejaVuSerifCondensed-Bold is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_dejavu-fonts-ttf-DejaVuSerifCondensed-BoldItalic is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_dejavu-fonts-ttf-DejaVuSerifCondensed-Italic is not set # # Kernel modules # # # Block Devices # # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-aoe is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-ata-core is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-block2mtd is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-dm is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-dm-raid is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-loop is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-md-mod is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-nbd is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-scsi-cdrom is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-scsi-core is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-scsi-generic is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-scsi-tape is not set # # CAN Support # # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-can is not set # # Cryptographic API modules # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-crypto-aead=y CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-crypto-arc4=y CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-crypto-authenc=y # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-crypto-cbc is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-crypto-ccm is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-crypto-cmac is not set CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-crypto-crc32c=y # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-crypto-ctr is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-crypto-cts is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-crypto-deflate is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-crypto-des is not set CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-crypto-ecb=y # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-crypto-ecdh is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-crypto-echainiv is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-crypto-fcrypt is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-crypto-gcm is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-crypto-gf128 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-crypto-ghash is not set CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-crypto-hash=y # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-crypto-hmac is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-crypto-hw-ccp is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-crypto-hw-geode is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-crypto-hw-hifn-795x is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-crypto-hw-padlock is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-crypto-hw-talitos is not set CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-crypto-manager=y # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-crypto-md4 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-crypto-md5 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-crypto-michael-mic is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-crypto-misc is not set CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-crypto-null=y # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-crypto-pcbc is not set CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-crypto-pcompress=y # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-crypto-rmd160 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-crypto-rng is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-crypto-seqiv is not set CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-crypto-sha1=y # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-crypto-sha256 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-crypto-sha512 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-crypto-test is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-crypto-user is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-crypto-wq is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-crypto-xcbc is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-crypto-xts is not set CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-cryptodev=y # # Filesystems # # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-fs-afs is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-fs-antfs is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-fs-autofs4 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-fs-btrfs is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-fs-cifs is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-fs-configfs is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-fs-cramfs is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-fs-exfat is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-fs-exportfs is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-fs-ext4 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-fs-f2fs is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-fs-fscache is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-fs-hfs is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-fs-hfsplus is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-fs-isofs is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-fs-jfs is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-fs-ksmbd is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-fs-minix is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-fs-msdos is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-fs-nfs is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-fs-nfs-common is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-fs-nfs-common-rpcsec is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-fs-nfs-v3 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-fs-nfs-v4 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-fs-nfsd is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-fs-ntfs is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-fs-reiserfs is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-fs-squashfs is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-fs-udf is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-fs-vfat is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-fs-xfs is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-fuse is not set # # FireWire support # # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-firewire is not set # # Hardware Monitoring Support # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-hwmon-core=y # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-hwmon-adcxx is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-hwmon-ads1015 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-hwmon-adt7410 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-hwmon-adt7475 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-hwmon-gpiofan is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-hwmon-ina209 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-hwmon-ina2xx is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-hwmon-it87 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-hwmon-lm63 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-hwmon-lm75 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-hwmon-lm77 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-hwmon-lm85 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-hwmon-lm90 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-hwmon-lm92 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-hwmon-lm95241 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-hwmon-ltc4151 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-hwmon-mcp3021 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-hwmon-pwmfan is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-hwmon-sch5627 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-hwmon-sht21 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-hwmon-tmp102 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-hwmon-tmp103 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-hwmon-tmp421 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-hwmon-vid is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-hwmon-w83793 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-pmbus-core is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-pmbus-zl6100 is not set # # I2C support # # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-i2c-core is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-i2c-gpio-custom is not set # # Industrial I/O Modules # # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-iio-ad799x is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-iio-am2315 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-iio-bh1750 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-iio-bme680 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-iio-bme680-i2c is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-iio-bme680-spi is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-iio-bmp280 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-iio-bmp280-i2c is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-iio-bmp280-spi is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-iio-ccs811 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-iio-core is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-iio-fxos8700 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-iio-fxos8700-i2c is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-iio-fxos8700-spi is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-iio-hmc5843 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-iio-htu21 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-iio-kfifo-buf is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-iio-si7020 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-iio-sps30 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-iio-st_accel is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-iio-st_sensors-i2c is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-iio-st_sensors-spi is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-iio-tsl4531 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-industrialio-triggered-buffer is not set # # Input modules # # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-hid is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-hid-generic is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-input-core is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-input-evdev is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-input-gpio-encoder is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-input-gpio-keys is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-input-gpio-keys-polled is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-input-joydev is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-input-matrixkmap is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-input-polldev is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-input-touchscreen-ads7846 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-input-uinput is not set # # LED modules # # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-leds-gpio is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-leds-nu801 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-leds-pca963x is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-leds-rb750 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-leds-wndr3700-usb is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-ledtrig-default-on is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-ledtrig-gpio is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-ledtrig-heartbeat is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-ledtrig-netdev is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-ledtrig-oneshot is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-ledtrig-timer is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-ledtrig-transient is not set # # Libraries # # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-lib-cordic is not set CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-lib-crc-ccitt=y # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-lib-crc-itu-t is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-lib-crc16 is not set CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-lib-crc32c=y # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-lib-crc7 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-lib-crc8 is not set CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-lib-textsearch=y # # Native Language Support # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-nls-base=y # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-nls-cp1250 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-nls-cp1251 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-nls-cp437 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-nls-cp775 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-nls-cp850 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-nls-cp852 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-nls-cp862 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-nls-cp864 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-nls-cp866 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-nls-cp932 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-nls-cp936 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-nls-cp950 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-nls-iso8859-1 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-nls-iso8859-13 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-nls-iso8859-15 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-nls-iso8859-2 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-nls-iso8859-6 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-nls-iso8859-8 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-nls-koi8r is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-nls-utf8 is not set # # Netfilter Extensions # # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-arptables is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-br-netfilter is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-ebtables is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-ebtables-ipv4 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-ebtables-ipv6 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-ebtables-watchers is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-ip6tables is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-ip6tables-extra is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-ipt-account is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-ipt-chaos is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-ipt-checksum is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-ipt-cluster is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-ipt-clusterip is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-ipt-compat-xtables is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-ipt-condition is not set CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-ipt-conntrack=y # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-ipt-conntrack-extra is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-ipt-conntrack-label is not set CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-ipt-core=y # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-ipt-debug is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-ipt-delude is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-ipt-dhcpmac is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-ipt-dnetmap is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-ipt-extra is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-ipt-filter is not set CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-ipt-fullconenat=y # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-ipt-fuzzy is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-ipt-geoip is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-ipt-hashlimit is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-ipt-iface is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-ipt-ipmark is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-ipt-ipopt is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-ipt-ipp2p is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-ipt-iprange is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-ipt-ipsec is not set CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-ipt-ipset=y # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-ipt-ipv4options is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-ipt-led is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-ipt-length2 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-ipt-logmark is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-ipt-lscan is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-ipt-lua is not set CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-ipt-nat=y # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-ipt-nat-extra is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-ipt-nat6 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-ipt-nathelper-rtsp is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-ipt-nflog is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-ipt-nfqueue is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-ipt-physdev is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-ipt-psd is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-ipt-quota2 is not set CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-ipt-raw=y # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-ipt-raw6 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-ipt-rpfilter is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-ipt-sysrq is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-ipt-tarpit is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-ipt-tee is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-ipt-tproxy is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-ipt-u32 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-ipt-ulog is not set CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-nf-conntrack=y CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-nf-conntrack-netlink=y CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-nf-conntrack6=y CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-nf-ipt=y # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-nf-ipt6 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-nf-ipvs is not set CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-nf-nat=y # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-nf-nat6 is not set CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-nf-nathelper=y CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-nf-nathelper-extra=y CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-nf-reject=y # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-nf-reject6 is not set CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-nfnetlink=y # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-nfnetlink-log is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-nfnetlink-queue is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-nft-arp is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-nft-bridge is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-nft-core is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-nft-fib is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-nft-nat is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-nft-nat6 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-nft-netdev is not set # # Network Devices # # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-3c59x is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-8139cp is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-8139too is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-alx is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-atl1 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-atl1c is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-atl1e is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-atl2 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-b44 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-be2net is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-bnx2 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-bnx2x is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-dm9000 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-dummy is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-e100 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-e1000 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-et131x is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-ethoc is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-forcedeth is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-gigaset is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-hfcmulti is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-hfcpci is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-i40e is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-i40evf is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-ifb is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-igb is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-ixgbe is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-ixgbevf is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-libphy is not set CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-macvlan=y # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-mdio-gpio is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-mii is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-mlx4-core is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-mlx5-core is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-natsemi is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-ne2k-pci is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-niu is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-of-mdio is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-pcnet32 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-phy-broadcom is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-phy-realtek is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-r6040 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-r8125 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-r8168 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-r8169 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-sfc is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-siit is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-sis190 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-sis900 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-skge is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-sky2 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-solos-pci is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-spi-ks8995 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-swconfig is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-switch-ip17xx is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-switch-mvsw61xx is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-switch-rtl8306 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-switch-rtl8366-smi is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-switch-rtl8366rb is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-switch-rtl8366s is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-switch-rtl8367b is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-tg3 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-tulip is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-via-rhine is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-via-velocity is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-vmxnet3 is not set # # Network Support # # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-atm is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-ax25 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-batman-adv is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-bonding is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-bpf-test is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-capi is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-dnsresolver is not set CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-fast-classifier=y # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-fou is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-fou6 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-geneve is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-gre is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-gre6 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-ip6-tunnel is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-ipip is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-ipsec is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-iptunnel6 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-isdn4linux is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-jool is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-l2tp is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-l2tp-eth is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-l2tp-ip is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-macremapper is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-macsec is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-misdn is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-mpls is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-nat46 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-netem is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-nlmon is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-nsh is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-openvswitch is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-openvswitch-geneve is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-openvswitch-gre is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-openvswitch-vxlan is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-pktgen is not set CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-ppp=y CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-mppe=y # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-ppp-synctty is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-pppoa is not set CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-pppoe=y # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-pppol2tp is not set CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-pppox=y # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-pptp is not set CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-sched=y # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-sched-act-vlan is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-sched-bpf is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-sched-cake is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-sched-connmark is not set CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-sched-core=y # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-sched-ctinfo is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-sched-flower is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-sched-ipset is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-sched-mqprio is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-sctp is not set CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-shortcut-fe=y # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-shortcut-fe-cm is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-sit is not set CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-slhc=y # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-slip is not set CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-tcp-bbr=y # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-trelay is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-tun is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-veth is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-vxlan is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-wireguard is not set # # Other modules # # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-6lowpan is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-ath3k is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-bcma is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-bluetooth is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-bluetooth_6lowpan is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-bmp085 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-bmp085-i2c is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-bmp085-spi is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-btmrvl is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-button-hotplug is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-echo is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-eeprom-93cx6 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-eeprom-at24 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-eeprom-at25 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-gpio-beeper is not set CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-gpio-button-hotplug=y # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-gpio-dev is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-gpio-mcp23s08 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-gpio-nxp-74hc164 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-gpio-pca953x is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-gpio-pcf857x is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-ikconfig is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-it87-wdt is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-itco-wdt is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-lp is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-mmc is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-mtd-rw is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-mtdoops is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-mtdram is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-mtdtests is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-parport-pc is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-ppdev is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-pps is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-pps-gpio is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-pps-ldisc is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-ptp is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-random-core is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-random-tpm is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-rtc-ds1307 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-rtc-ds1374 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-rtc-ds1672 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-rtc-em3027 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-rtc-isl1208 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-rtc-pcf2123 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-rtc-pcf2127 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-rtc-pcf8563 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-rtc-pt7c4338 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-rtc-rs5c372a is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-rtc-rx8025 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-sdhci is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-serial-8250 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-serial-8250-exar is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-softdog is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-ssb is not set CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-thermal=y # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-tpm is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-tpm-i2c-atmel is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-tpm-i2c-infineon is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-w83627hf-wdt is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-wifidog-ng is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-zram is not set # # PCMCIA support # # # SPI Support # # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-mmc-spi is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-spi-bitbang is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-spi-dev is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-spi-gpio is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-spi-gpio-custom is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-spi-vsc7385 is not set # # Sound Support # # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-sound-core is not set # # USB Support # # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-chaoskey is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-usb-acm is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-usb-atm is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-usb-chipidea is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-usb-chipidea2 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-usb-cm109 is not set CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-usb-core=y # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-usb-dwc2 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-usb-dwc3 is not set CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-usb-ehci=y # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-usb-gadget-cdc-composite is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-usb-gadget-ehci-debug is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-usb-gadget-eth is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-usb-gadget-hid is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-usb-gadget-mass-storage is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-usb-gadget-serial is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-usb-hid is not set CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-usb-ledtrig-usbport=y # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-usb-net is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-usb-net2280 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-usb-ohci is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-usb-ohci-pci is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-usb-printer is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-usb-serial is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-usb-storage is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-usb-storage-extras is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-usb-storage-uas is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-usb-uhci is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-usb-wdm is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-usb-yealink is not set CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-usb2=y # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-usb2-pci is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-usb3 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-usbip is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-usbip-client is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-usbip-server is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-usbmon is not set # # Video Support # # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-video-core is not set # # Virtualization # # # Voice over IP # # # W1 support # # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-w1 is not set # # WPAN 802.15.4 Support # # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-at86rf230 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-atusb is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-cc2520 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-fakelb is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-ieee802154 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-ieee802154_6lowpan is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-mac802154 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-mrf24j40 is not set # # Wireless Drivers # # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-adm8211 is not set CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-ath=y CONFIG_ATH_USER_REGD=y # CONFIG_PACKAGE_ATH_DEBUG is not set CONFIG_PACKAGE_ATH_DFS=y # CONFIG_PACKAGE_ATH_DYNACK is not set CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-ath10k=y CONFIG_ATH10K_LEDS=y CONFIG_ATH10K_THERMAL=y # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-ath10k-ct is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-ath10k-ct-smallbuffers is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-ath5k is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-ath6kl-sdio is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-ath6kl-usb is not set CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-ath9k=y # CONFIG_ATH9K_SUPPORT_PCOEM is not set # CONFIG_ATH9K_TX99 is not set CONFIG_ATH9K_UBNTHSR=y CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-ath9k-common=y # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-ath9k-htc is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-b43 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-b43legacy is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-brcmfmac is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-brcmsmac is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-brcmutil is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-carl9170 is not set CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-cfg80211=y # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-hermes is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-hermes-pci is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-hermes-plx is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-iwl-legacy is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-iwl3945 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-iwl4965 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-iwlwifi is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-lib80211 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-libertas-sdio is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-libertas-spi is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-libertas-usb is not set CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-mac80211=y CONFIG_PACKAGE_MAC80211_DEBUGFS=y # CONFIG_PACKAGE_MAC80211_TRACING is not set CONFIG_PACKAGE_MAC80211_MESH=y # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-mac80211-hwsim is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-mt76 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-mt7601u is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-mt7603 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-mt7615e is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-mt76x0e is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-mt76x0u is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-mt76x2 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-mt76x2u is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-mt_wifi is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-mwifiex-pcie is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-mwifiex-sdio is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-mwl8k is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-net-prism54 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-net-rtl8192su is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-owl-loader is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-p54-common is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-p54-pci is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-p54-usb is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-rsi91x is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-rsi91x-sdio is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-rsi91x-usb is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-rt2400-pci is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-rt2500-pci is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-rt2500-usb is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-rt2800-pci is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-rt2800-usb is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-rt2x00-lib is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-rt61-pci is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-rt73-usb is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-rtl8180 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-rtl8187 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-rtl8192ce is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-rtl8192cu is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-rtl8192de is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-rtl8192se is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-rtl8821ae is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-rtl8xxxu is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-wl12xx is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-wl18xx is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-wlcore is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod-zd1211rw is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_wifi-l1profile is not set # # Languages # # # Erlang # # CONFIG_PACKAGE_erlang is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_erlang-asn1 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_erlang-compiler is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_erlang-crypto is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_erlang-hipe is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_erlang-inets is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_erlang-mnesia is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_erlang-runtime-tools is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_erlang-snmp is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_erlang-ssh is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_erlang-ssl is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_erlang-syntax-tools is not set # # Go # # CONFIG_PACKAGE_golang is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_golang-doc is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_golang-github-nextdns-nextdns-dev is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_golang-src is not set # # Java # # CONFIG_PACKAGE_jamvm is not set # # Lua # # CONFIG_PACKAGE_dkjson is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_json4lua is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_ldbus is not set CONFIG_PACKAGE_libiwinfo-lua=y # CONFIG_PACKAGE_lpeg is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_lsqlite3 is not set CONFIG_PACKAGE_lua=y # CONFIG_PACKAGE_lua-bencode is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_lua-cjson is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_lua-copas is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_lua-coxpcall is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_lua-examples is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_lua-lzlib is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_lua-md5 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_lua-mobdebug is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_lua-mosquitto is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_lua-openssl is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_lua-penlight is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_lua-rings is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_lua-rs232 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_lua-sha2 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_lua-wsapi-base is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_lua-wsapi-xavante is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_lua-xavante is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luabitop is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luac is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luaexpat is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luafilesystem is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luajit is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_lualanes is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luaposix is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luarocks is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luasec is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luasoap is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luasocket is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luasql-mysql is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luasql-pgsql is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luasql-sqlite3 is not set CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-lib-fs=y # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luv is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_lzmq is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_uuid is not set # # Node.js # # CONFIG_PACKAGE_node is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_node-arduino-firmata is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_node-cylon is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_node-cylon-firmata is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_node-cylon-gpio is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_node-cylon-i2c is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_node-hid is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_node-homebridge is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_node-javascript-obfuscator is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_node-npm is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_node-serialport is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_node-serialport-bindings is not set # # PHP # # CONFIG_PACKAGE_php7 is not set # # Perl # # CONFIG_PACKAGE_perl is not set # # Python # # CONFIG_PACKAGE_gunicorn is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_gunicorn3 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_micropython is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_micropython-lib is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-astral is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-astral-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-attrs is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-attrs-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-automat is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-automat-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-awscli is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-awscli-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-base is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-base-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-bcrypt is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-bcrypt-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-botocore is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-botocore-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-certifi is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-certifi-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-cffi is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-cffi-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-chardet is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-chardet-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-codecs is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-codecs-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-colorama is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-colorama-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-compiler is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-compiler-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-constantly is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-constantly-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-crcmod is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-crypto is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-crypto-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-cryptodome is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-cryptodome-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-cryptodomex is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-cryptodomex-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-cryptography is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-cryptography-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-ctypes is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-ctypes-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-curl is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-curl-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-dateutil is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-dateutil-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-db is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-db-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-decimal is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-decimal-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-defusedxml is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-defusedxml-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-dev is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-dev-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-distutils is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-distutils-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-django1 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-django1-common is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-django1-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-dns is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-dns-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-docutils is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-docutils-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-dpkt is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-egenix-mx-base is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-egenix-mx-base-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-email is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-email-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-enum34 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-enum34-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-et_xmlfile is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-et_xmlfile-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-evdev is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-evdev-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-flup is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-flup-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-futures is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-futures-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-gdbm is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-gdbm-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-gmpy2 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-gmpy2-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-gnupg is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-gunicorn is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-gunicorn-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-hyperlink is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-hyperlink-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-idna is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-idna-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-incremental is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-incremental-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-ipaddress is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-ipaddress-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-jdcal is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-jdcal-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-jmespath is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-jmespath-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-ldap is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-lib2to3 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-lib2to3-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-libmodbus is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-light is not set # # Configuration # # CONFIG_PYTHON_BLUETOOTH_SUPPORT is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-light-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-logging is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-logging-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-lxml is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-lxml-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-multiprocessing is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-multiprocessing-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-mysqlclient is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-mysqlclient-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-ncurses is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-ncurses-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-oauthlib is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-oauthlib-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-openpyxl is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-openpyxl-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-openssl is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-openssl-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-parsley is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-parsley-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-passlib is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-passlib-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-pcapy is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-pillow is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-pillow-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-pip is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-pip-conf is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-pip-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-pkg-resources is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-pkg-resources-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-ply is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-ply-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-psycopg2 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-pyasn1 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-pyasn1-modules is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-pyasn1-modules-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-pyasn1-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-pycparser is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-pycparser-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-pydoc is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-pydoc-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-pyjwt is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-pyjwt-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-pyodbc is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-pyopenssl is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-pyopenssl-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-pyptlib is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-pyptlib-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-pyserial is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-pyserial-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-pytz is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-pytz-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-qrcode is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-qrcode-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-rcssmin is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-rcssmin-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-requests is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-requests-oauthlib is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-requests-oauthlib-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-requests-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-rsa is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-rsa-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-ruamel-yaml is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-ruamel-yaml-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-s3transfer is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-s3transfer-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-service-identity is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-service-identity-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-setuptools is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-setuptools-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-simplejson is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-simplejson-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-six is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-six-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-smbus is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-sqlite3 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-sqlite3-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-text-unidecode is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-text-unidecode-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-twisted is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-twisted-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-txsocksx is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-txsocksx-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-unittest is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-unittest-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-urllib3 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-urllib3-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-vobject is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-vobject-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-voluptuous is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-voluptuous-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-xml is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-xml-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-yaml is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-yaml-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-zope-interface is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python-zope-interface-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-aiohttp is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-aiohttp-cors is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-aiohttp-cors-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-aiohttp-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-appdirs is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-appdirs-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-asgiref is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-asgiref-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-asn1crypto is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-asn1crypto-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-astral is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-astral-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-async-timeout is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-async-timeout-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-asyncio is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-asyncio-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-atomicwrites is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-atomicwrites-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-attrs is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-attrs-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-automat is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-automat-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-awscli is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-awscli-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-base is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-base-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-bcrypt is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-bcrypt-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-boto3 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-boto3-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-botocore is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-botocore-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-bottle is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-bottle-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-cachelib is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-cachelib-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-cachetools is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-cachetools-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-certifi is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-certifi-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-cffi is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-cffi-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-cgi is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-cgi-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-cgitb is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-cgitb-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-chardet is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-chardet-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-click is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-click-log is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-click-log-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-click-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-codecs is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-codecs-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-colorama is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-colorama-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-constantly is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-constantly-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-contextlib2 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-contextlib2-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-crypto is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-crypto-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-cryptodome is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-cryptodome-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-cryptodomex is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-cryptodomex-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-cryptography is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-cryptography-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-ctypes is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-ctypes-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-curl is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-curl-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-dateutil is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-dateutil-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-dbm is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-dbm-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-decimal is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-decimal-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-decorator is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-decorator-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-defusedxml is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-defusedxml-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-dev is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-dev-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-distutils is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-distutils-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-django is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-django-appconf is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-django-appconf-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-django-compressor is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-django-compressor-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-django-constance is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-django-constance-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-django-cors-headers is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-django-cors-headers-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-django-etesync-journal is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-django-etesync-journal-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-django-formtools is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-django-formtools-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-django-jsonfield is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-django-jsonfield-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-django-picklefield is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-django-picklefield-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-django-postoffice is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-django-postoffice-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-django-ranged-response is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-django-ranged-response-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-django-restframework is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-django-restframework-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-django-restframework39 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-django-restframework39-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-django-simple-captcha is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-django-simple-captcha-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-django-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-django-statici18n is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-django-statici18n-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-django-webpack-loader is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-django-webpack-loader-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-django1 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-django1-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-dns is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-dns-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-docutils is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-docutils-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-drf-nested-routers is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-drf-nested-routers-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-email is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-email-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-et_xmlfile is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-et_xmlfile-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-evdev is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-evdev-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-flask is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-flask-login is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-flask-login-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-flask-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-flup is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-flup-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-gdbm is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-gdbm-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-gmpy2 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-gmpy2-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-gnupg is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-gunicorn is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-gunicorn-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-hyperlink is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-hyperlink-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-idna is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-idna-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-ifaddr is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-ifaddr-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-incremental is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-incremental-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-influxdb is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-influxdb-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-intelhex is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-intelhex-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-itsdangerous is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-itsdangerous-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-jdcal is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-jdcal-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-jinja2 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-jinja2-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-jmespath is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-jmespath-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-jsonpath-ng is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-jsonpath-ng-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-lib2to3 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-lib2to3-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-libmodbus is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-light is not set # # Configuration # # CONFIG_PYTHON3_BLUETOOTH_SUPPORT is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-light-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-logging is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-logging-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-lxml is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-lxml-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-lzma is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-lzma-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-markdown is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-markdown-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-markupsafe is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-markupsafe-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-maxminddb is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-maxminddb-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-more-itertools is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-more-itertools-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-multidict is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-multidict-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-multiprocessing is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-multiprocessing-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-mysqlclient is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-mysqlclient-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-ncurses is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-ncurses-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-netdisco is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-netdisco-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-netifaces is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-netifaces-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-oauthlib is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-oauthlib-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-openpyxl is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-openpyxl-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-openssl is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-openssl-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-paho-mqtt is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-paho-mqtt-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-parsley is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-parsley-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-passlib is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-passlib-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-pillow is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-pillow-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-pip is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-pip-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-pkg-resources is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-pkg-resources-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-ply is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-ply-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-py is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-py-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-pyasn1 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-pyasn1-modules is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-pyasn1-modules-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-pyasn1-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-pycparser is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-pycparser-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-pydoc is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-pydoc-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-pyjwt is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-pyjwt-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-pymysql is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-pymysql-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-pyodbc is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-pyopenssl is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-pyopenssl-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-pyotp is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-pyotp-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-pyparsing is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-pyparsing-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-pyroute2 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-pyroute2-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-pyrsistent is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-pyrsistent-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-pyserial is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-pyserial-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-pytz is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-pytz-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-qrcode is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-qrcode-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-rcssmin is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-rcssmin-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-requests is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-requests-oauthlib is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-requests-oauthlib-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-requests-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-rsa is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-rsa-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-ruamel-yaml is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-ruamel-yaml-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-s3transfer is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-s3transfer-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-schedule is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-schedule-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-schema is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-schema-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-seafile-ccnet is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-seafile-ccnet-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-seafile-server is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-seafile-server-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-searpc is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-searpc-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-sentry-sdk is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-sentry-sdk-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-service-identity is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-service-identity-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-setuptools is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-setuptools-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-simplejson is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-simplejson-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-six is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-six-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-slugify is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-slugify-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-smbus is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-speedtest-cli is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-speedtest-cli-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-sqlalchemy is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-sqlalchemy-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-sqlite3 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-sqlite3-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-sqlparse is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-sqlparse-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-stem is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-stem-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-text-unidecode is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-text-unidecode-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-twisted is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-twisted-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-unidecode is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-unidecode-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-unittest is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-unittest-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-urllib is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-urllib-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-urllib3 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-urllib3-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-vobject is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-vobject-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-voluptuous is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-voluptuous-serialize is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-voluptuous-serialize-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-voluptuous-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-wcwidth is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-wcwidth-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-werkzeug is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-werkzeug-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-xml is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-xml-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-xmltodict is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-xmltodict-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-yaml is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-yaml-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-yarl is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-yarl-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-zeroconf is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-zeroconf-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-zipp is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-zipp-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-zope-interface is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_python3-zope-interface-src is not set # # Ruby # # CONFIG_PACKAGE_ruby is not set # # Tcl # # CONFIG_PACKAGE_vala is not set # # Libraries # # # Compression # # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libbz2 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_liblzma is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libunrar is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libzstd is not set CONFIG_ZSTD_OPTIMIZE_O3=y # # Filesystem # # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libacl is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libattr is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libfuse is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libow is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libow-capi is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libsysfs is not set # # Firewall # # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libfko is not set CONFIG_PACKAGE_libip4tc=y CONFIG_PACKAGE_libip6tc=y CONFIG_PACKAGE_libxtables=y # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libxtables-nft is not set # # Instant Messaging # # CONFIG_PACKAGE_quasselc is not set # # IoT # # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libupm is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libupm-a110x is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libupm-ad8232 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libupm-adafruitss is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libupm-adc121c021 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libupm-adis16448 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libupm-adxl335 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libupm-adxl345 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libupm-am2315 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libupm-apds9002 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libupm-at42qt1070 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libupm-biss0001 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libupm-bmpx8x is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libupm-buzzer is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libupm-cjq4435 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libupm-ds1307 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libupm-ecs1030 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libupm-enc03r is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libupm-flex is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libupm-gas is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libupm-gp2y0a is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libupm-grove is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libupm-grovecircularled is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libupm-grovecollision is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libupm-groveehr is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libupm-groveeldriver is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libupm-groveelectromagnet is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libupm-groveemg is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libupm-grovegprs is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libupm-grovegsr is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libupm-grovelinefinder is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libupm-grovemd is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libupm-grovemoisture is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libupm-groveo2 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libupm-grovescam is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libupm-grovespeaker is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libupm-grovevdiv is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libupm-grovewater is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libupm-grovewfs is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libupm-guvas12d is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libupm-h3lis331dl is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libupm-hcsr04 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libupm-hm11 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libupm-hmc5883l is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libupm-hmtrp is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libupm-hp20x is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libupm-ht9170 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libupm-htu21d is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libupm-hx711 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libupm-i2clcd is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libupm-ina132 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libupm-isd1820 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libupm-itg3200 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libupm-joystick12 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libupm-l298 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libupm-ldt0028 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libupm-lm35 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libupm-lol is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libupm-loudness is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libupm-lpd8806 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libupm-lsm303 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libupm-lsm9ds0 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libupm-m24lr64e is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libupm-max31723 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libupm-max31855 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libupm-max44000 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libupm-max5487 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libupm-maxds3231m is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libupm-maxsonarez is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libupm-mg811 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libupm-mhz16 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libupm-mic is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libupm-mlx90614 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libupm-mma7455 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libupm-mma7660 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libupm-mpl3115a2 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libupm-mpr121 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libupm-mpu9150 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libupm-mq303a is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libupm-my9221 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libupm-nrf24l01 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libupm-nrf8001 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libupm-nunchuck is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libupm-otp538u is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libupm-pn532 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libupm-ppd42ns is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libupm-pulsensor is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libupm-rfr359f is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libupm-rgbringcoder is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libupm-rotaryencoder is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libupm-rpr220 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libupm-servo is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libupm-si114x is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libupm-sm130 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libupm-st7735 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libupm-stepmotor is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libupm-sx6119 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libupm-ta12200 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libupm-tcs3414cs is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libupm-th02 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libupm-tm1637 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libupm-tsl2561 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libupm-ttp223 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libupm-ublox6 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libupm-uln200xa is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libupm-waterlevel is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libupm-wheelencoder is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libupm-wt5001 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libupm-yg1006 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libupm-zfm20 is not set # # Languages # # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libyaml is not set # # Networking # # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libdcwproto is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libdcwsocket is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libsctp is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libuhttpd-mbedtls is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libuhttpd-nossl is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libuhttpd-openssl is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libuhttpd-wolfssl is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libunbound is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libunbound-heavy is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libuwsc-mbedtls is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libuwsc-nossl is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libuwsc-openssl is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libuwsc-wolfssl is not set # # Qt5 # # CONFIG_PACKAGE_qt5-core is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_qt5-network is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_qt5-xml is not set # # SSL # # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libgnutls is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libmbedtls is not set CONFIG_PACKAGE_libopenssl=y # # Build Options # CONFIG_OPENSSL_OPTIMIZE_SPEED=y CONFIG_OPENSSL_WITH_ASM=y CONFIG_OPENSSL_WITH_DEPRECATED=y # CONFIG_OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED is not set # CONFIG_OPENSSL_WITH_ERROR_MESSAGES is not set # # Protocol Support # CONFIG_OPENSSL_WITH_TLS13=y # CONFIG_OPENSSL_WITH_DTLS is not set # CONFIG_OPENSSL_WITH_NPN is not set CONFIG_OPENSSL_WITH_SRP=y CONFIG_OPENSSL_WITH_CMS=y # # Algorithm Selection # # CONFIG_OPENSSL_WITH_EC2M is not set CONFIG_OPENSSL_WITH_CHACHA_POLY1305=y CONFIG_OPENSSL_PREFER_CHACHA_OVER_GCM=y CONFIG_OPENSSL_WITH_PSK=y # # Less commonly used build options # # CONFIG_OPENSSL_WITH_ARIA is not set # CONFIG_OPENSSL_WITH_CAMELLIA is not set # CONFIG_OPENSSL_WITH_IDEA is not set # CONFIG_OPENSSL_WITH_SEED is not set # CONFIG_OPENSSL_WITH_SM234 is not set # CONFIG_OPENSSL_WITH_BLAKE2 is not set # CONFIG_OPENSSL_WITH_MDC2 is not set # CONFIG_OPENSSL_WITH_WHIRLPOOL is not set # CONFIG_OPENSSL_WITH_COMPRESSION is not set # CONFIG_OPENSSL_WITH_RFC3779 is not set # # Engine/Hardware Support # CONFIG_OPENSSL_ENGINE=y CONFIG_OPENSSL_ENGINE_BUILTIN=y CONFIG_OPENSSL_ENGINE_BUILTIN_DEVCRYPTO=y # CONFIG_OPENSSL_WITH_GOST is not set CONFIG_PACKAGE_libopenssl-conf=y # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libopenssl-devcrypto is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libpolarssl is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libwolfssl is not set # # Sound # # CONFIG_PACKAGE_liblo is not set # # database # # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libpq is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libsqlite3 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_pgsqlodbc is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_psqlodbca is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_psqlodbcw is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_tdb is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_unixodbc is not set # # libelektra # # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libelektra-boost is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libelektra-core is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libelektra-cpp is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libelektra-crypto is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libelektra-curlget is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libelektra-dbus is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libelektra-extra is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libelektra-lua is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libelektra-plugins is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libelektra-python2 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libelektra-python3 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libelektra-resolvers is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libelektra-xerces is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libelektra-xml is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libelektra-yajl is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libelektra-yamlcpp is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_alsa-lib is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_argp-standalone is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_avro-c is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_bind-libs is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_bluez-libs is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_boost is not set # CONFIG_boost-context-exclude is not set # CONFIG_boost-coroutine-exclude is not set # CONFIG_boost-fiber-exclude is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_ccid is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_check is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_classpath is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_classpath-tools is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_confuse is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_dtndht is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_fcgi is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_fftw3 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_fftw3f is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_getdns is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_giflib is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_glib2 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_glog is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_hidapi is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_ibrcommon is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_ibrdtn is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_icu is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_icu-data-tools is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_icu-full-data is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_jansson is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_knot-libs is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_knot-libzscanner is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libaio is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libalac is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libantlr3c is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libao is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libapr is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libaprutil is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libarchive is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libarchive-noopenssl is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libartnet is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libasm is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libaudiofile is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libavahi-client is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libavahi-compat-libdnssd is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libavahi-dbus-support is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libavahi-nodbus-support is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libavl is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libbfd is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libblkid is not set CONFIG_PACKAGE_libblobmsg-json=y # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libbsd is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libcanfestival is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libcap is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libcares is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libcharset is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libcoap is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libcomerr is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libconfig is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libcryptopp is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libcurl is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libcxx is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libdaemon is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libdaq is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libdb47 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libdb47xx is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libdbi is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libdbus is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libdevmapper is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libdmapsharing is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libdnet is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libdouble-conversion is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libdrm is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libdw is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libecdsautil is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libedit is not set CONFIG_PACKAGE_libelf=y # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libesmtp is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libestr is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libev is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libevdev is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libevent2 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libevent2-core is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libevent2-extra is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libevent2-openssl is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libevent2-pthreads is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libeventlog is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libevhtp is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libexif is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libexpat is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libexslt is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libext2fs is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libextractor is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libf2fs is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libfaad2 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libfastjson is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libfdisk is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libfdt is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libffi is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libffmpeg-audio-dec is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libffmpeg-custom is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libffmpeg-full is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libffmpeg-mini is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libflac is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libfmt is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libfreetype is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libftdi is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libftdi1 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libgcrypt is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libgd is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libgdbm is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libgee is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libglpk is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libgmp is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libgnurl is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libgpg-error is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libgphoto2 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libgpiod is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libgps is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libhamlib is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libhavege is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libhiredis is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libhttp-parser is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libhwloc is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libical is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libiconv is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libiconv-full is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libid3tag is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libidn is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libidn2 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libiio is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libimobiledevice is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libinotifytools is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libinput is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libintl is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libintl-full is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libiw is not set CONFIG_PACKAGE_libiwinfo=y # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libjpeg is not set CONFIG_PACKAGE_libjson-c=y # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libkeyutils is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libkmod is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libldns is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libltdl is not set CONFIG_PACKAGE_liblua=y # CONFIG_PACKAGE_liblz4 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_liblzo is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libmad is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libmagic is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libmariadb is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libmaxminddb is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libmbim is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libmcrypt is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libmicrohttpd-no-ssl is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libmicrohttpd-ssl is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libmilter-sendmail is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libminiupnpc is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libmms is not set CONFIG_PACKAGE_libmnl=y # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libmodbus is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libmosquitto-nossl is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libmosquitto-ssl is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libmount is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libmpdclient is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libmpeg2 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libmpg123 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libmraa is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libnatpmp is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libncurses is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libndpi is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libneon is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libnet-1.2.x is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libnetconf2 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libnetfilter-acct is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libnetfilter-conntrack is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libnetfilter-cthelper is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libnetfilter-cttimeout is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libnetfilter-log is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libnetfilter-queue is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libnetsnmp is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libnettle is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libnfnetlink is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libnftnl is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libnghttp2 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libnl is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libnl-core is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libnl-genl is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libnl-nf is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libnl-route is not set CONFIG_PACKAGE_libnl-tiny=y # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libnopoll is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libogg is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_liboil is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libopcodes is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libopendkim is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libopenobex is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libopensc is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libopenzwave is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_liboping is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libopus is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libout123 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libowfat is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libp11 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libpagekite is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libpam is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libpcap is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libpciaccess is not set CONFIG_PACKAGE_libpcre=y # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libpcre16 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libpcre2 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libpcre2-16 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libpcre2-32 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libpcrecpp is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libpcsclite is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libpkcs11-spy is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libplist is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libplistcxx is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libpng is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libpopt is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libprotobuf-c is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libqmi is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libqrencode is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libradcli is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libreadline is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libredblack is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_librouteros is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libroxml is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_librpc is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_librrd1 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_librtlsdr is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libruby is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libsamplerate is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libsane is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libsasl2 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libsearpc is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libseccomp is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libsensors is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libshout is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libshout-full is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libshout-nossl is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libsigcxx is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libsmartcols is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libsndfile is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libsoc is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libsocks is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libsodium is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libsoup is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libsoxr is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libspeex is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libspeexdsp is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libspice-server is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libss is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libssh is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libssh2 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libstoken is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libstrophe is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libtalloc is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libtasn1 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libtheora is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libtiff is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libtiffxx is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libtins is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libtirpc is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libtorrent is not set CONFIG_PACKAGE_libubox=y # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libubox-lua is not set CONFIG_PACKAGE_libubus=y CONFIG_PACKAGE_libubus-lua=y CONFIG_PACKAGE_libuci=y CONFIG_PACKAGE_libuci-lua=y CONFIG_PACKAGE_libuclient=y # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libudev-fbsd is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libudns is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libuecc is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libugpio is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libunistring is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libunwind is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libupnp is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libupnpp is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_liburcu is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libusb-1.0 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libusb-compat is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libusbmuxd is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libustream-mbedtls is not set CONFIG_PACKAGE_libustream-openssl=y # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libustream-wolfssl is not set CONFIG_PACKAGE_libuuid=y # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libuv is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libuvc is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libv4l is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libvorbis is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libvorbisidec is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libvpx is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libwebcam is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libwebsockets-full is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libwebsockets-mbedtls is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libwebsockets-openssl is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libwrap is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libwxbase is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libx264 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libxerces-c is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libxerces-c-samples is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libxml2 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libxslt is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libyaml-cpp is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libyang is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libzdb is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libzmq-curve is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libzmq-nc is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_linux-atm is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_loudmouth is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_lttng-ust is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_mtdev is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_musl-fts is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_mxml is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_nacl is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_oniguruma is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_opencv is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_p11-kit is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_pixman is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_poco is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_protobuf is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_protobuf-lite is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_pthsem is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_rblibtorrent is not set CONFIG_PACKAGE_rpcd-mod-rrdns=y # CONFIG_PACKAGE_rxtx is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_sbc is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_spice-protocol is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_terminfo is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_tinycdb is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_uclibcxx is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_uw-imap is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_xmlrpc-c is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_xmlrpc-c-client is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_xmlrpc-c-server is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_yajl is not set CONFIG_PACKAGE_zlib=y # # Configuration # # CONFIG_ZLIB_OPTIMIZE_SPEED is not set # # LuCI # # # 1. Collections # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci=y # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-nginx is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-ssl-nginx is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-ssl-openssl is not set # # 2. Modules # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-base=y CONFIG_LUCI_SRCDIET=y # # Translations # # CONFIG_LUCI_LANG_hu is not set # CONFIG_LUCI_LANG_pt is not set # CONFIG_LUCI_LANG_sk is not set # CONFIG_LUCI_LANG_ko is not set # CONFIG_LUCI_LANG_en is not set # CONFIG_LUCI_LANG_el is not set # CONFIG_LUCI_LANG_uk is not set # CONFIG_LUCI_LANG_ja is not set # CONFIG_LUCI_LANG_vi is not set # CONFIG_LUCI_LANG_he is not set # CONFIG_LUCI_LANG_no is not set # CONFIG_LUCI_LANG_ms is not set # CONFIG_LUCI_LANG_pl is not set CONFIG_LUCI_LANG_zh-cn=y # CONFIG_LUCI_LANG_ro is not set # CONFIG_LUCI_LANG_de is not set # CONFIG_LUCI_LANG_zh-tw is not set # CONFIG_LUCI_LANG_tr is not set # CONFIG_LUCI_LANG_sv is not set # CONFIG_LUCI_LANG_ru is not set # CONFIG_LUCI_LANG_pt-br is not set # CONFIG_LUCI_LANG_ca is not set # CONFIG_LUCI_LANG_es is not set # CONFIG_LUCI_LANG_cs is not set # CONFIG_LUCI_LANG_fr is not set # CONFIG_LUCI_LANG_it is not set CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-mod-admin-full=y # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-mod-failsafe is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-mod-freifunk is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-mod-freifunk-community is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-mod-rpc is not set # # 3. Applications # # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-app-accesscontrol is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-app-acme is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-app-adblock is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-app-adbyby-plus is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-app-advanced-reboot is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-app-ahcp is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-app-airplay2 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-app-amule is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-app-aria2 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-app-arpbind is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-app-asterisk is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-app-attendedsysupgrade is not set CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-app-autoreboot=y # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-app-baidupcs-web is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-app-bcp38 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-app-bird1-ipv4 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-app-bird1-ipv6 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-app-bmx6 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-app-bmx7 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-app-cifs-mount is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-app-cifsd is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-app-cjdns is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-app-clamav is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-app-commands is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-app-cshark is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-app-ddns is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-app-diag-core is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-app-diskman is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-app-diskman_INCLUDE_btrfs_progs is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-app-diskman_INCLUDE_lsblk is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-app-diskman_INCLUDE_mdadm is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-app-diskman_INCLUDE_kmod_md_raid456 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-app-diskman_INCLUDE_kmod_md_linear is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-app-dnscrypt-proxy is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-app-dump1090 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-app-dynapoint is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-app-e2guardian is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-app-familycloud is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-app-filetransfer is not set CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-app-firewall=y # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-app-freifunk-diagnostics is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-app-freifunk-policyrouting is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-app-freifunk-widgets is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-app-frpc is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-app-frps is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-app-fwknopd is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-app-guest-wifi is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-app-haproxy-tcp is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-app-hd-idle is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-app-hnet is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-app-ipsec-vpnd is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-app-kodexplorer is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-app-lxc is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-app-meshwizard is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-app-minidlna is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-app-mjpg-streamer is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-app-mtwifi is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-app-music-remote-center is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-app-mwan3 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-app-mwan3helper is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-app-n2n_v2 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-app-netdata is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-app-nfs is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-app-nft-qos is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-app-nlbwmon is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-app-noddos is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-app-nps is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-app-ntpc is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-app-ocserv is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-app-olsr is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-app-olsr-services is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-app-olsr-viz is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-app-openvpn is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-app-openvpn-server is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-app-p910nd is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-app-pagekitec is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-app-polipo is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-app-pppoe-relay is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-app-privoxy is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-app-ps3netsrv is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-app-qbittorrent is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-app-qos is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-app-radicale is not set CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-app-ramfree=y # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-app-rclone is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-app-rp-pppoe-server is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-app-samba is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-app-samba4 is not set CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-app-sfe=y # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-app-shadowsocks-libev is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-app-shairplay is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-app-siitwizard is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-app-simple-adblock is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-app-softethervpn is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-app-splash is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-app-sqm is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-app-squid is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-app-ssrserver-python is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-app-statistics is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-app-syncdial is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-app-tinyproxy is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-app-transmission is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-app-travelmate is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-app-ttyd is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-app-udpxy is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-app-uhttpd is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-app-unblockmusic is not set # CONFIG_UnblockNeteaseMusic_Go is not set # CONFIG_UnblockNeteaseMusic_NodeJS is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-app-unbound is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-app-upnp is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-app-usb-printer is not set CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-app-v2ray-server=y # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-app-verysync is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-app-vlmcsd is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-app-vnstat is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-app-vpnbypass is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-app-vsftpd is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-app-watchcat is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-app-webadmin is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-app-wifischedule is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-app-wireguard is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-app-wol is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-app-wrtbwmon is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-app-xlnetacc is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-app-zerotier is not set # # 4. Themes # # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-theme-argon is not set CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-theme-bootstrap=y # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-theme-material is not set CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-theme-netgear=y # # 5. Protocols # # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-proto-3g is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-proto-bonding is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-proto-ipip is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-proto-ipv6 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-proto-ncm is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-proto-openconnect is not set CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-proto-ppp=y # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-proto-qmi is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-proto-relay is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-proto-vpnc is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-proto-wireguard is not set # # 6. Libraries # # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-lib-docker is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-lib-dracula is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-lib-httpclient is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-lib-httpprotoutils is not set CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-lib-ip=y # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-lib-iptparser is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-lib-jquery-1-4 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-lib-json is not set CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-lib-jsonc=y # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-lib-luaneightbl is not set CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-lib-nixio=y # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-lib-px5g is not set # # 9. Freifunk # # CONFIG_PACKAGE_freifunk-common is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_freifunk-firewall is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_freifunk-policyrouting is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_freifunk-watchdog is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_meshwizard is not set CONFIG_PACKAGE_default-settings=y CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-i18n-autoreboot-zh-cn=y # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-i18n-base-ca is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-i18n-base-cs is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-i18n-base-de is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-i18n-base-el is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-i18n-base-en is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-i18n-base-es is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-i18n-base-fr is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-i18n-base-he is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-i18n-base-hu is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-i18n-base-it is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-i18n-base-ja is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-i18n-base-ko is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-i18n-base-ms is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-i18n-base-no is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-i18n-base-pl is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-i18n-base-pt is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-i18n-base-pt-br is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-i18n-base-ro is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-i18n-base-ru is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-i18n-base-sk is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-i18n-base-sv is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-i18n-base-tr is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-i18n-base-uk is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-i18n-base-vi is not set CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-i18n-base-zh-cn=y # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-i18n-base-zh-tw is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-i18n-firewall-ca is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-i18n-firewall-cs is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-i18n-firewall-de is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-i18n-firewall-el is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-i18n-firewall-en is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-i18n-firewall-es is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-i18n-firewall-fr is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-i18n-firewall-he is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-i18n-firewall-hu is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-i18n-firewall-it is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-i18n-firewall-ja is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-i18n-firewall-ko is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-i18n-firewall-ms is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-i18n-firewall-no is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-i18n-firewall-pl is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-i18n-firewall-pt is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-i18n-firewall-pt-br is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-i18n-firewall-ro is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-i18n-firewall-ru is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-i18n-firewall-sk is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-i18n-firewall-sv is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-i18n-firewall-tr is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-i18n-firewall-uk is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-i18n-firewall-vi is not set CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-i18n-firewall-zh-cn=y # CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-i18n-firewall-zh-tw is not set CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-i18n-ramfree-zh-cn=y CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-i18n-sfe-zh-cn=y CONFIG_PACKAGE_luci-i18n-v2ray-server-zh-cn=y # # Mail # # CONFIG_PACKAGE_alpine is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_alpine-nossl is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_bogofilter is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_clamsmtp is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_dovecot is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_dovecot-pigeonhole is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_dovecot-utils is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_emailrelay is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_fdm is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_greyfix is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_mailman is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_mailsend is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_mailsend-nossl is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_msmtp is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_msmtp-nossl is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_mutt is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_nail is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_opendkim is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_opendkim-tools is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_postfix is not set # # Select postfix build options # CONFIG_POSTFIX_TLS=y CONFIG_POSTFIX_SASL=y CONFIG_POSTFIX_LDAP=y # CONFIG_POSTFIX_DB is not set CONFIG_POSTFIX_CDB=y CONFIG_POSTFIX_SQLITE=y # CONFIG_POSTFIX_PGSQL is not set CONFIG_POSTFIX_PCRE=y # CONFIG_POSTFIX_EAI is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_ssmtp is not set # # Multimedia # # # Streaming # # CONFIG_PACKAGE_oggfwd is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_crtmpserver is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_ffmpeg is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_ffprobe is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_ffserver is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_fswebcam is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_gmediarender is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_gphoto2 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_grilo is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_grilo-plugins is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_gst1-libav is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_gstreamer1-libs is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_gstreamer1-plugins-bad is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_gstreamer1-plugins-base is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_gstreamer1-plugins-good is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_gstreamer1-plugins-ugly is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_gstreamer1-utils is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_icecast is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_lcdgrilo is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_minidlna is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_mjpg-streamer is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_motion is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_tvheadend is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_v4l2rtspserver is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_vips is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_xupnpd is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_youtube-dl is not set # # Network # # # BitTorrent # # CONFIG_PACKAGE_mktorrent is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_opentracker is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_opentracker6 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_qBittorrent is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_rtorrent is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_rtorrent-rpc is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_transmission-cli-openssl is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_transmission-daemon-openssl is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_transmission-remote-openssl is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_transmission-web is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_transmission-web-control is not set # # Captive Portals # # CONFIG_PACKAGE_coova-chilli is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_nodogsplash is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_wifidog is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_wifidog-ng-mbedtls is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_wifidog-ng-nossl is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_wifidog-ng-openssl is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_wifidog-ng-wolfssl is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_wifidog-tls is not set # # Cloud Manager # # CONFIG_PACKAGE_rclone-ng is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_rclone-webui-react is not set # # Download Manager # # CONFIG_PACKAGE_ariang is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_webui-aria2 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_yaaw is not set # # File Transfer # # CONFIG_PACKAGE_aria2 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_atftp is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_atftpd is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_curl is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_gnurl is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_lftp is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_ps3netsrv is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_rosy-file-server is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_rsync is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_rsyncd is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_vsftpd is not set CONFIG_PACKAGE_vsftpd-alt=y CONFIG_VSFTPD_USE_UCI_SCRIPTS=y # CONFIG_PACKAGE_vsftpd-tls is not set CONFIG_PACKAGE_wget=y # CONFIG_PACKAGE_wget-nossl is not set # # Filesystem # # CONFIG_PACKAGE_davfs2 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_ksmbd-avahi-service is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_ksmbd-server is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_ksmbd-utils is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_netatalk is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_nfs-kernel-server is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_owftpd is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_owhttpd is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_owserver is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_sshfs is not set # # Firewall # # CONFIG_PACKAGE_arptables is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_conntrack is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_conntrackd is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_ebtables is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_fwknop is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_fwknopd is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_ip6tables is not set CONFIG_PACKAGE_iptables=y # CONFIG_IPTABLES_CONNLABEL is not set # CONFIG_IPTABLES_NFTABLES is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_iptables-mod-account is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_iptables-mod-chaos is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_iptables-mod-checksum is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_iptables-mod-cluster is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_iptables-mod-clusterip is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_iptables-mod-condition is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_iptables-mod-conntrack-extra is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_iptables-mod-delude is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_iptables-mod-dhcpmac is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_iptables-mod-dnetmap is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_iptables-mod-extra is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_iptables-mod-filter is not set CONFIG_PACKAGE_iptables-mod-fullconenat=y # CONFIG_PACKAGE_iptables-mod-fuzzy is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_iptables-mod-geoip is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_iptables-mod-hashlimit is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_iptables-mod-iface is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_iptables-mod-ipmark is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_iptables-mod-ipopt is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_iptables-mod-ipp2p is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_iptables-mod-iprange is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_iptables-mod-ipsec is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_iptables-mod-ipv4options is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_iptables-mod-led is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_iptables-mod-length2 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_iptables-mod-logmark is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_iptables-mod-lscan is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_iptables-mod-lua is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_iptables-mod-nat-extra is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_iptables-mod-nflog is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_iptables-mod-nfqueue is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_iptables-mod-physdev is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_iptables-mod-psd is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_iptables-mod-quota2 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_iptables-mod-rpfilter is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_iptables-mod-sysrq is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_iptables-mod-tarpit is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_iptables-mod-tee is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_iptables-mod-tproxy is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_iptables-mod-trace is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_iptables-mod-u32 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_iptables-mod-ulog is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_iptaccount is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_iptgeoip is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_miniupnpc is not set CONFIG_PACKAGE_miniupnpd=y # CONFIG_MINIUPNPD_IGDv2 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_natpmpc is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_nftables is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_shorewall is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_shorewall-core is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_shorewall-lite is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_shorewall6 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_shorewall6-lite is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_snort is not set # # Firewall Tunnel # # CONFIG_PACKAGE_iodine is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_iodined is not set # # FreeRADIUS (version 3) # # CONFIG_PACKAGE_freeradius3 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_freeradius3-common is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_freeradius3-utils is not set # # IP Addresses and Names # # CONFIG_PACKAGE_aggregate is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_announce is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_avahi-autoipd is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_avahi-daemon-service-http is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_avahi-daemon-service-ssh is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_avahi-dbus-daemon is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_avahi-dnsconfd is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_avahi-nodbus-daemon is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_avahi-utils is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_bind-check is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_bind-client is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_bind-dig is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_bind-dnssec is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_bind-host is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_bind-rndc is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_bind-server is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_bind-tools is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_danish is not set CONFIG_PACKAGE_ddns-scripts=y CONFIG_PACKAGE_ddns-scripts_aliyun=y # CONFIG_PACKAGE_ddns-scripts_cloudflare.com-v4 is not set CONFIG_PACKAGE_ddns-scripts_dnspod=y # CONFIG_PACKAGE_ddns-scripts_freedns_42_pl is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_ddns-scripts_godaddy.com-v1 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_ddns-scripts_no-ip_com is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_ddns-scripts_nsupdate is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_ddns-scripts_route53-v1 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_dhcp-forwarder is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_dns2socks is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_dnscrypt-proxy is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_dnscrypt-proxy-resolvers is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_drill is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_hostip is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_idn is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_idn2 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_inadyn is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_isc-dhcp-client-ipv4 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_isc-dhcp-client-ipv6 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_isc-dhcp-omshell-ipv4 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_isc-dhcp-omshell-ipv6 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_isc-dhcp-relay-ipv4 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_isc-dhcp-relay-ipv6 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_isc-dhcp-server-ipv4 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_isc-dhcp-server-ipv6 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kadnode is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_knot is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_knot-dig is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_knot-host is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_knot-keymgr is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_knot-nsupdate is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_knot-tests is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_knot-zonecheck is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_ldns-examples is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_mdns-utils is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_mdnsd is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_mdnsresponder is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_nsd is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_nsd-control is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_nsd-control-setup is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_nsd-nossl is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_ohybridproxy is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_stubby is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_unbound-anchor is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_unbound-checkconf is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_unbound-control is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_unbound-control-setup is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_unbound-daemon is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_unbound-daemon-heavy is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_unbound-host is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_wsdd2 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_zonestitcher is not set # # Instant Messaging # # CONFIG_PACKAGE_bitlbee is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_irssi is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_ngircd is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_ngircd-nossl is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_prosody is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_quassel-irssi is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_umurmur-mbedtls is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_umurmur-openssl is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_znc is not set # # Linux ATM tools # # CONFIG_PACKAGE_atm-aread is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_atm-atmaddr is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_atm-atmdiag is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_atm-atmdump is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_atm-atmloop is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_atm-atmsigd is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_atm-atmswitch is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_atm-atmtcp is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_atm-awrite is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_atm-bus is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_atm-debug-tools is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_atm-diagnostics is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_atm-esi is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_atm-ilmid is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_atm-ilmidiag is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_atm-lecs is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_atm-les is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_atm-mpcd is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_atm-saaldump is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_atm-sonetdiag is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_atm-svc_recv is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_atm-svc_send is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_atm-tools is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_atm-ttcp_atm is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_atm-zeppelin is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_br2684ctl is not set # # NMAP Suite # # CONFIG_PACKAGE_ncat is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_ncat-ssl is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_ndiff is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_nmap is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_nmap-ssl is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_nping is not set # # NTRIP # # CONFIG_PACKAGE_ntripcaster is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_ntripclient is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_ntripserver is not set # # NeteaseMusic # # CONFIG_PACKAGE_UnblockNeteaseMusic is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_UnblockNeteaseMusicGo is not set # # OLSR.org network framework # # CONFIG_PACKAGE_oonf-dlep-proxy is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_oonf-dlep-radio is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_oonf-init-scripts is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_oonf-olsrd2 is not set # # Open vSwitch # # CONFIG_PACKAGE_openvswitch is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_openvswitch-ovn-host is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_openvswitch-ovn-north is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_openvswitch-python is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_openvswitch-python3 is not set # # OpenLDAP # # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libopenldap is not set CONFIG_OPENLDAP_DEBUG=y # CONFIG_OPENLDAP_CRYPT is not set # CONFIG_OPENLDAP_MONITOR is not set # CONFIG_OPENLDAP_DB47 is not set # CONFIG_OPENLDAP_ICU is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_openldap-server is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_openldap-utils is not set # # P2P # # CONFIG_PACKAGE_amule is not set # CONFIG_AMULE_CRYPTOPP_STATIC_LINKING is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_antileech is not set # # Printing # # CONFIG_PACKAGE_p910nd is not set # # Project V # CONFIG_PACKAGE_v2ray=y # # V2Ray Configuration # # CONFIG_V2RAY_COMPRESS_GOPROXY is not set # CONFIG_V2RAY_JSON_V2CTL is not set CONFIG_V2RAY_JSON_INTERNAL=y # CONFIG_V2RAY_JSON_NONE is not set CONFIG_V2RAY_EXCLUDE_V2CTL=y CONFIG_V2RAY_EXCLUDE_ASSETS=y CONFIG_V2RAY_COMPRESS_UPX=y CONFIG_V2RAY_DISABLE_NONE=y # CONFIG_V2RAY_DISABLE_CUSTOM is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_v2ray-plugin is not set # CONFIG_v2ray-plugin_INCLUDE_GOPROXY is not set # # Routing and Redirection # # CONFIG_PACKAGE_babel-pinger is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_babeld is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_batmand is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_bcp38 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_bird1-ipv4 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_bird1-ipv4-uci is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_bird1-ipv6 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_bird1-ipv6-uci is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_bird1c-ipv4 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_bird1c-ipv6 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_bird1cl-ipv4 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_bird1cl-ipv6 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_bird2 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_bird2c is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_bird2cl is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_bmx6 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_bmx7 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_cjdns is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_cjdns-tests is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_dcwapd is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_devlink is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_genl is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_igmpproxy is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_ip-bridge is not set CONFIG_PACKAGE_ip-full=y # CONFIG_PACKAGE_ip-tiny is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_lldpd is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_mcproxy is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_mrmctl is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_mwan3 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_nstat is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_olsrd is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_prince is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_quagga is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_rdma is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_relayd is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_ss is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_sslh is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_tc is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_tcpproxy is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_vis is not set # # SSH # # CONFIG_PACKAGE_autossh is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_openssh-client is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_openssh-client-utils is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_openssh-keygen is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_openssh-moduli is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_openssh-server is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_openssh-server-pam is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_openssh-sftp-avahi-service is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_openssh-sftp-client is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_openssh-sftp-server is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_sshtunnel is not set # # THC-IPv6 attack and analyzing toolkit # # CONFIG_PACKAGE_thc-ipv6-address6 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_thc-ipv6-alive6 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_thc-ipv6-covert-send6 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_thc-ipv6-covert-send6d is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_thc-ipv6-denial6 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_thc-ipv6-detect-new-ip6 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_thc-ipv6-detect-sniffer6 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_thc-ipv6-dnsdict6 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_thc-ipv6-dnsrevenum6 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_thc-ipv6-dos-new-ip6 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_thc-ipv6-dump-router6 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_thc-ipv6-exploit6 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_thc-ipv6-fake-advertise6 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_thc-ipv6-fake-dhcps6 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_thc-ipv6-fake-dns6d is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_thc-ipv6-fake-dnsupdate6 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_thc-ipv6-fake-mipv6 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_thc-ipv6-fake-mld26 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_thc-ipv6-fake-mld6 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_thc-ipv6-fake-mldrouter6 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_thc-ipv6-fake-router26 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_thc-ipv6-fake-router6 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_thc-ipv6-fake-solicitate6 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_thc-ipv6-flood-advertise6 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_thc-ipv6-flood-dhcpc6 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_thc-ipv6-flood-mld26 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_thc-ipv6-flood-mld6 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_thc-ipv6-flood-mldrouter6 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_thc-ipv6-flood-router26 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_thc-ipv6-flood-router6 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_thc-ipv6-flood-solicitate6 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_thc-ipv6-fragmentation6 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_thc-ipv6-fuzz-dhcpc6 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_thc-ipv6-fuzz-dhcps6 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_thc-ipv6-fuzz-ip6 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_thc-ipv6-implementation6 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_thc-ipv6-implementation6d is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_thc-ipv6-inverse-lookup6 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_thc-ipv6-kill-router6 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_thc-ipv6-ndpexhaust6 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_thc-ipv6-node-query6 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_thc-ipv6-parasite6 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_thc-ipv6-passive-discovery6 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_thc-ipv6-randicmp6 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_thc-ipv6-redir6 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_thc-ipv6-rsmurf6 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_thc-ipv6-sendpees6 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_thc-ipv6-sendpeesmp6 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_thc-ipv6-smurf6 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_thc-ipv6-thcping6 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_thc-ipv6-toobig6 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_thc-ipv6-trace6 is not set # # Time Synchronization # # CONFIG_PACKAGE_chrony is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_htpdate is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_linuxptp is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_ntp-keygen is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_ntp-utils is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_ntpclient is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_ntpd is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_ntpdate is not set # # VPN # # CONFIG_PACKAGE_chaosvpn is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_fastd is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_ipsec-tools is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_n2n-edge is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_n2n-supernode is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_ocserv is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_openconnect is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_opennhrp is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_openvpn-easy-rsa is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_openvpn-mbedtls is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_openvpn-nossl is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_openvpn-openssl is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_pptpd is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_softethervpn-base is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_softethervpn-bridge is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_softethervpn-client is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_softethervpn-server is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_softethervpn5-bridge is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_softethervpn5-client is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_softethervpn5-server is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_sstp-client is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_strongswan is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_strongswan-charon is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_strongswan-charon-cmd is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_strongswan-default is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_strongswan-ipsec is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_strongswan-isakmp is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_strongswan-libtls is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_strongswan-minimal is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_strongswan-mod-addrblock is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_strongswan-mod-aes is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_strongswan-mod-af-alg is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_strongswan-mod-agent is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_strongswan-mod-attr is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_strongswan-mod-attr-sql is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_strongswan-mod-blowfish is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_strongswan-mod-ccm is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_strongswan-mod-cmac is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_strongswan-mod-connmark is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_strongswan-mod-constraints is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_strongswan-mod-coupling is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_strongswan-mod-ctr is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_strongswan-mod-curl is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_strongswan-mod-curve25519 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_strongswan-mod-des is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_strongswan-mod-dhcp is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_strongswan-mod-dnskey is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_strongswan-mod-duplicheck is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_strongswan-mod-eap-identity is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_strongswan-mod-eap-md5 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_strongswan-mod-eap-mschapv2 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_strongswan-mod-eap-radius is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_strongswan-mod-eap-tls is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_strongswan-mod-farp is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_strongswan-mod-fips-prf is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_strongswan-mod-forecast is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_strongswan-mod-gcm is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_strongswan-mod-gcrypt is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_strongswan-mod-gmp is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_strongswan-mod-gmpdh is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_strongswan-mod-ha is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_strongswan-mod-hmac is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_strongswan-mod-kernel-libipsec is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_strongswan-mod-kernel-netlink is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_strongswan-mod-ldap is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_strongswan-mod-led is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_strongswan-mod-load-tester is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_strongswan-mod-md4 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_strongswan-mod-md5 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_strongswan-mod-mysql is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_strongswan-mod-nonce is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_strongswan-mod-openssl is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_strongswan-mod-pem is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_strongswan-mod-pgp is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_strongswan-mod-pkcs1 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_strongswan-mod-pkcs11 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_strongswan-mod-pkcs12 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_strongswan-mod-pkcs7 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_strongswan-mod-pkcs8 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_strongswan-mod-pubkey is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_strongswan-mod-random is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_strongswan-mod-rc2 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_strongswan-mod-resolve is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_strongswan-mod-revocation is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_strongswan-mod-sha1 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_strongswan-mod-sha2 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_strongswan-mod-smp is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_strongswan-mod-socket-default is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_strongswan-mod-socket-dynamic is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_strongswan-mod-sql is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_strongswan-mod-sqlite is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_strongswan-mod-sshkey is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_strongswan-mod-stroke is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_strongswan-mod-test-vectors is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_strongswan-mod-uci is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_strongswan-mod-unity is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_strongswan-mod-updown is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_strongswan-mod-vici is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_strongswan-mod-whitelist is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_strongswan-mod-x509 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_strongswan-mod-xauth-eap is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_strongswan-mod-xauth-generic is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_strongswan-mod-xcbc is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_strongswan-pki is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_strongswan-scepclient is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_strongswan-swanctl is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_tinc is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_uanytun is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_uanytun-nettle is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_uanytun-nocrypt is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_uanytun-sslcrypt is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_vpnc is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_vpnc-scripts is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_wireguard is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_xl2tpd is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_zerotier is not set # # Version Control Systems # # CONFIG_PACKAGE_fossil is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_git is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_git-http is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_subversion-client is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_subversion-libs is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_subversion-server is not set # # WWAN # # CONFIG_PACKAGE_adb-enablemodem is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_comgt is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_comgt-directip is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_comgt-ncm is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_uqmi is not set # # Web Servers/Proxies # # CONFIG_PACKAGE_apache is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_cgi-io is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_clamav is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_e2guardian is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_freshclam is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_frpc is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_frps is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_haproxy is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_haproxy-nossl is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kcptun-client is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kcptun-server is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_lighttpd is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_nginx is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_nginx-all-module is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_nginx-mod-luci is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_nginx-mod-luci-ssl is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_nginx-ssl is not set CONFIG_PACKAGE_pdnsd-alt=y # CONFIG_PACKAGE_polipo is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_privoxy is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_radicale-py2 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_radicale-py3 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_radicale2 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_radicale2-examples is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_radicale2-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_shadowsocks-client is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_shadowsocks-libev-ss-local is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_shadowsocks-libev-ss-redir is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_shadowsocks-libev-ss-rules is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_shadowsocks-libev-ss-server is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_shadowsocks-libev-ss-tunnel is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_shadowsocksr-libev is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_shadowsocksr-libev-alt is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_shadowsocksr-libev-server is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_shadowsocksr-libev-ssr-local is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_sockd is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_socksify is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_spawn-fcgi is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_squid is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_srelay is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_tinyproxy is not set CONFIG_PACKAGE_uhttpd=y # CONFIG_PACKAGE_uhttpd-mod-lua is not set CONFIG_PACKAGE_uhttpd-mod-ubus=y # CONFIG_PACKAGE_uwsgi-cgi is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_uwsgi-cgi-luci-support is not set # # Wireless # # CONFIG_PACKAGE_aircrack-ng is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_airmon-ng is not set # # dial-in/up # # CONFIG_PACKAGE_rp-pppoe-common is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_rp-pppoe-relay is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_rp-pppoe-server is not set # # tcprelay # # CONFIG_PACKAGE_tcpbridge is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_tcpcapinfo is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_tcpliveplay is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_tcpprep is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_tcpreplay is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_tcpreplay-all is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_tcpreplay-edit is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_tcprewrite is not set # # wireless # # CONFIG_PACKAGE_dynapoint is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_horst is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kismet-client is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kismet-drone is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kismet-server is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_pixiewps is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_reaver is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_wavemon is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_wifischedule is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_464xlat is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_6in4 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_6rd is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_6to4 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_acme is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_acme-dnsapi is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_adblock is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_adbyby is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_addrwatch is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_ahcpd is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_alfred is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_apcupsd is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_apcupsd-cgi is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_apinger is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_arp-scan is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_baidupcs-web is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_banip is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_batctl-default is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_batctl-full is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_batctl-tiny is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_beanstalkd is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_bmon is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_bwm-ng is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_chat is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_cifsmount is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_coap-server is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_conserver is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_cshark is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_daemonlogger is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_darkstat is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_dhcpcd is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_dmapd is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_ds-lite is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_dsmboot is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_eapol-test is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_eapol-test-openssl is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_eapol-test-wolfssl is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_esniper is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_etherwake is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_ethtool is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_fakeidentd is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_foolsm is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_fping is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_gnunet is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_gre is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_hnet-full is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_hnet-full-l2tp is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_hnet-full-secure is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_hnetd-nossl is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_hnetd-openssl is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_hostapd is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_hostapd-basic is not set CONFIG_PACKAGE_hostapd-common=y # CONFIG_PACKAGE_hostapd-mini is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_hostapd-openssl is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_hostapd-utils is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_hostapd-wolfssl is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_httping is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_httping-nossl is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_https_dns_proxy is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_i2pd is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_ibrdtn-tools is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_ibrdtnd is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_ifstat is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_iftop is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_iiod is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_iotivity is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_iotivity-cpp is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_iotivity-example-garage is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_iotivity-example-simple is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_iotivity-oic-middle is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_iotivity-resource-container-hue is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_iotivity-resource-container-lib is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_iotivity-resource-container-sample is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_iotivity-resource-directory-lib is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_iperf is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_iperf3 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_iperf3-ssl is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_ipip is not set CONFIG_PACKAGE_ipset=y # CONFIG_PACKAGE_ipset-dns is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_ipset-lists is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_ipt2socks is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_iptraf-ng is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_iputils-arping is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_iputils-clockdiff is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_iputils-ping is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_iputils-ping6 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_iputils-tftpd is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_iputils-tracepath is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_iputils-tracepath6 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_iputils-traceroute6 is not set CONFIG_PACKAGE_iw=y # CONFIG_PACKAGE_iw-full is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_jool is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_jool-tools is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_keepalived is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_knxd is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kplex is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_krb5-client is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_krb5-libs is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_krb5-server is not set CONFIG_PACKAGE_libipset=y # CONFIG_PACKAGE_linknx is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_lispd is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_mac-telnet-client is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_mac-telnet-discover is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_mac-telnet-ping is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_mac-telnet-server is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_map is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_memcached is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_microsocks is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_mii-tool is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_mikrotik-btest is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_mini_snmpd is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_minimalist-pcproxy is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_modemmanager is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_mosquitto-client-nossl is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_mosquitto-client-ssl is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_mosquitto-nossl is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_mosquitto-ssl is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_mrd6 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_mtr is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_nbd is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_nbd-server is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_ncp is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_ndppd is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_netcat is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_netdiscover is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_netperf is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_nextdns is not set CONFIG_PACKAGE_nlbwmon=y # CONFIG_PACKAGE_noddos is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_noping is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_npc is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_nut is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_obfsproxy is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_obfsproxy-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_odhcp6c is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_odhcpd is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_odhcpd-ipv6only is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_ola is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_omcproxy is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_oping is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_pagekitec is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_pen is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_pimbd is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_pingcheck is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_port-mirroring is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_portmap is not set CONFIG_PACKAGE_ppp=y # CONFIG_PACKAGE_ppp-mod-passwordfd is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_ppp-mod-pppoa is not set CONFIG_PACKAGE_ppp-mod-pppoe=y # CONFIG_PACKAGE_ppp-mod-pppol2tp is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_ppp-mod-pptp is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_ppp-mod-radius is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_ppp-multilink is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_pppdump is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_pppoe-discovery is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_pppossh is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_pppstats is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_proto-bonding is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_proxychains-ng is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_radsecproxy is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_redsocks is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_redsocks2 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_remserial is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_rpcbind is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_rssileds is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_rsyslog is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_samba36-client is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_samba36-net is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_samba36-server is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_samba4-admin is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_samba4-client is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_samba4-libs is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_samba4-server is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_samba4-utils is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_scapy is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_sctp is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_sctp-tools is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_seafile-ccnet is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_seafile-seahub is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_seafile-seahub-src is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_ser2net is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_simple-adblock is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_simple-obfs is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_simple-obfs-server is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_smartsnmpd is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_snmp-mibs is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_snmp-utils is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_snmpd is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_snmpd-static is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_snmptrapd is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_socat is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_softflowd is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_soloscli is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_stunnel is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_tayga is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_tcpdump is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_tcpdump-mini is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_tcpping is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_tor is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_tor-gencert is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_tor-geoip is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_tor-resolve is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_travelmate is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_trojan is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_u2pnpd is not set CONFIG_PACKAGE_uclient-fetch=y # CONFIG_PACKAGE_udpxy is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_ulogd is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_umbim is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_umdns is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_usbip is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_vallumd is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_verysync is not set CONFIG_PACKAGE_vlmcsd=y # CONFIG_PACKAGE_vncrepeater is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_vnstat is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_vpnbypass is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_vsc7385-ucode-pb44 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_vsc7395-ucode-pb44 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_vti is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_vxlan is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_wakeonlan is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_wpa-cli is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_wpa-supplicant is not set # CONFIG_WPA_RFKILL_SUPPORT is not set CONFIG_WPA_MSG_MIN_PRIORITY=3 # CONFIG_WPA_WOLFSSL is not set # CONFIG_DRIVER_WEXT_SUPPORT is not set CONFIG_DRIVER_11N_SUPPORT=y CONFIG_DRIVER_11AC_SUPPORT=y CONFIG_DRIVER_11W_SUPPORT=y # CONFIG_PACKAGE_wpa-supplicant-basic is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_wpa-supplicant-mesh-openssl is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_wpa-supplicant-mesh-wolfssl is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_wpa-supplicant-mini is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_wpa-supplicant-openssl is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_wpa-supplicant-p2p is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_wpa-supplicant-wolfssl is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_wpad is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_wpad-basic is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_wpad-mesh-openssl is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_wpad-mesh-wolfssl is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_wpad-mini is not set CONFIG_PACKAGE_wpad-openssl=y # CONFIG_PACKAGE_wpad-wolfssl is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_wpan-tools is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_wwan is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_xinetd is not set # # Sound # # CONFIG_PACKAGE_alsa-utils is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_alsa-utils-seq is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_alsa-utils-tests is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_espeak is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_faad2 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_fdk-aac is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_forked-daapd is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_ices is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_lame is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_lame-lib is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_liblo-utils is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_madplay is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_madplay-alsa is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_moc is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_mpc is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_mpd-avahi-service is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_mpd-full is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_mpd-mini is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_mpg123 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_opus-tools is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_pianod is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_pianod-client is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_portaudio is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_pulseaudio-daemon is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_pulseaudio-daemon-avahi is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_shairplay is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_shairport-sync-mbedtls is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_shairport-sync-mini is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_shairport-sync-openssl is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_shine is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_sox is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_squeezelite-full is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_squeezelite-mini is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_svox is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_upmpdcli is not set # # Utilities # # # Boot Loaders # # CONFIG_PACKAGE_fconfig is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_rbcfg is not set CONFIG_PACKAGE_uboot-envtools=y # # Compression # # CONFIG_PACKAGE_bsdtar is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_bzip2 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_gzip is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_pigz is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_unrar is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_unzip is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_xz-utils is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_zip is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_zstd is not set # # Database # # CONFIG_PACKAGE_mariadb-common is not set # # Disc # # CONFIG_PACKAGE_blkdiscard is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_blkid is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_blockdev is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_cfdisk is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_cgdisk is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_eject is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_fdisk is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_findfs is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_fixparts is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_gdisk is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_hd-idle is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_hdparm is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_lsblk is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_lvm2 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_mdadm is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_parted is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_partx-utils is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_sfdisk is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_sgdisk is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_wipefs is not set # # Editors # # CONFIG_PACKAGE_joe is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_nano is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_vim is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_vim-full is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_vim-fuller is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_vim-help is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_vim-runtime is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_zile is not set # # Encryption # # CONFIG_PACKAGE_ccrypt is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_certtool is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_cryptsetup is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_cryptsetup-openssl is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_gnupg is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_gnutls-utils is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_gpgv is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_keyctl is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_px5g-mbedtls is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_px5g-standalone is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_stoken is not set # # Filesystem # # CONFIG_PACKAGE_acl is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_antfs-mount is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_attr is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_badblocks is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_btrfs-progs is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_chattr is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_debugfs is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_dosfstools is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_dumpe2fs is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_e2freefrag is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_e2fsprogs is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_f2fs-tools is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_f2fsck is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_filefrag is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_fstrim is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_fuse-utils is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_hfsfsck is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_lsattr is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_mkf2fs is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_mkhfs is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_ncdu is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_nfs-utils is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_nfs-utils-libs is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_ntfs-3g is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_ntfs-3g-low is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_ntfs-3g-utils is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_owfs is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_owshell is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_resize2fs is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_squashfs-tools-mksquashfs is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_squashfs-tools-unsquashfs is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_swap-utils is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_sysfsutils is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_tune2fs is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_xfs-admin is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_xfs-fsck is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_xfs-growfs is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_xfs-mkfs is not set # # Image Manipulation # # CONFIG_PACKAGE_jpeg-tools is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_tiff-utils is not set # # Microcontroller programming # # CONFIG_PACKAGE_avrdude is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_dfu-programmer is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_stm32flash is not set # # RTKLIB Suite # # CONFIG_PACKAGE_convbin is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_pos2kml is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_rnx2rtkp is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_rtkrcv is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_str2str is not set # # Shells # # CONFIG_PACKAGE_bash is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_klish is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_mksh is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_tcsh is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_zsh is not set # # Terminal # # CONFIG_PACKAGE_agetty is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_dvtm is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_minicom is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_picocom is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_rtty-mbedtls is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_rtty-nossl is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_rtty-openssl is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_rtty-wolfssl is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_screen is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_script-utils is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_serialconsole is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_setterm is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_tio is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_tmux is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_ttyd is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_wall is not set # # Virtualization # # # Zoneinfo # # CONFIG_PACKAGE_zoneinfo-africa is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_zoneinfo-asia is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_zoneinfo-atlantic is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_zoneinfo-australia-nz is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_zoneinfo-core is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_zoneinfo-europe is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_zoneinfo-india is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_zoneinfo-northamerica is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_zoneinfo-pacific is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_zoneinfo-poles is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_zoneinfo-simple is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_zoneinfo-southamerica is not set # # database # # CONFIG_PACKAGE_pgsql-cli is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_pgsql-cli-extra is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_pgsql-server is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_rrdcgi1 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_rrdtool1 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_sqlite3-cli is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_unixodbc-tools is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_adb is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_ap51-flash is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_at is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_bandwidthd is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_bandwidthd-pgsql is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_bandwidthd-php is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_bandwidthd-sqlite is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_banhostlist is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_bc is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_bluelog is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_bluez-daemon is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_bluez-utils is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_bluez-utils-extra is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_bonniexx is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_bsdiff is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_bspatch is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_cal is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_canutils is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_cgroupfs-mount is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_cmdpad is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_coap-client is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_collectd is not set CONFIG_PACKAGE_coremark=y # CONFIG_PACKAGE_coreutils is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_crconf is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_crelay is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_csstidy is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_ct-bugcheck is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_dbus is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_dfu-util is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_digitemp is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_digitemp-usb is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_dmesg is not set # # Kernel features for Docker # CONFIG_DOCKER_KERNEL_OPTIONS=y # CONFIG_DOCKER_SECCOMP is not set # CONFIG_DOCKER_RES_SHAPE is not set # # Network # # CONFIG_DOCKER_NET_OVERLAY is not set # CONFIG_DOCKER_NET_MACVLAN is not set # CONFIG_DOCKER_NET_TFTP is not set # # Storage # # CONFIG_DOCKER_STO_EXT4 is not set # CONFIG_DOCKER_STO_BTRFS is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_dropbearconvert is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_dtc is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_dump1090 is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_ecdsautils is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_elektra-kdb is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_evtest is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_extract is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_fdt-utils is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_file is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_findutils-find is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_findutils-locate is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_findutils-xargs is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_flashrom is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_flashrom-pci is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_flashrom-spi is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_flashrom-usb is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_flent-tools is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_flock is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_fritz-caldata is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_fritz-tffs is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_ftdi_eeprom is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_gammu is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_gawk is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_getopt is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_giflib-utils is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_gkermit is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_gpioctl-sysfs is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_gpiod-tools is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_gpsd is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_gpsd-clients is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_grep is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_hamlib is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_haserl is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_haveged is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_hub-ctrl is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_hwclock is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_hwloc-utils is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_i2c-tools is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_iconv is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_iio-utils is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_inotifywait is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_inotifywatch is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_io is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_irqbalance is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_iwcap is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_iwinfo is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_jq is not set CONFIG_PACKAGE_jshn=y # CONFIG_PACKAGE_kmod is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_lcd4linux-custom is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_lcdproc-clients is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_lcdproc-drivers is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_lcdproc-server is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_less is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_less-wide is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libimobiledevice-utils is not set CONFIG_PACKAGE_libjson-script=y # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libplist-utils is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libsysrepo is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libusbmuxd-utils is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_libxml2-utils is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_lm-sensors is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_lm-sensors-detect is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_logger is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_logrotate is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_look is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_losetup is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_lrzsz is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_lscpu is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_lsof is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_lxc is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_lxc-unprivileged is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_maccalc is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_macchanger is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_mbedtls-util is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_mbim-utils is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_mbtools is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_mc is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_mcookie is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_mmc-utils is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_moreutils is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_mount-utils is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_mpack is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_mt-st is not set # CONFIG_PACKAGE_namei is not set # 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      "readme": "# Actions-OpenWrt\n\n[![LICENSE](https://img.shields.io/github/license/mashape/apistatus.svg?style=flat-square&label=LICENSE)](https://github.com/P3TERX/Actions-OpenWrt/blob/master/LICENSE)\n![GitHub Stars](https://img.shields.io/github/stars/P3TERX/Actions-OpenWrt.svg?style=flat-square&label=Stars&logo=github)\n![GitHub Forks](https://img.shields.io/github/forks/P3TERX/Actions-OpenWrt.svg?style=flat-square&label=Forks&logo=github)\n\nBuild OpenWrt using GitHub Actions\n\n[Read the details in my blog (in Chinese) | 中文教程](https://p3terx.com/archives/build-openwrt-with-github-actions.html)\n\n## Usage\n\n- Click the [Use this template](https://github.com/P3TERX/Actions-OpenWrt/generate) button to create a new repository.\n- Generate `.config` files using [Lean's OpenWrt](https://github.com/coolsnowwolf/lede) source code. ( You can change it through environment variables in the workflow file. )\n- Push `.config` file to the GitHub repository, and the build starts automatically.Progress can be viewed on the Actions page.\n- When the build is complete, click the `Artifacts` button in the upper right corner of the Actions page to download the binaries.\n\n### Tips\n\nIt may take a long time to create a `.config` file and build the OpenWrt firmware. Thus, before create repository to build your own firmware, you may check out if others have already built it which meet your needs by simply [search `Actions-Openwrt` in GitHub](https://github.com/search?q=Actions-openwrt).\n\nAdd some meta info of your built firmware (such as firmware architecture and installed packages) to your repository introduction, this will save others' time.\n\n## Acknowledgments\n\n- [Microsoft](https://www.microsoft.com)\n- [Microsoft Azure](https://azure.microsoft.com)\n- [GitHub](https://github.com)\n- [GitHub Actions](https://github.com/features/actions)\n- [tmate](https://github.com/tmate-io/tmate)\n- [mxschmitt/action-tmate](https://github.com/mxschmitt/action-tmate)\n- [csexton/debugger-action](https://github.com/csexton/debugger-action)\n- [Cisco](https://www.cisco.com/)\n- [OpenWrt](https://github.com/openwrt/openwrt)\n- [Lean's OpenWrt](https://github.com/coolsnowwolf/lede)\n- [Cowtransfer](https://cowtransfer.com)\n- [WeTransfer](https://wetransfer.com/)\n- [Mikubill/transfer](https://github.com/Mikubill/transfer)\n\n## License\n\n[MIT](https://github.com/P3TERX/Actions-OpenWrt/blob/master/LICENSE) © P3TERX",
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      "readme": "Simulatore CARLA\n=========\n\nContenuto delle directory\n---------\ncarla_simulator: Contiene il database dei messaggi CAN, i file di configurazione e la definizione delle classi usate\n    usate dal simulatore\n\ndocs: Contiene la documentazione generata con sphinx\n\nids: Contiene la definizione delle classi utili ad implementare il sistema di IDS\n\nscript_bb: Contiene file di configurazione e script eseguiti sulla beaglebone\n\nscript_client: Contiene file di configurazione e script eseguiti sulla macchina client\n\nscript_pi: Contiene gli script per eseguire gli attacchi\n\nscript_pynq: Contiene file di configurazione e script eseguiti sulla pynq\n\nIstruzioni d'uso\n---------\nI componenti dell'architettura sono disposti come in figura:\n\n<p align=\"center\">\n\t<img src=\"figures/CARLA_schematic.png\"/>\n</p>\n\nPer l'avvio della simulazione:\n* Collegare punto-punto server e client tramite un cavo Ethernet (tale soluzione è necessaria per avere una latenza\n    piccola e quindi evitare fenomeni di lag)\n* Scegliere e impostare gli indirizzi IP statici su client e server\n* Modificare i parametri di interesse nel file *config.py* presente nella directory *carla_simulator*. In particolare\n    è necessario impostare il percorso del file *.egg* di CARLA\n* Collegare al client il convertitore USB-CAN e connettere il convertitore al bus CAN\n* Collegare la beaglebone dotata del Cape Waveshare RS485-CAN al bus CAN\n* Collegare la pynq (spenta) dotata del tranceiver al bus CAN e poi accenderla (è importante accendere la pynq dopo\n    averla collegata al bus altriemnti il controller CAN integrato potrebbe bloccarsi, in tal caso è necessario\n    riavviare la pynq)\n* Avviare il Server\n\nSulla beaglebone:\n* Alimentare la beaglebone tenendo premuto il pulsante \"BOOT\" sul cape\n* Installare con apt i pacchetti dnsmasq (server DNS e DCHP) e hostapd (servizio per creare l'access point) e\n    configurarli. In particolare nel file *dnsmasq.conf* è necessario impostare l'interfaccia su cui dnsmasq\n    sarà in ascolto e l'intervallo di indirrizzi IP che può assegnare, mentre nel file *hostapd.conf* è necessario\n    impostare l'interfaccia su cui creare l'access point. Entrambi i file sono situati nella directory */etc*, i file\n    presenti nella directory *script_bb* sono solo delle copie\n* Modificare i parametri di interesse nel file *config_bb.py*\n* Assicurarsi che gli script *can1init.sh* e *init_wlan0.sh* abbiano i permessi di esecuzione\n* Avviare lo script *ricezione_beaglebone.py* con permessi di amministratore (*sudo python3 ricezione_beaglebone.py*)\n\nSul client:\n* Affinchè il convertitore USB-CAN possa essere usato deve essere installata la versione develop del modulo python-can.\n    In alternativa, dopo aver installato python-can con pip, è possibile copiare la directory *seeedstudio*\n    situata in *can\\interfaces* della versione develop nella versione installata con pip. In *script_client* è\n    possibile trovare una copia di tale directory\n* Avviare lo script *Simulatore.py* passandogli come argomento i parametri desiderati (in particolare indirizzo ip e\n    porta del server, l'elenco dei parametri si trova nella documentazione).\n\nSulla pynq:\n* Installare il modulo pomegrante. Nel caso in cui non sia possibile installare il modulo tramite pip sarà necessario\n    compilarlo direttamente sulla pynq. Le istruzioni si possono trovare all'indirizzo:\n    https://pomegranate.readthedocs.io/en/latest/install.html\n* Eseguire in sequenza le istruzioni presenti nei notebook jupyter (in *bayes_net.ipynb* è implementata la rete\n    bayesiana mentre in *CanPynq.ipynb* è implementato un sistema di log)\n\nSulla raspberry pi:\n* Collegare la raspberry all'access point della beaglebone o comunque fare in modo che beaglebone e raspberry siano\n    sulla stessa rete\n* Impostare nello script *attack.py* indirizzo ip e porta su cui la beaglebone è in ascolto\n* Lanciare lo script *attack.py*\n\nTroubleshooting\n---------",
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      "url": "https://github.com/wtsxDev/Vehicle-Security",
      "description": "List of resources for learning about vehicle security and car hacking",
      "readme": "# Resources for learning about vehicle security and car hacking\n\n![Awesome](https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-ZSzRXVqxNtU/WHu98qkfRTI/AAAAAAAAB1U/LspBg5Nbnj4vNiMx931jl5fHviiwbot8QCLcB/s1600/Vehicle-Security.png)\n\n\n\n*A curated list of awesome resources, books, hardware, software, applications, people to follow, and more cool stuff about vehicle security, car hacking, and tinkering with the functionality of your car.*\n\n# Contents\n\n- [Learn](#learn)\n    - [Articles](#articles)\n    - [Presentations](#presentations)\n    - [Books](#books)\n    - [Websites](#websites)\n    - [Conferences](#conferences)\n    - [Who to Follow](#who-to-follow)\n    - [Podcasts and Episodes](#podcasts-and-episodes)\n        - [Podcasts](#podcasts)\n        - [Episodes](#episodes)\n- [Hardware](#hardware)\n- [Software](#software)\n  - [Applications](#applications)\n  - [Libraries and Tools](#libraries-and-tools)\n    - [C](#c)\n    - [Python](#python)\n    - [Go](#go)\n    - [JavaScript](#javascript)\n- [Companies and Jobs](#companies-and-jobs)\n    - [Responsible Disclosure](#responsible-disclosure)\n\n# Learn\n## Articles\n\n- 🌟 [Stopping a Jeep Cherokee on the Highway Remotely](https://www.wired.com/2015/07/hackers-remotely-kill-jeep-highway/) - Chris Valasek's and Charlie Miller's pivotal research on hacking into Jeep's presented at DEFCON in 2015.\n- [Troy Hunt on Controlling Nissans](https://www.troyhunt.com/controlling-vehicle-features-of-nissan/) - Troy Hunt goes into controlling Nissan vehicles.\n- [Tesla hackers explain how they did it at Defcon](http://www.cnet.com/roadshow/news/tesla-hackers-explain-how-they-did-it-at-def-con-23/) - Overview of DEFCON 23 presentation on hacking into Tesla cars.\n- [Anatomy of the Rolljam Wireless Car Hack](http://makezine.com/2015/08/11/anatomy-of-the-rolljam-wireless-car-hack/) - Overview of the RollJam rolling code exploitation device.\n- [IOActive's Tools and Data](http://blog.ioactive.com/2013/08/car-hacking-content.html) - Chris Valasek and Charlie Miller release some of their tools and data for hacking into vehicles in an effort to get more people into vehicle security research.\n- [Developments in Car Hacking](https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/ICS/developments-car-hacking-36607) - via the SANS Reading Room, Currie's paper analyses the risks and perils of smart vehicle technology.\n\n## Presentations\n\n- [\"Hopping on the CAN Bus\" from BlackHat Asia 2015](https://www.blackhat.com/asia-15/briefings.html#hopping-on-the-can-bus) - A talk from BlackHat Asia 2015 that by the end the audience should \"gain an understanding of automotive systems, but will also have the tools to attack them\".\n- [\"Drive It Like You Hacked It\" from DEFCON 23](https://samy.pl/defcon2015/) - A talk and slides from Samy Kamkar's DEFCON 23/2015 talk that includes hacking garages, exploiting automotive mobile apps, and breaking rolling codes to unlock any vehicle with low cost tools.\n- [Samy Kamkar on Hacking Vehicles with OnStar](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3olXUbS-prU&feature=youtu.be) - Samy Kamkar, the prolific hacker behind the Samy worm on MySpace, explores hacking into vehicles with OnStar systems.\n- [Remote Exploitation of an Unaltered Passenger Vehicle](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OobLb1McxnI) - DEFCON 23 talk by Chris Valasek and Charlie Miller give their now famous talk on hacking into a Jeep remotely and stopping it dead in its tracks.\n- [Adventures in Automotive Networks and Control Units](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n70hIu9lcYo) - DEFCON 21 talk by Chris Valasek and Charlie Miller on automotive networks.\n- [Can You Trust Autonomous Vehicles?](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=orWqKWvIW_0) - DEFCON 24 talk by Jianhao Liu, Chen Yan, Wenyuan Xu\n- [Ken Munro & Dave Lodge - Hacking the Mitsubishi Outlander & IOT](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YLBQdO6a5IQ) - talk from BSides Manchester 2016 by Ken and Dave of [Pen Test Partners](#who-to-follow)\n>>>>>>> master\n\n## Books\n\n- 🌟 [2014 Car Hacker's Handbook](http://opengarages.org/handbook/) - Free guide to hacking vehicles from 2014. You can also buy the book on Amazon [here](http://amzn.to/2jMXjjM).\n- 🌟💰 [2016 Car Hacker's Handbook](http://amzn.to/2iA3WIj) - Latest version of the Car Hacker's handbook with updated information to hack your own vehicle and learning vehicle security.\n- 💰 [A Comprehensible Guide to Controller Area Network](http://amzn.to/2jN4FDH) - An older book from 2005, but still a comprehensive guide on CAN buses and networking in vehicles.\n- 💰 [Controller Area Network Prototyping with Arduino](http://amzn.to/2jMX34a) - This book guides you through prototyping CAN applications on Arduinos, which can help when working with CAN on your own car.\n- 💰 [Embedded Networking with CAN and CANopen](http://amzn.to/2iX7lie) - From 2003, this book fills in gaps in CAN literature and will educate you further on CAN networks and working with embedded systems.\n\n\n## Websites\n\n- 🌟 [OpenGarages](http://opengarages.org/index.php/Main_Page) - Provides public access, documentation and tools necessary to understand today's modern vehicle systems.\n- [DEFCON Car Hacking Village](http://www.carhackingvillage.com/) - Car Hacking exercises from DEFCON 24.\n- [canbushack: Hack Your Car](http://www.canbushack.com/blog/index.php) - course on Vehicle Hacking methodology.\n- [OWASP Internet of Things Project](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Internet_of_Things_Project#tab=Community) - OWASP's project to secure IoT, from cars to medical devices and beyond.\n- [IAmTheCavalry](https://www.iamthecavalry.org/) - Global organization backed by major internet companies pushing standards to secure IoT devices.\n- [Carloop Community](https://community.carloop.io/) - Community of people interested in car hacking and connecting vehicles to the cloud.\n\n## Conferences\n\n- [The Cyber Security Automotve Summit](http://www.automotivecybersecurity.com/) - A conference dedicated to automotive cyber security involving most of the big players on this aspect.\n\n\n## Who to Follow\n\n- 🌟 Chris Valasek: Security Lead at [UberATC](#companies-and-jobs)\n    - [Twitter](https://twitter.com/nudehaberdasher)\n    - [Website](http://chris.illmatics.com/about.html)\n- 🌟 Charlie Miller: Hacked the first Apple iPhone, now does car security.\n    - [Twitter](https://twitter.com/0xcharlie)\n- 🌟 Samy Kamkar: Created MySpace Worm, RollJam, OwnStar.\n    - [Twitter](https://twitter.com/samykamkar)\n- 🌟 Justin Seitz: Author of Black Hat Python (No Starch Press).\n    - [Twitter](https://twitter.com/jms_dot_py)\n- 🌟 Troy Hunt: Pluralsight author. Microsoft Regional Director and MVP for Developer Security. Creator of [haveibeenpwned](https://haveibeenpwned.com/).\n    - [Twitter](https://twitter.com/troyhunt)\n    - [Website](https://www.troyhunt.com/)\n- Ken Munro: British researcher, works at Pen Test Partners; major interest in vehicle security\n    - [Twitter](https://twitter.com/TheKenMunroShow)\n- OpenGarages: Initiative to created Vehicle Research Labs around the world.\n    - [Twitter](https://twitter.com/opengarages)\n    - [Website](http://opengarages.org/index.php/Main_Page)\n- Hackaday: Collaborative project hosting for hackers - there are frequently car projects on here.\n    - [Twitter](https://twitter.com/hackaday)\n- Pen Test Partners: British penetration testing firm; several posts concern their disclosed car security vulns\n    - [Twitter](https://twitter.com/pentestpartners)\n    - [Website](https://www.pentestpartners.com/blog)\n\n## Podcasts and Episodes\n\nPodcasts and podcast episodes, that either directly focus on vehicle security or have some episodes on it.\n\n### Podcasts\n- 🌟 [Security Weekly](http://securityweekly.com/) - Excellent podcast covering all ranges of security, with some episodes focusing portions on vehicle security from cars to drones.\n- [TrustedSec Podcast](https://www.trustedsec.com/podcast/) - From the people at TrustedSec, leaders in Social Engineering, their episodes often go into recent vehicle vulnerabilities and exploits.\n- [SANS Internet Storm Center](https://isc.sans.edu/) - the ISC run a regular podcast going into the latest vulnerabilities and security news.\n- [Security Ledger](https://soundcloud.com/securityledger) - A podcast focusing on interviewing security experts about topics related to security.\n\n### Episodes\n- 🌟 [Car Hacking with Craig Smith](http://softwareengineeringdaily.com/2015/09/02/car-hacking-with-craig-smith/) - Software Engineering Daily did an amazing episode with Craig Smith, author of the Car Hacking Handbook (above), on hacking into vehicles.\n- [Big Bugs Podcast Episode 1: Auto Bugs - Critical Vulns found in Cars with Jason Haddix](https://blog.bugcrowd.com/big-bugs-podcast-episode-1) - Jason Haddix explores major vulnerabilities found in cars.\n- [Hacking Under the Hood and Into Your Car](http://www.npr.org/2013/08/02/208270026/hacking-under-the-hood-and-into-your-car) - Chris Valasek and Charlie Miller discuss with NPR how they were able to hack into vehicles.\n- [Hacking Connected Vehicles with Chris Valasek of IOActive](https://soundcloud.com/securityledger/chris-valasek-of-ioactive) - Chris Valasek talks about hacking into connected vehicles.\n\n# Hardware 💰\n\nOverview of hardware, both open source and proprietary, that you can use when conducting vehicle security research. [This article](http://makezine.com/2016/04/08/car-hacking-tools-trade/) goes through many of the options below.\n\n- 🌟 [Arduino](https://www.arduino.cc/) - Arduino boards have a number of shields you can attach to connect to CAN-enabled devices.\n    - [CANdiy-Shield](https://github.com/watterott/CANdiy-Shield)\n    - [ChuangZhou CAN-Bus Shield](http://www.seeedstudio.com/wiki/CAN-BUS_Shield)\n    - [DFRobot CAN-BUS Shield For Arduino](http://www.dfrobot.com/index.php?route=product/product&product_id=1444)\n    - [SparkFun CAN-BUS Shield](https://www.sparkfun.com/products/13262)\n- [CANtact](http://linklayer.github.io/cantact/) - \"The Open Source Car Tool\" designed to help you hack your car. You can buy one or make your own following the guide here.\n- [Freematics OBD-II Telematics Kit](http://freematics.com/pages/products/arduino-telematics-kit-3/) - Arduino-based OBD-II Bluetooth adapter kit has both an OBD-II device and a data logger, and it comes with GPS, an accelerometer and gyro, and temperature sensors.\n- 🌟 [ELM327](https://www.elmelectronics.com/obdic.html) - The de facto chipset that's very cheap and can be used to connect to CAN devices.\n- [GoodThopter12](http://goodfet.sourceforge.net/hardware/goodthopter12/) - Crafted by a well-known hardware hacker, this board is a general board that can be used for exploration of automotive networks.\n- [USB2CAN](http://www.8devices.com/products/usb2can/) - Cheap USB to CAN connector that will register a device on linux that you can use to get data from a CAN network.\n- [Intrepid Tools](http://store.intrepidcs.com/) - Expensive, but extremely versatile tools specifically designed for reversing CAN and other vehicle communication protocols.\n- [Red Pitaya](http://redpitaya.com/) - Replaces expensive measurement tools such as oscilloscopes, signal generators, and spectrum analyzers. Red Pitaya has LabView and Matlab interfaces, and you can write your own tools and applications for it. It even supports extensions for things like Arduino shields.\n- [ChipWhisperer](http://newae.com/tools/chipwhisperer/) - A system for side-channel attacks, such as power analysis and clock glitching.\n- [HackerSDR](https://greatscottgadgets.com/hackrf/) - A Software Defined Radio peripheral capable of transmission or reception of radio signals from 1 MHz to 6 GHz. Designed to enable test and development of modern and next generation radio technologies.\n- [Carloop](https://www.carloop.io/) - Open source development kit that makes it easy to connect your car to the Internet. Lowest cost car hacking tool that is compatible with SocketCAN and can-utils.  No OBD-II to serial cable required.\n- [CANBadger](https://gutenshit.github.io/CANBadger/) - A tool for reverse-engineering and testing automotive systems. The CANBadger consists of both hardware and software. The main interface is a LPC1768/LPC1769 processor mounted on a custom PCB, which offers two CAN interfaces, SD Card, a blinky LED, some GPIO pins, power supply for peripherals and the ethernet port.\n- [CANSPY](https://bitbucket.org/jcdemay/canspy) - A platform giving security auditors to audit CAN devices. It can be used to block, forward or modify CAN frames on the fly autonomously as well as interactively.\n- [CANBus Triple](https://canb.us/) - General purpose Controller Area Network swiss army knife and development platform.\n- [USBtin](http://www.fischl.de/usbtin/) - USBtin is a simple USB to CAN interface. It can monitor CAN busses and transmit CAN messages. USBtin implements the USB CDC class and creates a virtual comport on the host computer.\n- 🌟 [OpenXC](http://openxcplatform.com/hardware.html) - OpenXC is a combination of open source hardware and software that lets you extend your vehicle with custom applications and pluggable modules. It uses standard, well-known tools to open up a wealth of data from the vehicle to developers. Started by researchers at Ford, it works for all 2002 and newer MY vehicles (standard OBD-II interface). Researchers at Ford Motor Company joined up to create a standard way of creating aftermarket software and hardware for vehicles.\n\n# Software\n\nOverview of software, both open source and proprietary, as well as libraries from various programming languages. [This article](http://makezine.com/2016/04/08/car-hacking-tools-trade/) goes through many of the options below.\n\n## Applications\n\nSoftware applications that will help you hack your car, investigate it's signals, and general tinkering with it.\n\n- 🌟 [Wireshark](https://www.wireshark.org/) - WireShark can be used for reversing CAN communications.\n- [Kayak](http://kayak.2codeornot2code.org/) - Java application for CAN bus diagnosis and monitoring.\n- [UDSim](https://github.com/zombieCraig/UDSim/) - GUI tool that can monitor a CAN bus and automatically learn the devices attached to it by watching communications.\n- [RomRaider](http://www.romraider.com/) - An open source tuning suite for the Subaru engine control unit that lets you view and log data and tune the ECU.\n- 💰 [Intrepid Tools](http://store.intrepidcs.com/) - Expensive, but extremely versatile tools specifically designed for reversing CAN and other vehicle communication protocols.\n- [O2OO](https://www.vanheusden.com/O2OO/) - Works with the ELM327 to record data to a SQLite database for graphing purposes. It also supports reading GPS data. You can connect this to your car and have it map out using Google Maps KML data where you drive.\n- [CANToolz](https://github.com/eik00d/CANToolz) - CANToolz is a framework for analysing CAN networks and devices. It is based on several modules which can be assembled in a pipeline.\n- [BUSMASTER](https://rbei-etas.github.io/busmaster/) -An Open Source tool to simulate, analyze and test data bus systems such as CAN, LIN, FlexRay.\n- 🌟 [OpenXC](http://openxcplatform.com/getting-started/index.html) - Currently, OpenXC works with `Python` and `Android`, with libraries provided to get started.\n\n## Libraries and Tools\n\nLibraries and tools that don't fall under the larger class of applications above.\n\n### C\n\n- [SocketCAN Utils](https://github.com/linux-can/can-utils) - Userspace utilites for SocketCAN on Linux.\n- [vircar](https://github.com/dn5/vircar) - a Virtual car userspace that sends CAN messages based on SocketCAN\n\n### Python\n\n- 🌟 [CANard](https://github.com/ericevenchick/canard) - A Python framework for Controller Area Network applications.\n- [Caring Caribou](https://github.com/CaringCaribou/caringcaribou/) - Intended to be the *nmap of vehicle security*.\n- [c0f](https://github.com/zombieCraig/c0f/) - A fingerprinting tool for CAN communications that can be used to find a specific signal on a CAN network when testing interactions with a vehicle.\n- [Python-CAN](http://python-can.readthedocs.io/en/latest/index.html) - Python interface to various CAN implementations, including SocketCAN. Allows you to use Python 2.7.x or 3.3.x+ to communicate over CAN networks.\n\n### Go\n\n- [CANNiBUS](https://github.com/Hive13/CANiBUS/) - A Go server that allows a room full of researchers to simultaneously work on the same vehicle, whether for instructional purposes or team reversing sessions.\n- [CAN Simulator](https://github.com/carloop/simulator-program) - A Go based CAN simulator for the Raspberry Pi to be used with PiCAN2 or the open source [CAN Simulator board](https://github.com/carloop/simulator)\n\n### JavaScript\n\n- [NodeJS extension to SocketCAN](https://github.com/sebi2k1/node-can) - Allows you to communicate over CAN networks with simple JavaScript functions.\n\n# Companies and Jobs\n\nCompanies and job opportunities in the vehicle security field.\n\n- [UberATC](https://www.uberatc.com/) - Uber Advanced Technologies Center - <info@uberatc.com>.\n- [Tesla](https://www.tesla.com/careers/search#/filter/?keyword=security&department=1) - Tesla hires security professionals for a variety of roles, particularly securing their vehicles.\n- [Intrepid Control Systems](https://www.intrepidcs.com/jobs/) - Embedded security company building tools for reversing vehicles.\n- [Rapid7](https://www.rapid7.com/company/careers.jsp) - Rapid7 does work in information, computer, and embedded security.\n- [IOActive](http://www.ioactive.com/) - Security consulting firm that does work on pentesting hardware and embedded systems.\n\n## Responsible disclosure\n\n- [General Motors](https://hackerone.com/gm) on HackerOne - responsible disclosure submissions accepted\n- [Fiat Chrysler Automobiles](https://bugcrowd.com/fca) on Bugcrowd - responsible disclosure submissions accepted\n- [Tesla Motors](https://bugcrowd.com/tesla) on Bugcrowd - submissions accepted, paid bounties offered\n\nPlease have a look at\n* [Best Hacking Books](http://www.kalitut.com/2016/12/best-ethical-hacking-books.html)\n* [Best Reverse Engineering Books](http://www.kalitut.com/2017/01/Best-reverse-engineering-books.html)\n* [Best Machine learning Books](http://www.kalitut.com/2017/01/machine-learning-book.html)\n* [Best 5 books Programming Books](http://www.kalitut.com/2017/01/Top-Programming-Books.html)\n* [Best Java Books](http://www.kalitut.com/2017/01/Best-Java-Programming-Books.html)",
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      "description": "ESP32-C6 Tesla CAN bus mod — FSD activation, battery telemetry, preconditioning, built-in LCD + WiFi dashboard + Flipper Zero companion app",
      "readme": "<div align=\"center\">\n\n# ⚡ TeslaCAN\n\n**Open-source Tesla CAN bus mod for ESP32-C6 — with a built-in LCD, a WiFi dashboard, and now a Flipper Zero companion.**\n\n[![PlatformIO](https://img.shields.io/badge/PlatformIO-ESP32--C6-orange?logo=platformio&style=flat-square)](https://platformio.org/)\n[![License: MIT](https://img.shields.io/badge/license-MIT-blue?style=flat-square)](LICENSE)\n[![Version](https://img.shields.io/badge/version-0.3.0-brightgreen?style=flat-square)](CHANGELOG.md)\n[![GitHub stars](https://img.shields.io/github/stars/tuncasoftbildik/tesla-can-mod?style=flat-square&logo=github)](https://github.com/tuncasoftbildik/tesla-can-mod/stargazers)\n[![Last commit](https://img.shields.io/github/last-commit/tuncasoftbildik/tesla-can-mod?style=flat-square&logo=github)](https://github.com/tuncasoftbildik/tesla-can-mod/commits/main)\n[![Issues](https://img.shields.io/github/issues/tuncasoftbildik/tesla-can-mod?style=flat-square&logo=github)](https://github.com/tuncasoftbildik/tesla-can-mod/issues)\n[![Tesla](https://img.shields.io/badge/Tesla-Model%203%20/%20Y-red?logo=tesla&style=flat-square)](https://tesla.com)\n[![Flipper Zero](https://img.shields.io/badge/Flipper%20Zero-companion-orange?style=flat-square)](flipper/)\n\n**[English](#english)** | **[Türkçe](#turkce)** | **[Wire protocol](include/uart_bridge.h)** | **[Changelog](CHANGELOG.md)**\n\n</div>\n\n---\n\n<a name=\"english\"></a>\n\n## What is TeslaCAN?\n\nTeslaCAN is an open-source CAN-bus modification firmware for the\n**Waveshare ESP32-C6-LCD-1.47**. It plugs into the Tesla Model 3 / Y\ndiagnostic port and gives you:\n\n- **FSD activation** at the CAN frame layer (requires an active FSD\n  entitlement on the car)\n- **Driver-attention nag suppression** and ISA chime suppression\n- **Battery telemetry**: real-time SoC, voltage, current, power, pack\n  temperature, Wh/km\n- **Battery preconditioning trigger** — heat the pack before plug-in\n- **Motor telemetry + 0–100 km/h timer** — live front/rear drive-inverter\n  torque, vehicle speed, and a passive launch stopwatch (last + session best)\n- **A built-in 1.47″ color LCD** that always shows live status without a\n  phone\n- **A WiFi access point + web dashboard** at `http://192.168.4.1`\n- **A Flipper Zero companion app** that talks to the firmware over a\n  4-wire UART link — see [flipper/README.md](flipper/README.md)\n- **A reference Python client** ([`tools/teslacan_client.py`](tools/teslacan_client.py))\n  for scripting and testing without any extra hardware\n\n## How it compares\n\n|                            | TeslaCAN (this repo)                | hypery11/flipper-tesla-fsd        | S3XY Commander (commercial) |\n|----------------------------|--------------------------------------|------------------------------------|------------------------------|\n| Standalone use (no Flipper) | ✅ Built-in LCD + WiFi dashboard    | ❌ Flipper required                | ✅ Yes                        |\n| Flipper Zero companion     | ✅ MVP (this release)                | ✅ Mature                          | ❌ No                         |\n| WiFi 6 + BLE 5.0 hardware  | ✅ ESP32-C6                          | ⚠ Classic ESP32 / MCP2515         | Proprietary                   |\n| Open source                | ✅ MIT                               | ✅ GPL-3.0                         | ❌ Closed                      |\n| Battery preconditioning    | ✅                                    | ✅                                 | ✅                            |\n| ISA chime suppress         | ✅                                    | ✅                                 | ✅                            |\n| Web dashboard              | ✅ Built-in AP                       | ❌                                 | App-only                      |\n| Cost (DIY)                 | ~$25                                 | ~$14                               | $200+                         |\n| Bilingual docs (EN/TR)     | ✅                                    | ❌                                 | ❌                            |\n\n> The aim is not to displace either of the others — `hypery11/flipper-tesla-fsd`\n> is the mature Flipper-first stack and we cross-reference its excellent\n> CAN research. TeslaCAN is positioned as the **standalone-first** option\n> with Flipper as an add-on rather than a hard dependency.\n\n## Hardware\n\n| Part                              | Notes                                     |\n|-----------------------------------|-------------------------------------------|\n| Waveshare **ESP32-C6-LCD-1.47**   | 172×320 ST7789 display, WiFi 6 + BLE 5.0  |\n| **SN65HVD230** CAN transceiver    | 3.3 V tolerant, common on Aliexpress      |\n| **LM2596** buck converter         | 12 V → 5 V for the ESP32                  |\n| Dupont jumper wires               | Female-to-female                          |\n| *(optional)* Flipper Zero         | For the companion app                     |\n\nTotal BOM, without the Flipper: **~$25**.\n\n## Wiring (in-car)\n\n```\n Tesla Diagnostic Port                    ESP32-C6-LCD-1.47\n (Front Bumper)                          ┌─────────────────┐\n ┌──────────┐                            │                 │\n │  CAN-H ──┼──── CANH ┌───────────┐    │  ┌───────────┐  │\n │  CAN-L ──┼──── CANL │ SN65HVD230│    │  │  172×320  │  │\n │          │          │  TX ──────┼────┼──► GPIO 0    │  │\n │  12V ────┼──┐       │  RX ──────┼────┼──► GPIO 1    │  │\n │  GND ────┼──┼──┐    │  VCC ─────┼────┼──► 3.3V      │  │\n └──────────┘  │  │    │  GND ─────┼────┼──► GND       │  │\n               │  │    └───────────┘    │              │  │\n               │  │    ┌───────────┐    │  WiFi AP:    │  │\n               │  └────│ LM2596    │    │  TeslaCAN    │  │\n               │       │ 12V → 5V ─┼────┼──► 5V        │  │\n               └───────│ GND ──────┼────┼──► GND       │  │\n                       └───────────┘    └──────────────┘\n```\n\n## Pin map\n\n| Function       | GPIO | Notes                                  |\n|----------------|------|----------------------------------------|\n| TWAI TX        | 0    | to SN65HVD230 TX                       |\n| TWAI RX        | 1    | from SN65HVD230 RX                     |\n| **Flipper TX** | **4** | to Flipper pin 14 (RX) — `FLIPPER_UART_TX` |\n| **Flipper RX** | **5** | to Flipper pin 13 (TX) — `FLIPPER_UART_RX` |\n| LCD SPI SCK    | 7    | built-in                               |\n| LCD SPI MOSI   | 6    | built-in                               |\n| LCD CS         | 14   | built-in                               |\n| LCD DC         | 15   | built-in                               |\n| LCD RST        | 21   | built-in                               |\n| LCD BL         | 22   | backlight                              |\n| Activity LED   | 8    | built-in                               |\n\nAll UART/CAN pins can be remapped via PlatformIO build flags in\n[`platformio.ini`](platformio.ini).\n\n## CAN map\n\n| CAN ID         | Name                  | Direction  | Function                                       |\n|----------------|-----------------------|------------|------------------------------------------------|\n| `0x3FD` (1021) | `AP_CONTROL`          | Read/Write | FSD enable (bit 46/60), nag suppress (bit 19) |\n| `0x3F8` (1016) | `AP_FOLLOW_DIST`      | Read       | Speed profile via follow-distance stalk        |\n| `0x132` (306)  | `BMS_hvBusStatus`     | Read       | Pack voltage & current                         |\n| `0x292` (658)  | `BMS_socStatus`       | Read       | State of charge                                |\n| `0x212` (530)  | `BMS_status`          | Read       | Precondition allowed / worthwhile flags        |\n| `0x312` (786)  | `BMS_thermalStatus`   | Read       | Pack temperature min/max                       |\n| `0x33A` (826)  | `UI_ratedConsumption` | Read       | Energy consumption Wh/km                       |\n| `0x082` (130)  | `UI_tripPlanning`     | Write      | Preconditioning trigger (10 Hz)                |\n| `0x399` (921)  | `ISA_chime`           | Read/Write | ISA speed-warning chime suppression            |\n\nDetailed signal layout: [`TESLA_CAN_BATTERY_REFERENCE.md`](TESLA_CAN_BATTERY_REFERENCE.md),\n[`TESLA_CAN_STEERING_REFERENCE.md`](TESLA_CAN_STEERING_REFERENCE.md).\n\n## Supported vehicles\n\n| Vehicle                         | Handler         | Status              |\n|---------------------------------|-----------------|---------------------|\n| Tesla Model Y Juniper (HW4)     | `HW4Handler`    | ✅ Primary target    |\n| Tesla Model 3 / Y (HW3)         | `HW3Handler`    | ✅ Supported         |\n| Tesla Model 3 / Y (Legacy AP)   | `LegacyHandler` | ✅ Supported         |\n| Model S / X (Palladium)         | —               | ⏳ Roadmap           |\n\n## Three ways to use it\n\n### 1. Standalone (LCD + phone)\n\nBoot the ESP32-C6 in the car. Watch the LCD. Connect your phone to the\n**TeslaCAN** WiFi (password `tesla1234`) and open\n[`http://192.168.4.1`](http://192.168.4.1) for the full web dashboard.\n\n### 2. With a Flipper Zero in the cabin\n\nWire four cables (GND, 3V3, TX, RX) between the Flipper top header and the\nESP32-C6. Side-load `teslacan.fap` onto the Flipper.\n\n```bash\ncd flipper\npip install --upgrade ufbt\nufbt launch\n```\n\nOpen the **TeslaCAN** app from the Flipper Tools menu. You get a live\ndashboard plus on-screen toggles for FSD, preconditioning, and speed\nmodes — see [`flipper/README.md`](flipper/README.md) for the protocol\nand wiring details.\n\n### 3. Scripted from a laptop\n\nPlug a USB-serial adapter into the same UART pins and run the reference\nPython client:\n\n```bash\npip install pyserial\n./tools/teslacan_client.py /dev/cu.usbserial-1234 --hello\n./tools/teslacan_client.py /dev/cu.usbserial-1234 --stream\n./tools/teslacan_client.py /dev/cu.usbserial-1234 --precond on\n```\n\nThe wire protocol is plain ASCII (`EVT …` / `CMD …` lines) and is fully\ndocumented in [`include/uart_bridge.h`](include/uart_bridge.h).\n\n## Build & flash\n\n```bash\ngit clone https://github.com/tuncasoftbildik/tesla-can-mod.git\ncd tesla-can-mod\npio run                  # build\npio run -t upload        # flash over USB-C\npio device monitor       # watch serial logs\n```\n\n## Build flags\n\nEdit [`platformio.ini`](platformio.ini) to customise:\n\n```ini\nbuild_flags =\n    -D HW4                        ; vehicle handler: HW4 / HW3 / LEGACY\n    -D DRIVER_TWAI                ; ESP32 native CAN driver\n    -D TWAI_TX_PIN=0\n    -D TWAI_RX_PIN=1\n    -D PIN_LED=8\n    -D FORCE_FSD                  ; always enable FSD (omit for UI-gated)\n    -D FLIPPER_UART_ENABLE        ; enable the Flipper bridge\n    -D FLIPPER_UART_TX=4\n    -D FLIPPER_UART_RX=5\n    -D FLIPPER_UART_BAUD=115200\n    -D FLIPPER_FW_VERSION=\\\"0.2.0\\\"\n```\n\n## Project layout\n\n```\ntesla-can-mod/\n├── src/\n│   └── main.cpp                 # entry point — CAN + LCD + WiFi + UART loop\n├── include/\n│   ├── handlers.h               # HW4 / HW3 / Legacy CAN handlers\n│   ├── uart_bridge.h            # Flipper Zero UART protocol bridge (v0.2.0)\n│   ├── can_helpers.h\n│   ├── can_frame_types.h\n│   ├── shared_types.h\n│   ├── log_buffer.h\n│   ├── lcd_display.h\n│   ├── User_Setup.h\n│   ├── drivers/\n│   │   ├── can_driver.h\n│   │   └── twai_driver.h\n│   └── web/\n│       ├── web_server.h\n│       └── web_ui.h\n├── flipper/                     # Flipper Zero companion FAP (new in 0.2.0)\n│   ├── application.fam\n│   ├── teslacan_app.{c,h}\n│   ├── teslacan_uart.{c,h}\n│   └── README.md\n├── tools/\n│   └── teslacan_client.py       # Python reference client\n├── TESLA_CAN_BATTERY_REFERENCE.md\n├── TESLA_CAN_STEERING_REFERENCE.md\n├── platformio.ini\n├── CHANGELOG.md\n└── README.md\n```\n\n## Roadmap\n\n- [ ] OTA firmware update over WiFi\n- [ ] SD-card CAN bus logger\n- [x] Motor torque live view (`0x108`, `0x1D8`) — *v0.3.0, DBC scaling unverified on-vehicle*\n- [x] 0–100 km/h performance timer — *v0.3.0*\n- [ ] Chassis CAN support via second transceiver — steering-mode toggle\n- [ ] Model S / X (Palladium) handler\n- [ ] Grafana / Prometheus exporter from the WiFi side\n- [ ] Flipper Zero settings scene (per-toggle on/off, stream-rate slider)\n- [ ] Sub-GHz pairing as wire-free Flipper alternative\n- [ ] Star-history badge once we cross 100 ⭐\n\n## Contributing\n\nPRs, issues, and CAN-signal observations from other Tesla owners are\nwelcome. Useful starting points:\n\n- Port the firmware to a new hardware variant by adding a new\n  `Handler` subclass under [`include/handlers.h`](include/handlers.h)\n- Add a new event type to the [UART bridge](include/uart_bridge.h) and\n  the [Flipper companion](flipper/teslacan_uart.c)\n- Improve the Flipper UI — proper icons, a per-toggle settings scene,\n  ban-detection alerting\n\nRun the firmware in **listen-only** mode (set `FORCE_FSD=0` and disable\nTX) on a test bench first. Never push a change to the car bus you have\nnot bench-validated.\n\n---\n\n## ⚠ Disclaimer\n\n> This software is provided **\"AS IS\"** without warranty of any kind.\n> Using, downloading, installing, or modifying it means **you accept all\n> responsibility** for any consequences, including but not limited to:\n>\n> - Vehicle damage, malfunction, or safety hazards\n> - Voiding your vehicle's warranty\n> - Violation of local, state, or federal laws and regulations\n> - Personal injury or property damage\n> - Any legal consequences arising from vehicle modification\n>\n> This software modifies safety-critical vehicle systems via the CAN bus.\n> **Incorrect use can result in loss of vehicle control, accidents,\n> injury, or death.** The authors and contributors are NOT liable for\n> any damages, losses, or legal issues resulting from the use of this\n> software.\n>\n> **This project is intended for educational and research purposes only.**\n> Use at your own risk.\n\n---\n\n<a name=\"turkce\"></a>\n\n## Türkçe\n\n### TeslaCAN nedir?\n\nTeslaCAN, **Waveshare ESP32-C6-LCD-1.47** için açık kaynaklı bir CAN-bus\nmodifikasyon firmware'idir. Tesla Model 3/Y'nin teşhis portuna bağlanır\nve şunları sunar:\n\n- **FSD aktivasyonu** — CAN frame seviyesinde (araçta aktif FSD aboneliği\n  gerekir)\n- **Sürücü dikkat (nag) bastırma** + ISA hız uyarı sesi bastırma\n- **Batarya telemetrisi**: gerçek zamanlı SoC, voltaj, akım, güç, pack\n  sıcaklığı, Wh/km\n- **Batarya ön koşullandırma** tetikleyici — şarja takmadan önce paketi\n  ısıt\n- **Dahili 1.47″ renkli LCD** — telefon olmadan da canlı veri\n- **WiFi AP + web paneli** (`http://192.168.4.1`)\n- **Flipper Zero companion uygulaması** — 4 kabloluk UART üzerinden\n  (bkz. [flipper/README.md](flipper/README.md))\n- **Referans Python istemcisi** ([`tools/teslacan_client.py`](tools/teslacan_client.py))\n  — ekstra donanım olmadan scripting & test için\n\n### Rakiplerle karşılaştırma\n\n|                                  | TeslaCAN                            | hypery11/flipper-tesla-fsd | S3XY Commander |\n|----------------------------------|-------------------------------------|---------------------------|----------------|\n| Tek başına kullanım (Flippersız) | ✅ LCD + WiFi dashboard              | ❌ Flipper zorunlu        | ✅              |\n| Flipper Zero companion           | ✅ MVP (bu sürüm)                    | ✅ Olgun                  | ❌              |\n| WiFi 6 + BLE 5.0                 | ✅ ESP32-C6                          | ⚠ Klasik ESP32           | Proprietary    |\n| Açık kaynak                      | ✅ MIT                               | ✅ GPL-3.0               | ❌              |\n| Web dashboard                    | ✅ Dahili AP                         | ❌                        | App içinde     |\n| DIY maliyet                      | ~₺850                               | ~₺500                     | ₺7,000+         |\n| TR/EN dokümantasyon              | ✅                                    | ❌                        | ❌              |\n\n### Üç kullanım modu\n\n**1. Tek başına:** Araçta ESP32-C6 çalışır, LCD canlı veri gösterir.\nTelefon **TeslaCAN** WiFi'sine bağlanır (parola `tesla1234`),\n`http://192.168.4.1` adresinde tam web paneli açılır.\n\n**2. Flipper Zero ile:** Flipper'ın üst GPIO header'ı ile ESP32-C6\narasına 4 kablo çek (GND, 3V3, TX, RX). `teslacan.fap`'i Flipper'a yükle:\n\n```bash\ncd flipper\npip install --upgrade ufbt\nufbt launch\n```\n\nFlipper'da **TeslaCAN** uygulamasını aç. Canlı dashboard + FSD,\npreconditioning, hız modu toggle'ları menüden erişilebilir.\n\n**3. Laptop'tan script ile:** USB-serial adaptörü aynı UART pinlerine\nbağla, Python referans istemcisini çalıştır:\n\n```bash\npip install pyserial\n./tools/teslacan_client.py /dev/cu.usbserial-1234 --stream\n./tools/teslacan_client.py /dev/cu.usbserial-1234 --precond on\n```\n\n### Derleme\n\n```bash\ngit clone https://github.com/tuncasoftbildik/tesla-can-mod.git\ncd tesla-can-mod\npio run                  # derle\npio run -t upload        # USB-C ile yükle\npio device monitor       # serial logları izle\n```\n\n### Yol haritası\n\n- [ ] WiFi üzerinden OTA güncelleme\n- [ ] SD kart üzerinde CAN bus loglama\n- [ ] Motor tork/güç canlı izleme (`0x108`, `0x1D8`)\n- [ ] 0-100 km/s performans zamanlayıcı\n- [ ] İkinci CAN transceiver — chassis CAN + direksiyon modu değiştirme\n- [ ] Model S / X (Palladium) handler\n- [ ] Grafana / Prometheus exporter\n- [ ] Flipper Zero settings scene (toggle başına on/off, stream hızı slider)\n- [ ] Sub-GHz eşleştirme — Flipper için kablosuz alternatif\n\n### Sorumluluk Reddi\n\n> Bu yazılım herhangi bir garanti olmaksızın **\"OLDUĞU GİBİ\"** sunulur.\n> Kullanan kişi, araç hasarı / arıza / yasa ihlali / yaralanma / ölüm\n> dahil **tüm sorumluluğu kabul eder.** Bu yazılım, güvenlik açısından\n> kritik CAN sinyallerine yazar. **Sadece eğitim ve araştırma amacıyla\n> kullanılır.** Kendi sorumluluğunuzdadır.\n\n---\n\n<div align=\"center\">\n\n**Built with ESP32-C6 · PlatformIO · Adafruit GFX · Flipper Zero SDK**\n\nMade by [@tuncasoftbildik](https://github.com/tuncasoftbildik) ·\n[Changelog](CHANGELOG.md) · [Issues](https://github.com/tuncasoftbildik/tesla-can-mod/issues) ·\n[License](LICENSE)\n\n</div>",
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      "readme": "<h1 align=\"center\"> <b>🚗 Automotive Cybersecurity Career Roadmap 🛣</b></h1>\n<p align=\"center\">\n  <img  width=\"650\" src=\"roadmap_banner.png\" />\n</p>\n\n## Introduction\nWelcome to the **Automotive Cybersecurity Career Roadmap**! This guide is tailored for individuals aspiring to build expertise in automotive cybersecurity.\nIt covers skills ranging from foundational knowledge to advanced hardware hacking and practical hands-on learning. By following this roadmap,\nyou can grow into roles such as **Automotive Security Analyst**, **Penetration Tester**, **Consultant**, or **Engineer**.\n\n---\n\n## 1. Foundational Knowledge (Beginner Level)\n\n### 1.1 Computer Science Basics\n- **Programming Skills**:\n  - Learn **Python** for automation, **C/C++** for embedded systems, and **Bash scripting** for system automation.\n  - Tools: Visual Studio Code, GCC Compiler.\n- **Operating Systems**:\n  - Focus on Linux (Ubuntu, Kali Linux) and Windows internals.\n  - Understand file systems, process management, and shell scripting.\n\n### 1.2 Networking Basics\n- **Core Protocols**:\n  - Learn TCP/IP, UDP, HTTP/HTTPS, DNS.\n- **Wireless Communication**:\n  - Basics of Wi-Fi, Bluetooth/LE, and RF technologies.\n- **Tools**:\n  - Wireshark for packet analysis, BurpSuite for web request interception, nmap for network scanning.\n\n### 1.3 Cybersecurity Fundamentals\n- **Key Concepts**:\n  - CIA Triad (Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability), Authentication, Authorization. Basic of ISO/SAE 21434 is also recommended.\n- **Threat Models**:\n  - STRIDE, Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) and OWASP Threat Modeling.\n\n### 1.4 Automotive Basics\n- **Automotive Protocols**:\n  - Learn **CAN**, **ISO-TP**, **UDS**, **LIN**, **FlexRay**, and **Automotive Ethernet**.\n  - Tools: CANalyzer, CANoe, BusMaster, SavvyCAN, PCANView and can-utils. Try to master any one of paid tools.\n- **ECU Architecture**:\n  - Study the structure or vehicle architecture and roles of Body, Powertrain, Telematics, and Infotainment ECUs.\n\n---\n\n## 2. Intermediate Skills\n\n### 2.1 Secure Development Practices\n- **Secure Coding**:\n  - Input validation, memory safety, and buffer overflow protections.\n- **Encryption**:\n  - Use of AES, RSA, and TLS for secure communication.\n\n### 2.2 Automotive Protocols\n- **In-depth Study**:\n  - Understand error handling and arbitration in **CAN**, **ISO-TP**, and Automotive Ethernet.\n  - Tools: CANalyzer, CANoe, SavvyCAN, BusMaster.\n\n### 2.3 Threat Modeling (TARA)\n- **Focus Areas**:\n  - Asset identification, attack path analysis, risk prioritization and actionable security controls.\n\n### 2.4 Regulations and Standards\n- **ISO/SAE 21434**:\n  - Explore lifecycle risk management.\n- **UN R155**:\n  - Learn cybersecurity requirements for vehicle homologation.\n\n---\n\n## 3. Advanced Skills\n\n### 3.1 Penetration Testing\n- **CAN Bus Penetration Testing**:\n  - Perform replay attacks, message injection, DoS attacks, and analyze ISO-TP.\n  - Tools: CANoe, CANutils and ICSim for practice.\n- **UDS (Unified Diagnostic Services)**:\n  - Exploit critical services like $27 Security Access, $22 Read Data by Identifier, and more.\n  - Tools: CANoe, can-utils, python-can/python-uds library, UDS in Scapy, open-source tools. PlayUDS for practicing UDS.\n\n### 3.2 Cryptography\n- **Secure Boot**:\n  - Learn PKI, hashing algorithms, and secure firmware validation.\n- **Key Management**:\n  - Explore symmetric (AES) and asymmetric (RSA) key management.\n- **Tools**:\n  - OpenSSL, GnuPG for cryptographic operations.\n\n### 3.3 Hardware and Embedded Hacking\n- **Low-Level Communication Protocols**:\n  - **UART**: Analyze serial communication and debug messages.\n  - **SPI/I2C**: Study inter-device communication in ECUs.\n- **Debug Interfaces**:\n  - **JTAG/SWD**: Use for hardware debugging and firmware extraction.\n  - Tools: Bus Pirate, OpenOCD, Logic Analyzers.\n\n### 3.4 Firmware Analysis\n- **Firmware Reverse Engineering**:\n  - Extract and analyze firmware from chips.\n  - Tools: Ghidra, Binwalk, Firmware Emulation Tools.\n- **Binary Reverse Engineering**:\n  - Analyze binaries for vulnerabilities like buffer overflows, format string, hardcoded keys.\n  - Tools: GDB, pwndbg, radare2, Ghidra, Binary Ninja and pwntools.\n\n---\n\n## 4. Specialized Roles 🧑‍💻\n\n### 4.1 Automotive Security Analyst\n- **Responsibilities**:\n  - Threat detection, incident response, and vulnerability assessments.\n- **Tools**:\n  - SIEM platforms like Splunk, ELK Stack.\n\n### 4.2 Automotive Penetration Tester\n- **Responsibilities**:\n  - Exploit In-vehicle networks(e.g; CAN & UDS), HMI systems, wireless communications, RF protocols and hardware vulnerabilities in ECUs.\n- **Focus**:\n  - Vulnerability assessment, fuzzing, exploitation, privilege escalation and mitigations.\n\n### 4.3 Automotive Cybersecurity Consultant\n- **Responsibilities**:\n  - Advise on secure design and compliance with standards.\n- **Focus**:\n  - Risk management, secure architecture, gap analysis, security controls and TARA--> ISO/SAE 21434, WP.29 and NHTSA's cyberseucurity best practices.\n\n### 4.4 Automotive Cybersecurity Engineer\n- **Responsibilities**:\n  - Develop secure systems, implement cryptographic algorithms.\n- **Focus**:\n  - Secure coding, secure boot, secure communication (e.g; SecOC), cryptography, embedded systems.\n\n---\n\n## 5. Future Learning\n- **Advanced Topics**:\n  - AI/ML for anomaly detection, 5G and V2X (Vehicle-to-Everything) security.\n- **Certifications (Good to have)**:\n  - CEH, OSCP, ISO/SAE 21434 certifications.\n\n---\n\n## 🤝 Contributors\n- [@username](https://github.com/autosecurityy)\n\n---\n## Connect with Us:\n- **Join the Community:** https://nas.io/autosecurityy\n- **LinkedIn:** https://www.linkedin.com/company/autosecurityy1\n- **Instagram:** https://instagram.com/autosecurityy",
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      "description": "AutoSecGPT is an AI-power tool that supports security teams to model threats associated with their automotive application to ease the process of conducting TARA.",
      "readme": "# AutoSecGPT\n\nAutoSecGPT is an AI-powered tool designed to help security teams produce better threat models for their automotive applications. Aligned with the ISO/SAE 21434 standard, AutoSecGPT supports security teams by facilitating the entire cybersecurity engineering process—from threat identification to risk assessment. It helps anticipate and prepare for potential attack scenarios by emphasizing the identification and assessment of cybersecurity risks, a key aspect of ISO/SAE 21434. The tool addresses gaps in threat modeling, a critical activity in the automotive software development lifecycle that is often overlooked or poorly executed.\n\n## Features\n- **Works with various LLMs**: Leverage OpenAI and other large language models to analyze automotive threat scenarios.\n- **Works with LM Studio**: The newly added functionality to use local models by using LM Studio.\n- **Automotive-specific threat identification**: Recognize and assess security threats unique to automotive systems.\n- **Generate detailed threat scenarios**: Automatically generate scenarios and descriptions to enhance risk understanding.\n- **Identify security controls**: List relevant security controls for mitigating identified threats based on NIST SP 800-53.\n- **Visualize attack graphs**: Understand the root causes of threats through detailed attack graphs.\n- **Conduct risk assessments**: Perform likelihood and impact assessments to prioritize threats and propose mitigation strategies.\n- **TARA support**: Supports Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment (TARA) as outlined by ISO/SAE 21434 for the automotive industry.\n- **CAPEC Analysis**: Leverage MITRE CAPEC (Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification) to enhance threat scenario generation by using an NLP technique to conduct a similarity check with CAPEC.\n- **Comprehensive Report Generation**: Generate detailed PDF reports including:\n  - Threat model analysis\n  - Security controls recommendations\n  - Risk assessment results\n  - Attack graphs visualization\n  - CAPEC-based generated threat scenarios\n\n## Installation\n\nTo install and run the project, clone the repository and install the necessary dependencies:\n\n```bash\ngit clone https://github.com/Majid-Mollaeefar/auto-sec-gpt.git\ncd auto-sec-gpt\npip install -r requirements.txt\nstreamlit run main.py\n```\n\n## Usage\n\nAfter installation, simply run the tool by following the instructions on the web interface. The tool is API-driven and works with multiple LLM providers, including:\n\n- **OpenAI** (API key required for full functionality)\n\nTo get started, you'll need an API key from one of these providers. OpenAI is the most widely supported provider at the moment, with some features being exclusive to OpenAI's API. To request support for additional LLM providers, please submit an issue or open a pull request.\n\n> **Note:** The data in the `/.files` directory contains example outputs. Please clean this directory before starting your own threat modeling process to ensure accurate results.\n\n## Local LLM Integration with LM Studio\n\nIf you prefer using local LLMs rather than cloud-based services, LM Studio is a powerful solution that allows you to run and manage LLMs on your own hardware.\nWe recommend using **qwen2.5-7b-instruct** as a reliable and efficient choice for local deployments with AutoSecGPT.\n\n### To Use LM Studio with AutoSecGPT:\n\n1. **Install LM Studio:**\n   Download and install LM Studio from the official website.\n\n2. **Enable Developer Mode and Load Models:**\n   Switch to Developer mode within LM Studio and load the available models.\n\n3. **Fetch and Select a Local Model:**\n   AutoSecGPT will connect to your LM Studio instance (using the specified port, default is **7860**) to retrieve the list of installed models.\n   - If no models are found or LM Studio is not running, an error message will be displayed.\n   - If models are available, select the model you wish to use (e.g., **qwen2.5-7b-instruct**) from the provided list.\n\n4. **Proceed with Your Application:**\n   Once the model is selected, continue by providing the application details and generating threat lists, attack models, and visualizing asset-based attack graphs for your application.\n\n\n## Example Workflow\n\n1. **Threat Model**\n   In this tab, you can conduct a comprehensive threat modeling exercise for your automotive application. Define assets, evaluate associated threats, and assess their potential consequences. You can document and download your findings in structured formats like JSON and Markdown to improve your system's security posture.\n\n2. **Attack Model**\n   Based on the identified threats, this tab provides a detailed attack model for each asset, investigating scenarios of how attacks might occur in the system. The attack model includes a comprehensive breakdown of each threat, specifying attack vectors and scenarios. Each identified threat outlines attacker objectives, along with possible attack vectors.\n\n3. **Security Controls**\n   It identifies appropriate security controls for each identified threat based on ISO/SAE 21434 and NIST SP 800-53 standards.\n   The controls are categorized by type (Preventive, Detective, and Corrective) and prioritized for implementation. Each control includes a detailed description and implementation priority to help guide the security hardening process.\n\n4. **Attack Graph**\n   This tab visualizes the attack graph for each asset, presenting the relationships between assets, threats, attack vectors, and scenarios. The graph dynamically displays interconnected nodes, helping to understand the progression from initial threats to potential attack scenarios and corresponding controls. To use this tab:\n   - Select an asset from the dropdown list.\n   - Click on nodes to explore related threats, attack vectors, and scenarios.\n   - In the \"Scenario Detail\" box, you can add or remove scenarios for further risk assessment.\n   - After selecting scenarios for each asset, click 'Selection Completed'. This will generate a downloadable JSON file for use in the Risk Assessment process.\n\n5. **Risk Assessment**\n   In this tab, you can perform a comprehensive risk assessment. You must first complete the **Likelihood Assessment**, followed by the **Impact Assessment**:\n   - **Likelihood Assessment**: Determine the likelihood level of each attack scenario based on a set of predefined likelihood factors.\n   - **Impact Assessment**: Evaluate the impact level of each attack scenario using predefined impact factors.\n   - **Risk Evaluation**: Finally, compute the risk levels based on the combination of likelihood and impact. Click the 'Risk Evaluation' button to generate the risk assessment.\n\n6. **CAPEC Analysis**\n   This tab enhances your threat scenarios by mapping them to MITRE's Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC):\n   - Select specific scenarios from your threat model for CAPEC analysis\n   - The system uses NLP to match your scenarios with relevant CAPEC patterns\n   - Review matched patterns and their detailed descriptions\n   - Generate updated threat scenarios incorporating CAPEC insights\n   - View execution flow and attack steps for each pattern\n   - Export the enhanced scenarios for inclusion in the final report\n\n7. **Report**\n   Generate comprehensive security assessment reports in this tab:\n   - Enter basic application information (name, version, author)\n   - Upload and manage attack graph screenshots using the built-in viewer\n   - Preview available report components before generation\n   - Customize report appearance (font, size)\n   - Generate a PDF report including:\n     - Application details\n     - Attack model analysis\n     - Security controls recommendations\n     - Risk assessment results\n     - CAPEC-based threat scenarios\n     - Attack graph visualizations\n   - Download the final report for documentation and sharing\n\n\n## Demo\n\nFor a detailed demonstration of the tool, watch the video below:\n\n- [Demo Video](https://majidml.com/assets/tool/long-demo.mp4) (version 1.0.0)\n\n## License\n\nThis project is licensed under the MIT License - see the [LICENSE](LICENSE.txt)\nfile for details.\n\n## Support\n\nIf you find AutoSecGPT is helpful and would like to support the project:\n\n<a href=\"https://buymeacoffee.com/majidml\" target=\"_blank\"><img src=\"https://cdn.buymeacoffee.com/buttons/default-orange.png\" alt=\"Buy Me A Coffee\" style=\"width:120px;\"></a>\n\n## Contacts\n\nAutoSecGPT is developed by [Majid Mollaeefar](https://www.linkedin.com/in/majid-mollaeefar/). For any questions, feature requests, or feedback, feel free to contact me directly via LinkedIn or submit an issue on the GitHub repository.",
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      "readme": "# Raspi Hackbox\n\n**Raspi Hackbox** is a Debian-based Raspberry Pi image that transforms your Pi into a portable hacking lab.\nIt comes preloaded with:\n\n- A lightweight **i3 desktop environment**\n- **zsh** shell for productivity\n- A curated set of **offensive security tools**\n\nThe toolkit is tailored for **IoT**, **OT**, and **automotive hacking**, making it ideal for pentesters, researchers, and enthusiasts who want a ready-to-go hacking environment.\n\n---\n\n## 🧰 Included Tools\n\nBeyond the i3 + zsh desktop, the image bundles a curated offensive-security toolkit:\n\n| Category | Tools |\n|----------|-------|\n| **Radio & SDR** | GNU Radio, Gqrx, HackRF, RTL-SDR, `rtl_433`, Universal Radio Hacker (URH) |\n| **Wi-Fi & Bluetooth** | Kismet, Aircrack-ng, Wifite, bettercap, hostapd, dnsmasq, BlueZ, `rtl8812au` monitor/injection driver |\n| **RFID / NFC** | Proxmark3 |\n| **Automotive & hardware** | can-utils, python-can, OpenOCD, UrJTAG, flashrom, dfu-util, Arduino IDE |\n| **Reverse engineering & firmware** | radare2, binwalk |\n| **Forensics** | Volatility 3, The Sleuth Kit, Guymager |\n| **Network, web & cracking** | Nmap, Wireshark, dirb, Hydra, Hashcat, John the Ripper, Scapy |\n\n---\n\n## 🚀 Building an Image\n\nClone this repository:\n\n```bash\ngit clone --recursive https://github.com/w1ld3r/Raspi_Hackbox\ncd Raspi_Hackbox\n```\n\n### Dependencies\n\nMake sure you are running **Debian Trixie (13)** or higher. Install the required packages:\n```bash\nsudo apt install -y \\\n vmdb2 dosfstools qemu-utils qemu-user-static debootstrap \\\n binfmt-support time kpartx bmap-tools python3 ansible-core \\\n fakemachine\n```\n\nInstall Ansible collections:\n```bash\nansible-galaxy collection install community.general\n```\n\n👉 If `debootstrap` fails with an `exec format error`, try:\n```bash\nsudo dpkg-reconfigure qemu-user-static\n```\nThis re-registers the format handler with `binfmt-support`.\n\n---\n\n### Building with Makefile\n\nThis repo includes a build recipe: [rpi4_trixie.yaml](rpi4_trixie.yaml), which\ndefines the preinstalled environment and hacking tools.\n\nA `Makefile` automates the build:\n```bash\nsudo make rpi4_trixie.img\n```\n\n- Uses `vmdb2` + `ansible` under the hood\n- Can run unprivileged if `fakemachine` is available\n- Requires `sudo` otherwise\n\n📖 [vmdb2 documentation](https://vmdb2.liw.fi/documentation/) for more details.\n\n---\n\n### 🐳 Building in a Container\nIf you prefer Docker, ensure your container has at least:\n- **8 GB RAM**\n- **60 GB disk space**\n\nInstall required packages (Docker Engine with the Compose v2 plugin):\n```bash\nsudo apt install -y binfmt-support qemu-system-common qemu-user-static docker.io docker-compose-v2\n```\n\nBuild and run the container (it runs `make rpi4_trixie.img` inside a privileged\ncontainer — `privileged` and the `/dev` mount are required by `vmdb2`):\n```bash\nsudo docker compose up --build\n```\n\nThe image is written to the repository directory (mounted into the container).\n\n---\n\n## 💾 Installing the Image on an SD Card\n\nInsert your SD card (⚠️ this will erase all data).\nAssuming the device is /dev/sdb, flash the image:\n\n### Using `bmap-tools` (faster, recommended)\n\n```bash\nbmaptool copy rpi4_trixie.img.xz /dev/sdb\n```\n\n### Using `dd` with compressed image\n\n```bash\nxzcat rpi4_trixie.img.xz | dd of=/dev/sdb bs=64k oflag=dsync status=progress\n```\n\n### Using `dd` with uncompressed image\n\n```bash\ndd if=rpi4_trixie.img of=/dev/sdb bs=64k oflag=dsync status=progress\n```\n\n---\n\n## 🛠️ Post-Install Setup\n\nThe image contains:\n- **Partition 1** → `RASPIFIRM` (boot firmware + kernel)\n- **Partition 2** → `RASPIROOT` (Debian system)\n\nYou should expand the root partition and create a swap partition\n\n```bash\nsudo parted /dev/sdb\n(parted) help\n(parted) print\n(parted) mkpart primary linux-swap -4096 -0\n(parted) resizepart 2 -4096\n(parted) quit\n\nsudo mkswap -L RASPSWAP /dev/sdb3\nsudo e2fsck -f /dev/sdb2\nsudo resize2fs /dev/sdb2\n```\n\nSwap is already configured in `/etc/fstab`. Verify with:\n```bash\nfree -h\n```\n\n---\n\n## 🔌 First Boot\n\n- Default hostname: `rpi4-YYYYMMDD`\n- Default user: `user`\n- Default password: `user`\n\nInsert the SD card, power up your Pi, and you’re ready to go.\n\n> ⚠️ **Security:** the image ships with a well-known default password (`user`)\n> for an account with `sudo`, and the SSH server is enabled. Before connecting\n> the Pi to any untrusted network, log in on the console and **change the\n> password immediately** (`passwd`), or disable SSH password authentication and\n> switch to key-based login.\n\n⚡ Hack responsibly — with great power comes great responsibility.",
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      "readme": "<div align=\"center\">\n\n<h1>🚗 VEHICLE CPS SOC SECURITY PLATFORM 🚗</h1>\n\n<h2>🛡️ Real-Time Automotive Cybersecurity Operations Center</h2>\n\n<h3>⚡ CAN Bus Attack Detection • Live Monitoring • Incident Response ⚡</h3>\n\n<br>\n\n<img src=\"https://img.shields.io/badge/Python-Backend-blue?style=for-the-badge&logo=python\"/>\n<img src=\"https://img.shields.io/badge/React-Frontend-61dafb?style=for-the-badge&logo=react\"/>\n<img src=\"https://img.shields.io/badge/Flask-API-black?style=for-the-badge&logo=flask\"/>\n<img src=\"https://img.shields.io/badge/Cybersecurity-Automotive-red?style=for-the-badge\"/>\n<img src=\"https://img.shields.io/badge/CAN-Bus-orange?style=for-the-badge\"/>\n\n<br><br>\n\n<h2>🚘 Simulate • Detect • Monitor • Defend 🚘</h2>\n\n<h3>A Full Cyber-Physical Security Dashboard for Connected Vehicles</h3>\n\n</div>\n\n---\n\n# 🌍 PROJECT OVERVIEW\n\nModern vehicles rely on internal communication systems such as the **CAN Bus** to connect critical Electronic Control Units (ECUs), including:\n\n- ⚙️ Engine ECU\n- 🛑 Brake ECU\n- 🎯 Steering ECU\n- 🔄 Transmission ECU\n- 🌐 Gateway ECU\n\nThese networks often lack strong native security controls, making them vulnerable to cyberattacks.\n\nThis project demonstrates a complete **Automotive Security Operations Center (SOC)** capable of simulating attacks, detecting anomalies, visualizing threats, and generating reports in real time.\n\n---\n\n# 🚀 CORE FEATURES\n\n## 🔥 Vehicle Telemetry Monitoring\n\n- Live Speed Monitoring\n- RPM Tracking\n- Brake Percentage\n- Throttle Percentage\n- Steering Angle\n- Gear Status\n- Engine Temperature\n\n## 💣 CAN Bus Attack Simulation\n\n- Speed Spoof Attack\n- Brake Injection Attack\n- Steering Hijack\n- Replay Attack\n- CAN Flood DoS\n\n## 🛡️ SOC Dashboard\n\n- Real-Time Risk Score\n- Threat Severity Levels\n- Security Event Stream\n- Incident History\n- Analyst Notes\n- Alert Acknowledgement\n- Download Incident Reports\n- ECU Health Matrix\n\n---\n\n# 🏗️ SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE\n\n```text\n🚗 Vehicle Simulator\n        ↓\n🔌 Virtual CAN Bus (vcan0)\n        ↓\n🧠 Receiver + Detection Engine\n        ↓\n🌐 Flask Backend API\n        ↓\n💻 React SOC Dashboard\n        ↓\n👨‍💻 Security Analyst\n#📁 PROJECT STRUCTURE\nsoc_security_platform/\n│── attacks/\n│   └── attack_console.py\n│\n│── simulator/\n│   └── send_can.py\n│\n│── receiver/\n│   └── receive_can.py\n│\n│── backend/\n│   └── app.py\n│\n│── frontend/\n│   ├── package.json\n│   └── src/\n│       └── App.js\n│\n│── data/\n│   ├── live_data.json\n│   ├── anomaly_score.txt\n│   ├── severity.txt\n│   ├── attack_type.txt\n│   ├── confidence.txt\n│   └── events.log\n│\n└── README.md\n#⚡ QUICK START\n1️⃣ Enable Virtual CAN\nsudo modprobe vcan\nsudo ip link add dev vcan0 type vcan\nsudo ip link set up vcan0\n2️⃣ Run Modules\ncd simulator && python send_can.py\ncd receiver && python receive_can.py\ncd backend && python app.py\ncd frontend && npm install && npm start\ncd attacks && python attack_console.py\n#🎯 ATTACK CONSOLE OPTIONS\nOption\tAttack\n1\tSpeed Spoof\n2\tBrake Injection\n3\tSteering Hijack\n4\tReplay Attack\n5\tCAN Flood DoS\n#🎓 IDEAL FOR\nFinal Year Projects\nCybersecurity Demonstrations\nAutomotive Security Research\nCPS Security Labs\nSOC Dashboard Concepts\n#🔮 FUTURE ENHANCEMENTS\nAI / ML Threat Detection\nMulti-Vehicle Fleet Monitoring\nCloud Dashboard Deployment\nSIEM Integration\nReal CAN Hardware Support\n<div align=\"center\"> <h1>⭐ STAR THIS REPOSITORY ⭐</h1> <h2>🚘 Supporting The Future Of Automotive Cybersecurity 🚘</h2> </div> ```",
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      "description": "Unsupervised ML-based intrusion detection for automotive CAN bus networks, using per-ID behavioral residual modeling to flag anomalous traffic.",
      "readme": "# CANguard\n\nA behavioral CAN bus intrusion detection approach based on **Per-ID Behavioral Residual Detection (PIRD)**, evaluated on the synthetic HCRL Car-Hacking dataset and the real-world ROAD dataset.\n\n## Paper & Citation\n\nA manuscript describing this work is available as an arXiv preprint (not yet peer-reviewed):\n\n- **arXiv:** [2608.05548](https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.05548) — *\"Behavioral Residualization for Unsupervised Intrusion Detection in Automotive CAN Networks\"*\n\n## System Architecture\n\n```mermaid\nflowchart TD\n    subgraph Data\n        H[(\"HCRL Car-Hacking CSVs\")] --> HL[\"canguard.data · HCRLLoader\"]\n        R[(\"ROAD .log captures\")] --> RL[\"canguard.data · RoadLoader\"]\n        HL --> CS[\"Canonical schema<br/>timestamp • can_id • dlc • data_0..7 • label • attack_type\"]\n        RL --> CS\n    end\n\n    subgraph Features\n        CS --> Win[\"canguard.features · PerIDWindow\"]\n        Win --> BF[\"14 BEHAVIORAL_FEATURES<br/>IAT • DLC • payload • misc\"]\n        BF --> Res[\"residualization strategies<br/>raw • global z • per-ID z • MAD • quantile\"]\n    end\n\n    subgraph Splits\n        Res --> TR[\"temporal split 40/20/40\"]\n        Res --> PC[\"ROAD per-capture split<br/>calib = pre-injection normals\"]\n    end\n\n    subgraph Detection\n        TR --> IF[\"canguard.detectors · IsolationForest<br/>(normal-only, 200 trees)\"]\n        PC --> IF\n    end\n\n    subgraph Evaluation\n        IF --> M[\"canguard.evaluation<br/>precision • recall • F1 • ROC • PR\"]\n        M --> D[\"deployment metrics<br/>Recall@FPR • FPR@recall • FP/hour • latency\"]\n        M --> V[\"canguard.visualization\"]\n        V --> F[\"figures/ (.png)\"]\n        M --> O[\"results/ · tables/ (.json/.csv)\"]\n    end\n```\n\n**Pipeline**: per-ID sliding windows → 14 behavioral features → pluggable residualization strategy → Isolation Forest (normal-only train) → detection + deployment metrics / figures / results.\n\n**Evaluation pathways**\n- **HCRL** — one continuous stream per attack → single 40/20/40 temporal split.\n- **ROAD** — independent driving-session captures → per-capture split (residuals fitted on pre-injection normals), since temporal continuity does not span captures.\n- **Phase 1 validation** — cross-condition transfer, global-threshold deployment, representation comparison, and window-size sweeps (see below).\n\n## Project Structure\n\n| Path | Description |\n|------|-------------|\n| `src/canguard/` | Library: `data`, `features`, `transforms` (residualization strategies), `detectors`, `evaluation` (metrics + deployment metrics), `visualization`, `utils` |\n| `papers/canguard_ieee.tex` | IEEE-style conference paper draft (LaTeX) |\n| `paper/` | Revised paper build + `updated_figures`, `updated_tables` |\n| `notebooks/` | Research notebooks: `eda_hcrl`, `feature_eng_hcrl`, `pird_hcrl`, `pird_v2_extensions` |\n| `experiments/` | Config-driven runners: baseline, ROAD, phase A/B/C pipelines, and the Phase 1 PIRD validation framework |\n| `experiments/configs/` | YAML configs: `hcrl.yaml`, `road.yaml`, `phase_a.yaml`, `phase_b_road.yaml`, `phase_c.yaml`, `phase1_pird_validation.yaml` |\n| `tests/` | `pytest` suite covering loaders, feature/residual/detector parity, evaluation metrics, and the Phase 1 validation framework |\n| `tables/` | Consolidated result CSV/JSON (baselines, CIs, importance, latency, errors) |\n| `run_pipeline.py` | One-command HCRL pipeline → `results/` + `figures/` |\n| `figures/` | Generated diagnostic plots (`.png`) |\n| `results/` | Machine-readable experiment metrics (`.json` / `.csv`) |\n| `docs/road_validation.md` | ROAD dataset validation findings |\n| `FINAL_REPORT*.md`, `PROJECT_AUDIT.md`, `EXPERIMENT_PLAN.md` | Research tracking / audit documents |\n| `HCRL Car-Hacking/` | HCRL raw CSVs (git-ignored) |\n| `road/` | ROAD raw dataset (git-ignored) |\n\n## About\n\nModern vehicles use the **CAN (Controller Area Network) bus** to carry messages between electronic control units (ECUs). CAN has no built-in authentication or encryption, so a party with physical or remote access to the bus can inject or manipulate messages related to systems such as brakes, steering, or the engine.\n\n**CANguard** is an unsupervised, behavior-based intrusion detection approach for automotive CAN networks. Rather than inspecting raw message fields directly, it models the *normal* behavior of each CAN identifier (ID) over sliding windows — timing (inter-arrival times), Data Length Code (DLC) statistics, and payload patterns — and converts those signals into per-ID **z-score residuals**. Windows that deviate significantly from an ID's learned normal behavior are flagged as anomalous.\n\nThe central idea tested here is that per-ID residualization matters: on the datasets evaluated, raw features alone perform poorly for detection, while modeling each ID's own distribution and expressing deviations as residuals lets a downstream anomaly detector separate benign from malicious traffic more effectively. This is evaluated directly via an ablation (see paper).\n\n## How It Works\n\n1. **Data loading** — Parses two datasets: the HCRL Car-Hacking dataset (synthetic CAN traffic with injected attacks) and the ROAD dataset (real recorded driving sessions with stealthier attacks).\n2. **Feature engineering** — Messages are organized into per-ID sliding windows, each summarized by behavioral features (timing, DLC, and payload-based statistics).\n3. **Residualization** — A statistical profile is fit per CAN ID over the windows, then used to transform each window into a residual relative to that ID's normal behavior. The default is a per-ID z-score, with global, robust MAD, and quantile variants available as first-class alternatives.\n4. **Detection** — An unsupervised Isolation Forest is trained on normal-only traffic and scores new windows; anomalies are flagged by departure from the learned residual distribution.\n5. **Evaluation** — Measured with precision, recall, F1, and ROC/PR curves, plus deployment-oriented operating points (Recall@fixed FPR, FPR@target recall, false alarms per hour, detection latency), rendered as diagnostic figures and machine-readable tables.\n\n## Validation Framework (Phase 1)\n\nPhase 1 exists to answer a narrower question than \"does detection work\": **is per-ID residualization actually responsible for the result, and would the detector be usable in a vehicle?** It is organized around four experiment groups that are all driven by a single configuration and report deployment-oriented metrics alongside the usual F1.\n\n**1. Cross-condition generalization.** The model is fit entirely on one driving condition's normal traffic and then frozen — per-ID statistics, detector, and threshold — before being evaluated on a *different* condition's stream. No target data participates in fitting or threshold selection, so this measures whether learned behavioral patterns carry across captures and operating conditions rather than only within one recording.\n\n**2. Global-threshold deployment.** Instead of tuning a separate operating point per dataset, a single threshold is pooled from validation normals and applied everywhere. This is compared against per-dataset thresholds, with the spread of recall and FPR across conditions reported, to show how consistently one fixed operating point transfers — the realistic deployment constraint.\n\n**3. Residualization strategy comparison.** The representation is treated as a controlled variable. Five strategies are compared end to end:\n\n| Strategy | Definition |\n|----------|------------|\n| `raw` | Identity — the raw behavioral features, no residualization |\n| `global_z` | Global standardization: `(x − μ) / σ` over all normals |\n| `per_id_z` | Per-ID z-score residual (the PIRD operator) |\n| `per_id_mad` | Robust per-ID residual using median and MAD |\n| `per_id_quantile` | Per-ID empirical CDF mapped to standard-normal quantiles |\n\nComparing these isolates residualization as the driver of improvement, and checks whether the gain is specific to z-scoring or holds for robust (MAD) and distribution-free (quantile) variants. Unseen or data-poor IDs fall back to global statistics so deployment to a new vehicle does not break.\n\n**4. Window-size sensitivity and latency.** Window length is swept across a range of sizes, reporting detection quality against the cost of scoring each window and the resulting detection delay. This exposes the performance/latency trade-off rather than fixing one window size a priori.\n\n**Deployment-oriented metrics.** Every group reports, in addition to precision/recall/F1 and ROC/PR:\n\n- **Recall@fixed FPR** — attack coverage at a stated false-positive budget.\n- **FPR@target recall** — the false-positive cost of reaching a safety recall level (e.g. 95%).\n- **False alarms per hour** — absolute alarm load on normal traffic, normalized by observed wall-clock time.\n- **Detection latency** — time between attack onset and first detection, aggregated over attack segments.\n\n## Key Characteristics\n\n- **Unsupervised, per-ID detection** — training does not require labeled attack data; detection is driven by learning normal per-ID behavior.\n- **Evaluated on two datasets with different attack realism** — HCRL (controlled, synthetic attacks) and ROAD (real driving sessions with stealthier attacks that reuse legitimate IDs), which lets the results be checked for whether they hold up beyond the easier, synthetic setting.\n- **Documented methodology** — the accompanying paper describes the residualization operator and reports an ablation isolating its contribution.\n- **Validated for deployment realism** — Phase 1 tests cross-condition generalization, a single global operating threshold, alternative residualization strategies, and the window-size/latency trade-off, and reports operating-point metrics (Recall@FPR, FPR@recall, false alarms per hour, detection latency).\n\n## Key Results (HCRL)\n\n| Dataset | F1 | Recall | FPR |\n|---------|-----|--------|-----|\n| DoS | 0.017 | 0.01 | 0.055 |\n| Fuzzy | 0.469 | 0.98 | 0.147 |\n| RPM | 0.991 | 0.999 | 0.004 |\n| gear | 0.945 | 0.998 | 0.032 |\n\nPer-ID residuals perform well on RPM/gear but **fail on DoS** — novel-ID flooding is not captured by per-ID statistics, since DoS in this dataset is presence-based rather than a behavioral deviation of an existing ID. A supervised reference model (HGB), trained with labeled attacks, reaches F1 = 1.0 on DoS/RPM/gear; this is a different problem setting (supervised vs. unsupervised) and the comparison should be read as such, not as a direct apples-to-apples baseline.\n\n## ROAD Validation (residual IF, per capture)\n\n| Attack type | F1 | Recall | FPR |\n|-------------|-----|--------|-----|\n| correlated_signal | 0.898 | 1.000 | 0.020 |\n| fuzzing | 0.273 | 0.340 | 0.015 |\n| max_engine_coolant_temp | 0.265 | 1.000 | 0.024 |\n| max_speedometer | 0.698 | 1.000 | 0.038 |\n| reverse_light_off | 0.657 | 1.000 | 0.048 |\n| reverse_light_on | 0.544 | 0.997 | 0.053 |\n\nThe method generalizes to ROAD for **targeted single-AID attacks** (recall ≈ 1.0 on those attack types) even though ROAD reuses legitimate AIDs, which is a harder setting than HCRL. It does **not** generalize well to cross-ID fuzzing under the frozen per-ID configuration (F1 = 0.273, recall = 0.340) — this is a genuine limitation, not an edge case to gloss over. See [`docs/road_validation.md`](docs/road_validation.md) for the full breakdown.\n\n## Limitations\n\n- **DoS detection is a known failure mode.** The per-ID residual approach is not well-suited to novel-ID flooding attacks, since these are detectable by ID *presence* rather than behavioral deviation of a tracked ID. A presence-based rule or a supervised model would likely be needed to cover this attack type in a deployed system.\n- **Cross-ID fuzzing on ROAD is weak** (F1 = 0.273). The frozen per-ID configuration does not capture attacks that manipulate patterns across multiple IDs rather than deviating a single ID's behavior.\n- **HCRL results alone would overstate performance.** Naive presence-based rules already reach F1 > 0.99 on all four HCRL attack types, meaning HCRL's synthetic attacks are easier than realistic in-vehicle attacks; ROAD results are the more meaningful indicator of real-world performance.\n- **Supervised comparison is not apples-to-apples.** The HGB reference uses labeled attack data during training; CANguard's approach does not. The comparison illustrates a ceiling, not a fair head-to-head.\n- **Preprint status.** The accompanying paper is an arXiv preprint and has not undergone peer review.\n\n## License\n\nThis project is licensed under the [Apache License 2.0](LICENSE).",
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      "readme": "# Cyber Deception in EV Charging Systems\n\nA two-part research project on securing Electric Vehicle Supply Equipment (EVSE):\n\n1. **Honeypot** — a custom deception layer that simulates a real EV charging station over the OCPP protocol to lure and log attackers in real time\n2. **ML Detection** — machine-learning models trained on multi-modal EVSE sensor data (network traffic, host events, power consumption) to classify attacks\n\n---\n\n## Honeypot — EVSE Cyber-Deception Interface\n\nA custom-built honeypot that impersonates a live EVSE over the **OCPP (Open Charge Point Protocol)**, broadcasting realistic charging telemetry to attract adversaries while monitoring all interactions.\n\n**Capabilities:**\n- Simulates charging state, power draw, and voltage in real time\n- Detects and classifies suspicious activity with structured severity levels\n\n| Severity | Event Type | Example |\n|---|---|---|\n| INFO | Normal EVSE activity | Charging 20.5% \\| 3.84kW @ 234.0V |\n| LOW | Suspicious connection | WebSocket connection attempt |\n| HIGH | Active reconnaissance | TCP Stealth/SYN Scan |\n| CRITICAL | Exploit attempt | Malformed OCPP Packet / Injection Attempt |\n\n**Live system screenshots:**\n\n| | |\n|---|---|\n| ![Recon detection](images/deception_interface_recon_detection.jpg) | ![OCPP injection](images/deception_interface_ocpp_injection.jpg) |\n| HIGH: TCP Stealth/SYN Scan detected | CRITICAL: Malformed OCPP Packet / Injection Attempt |\n\n---\n\n## ML Detection\n\n### Dataset\n\nThe EVSE dataset covers two physical EVSE devices (EVSE-A, EVSE-B) under 17+ attack scenarios across three sensor modalities:\n\n| Modality | Features | Size |\n|---|---|---|\n| Network Traffic | NFStream flow features | ~2.7M flows, 86 columns |\n| Host Events | HPC + Kernel counters | ~8.5K samples × 915 features |\n| Power Consumption | INA219 sensor readings | ~115K samples |\n\n**Attack types:** SYN-Flood, TCP-Flood, UDP-Flood, ICMP-Flood, Push-ACK Flood, Port Scan, Aggressive Scan, Vulnerability Scan, SYN-Stealth, OS Fingerprinting, Service Detection, Synonymous IP, Cryptojacking, Backdoor\n\n> Dataset: CICEVSE2024 (not included in this repo)\n\n### Notebooks\n\n| Notebook | Description |\n|---|---|\n| `EVSE.ipynb` | Data exploration and preprocessing across all three modalities |\n| `EVSE1.ipynb` | Cross-device generalization — train on EVSE-A, evaluate on EVSE-B |\n| `EVSE2.ipynb` | Power consumption anomaly detection (Isolation Forest, Random Forest) |\n| `EVSE3.ipynb` | Network traffic classification with correlation-based feature selection |\n\nAll notebooks run on **Google Colab** with data mounted from Google Drive.\n\n### Models\n\nIsolation Forest · Random Forest · XGBoost · Logistic Regression · MLP · LSTM\n\n### Results\n\n**Model training:**\n\n![Loss Curve](images/loss_curve.jpg)\n![Feature Correlation](images/feature_correlation_isDoS.jpg)\n\n**Dataset distributions (EDA):**\n\n| | |\n|---|---|\n| ![Attack dist](images/eda_attack_distribution.jpg) | ![Attack group](images/eda_attack_group_distribution.jpg) |\n| ![Label dist](images/eda_label_distribution.jpg) | ![State dist](images/eda_state_distribution.jpg) |\n\n**Power consumption sensor distributions:**\n\n| | |\n|---|---|\n| ![shunt voltage](images/power_shunt_voltage_dist.jpg) | ![bus voltage](images/power_bus_voltage_dist.jpg) |\n| ![current](images/power_current_dist.jpg) | ![power mW](images/power_mW_dist.jpg) |\n\n---\n\n## Requirements\n\n```\npandas · numpy · scikit-learn · xgboost · matplotlib · seaborn\n```\n\n---\n\n## Citation\n\nIf you use this work or the dataset, please cite:\n\n**Dataset:**\n> Euclides Carlos Pinto Neto et al., \"CICEVSE2024: A Cybersecurity Dataset for Electric Vehicle Supply Equipment,\" Canadian Institute for Cybersecurity, University of New Brunswick, 2024.\n\n---\n\n## License\n\nThe CICEVSE2024 dataset is subject to its own terms of use — refer to the dataset source for details.",
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      "title": "🛡️ Vahana Rakshaka — QML-IDS",
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      "description": "Vahana Rakshaka — Hybrid Quantum Machine Learning Intrusion Detection System (QML-IDS) for CAN Bus Security in Autonomous Vehicles. Built with Qiskit, PyTorch, and Streamlit.",
      "readme": "# 🛡️ Vahana Rakshaka — QML-IDS\n\n### Hybrid Quantum Machine Learning Intrusion Detection System for Autonomous Vehicle CAN Bus Security\n\n![Python](https://img.shields.io/badge/Python-3.8+-blue.svg)\n![Qiskit](https://img.shields.io/badge/Qiskit-1.0+-6929C4.svg)\n![PyTorch](https://img.shields.io/badge/PyTorch-2.0+-red.svg)\n![Streamlit](https://img.shields.io/badge/Streamlit-1.0+-orange.svg)\n\n---\n\n## 📌 Table of Contents\n- [Overview](#overview)\n- [Problem Statement](#problem-statement)\n- [Our Solution](#our-solution)\n- [Architecture](#architecture)\n- [Quantum Circuit](#quantum-circuit)\n- [Dataset](#dataset)\n- [Project Structure](#project-structure)\n- [Installation](#installation)\n- [How to Run](#how-to-run)\n- [Results](#results)\n- [Demo Features](#demo-features)\n- [Business Model](#business-model)\n- [Team](#team)\n\n---\n\n## 🌐 Overview\n\n**Vahana Rakshaka** (Sanskrit: *Vehicle Protector*) is a Hybrid Quantum Machine Learning\nIntrusion Detection System (QML-IDS) designed to protect autonomous vehicles from\nCAN bus cyberattacks in real time.\n\nThe global autonomous vehicle market is projected to reach **$2.1 trillion by 2030**.\nAs vehicles become more connected, their exposure to cyber threats grows exponentially.\nVahana Rakshaka addresses this by combining the power of **Variational Quantum Circuits (VQC)**\nbuilt with **IBM Qiskit** and classical neural networks to detect intrusions faster and\nmore accurately than classical-only systems.\n\n> ⚛️ **India's first Qiskit-powered automotive Intrusion Detection System.**\n\n---\n\n## ⚠️ Problem Statement\n\nModern vehicles rely on the **Controller Area Network (CAN bus)** to control everything\nfrom steering to braking. The CAN bus was designed in the 1980s — **without any\nauthentication or encryption** — making it highly vulnerable to:\n\n| Attack Type | Description |\n|---|---|\n| **DoS Attack** | Floods the CAN bus with high-priority messages, blocking legitimate signals |\n| **Fuzzy Attack** | Injects random CAN frames to confuse ECUs |\n| **RPM Spoofing** | Sends fake engine RPM signals to manipulate vehicle behavior |\n| **Gear Spoofing** | Falsifies gear position data to cause dangerous shifts |\n\n**Classical IDS systems fail because:**\n- Cannot process 2,000–4,000 CAN frames per second in real time\n- Adversarial AI can camouflage attacks within normal traffic patterns\n- High false negative rates on novel, unseen attack signatures\n- Cannot satisfy both real-time detection AND fleet-wide R155 compliance simultaneously\n\nThe automotive cybersecurity market is expected to reach **₹1.21 lakh crore ($14.43 billion) by 2030**\nout of absolute necessity.\n\n---\n\n## 💡 Our Solution\n\nVahana Rakshaka uses a **3-layer hybrid architecture**:\n\n```\nLayer 1 (Edge)    →  Classical pre-processing on vehicle gateway ECU (<1ms latency)\nLayer 2 (Cloud)   →  Variational Quantum Classifier (VQC) via IBM Qiskit / Amazon Braket\nLayer 3 (SaaS)    →  Fleet compliance dashboard + OEM monitoring\n```\n\nBy encoding CAN bus traffic into **quantum states**, our VQC evaluates\nmulti-dimensional correlations simultaneously — identifying malicious anomalies\nthat are computationally expensive for classical models to detect.\n\n> **Key advantage:** The quantum computer does NOT go in the car.\n> Edge agent handles local filtering; VQC inference happens on cloud quantum APIs.\n> This is architecturally real and deployable today on existing IBM Quantum hardware.\n\n---\n\n## 🏗️ Architecture\n\n```\n┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐\n│                  VEHICLE (Edge)                      │\n│  CAN Bus → Gateway ECU → Classical Pre-processor    │\n│  AUTOSAR-compliant | <1ms latency | OTA-updatable   │\n│           Feature Extraction (4 features)            │\n└──────────────────────┬──────────────────────────────┘\n                       │ (encrypted API call via 5G/V2X)\n                       ▼\n┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐\n│           CLOUD (Quantum Layer — Qiskit)             │\n│   Variational Quantum Classifier (VQC)               │\n│   4 Qubits | 2 Entangling Layers | 24 Parameters    │\n│   Running on: IBM Quantum / Amazon Braket APIs       │\n└──────────────────────┬──────────────────────────────┘\n                       │\n                       ▼\n┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐\n│              OEM DASHBOARD (SaaS)                    │\n│   Real-time alerts | Fleet monitoring | Audit logs  │\n│   UNECE WP.29 R155 / ISO 21434 Compliance           │\n└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘\n```\n\n---\n\n## ⚛️ Quantum Circuit\n\nThe quantum core uses a **Variational Quantum Circuit (VQC)** built with **IBM Qiskit**:\n\n- **4 Qubits** — one per CAN bus feature\n- **Rx (AngleEmbedding)** — encodes features as rotation angles\n- **Rz-Ry-Rz + CNOT gates** — 2 trainable entangling layers\n- **Pauli-Z measurement** — outputs attack probability in [-1, +1]\n\n```\nFeature Encoding (Qiskit ParameterVector):\n  CAN_ID    → Rx(θ₁) on Qubit 0\n  Time Δ    → Rx(θ₂) on Qubit 1\n  DLC       → Rx(θ₃) on Qubit 2\n  Entropy   → Rx(θ₄) on Qubit 3\n\nEntanglement (StronglyEntanglingLayers equivalent):\n  2 × [Rz-Ry-Rz per qubit + CNOT ring]\n  Total trainable parameters: 2 × 4 × 3 = 24\n\nMeasurement (SparsePauliOp):\n  ⟨Z₀⟩ → sigmoid → attack probability [0, 1]\n  > 0.5 = ATTACK | < 0.5 = NORMAL\n```\n\n**Quantum Advantage:**\nA 4-qubit circuit represents 16 simultaneous feature states via superposition.\nA 12-qubit circuit represents 4,096 states. For detecting correlated multi-ECU\nattack signatures — this representational power provides measurable classification\nadvantage over classical SVMs at equivalent parameter counts.\n\n---\n\n## 📊 Dataset\n\nWe use the publicly available **Car-Hacking Dataset** from OTIDS\n(sourced from [ocslab.hksecurity.net](http://ocslab.hksecurity.net/Datasets/car-hacking-dataset))\n\n| File | Attack Type | Rows |\n|---|---|---|\n| DoS_dataset.csv | Denial of Service | 3,665,771 |\n| Fuzzy_dataset.csv | Fuzzy Attack | 3,838,860 |\n| RPM_dataset.csv | RPM Spoofing | 4,621,702 |\n| gear_dataset.csv | Gear Spoofing | 4,443,142 |\n\n**Total: 16,569,475 rows** of real CAN bus traffic recorded from a real KIA Soul vehicle.\n**Labels:** Read from `Flag` column — `R` = Normal, `T` = Attack\n**Balanced training set:** 5,000 attack + 5,000 normal = 10,000 samples\n\n**4 extracted features per frame:**\n1. CAN ID (hex → int)\n2. Time delta between frames\n3. DLC (Data Length Code)\n4. Byte entropy of data payload\n\n---\n\n## 📁 Project Structure\n\n```\nvahana_rakshaka/\n├── data/                    ← CAN bus CSV datasets (not pushed to GitHub)\n│   ├── DoS_dataset.csv\n│   ├── Fuzzy_dataset.csv\n│   ├── RPM_dataset.csv\n│   └── gear_dataset.csv\n├── processed/               ← Generated by preprocess.py (not pushed)\n│   ├── X_train.npy\n│   ├── X_val.npy\n│   ├── X_test.npy\n│   ├── y_train.npy\n│   ├── y_val.npy\n│   ├── y_test.npy\n│   ├── scaler.pkl\n│   ├── qml_model.pt\n│   ├── svm.pkl\n│   ├── rf.pkl\n│   └── benchmark.json\n├── venv/                    ← Virtual environment (not pushed)\n├── app.py                   ← Streamlit dashboard\n├── model.py                 ← Hybrid QNN model (Qiskit + PyTorch)\n├── preprocess.py            ← Data loading and feature extraction\n├── train.py                 ← Model training + benchmarking\n├── requirements.txt         ← Python dependencies\n└── README.md                ← This file\n```\n\n---\n\n## ⚙️ Installation\n\n### Prerequisites\n- Python 3.8 or higher\n- Windows / Mac / Linux\n- 4GB RAM minimum (8GB recommended)\n\n### Step 1 — Clone the repository\n```bash\ngit clone https://github.com/Balukodeboyina/vahana-rakshaka.git\ncd vahana-rakshaka\n```\n\n### Step 2 — Create virtual environment\n```bash\npython -m venv venv\n\n# Windows\nvenv\\Scripts\\activate\n\n# Mac/Linux\nsource venv/bin/activate\n```\n\n### Step 3 — Install dependencies\n```bash\npip install -r requirements.txt\n```\n\n### Step 4 — Download the dataset\nDownload the Car-Hacking Dataset from:\nhttp://ocslab.hksecurity.net/Datasets/car-hacking-dataset\n\nPlace all CSV files inside the `data/` folder.\n\n---\n\n## 🚀 How to Run\n\nRun these commands in order:\n\n### 1. Preprocess the data\n```bash\npython preprocess.py\n```\nExpected output:\n```\n✅ Done!\n   Train : (7000, 4)\n   Val   : (1500, 4)\n   Test  : (1500, 4)\n```\n\n### 2. Train the models (~30-45 minutes)\n```bash\npython train.py\n```\nExpected output:\n```\nTraining Hybrid QML model (Qiskit)...\nEpoch 01 | Loss: 0.6082 | Val Acc: 0.6720 | Val F1: 0.6559\n...\nEpoch 15 | Loss: 0.5028 | Val Acc: 0.7060 | Val F1: 0.6646\n\n=== BENCHMARK RESULTS ===\nQML-IDS (Ours): Acc=0.7033 | F1=0.6611 | FNR=0.2107\nSVM:            Acc=0.7960 | F1=0.7890 | FNR=0.1187\nRandom Forest:  Acc=0.9993 | F1=0.9993 | FNR=0.0007\n```\n\n### 3. Launch the dashboard\n```bash\nstreamlit run app.py\n```\nOpens at: **http://localhost:8501**\n\n---\n\n## 📈 Results\n\n| Model | Accuracy | F1 Score | False Negative Rate |\n|---|---|---|---|\n| **QML-IDS — Qiskit VQC (Ours)** | 0.7033 | 0.6611 | 0.2107 |\n| SVM (Classical) | 0.7960 | 0.7890 | 0.1187 |\n| Random Forest | 0.9993 | 0.9993 | 0.0007 |\n\n> **Honest interpretation:**\n> Random Forest's near-perfect score indicates overfitting — it memorizes training data\n> and will fail on novel, unseen attack types.\n> Our Qiskit VQC is a NISQ-era prototype running on 4 simulated qubits.\n> Quantum advantage in ML scales with qubit count and circuit depth —\n> on real IBM Quantum hardware with 12+ qubits, representational advantage\n> becomes measurable and consistent, as demonstrated in Salek et al. (2023 IEEE Access).\n\n---\n\n## 🖥️ Demo Features\n\nThe Streamlit dashboard has 4 tabs:\n\n| Tab | Description |\n|---|---|\n| ⚡ **Live Detection** | Real-time simulation of CAN bus frame classification |\n| 📊 **Model Comparison** | Side-by-side benchmark charts vs classical models |\n| 🔬 **Quantum Circuit** | Interactive Qiskit VQC diagram with step-by-step explanation |\n| 🎯 **Manual Test** | Inject custom CAN frames and see attack probability gauge |\n\n---\n\n## 💼 Business Model\n\n| Revenue Stream | Details |\n|---|---|\n| Per-vehicle license | ₹700 – ₹1,000 per vehicle per year |\n| OEM SaaS platform | ₹25 lakh – ₹85 lakh per OEM annually |\n| Professional services | UNECE R155 / ISO 21434 compliance documentation — ₹5 lakh – ₹15 lakh |\n\n**Why this pricing makes sense:**\n- A single CAN bus cyberattack recall can cost an OEM **₹500 crore+**\n- Our annual fee is less than **0.1%** of that risk\n- Since July 2024, UNECE R155 makes cybersecurity a **legal requirement** — not optional\n\n**First target customers:**\n- Stellantis India GCC — Pune\n- Volkswagen India GCC — Hyderabad\n- Hyundai India — Chengalpattu\n\n**Go-to-market:** India first (14.5% CAGR in automotive cybersecurity),\nthen expand globally through Tier-1 automotive suppliers like Bosch, Continental, and Minda.\n\n---\n\n## 👥 Team\n\n| Name | Role | Responsibilities |\n|---|---|---|\n| **Vishnu Vardhan Malempati** | Founder / CEO — Quantum ML Engineer & Frontend Developer | Hybrid QNN architecture, model training & optimization, feature extraction from CAN bus data|\n| **Kodeboyina Bala Anjaneya Siva Kumar** | Co-Founder / COO — Quantum ML Engineer & Backend Developer | VQC design, Qiskit circuit implementation, data preprocessing pipeline, Streamlit dashboard,  GitHub & deployment|\n| **Moturi Sai Madhuri** | CTO — Machine Learning Engineer | Classical baseline models, benchmark analysis, model evaluation pipeline |\n| **Sunkara Satya Vasu** | CPO — Marketing & Growth Manager | Business model, market research, product strategy, investor pitch |\n| **Mohammad Farida Begum** | CDO — DevOps Engineer | Data pipeline infrastructure, GitHub CI/CD, deployment, dataset management |\n\n---\n\n## 🙏 Acknowledgements\n\n- [IBM Qiskit](https://qiskit.org/) — Quantum computing framework\n- [Qiskit Machine Learning](https://qiskit-community.github.io/qiskit-machine-learning/) — QNN and TorchConnector\n- [OTIDS Car-Hacking Dataset](http://ocslab.hksecurity.net/Datasets/car-hacking-dataset) — Real CAN bus attack data\n- [IBM Quantum](https://quantum.ibm.com/) — Quantum computing platform\n- Research reference: Salek et al., 2023 IEEE Access — *\"A Novel Hybrid Quantum-Classical Framework for an In-Vehicle CAN Intrusion Detection\"*\n\n---\n\n*India's first Qiskit-powered automotive Intrusion Detection System.*",
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      "readme": "# Automotive\n\n[![crates.io](https://img.shields.io/crates/v/automotive.svg)](https://crates.io/crates/automotive)\n[![docs.rs](https://img.shields.io/docsrs/automotive)](https://docs.rs/automotive/latest/automotive/)\n[![PyPI](https://img.shields.io/pypi/v/automotive.svg)](https://pypi.org/project/automotive/)\n\n`automotive` is a [Rust crate](https://docs.rs/automotive/latest/automotive/)\nand [Python library](python/README.md) for CAN communication, ISO-TP and DoIP\ntransports, and UDS, XCP, and CCP clients. The Rust API is async; Python offers\nboth synchronous and asyncio APIs.\n\nRust:\n\n```sh\ncargo add automotive --features default-adapters\n```\n\nPython:\n\n```sh\nuv add automotive\n```\n\n## CAN receive and transmit\n\n`automotive::can` provides shared CAN types and an async adapter interface for\nsending and receiving Classical CAN and CAN FD frames.\n\nRust adapter support is opt-in; no hardware adapters are enabled by default.\n\n### Supported adapters\n\n| Adapter | Platforms | Feature |\n| --- | --- | --- |\n| SocketCAN | Linux | `socketcan` |\n| comma.ai panda | Linux, macOS, Windows (USB) | `panda` |\n| PEAK PCAN-USB FD family | Linux, macOS, Windows (raw USB) | `peak` |\n| J2534 PassThru | Windows | `j2534` |\n| Vector XL | Windows x64 | `vector-xl` |\n\n`default-adapters` enables panda and SocketCAN; `all-adapters` enables every\nbackend supported on the target platform. Adapter implementations and discovery\nlive in `automotive::adapters`.\n\n### Sending and receiving frames\n\n`adapters::get_adapter()` opens the first available adapter. Send a frame and\nreceive frames as a stream:\n\n```rust,no_run\nuse std::time::Duration;\n\nuse automotive::{\n    adapters::get_adapter,\n    can::{Frame, Identifier},\n    StreamExt,\n};\n\n#[tokio::main]\nasync fn main() -> automotive::Result<()> {\n    let adapter = get_adapter()?;\n    let mut frames = adapter.recv_for(Duration::from_millis(100));\n    let frame = Frame::builder(Identifier::standard(0x541)?)\n        .data(&[0xff; 8])\n        .build()?;\n\n    adapter.send(&frame).await?;\n\n    while let Some(frame) = frames.next().await {\n        println!(\"{frame:?}\");\n    }\n    Ok(())\n}\n```\n\n`send().await` waits for transmit confirmation. Confirmation accuracy depends\non the adapter and driver; backends without hardware confirmation emulate it.\nReceive streams include transmit echoes, marked with `frame.loopback`.\n`recv_for(duration)` subscribes immediately and returns a stream. Its timer and\nwaiting start when the stream is first consumed, so create it before sending.\n\n`Frame::builder` supports standard and extended identifiers, CAN FD, and bitrate\nswitching. See the [CAN API](https://docs.rs/automotive/latest/automotive/can/)\nfor frame types and validation, or run the\n[CAN sender example](examples/can_sender.rs):\n\n```sh\ncargo run --example can_sender --features default-adapters\n```\n\nAlternatively, enable the `peak` feature and select a PEAK adapter with explicit\nnominal and CAN FD data bitrates:\n\n```rust,no_run\n#[cfg(feature = \"peak\")]\nfn open_peak() -> automotive::Result<automotive::can::AsyncCanAdapter> {\n    use automotive::adapters::peak::{PeakAdapter, PeakConfig};\n\n    let config = PeakConfig::builder()\n        .bitrate(|bitrate| bitrate.bitrate(500_000).data_bitrate(2_000_000))\n        .build()?;\n    PeakAdapter::new_async(config)\n}\n```\n\nSee the [adapter API](https://docs.rs/automotive/latest/automotive/adapters/)\nand [bitrate example](examples/configure_bitrate.rs) for more configuration options.\n\n## Transports\n\n`automotive::transports` provides message transports implementing the shared\n`Transport` interface used by UDS.\n\n### ISO-TP\n\n`IsoTP` exchanges messages over Classical CAN or CAN FD, handling segmentation,\nreassembly, and flow control. Wrap a CAN adapter with `IsoTP::new` and an\n`IsoTPConfig`, or use `IsoTP::from_id` for a standard configuration.\n\n```rust,no_run\nuse automotive::{adapters::get_adapter, transports::isotp::IsoTP, Error, StreamExt};\n\n#[tokio::main]\nasync fn main() -> automotive::Result<()> {\n    let adapter = get_adapter()?;\n    let transport = IsoTP::from_id(&adapter, 0x7a1);\n    let mut responses = transport.recv();\n\n    transport.send(&[0x3e, 0x00]).await?;\n    let response = responses.next().await.ok_or(Error::Disconnected)??;\n    println!(\"Response: {response:02x?}\");\n    Ok(())\n}\n```\n\nThe configuration builder controls transmit and receive identifiers, bus,\naddressing, CAN FD, and timing. See the\n[ISO-TP API](https://docs.rs/automotive/latest/automotive/transports/isotp/)\nand [example](examples/isotp.rs).\n\nOn Windows, `J2534NativeIsoTP` can offload ISO-TP framing and timing to a\ncompatible PassThru device.\n\n### DoIP\n\n`DoIP` carries diagnostic messages over Ethernet using ordinary IPv4 or IPv6\nsockets. It works on Linux, macOS, and Windows without a hardware-adapter\nfeature. Connect to a known ECU with\n`DoIP::connect(\"192.168.0.10:13400\", 0x1000).await?`, or discover vehicles:\n\n```rust,no_run\nuse automotive::transports::doip::discover;\n\n#[tokio::main]\nasync fn main() -> automotive::Result<()> {\n    for vehicle in discover().await? {\n        let transport = vehicle.connect().await?;\n        println!(\"Connected to {}\", transport.peer_address());\n    }\n    Ok(())\n}\n```\n\nActive and passive discovery, source binding, and IPv6 multicast are configurable.\nThe transport handles routing activation and alive checks; TLS and OEM\nauthentication are not implemented. See the\n[DoIP API](https://docs.rs/automotive/latest/automotive/transports/doip/)\nand [example](examples/doip.rs). For a directly connected ECU on Linux,\n[scripts/set_up_doip.sh](scripts/set_up_doip.sh) configures the network interface.\n\n## Diagnostics\n\nProtocol clients live in `automotive::protocols`.\n\n### UDS\n\n`UDSClient` works over ISO-TP or DoIP through the shared `Transport` interface.\nFor example, read a VIN over CAN:\n\n```rust,no_run\nuse automotive::{\n    adapters::get_adapter,\n    protocols::uds::{DataIdentifier, UDSClient},\n    transports::isotp::IsoTP,\n};\n\n#[tokio::main]\nasync fn main() -> automotive::Result<()> {\n    let adapter = get_adapter()?;\n    let transport = IsoTP::from_id(&adapter, 0x7a1);\n    let uds = UDSClient::new(&transport);\n\n    let vin = uds.read_data_by_identifier(DataIdentifier::Vin).await?;\n    println!(\"VIN: {}\", String::from_utf8_lossy(&vin));\n    Ok(())\n}\n```\n\nTo use DoIP, pass a connected `DoIP` transport to `UDSClient::new` instead.\nThe client provides typed service helpers, response validation, configurable\ntiming, and positive-response suppression. Keep one request outstanding per ECU.\nSee the [UDS API](https://docs.rs/automotive/latest/automotive/protocols/uds/)\nand [example](examples/uds.rs) for supported services and configuration.\n\n### XCP\n\n`XCPClient` supports XCP over Classical CAN, CAN FD, and Ethernet (TCP/UDP),\nusing `XCPOnCAN`, `XCPOnTCP`, or `XCPOnUDP`. It provides session, resource access,\nand memory transfer commands.\n\n```rust,no_run\nuse automotive::{\n    adapters::get_adapter,\n    can::Identifier,\n    protocols::xcp::{XCPCanConfig, XCPClient, XCPOnCAN},\n};\nuse std::sync::Arc;\n\n#[tokio::main]\nasync fn main() -> automotive::Result<()> {\n    let adapter = Arc::new(get_adapter()?);\n    let config = XCPCanConfig::new(Identifier::standard(0x6c3)?, Identifier::standard(0x6c4)?);\n    let xcp = XCPClient::new(XCPOnCAN::new(adapter, config)?)?;\n\n    xcp.connect(0).await?;\n    let data = xcp.short_upload(0x8000_0000, 4, 0).await?;\n    println!(\"Memory: {data:02x?}\");\n    xcp.disconnect().await?;\n    Ok(())\n}\n```\n\nSee the [XCP API](https://docs.rs/automotive/latest/automotive/protocols/xcp/)\nand the [CAN](examples/xcp_on_can.rs) and\n[Ethernet](examples/xcp_on_ethernet.rs) examples.\n\n### CCP\n\n`CCPClient` supports CCP 2.1 session, resource access, and memory commands over\nClassical CAN. Construct it with a CAN adapter and `CCPConfig` specifying the\nCRO/DTO identifiers and ECU memory byte order.\n\n```rust,no_run\nuse automotive::{\n    adapters::get_adapter,\n    can::Identifier,\n    protocols::ccp::{CCPClient, CCPConfig},\n};\nuse std::sync::Arc;\n\n#[tokio::main]\nasync fn main() -> automotive::Result<()> {\n    let adapter = Arc::new(get_adapter()?);\n    let config = CCPConfig::new(Identifier::standard(0x6ec)?, Identifier::standard(0x6ed)?);\n    let ccp = CCPClient::new(adapter, config)?;\n\n    ccp.connect(0).await?;\n    let data = ccp.short_upload(0x8000_0000, 4, 0).await?;\n    println!(\"Memory: {data:02x?}\");\n    ccp.disconnect(false).await?;\n    Ok(())\n}\n```\n\nSee the [CCP API](https://docs.rs/automotive/latest/automotive/protocols/ccp/)\nand the [memory read example](examples/ccp.rs).\n\n## Python library\n\nThe Python package exposes the same CAN adapters, transports, and protocol\nclients through synchronous and asyncio APIs, with the import name `automotive`.\nFor example, read a VIN over DoIP.\n\nSynchronous:\n\n```python\nfrom automotive.sync.protocols.uds import DataIdentifier, UDSClient\nfrom automotive.sync.transports.doip import DoIP\n\nwith DoIP.connect(\"192.168.0.10\", 0x1000) as transport:\n    uds = UDSClient(transport)\n    vin = uds.read_data_by_identifier(DataIdentifier.VIN)\n    print(vin.decode())\n```\n\nAsyncio:\n\n```python\nimport asyncio\n\nfrom automotive.protocols.uds import DataIdentifier, UDSClient\nfrom automotive.transports.doip import DoIP\n\n\nasync def main():\n    async with await DoIP.connect(\"192.168.0.10\", 0x1000) as transport:\n        uds = UDSClient(transport)\n        vin = await uds.read_data_by_identifier(DataIdentifier.VIN)\n        print(vin.decode())\n\n\nasyncio.run(main())\n```\n\nSee the [Python README](python/README.md) for more examples and the\n[Python documentation](https://i-can-hack.github.io/automotive/) for the user\nguide and API reference. Matching examples live in\n[python/examples](python/examples) and [python/examples/sync](python/examples/sync).\n\n## Development\n\nThe optional Nix development shell includes Rust, Python, Scapy, and the build\nand network tools used by the project:\n\n```sh\nnix develop\ncargo test\ncargo test --features all\n```\n\nFor the virtual ECU tests on Linux, set up `vcan0` and enable the transport test\nfeatures. The setup script requires `sudo`; Scapy must be available to Python.\n\n```sh\nscripts/set_up_vcan.sh\ncargo test --features test-vcan,test-doip,serde\n```\n\n`test-vcan` runs CAN tests; `test-doip` runs the DoIP tests over IPv4 and IPv6.\nSee the [Python README](python/README.md) for Python development and test commands.",
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      "id": "github:rajkotpodman/jigsi-karia-search",
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      "record_type": "repository",
      "title": "Jigsi Karia — Cyber OSINT Gateway & Hacker Scanner",
      "full_name": "rajkotpodman/jigsi-karia-search",
      "name": "jigsi-karia-search",
      "owner": "rajkotpodman",
      "url": "https://github.com/rajkotpodman/jigsi-karia-search",
      "description": "A professional-grade cyber intelligence dashboard aggregating 900+ search engines, OSINT tools, exploit databases, API fetchers, dark web scanners, tire/vehicle lookups, and AI-powered intelligence modules — available as a single-file web app, a PWA, and a native Android APK.",
      "readme": "# Jigsi Karia — Cyber OSINT Gateway & Hacker Scanner\n\n<p align=\"center\">\n  <img src=\"https://img.shields.io/badge/version-5.0.0-00ff00?style=for-the-badge&logo=github\" alt=\"Version\" />\n  <img src=\"https://img.shields.io/badge/tools-900+-ff0055?style=for-the-badge&logo=search\" alt=\"Tools\" />\n  <img src=\"https://img.shields.io/badge/categories-30-00bcff?style=for-the-badge\" alt=\"Categories\" />\n  <img src=\"https://img.shields.io/badge/platform-web_|_android_|_pwa-black?style=for-the-badge&logo=android\" alt=\"Platform\" />\n  <img src=\"https://img.shields.io/badge/size-213_KB-00ff00?style=for-the-badge\" alt=\"Size\" />\n  <img src=\"https://img.shields.io/badge/license-educational_only-ff4444?style=for-the-badge\" alt=\"License\" />\n</p>\n\n<p align=\"center\">\n  <b>Zero-dependency | Single-file | PWA + Native Android | Gujarati UI</b>\n</p>\n\nA professional-grade cyber intelligence dashboard aggregating 900+ search engines, OSINT tools, exploit databases, API fetchers, dark web scanners, tire/vehicle lookups, and AI-powered intelligence modules — available as a single-file web app, a PWA, and a native Android APK.\n\n---\n\n## Table of Contents\n\n- [Overview](#overview)\n- [Features Matrix](#features-matrix)\n- [Platform Availability](#platform-availability)\n- [Quick Start](#quick-start)\n- [Category Index](#category-index)\n- [AI Intelligence Fetcher](#ai-intelligence-fetcher)\n- [Android Application](#android-application)\n  - [Installation](#android-installation)\n  - [Project Structure](#android-project-structure)\n  - [Build from Source](#android-build-from-source)\n  - [JavaScript Bridge API](#android-javascript-bridge-api)\n  - [Key Files](#android-key-files)\n- [Web Deployment](#web-deployment)\n- [Repository Structure](#repository-structure)\n- [Architecture & Data Flow](#architecture--data-flow)\n- [Technical Specifications](#technical-specifications)\n- [Color System](#color-system)\n- [Authentication](#authentication)\n- [Security Notice](#security-notice)\n- [Contributing / Build Guide](#contributing--build-guide)\n- [Contact & Links](#contact--links)\n\n---\n\n## Overview\n\nJigsi Karia (Gujarati: જિજ્ઞાસુ કારિયા) is an all-in-one cyber investigation portal built as a single HTML file with zero external dependencies. Every tool, API endpoint, and search engine is mapped to a URL template. Enter a query like a phone number, IP address, domain, email, username, or vehicle VIN — then launch it across any of the 900+ pre-configured services with one click.\n\n**What makes it unique:**\n- Entire application in **one file** — no build step, no bundler, no npm\n- **900+ URL templates** covering search engines, OSINT tools, blockchain explorers, tire catalogs, vehicle databases, and more\n- **11 AI Fetch modules** that launch multiple intelligence tabs simultaneously\n- **Native Android APK** with full WebView integration, JavaScript bridge, and offline support\n- **PWA installable** with service worker caching\n- **Matrix digital rain** canvas background with dark/light mode toggle\n- **Gujarati-language UI** for the primary audience with English mixed labels\n\n---\n\n## Features Matrix\n\n| Feature | Web | PWA | Android APK |\n|---------|:---:|:---:|:-----------:|\n| Matrix Canvas Animation | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ |\n| 900+ Search Engine Launchers | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ |\n| AI Fetch Intelligence Panel (12 modules) | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ |\n| Dark/Light Mode Toggle | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ |\n| Smart Autocomplete (30 keywords) | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ |\n| Search History (MRU 10) | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ |\n| Clipboard Copy | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ |\n| Category Quick-Jump Toolbar | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ |\n| Stats Counter Dashboard | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ |\n| WhatsApp Floating Button | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ |\n| Pro Action Hub (Buy/Donate/Store) | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ |\n| Offline Caching | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ |\n| Install to Home Screen | ❌ | ✅ | ✅ |\n| Native Splash Screen | ❌ | ❌ | ✅ |\n| Fullscreen Immersive Mode | ❌ | ❌ | ✅ |\n| External App Launching | ❌ | ❌ | ✅ |\n| JavaScript Bridge (Android API) | ❌ | ❌ | ✅ |\n| Back Button Navigation | ❌ | ❌ | ✅ |\n| Share Intent | ❌ | ❌ | ✅ |\n| Toast Notifications | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ |\n\n---\n\n## Platform Availability\n\n| Platform | Type | File | Size |\n|----------|------|------|:----:|\n| **Web** | Single HTML file | `index.html` | 213 KB |\n| **PWA** | Progressive Web App | `index.html` + `manifest.json` + `sw.js` | 214 KB |\n| **Android** | Native APK (signed) | `jigsi-karia-v5.apk` | 4.6 MB |\n| **Android** | Android Studio project | `android/` directory | source only |\n\n---\n\n## Quick Start\n\n### Web / PWA\n\n```bash\n# Clone the repository\ngit clone https://github.com/rajkotpodman/jigsi-karia-search.git\ncd jigsi-karia-search\n\n# Start local server (Python 3)\npython3 -m http.server 8080 --bind 0.0.0.0\n\n# Or with Node.js\nnpx serve .\n```\n\nOpen `http://localhost:8080` in your browser.\n**Default credentials:** `admin` / `admin`\n\n### Android APK\n\nDownload `jigsi-karia-v5.apk` from the repository root and install directly on any Android device (5.0+).\nOr build from source (see [Build from Source](#android-build-from-source)).\n\n---\n\n## Category Index\n\n| # | Category | Buttons | Key Tools |\n|:--:|----------|:-------:|-----------|\n| 1 | Mega Search Engines | 56 | Google, Bing, Yandex, Baidu, DuckDuckGo, Brave AI, SearX |\n| 2 | OSINT & Intelligence | 96 | Shodan, IntelX, Maltego, HaveIBeenPwned, Censys, ZoomEye |\n| 3 | Network & Domain Tools | 55 | DNSDumpster, MXToolBox, BGPView, SecurityTrails, ViewDNS |\n| 4 | Exploit & Vulnerability DB | 47 | Exploit-DB, NVD, CVE Details, Metasploit, VulHub, GTFOBins |\n| 5 | Threat Intelligence & Malware | 38 | VirusTotal, MalwareBazaar, MISP, YARA, CrowdStrike, ThreatFox |\n| 6 | Social & People Search | 48 | Pipl, Spokeo, WhatsMyName, UserSearch, LinkedIn, TrueCaller |\n| 7 | Advanced AI Suites | 30 | ChatGPT, Claude, Gemini, DeepSeek, Hugging Face, Ollama |\n| 8 | Cryptocurrency & Blockchain | 30 | Blockchair, Etherscan, DeBank, CoinGecko, Glassnode, Messari |\n| 9 | Dark Web & TOR | 23 | Ahmia, DarkSearch, Tor Project, OnionShare, I2P, Freenet |\n| 10 | Cloud & DevOps OSINT | 28 | AWS, Azure, GCP, Kubernetes, Docker Hub, Vercel, Supabase |\n| 11 | Forensic & Data Leak | 36 | Autopsy, Volatility, BreachDirectory, DeHashed, Cellebrite |\n| 12 | Misc Hacker Tools | 47 | CyberChef, Hash Killer, JWT.io, Regex101, CodePen, CodeBeautify |\n| 13 | Cyber Security News | 20 | Krebs, TheHackerNews, BleepingComputer, SANS, DarkReading |\n| 14 | Pentest, CTF & Lab | 25 | HackTheBox, TryHackMe, HackerOne, Bugcrowd, PentesterLab |\n| 15 | Sandbox & File Analysis | 20 | Cuckoo, CAPE, Joe Sandbox, Intezer, Triage, FileScan.io |\n| 16 | Privacy, VPN & Anonymity | 20 | NordVPN, Mullvad, ProtonVPN, PrivacyTools, Tails OS, Whonix |\n| 17 | Email Intel & Spam Check | 19 | MXToolBox, EmailRep, Mail-Tester, NeverBounce, ZeroBounce |\n| 18 | Geo, Map & Location | 20 | Google Maps, OpenStreetMap, Sentinel Hub, GeoNames, GPS Visualizer |\n| 19 | Paste & Archive Sites | 14 | Pastebin, Rentry, PrivateBin, Wayback Machine, Archive.today |\n| 20 | Developer Tools | 20 | NPM, PyPI, MDN, LeetCode, CodeWars, StackOverflow, DevDocs |\n| 21 | Wireless & IoT | 15 | WiGLE, CellMapper, Shodan IoT, RouterPwn, Insecam, Mirai Tracker |\n| 22 | Phishing Detection | 15 | Google SafeBrowse, PhishTank, CheckPhish, ScamAdviser, Trustpilot |\n| 23 | Government & Cert DB | 15 | CISA, NIST, FBI IC3, INTERPOL, Europol, NCSC UK, CERT/CC |\n| 24 | Image, Video & Media | 15 | TinEye, PimEyes, Forensically, EXIF Viewer, FaceCheck.id |\n| 25 | Extra Bonus Tools | 22 | Nmap, SQLMap, FFUF, Nuclei, GAU, Amass, Masscan, RustScan |\n| 26 | Free Tire Search & Price | 35 | TireRack, Discount Tire, eBay, Walmart, Freecycle, OfferUp |\n| 27 | Real-Time API Fetchers | 40 | ipapi.co, OpenWeatherMap, GitHub API, CoinGecko, Agify.io |\n| 28 | Vehicle Database & Specs | 25 | NHTSA VIN, Kelley Blue Book, Carfax, Edmunds, CarMax, Copart |\n| 29 | Price Comparison & Deals | 20 | Google Shopping, CamelCamelCamel, Slickdeals, Rakuten, Groupon |\n| 30 | Web Fetchers & Scrapers | 30 | SerpAPI, Diffbot, ScrapingBee, Apify, Common Crawl, Bright Data |\n\n---\n\n## AI Intelligence Fetcher\n\nThe AI Fetch Panel provides one-click multi-tab intelligence gathering across 11 domains. Each module opens 3 URLs simultaneously with a 400ms stagger delay, logs progress to an inline result panel, and shows a toast notification.\n\n```\n┌─────────────────────┬──────────────────────────────────────────┐\n│ Module              │ Endpoints Launched                       │\n├─────────────────────┼──────────────────────────────────────────┤\n│ Full OSINT Scan     │ IP Geo + WHOIS + Shodan                  │\n│ Geo IP Lookup       │ ipapi.co + ipinfo.io + AbuseIPDB         │\n│ WHOIS Fetch         │ DomainTools + crt.sh SSL + DNSDumpster   │\n│ Breach Check        │ HaveIBeenPwned + DeHashed + LeakCheck    │\n│ Phone Intel         │ TrueCaller + PhoneInfoga + Numverify     │\n│ Tire & Vehicle      │ TireRack + Discount Tire + SimpleTire    │\n│ Social Scan         │ WhatsMyName + UserSearch + Social Search │\n│ Crypto Trace        │ Blockchair + Etherscan + BSCScan         │\n│ DNS Enumeration     │ DNSDumpster + SecurityTrails + ViewDNS   │\n│ Malware Check       │ VirusTotal + HybridAnalysis + URLScan    │\n│ Reverse Image       │ TinEye + Google Images + Yandex Images   │\n│ DarkWeb Monitor     │ Ahmia + DarkSearch + Tor Project         │\n└─────────────────────┴──────────────────────────────────────────┘\n```\n\n**Total: 36 API endpoints** configurable via `FETCH_MAP` in JavaScript.\n\n---\n\n## Android Application\n\nThe native Android app wraps the entire web application in a hardened `WebView` with full JavaScript bridging, offline asset loading, external URL intent handling, and immersive fullscreen mode.\n\n### Android Installation\n\n1. Download `jigsi-karia-v5.apk` from the [repository root](https://github.com/rajkotpodman/jigsi-karia-search)\n2. On your Android device, enable **Settings > Security > Unknown Sources**\n3. Open the APK file and tap **Install**\n4. Launch \"Jigsi Karia\" from your app drawer\n\n**Requirements:** Android 5.0 (API 21) or higher\n\n### Android Project Structure\n\n```\nandroid/\n├── build.gradle                          # Root: AGP 8.2.0 plugin, clean task\n├── settings.gradle                       # Module registration, repo config\n├── gradle.properties                     # JVM args, AndroidX flags\n├── gradlew / gradlew.bat                 # Gradle wrapper scripts\n├── gradle/wrapper/\n│   ├── gradle-wrapper.jar                # Wrapper binary\n│   └── gradle-wrapper.properties         # Gradle 8.5 distribution URL\n├── .gitignore                            # Android-specific ignores\n└── app/\n    ├── build.gradle                      # App: compileSdk 34, dependencies\n    ├── proguard-rules.pro                # ProGuard keep rules\n    └── src/main/\n        ├── AndroidManifest.xml           # Permissions, activity, intent filters\n        ├── assets/                       # Bundled web application files\n        │   ├── index.html                #   (3,277 lines — the entire app)\n        │   ├── manifest.json             #   PWA manifest\n        │   ├── sw.js                     #   Service Worker\n        │   └── robots.txt                #   Crawl rules\n        ├── java/com/jigsi/karia/\n        │   └── MainActivity.java         # WebView host activity (253 lines)\n        └── res/\n            ├── drawable/\n            │   └── ic_launcher_foreground.xml   # Lightning bolt vector icon\n            ├── layout/\n            │   └── activity_main.xml            # WebView + ProgressBar layout\n            ├── mipmap-anydpi-v26/\n            │   ├── ic_launcher.xml              # Adaptive icon\n            │   └── ic_launcher_round.xml        # Round adaptive icon\n            ├── values/\n            │   ├── colors.xml                   # Matrix-green color palette\n            │   ├── strings.xml                  # App name and labels\n            │   └── themes.xml                   # Material theme (dark, no action bar)\n            └── xml/\n                └── backup_rules.xml             # Auto-backup rules\n```\n\n### Android Build from Source\n\n```bash\n# Prerequisites\n# - Java JDK 17+\n# - Android SDK (platforms;android-34, build-tools;34.0.0)\n# - Set ANDROID_SDK_ROOT environment variable\n\n# Clone and enter android directory\ngit clone https://github.com/rajkotpodman/jigsi-karia-search.git\ncd jigsi-karia-search/android\n\n# Make gradlew executable\nchmod +x gradlew\n\n# Build debug APK\n./gradlew assembleDebug\n\n# Build release APK (unsigned)\n./gradlew assembleRelease\n\n# Sign the release APK\napksigner sign --ks your-keystore.jks \\\n  --out app/build/outputs/apk/release/jigsi-karia-signed.apk \\\n  app/build/outputs/apk/release/app-release-unsigned.apk\n\n# Verify\napksigner verify app/build/outputs/apk/release/jigsi-karia-signed.apk\n```\n\n**Build output:**\n\n| Variant | Path | Size |\n|---------|------|:----:|\n| Debug | `app/build/outputs/apk/debug/app-debug.apk` | ~4.6 MB |\n| Release (unsigned) | `app/build/outputs/apk/release/app-release-unsigned.apk` | ~4.6 MB |\n| Release (signed) | `app/build/outputs/apk/release/jigsi-karia-v5.apk` | 4.6 MB |\n\n### Android JavaScript Bridge API\n\nThe `MainActivity` exposes a `WebAppInterface` class as `window.Android` in the WebView:\n\n```javascript\n// Show native Android toast\nAndroid.showToast(\"Search completed!\");\n\n// Trigger native share sheet\nAndroid.shareContent(\"Jigsi Karia\", \"900+ OSINT tools\", \"https://...\");\n\n// Open URL in external browser\nAndroid.openExternal(\"https://example.com\");\n\n// Get app version string\nconst version = Android.getAppVersion();  // \"5.0.0\"\n\n// Check network connectivity\nconst online = Android.isOnline();\n```\n\n### Android Key Files\n\n| File | Lines | Purpose |\n|------|:-----:|---------|\n| `MainActivity.java` | 253 | WebView host, JS bridge, external URL handler, lifecycle |\n| `AndroidManifest.xml` | 40 | Permissions (INTERNET, NETWORK, WIFI, VIBRATE), activities, intent filters |\n| `app/build.gradle` | 45 | SDK versions, dependencies (AppCompat, WebKit, Material) |\n| `activity_main.xml` | 17 | LinearLayout with ProgessBar + WebView |\n| `colors.xml` | 12 | Matrix-green primary palette |\n| `themes.xml` | 22 | MaterialComponents.NoActionBar dark theme |\n\n### Android Features\n\n| Feature | Implementation |\n|---------|----------------|\n| Target/Compile SDK | 34 (Android 14) |\n| Min SDK | 21 (Android 5.0) |\n| WebView Engine | Chromium WebView with full JS/DOM/localStorage |\n| URL Handling | http/https → external browser, whatsapp/tel/mailto → native app, file:// → internal |\n| Fullscreen | API 30+ WindowInsetsController, API <30 SYSTEM_UI_FLAG flags |\n| JavaScript Bridge | WebAppInterface with toast, share, openExternal, getAppVersion, isOnline |\n| Progress Bar | Horizontal ProgressBar tinted Matrix green (#00ff00) |\n| Back Navigation | WebView.goBack() for history, Activity.finish() when at root |\n| Lifecycle | onPause/onResume/onDestroy properly forwarded to WebView |\n| Dependencies | AppCompat 1.6.1, Core 1.12.0, WebKit 1.9.0, Material 1.11.0 |\n| Gradle | AGP 8.2.0, Gradle 8.5, Java 17 |\n\n---\n\n## Web Deployment\n\n### Static Hosting (Zero Config)\n\n| Platform | Setup |\n|----------|-------|\n| **GitHub Pages** | Push to `main` branch, enable in Settings > Pages, set source to root |\n| **Vercel** | Import repo — auto-detected static site, instant deploy |\n| **Netlify** | Drag folder or connect repo — no build command needed |\n| **Cloudflare Pages** | Connect repo, build command: `(none)`, output directory: `/` |\n| **Surge** | `npx surge . jigsi-karia.surge.sh` |\n| **Render** | Create static site, publish directory: `/` |\n\n### PWA Verification\n\n```bash\n# Verify manifest serves correctly\ncurl -s https://your-domain.com/manifest.json | python3 -m json.tool\n\n# Verify service worker is registered\ncurl -s https://your-domain.com/sw.js | head -3\n\n# Audit with Lighthouse\n# Open Chrome DevTools > Lighthouse > Run audit\n```\n\nThe app scores high on Lighthouse PWA checks due to:\n- Valid `manifest.json` with theme_color, icons, and standalone display\n- Registered service worker with cache-first strategy\n- Responsive viewport meta tag\n- All content served over HTTPS\n\n---\n\n## Repository Structure\n\n```\njigsi-karia-search/\n│\n├── index.html                  # Main application (3,277 lines, 213 KB)\n│                               #   CSS:    540 lines  (embedded <style>)\n│                               #   HTML: 1,267 lines  (30 category sections, 900+ buttons)\n│                               #   JS:   1,448 lines  (engine mappings, AI fetch, auth)\n│\n├── jigsi-karia-v5.apk          # Signed release APK (4.6 MB) — install on Android 5.0+\n│\n├── manifest.json               # PWA Web App Manifest (27 lines)\n├── sw.js                       # Service Worker with cache-first strategy (48 lines)\n├── robots.txt                  # SEO crawl directives\n├── .gitignore                  # Node modules, build artifacts, IDE files\n├── README.md                   # You are here\n│\n└── android/                    # Full Android Studio project\n    ├── build.gradle             #   Root Gradle config (AGP 8.2.0)\n    ├── settings.gradle          #   Module and repository configuration\n    ├── gradle.properties        #   JVM args (2048m), AndroidX flags\n    ├── gradlew                  #   Gradle wrapper (Unix)\n    ├── gradlew.bat              #   Gradle wrapper (Windows)\n    ├── .gitignore               #   Android-specific ignores\n    ├── gradle/wrapper/\n    │   ├── gradle-wrapper.jar\n    │   └── gradle-wrapper.properties\n    └── app/\n        ├── build.gradle         #   App-level: SDK 34, dependencies\n        ├── proguard-rules.pro   #   ProGuard keep rules\n        └── src/main/\n            ├── AndroidManifest.xml\n            ├── assets/          #   Bundled web files (4 files)\n            ├── java/.../MainActivity.java\n            └── res/             #   Resources (8 files)\n```\n\n**Total project files:** 27 source files + 1 signed APK\n**Total lines of code:** ~3,719 (web + Android combined, excluding auto-generated Gradle files)\n\n---\n\n## Architecture & Data Flow\n\n```\n┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐\n│                      USER INPUT                          │\n│         (phone, IP, domain, email, VIN, query)           │\n└─────────────────────┬───────────────────────────────────┘\n                      │\n                      ▼\n┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐\n│                 SMART SEARCH LAYER                       │\n│  ┌─────────────┐  ┌──────────────┐  ┌────────────────┐  │\n│  │ Autocomplete │  │ Search       │  │ Clipboard      │  │\n│  │ (30 terms)   │  │ History MRU  │  │ Copy Button    │  │\n│  └─────────────┘  └──────────────┘  └────────────────┘  │\n└─────────────────────┬───────────────────────────────────┘\n                      │\n          ┌───────────┼───────────┐\n          ▼           ▼           ▼\n┌──────────────┐ ┌─────────┐ ┌──────────────────────┐\n│ 900+ Engines │ │ AI Fetch│ │ Quick Access Ribbon  │\n│ openEngine() │ │ Panel   │ │ (Phone/Email/IP/...) │\n│ Opens query  │ │ 36 URLs │ │ One-click presets    │\n│ in new tab   │ │ Stagger │ │                      │\n│              │ │ launch  │ │                      │\n└──────────────┘ └─────────┘ └──────────────────────┘\n                      │\n                      ▼\n┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐\n│                 STORAGE (localStorage)                   │\n│  Credentials | Theme | Visit Count | Search History     │\n│  (with _memStore fallback if localStorage is blocked)   │\n└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘\n```\n\n### Engine Resolution Flow\n\n```\n1. User enters query in search input\n2. User clicks a category button (e.g., \"Shodan\")\n3. openEngine('shodan') is called\n4. Query is URI-encoded and added to search history\n5. Engine mapping resolves: shodan → \"https://www.shodan.io/search?query={enc}\"\n6. window.open(url, '_blank') launches in new tab\n```\n\n---\n\n## Technical Specifications\n\n### Web Application\n\n| Attribute | Value |\n|-----------|-------|\n| File size | 213 KB (218,112 bytes) |\n| Total lines | 3,277 |\n| CSS lines | ~540 |\n| HTML lines | ~1,267 |\n| JavaScript lines | ~1,448 |\n| External dependencies | **0** (zero) |\n| CDN requests | **0** (zero) |\n| Engine URL mappings | 900+ |\n| CSS class variants | 40 category color classes |\n| Autocomplete keywords | 30 |\n| JavaScript functions | 26 named + 3 anonymous |\n| AI Fetch modules | 11 (36 total endpoints) |\n| Search history capacity | 10 items (MRU) |\n\n### Android Application\n\n| Attribute | Value |\n|-----------|-------|\n| APK size | 4.6 MB |\n| APK type | Signed release (RSA 2048-bit) |\n| compileSdk | 34 (Android 14) |\n| minSdk | 21 (Android 5.0 Lollipop) |\n| targetSdk | 34 |\n| versionCode | 5 |\n| versionName | 5.0.0 |\n| Kotlin usage | 0 (pure Java) |\n| Java source lines | 253 |\n| Permissions | INTERNET, ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE, ACCESS_WIFI_STATE, VIBRATE |\n| Gradle | 8.5 |\n| AGP | 8.2.0 |\n| Build time | ~3 minutes |\n\n### Browser Compatibility\n\n| Browser | Support |\n|---------|:-------:|\n| Chrome 90+ | Full |\n| Firefox 90+ | Full |\n| Safari 15+ | Full (minor canvas perf difference) |\n| Edge 90+ | Full |\n| Samsung Internet | Full |\n| Opera | Full |\n| Android WebView | Full (native APK target) |\n\n---\n\n## Color System\n\n```\n┌──────────────┬──────────┬─────────────────────────┐\n│ Role         │ Hex      │ Usage                   │\n├──────────────┼──────────┼─────────────────────────┤\n│ Primary      │ #00ff00  │ Matrix green, borders    │\n│ Secondary    │ #00bcff  │ Cyber blue, accents      │\n│ Accent       │ #ff0055  │ Hot pink, highlights     │\n│ Warning      │ #ffaa00  │ Amber, pro hub           │\n│ Danger       │ #ff4444  │ Red, error states        │\n│ Background   │ #000000  │ Page background          │\n│ Surface      │ #0a0f1d  │ Card/panel backgrounds   │\n│ Text         │ #cccccc  │ Secondary text           │\n└──────────────┴──────────┴─────────────────────────┘\n```\n\n**Category Color Classes (40 total):**\n\n```\nSearch:   #00ff00   OSINT:    #ff0055   Network:  #ffaa00   Exploit:  #aa44ff\nThreat:   #ff4444   Social:   #ff88cc   AI:       #cc33ff   Crypto:   #ffaa33\nDark:     #333333   Cloud:    #66ddff   Leak:     #ff66aa   Forensic: #33aaff\nMisc:     #66ccff   News:     #ff9933   Pentest:  #cc0000   Sandbox:  #009966\nVPN:      #005599   Privacy:  #336699   Email:    #dd4499   Geo:      #22aa55\nPaste:    #7755cc   Archive:  #aa6600   Dev:      #0077cc   Wireless: #33bbaa\nIoT:      #996600   Phishing: #ff5500   Gov:      #334477   Image:    #ee44bb\nVideo:    #cc2244   Tire:     #ff6600   Price:    #22cc44   API:      #7744ff\nReview:   #00aacc   Vehicle:  #557799   Tyre:     #cc6600   Freebie:  #ee2277\nMarket:   #006699   Fetch:    #ff3377   Deal:     #ffbb00   Cert:     #33aa77\n```\n\n---\n\n## Authentication\n\nThe portal uses `localStorage`-based credential management with a `_memStore` fallback for environments where `localStorage` is unavailable (e.g., some WebView configurations).\n\n```\nDefault credentials:  admin / admin\nMinimum length:       2 characters\nPersistence:          localStorage (survives page reload and app restart)\nFallback:             In-memory object (_memStore) if localStorage blocked\n```\n\nTo reset credentials, clear localStorage or run in console:\n```javascript\nlocalStorage.removeItem('gate_user');\nlocalStorage.removeItem('gate_pass');\n```\n\n---\n\n## Security Notice\n\n> **IMPORTANT:** This dashboard is structured explicitly for authorized cyber security verification, data intelligence research, and ethical OSINT investigation. Do not use this site for any illegal activities. Users must acknowledge the notice banner before accessing tools.\n\n- No data is collected, proxied, or stored server-side\n- All tools open URLs in external browser tabs pointed at legitimate third-party services\n- User credentials are stored only in `localStorage` on the device\n- The app requests only essential Android permissions (INTERNET, NETWORK_STATE)\n\n---\n\n## Contributing / Build Guide\n\n### Web Development\n\n```bash\n# No build step required — edit index.html directly\n# Test locally:\npython3 -m http.server 8080\n\n# Validate HTML (optional):\n# Open in Chrome DevTools > Console for errors\n```\n\n### Adding New Tools\n\n1. Add a button in the appropriate category section in `index.html`\n2. Add the URL mapping in the `engines` object (inside `openEngine()` function)\n3. Optionally add a color class if it belongs to a new category\n\n```javascript\n// Example: adding a new search engine\n// In engines object:\nmynewtool: `https://mynewtool.com/search?q=${encodeURIComponent(query)}`,\n\n// In HTML:\n<button class=\"engine-btn c-osint\" onclick=\"openEngine('mynewtool')\">My New Tool</button>\n```\n\n### Android Build Setup\n\n```bash\n# 1. Install Java 17+\n# 2. Install Android SDK command-line tools\n# 3. Set environment variables:\nexport ANDROID_SDK_ROOT=/path/to/android-sdk\nexport JAVA_HOME=/path/to/jdk-17\n\n# 4. Accept licenses\nyes | $ANDROID_SDK_ROOT/cmdline-tools/latest/bin/sdkmanager --licenses\n\n# 5. Install SDK components\n$ANDROID_SDK_ROOT/cmdline-tools/latest/bin/sdkmanager \\\n  \"platforms;android-34\" \\\n  \"build-tools;34.0.0\" \\\n  \"platform-tools\"\n\n# 6. Build\ncd android && ./gradlew assembleRelease\n```\n\n---\n\n## Contact & Links\n\n| Channel | Link |\n|---------|------|\n| **GitHub** | [rajkotpodman/jigsi-karia-search](https://github.com/rajkotpodman/jigsi-karia-search) |\n| **WhatsApp** | [+91 98980 48483](https://wa.me/919898048483) |\n| **Hub ID** | jigsi_karia |\n| **Pro License** | Contact via WhatsApp |\n| **Digital Store** | [WhatsApp Catalog](https://wa.me/c/919898048483) |\n| **Donation** | [Google Form](https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLScJ7WjuxEXqdoSlUtxN7NQ8UeKpbEAeA9iIO-IXOmBmYzlLHQ/viewform) |\n\n---\n\n<p align=\"center\">\n  <b>Jigsi Karia v5.0.0</b> — Built in Gujarat, deployed globally.<br/>\n  <sub>Educational and authorized research use only.</sub>\n</p>",
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      "full_name": "MedhatElessawy/Automotive-OBD_II-UDS-Security-Framework",
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      "description": "Educational CAN bus lab implementing OBD-II and UDS diagnostics, ECU simulation, and security attack scenarios over ISO-TP using Python.",
      "readme": "# Automotive-OBD_II-UDS-Security-Framework\n\n## Overview\n\nThis project provides a local automotive diagnostics and security testing lab built on top of python-can and ISO-TP.\nIt simulates realistic ECU behavior, exposes common UDS/OBD services, and includes an interactive tester and attack framework for security experimentation.\n\nThe lab is designed for learning, testing, and demonstrating:\n- Diagnostic workflows\n- Session and security state handling\n- Common automotive attack surfaces\n\n---\n\n## Architecture\n\n### 1) Tester\n\n#### OBD-II client\n- Builds OBD requests by selecting CAN ID + Mode + PID(s)\n- Supports Mode 0x01 (Show Current data) multi-PID querying and 0x09 (Request Vehicle Info.)\n- Displays raw ECU replies and basic service validation (positive responses vs negative responses)\n#### UDS client\n- Sends raw UDS frames  exactly as a real tester would send service requests.\n- Implements a complete **SecurityAccess (0x27)** exchange:\n   - Sends seed request (27 01) to the physical ECU address\n   - Computes the key locally using the same seed→key logic as the ECU (shared algorithm)\n   - Sends key (27 02) and confirms whether access was granted or rejected\n- Supports **TesterPresent (0x3E)** via hotkey (Ctrl+R) to keep sessions alive (S3 behavior), matching real-world keep-alive traffic\n- If MITM protection is enabled on the lab ECU, the tester can store the returned token after SecurityAccess and append it automatically for protected session transitions (10 02 / 10 03)\n\n\n### 2) ECU\n\n#### OBD-II SERVER\n- Vehicle Information service (Mode 0x09), including VIN retrieval\n- Live data service (Mode 0x01) with example PIDs such as engine RPM and vehicle speed (implementation-dependent)\n\n\n#### UDS SERVER\n- Diagnostic Session Control (0x10): Default, Extended, and Programming sessions\n- SecurityAccess (0x27): seed/key authentication with configurable protection modes\n- ECU Reset (0x11): restricted behind successful security access\n- ReadDataByIdentifier (0x22): controlled access to identifiers such as VIN, serial number, and program image\n- WriteDataByIdentifier (0x2E): persistent update of a simulated program image\n- RoutineControl (0x31): example routines including self-test and checksum calculation\n- TesterPresent (0x3E): session keep-alive with S3 timeout enforcement\n\n#### Security Modes and Defensive Behavior for UDS\n\n- **Protected mode**\n  - Limits the number of incorrect SecurityAccess key attempts\n  - Triggers a timed lockout window after repeated failures\n  - Uses the protected seed→key validation path\n  - (Optional) Requires a valid session token for sensitive session transitions to emulate MITM-resistant workflows\n\n- **Unprotected mode**\n  - Allows unlimited SecurityAccess attempts (no lockout)\n  - Uses a simplified seed→key validation path intended for lab attacks and analysis\n  - Does not require a session token for session transitions\n  - Represents a deliberately weak configuration for educational testing\n\n\n\n### 3) Attacker\n\nThe project includes a menu-driven offensive lab that demonstrates common attack techniques against OBD-II and UDS diagnostic services over ISO-TP.\n\n#### OBD-II Attacks\n\n- **PID Enumeration**\n  - Systematically queries supported Parameter IDs for a given OBD mode.\n  - Used to identify which live data points are exposed by the ECU.\n\n- **Denial-of-Service (DoS) Simulation**\n  - Sends a high rate of diagnostic requests to overwhelm the ECU.\n  - Demonstrates how excessive traffic can degrade or disrupt diagnostic responsiveness.\n\n- **Replay Attack**\n  - Captures valid ECU responses during normal operation.\n  - Re-injects previously observed messages to demonstrate trust-based weaknesses in OBD communication.\n\n#### UDS Attacks\n\n- **DID / RID Enumeration**\n  - Probes Data Identifiers using ReadDataByIdentifier (0x22).\n  - Probes Routine Identifiers using RoutineControl (0x31).\n  - Identifies accessible, restricted, and unsupported services.\n\n- **Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) Session Manipulation**\n  - Observes successful SecurityAccess authentication.\n  - Forces diagnostic session transitions and maintains session validity using TesterPresent messages.\n\n- **Seed-Based Brute Force (SecurityAccess)**\n  - Repeatedly attempts key values for SecurityAccess (0x27).\n  - Demonstrates the impact of weak seed–key algorithms and missing lockout mechanisms.\n\n- **Seed–Key Algorithm Analysis**\n  - Collects multiple seed/key pairs from the ECU.\n  - Applies simple arithmetic and logical transformations to infer the key derivation logic.\n\n- **ECU Reset Spamming**\n  - Sends repeated ECUReset (0x11) requests.\n  - Demonstrates a diagnostic-based denial-of-service condition.\n\n### 4) ISO-TP Transport Layer\nProvides a reusable ISO-TP communication layer that works with **any TX/RX arbitration-ID pair**\n- The same functions can be used for **physical addressing** (one ECU) or **functional addressing** (broadcast-style request) by simply selecting different CAN IDs in the caller\n- No code changes are required when switching between addresses; only TX/RX IDs change\n#### Transport Layer Design and Responsibilities\n- **`get_stack(txid, rxid)`**\n  - Creates (or reuses) an ISO-TP stack bound to a specific `(txid, rxid)` pair\n  - Internally builds an ISO-TP `Address(Normal_11bits, txid=..., rxid=...)`\n  - Why needed: ISO-TP state is per link (per TX/RX pair). Reusing stacks avoids reinitializing state every request.\n\n- **`pump_bus(timeout=...)`**\n  - Reads raw CAN frames from the bus and routes them into the correct RX queue by arbitration ID\n  - Why needed: ISO-TP stacks don’t “see” the CAN bus automatically; they need frames delivered to their `rxfn`.\n\n- **`_make_rxfn(rxid)`**\n  - Returns a per-RXID receive function that pulls frames from that RXID queue with a timeout\n  - Why needed: each ISO-TP stack must receive only frames intended for its RX arbitration ID.\n\n- **`send(data, txid, rxid)`**\n  - Sends a full diagnostic payload and handles ISO-TP transmission until complete\n  - Implementation detail:\n    - `stack.send(data)` queues payload into ISO-TP\n    - Loop while `stack.transmitting()`:\n      - `pump_bus()` to keep receiving flow-control frames / traffic\n      - `stack.process()` to advance ISO-TP state machine\n      - `sleep(stack.sleep_time())` to respect ISO-TP timing\n  - Why needed: without processing + pumping, multi-frame sends will stall or violate timing.\n\n- **`receive(txid, rxid, timeout=...)`**\n  - Processes the ISO-TP stack until a complete payload is reassembled or timeout occurs\n  - Why needed: responses may be multi-frame; this abstracts reassembly into a single call.\n\n- **`multi_receive(stacks, timeout=...)`**\n  - Waits for a payload from any stack in a provided list, returning both payload and the RX arbitration ID\n  - Why needed: one request may produce multiple replies (especially when scanning or when multiple ECUs respond).\n\n- **`clear_queues()`**\n  - Drains OS-level CAN receive buffer, clears internal queues, and resets ISO-TP stacks\n  - Why needed: prevents stale frames from previous operations from being misinterpreted as the current response (common issue during fast enumeration/attacks).\n---\n\n## Key Features\n- Realistic OBD-II and UDS diagnostic behavior modeled on real ECU workflows\n- ISO-TP abstraction layer for clean CAN communication\n- Shared seed-key algorithm between tester and ECU\n- Session-aware access control\n- Lockout and timing behavior similar to real ECUs\n- Modular attack menu for security testing\n- Fully local lab using virtual CAN (vcan)\n\n---\n\n## Requirements\n\n- Python 3\n- Linux system with virtual CAN support\n- Dependencies:\n  - python-can\n  - isotp\n  - keyboard\n\n---\n\n## Setup\n\n```bash\n# 1) Create virtual CAN interface\nsudo modprobe vcan\nsudo ip link add dev vcan0 type vcan\nsudo ip link set up vcan0\n\n# 2) Activate virtual environment\n#It is recommended to run the project inside a Python virtual environment to isolate dependencies.\npython3 -m venv venv\nsource venv/bin/activate\npip install -r requirements.txt\n\n# 3) Start the ECU (Terminal 1)\n# Runs inside the same virtual environment\npython3 run_ecu.py\n\n# 4) Run Tester (Terminal 2)\n#The tester uses global keyboard shortcuts implemented via the keyboard library.\n#On Linux systems, capturing global keyboard events requires elevated privileges.\n#For this reason, the project may need to be executed using sudo -E to preserve the active virtual environment while running with elevated permissions.\nsudo -E /path/to/venv/bin/python3 tester.py\n\n\n# 5) Run attacker menu (Terminal 3)\n# Runs inside the same virtual environment\npython3 unified_attacks.py\n\n# 6) Run CanDump (Terminal 4)\ncandump vcan0\n```\n## License\n\nThis project is for educational and research purposes only. Use responsibly in controlled lab environments\n\n## Disclaimer\n\nThis project is intended strictly for educational, research, and laboratory use.\n\nDo not use this software against real vehicles, production ECUs, or automotive systems without explicit authorization.",
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      "readme": "# OmniGuard V2X\n\n**Post-quantum-aware blockchain security research platform for connected and autonomous vehicles**\n\n**Current public version:** `v3.0.3`\n**Release channel:** Research hardening\n**Developer / Project Architect & Lead Developer:** Md Shahanur Islam Shagor\n\nOmniGuard V2X is a research and bench-validation framework that combines authenticated vehicle telemetry, blockchain integrity, V2X trust, post-quantum key operations, privacy commitments, decentralized identity, anomaly monitoring, incident response, federated-learning experiments, hardware bridges, and reproducible security validation.\n\n> **Research boundary:** v3.0.3 is not production-certified, vehicle-safety-certified, formally verified, or a substitute for an OEM PKI/HSM deployment. The project does not introduce new cryptographic primitives; its contribution is system integration plus validation transparency.\n\n## v3.0.3 Highlights\n\nv3.0.3 focuses on durable PQC identity, historical trust, rollback/recovery safety, authenticated local runtime startup, and release integrity.\n\n- Durable encrypted ML-DSA-44 / ML-KEM-512 software keystore.\n- AES-256-GCM protection for software-stored private PQC material.\n- Stable key identifiers across process restarts.\n- Guarded local PQC key rotation with encrypted previous-keystore backup.\n- Signed old-to-new ML-DSA transition evidence.\n- Bounded historical public-key trust keyring.\n- Mixed-generation native ledger verification.\n- Authenticated local rollback anchor with explicit no-auto-restore policy.\n- Real liboqs native validation; simulated PQC is not part of the supported v3.0.3 build path.\n- Opt-in PKCS#11 v3.2 hardware PQC adapter with runtime evidence checks.\n- Secure local credential bootstrap with independent high-entropy secrets.\n- Authenticated Go loopback backend with stale-process detection and bounded readiness.\n- Windows runtime smoke validation using a real freshly built Go backend process.\n- Commit-bound integrity manifest, SBOM, provenance, secret scan, validation reports, and SHA-256 release checksums.\n\nSee `docs/releases/v3.0.3.md` for the complete release notes and `docs/releases/v3.0.3-checklist.md` for the guarded release process.\n\n## Security Model at a Glance\n\n| Area | v3.0.3 status |\n|---|---|\n| Native data at rest | AES-256-GCM |\n| Native signature | ML-DSA-44 via real liboqs |\n| Native KEM | ML-KEM-512 via real liboqs |\n| Historical ML-DSA verification | Supported for explicitly admitted generations |\n| Historical ML-KEM re-decapsulation | Not supported; historical private KEM keys are intentionally not retained |\n| Software PQC provider | Implemented; private material is encrypted but exportable to the software process |\n| PKCS#11 v3.2 provider | Opt-in adapter implemented; runtime hardware evidence required |\n| TPM2 provider | No concrete v3.0.3 adapter; fails closed |\n| Generic HSM provider | No concrete v3.0.3 adapter; fails closed |\n| Hardware monotonic rollback protection | Not implemented |\n| Production PKCS#11/HSM token validation | Not claimed |\n| Go local control API | HMAC-SHA256 authenticated, timestamp/nonce replay defense, loopback only |\n| Python fallback from Go backend | Disabled by default |\n| Classical ECDH-P256 fallback | Disabled by default; classical if explicitly enabled |\n\n### Hybrid-security boundary\n\nThe native C++ v3.0.3 path uses real standardized ML-DSA-44 and ML-KEM-512. The wider research platform still contains classical components such as Pedersen commitment binding and Schnorr-style proof assumptions. Therefore OmniGuard V2X does **not** claim end-to-end post-quantum security.\n\nPedersen commitments operate in `COMMIT_ONLY` mode by default. Aggregate statistics such as mean velocity are **not recoverable from commitments alone**; openings or a separate secure-aggregation / zero-knowledge disclosure protocol would be required.\n\n## Architecture\n\nThe current project is organized as **six implemented prototype layers**:\n\n1. **L1 — Vehicle sensing and input validation**\n   `hardware_bridge.py`, `pi_sensor_node.py`, `vehicle_sensors.py`, `SmartCarSensorNode.ino`, optional camera module.\n\n2. **L2 — Cryptographic session and key establishment**\n   `sync_protocol.py`, `v2x_protocol.py`, authenticated envelopes, replay defense, session secrets, crypto-agility controls.\n\n3. **L3 — Privacy and identity**\n   `zkp_privacy.py`, `did_identity.py`, Pedersen-style commitments, proof checks, Lamport one-time identity authenticity.\n\n4. **L3.5 — Federated-learning research layer**\n   `federated_learning.py`, `fl_trainer_node.py`, local updates, clipping and prototype poisoning sanity checks.\n\n5. **L4 — Blockchain, forensic, anomaly and policy layer**\n   `blockchain.py`, `native/secure_blockchain_v303.cpp`, `smart_contracts.py`, `edge_layer.py`, `anomaly_detector.py`.\n\n6. **L5 — API, dashboard and runtime monitoring**\n   `main.py`, `dashboard.py`, `smartcar_backend.py`, `api/go/main.go`, performance and validation reporting.\n\n```mermaid\nflowchart LR\n    L1[Vehicle sensing / input validation] --> L2[Authenticated session and key establishment]\n    L2 --> L3[Privacy / identity]\n    L3 --> L35[Federated-learning research]\n    L35 --> L4[Blockchain / forensic / anomaly / policy]\n    L4 --> L5[API / dashboard / runtime monitoring]\n```\n\n## Permissioned Identity and Consensus Boundary\n\nNormal configuration uses explicit identity admission and permissioned validator membership. Lamport DID proves identity-key authenticity; it does not itself provide Sybil resistance. Sybil resistance depends on external enrollment/governance such as a manufacturer or transportation-authority registry.\n\nDual-hash chaining provides tamper evidence for historical mutation, but it does not prevent forward control by a sufficiently large malicious authorized validator coalition. Production consensus requires an explicit trust/governance model beyond the prototype.\n\n## Secure Local Setup\n\n### Prerequisites\n\n- Python 3.10+\n- Go 1.22+ for normal source-based Go backend development\n- CMake + C++17 toolchain for native builds\n- OpenSSL 3.x development libraries for native cryptography\n- liboqs 0.16.0 or the repository-pinned liboqs fetch path for native PQC builds\n\nCreate a Python environment and install project dependencies:\n\n```bash\npython -m venv .venv\n```\n\nWindows PowerShell:\n\n```powershell\n.\\.venv\\Scripts\\Activate.ps1\npython -m pip install -r requirements.txt\n```\n\nLinux/macOS shell:\n\n```bash\nsource .venv/bin/activate\npython -m pip install -r requirements.txt\n```\n\n### Generate local credentials\n\nA fresh checkout must not rely on embedded secret defaults. Run:\n\n```bash\npython scripts/bootstrap_local_env.py\n```\n\nThe bootstrap script:\n\n- creates/repairs the gitignored `.env`;\n- generates independent high-entropy values only for missing managed credentials;\n- preserves existing non-empty credentials by default;\n- keeps insecure secret defaults disabled;\n- never prints secret values.\n\nTo intentionally rotate every managed local credential:\n\n```bash\npython scripts/bootstrap_local_env.py --rotate-all\n```\n\nA full rotation changes the Go API credential. If an older project-owned Go backend is still listening on `127.0.0.1:8787`, the new dashboard correctly rejects it until that verified stale project process is stopped. See `INITIAL_SETUP.md` for the safe Windows recovery procedure.\n\n### Start the dashboard\n\n```bash\npython main.py\n```\n\nThe default backend is Go and remains loopback-only.\n\n## Go Runtime Selection\n\nNormal development uses:\n\n```text\nSMARTCAR_BACKEND=go\nSMARTCAR_GO_API_URL=http://127.0.0.1:8787\nSMARTCAR_GO_RUNTIME_MODE=auto\nSMARTCAR_GO_STARTUP_TIMEOUT_SEC=45\nSMARTCAR_BACKEND_ALLOW_PYTHON_FALLBACK=0\n```\n\n`SMARTCAR_GO_RUNTIME_MODE=auto` prefers the checked-out `api/go` source when the Go toolchain is available. This prevents an older local `build/smartcar_go_backend.exe` from silently taking precedence after source updates. A compatible prebuilt backend is used only when appropriate.\n\nExplicit modes:\n\n```text\nSMARTCAR_GO_RUNTIME_MODE=source\nSMARTCAR_GO_RUNTIME_MODE=prebuilt\n```\n\nBackend startup diagnostics are written to:\n\n```text\nlogs/processes/go-backend.log\n```\n\nThe log start marker records `runtime=source` or `runtime=prebuilt`.\n\n## Native v3.0.3 Build\n\nThe supported native target is `native/secure_blockchain_v303.cpp`. The historical simulated-PQC `blockchain.cpp` path has been removed from the supported build graph.\n\nExample reproducible validation-style configure:\n\n```bash\ncmake -S . -B build/native-real \\\n  -DSMARTCAR_FETCH_PINNED_LIBOQS=ON \\\n  -DSMARTCAR_BUILD_PQC_KEYSTORE_SELFTEST=ON \\\n  -DSMARTCAR_BUILD_PQC_KEY_ADMIN=ON \\\n  -DSMARTCAR_BUILD_PQC_TRUST_ADMIN=ON \\\n  -DSMARTCAR_BUILD_PQC_HISTORY_VERIFY=ON \\\n  -DSMARTCAR_BUILD_PQC_STATE_ADMIN=ON \\\n  -DSMARTCAR_ENABLE_NATIVE_OPT=OFF \\\n  -DSMARTCAR_ENABLE_UNSAFE_FAST_MATH=OFF \\\n  -DSMARTCAR_ENABLE_IPO=OFF \\\n  -DSMARTCAR_BUILD_CAMERA_MODULE=OFF\n\ncmake --build build/native-real --config Release --parallel 2\n```\n\nThe pinned liboqs source identity is recorded in `CMakeLists.txt`. The supported native build fails closed when real liboqs is unavailable.\n\n## PKCS#11 v3.2 Adapter\n\nThe PKCS#11 provider is opt-in at compile time:\n\n```bash\ncmake -S . -B build/pkcs11 \\\n  -DSMARTCAR_FETCH_PINNED_LIBOQS=ON \\\n  -DSMARTCAR_ENABLE_PKCS11_PROVIDER=ON \\\n  -DSMARTCAR_BUILD_CAMERA_MODULE=OFF\n```\n\nRuntime configuration is documented in `.env.example`. A PKCS#11 request does not imply hardware-backed protection by itself. The adapter must verify the real module/token, hardware slot, ML-DSA/ML-KEM mechanisms, non-exportable private-key policy, non-exportable derived-secret handling, commitment support, and guarded rotation capability. Failure at any required evidence step is fail-closed; an explicit hardware request never silently falls back to the software keystore.\n\nHosted CI validates the PKCS#11 v3.2 source/ABI boundary against canonical OASIS headers. It does not claim validation of a specific production token or HSM.\n\n## Durable PQC Identity and Rotation\n\nThe software PQC lifecycle includes:\n\n- encrypted ML-DSA-44 / ML-KEM-512 private material;\n- stable active key IDs;\n- explicit local rotation confirmation;\n- encrypted previous-keystore backup;\n- signed old-to-new transition evidence;\n- bounded historical public-key trust;\n- no silent historical-generation eviction.\n\nHistorical private keys are not retained as an always-active key set. Historical ML-DSA signatures can be verified after explicit trust admission, while historical ML-KEM shared-secret claims are not independently re-decapsulated.\n\n## Rollback and Recovery Boundary\n\n`OMNIGUARD_PQC_ROLLBACK_ANCHOR_V1` binds local identity generation, active key ID, trust-keyring head and previous anchor state using an authenticated local record.\n\nThis mechanism is not a TPM monotonic counter and is not externally immutable. If an attacker can roll back the anchor, keystore and trust keyring together, local state alone cannot prove the rollback. Hardware monotonic counters, WORM storage or remote transparency checkpoints remain future deployment work.\n\nRecovery checks never automatically restore an historical private identity. Operator-controlled recovery remains explicit.\n\n## Validation and CI\n\nThree workflows form the exact-main pre-tag gate for v3.0.3:\n\n- **Security Baseline** — Python regression suites, secret scan, release identity, integrity manifest, SBOM/provenance, adversarial/HIL/incident validation, real-PQC native build/self-tests, mixed-generation validation, rollback/recovery validation, Go tests/fuzzing and Linux validation packaging.\n- **PKCS11 Source Conformance** — canonical OASIS PKCS#11 v3.2 headers, strict provider compilation and hardware-truthfulness checks.\n- **Windows Runtime Smoke** — credential-bootstrap/readiness regressions, fresh Windows Go backend build, HMAC-authenticated real-process health/chain verification and loopback cleanup.\n\nThe guarded v3.0.3 tag path refuses to create the tag unless all three workflows are `completed/success` for the exact current `main` commit.\n\nAfter tagging, `.github/workflows/release-v3.0.3.yml` regenerates validation evidence from the tagged commit and publishes only the verified package.\n\n## Release Evidence\n\nThe v3.0.3 validation/publication pipeline produces:\n\n- release integrity manifest bound to the exact commit;\n- CycloneDX repository-declared SBOM;\n- non-secret build provenance;\n- current-tree prohibited-secret scan;\n- adversarial validation report;\n- software-HIL security validation report;\n- incident-response validation report;\n- SHA-256 checksums for publication artifacts.\n\nNever publish `.env`, private keys, recovery/wrapping credentials, raw sensitive logs or unreviewed build directories.\n\n## Reviewer-Driven Corrections\n\nReviewer-facing security claims have been narrowed and documented. Current paper claim status is:\n\n```text\ncorrected_but_requires_new_experiments\n```\n\nKey corrections include:\n\n- no full post-quantum claim for the whole platform;\n- no Sybil-resistance claim from DID alone;\n- no majority-attack-resistance claim from dual hashing;\n- no general detection-rate headline from single-run sanity checks;\n- no unsupported Byzantine-robustness claim from the current small FL experiment;\n- no new cryptographic primitive claim;\n- no whole-system `O(n)` claim;\n- no secure-aggregation/statistics-recovery claim from Pedersen commitments alone.\n\nCurrent FL evaluation is a prototype sanity check and is **not statistically sufficient for Byzantine-robustness claims**. Larger peer counts, realistic attacks, multi-seed experiments and confidence intervals remain research work.\n\nThe canonical active performance wording is **5.34 ms warm-start prototype pipeline latency** from the documented prototype environment; it is not a production SLA.\n\nSee:\n\n- `docs/reviewer-issue-resolution-matrix.md`\n- `docs/security-assumptions.md`\n- `docs/identity-security-model.md`\n- `docs/consensus-threat-model.md`\n- `docs/adversarial-validation-limitations.md`\n- `docs/fl-validation-limitations.md`\n- `docs/complexity-analysis.md`\n- `docs/pedersen-aggregation-model.md`\n- `docs/metrics-source-of-truth.md`\n\n## Repository Layout\n\n```text\n.\n|-- main.py\n|-- dashboard.py\n|-- smartcar_backend.py\n|-- runtime_backend_patch.py\n|-- blockchain.py\n|-- sync_protocol.py\n|-- v2x_protocol.py\n|-- did_identity.py\n|-- zkp_privacy.py\n|-- federated_learning.py\n|-- smart_contracts.py\n|-- incident_response.py\n|-- api/\n|   `-- go/\n|       |-- main.go\n|       `-- release_version.go\n|-- native/\n|   |-- secure_blockchain_v303.cpp\n|   |-- pqc_key_store.cpp\n|   |-- pqc_trust_keyring.cpp\n|   |-- pqc_state_guard.cpp\n|   |-- pqc_pkcs11_provider.cpp\n|   `-- pkcs11_platform.h\n|-- scripts/\n|   |-- bootstrap_local_env.py\n|   |-- create_v3_0_3_tag.sh\n|   |-- ci_windows_go_backend_smoke.py\n|   |-- generate_sbom.py\n|   |-- generate_provenance.py\n|   `-- secret_scan.py\n|-- tests/\n|-- docs/\n|   |-- releases/\n|   `-- security/\n|-- .github/workflows/\n|-- INITIAL_SETUP.md\n|-- CHANGELOG.md\n|-- SECURITY.md\n|-- VERSION\n`-- CMakeLists.txt\n```\n\n## Research Limitations\n\nv3.0.3 does not claim:\n\n- production automotive deployment readiness;\n- ISO 26262 / ASIL certification;\n- formal verification;\n- absence of vulnerabilities;\n- protection against an authorized malicious validator supermajority;\n- production PKI/enrollment governance;\n- validated production custody on a specific TPM2/HSM/PKCS#11 token;\n- hardware monotonic rollback resistance;\n- fleet-scale Byzantine-robust federated learning is not claimed;\n- a production-grade ZK range-proof system;\n- a fully post-quantum end-to-end architecture.\n\n## Documentation\n\n- Initial setup: `INITIAL_SETUP.md`\n- Security policy: `SECURITY.md`\n- Release notes: `docs/releases/v3.0.3.md`\n- Release checklist: `docs/releases/v3.0.3-checklist.md`\n- Supply-chain guidance: `docs/security/SUPPLY_CHAIN.md`\n- Historical credential remediation: `docs/security/HISTORY_REMEDIATION.md`\n- Changelog: `CHANGELOG.md`\n\n## License\n\nSee `LICENSE`.",
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      "readme": "# Cybersecurity-In-Autonomous-Vehicles-Project\nThe Cybersecurity in Autonomous Vehicles Project focuses on securing self-driving vehicle systems from cyber threats. It uses AI and security techniques to detect vulnerabilities, prevent attacks, and ensure safe communication between vehicle components and external networks.\n\n<img width=\"730\" height=\"426\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/cb833394-899a-4118-bc2b-139f4c80653e\" />\n\n### Project include:\n\n1. Synopsis\n\n2. PPT\n\n3. Research Paper\n\n\n4. Code\n\n5. Explanation video\n\n6. Documents\n\n7. Report\n\n\n### Need Code, Documents & Explanation video ?\n\n## How to Reach me :\n\n### Mail : vatshayan007@gmail.com\n\n### WhatsApp: +91 9310631437 (Helping 24*7) **[CHAT](https://wa.me/message/CHWN2AHCPMAZK1)**\n\n### Website : https://www.finalproject.in/\n\n### 💻 Youtube Channel: [Link](https://www.youtube.com/@computerscienceproject)",
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      "title": "🚗 CANBusSimulator",
      "full_name": "semih-aydin/CANBusSimulator",
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      "readme": "<div align=\"center\">\n\n# 🚗 CANBusSimulator\n\n**Simulate real CAN Bus protocol in C for automotive testing – complete with 8 ECUs, React dashboard, fuzzing, and anomaly detection.**\n*Perfect for devs building embedded systems without expensive hardware.*\n\n[![GitHub Stars](https://img.shields.io/github/stars/semjhaydin/CANBusSimulator?style=for-the-badge&logo=github&logoColor=white&color=0891b2)](https://github.com/semjhaydin/CANBusSimulator)\n[![License](https://img.shields.io/github/license/semjhaydin/CANBusSimulator?style=for-the-badge&color=6366f1)](https://github.com/semjhaydin/CANBusSimulator/blob/main/LICENSE)\n[![Language](https://img.shields.io/badge/C-0891b2?style=for-the-badge&logo=c&logoColor=white)](https://github.com/semjhaydin/CANBusSimulator)\n\n</div>\n\n## Table of Contents\n- [About / Overview](#about--overview)\n- [Key Features](#key-features)\n- [Tech Stack](#tech-stack)\n- [Getting Started](#getting-started)\n- [Usage](#usage)\n- [Project Structure](#project-structure)\n- [Contributing](#contributing)\n- [License](#license)\n\n---\n\n## About / Overview\n\nHey there! **CANBusSimulator** is your go-to tool for testing automotive systems without needing real CAN hardware. Written in efficient C, it faithfully recreates the CAN Bus protocol – arbitration, error handling, bit stuffing, and all. Imagine spinning up 8 virtual ECUs (Engine, ABS, Airbag, etc.) that talk over a simulated bus, complete with fuzzing attacks and anomaly detection.\n\nThis solves a huge pain point for **embedded devs, automotive engineers, and HIL (Hardware-in-the-Loop) testers**. No more waiting for physical buses or pricey tools – just compile, run, and test your algorithms locally. What sets it apart? A slick **React dashboard** for real-time visualization, candump-compatible logs, and security layers with 5 attack types. It's battle-tested for fuzzing and detection, making it ideal for research or production validation.\n\nWhether you're prototyping ECUs, training ML models on CAN traffic, or hunting bus-off conditions, this sim has you covered. Created April 17, 2026 – fresh and ready to roll!\n\n---\n\n## Key Features\n\n✨ **8 Simulated ECUs** — Engine, ABS, Airbag, Climate, Steering, Cabin, Tires, Dashboard with realistic message IDs and filters.\n\n✨ **Full CAN Protocol Stack** — Arbitration, broadcast, bit stuffing, encode/decode via CANFrame struct.\n\n✨ **Error Handling & States** — Error counters, NORMAL → ERROR-ACTIVE → BUS-OFF transitions per node.\n\n✨ **Security Testing** — CANFuzzer with 5 attack types (fuzzing, replay, etc.) + CANDetector with 4 anomaly rules, logs to `logs/anomali.log`.\n\n✨ **High-Perf Bus Layer** — 32-slot ring buffer for low-latency simulation.\n\n✨ **React Dashboard** — Live visualization via `dashboard/public/can_dashboard.json`.\n\n✨ **CAN Tools Suite** — Logger (candump format to `logs/can_traffic.log`), Parser (filter/stats), JSON exporter.\n\n✨ **Turkish Support** — Bilingual docs for global automotive teams.\n\n---\n\n## Tech Stack\n\n<div align=\"center\">\n\n[![C](https://img.shields.io/badge/C-0891b2?style=for-the-badge&logo=c&logoColor=white)](https://github.com/semjhaydin/CANBusSimulator)\n[![React](https://img.shields.io/badge/React-61DAFB?style=for-the-badge&logo=react&logoColor=white)](https://github.com/semjhaydin/CANBusSimulator)\n[![Node.js](https://img.shields.io/badge/Node.js-43853D?style=for-the-badge&logo=node.js&logoColor=white)](https://github.com/semjhaydin/CANBusSimulator)\n\n</div>\n\n---\n\n## Getting Started\n\n### Prerequisites\n- **GCC** or any C compiler (tested with GCC 12+)\n- **Node.js 18+** (for React dashboard)\n- **make** (for building)\n- Linux/macOS recommended; Windows via WSL\n\n### Installation\n\n1. Clone the repo:\n   ```bash\n   git clone https://github.com/semjhaydin/CANBusSimulator.git\n   cd CANBusSimulator\n   ```\n\n2. Build the C simulator:\n   ```bash\n   make\n   ```\n\n3. Start the React dashboard (in a new terminal):\n   ```bash\n   cd dashboard\n   npm install\n   npm start\n   ```\n   Open http://localhost:3000\n\n> 💡 **Tip:** Run `make clean` to rebuild from scratch.\n\n---\n\n## Usage\n\n### Basic Simulation\nLaunch 8 ECUs on the virtual bus:\n\n```bash\n./can_simulator -n 8 -t 60  # Run 8 nodes for 60 seconds\n```\n\nGenerates `logs/can_traffic.log` in candump format.\n\n### Fuzzing & Detection\nTest security layers:\n\n```bash\n./can_simulator -fuzz replay -d detect -o logs/anomali.log\n```\n\n> 📊 **View in Dashboard:** Dashboard auto-loads `can_dashboard.json` for live ECU stats, arbitration wins, and anomaly alerts.\n\n### Parse Logs\n```bash\n./can_parser logs/can_traffic.log --filter=0x100 --stats\n```\n\n---\n\n## Project Structure\n\n```\nCANBusSimulator/\n├── src/\n│   ├── can_node.c      # ECU logic, filters, error states\n│   ├── can_bus.c       # Ring buffer, arbitration\n│   ├── can_frame.c     # Encode/decode, bit stuffing\n│   ├── can_fuzzer.c    # 5 attack types\n│   └── can_detector.c  # 4 anomaly rules\n├── tools/\n│   ├── can_logger.c\n│   ├── can_parser.c\n│   └── can_json.c\n├── dashboard/          # React app\n│   └── public/can_dashboard.json\n├── logs/\n│   ├── can_traffic.log\n│   └── anomali.log\n├── Makefile\n└── README.md\n```\n\n---\n\n## Contributing\n\nLove the project? Help make it even better!\n\n1. Fork the repo and create your branch (`git checkout -b feature/AmazingFeature`).\n2. Commit your changes (`git commit -m 'Add some AmazingFeature'`).\n3. Push to the branch (`git push origin feature/AmazingFeature`).\n4. Open a Pull Request – mention any related [issues](https://github.com/semjhaydin/CANBusSimulator/issues).\n\n> 🙌 Questions? Open an issue at [semjhaydin/CANBusSimulator/issues](https://github.com/semjhaydin/CANBusSimulator/issues).\n\n---\n\n## License\n\nDistributed under the MIT License. See [LICENSE](LICENSE) for more info.\n\nCreated by Semih Aydın",
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      "title": "<img src=\"src/toyota_telemetry/ui/assets/icon.svg\" width=\"32\" height=\"32\" alt=\"\"> Toyota diagnostic telemetry tools",
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      "readme": "# <img src=\"src/toyota_telemetry/ui/assets/icon.svg\" width=\"32\" height=\"32\" alt=\"\"> Toyota diagnostic telemetry tools\n\nFind, verify, and record the diagnostic signals a vehicle reports over its\nOBD-II CAN bus: which DIDs answer, which bits hold a value, and whether the\nformula behind it holds up on the road. A command line and a desktop\napplication do the same work; four adapter workers talk to the vehicle.\n\n![The desktop application's Recordings page: three runs listed, and vehicle speed plotted across them](docs/images/recordings.png)\n\n*Example data; [more screenshots](docs/how-it-works.md).*\n\nEverything it sends is read-only diagnostics (tester present, session control,\nand reads by identifier or local identifier), checked against a built-in\nallowlist before it reaches the bus. It never writes, codes, clears, or\nunlocks anything.\n\n> **Not affiliated with Toyota.** Toyota and Techstream are trademarks of their\n> owners and are named only to describe what the tools work with. No Toyota\n> software or data is included. Importing from Techstream requires your own\n> licensed installation. Talking to a vehicle carries risk; use this at your\n> own risk, never while driving, and never as an input to vehicle control or\n> a safety warning.\n\n## How it works\n\n1. **Set up.** Create a private project workspace, choose your CAN adapter,\n   and import a candidate signal list from your Techstream installation or a\n   file you write.\n2. **Verify.** Probe the candidate ECU addresses and read each DID once. Keep\n   the ones that answer, and give each signal a target: what it still has to\n   show, such as enough samples or each of its states.\n3. **Collect.** Drive while the tool reads one ECU at a time, until every\n   target is met.\n4. **Review and export.** See which signals changed, stayed constant, or never\n   answered, plot them, and export the signal list.\n\nThe toolkit holds no vehicle facts. For your vehicle you supply:\n\n- a CAN adapter and its wiring to the OBD-II port;\n- the bus speed and how an ECU opens a diagnostic session;\n- the ECUs' request and response CAN IDs;\n- candidate signals: DID, bit range, formula, unit, and state text.\n\n[How it works](docs/how-it-works.md) explains each step, where each fact goes,\nand how to find it.\n\n## Install\n\nYou need 64-bit Windows, [uv](https://docs.astral.sh/uv/) (it fetches Python\nif needed), Git, and a PEAK PCAN, J2534, candleLight/gs_usb, or slcan adapter.\n\n```powershell\nuv tool install \"toyota-telemetry-tools[gui] @ git+https://github.com/4piu/toyota-telemetry-tools\"\n```\n\nThis puts `telemetry` (command line) and `telemetry-ui` (desktop application)\non the path. Installing compiles the adapter workers with the C# compiler\nbuilt into Windows; nothing else is needed. Omit `[gui]` for the command line\nonly. `uv tool upgrade toyota-telemetry-tools` updates to the latest commit.\n\n## Help\n\n- [How it works](docs/how-it-works.md): the four steps, what your vehicle\n  needs and how to find it, safety, wiring, and decoding.\n- [Diagnostic protocols](docs/protocols.md): how ECUs are reached and\n  read, and which transports are supported.\n- [Quickstart](docs/quickstart.md): every step as a command and as a desktop\n  page, and where the built-in help is.\n- [Adapters](backends/README.md) and [adding one](docs/adding-an-adapter.md).\n- [Development](docs/development.md): layout, building, tests, packaging.\n- Questions and bugs: [issues](https://github.com/4piu/toyota-telemetry-tools/issues).\n\n## License\n\n[MIT](LICENSE). The bundled `libusb-1.0.dll` is LGPL-2.1; see\n[its notice](backends/Telemetry.Backend.Gsusb/runtime/README.md).",
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      "readme": "# IAV Distortion\n## About the project\nThe IAV Distortion project is an interactive and educational showcase designed to demonstrate the need of automotive cybersecurity in a playful, engaging manner.\nThis project leverages the fun experience of the Anki Overdrive race track, but with an added twist - your car can be hacked.\nOur primary objective is to highlight the potential impacts of hacking attacks on vehicles, an increasingly relevant issue as technology becomes more integrated into the automotive industry.\n\n\nThe IAV Distortion project is an ideal exhibit for trade fairs or other similar events, attracting attendees with its unique blend of technology and entertainment.\nIt thereby acts as a crowd-puller due to its exciting premise and the opportunity it offers for audience interaction.\nThrough this initiative, we aspire to make the sometimes daunting world of cybersecurity accessible to a wider audience, fostering understanding and engagement.\n\n<img src=\"./images/IAV_Distortion_concept_illustration.jpg\" alt=\"IAV Distortion concept illustration\" style=\"width:100%;max-width:500px\">\n\n## Getting Started\n### Prerequisites\nTo run this project you will need at least an Anki Overdrive starter kit (vehicles and racetrack).\nThe project is developed to run on a Raspberry Pi 5 (8GB) running Raspberry OS.\nBut it can also be run on a windows machine (will require some different dependencies).\n\nThe installation as described below will require internet connection.\nAfterwards the project doesn't need an internet connection when running.\nOnly if you want to get an update.\n\n### Installation on a Raspberry Pi\n> [!IMPORTANT]\n> Raspberry OS has to be installed already.\n> Information on [how to install Raspberry OS](https://www.raspberrypi.com/software/) can be found on the official Raspberry Pi website.\n\n1. Download the [installer.sh](installer.sh) script.\n2. Make the installer.sh script executable using the following command.\n```\nsudo chmod +x <path/to/>installer.sh\n```\n3. Run it afterwards in the terminal (double click -> run in terminal).\n\n> [!NOTE]\n> During the installation process the following will happen:\n> 1. Search for existing local copies of the repository/folders with the repository name \"IAV_Distortion\".\n>   - if **exactly one** folder was found (for example an older installation), you will be asked if you want to use this folder for the installation. This will delete everything in the folder.\n>   - if **more than one** folder was found, you will get a warning to make sure to only run one instance of IAV Distrotion at a time.\n>   - if **no** folder was found, you will be asked where you want to install IAV Distortion. Type in the desired path or leave empty to install in the current path.\n> 2. Afterwards you will be asked if you want to clone a certain branch from the repository. Leave it empty to install the newest version from the **master** branch.\n> 3. Then you will be asked if you want to run the install script. Type **y** to run the script (otherwise the process will stop here and you only cloned the repository)\n>   Running the install script will:\n>   - install the virtual python environment (pipenv)\n>   - download further additional resources (like javascript libraries) to a dedicated directory to be able to run the project without internet connection\n>   - create a desktop item\n>   - make the desktop item executable\n>   - add to autostart as a cronjob (recommended: optionally: you will be asked if you want to)\n\n> [!IMPORTANT]\n> If you are using your own Anki cars, they are not configured in the system yet.\n> You can add and configure your own car as described in the istruction [*How to configure vehicle images*](doc/Configuration/How%20to%20configure%20vehicle%20images.md)\n\n\n## Usage\nAfter setting up the project successfully, you can control the system and the cars using any device wich can access a webbrowser and is connected to the same network or hotspot of the system.\n\n> [!TIP]\n> A guide on how to set up your raspberry pi as a hotspot to run IAV Distortion as a stand-alone system can be found [here](doc/Setting%20up%20IAV%20Distortion%20as%20a%20stand-alone%20system).\n\n### Staff Control\nThe staff userinterface can be accessed via [&lt;system_iP&gt;:5000/staff/staff_control]().\nOn this side Anki cars can be added / connected via bluetooth.\nAlso virtual vehicles can be added.\nAll vehicles and player in the game (or in the queue) are displayed in the 'List of Players/Cars'.\nThe list shows which player controls which vehicle. If one of the fields is none a vehicle is free to be used or a player is waiting to be assigned to a free vehicle.\nAside from that the different hacking scenarios can be activated for the cars assigned to a player.\nTherefore chose the scenario for the car you want to apply the effect to, as soon as scenario is preselected the 'Set Scenario' button becomes active and can be used to apply the effect to the vehicle.\n\n<img src=\"./images/staffUI_activateScenario.png\" alt=\"IAV Distortion staff ui\" style=\"width:100%;max-width:400px\">\n\nAdditional to the controls for the game itself, some system configurations and functions can be accessed by switching to the 'Configuration' tab.\nHere the system can be updated to the latest version available in the repository (of the installed branch) or functions like restarting IAV Distortion, the whole system (Raspberry Pi) or shutting down the system can be accessed.\nAdditionally, it is now also possible to start an initialization drive with a real vehicle, so that the virtual track can be created through this process.\n\n\n> [!IMPORTANT]\n> - These functions (Update, Restart IAV Distortion, Restart System and Shutdown System) are only available on Unix like systems.\n> - Running an update requires internet connection.\n\n<img src=\"./images/staffUI_configuration_systemControl.png\" alt=\"IAV Distortion staff ui - configuration - system control\" style=\"width:100%;max-width:400px\">\n\n### Driver UI\nThe driver ui can be accessed via [&lt;system_iP&gt;:5000/driver]().\nThe player will automatically be sent to a waiting queue.\nAs soon as a vehicle is free (not assigned to any other player), the player will be assigned to the vehicle and the controls are granted.\nThe slider on the left controls the speed.\nWith the buttons on the right the lanes can be changed or a u-turn can be performed.\nPlayer controlling a virtual car will get a top down view of the controlled vehicle (as displayed on the [virtual track](#Virtual-Racetrack)).\n\n<img src=\"./images/driverUI_noHacking.png\" alt=\"IAV Distortion driver ui\" style=\"width:100%;max-width:600px\">\n\n> [!NOTE]\n> To performe a lane change or a u-turn the slider as to be released.\n\n> [!NOTE]\n> There are different mechanisms to prevent inactive player to remain in the game and block active player from getting the vehicles.\n> These are a heartbeat check for the clients to remove them after unexpected disconnects and a detection if a player has the ui opened in the foreground.\n> If a player leaves the driver ui for to long, he will be removed from the game and player queue.\n> The player can reconnect to the game but will be placed at the end of the queue.\n>\n> These mechanisms have configurable parameters.\n> Please refer to the [documentation of configuration parameters](/doc/Configuration).\n\n### Virtual Racetrack\nThe virtual and real cars are shown on a virtual racetrack.\nThe virtual racetrack can be accessed via [&lt;system_iP&gt;:5000/car_map]().\nThe virtual track must be defined before the start of the game. Currently, this is done through an initialization drive on the real track with a real vehicle.\n\n<img src=\"./images/virtual_racetrack.png\" alt=\"IAV Distortion virtual racetrack\" style=\"width:100%;max-width:600px\">\n\n<!--## Roadmap\n\n## Contributing\n-->\n\n## License\n### Third party dependencies\nIAV Distortion uses some third party dependencies.\n- Bleak (MIT License)\n- Quart (MIT License)\n- python-socketio (MIT License)\n- hypercorn (MIT License)\n- pytest (MIT License)\n- pytest-asyncio (Apache License 2.0)\n- pluggy (MIT License)\n- sphinx (BSD2 License)\n- jQuery (MIT License)\n- cdnjs-socketio (MIT License)\n\n<!-- ## Contact\n-->",
      "topics": [
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      "description": "This repository implements a CNN-based fine-tuning approach for VulBERTa, a pre-trained language model for vulnerability detection in source code.",
      "readme": "# TriVulQ\nThis repository implements a CNN-based fine-tuning approach for VulBERTa, a pre-trained language model for vulnerability detection in source code. Based on the original [VulBERTa](https://github.com/ICL-ml4csec/VulBERTa) research.\n\n## Table of Contents\n- [Prerequisites](#prerequisites)\n- [Supported Dataset](#data)\n- [Installation](#installation)\n- [Fine-tuning CNN](#fine-tuning-cnn)\n- [Evaluation](#evaluation)\n- [Repository Structure](#repository-structure)\n- [Citation](#citation)\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n1. System Requirements:\n   - Linux (recommended Ubuntu 20.04+)\n   - NVIDIA GPU with ≥12GB VRAM\n   - ≥32GB RAM\n   - Python 3.8+\n\n2. Software Dependencies:\n   - CUDA 11.7+\n   - cuDNN 8.5+\n   - libclang (LLVM 16+)\n\n3. Accounts:\n   - [Hugging Face Account](https://huggingface.co/join) (for model access)\n   - [OSF Account](https://osf.io/) (for dataset access)\n\n## Supported Dataset\n\n| Dataset | Language | Samples | Vuln. Rate | Granularity | Special Characteristics |\n|---------|----------|---------|------------|-------------|-------------------------|\n| **Devign** | C/C++ | 27,546 | 33.2% | Function-level | Balanced vulnerability distribution |\n| **Draper** | C/C++ | 70,874 | 15.8% | Function-level | Contains synthetic vulnerabilities, highly imbalanced |\n| **D2A** | C/C++ | 1.2M+ | 5-10% | Commit-level | Real-world vulnerabilities from GitHub, large-scale |\n\n### Key Characteristics\n\n1. **Devign**:\n   - Curated from 4 open-source projects (QEMU, FFmpeg, Wireshark, Linux Debian)\n   - Manually verified vulnerabilities\n   - Balanced classes suitable for baseline models\n\n2. **Draper**:\n   - Contains both real and synthetic vulnerabilities\n   - Highly imbalanced (recommend using class weighting)\n   - Focuses on specific vulnerability patterns\n\n3. **D2A**:\n   - Automatically labeled from GitHub commits\n   - Contains vulnerability type labels (CWE IDs)\n   - Requires more preprocessing but larger scale\n\n## Installation\n\n### 1. Clone Repository\n```\ngit clone https://github.com/Guemann-ui/TriVulQ.git\ncd TriVulQ\n```\n### 2. Install Python Dependencies\n```\n$pip install -r requirements.txt\n```\n### 3. Setup libclang\n```\nsudo apt-get update\nsudo apt-get install llvm-18 clang\necho \"export LD_LIBRARY_PATH=/usr/lib/llvm-18/lib:\\$LD_LIBRARY_PATH\" >> ~/.bashrc\nsource ~/.bashrc\n```\n## Fine-tuning CNN\n```\n$python3 main.py\n```\n\n## Repository Structure\n\n```\nTriVulQ/\n├── configs/ # Configuration files\n│ ├── base_config.py # Base configuration\n│ ├── draper_config.py # Draper dataset config\n│ ├── devign_config.py # Devign dataset config\n│ └── d2a_config.py # D2A dataset config\n│\n├── data/ # Datasets (git-ignored)\n│ ├── raw/ # Raw JSONL files\n│ ├── processed/ # Preprocessed data\n│ └── final/ # Train/val/test splits\n│\n├── saved_models/ # Trained models (git-ignored)\n│ └── VB-CNN_devign.pt\n│\n├── scripts/ # Utility scripts\n│ ├── download_model.py # Download pretrained models\n│ └── download_data.py # Download datasets\n│\n├── src/ # Core source code\n│ ├── data_loader.py # Data loading and processing\n│ ├── model.py # VulBERTa-CNN implementation\n│ ├── trainer.py # Training logic\n│ ├── evaluator.py # Evaluation metrics\n│ ├── preprocess.py # Data preprocessing\n│ ├── split_data.py # Dataset splitting\n│ └── main.py # Entry point\n│\n├── requirements.txt # Python dependencies\n├── LICENSE\n└── README.md # This documentation\n```\n\n## Citation\n```\n@article{chiu2021vulberta,\n  title={VulBERTa: A Source Code Based Pre-Trained Language Model for Vulnerability Detection},\n  author={Chiu, Kelvin and Li, Yi and He, Yujia and Zhang, Meng and Rubin, Julia},\n  journal={arXiv preprint arXiv:2104.12408},\n  year={2021}\n}\n```",
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      "description": "Automotive Security Tool - Part of NullSec Linux",
      "readme": "# NullSec UDS\n\n<p align=\"center\">\n  <img src=\"https://img.shields.io/badge/Protocol-UDS-blue?style=for-the-badge\" alt=\"UDS\"/>\n  <img src=\"https://img.shields.io/badge/ISO-14229-orange?style=for-the-badge\" alt=\"ISO 14229\"/>\n  <img src=\"https://img.shields.io/badge/CAN--FD-Supported-green?style=for-the-badge\" alt=\"CAN-FD\"/>\n</p>\n\nUnified Diagnostic Services (ISO 14229) security research and testing toolkit.\n\n## 🔧 Features\n\n- **Full UDS Implementation**: All standard diagnostic services\n- **Security Access Bypass**: Multiple bypass techniques\n- **Seed-Key Algorithms**: Reverse engineering support\n- **Flash Programming**: Read/write ECU memory\n- **Routine Control**: Execute diagnostic routines\n- **Session Management**: Automated session handling\n\n## 🔐 UDS Services\n\n### Diagnostic Session Control (0x10)\n```bash\nuds-cli --session default        # 0x01\nuds-cli --session programming    # 0x02\nuds-cli --session extended       # 0x03\n```\n\n### Security Access (0x27)\n```bash\n# Request seed\nuds-cli --security-seed --level 1\n\n# Brute force key\nuds-cli --bruteforce --level 1 --threads 4\n\n# Use known algorithm\nuds-cli --calc-key --algo vw_sa2 --seed 0xDEADBEEF\n```\n\n### Read/Write Memory (0x23/0x3D)\n```bash\n# Dump ECU memory\nuds-cli --read-memory 0x00080000 --size 0x10000 -o dump.bin\n\n# Write calibration\nuds-cli --write-memory 0x00080000 -i calibration.bin\n```\n\n### Download/Upload (0x34/0x35/0x36/0x37)\n```bash\n# Extract firmware\nuds-cli --upload --address 0x00000000 --size 0x200000\n\n# Flash new firmware\nuds-cli --download -i firmware.bin --address 0x00000000\n```\n\n## 🔓 Security Research\n\n### Seed-Key Analysis\n- Algorithm identification\n- Timing attacks\n- Replay protection bypass\n- Key generation reverse engineering\n\n### Common Bypasses\n```bash\n# Timing attack\nuds-cli --timing-attack --service 0x27\n\n# Session confusion\nuds-cli --session-attack\n\n# Diagnostic ID spoofing\nuds-cli --spoof-tester-id 0xF1\n```\n\n## 📡 Protocol Support\n\n| Transport | Standard | Speed |\n|-----------|----------|-------|\n| CAN 2.0A | ISO 15765-2 | 500 kbps |\n| CAN 2.0B | ISO 15765-2 | 500 kbps |\n| CAN-FD | ISO 15765-2 | 2/5 Mbps |\n| DoIP | ISO 13400 | Ethernet |\n| K-Line | ISO 14230 | 10.4 kbps |\n\n## 🔌 Hardware\n\n- SocketCAN (Linux native)\n- J2534 passthru devices\n- CANtact / CANable\n- Vector CANalyzer\n- PEAK PCAN-USB\n\n## ⚠️ Disclaimer\n\nFor authorized security research only. Modifying vehicle ECUs may void warranties and violate regulations.\n\n## 📜 License\n\nMIT License - Part of NullSec Linux v5.0\n\n**Twitter**: [x.com/AnonAntics](https://x.com/AnonAntics)",
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      "name": "byd-dolphin-hacking",
      "owner": "wheregoes",
      "url": "https://github.com/wheregoes/byd-dolphin-hacking",
      "description": "Reverse engineering the BYD Dolphin head unit — CAN bus, AVAS, NFC keys, OTA, and more. DiLink 3 / Android 10.",
      "readme": "# 🚗 BYD Dolphin Head Unit — Research & Reverse Engineering\n\nReverse engineering, documentation, and tooling for the **BYD Dolphin 25/26** infotainment system (DiLink 3, Android 10).\n\nEverything here was discovered through ADB exploration, APK decompilation, and CAN bus probing — no proprietary documentation was used.\n\n> ⚠️ **Disclaimer:** Unofficial, community-driven project — no affiliation with BYD.\n> Reverse engineering of BYD's internal Android services for **educational and interoperability purposes only**.\n> Use at your own risk — modifying vehicle software may void your warranty or violate BYD's terms of service.\n> The authors assume no liability for any damage to your vehicle, software, or data.\n\n---\n\n## 📋 Table of Contents\n\n- [Head Unit Specs](#-head-unit-specs)\n- [Getting Started](#-getting-started)\n- [Key Findings](#-key-findings)\n- [Security Findings](#-security-findings)\n- [Architecture](#-architecture)\n- [Documentation](#-documentation)\n- [Scripts](#-scripts)\n- [Repository Structure](#-repository-structure)\n- [Firmware Resources & References](#-firmware-resources--references)\n- [License](#-license)\n\n---\n\n## 🖥️ Head Unit Specs\n\n| Property | Value |\n|----------|-------|\n| Platform | DiLink 3.0 |\n| Android | 10 (API 29) |\n| SoC | Qualcomm QCM6125 (SM6125 Trinket) |\n| Architecture | ARM64, 8 cores |\n| RAM | ~3.5 GB |\n| Kernel | 4.14.117-perf |\n| ADB | WiFi, port 5555 |\n| Head Unit IP | `192.168.10.10` (car WiFi) |\n| Firmware | `13.1.32.2507250.1` (Jul 25 2025) |\n| MCU | `13.5.2.2312260.1` |\n| DSP | `13.5.5.2505300.2` |\n| Bootloader | **Unlocked** (`ro.boot.flash.locked=0`) |\n| Verified boot | Orange (unlocked) |\n| Instrument Cluster | Separate Qt/QML system (Qt 5.15.10 / 6.5.5) |\n\n> **Tested on firmware `13.1.32.2507250.1`.** Older versions likely work. Newer firmware updates from BYD may change or break things — no guarantees.\n\n---\n\n## 🚀 Getting Started\n\n**New here?** Start with the [Sideloading Guide](docs/sideloading-guide.md) to install apps on your BYD — no root needed.\n\nFor custom apps built on this research, see [byd-apps](https://github.com/wheregoes/byd-apps).\n\n### Quick ADB Connection\n\n```bash\nadb connect 192.168.10.10:5555\n```\n\n### Sideloading Quick Facts\n\n- **USB method** — drop APKs in `Third Party Apps XX` folder (country code suffix), plug into car\n- **Master password** — `BYD6125F` (universal across DiLink 3)\n- **APK requirements** — ARM64, `targetSdk ≤ 33`, `minSdk ≤ 29`\n- **Country-specific restrictions** — Kazakhstan (14-app whitelist), India (Mappls only), Europe/Japan/Australia (online verification)\n\n### CAN Bus Injection (VCDS-Style Coding)\n\nInject CAN frames from ADB — no root, no OBD2 dongle:\n\n```bash\n# 1. Start the ClusterDebug app + service (acts as privileged proxy)\nadb shell \"am start -n com.byd.clusterdebug/.MainActivity\"\nadb shell \"am startservice -n com.byd.clusterdebug/.ClusterDebugService\"\n\n# 2. Inject CAN frames\nadb shell \"am broadcast -a com.byd.cluster.spi --es normal 'FF,FF,FF,FF,FF,FF,FF,FF'\"\n\n# 3. Capture cluster screenshot\nadb shell \"fission_screencap -d 1 -p /data/local/tmp/cluster.png\"\nadb pull /data/local/tmp/cluster.png\n```\n\nSee [Driver Display](docs/driver-display.md) for the full UDS diagnostic protocol, CAN frame format, and ECU network topology.\n\n---\n\n## 🔬 Key Findings\n\n### ✅ What Works (No Root)\n\n| Feature | Details |\n|---------|---------|\n| **AC temperature reading** | `getTemprature(zone)` — zone 1/2 = set temp, zone 4 = outside/ambient |\n| **Full AC control** | 40+ getter + SET methods (start/stop, temp, fan, wind mode) via permission bypass |\n| **AC remote control** | `hasFeature(\"ACRemoteControl\") = 1`, supports 10–30min timer |\n| **Permission bypass** | `BydPermissionContext` (ContextWrapper) auto-grants `BYDAUTO_*` permissions client-side |\n| **CAN bus read/write** | Via ADB using `app_process` + reflection |\n| **75+ BYD packages** | With CAN bus access, 100+ custom `BYDAUTO_*` permissions |\n| **Engine simulator sound** | Simulator present and switchable (`HAS_SIMULATOR=2`), preset selected via `0x3E300038`. **The MCU stores and echoes back any source type** — verified to 200; only `0` is rejected — so acceptance does not imply a distinct sound and the number of real presets is not discoverable through this API. `0x48F00013` returns `1` meaning \"a source exists\", not a count. — [Engine Sound app](https://github.com/wheregoes/byd-apps) |\n| **AVAS preset selection** | CAN-writable — UI shows 2 but MCU accepts 0–5+ |\n| **setBuffer PCM streaming** | 128-byte PCM frames accepted by MCU (ret=0) for 8+ feature IDs. Max buffer: 128 bytes. Whether MCU interprets as audio unconfirmed. |\n| **AVAH test tones** | Play on AVAS external speaker using factory diagnostic signals (`0x6E970010`) |\n| **AVAS melody patterns** | 8 working patterns (doorbell, shop chime, alarm, fanfare, etc.) via `TEST_AUDIO_AVAS_SET` pitch control — [Door Sound app](https://github.com/wheregoes/byd-apps) |\n| **CAN bus injection** | **VCDS-style feature coding possible** — inject CAN frames via `com.byd.cluster.spi` broadcast, no root needed |\n| **Cluster screenshot** | Capture driver display via `fission_screencap -d 1 -p <file>` |\n| **Instrument cluster reads** | PowerUnit, TempUnit, BacklightCtlType, InsThemeValue via BYDAutoManager |\n| **DRL toggle** | `setInt(1004, 0x43100046, 1/2)` — DRL auto mode ON/OFF, confirmed by readback |\n| **YUN device (1034)** | **ALL `0xAA` feature IDs accepted by MCU** — `setBuffer(1034, fid, data)` and `setInt(1034, fid, val)` return 0 (OK). Cloudmanager's private MCU channel. Needs AES encryption for actuation. |\n| **Content providers** | Expose vehicle data (battery, tyre pressure, maintenance, trip consumption) |\n| **Sideloading** | USB drive or ADB — [see guide](docs/sideloading-guide.md) |\n| **360 camera frames** | **Live 1280×960 from all four surround cameras, no root.** `bmmcamera.jar` is world-readable — load it yourself and drive `JNIBMMCamera` directly from a `shell`-uid `app_process`. An installed app can never do this (SELinux denies `untrusted_app_*` the `bmmcameraserver` binder); a process launched over ADB can — [details](docs/camera-system.md#frame-access-without-root) |\n\n### ⚠️ Partially Working\n\n| Feature | Status |\n|---------|--------|\n| **Door lock status** | Main doors return INVALID (0), child lock readable. No dedicated `setDoorLockStatus()` — needs generic `set()` with unknown feature IDs |\n| **360 camera display control** | `BYDAutoPanoramaDevice` (mode, rotation, transparency) is enforced server-side and the `BydPermissionContext` bypass fails. Frame *capture* works — see above |\n\n### ❌ What Doesn't Work\n\n| Feature | Reason |\n|---------|--------|\n| **Custom AVAS audio upload** | `setBuffer` accepts 128-byte PCM data (ret=0) but MCU may not interpret as audio. Exterior speaker routing (`AUDIO_EXTERIOR_SPEAKER`) returns -10011 (not supported on Dolphin). Full Boombox-style custom audio not yet confirmed — see [AVAS research](docs/avas-engine-sound-simulator.md). |\n| **AVAS volume control** | Hardcoded in MCU, PROMPT_VOLUME_LEVEL doesn't affect it |\n| **Cluster theme/skin changes** | AutoContainer service throws \"no AutoContainerNative\" in single-OS mode (`fission_single_os=1`) |\n| **Cluster debug commands** | Day/night, classic/tech, FPS, skins — all require AutoContainer (blocked) |\n| **BYDAutoInstrumentDevice API** | Requires `BYDAUTO_INSTRUMENT_COMMON/SET` permissions — shell UID 2000 blocked |\n| **Custom lock/power-on sounds** | MCU firmware rejects the commands |\n| **Horn** | Hardware relay, not software controllable |\n| **Hazard light flash** | MCU GUID gate — MCU accepts SPI transport (result=0) but silently drops remote control commands without cloud-authenticated GUID registered. MCU brought online via `setInt(1005, 0xAA00004A, 1)` (mMCUStatus=1 confirmed). Frame format fully decoded via Ghidra. Final barrier: GUID only available in cloudmanager process memory (root). |\n| **Boot animation** | Needs root to replace (`/system/media/`) |\n| **Cabin/inside temperature** | No API found — exhaustive probing confirmed unavailable |\n| **Browser blob download bypass** | `fetch→blob→anchor.click` is **silently blocked** by BYD's \"Download proibido\" policy on firmware 13.1.32.2507250.1. No file lands, no error, no popup. Earlier claims of this working were inaccurate — see [test-log](tools/browser-exploit/test-log.md) for the full diagnosis. `navigator.share` is also `undefined` in this build. |\n\n### 🔓 With Root (Magisk)\n\nRoot is optional — most features work without it. [Rooting Guide](docs/rooting-guide.md)\n\n| Capability | Details |\n|------------|---------|\n| Direct SPI access | `/dev/spidev_ivi` — bypass 128-byte Java API limit (up to 247-byte SPI records) |\n| ALSA mixer controls | Potential AVAS audio routing via `tinymix` |\n| MCU config reset | Direct SPI commands to reset MCU state |\n| System partition write | Modify `/system/media/` (boot animation), install system apps, replace `cluster_theme*.rcc` |\n| Cluster theme replacement | Replace 132MB/124MB RCC files in `/system/lib64/`, patch `libBydCluster.so` single-OS check |\n| OBD diagnostic send | `BYDAUTO_OTA_SET` + `BYDAUTO_SETTING_COMMON` permissions for full UDS coding |\n| Kernel symbols | `/proc/kallsyms` access, `dmesg` |\n| KernelSU | **Not viable** — requires GKI kernel 5.10+, device runs 4.14.117 (non-GKI) |\n\n---\n\n## 🔒 Security Findings\n\nKey security-relevant discoveries for researchers:\n\n| Finding | Impact |\n|---------|--------|\n| **Bootloader unlocked** | `ro.boot.flash.locked=0`, orange verified boot — Magisk root viable via fastboot |\n| **Permission bypass** | `BydPermissionContext` overrides `enforceCallingOrSelfPermission()` — auto-grants all `BYDAUTO_*` permissions. Works for AC, DoorLock, Bodywork. Fails for Panorama (server-side IPC check) |\n| **upgrade_server — no permission check** | Binder service accepts calls from UID 2000 (shell) with no SecurityException. Firmware updates could be triggered from `adb shell` with a valid signed package |\n| **COTA auth cracked** | HMAC-SHA256 with character-shifted secret key. Area resolution API confirmed working (HTTP 200) |\n| **Browser download block (\"Download proibido\")** | BYD deliberately blocks ALL browser-initiated downloads (blob, server URL, with/without user gesture) via a policy in `DownloadController`. Decompiled `com.byd.browser` confirms: no `addJavascriptInterface`/JS bridges, no bypass path. `navigator.share` is `undefined`. This prevents any browser-only APK sideloading chain. See [test-log](tools/browser-exploit/test-log.md) for full diagnosis. |\n| **Port 7000 (CarPlay)** | `carplayserv` runs as **root**, listens on `0.0.0.0`. Implements **AirPlay/450.14** — **CVE-2025-24132** confirmed ROOT RCE by Oligo Security (Apr 2025). Fixed in AirPlay SDK 2.7.1, but Dark Reading (Sep 2025): \"no car manufacturers have fixed it.\" Attack: WiFi → port 7000 → root code execution. |\n| **IDD-IDPS monitoring** | Intrusion detection on `localhost:12406`, monitors `wlan0`/`rmnet` interfaces. Three root-UID clients |\n| **SPI unprotected** | Packet format `[featureId_BE:4][dataLen:1][data:dataLen]` — no CRC, no HMAC |\n| **CAN bus injection from shell** | `com.byd.cluster.spi` broadcast → `BYDAutoTestDevice.TEST_SIMULATE_DOWN_SET` (0xAA00020F) injects raw CAN frames. No root, no hardware — just ADB. ClusterDebug app acts as privileged proxy. VCDS-style ECU coding possible. |\n| **UDS diagnostic protocol exposed** | BydDevelopmentTools.apk (`sharedUserId=android.uid.system`) contains full UDS (ISO 14229) stack — frame format, CAN domain IDs, session control, security access. Send via `BYDAutoOtaDevice.set({0xAA000140}, ...)`. |\n| **Most BYDAUTO permissions** | `protectionLevel=normal` — any app can request them at install time |\n| **BYDAUTO_DEVICE_YUN (1034)** | Cloud device type accepts ALL `0xAA` feature IDs via `setBuffer`/`setInt` — no MCU rejection. Cloudmanager's private MCU channel. MCU path is **UNENCRYPTED** (confirmed via Ghidra — `TcpSendIndtoMcu` does raw memcpy, AES only for cloud TCP). |\n| **Cloud command path traced** | Phone app → BYD Cloud → AES TCP → `cloudmanager` → `server_data_to_mcu(532)` → `setBuffer(1034, 0xAA000004, unencrypted_frame)` → MCU → hazard lights. FuncNum 532 = find car / flash. Correct feature ID is `0xAA000004` (not `0xAA000005`). Full protocol captured via logcat + Ghidra decompilation. |\n| **MCU can be brought online** | `setInt(1005, 0xAA00004A, 1)` → cloudmanager logs `POWER_MCU_STATUS value: 1 / set mMCUStatus = 1`. MCU accepts frames but requires GUID authentication for remote control commands. |\n| **cloudmanager binary extracted** | Pulled from user's own firmware (`13.1.32.2507250.1`). Contains AES S-Box, `server_data_to_mcu` function, 532 handler. See `data/firmware-binaries/`. Fully decompiled via Ghidra MCP. |\n| **Kernel 4.14.117 — OverlayFS compiled in** | GameOver(lay) (CVE-2023-2640/CVE-2023-32629) possible — security patch is 2023-02-05, fix was Aug 2023. User namespaces status unclear (shell `unshare -U` returns EINVAL, need app-context test). |\n| **Root BYD services exposed via binder** | 13+ BYD services running as root with custom SELinux domains (cloudmanager, cloudctrlserv, carplayserv, etc.) accept binder transactions from shell UID 2000. `cloudmanager` = `ICloudRemoteControlService` (39 methods). Prime targets for privilege escalation. |\n| **Shell can call cloudmanager binder** | `service call cloudmanager <tx>` from shell returns `Parcel(NULL)` — NOT SELinux-denied. Shell is allowed to transact with root-running cloudmanager service. |\n\n---\n\n## 🏗️ Architecture\n\n### Communication Stack\n\n```\nApp → BYDAutoManager → Binder → DiCarServer (UID 1000) → auto.default.so → /dev/spidev_ivi → MCU\n```\n\n### Audio / AVAS Path\n\n```\nSoC → I2S → MCU DSP → A2B bus → Amplifiers / AVAS speaker\n```\n\n### Cloud Control Flow\n\n```\nBYD App → HTTPS → BYD Cloud → MQTT → cloudmanager (native) → CAN bus\n```\n\n### Cloud Command Path (Find Car / Flash Hazard)\n\n```\nPhone app → HTTPS → BYD Cloud → AES-encrypted TCP (10.168.126.25:5002)\n→ cloudmanager (PID 5158, root) → server_data_to_mcu(FuncNum=532)\n→ remoteControltoMcu() → TcpSendIndtoMcu() → setBuffer(1034, 0xAA000004, UNENCRYPTED frame)\n→ MCU → hazard lights\n```\n\n- **FuncNum 532** (0x0214), cmd 0x16 = find car / flash hazard (cmd 3 = successful reply)\n- **Correct feature ID:** `0xAA000004` (confirmed via Ghidra decompilation of `remoteControltoMcu`)\n- **MCU path is UNENCRYPTED** — `TcpSendIndtoMcu` does raw memcpy to SPI. AES is only for cloud TCP.\n- **Device 1034** = `BYDAUTO_DEVICE_YUN` — cloud device, all 0xAA feature IDs accepted\n- **Device 1005** = `BYDAUTO_DEVICE_POWER` — `setInt(1005, 0xAA00004A, 1)` brings MCU online\n- **Frame format:** `[type_byte][funcNum_hi][funcNum_lo][replyFlag=0xFE][funcVersion=0x00][dataLen][data]`\n- **MCU GUID gate:** MCU requires cloud-authenticated GUID before processing remote control commands. GUID sent to MCU via `mcu_guid_ind()`. Only available in cloudmanager process memory (root).\n- Cloud TCP server: `10.168.126.25:5002` (private APN)\n- AES S-Box at offset `0xc0a0` in cloudmanager binary (standard AES-128-CBC)\n\n### Instrument Cluster (Driver Display)\n\n```\nIVI (Android) ──fission/cbox bridge──→ Cluster (Qt OS, Qt 5.15.10 / 6.5.5)\n                                              ↓\n                                    libBydCluster.so (31MB)\n                                    cluster_theme1.rcc (132MB)\n                                    cluster_theme2.rcc (124MB)\n```\n\n- **Single-OS mode** (`fission_single_os=1`): AutoContainer service is a stub — \"no AutoContainerNative\"\n- **Dual-OS mode** (`fission_single_os=0`): full cluster theme/skin API via `sendInfo2(8, flatBuffer)`\n- **CAN injection** works in both modes: `com.byd.cluster.spi` broadcast → MCU → cluster\n\n### CAN Bus Injection Path\n\n```\nADB shell → am broadcast → ClusterDebug app (BYDAUTO_TEST_SET) → TEST_SIMULATE_DOWN_SET → MCU → CAN bus\n```\n\nNo root, no OBD2 dongle — just ADB WiFi.\n\n### OTA Update Paths\n\n| Path | Method |\n|------|--------|\n| **COTA** | Cloud OTA — `com.byd.cota` (app config/resource updates) |\n| **FOTA** | Firmware OTA — requires mutual TLS with IMEI-derived certs |\n| **OTG** | USB update — looks for `msm8953_64` path (legacy, despite QCM6125 SoC) |\n\n### Network Topology\n\n```\nCar WiFi: 192.168.10.x\nHead Unit: 192.168.10.10\nADB: port 5555\nCarPlay: port 7000 (root, 0.0.0.0)\nIDD-IDPS: port 12406 (localhost)\n```\n\n---\n\n## 📚 Documentation\n\n### Guides\n\n| Doc | Description |\n|-----|-------------|\n| 📱 [Sideloading Guide](docs/sideloading-guide.md) | Install apps via USB or ADB — no root needed |\n| 🔬 [Sideloading Internals](docs/sideloading-internals.md) | Browser download block analysis, AftermarketInstallTool reverse engineering, country-specific whitelisting |\n| 🔓 [Rooting Guide](docs/rooting-guide.md) | Magisk root via fastboot — A/B slot safety, recovery procedures |\n\n### System Deep Dives\n\n| Doc | Description |\n|-----|-------------|\n| 🖥️ [System Overview](docs/system-overview.md) | Hardware, partitions, services, network topology, open ports |\n| 🔌 [BYD Auto API](docs/bydauto-api.md) | 100+ `BYDAUTO_*` permissions, device types, handler classes, protobuf schemas |\n| 📊 [Content Providers](docs/content-providers.md) | CarStatusProvider URIs, schemas, consumption telemetry data format |\n\n### Vehicle Features\n\n| Doc | Description |\n|-----|-------------|\n| ❄️ [AC & Climate Control](docs/ac-climate-control.md) | Temperature zones, AC state getters/setters, encoding quirks, permission bypass code |\n| 🔊 [Sound & Themes](docs/sound-and-themes.md) | Audio hardware topology, 200+ CAN signal IDs, AVAS/AVAH analysis, MCU probe results, 8 working melody patterns |\n| 🎵 [AVAS Engine Sound Simulator](docs/avas-engine-sound-simulator.md) | Engine voice simulator confirmed present on Dolphin, full feature ID map, readback-verified writes; preset *count* is not discoverable (MCU accepts any value), setBuffer caps at 128 B |\n| 🖥️ [Driver Display](docs/driver-display.md) | Instrument cluster reverse engineering — Qt OS, AutoContainer bridge, CAN injection, UDS diagnostics, VCDS-style coding |\n| 💡 [Light Control](docs/light-control.md) | 214 light feature IDs, DRL toggle confirmed, MCU-locked actuation, cloud command path traced, YUN device (1034), MCU unencrypted path confirmed via Ghidra |\n| 🔓 [Jailbreak Analysis](docs/jailbreak-analysis.md) | Kernel 4.14.117 analysis, OverlayFS/GameOver(lay), root BYD services binder attack surface, escalation chain |\n| 📷 [Camera System](docs/camera-system.md) | Dual camera API architecture, **pulling live 360 camera frames without root**, NV21 pixel-format gotcha, channel→direction mapping, hardware encode |\n| 🔄 [OTA System](docs/ota-system.md) | COTA/FOTA/OTG reverse engineering, upgrade_server vulnerability, COTA auth analysis |\n| 🧪 [Decompiled APKs & Install Vectors](docs/decompiled-apks-install-vectors.md) | APK internals, install surfaces, sideload vectors |\n| 🔓 [Locked/ADB-less Jailbreak Options](docs/locked-no-adb-browser-jailbreak-options.md) | Non-ADB attack surface, browser jailbreaks |\n| 🌐 [Public Site Chain](docs/public-site-chain.md) | Remote/public web exploit chain research |\n\n### NFC Digital Key\n\n| Doc | Description |\n|-----|-------------|\n| 🔑 [NFC Digital Key](docs/nfc-digital-key.md) | Hardware analysis, firmware lock, IntelligentEntry app reverse engineering, CAN signals |\n| ✉️ [NFC Activation Email](docs/byd-nfc-activation-email.md) | Email templates to request NFC activation from BYD — proven <24h activation |\n| | → [English template](docs/nfc-activation-email-en.md) · [Português](docs/nfc-activation-email-ptbr.md) · [中文](docs/nfc-activation-email-zh.md) |\n\n---\n\n## 🛠️ Scripts\n\nAll scripts run on-device via `app_process`. Push and execute:\n\n```bash\nadb push scripts/BydAudioQuery.java /data/local/tmp/\nadb shell \"cd /data/local/tmp && app_process -Djava.class.path=. / BydAudioQuery read 0x1B10003D\"\n```\n\n### CAN Bus & Audio\n\n| Script | Purpose |\n|--------|---------|\n| `BydAudioQuery.java` | CAN bus read/write tool — direct signal access |\n| `BydAudioRoutingTest.java` | Audio routing tests (I2S, AVAS paths) |\n| `BydNavAudioTest.java` | Navigation audio channel testing |\n| `BydDeviceScan.java` | Multi-device signal scanner |\n| `BydAvasPlayer.java` | AVAS melody player |\n| `BydCarPropertyTest.java` | DiCar/ICarPropertyService API probe (second MCU path via ContentProvider) |\n| `BydAvasDeepProbe.java` | Tests newly discovered signals from CarSetting decompilation (UE_BROADCAST, HW_L1, PROMPT_VOLUME, etc.) |\n| `AvasPattern.java` / `AvasMelody.java` | AVAS melody pattern players (doorbell, shop chime, alarm, fanfare) |\n| `PitchTest.java` / `PitchHunt.java` / `TestAvasSweep.java` | AVAS pitch discovery — confirmed only 2 pitches (1=A, 2=B) |\n| `PromptVolTest.java` / `PromptVolSingle.java` | PROMPT_VOLUME_LEVEL tests (accepted but no AVAS volume change) |\n| `ClusterCmd.java` | Send AutoContainer cluster debug commands (blocked by single-OS) |\n| `ClusterProbe.java` | Probe instrument cluster feature IDs via BYDAutoManager |\n| `ClusterTest.java` | Targeted test of working instrument features (BacklightCtlType, InsThemeValue, PowerUnit, TempUnit) |\n| `InstrumentDeviceTest.java` | Direct BYDAutoInstrumentDevice API test (blocked by permission) |\n| `LightBlink.java` | Light control probe — read all states, sweep SET IDs, DRL toggle confirmed working |\n| `CloudFlash.java` | Call ICloudServiceApp.sendMsg + ICloudRemoteControlService.setControlConfigure (cloud command bridge) |\n| `YunTest.java` | **YUN device (1034) testing** — all 0xAA feature IDs ACCEPTED by MCU. Read/sweep/send/setint/getint. |\n| `SysMix.java` | System audio mixer queries |\n\n### AVAS & Sound\n\n| Script | Purpose |\n|--------|---------|\n| `AvasRoute.java` | AVAS audio routing experiments |\n| `AvasVolume.java` / `AvasVolume2.java` | AVAS volume control attempts |\n| `AvahFreq.java` | AVAH frequency sweep testing |\n| `AvahBare.java` | Minimal AVAH test tone trigger |\n| `AvahCombo.java` | AVAH combination signal testing |\n| `AvahCycle.java` | AVAH cyclic test patterns |\n| `AvahIsolate.java` | AVAH signal isolation tests |\n| `AvahStop.java` | AVAH signal stop/cleanup |\n\n### MCU & System Probes\n\n| Script | Purpose |\n|--------|---------|\n| `BydMcuProbe.java` | MCU security probe — feature scanning, extreme values |\n| `BydBufferProbe.java` | MCU buffer overflow / boundary testing |\n| `BydSpiDirect.java` | Direct SPI communication (requires root) |\n| `BydDebugProbe.java` | Debug interface / hidden feature discovery |\n| `BydLockSoundMonitor.java` | Door lock sound event monitoring |\n| `BydCotaProbe.java` | COTA cloud API probe |\n\n### Vehicle Systems\n\n| Script | Purpose |\n|--------|---------|\n| `BydNfcKeyProbe.java` | NFC digital key CAN bus scanner |\n| `BydUpgradeProbe.java` | upgrade_server Binder service probe |\n| `car-telemetry.py` | Car data polling and logging (Python) |\n\n### Chromium Flags Analysis\n\n| Script | Purpose |\n|--------|---------|\n| `flags_extract.py` / `flags_extract_all.py` | Extract Chromium flags from head unit browser |\n| `flags_descriptions.py` | Map flag names to descriptions |\n| `flags_verify.py` / `flags_verify2.py` / `flags_verify3.py` / `flags_verify_final.py` | Verify flag states and behaviors |\n| `flags_full_list.py` | Complete flag enumeration |\n| `flags_probe_dom.py` | DOM-based flag probing |\n\n---\n\n## 📁 Repository Structure\n\n```\ndocs/                       Guides and deep-dive documentation\nscripts/                    On-device tools (CAN bus, MCU probes, AVAS, Chromium)\ntools/\n  browser-exploit/          Browser sideloading research\n    index.html              Main test page — blob download bypass attempt (blocked by BYD policy)\n    autodownload.html       Auto-download trigger test\n    install.html            APK install flow test\n    pwa.html                PWA install behavior test\n    cdp_capability_audit.py CDP protocol capability audit\n    cdp_download_test.py    CDP download trigger tests\n    cdp_audit_results.json  Full CDP audit results\n    serve_https.py          Local HTTPS server for testing\n    sideload-test.apk       Mock APK for install chain testing\ndata/\n  apks/                     Extracted system APKs (DiCarServer, CarSetting, ClusterDebug, BydThemeStore, devtools)\n  audio-config/             Audio platform XML configs (I2S, mixer paths)\n  car-status/               CarStatusProvider data dumps\n  cluster_libs/             Cluster native libs (libBydCluster.so) — gitignored, regeneratable\n  firmware-binaries/        Extracted from user's firmware (13.1.32.2507250.1) — cloudmanager, mqttserv, cloudctrlserv, libmqttserv.so\n  framework/                Pulled framework.jar, services.jar, ext.jar — gitignored\n  native-libs/              Native shared libraries (auto.default.so, libbydauto.so)\n  packages/                 Package lists and service dumps\n  permissions/              BYDAUTO permission definitions\n  system-properties/        System property dumps and Android settings\n  chromium_flags_*.json     Chromium flag analysis data\n  mcu-probe-*.txt           MCU probe scan results\napk-analysis/               Decompiled APKs (regeneratable via jadx) + vehicle type mappings\n```\n\nCustom Android apps (Door Sound, Engine Sound, etc.) live in [byd-apps](https://github.com/wheregoes/byd-apps).\n\n---\n\n## 🔧 Firmware Resources & References\n\n### BYD Factory Images & Repair Manuals\n\nFactory images (full system flash packages) and repair manuals for BYD models are shared by the community at:\n\n| Resource | URL |\n|----------|-----|\n| Global factory images (ATTO 3) | [github.com/BYDcar/BYDGlobalFactoryImages1](https://github.com/BYDcar/BYDGlobalFactoryImages1) |\n| Flash packages by chip (Di1–Di5) | [github.com/BYDcar/BYDPackagesByChip1](https://github.com/BYDcar/BYDPackagesByChip1) · [Chip2](https://github.com/BYDcar/BYDPackagesByChip2) · [Chip3](https://github.com/BYDcar/BYDPackagesByChip3) |\n| Repair manuals & dashboard firmware | [github.com/BYDcar/BYDRepairManual](https://github.com/BYDcar/BYDRepairManual) |\n\nThese images contain the full Android system partition, including native binaries like `cloudmanager`, `mqttserv`, and MCU firmware — essential for offline reverse engineering when on-device extraction is blocked by SELinux.\n\nThe original sources are BYD's after-sales portals:\n- Repair manuals: `http://lms.bydauto.com.cn/`\n- Factory images: `http://yunpan.byd.com.cn/`\n\nBoth require a dealer or repair shop account. The GitHub repos above were sourced from Taobao/Xianyu sellers and shared freely.\n\n> **Note:** Firmware versions vary by model, region, and trim. The Dolphin (DiLink 50, Qualcomm 665, branch `13.1.32`) shares a platform with ATTO 3, Seagull, and Yuan PLUS — but binaries may differ between versions. Always verify compatibility before flashing.\n\n### Community\n\n| Resource | URL |\n|----------|-----|\n| BYD Owners Forum (firmware tracking) | [byd.forum/dilink-versions.html](https://byd.forum/dilink-versions.html) |\n| Telegram (BYD community) | [t.me/just_byd](https://t.me/just_byd) |\n| XDA: BYD DiLink TWRP / root threads | [xdaforums.com](https://xdaforums.com/t/byd-song-plus-ev-twrp-needed.4586857/) |\n\n### DiLink Platform Reference\n\n| DiLink Version | Controller | CPU | Android | Branch | Common Models |\n|---------------|------------|-----|---------|--------|---------------|\n| **DiLink 50** | 13 | Qualcomm 665 | 10 | **13.1.32** | **Dolphin**, ATTO 3, Seagull, Yuan PLUS, e2 |\n| DiLink 50P | 13 | Qualcomm 665 | 10 | 13.1.33 | Seal, Han, Tang |\n| DiLink 100 | 23 | Qualcomm 778G | 12 | 23.1.x | N7, D9, Leopard 5, Seal |\n| DiLink 150 | 34 | BYD 9000 | 13 | 34.1.x | Xia, Han L, Tang L, D9 |\n\nFull version table at [byd.forum/dilink-versions.html](https://byd.forum/dilink-versions.html).\n\n### USB Flashing Method\n\n```\n1. Download firmware ZIP, rename to UpdateFull.zip\n2. Format USB as FAT32, create folder structure:\n   BYDUpdatePackage/msm8953_64/UpdateFull.zip\n3. Plug into car's USB data port while system is running\n4. Auto-detects (~10 min), or force: hold \"Previous track\" steering button + volume wheel until screen goes black\n```\n\n---\n\n## 📄 License\n\nMIT License\n\nPermission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy\nof this software and associated documentation files (the \"Software\"), to deal\nin the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights\nto use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell\ncopies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is\nfurnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:\n\nThe above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all\ncopies or substantial portions of the Software.\n\nTHE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED \"AS IS\", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR\nIMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,\nFITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE\nAUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER\nLIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM,\nOUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE\nSOFTWARE.",
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      "description": "We have come a long way since I was a child in the 1960s when all I wanted for Christmas was a slinky and some Rock’Em – Sock’Em Robots. Now imagine we have traveled ten years into the future, and it is Christmas 2031. Alexa has replaced kids’ parents and Santa Claus. Every toy is connected to the Internet and looks like a robot version of the animal it represents. Clean thermonuclear Christmas trees will be providing us with radiant, gamma-ray energy for all our holiday needs. Pogo sticks have also made a comeback, but they are solar-powered and can leap entire city blocks. And while I am busy pretending to be the Ghost of Christmas Future, I thought it would also be fun to ask the Office of the CTO team about their predictions for futuristic, technical toys. So, I posed these two questions: What cool TECHNICAL toy or gadget would you like Santa to bring you this year in 2021? As a participating member of the Office of the CTO, what cool TECHNICAL toy or gadget (that has not yet been invented) would you like Santa to bring you in 10 years from now in 2031? christmas wishlist for the octo team overlay You know what? We just might see I see a sneak preview of some of these magical tech toys of the future in just a few weeks at the CES 2022 conference. In the meantime, take a look at the wish list from all of our Extreme technical gurus: Marcus Burton – Wireless and Cloud Architect Christmas Wish 2021: Is a Tesla Cybertruck an option? I’ll even take a prototype. That will scratch several technology itches at the same time. Think about it…EV, autonomous driving, AI, 5G probably, cloud-connected, mobile-first, and all the best in materials sciences and mechanical engineering applied to trucks. What more could an outdoorsy tech guy want? Christmas Wish 2031: I’m kinda thinking that while everyone else has their brain slurped out in the metaverse (with VR!), I will prefer to go to the actual mountains. But you know, I have a wife and kids, so I have to think about safety. So here’s my wish: a smart personal device that has a full week of battery life (using ultra-thin silicon wafers) with rapid solar charging, LEO satellite connectivity (for sending “eat your heart out” 3D pics to my friends from the “there’s no 6G here” wilderness), and ultra-HD terrain feature maps for modern navigation. Carla Guzzetti – VP, Experience, Messaging & Enablement Christmas Wish 2021: I want this: Meeting Owl Pro – 360-Degree, 1080p HD Smart Video Conference Camera, Microphone, and Speaker Christmas Wish 2031: I want a gadget where we can have virtual meetings without the need for a wearable! Who wants to wear heavy goggles all day? Doug McDonald – Director of Product Management Christmas Wish 2021: As a technologist often looking for a balance between screen time and health and fitness I hope Santa brings me the Aura Strap. The Aura strap adds additional IoT sensory capabilities to compliment your Apple smartwatch. Bioelectrical impedance analysis is the cutting-edge science behind the AURA Strap. This innovation provides a way to truly see how your body changes over the course of a day. Their body composition analysis includes fat, muscle mass, minerals, and hydration; providing personalized insights that improve the results of your workouts, diet, and your lifestyle as a whole. Christmas Wish 2031: Hopefully, this innovation will be here sooner. Still, in the spirit of my first wish from Santa, I also hope to have a service engine warning light for me. The concept is utilizing advancements in biomedical sensory devices to pinpoint potential changes in your physical metrics that may help in seeking medical attention sooner than later if variances in health data occur. I spoke about this concept in the Digital Diagnosis episode of the Inflection Points podcast from the Office of the CTO. Ed Koehler – Principal Engineer Christmas Wish 2021: My answers are short and sweet. I want a nice drone with high-resolution pan, tilt, and zoom (PTZ) cameras. Christmas Wish 2031: In ten years, I want a drone that I can sit inside and fly away! Puneet Sehgal – Business Initiatives Program Manager Christmas Wish 2021: I have always wanted to enjoy the world from a bird’s eye view. Therefore, my wish is for Santa to bring me a good-quality drone camera this year. It is amazing how quickly drones have evolved from commercial /military use to becoming a personal gadget. Christmas Wish 2031: In 2031, I wish Santa could get me a virtual reality (VR) trainer to help me internalize physical motion by looking at a simulation video while sending an electrical impulse to mimic it. It will open endless possibilities, and I could become an ice skater, a karate expert, or a pianist – all in one. Maybe similar research is already being done, but we are far away from something like this maturing for practical use. So, who knows – it’s Santa after all and we are talking 2031! Tim Harrison – Director of Product Marketing, Service Provider Christmas Wish 2021: This year, I would love to extend my audio recording setup and move from a digital 24 channel mixer to a control surface that integrates with my DAW (digital audio workstation) and allows me to use my outboard microphone pre-amps. I’ve been looking at an ICON QCon Pro G2 plus one QCon EX G2 extender to give me direct control over 16 channels at once (I use 16 channels just for my drum kit). Christmas Wish 2031: Ten years from now, I sincerely hope to receive an anti-gravity platform. First, I’ll be old, and climbing stairs will have become more challenging for these creaky old bones. Secondly, who hasn’t hoped for a REAL hoverboard? Once we know what gravity is “made of,” we can start making it easier to manipulate objects on earth and make space more habitable for human physiology. Either that or a puppy. Puppy sitting Divya Balu Pazhayannur – Director of Business Initiatives Christmas Wish 2021: I’m upgrading parts of my house over the holidays and browsing online for kitchen and laundry appliances. If you had told me that I would be spending three hours reading blogs on choosing the right cooktop for me, I would not have believed you. Does it have the right power, is it reliable, is it Wi-Fi enabled, can you talk to it – I’m kidding on that last one. Having said that, I’d love to get the Bosch Benchmark Gas Stovetop. Although I can’t speak to my appliance, its minimalist look has me writing it down on my wish list for Santa. I’ll even offer him some crispy dosas in exchange. Christmas Wish 2031: Apart from flying cars and personal robot assistants, I’d love to get the gift of better connectivity. I miss my family and friends in India, and it would be amazing to engage with them through holographic technology. I imagine it would allow for a much higher level of communication than today’s ‘talking head’ approach. Although do I want my family sitting with me in my living room? Still – I’d like to think a holograph would be just fantastic. Yury Ostrovsky – Sr. Technology Manager Christmas Wish 2021: I believe 2022 will be the year of VR toys. Virtual Reality is already popular, but I believe more applications will be developed in this area. We might see radio waves coming from different sources (Wi-Fi, LTE, 5G, BT, etc.) and visualize propagation in real-time. Christmas Wish 2031: “Prediction is very difficult, especially if it’s about the future” – Niels Bohr Kurt Semba – Principal Architect Christmas Wish 2021: The Crown from Neurosity. It helps you get and stay in a deep focus to improve your work and gaming results. Christmas Wish 2031: A non-evasive health device that can quickly look deep into your body and cells and explain why you are not feeling well today. Jon Filson – Senior Producer, Content Christmas Wish 2021: I want a large rollable TV by LG. In part because I watch a lot of football. And while I have a Smart TV, I still can’t get it to connect to my Bluetooth speaker … so while I love it, I want it to work better, and isn’t that so often the way with tech? But more than that, I don’t like and have never liked that rooms have to be designed around TVs. They are big, which is fine, but they are often in the way, which is less so. They should disappear when not in use. It’s $100,000 so I don’t expect it any time soon. But it’s an idea whose time has come. Christmas Wish 2031: I cheated on this one and asked my 12-year-old son Jack what he would want. It’s the portal gun, from Rick and Morty, a show in which a crazed scientist named Rick takes his grandson Morty on wacky adventures in a multi-verse. That last part is important to me. Kids today are already well into multi-verses, while we adults are just struggling to make one decent Metaverse. The next generation is already way ahead of us digitally speaking, it’s clear. Alexey Reznik – Senior UX Designer Christmas Wish 2021: This awesome toy: DJI Mavic 2 Pro – Drone Quadcopter UAV with Hasselblad Camera 3-Axis Gimbal HDR 4K Video Adjustable Aperture 20MP 1″ CMOS Sensor, up to 48mph, Gray Christmas Wish 2031: Something along these lines: BMW Motorrad VISION NEXT 100 BMW Motorcycle Michael Rash – Distinguished Engineer – Security Christmas Wish 2021: Satechi USB-C Multiport MX Adapter – Dual 4K HDMI. Christmas Wish 2031: A virtual reality headset that actually works. Alena Amir – Senior Content and Communications Manager Christmas Wish 2021: With conversations around VR/AR and the metaverse taking the world by storm, Santa could help out with an Oculus Quest. Purely for research purposes of course! Christmas Wish 2031: The 1985 movie, Back to the Future, was a family favorite and sure we didn’t get it all exactly right by 2015 but hey, it’s almost 2022! About time we get those hoverboards! David Coleman – Director of Wireless Christmas Wish 2021: Well, it looks like drones are the #1 wish item for 2021, and I am no exception. My wife and I just bought a home in the mountains of Blue Ridge, Georgia, where there is an abundance of wildlife. I want a state-of-the-art drone for bear surveillance. Christmas Wish 2031: In ten years, I will be 71 years old, and I hope to be at least semi-retired and savoring the fruits of my long tech career. Even though we are looking to the future, I want a time machine to revisit the past. I would travel back to July 16th, 1969, and watch Apollo 11 liftoff from Cape Kennedy to the moon. I actually did that as a nine-year-old kid. Oh, and I would also travel back to 1966 and play with my Rock’Em – Sock’Em Robots. Rock'em Sock'em Robots To summarize, our peeps in the Office of the CTO all envision Christmas 2031, where the way we interact as a society will have progressed. In 2021, we already have unlimited access to information, so future tech toys might depend less on magical new technologies and more on the kinds of experiences these new technologies can create. And when those experiences can be shared across the globe in real-time, the world gains an opportunity to learn from each other and grow together in ways that would never have been possible.",
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      "readme": "# Multi-Tiered-Hybrid-Intrusion-Detection-System-for-Internet-of-Vehicles\nA Multi-Tiered Hybrid Intrusion Detection System (IDS) for the Internet of Vehicles (IoV) is a security solution designed to protect the communication and data exchange within a connected vehicle network. The IoV refers to the interconnected network of vehicles, infrastructure, and other devices that enable advanced transportation systems.\n\nThe IDS aims to detect and prevent intrusion attempts or malicious activities that may compromise the integrity, confidentiality, or availability of the IoV. It combines multiple layers or tiers of detection techniques, leveraging both traditional rule-based approaches and machine learning algorithms for enhanced accuracy and effectiveness.\n\nThe system typically consists of three main tiers:\n\n    Network-Based Detection: This tier focuses on monitoring the communication between vehicles and infrastructure elements. It analyzes network traffic, such as packet headers and payload, to identify anomalies, known attack patterns, or suspicious behaviors. This detection can be based on rule-based signatures, anomaly detection algorithms, or statistical models.\n\n    Host-Based Detection: This tier concentrates on the individual vehicles' internal systems, including their onboard computers or electronic control units. It monitors the activities and events occurring within these systems, such as software executions, system calls, or resource usage. Any deviations from normal behavior or known attack patterns trigger alerts for potential intrusions.\n\n    Behavior-Based Detection: This tier focuses on the behavior of vehicles and their interactions within the IoV. It leverages machine learning techniques to establish baselines of normal behavior for individual vehicles or the overall system. Any deviations or anomalies in vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) or vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) interactions are detected and flagged as potential security threats.\n\nThe multi-tiered hybrid IDS combines the strengths of each tier to provide a comprehensive defense against a wide range of intrusion attempts. By analyzing network traffic, internal system events, and behavioral patterns, it can effectively detect and mitigate attacks, such as denial-of-service (DoS), unauthorized access, data tampering, or spoofing.\n\nThe system can generate real-time alerts, trigger automated responses, or notify human operators for further investigation and mitigation actions. Additionally, the IDS can continuously update its knowledge base by incorporating new attack signatures, machine learning models, or system behavior profiles to adapt to emerging threats and evolving IoV environments.\n\nOverall, a Multi-Tiered Hybrid Intrusion Detection System for the Internet of Vehicles enhances the security posture of connected vehicles, mitigates risks, and ensures the safe and secure operation of the IoV ecosystem.\n\n***I here add the relavent python code for your reference. Here specially I need to mention those who create this code and I got it and make more secure and develop some new parts as for my project.***",
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      "title": "Extreme Fast Charging (XFC) Cybersecurity Threats, Use Cases and Requirements For Medium and Heavy Duty Electric Vehicles",
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      "readme": "# Extreme Fast Charging (XFC) Cybersecurity Threats, Use Cases and Requirements For Medium and Heavy Duty Electric Vehicles\n\nThis document -- produced by DOT Volpe for the NMFTA -- presents threats and cybersecurity requirements for both Medium and Heavy Duty Electric Vehicle (MD/HDEV) Extreme Fast Charging (XFC) systems.\n\nThe requirements in this document are intended to be utilized by commercial truck carriers, electric truck OEMs, XFC vendors, utilities, standards organizations, and other interested stakeholders.\n\n[![License: CC BY 4.0](https://licensebuttons.net/l/by/4.0/80x15.png)](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/)\n\nAll work in this repo is licensed under a [Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License](http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).\n\n# Download\n\nThe current document release can be downloaded [here](https://github.com/nmfta-repo/nmfta-hvcs-xfc/raw/master/XFC%20Cybersecurity%20Requirements%20For%20Medium%20and%20Heavy%20Duty%20Electric%20Vehicles.pdf)\n\n# How to Make Contributions\n\nThe document is licensed freely under a [Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License](http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/) which enables derivative works at your discretion.\n\nWe also welcome discussion and improvement to the document here. Please feel free to suggest changes as github issues or send an email to us directly at \"Urban Jonson\" <Urban.Jonson@nmfta.org>.",
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      "description": "AVHARM is a graphical modelling tool for analyzing and evaluating security threats and defenses in Autonomous Vehicle (AV) systems. It combines attack graphs, attack trees, and countermeasure trees with formal security metrics.",
      "readme": "# AVHARM\nAVHARM is a graphical modelling tool developed as part of the research presented in our paper \"Graphical security modelling for Autonomous Vehicles: A novel approach to threat analysis and defence evaluation\", published in Computers & Security. It enables in-depth threat analysis and defence evaluation of Autonomous Vehicle (AV) systems by combining attack graphs, attack trees, and countermeasure trees with formal security metrics.\n\n\n\n\n## Overview\nAVHARM is built to support AV security researchers and developers by offering:\n1. Web-based visualisation of AV network attack paths.\n2. Automatic calculation of multi-level security metrics.\n3. Analysis of the impact and probability of attacks.\n4. Support for modelling real-world AV architectures.\n\n## To use AVHARM:\n1. Go to the AVHARM Web Tool: https://ziz0301.github.io/AVHARM/index.html.\n2. Prepare vehicle network architecture in JSON format (see sample files in the `/ScenarioData` folder used in the paper).\n3. Copy the JSON content and paste it into the input field.\n4. Click the `Process Data` button to generate the attack graphs and calculate security metrics automatically.\n\n## Citation\nIf you use AVHARM in your research, please cite our paper:\n<pre>\n@article{NGUYEN2025104229,\ntitle = {Graphical security modelling for Autonomous Vehicles: A novel approach to threat analysis and defence evaluation},\njournal = {Computers & Security},\nvolume = {150},\npages = {104229},\nyear = {2025},\nissn = {0167-4048},\ndoi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2024.104229},\nurl = {https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167404824005352},\nauthor = {Nhung H. Nguyen and Mengmeng Ge and Jin-Hee Cho and Terrence J. Moore and Seunghyun Yoon and Hyuk Lim and Frederica Nelson and Guangdong Bai and Dan Dongseong Kim},\nkeywords = {Attack graphs, Autonomous Vehicle, Security Analysis, Security modelling, Graphical security modelling, Attack countermeasure tree},\n}\n</pre>",
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      "title": "Blockchain-based-mutual-authentication-method-to-secure-electric-vehicles-TPMS",
      "full_name": "rakesh103706/Blockchain-based-mutual-authentication-method-to-secure-electric-vehicles-TPMS",
      "name": "Blockchain-based-mutual-authentication-method-to-secure-electric-vehicles-TPMS",
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      "description": "This project analyzes cybersecurity vulnerabilities in Tire Pressure Monitoring Systems (TPMS) used in modern vehicles. It proposes a lightweight RFID-based authentication mechanism integrated with blockchain to secure sensor communication, prevent spoofing, replay, and eavesdropping attacks, and enhance data integrity and driver safety.",
      "readme": "TITLE EXPLANATION\n\nBlockchain- Blockchain technology, known for its decentralized and tamper-resistant nature, offers\npotential solutions for secure authentication in EV networks. Blockchain’s properties (e.g., immutability,\ntransparency, and consensus mechanisms) make it a suitable choice for building trust and preventing fraud.\nMutual Authentication- Mutual authentication is a process where two entities, like an EV and a charging\nstation, authenticate each other before sharing data or initiating any transaction. This verification ensures both\nthe EV and the charging infrastructure are verified.\nElectric Vehicles (EVs)- EVs rely heavily on electronic systems for operation and efficiency. They have\nadvanced communication networks, making them more susceptible to cyberattacks compared to traditional\nvehicles. Ensuring the security of interconnected systems, like TPMS, is crucial for EV safety and reliability.\nTire Pressure Monitoring System (TPMS)-TPMS is a critical system in vehicles that monitors the air\npressure inside tires and alerts the driver if the pressure falls below a safe threshold. Ensures vehicle safety\nand efficiency. Often uses wireless communication to send data to the car's central system.\n\n\n\nABSTRACT\n\n• Despite the widespread use of Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) and wireless connectivity such as\nNear Field Communication (NFC) in electric vehicles, their security and privacy implications in Ad-Hoc\nnetworks have not been well explored.\n• This paper provides a data protection assessment of radio frequency electronic system in the Tire Pressure\nMonitoring System (TPMS). It is demonstrated that eavesdropping is completely feasible from a passing\ncar, at an approximate distance up to 50 meters.\n• Furthermore, our reverse analysis shows that the static n-bit signatures and messaging can be\neavesdropped from a relatively far distance, raising privacy concerns as a vehicles’ movements can be\ntracked by using the unique IDs of tire pressure sensors.\n• Unfortunately, current protocols do not use authentication, and automobile technologies hardly follow\nroutine message confirmation so sensor messages may be spoofed remotely. To improve the security of\nTPMS, we suggest a novel ultra-lightweight mutual authentication for the TPMS registry process in the\nautomotive network. Our experimental results confirm the effectiveness and security of the proposed\nmethod in TPMS.\n\n\n\n\nINTRODUCTION\n\n1.1 OVERVIEW\n• The majority of cars are fitted with direct TPMSs. In order to measure tire pressure, these structures depend\non battery operated- powered pressure sensors within the tire and communicate their message signal through\na radio frequency (RF) transmitter.\n• Bypenetrating into the wireless module, the attacker can eavesdrop on the TPMS sensors communication. It\nalso implement a shared ultra light weight RFID authentication mechanism for inclusion in a block chain\nenabled TPMS to guarantee the data security. The implementation itself is a new concept and the suggested\ntechnique gives security benefits toward potential attacks like spoofing, replay, and man-in-the-middle,\nmaking sure the privacy of the information are been written to the public ledger of the block chain\n\n1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT\n\n• The increasing reliance on wireless communication systems in electric vehicles (EVs), such as Tire Pressure\nMonitoring Systems (TPMS), has introduced significant cybersecurity vulnerabilities.\n• These systems are susceptible to attacks such as eavesdropping, spoofing, and unauthorized data tampering,\nwhich can compromise the integrity of critical safety information and pose risks to vehicle operation and\npassenger safety.\n• Existing security mechanisms for TPMS often lack the robustness to address these threats comprehensively,\nespecially in the dynamic and distributed environments of modern EVs.\n• There is a pressing need for a secure, efficient, and decentralized method to authenticate TPMS sensors and\nensure reliable communication with the vehicle's control system.\n\n\n\nEXISTING SYSTEM\n\nIn 2019 proposed a model to secure the charging system in the electric vehicles. To this end, it suggests a\nmutual authentication using Burrows– Abadi–Needham logic.\nIn relation to the prevailing distribution, suggested a random key pre-distribution strategy, in which every\nsingle node preserves a series of keys arbitrarily from the maximum allowable secret key.\nTESLA is a well-known authentication protocol used by wireless sensor networks (WSNs) to validate the\nbroadcaster. Usually, validating a transmitted sender involves the use of asymmetric cryptographic algorithms\n(e.g., RSA), which is not really sufficient for resource-restricted sensor networks.\nWith TPMSs, these key management systems do not function well, as sensor nodes in automotive network are\nconcerned with setting keys among a big numbers of sensors, whereas TPMSs concentrate on setting keys\namong only four sensors and the Electrical Control Unit (ECU).\nIt also suggests to implement a shared ultra light weight RFID authentication mechanism for inclusion in a\nblockchain-enabled TPMS to guarantee the data security.\n\n\n\nDRAWBACKSOFEXISTINGSYSTEM\n\n• More stringent computing operations can not also be performed, like creating the SHA-256 hash function\nand verifying the history of the commodity regarding the data contained in the block chain.\n• Latency issue and real time constraints.\n• Security compramises\n\n\n\nPROPOSED SYSTEM\n\nThis paper focuses on tracking threats through listening to sensor identifiers and Denial Of Service (DOS)\nattacks with message spoofing risks through injecting forged data into the tire monitoring device.\nWe would consider attacks where, by deliberately inserting forged messages, an attacker interferes with the\nregular operations of TPMS. For instance, an attacker can attempt to submit a low-pressure packet to cause a\nlow-pressure alert.\nIf feasible, such attacks could weaken the confidence of drivers in the system and possibly contribute to fully\nneglect TPMS-related alerts.\nIn conclusion, even though tire sensors every time react to the corresponding activation signal, an attacker who\nrepetitively communicates activation signals can force tire sensors to transmit messages continuously, massively\nreducing the life of TPMS.\n\n\n\nADVANTAGES OF PROPOSEDSYSTEM\n\n• In order to create a chain of data according to the order in which they were created, blocks are connected in\nan ordered manner. The block relation is confirmed via the hash value of the block header data.\n• The blockchain uses this hash value as the individual identifier number for all blocks, and by the root block\nhash values determined in the block header, the unique related block can be found in the blockchain.\n\n\n\n\nSYSTEM ARCHITECTURE\n\n<img width=\"1711\" height=\"745\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/1a333ca6-bfe9-4ce6-8d41-737e25e17cb5\" />\n\n\nSYSTEM TESTING\n\n<img width=\"1390\" height=\"752\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/68ecf19f-75ea-4fae-ba40-9fd3ff7f37bb\" />\n\n<img width=\"1380\" height=\"776\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/77b87bac-4c03-440b-921d-e06be921c00f\" />\n\n<img width=\"1511\" height=\"851\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/3d274321-b65d-4368-af40-d530c86f257a\" />\n\n<img width=\"1471\" height=\"828\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/e27e1e85-a085-473d-a7cf-7491cb293226\" />\n\n<img width=\"1486\" height=\"836\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/ce3c3a2e-cad5-4e23-baf0-d8546338d550\" />\n\n<img width=\"1549\" height=\"872\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/16bf1c3c-46e6-45e7-aa31-7f07aa142334\" />\n\n<img width=\"1516\" height=\"852\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/c701d87d-e3a2-4980-ba4b-726c59e30f2e\" />\n\n\n\n\n\nCONCLUSION\n\nThis study describes an effective Ultra light weight RFID Secure protocol with mutual authentication that is\nintegrated into a tire data monitoring system. TPMSs are one of the built-in wireless automotive networks\nwhich are integrated into novel electric vehicles (EVs)\nThis paper assesses the venerable area in tire pressure monitoring systems by experimentally evaluating\nrepresentatives. Our study shows that spoofing attack can disable the normal operation of the tire monitoring\nsystem.\n\n\n\nFUTURE SCOPE\n\nIt is seen that the authentication methodology of the proposed method is cost effective in terms of storage,\ncomputation, and communication. Finally, we present a secure block chain-based mutual authentication for\nintegration in the EVs network",
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      "title": "Car-Hacking Dataset",
      "full_name": "JehadAlyateem/Car-Hacking-Dataset",
      "name": "Car-Hacking-Dataset",
      "owner": "JehadAlyateem",
      "url": "https://github.com/JehadAlyateem/Car-Hacking-Dataset",
      "description": "This repository contains the Car-Hacking Dataset: CAN-bus traffic captured from a real vehicle while message-injection attacks were performed. The dataset was collected to support research on in-vehicle network intrusion detection and contains labeled normal and injected (attack) messages for several attack types.",
      "readme": "# Car-Hacking Dataset\n\nThis repository contains the **Car-Hacking Dataset** for intrusion detection in Controller Area Network (CAN) based in-vehicle networks. The dataset was originally provided by the Korea University **Cyber Security & Privacy Lab** and is made publicly available to foster research in automotive security.\n\n## Abstract\n\nAs modern vehicles have lots of connectivity, protecting in-vehicle network from cyber‑attacks becomes an important issue. Controller Area Network (CAN) is a de facto standard for the in‑vehicle network. But, lack of security features of CAN protocol makes vehicles vulnerable to attacks. The message injection attack is a representative attack type which injects fabricated messages to deceive original ECUs or cause malfunctions. Thus we open our datasets to the public to foster further car security research.\n\n## Dataset Description\n\nThe datasets were constructed by logging CAN traffic via the OBD‑II port from a real vehicle while performing message injection attacks. Each dataset contains **300 intrusions** of a specific attack type, each intrusion lasting 3 to 5 seconds. The total recording time for each attack dataset is approximately 30–40 minutes.\n\n### Data Attributes\n\nEach file (except the normal run) contains the following columns:\n\n| Column        | Description                                                      |\n|---------------|------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| Timestamp     | Recorded time in seconds                                         |\n| CAN ID        | Identifier of the CAN message in hexadecimal (e.g., `043f`)     |\n| DLC           | Data length code (number of data bytes, 0–8)                    |\n| DATA[0]–DATA[7] | Data values (bytes)                                            |\n| Flag          | `T` for injected (attack) messages, `R` for normal messages     |\n\nThe normal run file (`normal_run_data.txt`) does **not** contain a `Flag` column because all messages are normal.\n\n### Attack Types\n\n- **DoS Attack** – Injects messages with CAN ID `0000` (the most dominant ID) every 0.3 milliseconds.\n- **Fuzzy Attack** – Injects messages with random CAN ID and random DATA values every 0.5 milliseconds.\n- **Spoofing the drive gear** – Injects messages with a CAN ID related to gear information every 1 millisecond.\n- **Spoofing the RPM gauge** – Injects messages with a CAN ID related to RPM information every 1 millisecond.\n- **Attack-free (normal)** – Regular driving data without any injected messages.\n\n## File List\n\nDue to GitHub's file size limits, the dataset has been split into two ZIP archives. Download both parts and extract them to obtain the individual CSV files.\n\n### `Car-Hacking-Dataset-1.zip`\nContains the following files:\n\n| File Name               | Size     | Description                             |\n|-------------------------|----------|-----------------------------------------|\n| `DoS_dataset.csv`       | ~190 MB  | DoS attack CAN traffic                  |\n| `Fuzzy_dataset.csv`     | ~198 MB  | Fuzzy attack CAN traffic                 |\n| `normal_run_data.txt`   | ~87 MB   | Attack‑free (normal) driving data       |\n\n### `Car-Hacking-Dataset-2.zip`\nContains the following files:\n\n| File Name               | Size     | Description                             |\n|-------------------------|----------|-----------------------------------------|\n| `gear_dataset.csv`      | ~230 MB  | Spoofing the drive gear attack traffic   |\n| `RPM_dataset.csv`       | ~239 MB  | Spoofing the RPM gauge attack traffic    |\n\n*File sizes are approximate and may vary slightly.*\n\n## Dataset Overview\n\nThe following table summarises the number of messages in each dataset:\n\n| ATTACK TYPE               | # OF MESSAGES | # OF NORMAL MESSAGES | # OF INJECTED MESSAGES |\n|---------------------------|---------------|----------------------|-------------------------|\n| DoS Attack                | 3,665,771     | 3,078,250            | 587,521                 |\n| Fuzzy Attack              | 3,838,860     | 3,347,013            | 491,847                 |\n| Spoofing the drive gear   | 4,443,142     | 3,845,890            | 597,252                 |\n| Spoofing the RPM gauze    | 4,621,702     | 3,966,805            | 654,897                 |\n| GIDS: Attack-free (normal)| 988,987       | 988,872              | -                       |\n\n*Note: The normal dataset does not contain injected messages, hence the `-` in the last column.*\n\n## Source & Original Publication\n\nThis dataset was originally published by the **Cyber Security & Privacy Lab** at Korea University.\nFor more details, please visit the official page:\n[https://ocslab.hksecurity.net/Datasets/car-hacking-dataset](https://ocslab.hksecurity.net/Datasets/car-hacking-dataset)\n\nIf you use this dataset in your research, please cite the following paper:\n\n> Song, Hyun Min, Jiyoung Woo, and Huy Kang Kim. \"In-vehicle network intrusion detection using deep convolutional neural network.\" *Vehicular Communications* 21 (2020): 100198.\n\nYou may also consider citing the earlier conference version:\n\n> Seo, Eunbi, Hyun Min Song, and Huy Kang Kim. \"GIDS: GAN based Intrusion Detection System for In-Vehicle Network.\" *2018 16th Annual Conference on Privacy, Security and Trust (PST)*. IEEE, 2018.\n\n**Correction note:** Some numbers in Table 2 of the PST version were corrected in the arXiv version. Please refer to the arXiv paper for the most accurate statistics.\n\n### BibTeX Entries\n\n```bibtex\n@article{song2020vehicle,\n  title={In-vehicle network intrusion detection using deep convolutional neural network},\n  author={Song, Hyun Min and Woo, Jiyoung and Kim, Huy Kang},\n  journal={Vehicular Communications},\n  volume={21},\n  pages={100198},\n  year={2020},\n  publisher={Elsevier}\n}\n\n@inproceedings{seo2018gids,\n  title={GIDS: GAN based Intrusion Detection System for In-Vehicle Network},\n  author={Seo, Eunbi and Song, Hyun Min and Kim, Huy Kang},\n  booktitle={2018 16th Annual Conference on Privacy, Security and Trust (PST)},\n  pages={1--6},\n  year={2018},\n  organization={IEEE}\n}\n```",
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      "title": "Cybersecurity of Navigation & Positioning Systems in Autonomous Vehicles",
      "full_name": "Eng-Ghanem/Navigation_and_Positioning_Systems_Autonomous_Vehicles_Project",
      "name": "Navigation_and_Positioning_Systems_Autonomous_Vehicles_Project",
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      "description": "This project looks at the cybersecurity risks facing vehicle navigation systems, which have become a core part of modern transportation infrastructure. The focus is on four main areas: GPS spoofing, sensor-level attacks, encryption weaknesses, and insecure communication protocols.",
      "readme": "# Cybersecurity of Navigation & Positioning Systems in Autonomous Vehicles\n\nA comprehensive technical study and vulnerability analysis evaluating the cybersecurity risks facing Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS), multi-sensor localization architectures, and Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) communication channels in modern autonomous and connected vehicles.\n\n---\n\n## Table of Contents\n\n- [Executive Summary](#executive-summary)\n- [Core Vulnerability Taxonomy](#core-vulnerability-taxonomy)\n- [Research Focus Areas](#research-focus-areas)\n- [Defense & Resilient Architecture Strategies](#defense--resilient-architecture-strategies)\n- [Repository Artifacts](#repository-artifacts)\n- [Primary References & Deliverables](#primary-references--deliverables)\n- [Author](#author)\n\n---\n\n## Executive Summary\n\nCivilian Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) signals—including GPS (USA), GLONASS (Russia), Galileo (EU), and BeiDou (China)—are broadcast without cryptographic authentication. Arriving at Earth receivers with an extremely low signal power level of approximately **$-130\\text{ dBm}$** (billions of times weaker than standard Wi-Fi), civilian satellite positioning signals are inherently susceptible to radio-frequency (RF) jamming, intentional replay, and adversarial spoofing attacks.\n\nAs modern autonomous vehicles fuse GNSS positioning with onboard perceptual sensors (LiDAR, Radar, Cameras, and IMUs) and external communication networks (V2X, DSRC, 5G-V2X, and In-Vehicle CAN networks), safety-critical navigation systems face a significantly broadened cyber-physical attack surface.\n\n---\n\n## Core Vulnerability Taxonomy\n\n```mermaid\nflowchart TD\n    subgraph Attacks [\"Cyber-Physical Threat Vectors\"]\n        A1[\"GNSS RF Spoofing & Jamming\"]\n        A2[\"Sensor-Level Adversarial Attacks\"]\n        A3[\"V2X & Wireless Protocol Exploits\"]\n        A4[\"In-Vehicle CAN Bus Injection\"]\n    end\n\n    subgraph Fusion [\"Vehicle Localization & Sensor Fusion\"]\n        EKF[\"Multi-Sensor Fusion (EKF / UKF)\"]\n        Sensors[\"LiDAR / Radar / Cameras / IMU\"]\n        GNSS[\"Civilian GNSS Receiver (-130 dBm)\"]\n        GNSS --> EKF\n        Sensors --> EKF\n    end\n\n    subgraph Defense [\"Mitigation & Resilient Architectures\"]\n        D1[\"Cryptographic Auth (Galileo OSNMA)\"]\n        D2[\"Sensor Consistency Checks & Residual Monitoring\"]\n        D3[\"Multi-Constellation GNSS Redundancy\"]\n        D4[\"Secure CAN & V2X PKI Verification\"]\n    end\n\n    A1 -.->|False Pseudo-ranges| GNSS\n    A2 -.->|Laser/Optical Interference| Sensors\n    A3 -.->|Spoofed Telemetry| EKF\n    A4 -.->|Malicious Control Frames| EKF\n\n    D1 ==> GNSS\n    D2 ==> EKF\n    D3 ==> GNSS\n    D4 ==> Fusion\n```\n\n---\n\n## Research Focus Areas\n\n### 1. GNSS & Satellite Positioning Vulnerabilities\n- **Signal Weakness**: Atmospheric attenuation resulting in $\\approx -130\\text{ dBm}$ incident power at the antenna.\n- **Unauthenticated Civilian Broadcasts**: Absence of cryptographic signatures on civilian L1/E1 bands, permitting low-cost Software-Defined Radios (SDRs like HackRF/BladeRF) to transmit fraudulent ephemeris and pseudo-range signals.\n- **Attack Manifestations**: Position spoofing (inducing trajectory divergence) and time-synchronization attacks (disrupting coordinated sensor timestamping).\n\n### 2. Sensor-Level Cyber-Physical Attacks\n- **Optical & Camera Interference**: Optical blinding, laser dazzling, and adversarial patch attacks misleading visual odometry and object detection.\n- **LiDAR & Radar Jamming**: Photodiode saturation and acoustic/RF echo spoofing altering perceived obstacle distance and road boundaries.\n- **Inertial Drift Exploitation**: Gradual GPS drift injection designed to evade threshold-based IMU consistency monitors.\n\n### 3. Communication Networks (V2X & In-Vehicle CAN)\n- **V2X Channels**: Exploitation of unauthenticated Basic Safety Messages (BSMs), Sybil attacks, and message injection across Dedicated Short-Range Communications (DSRC) and Cellular-V2X (C-V2X).\n- **In-Vehicle Networks**: Controller Area Network (CAN) bus vulnerabilities, including lack of payload encryption and bus arbitration vulnerabilities enabling frame spoofing.\n\n---\n\n## Defense & Resilient Architecture Strategies\n\n1. **Cryptographic Signal Verification**:\n   - Adoption of **Galileo Open Service Navigation Message Authentication (OSNMA)** and Chips-out-of-Band authentication to verify signal origin.\n2. **Kalman Filter Innovation / Residual Monitoring**:\n   - Implementation of statistical fault-detection filters (Normalized Innovation Squared - NIS) to detect and reject sudden or unnatural sensor measurements.\n3. **Multi-Constellation & Multi-Frequency Receivers**:\n   - Cross-verifying positions across independent constellations (GPS L1/L5, Galileo E1/E5, BeiDou B1/B2) to detect single-frequency spoofing attempts.\n4. **Hardware-Anchored PKI for V2X**:\n   - Strict elliptic-curve cryptographic signing of all V2X communications using Hardware Security Modules (HSMs).\n\n---\n\n## Repository Artifacts\n\n```text\nNavigation_and_Positioning_Systems_Autonomous_Vehicles_Project/\n├── My_Report.pdf       # Comprehensive engineering research report and vulnerability analysis\n├── Presentaion.pdf     # Slide presentation breaking down cyber-physical threat vectors and defenses\n├── My_Vedio.mp4        # Presentation and walkthrough video\n└── README.md           # Research documentation overview\n```\n\n---\n\n## Primary References & Deliverables\n\n- Detailed Technical Report: [My_Report.pdf](My_Report.pdf)\n- Presentation Slide Deck: [Presentaion.pdf](Presentaion.pdf)\n- Video Presentation: [`My_Vedio.mp4`](My_Vedio.mp4)\n\n---\n\n## Author\n\n- **Mohamed Ghanem**\n  - **GitHub**: [Eng-Ghanem](https://github.com/Eng-Ghanem)\n  - **LinkedIn**: [Mohamed Ghanem](https://www.linkedin.com/in/mohamed-ghanem-88346538a)\n  - **Email**: [mohamed.ghanem26g@gmail.com](mailto:mohamed.ghanem26g@gmail.com)",
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      "readme": "# CAN-Bus-Intrusion-Detection-EV-\nA cybersecurity anomaly detection model that analyzes logs from the internal Controller Area Network (CAN) of an Electric Vehicle (EV), instantly flagging malicious packet injections to protect against cyber attacks.\nTitle:\n\nCAN Bus Intrusion Detection System for Electric Vehicles using Machine Learning\n\nAbstract:\n\nThis project focuses on developing an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) for the Controller Area Network (CAN) in Electric Vehicles (EVs). The system analyzes CAN bus logs and detects malicious packet injections using machine learning algorithms. Various models such as Logistic Regression, Decision Tree, and Random Forest are used to classify normal and attack data. The system improves vehicle cybersecurity by identifying anomalies in real-time.\n\nObjectives:\nTo understand CAN Bus communication\nTo detect anomalies in CAN messages\nTo build a machine learning-based IDS\nTo improve EV cybersecurity\nMethodology:\nData Collection (CAN dataset)\nData Preprocessing\nFeature Selection\nModel Training\nModel Evaluation\nDeployment of IDS system\n\nTools & Technologies:\nPython\nNumPy, Pandas\nScikit-learn\nMatplotlib, Seaborn\nResults:\nAchieved good accuracy in detecting malicious packets\nRandom Forest performed best\nSystem successfully identified abnormal CAN messages\n\n# Install required packages (run once)\n!pip install tensorflow scikit-learn pandas numpy matplotlib seaborn imbalanced-learn python-can\n\n# Core imports\nimport numpy as np\nimport pandas as pd\nimport matplotlib.pyplot as plt\nimport seaborn as sns\nfrom sklearn.ensemble import RandomForestClassifier\nfrom sklearn.preprocessing import StandardScaler, LabelEncoder\nfrom sklearn.model_selection import train_test_split\nfrom sklearn.metrics import classification_report, confusion_matrix, accuracy_score\nfrom imblearn.over_sampling import SMOTE\nimport tensorflow as tf\nfrom tensorflow.keras.models import Sequential, Model\nfrom tensorflow.keras.layers import SimpleRNN, LSTM, Dense, Dropout, Input\nfrom collections import Counter, deque\nimport warnings\nwarnings.filterwarnings('ignore')\n\nprint(\"✅ All imports loaded! Ready for CAN IDS training.\")\nprint(f\"TensorFlow version: {tf.__version__}\")\n\n\ndef generate_can_dataset(n_normal=50000, n_attacks=15000, save=True):\n    \"\"\"Generate realistic CAN bus dataset with attacks\"\"\"\n    np.random.seed(42)\n    data = []\n\n    # Normal traffic patterns (Engine RPM, Speed, Brake, etc.)\n    normal_ids = [0x180, 0x210, 0x280, 0x350, 0x3E0]  # Common ECU IDs\n    normal_patterns = {\n        0x180: lambda: np.array([1200 + np.random.randint(-50,50), 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0], dtype=np.uint8),\n        0x210: lambda: np.array([np.random.randint(0,255), 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0], dtype=np.uint8),\n    }\n\n    # Generate normal traffic\n    for i in range(n_normal):\n        timestamp = i * 0.01 + np.random.normal(0, 0.001)\n        can_id = np.random.choice(normal_ids, p=[0.3, 0x25, 0x2, 0x2, 0x15])\n        dlc = 8\n        data_bytes = normal_patterns.get(can_id, lambda: np.random.randint(0, 256, 8, dtype=np.uint8))()\n\n        data.append({\n            'Timestamp': timestamp,\n            'ID': can_id,\n            'DLC': dlc,\n            'Data': data_bytes.tolist(),\n            'Label': 0  # Normal\n        })\n\n    # Attack traffic (DoS, Fuzzy, Impersonation)\n    attack_types = ['DoS', 'Fuzzy', 'Impersonation']\n    for i, attack_type in enumerate(['DoS']*5000 + ['Fuzzy']*6000 + ['Impersonation']*4000):\n        timestamp = n_normal * 0.01 + i * 0.005 + np.random.normal(0, 0.01)  # Irregular timing\n\n        if attack_type == 'DoS':\n            can_id = 0x180  # Flood engine RPM ID\n            data_bytes = [255]*8\n        elif attack_type == 'Fuzzy':\n            can_id = np.random.randint(0x100, 0x500)\n            data_bytes = np.random.randint(0, 256, 8, dtype=np.uint8)\n        else:  # Impersonation\n            can_id = 0x180  # Spoof legitimate ID\n            data_bytes = [3000, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]  # Malicious RPM value\n\n        data.append({\n            'Timestamp': timestamp,\n            'ID': can_id,\n            'DLC': 8,\n            'Data': data_bytes.tolist(),\n            'Label': 1  # Attack\n        })\n\n    df = pd.DataFrame(data)\n    if save:\n        df.to_csv('can_dataset_full.csv', index=False)\n        print(f\"✅ Dataset saved: {len(df)} samples ({n_normal} normal, {n_attacks} attacks)\")\n\n    return df\n# Generate dataset\ndf = generate_can_dataset()\nprint(df.head())\nprint(df['Label'].value_counts())\ndef extract_can_features(df, window_size=50):\n    \"\"\"Extract comprehensive CAN bus features for IDS\"\"\"\n    features = pd.DataFrame()\n\n    # Basic features\n    features['ID'] = df['ID']\n    features['DLC'] = df['DLC']\n    features['Timestamp'] = df['Timestamp']\n\n    # 1. ID Frequency (DoS detection)\n    id_freq = df['ID'].rolling(window=window_size, min_periods=1).apply(\n        lambda x: Counter(x)[x.iloc[-1]]\n    )\n    features['ID_freq'] = id_freq.fillna(1)\n\n    # 2. Inter-arrival time (Timing attacks)\n    features['inter_arrival'] = features['Timestamp'].diff().fillna(0.01)\n\n    # 3. Payload statistical features\n    features['payload_mean'] = df['Data'].apply(lambda x: np.mean(x))\n    features['payload_std'] = df['Data'].apply(lambda x: np.std(x) if len(x)>1 else 0)\n    features['payload_max'] = df['Data'].apply(lambda x: np.max(x))\n    features['payload_entropy'] = df['Data'].apply(\n        lambda x: -sum((c/len(x)*np.log2(c/len(x)) for c in Counter(x).values() if c>0))\n    )\n\n    # 4. Hamming distance between consecutive payloads\n    def hamming_distance(data_list):\n        distances = [0]  # First frame\n        for i in range(1, len(data_list)):\n            d1, d2 = data_list.iloc[i-1], data_list.iloc[i]\n            dist = sum(b1 != b2 for b1, b2 in zip(d1[:8], d2[:8]))\n            distances.append(dist)\n        return distances\n\n    features['hamming_dist'] = hamming_distance(df['Data'])\n\n    # 5. Payload byte-wise statistics\n    for i in range(8):\n        features[f'byte_{i}_mean'] = df['Data'].apply(lambda x: x[i] if len(x)>i else 0)\n\n    return features.fillna(method='ffill').fillna(0)\n# Extract features\nprint(\"🔄 Extracting features...\")\nfeature_df = extract_can_features(df)\nprint(feature_df.head())\nprint(f\"Features created: {feature_df.shape[1]}\")\ndef create_sequences(features, labels, window_size=50, stride=10):\n    \"\"\"Create sliding windows for sequential models\"\"\"\n    X, y = [], []\n\n    for i in range(0, len(features) - window_size, stride):\n        # Extract window\n        window_features = features.iloc[i:i+window_size].drop(['ID', 'Timestamp'], axis=1).values\n        # Label is majority vote in window\n        window_labels = labels.iloc[i:i+window_size]\n        window_label = 1 if window_labels.sum() > window_size/2 else 0\n\n        X.append(window_features)\n        y.append(window_label)\n\n    return np.array(X), np.array(y)\n# Prepare sequences\nWINDOW_SIZE = 50\nX, y = create_sequences(feature_df, df['Label'], window_size=WINDOW_SIZE)\nprint(f\"✅ Sequences created: X.shape={X.shape}, y.shape={y.shape}\")\nprint(f\"Class distribution: {np.bincount(y)}\")\nclass RLRFGuard:\n    def __init__(self, window_size=WINDOW_SIZE, n_features=X.shape[2]):\n        self.window_size = window_size\n        self.n_features = n_features\n        self.rnn_lstm_model = None\n        self.rf_classifier = None\n        self.scaler = StandardScaler()\n\n    def build_rnn_lstm(self):\n        \"\"\"RNN + LSTM feature extractor\"\"\"\n        model = Sequential([\n            # RNN layer for short-term patterns\n            SimpleRNN(64, return_sequences=True, input_shape=(self.window_size, self.n_features)),\n            Dropout(0.2),\n\n            # LSTM layers for long-term dependencies\n            LSTM(128, return_sequences=True),\n            Dropout(0.2),\n            LSTM(64, return_sequences=False),\n\n            # Feature projection\n            Dense(32, activation='relu'),\n            Dropout(0.3)\n        ])\n\n        model.compile(optimizer='adam', loss='mse')\n        return model\n\n    def prepare_features(self, X):\n        \"\"\"Scale and reshape features\"\"\"\n        X_scaled = self.scaler.fit_transform(X.reshape(-1, X.shape[-1])).reshape(X.shape)\n        return X_scaled\n\n    def train(self, X_train, X_test, y_train, y_test):\n        \"\"\"Train hybrid RL-RF model\"\"\"\n        print(\"🚀 Training RL-RF Guard...\")\n\n        # Prepare features\n        X_train_scaled = self.prepare_features(X_train)\n        X_test_scaled = self.scaler.transform(X_test.reshape(-1, X_test.shape[-1])).reshape(X_test.shape)\n\n        # Build and train RNN-LSTM feature extractor\n        print(\"📡 Training RNN-LSTM feature extractor...\")\n        self.rnn_lstm_model = self.build_rnn_lstm()\n        rnn_features_train = self.rnn_lstm_model.fit(\n            X_train_scaled, X_train_scaled,  # Self-supervised\n            epochs=20, batch_size=64, verbose=1,\n            validation_split=0.2\n        ).model.predict(X_train_scaled, verbose=0)\n\n        rnn_features_test = self.rnn_lstm_model.predict(X_test_scaled, verbose=0)\n\n        # Train Random Forest classifier\n        print(\"🌲 Training Random Forest classifier...\")\n        self.rf_classifier = RandomForestClassifier(\n            n_estimators=200, max_depth=15, random_state=42, n_jobs=-1\n        )\n        self.rf_classifier.fit(rnn_features_train, y_train)\n\n        # Evaluate\n        y_pred = self.rf_classifier.predict(rnn_features_test)\n        accuracy = accuracy_score(y_test, y_pred)\n\n        print(f\"\\n🎯 Final Accuracy: {accuracy:.4f}\")\n        print(\"\\n📊 Classification Report:\")\n        print(classification_report(y_test, y_pred))\n\n        return accuracy\n\n    def predict_stream(self, can_frame):\n        \"\"\"Real-time prediction for single frame\"\"\"\n        # Convert single frame to window format (simplified)\n        features = extract_can_features(pd.DataFrame([can_frame])).iloc[0:1]\n        window = create_sequences(features, [0], window_size=1)[0]\n        window_scaled = self.scaler.transform(window.reshape(-1, window.shape[-1])).reshape(window.shape)\n        rnn_features = self.rnn_lstm_model.predict(window_scaled, verbose=0)\n        return self.rf_classifier.predict_proba(rnn_features)[0, 1] > 0.7\n# Split data\nX_train, X_test, y_train, y_test = train_test_split(X, y, test_size=0.2, random_state=42, stratify=y)\n# Initialize and train model\nmodel = RLRFGuard()\naccuracy = model.train(X_train, X_test, y_train, y_test)\n# Confusion Matrix\ny_pred = model.rf_classifier.predict(model.rnn_lstm_model.predict(X_test[:1000], verbose=0))\ncm = confusion_matrix(y_test[:1000], y_pred)\nplt.figure(figsize=(12, 5))\nplt.subplot(1, 2, 1)\nsns.heatmap(cm, annot=True, fmt='d', cmap='Blues')\nplt.title('Confusion Matrix')\nplt.ylabel('True Label')\nplt.xlabel('Predicted Label')\n# Feature Importance\nplt.subplot(1, 2, 2)\nimportances = model.rf_classifier.feature_importances_\nindices = np.argsort(importances)[::-1][:10]\nplt.bar(range(10), importances[indices])\nplt.title('Top 10 Feature Importances')\nplt.xticks(range(10), [f'F{i}' for i in indices], rotation=45)\nplt.tight_layout()\nplt.show()\nprint(\"✅ Model training complete! Accuracy:\", accuracy)\ndef simulate_real_time_detection(model, num_frames=200):\n    \"\"\"Simulate live CAN bus monitoring\"\"\"\n    recent_windows = deque(maxlen=50)\n    alerts = []\n\n    print(\"🛡️ REAL-TIME CAN BUS MONITORING (200 frames)\")\n    print(\"═\" * 60)\n\n    for i in range(num_frames):\n        # Simulate incoming CAN frame\n        if i < 150:  # Normal traffic\n            can_id = np.random.choice([0x180, 0x210, 0x280])\n            data = np.random.randint(0, 200, 8)\n            label = 0\n        else:  # Attack injection\n            can_id = 0x180\n            data = [255]*8\n            label = 1\n\n        frame = {\n            'Timestamp': i*0.01,\n            'ID': can_id,\n            'DLC': 8,\n            'Data': data.tolist(),\n            'Label': label\n        }\n\n        recent_windows.append(frame)\n\n        if len(recent_windows) == 50:\n            # Real-time prediction\n            window_df = pd.DataFrame(recent_windows)\n            window_features = extract_can_features(window_df)\n            X_window, _ = create_sequences(window_features, window_df['Label'], window_size=50)\n\n            if len(X_window) > 0:\n                pred_prob = model.predict_stream(frame)\n                if pred_prob:\n                    alerts.append(i)\n                    print(f\"🚨 ALERT #{len(alerts)} at frame {i}: Attack detected! (Prob: {pred_prob:.2f})\")\n                else:\n                    print(f\"✅ Frame {i}: Normal traffic\", end='\\r')\n\n    print(f\"\\n📈 Summary: {len(alerts)} alerts triggered out of {num_frames} frames\")\n    return alerts\n# Run real-time demo\nalerts = simulate_real_time_detection(model)\n# Save complete model for production\nmodel.rnn_lstm_model.save('can_ids_rnn_lstm.h5')\nimport joblib\njoblib.dump(model.rf_classifier, 'can_ids_rf.pkl')\njoblib.dump(model.scaler, 'can_ids_scaler.pkl')\nprint(\"💾 Model saved for deployment!\")\nprint(\"\"\"\n🚀 DEPLOYMENT INSTRUCTIONS:\n1. Edge device (Raspberry Pi/ECU):\n```bash\npip install tensorflow-lite scikit-learn joblib\npython deploy_can_ids.py\nimport can\nbus = can.interface.Bus('vcan0', bustype='socketcan')\nfor msg in bus:\n    frame = {'ID': msg.arbitration_id, 'Data': list(msg.data), ...}\n    if model.predict_stream(frame):\n        print(\"INTRUSION DETECTED!\")\n## Cell 9: Performance Summary Dashboard\n```python\n# Final dashboard\nfig, axes = plt.subplots(2, 2, figsize=(15, 10))\n# ROC-like visualization (simplified)\ntest_probs = model.rf_classifier.predict_proba(\n    model.rnn_lstm_model.predict(X_test[:5000], verbose=0)\n)[:, 1]\naxes[0,0].hist(test_probs[y_test[:5000]==0], bins=50, alpha=0.7, label='Normal', color='green')\naxes[0,0].hist(test_probs[y_test[:5000]==1], bins=50, alpha=0.7, label='Attack', color='red')\naxes[0,0].set_title('Prediction Probability Distribution')\naxes[0,0].legend()\n# Attack type analysis\naxes[0,1].pie([35000, 25000, 15000], labels=['Normal', 'DoS', 'Fuzzy/Impersonation'], autopct='%1.1f%%')\naxes[0,1].set_title('Dataset Composition')\n# Feature correlation heatmap (top features)\ncorr_matrix = pd.DataFrame(X_test[0]).corr()\nsns.heatmap(corr_matrix, annot=False, cmap='coolwarm', ax=axes[1,0])\naxes[1,0].set_title('Feature Correlation Heatmap')\n# Alert timeline\naxes[1,1].plot(alerts, np.ones(len(alerts)), 'ro-', markersize=8)\naxes[1,1].set_title('Real-time Alerts Timeline')\naxes[1,1].set_xlabel('Frame Number')\naxes[1,1].set_ylabel('Alert Triggered')\nplt.suptitle('🚗 CAN Bus IDS - RL-RF Guard Dashboard', fontsize=16, y=0.98)\nplt.tight_layout()\nplt.show()\nprint(\"🎉 PROJECT COMPLETE!\")\nprint(\"✅ Full RL-RF Guard implementation ready for EV deployment\")\nprint(\"📊 98% accuracy achieved on synthetic + real-world CAN patterns\")",
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      "description": "A cybersecurity anomaly detection model that analyzes logs from the internal Controller Area Network (CAN) of an Electric Vehicle (EV), instantly flagging malicious packet injections to protect against cyber attacks.",
      "readme": "# CAN-Bus-Intrusion-Detection\nA cybersecurity anomaly detection model that analyzes logs from the internal Controller Area Network (CAN) of an Electric Vehicle (EV), instantly flagging malicious packet injections to protect against cyber attacks.\nCAN Bus Intrusion Detection System*\nA cybersecurity model that detects malicious packet injections in Electric Vehicle (EV) Controller Area Networks (CAN) using anomaly detection.\n\n- Analyzes CAN logs for suspicious activity\n- Flags potential cyber attacks in real-time\n- Built with machine learning for robust detection\n\nTitle:\n\nCAN Bus Intrusion Detection System for Electric Vehicles using Machine Learning\n\nAbstract:\n\nThis project focuses on developing an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) for the Controller Area Network (CAN) in Electric Vehicles (EVs). The system analyzes CAN bus logs and detects malicious packet injections using machine learning algorithms. Various models such as Logistic Regression, Decision Tree, and Random Forest are used to classify normal and attack data. The system improves vehicle cybersecurity by identifying anomalies in real-time.\n\nObjectives:\nTo understand CAN Bus communication\nTo detect anomalies in CAN messages\nTo build a machine learning-based IDS\nTo improve EV cybersecurity\nMethodology:\nData Collection (CAN dataset)\nData Preprocessing\nFeature Selection\nModel Training\nModel Evaluation\nDeployment of IDS system\n\nTools & Technologies:\nPython\nNumPy, Pandas\nScikit-learn\nMatplotlib, Seaborn\nResults:\nAchieved good accuracy in detecting malicious packets\nRandom Forest performed best\nSystem successfully identified abnormal CAN messages",
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    "anushka-chaudhary16/automotive-can-ids": {
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      "evidence_type": "repository",
      "record_type": "repository",
      "title": "CAN Bus Intrusion Detection System",
      "full_name": "anushka-chaudhary16/automotive-can-ids",
      "name": "automotive-can-ids",
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      "description": "Real-time CAN Bus Intrusion Detection System using Deep Learning (1D-CNN, Bi-LSTM, CNN-LSTM). Achieves 99.75% accuracy on Car-Hacking Dataset. Includes Streamlit dashboard, CLI tools, and full ML pipeline with CI/CD.",
      "readme": "# CAN Bus Intrusion Detection System\n\n[![Python](https://img.shields.io/badge/Python-3.10%2B-blue?logo=python)](https://python.org)\n[![TensorFlow](https://img.shields.io/badge/TensorFlow-2.13-orange?logo=tensorflow)](https://tensorflow.org)\n[![License](https://img.shields.io/badge/License-MIT-green)](LICENSE)\n[![CI](https://github.com/anushka-chaudhary16/automotive-can-ids/actions/workflows/ci.yml/badge.svg)](https://github.com/anushka-chaudhary16/automotive-can-ids/actions/workflows/ci.yml)\n\n> **Real-time anomaly detection for automotive Controller Area Network (CAN) using Deep Learning**\n> Binary & Multiclass classification • Sliding-window inference • Streamlit dashboard • 99.75% Accuracy\n\n---\n\n## 🎯 Problem Statement\n\nModern vehicles contain 50–100 ECUs communicating over CAN bus — a protocol **designed without authentication or encryption**. Attackers with physical or remote access can inject malicious frames (DoS, Fuzzing, Spoofing) causing unintended acceleration, braking, or steering behavior.\n\nThis project implements a **production-grade ML pipeline** to detect such intrusions in real-time from raw CAN traffic.\n\n---\n\n## 🏗️ Architecture\n\n```mermaid\nflowchart LR\n    A[Raw CAN Logs\\nCSV/PCAP] --> B[Preprocessing\\nHex→Int, Labeling]\n    B --> C[Feature Engineering\\nSliding Windows\\n50 msg / stride 25]\n    C --> D[Deep Learning Models]\n    D --> D1[1D-CNN]\n    D --> D2[Bi-LSTM]\n    D --> D3[CNN-LSTM Hybrid]\n    D --> E[Real-Time Inference\\nAlert Logic: NORMAL/WARNING/CRITICAL]\n    E --> F[Streamlit Dashboard\\nLive Probability Charts]\n    E --> G[CLI Simulation\\nBatch Analysis]\n```\n\n**Pipeline Stages:**\n| Stage | Module | Key Responsibility |\n|-------|--------|-------------------|\n| **Ingestion** | `src/data/loader.py` | Car-Hacking, OTIDS, Survival datasets |\n| **Preprocessing** | `src/data/preprocessor.py` | Hex→Int, timestamp sorting, binary/multiclass labels |\n| **Windowing** | `src/data/feature_engineer.py` | Sliding windows (50, stride 25), statistical features |\n| **Modeling** | `src/models/*.py` | CNN, Bi-LSTM, CNN-LSTM with BatchNorm + Dropout |\n| **Training** | `src/training/trainer.py` | Stratified splits, class weights, callbacks (ES, CP, LR) |\n| **Inference** | `src/inference/predictor.py` | Ring buffer, scaler, consecutive-alert logic |\n| **Evaluation** | `src/utils/metrics.py` | Confusion matrix, ROC, classification report, plots |\n\n---\n\n## 📊 Results (Car-Hacking Dataset)\n\n| Model | Accuracy | Precision | Recall | F1 | AUC-ROC | Params |\n|-------|----------|-----------|--------|-----|---------|--------|\n| **Bi-LSTM** | **99.75%** | **99.75%** | **99.75%** | **99.75%** | **0.9998** | 316K |\n| CNN-LSTM | 99.62% | 99.61% | 99.62% | 99.61% | 0.9996 | 412K |\n| 1D-CNN | 99.41% | 99.40% | 99.41% | 99.40% | 0.9992 | 287K |\n\n> **Best Model**: Bi-LSTM (`models/bilstm_can_ids/best_model.keras`) — trained on 702K windows (17.5M raw frames), 30 epochs, class-weighted binary cross-entropy.\n\n### Per-Attack Breakdown (Binary: Normal vs Attack)\n\n| Attack Type | Recall | Precision | F1-Score | FPR | FNR | AUC-ROC |\n|-------------|--------|-----------|----------|-----|-----|---------|\n| **DoS** | 0.9983 | 0.9981 | 0.9982 | 0.0018 | 0.0017 | 0.9997 |\n| **Fuzzy** | 0.9968 | 0.9962 | 0.9965 | 0.0035 | 0.0032 | 0.9993 |\n| **Gear** | 0.9980 | 0.9976 | 0.9978 | 0.0022 | 0.0020 | 0.9996 |\n| **RPM** | 0.9977 | 0.9973 | 0.9975 | 0.0025 | 0.0023 | 0.9995 |\n\n### Adversarial Robustness\n\n| Adversarial Scenario | F1-Score | Δ from Baseline |\n|----------------------|----------|-----------------|\n| Baseline (clean) | 0.9982 | — |\n| Feature noise (σ=0.1) | 0.9971 | -0.0011 |\n| Payload corruption (2% bytes) | 0.9958 | -0.0024 |\n| Timing shift (±5 msgs) | 0.9965 | -0.0017 |\n\n> The model degrades gracefully under perturbations, maintaining >99.5% F1 even with 2% payload corruption.\n\n### Confusion Matrix (Bi-LSTM, Aggregate)\n![Confusion Matrix](reports/figures/bilstm_can_ids_cm.png)\n\n### Training Curves\n| Accuracy / Loss | Precision / Recall |\n|----------------|-------------------|\n| ![Acc/Loss](reports/figures/training_accuracy_loss.png) | ![Prec/Rec](reports/figures/training_precision_recall.png) |\n\n---\n\n## ⚡ Real-Time Benchmarking (Intel i7, CPU-only)\n\n| Metric | Value |\n|--------|-------|\n| **Throughput (batched, 32)** | 27,204 msg/sec |\n| **Avg latency/msg (batched)** | 0.037 ms |\n| **Avg latency/window (50 msgs)** | 1.84 ms |\n| **Model size** | 3.69 MB |\n| **Peak Memory** | 462 MB |\n| **CPU (batched)** | 93% |\n\n> **Real-time feasible**: 54× headroom over 500 Hz CAN bus (required < 2 ms/msg, achieved 0.037 ms/msg batched). Single-stream latency ~1.8 ms/window meets requirement.\n\n---\n\n## 🚀 Quick Start\n\n### Prerequisites\n- Python 3.10+\n- (Optional) NVIDIA GPU for training\n\n### Installation\n```bash\n# Clone\ngit clone https://github.com/anushka-chaudhary16/automotive-can-ids.git\ncd automotive-can-ids\n\n# Create environment\npython -m venv .venv\nsource .venv/bin/activate  # Windows: .venv\\Scripts\\activate\n\n# Install dependencies\npip install -r requirements.txt\n# For development: pip install -r requirements-dev.txt\n```\n\n### Download Dataset\n```bash\n# Car-Hacking Dataset (place in data/raw/car_hacking/)\n# https://ocslab.hksecurity.net/Datasets/can-intrusion-dataset\n# Expected files: DoS_attack.csv, Fuzzy_attack.csv, gear_spoofing.csv, rpm_spoofing.csv, normal_run_data.csv\n```\n\n### Train a Model\n```bash\n# Quick train (5 epochs for testing)\npython -m scripts.train --model bilstm --epochs 5\n\n# Full training (uses config.yaml defaults)\npython -m scripts.train --model bilstm\n```\n\n### Run Real-Time Dashboard\n```bash\nstreamlit run dashboard/app.py\n```\nThen open `http://localhost:8501` — load the model and click **Start Simulation**.\n\n### CLI Batch Simulation\n```bash\npython -m scripts.simulate_realtime \\\n  --csv data/raw/car_hacking/DoS_attack.csv \\\n  --model models/bilstm_can_ids/best_model.keras \\\n  --scaler models/scaler.pkl\n```\n\n### Evaluate on Test Set\n```bash\npython -m scripts.evaluate --model bilstm\n# Outputs: reports/bilstm_can_ids_metrics.csv + figures/\n```\n\n### Benchmark Inference\n```bash\npython -m scripts.benchmark\n```\n\n---\n\n## 📁 Project Structure\n\n```\nautomotive-can-ids/\n├── data/\n│   ├── raw/                 # Original CSV datasets (gitignored)\n│   └── processed/           # Generated .npy/.pkl (gitignored)\n├── dashboard/\n│   └── app.py               # Streamlit real-time dashboard\n├── docs/\n│   └── architecture.md      # Detailed design decisions\n├── models/\n│   └── bilstm_can_ids/      # Best model + scaler\n│       ├── best_model.keras\n│       └── scaler.pkl\n├── notebooks/\n│   ├── 01_eda.ipynb\n│   ├── 02_preprocessing.ipynb\n│   ├── 03_feature_engineering.ipynb\n│   ├── 04_model_cnn.ipynb\n│   ├── 05_model_lstm.ipynb\n│   ├── 06_model_cnn_lstm.ipynb\n│   └── 07_evaluation.ipynb\n├── reports/\n│   ├── figures/             # Generated plots\n│   └── *.csv                # Metrics tables\n├── scripts/\n│   ├── train.py             # CLI training\n│   ├── evaluate.py          # CLI evaluation\n│   ├── simulate_realtime.py # CLI batch inference\n│   └── benchmark.py         # Inference benchmarking\n├── src/\n│   ├── data/\n│   │   ├── loader.py\n│   │   ├── preprocessor.py\n│   │   └── feature_engineer.py\n│   ├── inference/\n│   │   └── predictor.py\n│   ├── models/\n│   │   ├── cnn.py\n│   │   ├── lstm.py\n│   │   └── cnn_lstm.py\n│   ├── training/\n│   │   └── trainer.py\n│   └── utils/\n│       ├── config.py\n│       └── metrics.py\n├── tests/\n│   ├── test_preprocessor.py\n│   └── test_feature_engineer.py\n├── .github/workflows/ci.yml # CI pipeline\n├── config.yaml              # Centralized hyperparameters\n├── pyproject.toml           # Modern packaging\n├── requirements.txt         # Runtime deps\n├── requirements-dev.txt     # Dev deps (lint, test, type)\n├── Makefile                 # Common commands\n├── LICENSE                  # MIT\n└── README.md\n```\n\n---\n\n## 🔧 Configuration\n\nAll hyperparameters live in `config.yaml` — no magic numbers in code:\n\n```yaml\nmodels:\n  window_size: 50\n  stride: 25\n  num_features: 10        # CAN_ID + DLC + DATA[0-7]\n  sequence_length: 50\n\ntraining:\n  epochs: 30\n  batch_size: 256\n  learning_rate: 0.001\n  dropout_rate: 0.3\n  test_size: 0.2\n  val_size: 0.1\n```\n\n---\n\n## 🧪 Testing\n\n```bash\n# Run unit tests\npytest tests/ -v\n\n# Lint\nruff check src/\n\n# Type check\nmypy src/\n```\n\n---\n\n## 📦 Deployment Notes\n\n- **Model serving**: Export to ONNX/TFLite for ECU deployment\n- **Scaler**: `joblib.dump(scaler, 'scaler.pkl')` — must ship with model\n- **Latency**: ~1.8 ms/window (batched) on CPU (Intel i7), suitable for 500 Hz CAN\n- **Memory**: < 5 MB model + buffer\n\n---\n\n## 🛡️ Security Considerations\n\n- **Adversarial robustness**: Evaluated — model maintains >99.5% F1 under feature noise, payload corruption, timing shifts\n- **Data privacy**: Raw CAN logs never leave preprocessing pipeline\n- **Model integrity**: Verify checksums (`sha256sum models/bilstm_can_ids/best_model.keras`)\n- **False positive rate**: 0.18–0.35% per attack type (operationally acceptable for alert triage)\n\n---\n\n## 📚 References\n\n1. *Car-Hacking Dataset* — Hacking & Defending Vehicle Networks (OCS Lab)\n2. *OTIDS Dataset* — Open Dataset for CAN IDS (IEEE IV 2020)\n3. *Survival Analysis Dataset* — Time-to-compromise modeling\n4. *TensorFlow/Keras* — Model implementation\n5. *Streamlit* — Dashboard framework\n\n---\n\n## 🤝 Contributing\n\nSee [CONTRIBUTING.md](CONTRIBUTING.md) for guidelines.\n\n1. Fork → Branch → Commit → PR\n2. Run `make lint test` before pushing\n3. Update docs for any API changes\n\n---\n\n## 📄 License\n\nMIT License — see [LICENSE](LICENSE) for details.\n\n---\n\n## 👨‍💻 Author\n\n**Anushka Chaudhary**\nB.Tech Cybersecurity, Manipal University Jaipur\n[GitHub](https://github.com/anushka-chaudhary16) • [LinkedIn](https://linkedin.com/in/anushka-chaudhary16)\n\n> Built as a final-year capstone project demonstrating end-to-end ML engineering for automotive security.",
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      "readme": "# CyberMoto\n\n**An ISO/SAE 21434 cybersecurity lifecycle for a two-wheeler ECU, from threat analysis to post-production vulnerability monitoring, with traceability end to end.**\n\n[![CI](https://github.com/Vb-777/cybermoto/actions/workflows/ci.yml/badge.svg)](https://github.com/Vb-777/cybermoto/actions/workflows/ci.yml)\n![Python](https://img.shields.io/badge/python-3.11%2B-blue) ![ISO/SAE 21434](https://img.shields.io/badge/ISO%2FSAE-21434-0b7a94) ![UN R155](https://img.shields.io/badge/UN-R155-0b7a94) ![CycloneDX](https://img.shields.io/badge/SBOM-CycloneDX%201.5-orange) ![License](https://img.shields.io/badge/license-MIT-lightgrey)\n\nThe subject is a fictional **Smart Connectivity Unit (SCU)** for a motorcycle. It links the bike to the rider's phone over Bluetooth LE and to the OEM back-end over cellular (theft tracking, remote immobilise), talks to the engine ECU over CAN, offers UDS diagnostics to the workshop, and receives firmware updates over the air.\n\nOne command runs the whole V-model for two firmware builds and produces the work products a vehicle cybersecurity team actually writes:\n\n```mermaid\nflowchart LR\n    A[Item definition<br/>assets, interfaces] --> B[TARA<br/>damage, threats,<br/>attack feasibility, risk]\n    B --> C[Cybersecurity goals<br/>& claims]\n    C --> D[Cybersecurity<br/>requirements]\n    D --> E[Security test bench<br/>UDS ECU, fuzzing]\n    D --> F[SBOM + vulnerability<br/>triage + VEX]\n    E --> G[(Traceability matrix<br/>threat → goal → requirement → evidence)]\n    F --> G\n```\n\n## What it covers\n\n| Vehicle cybersecurity task | In this project | Output |\n|---|---|---|\n| **Developing cybersecurity specifications for vehicle programs** | TARA following ISO/SAE 21434 clause 15: assets, damage scenarios with safety/financial/operational/privacy impact, STRIDE threat scenarios with attack paths, attack feasibility (attack-potential approach), risk matrix, treatment decisions. Produces cybersecurity goals, claims and 12 requirements, mapped to UN R155 Annex 5 threat categories, with automatic consistency checks. | `cybersecurity_specification.md` |\n| **Cybersecurity evaluation and testing** | A simulated SCU diagnostic server (UDS / ISO 14229: sessions, SecurityAccess, Read/WriteDataByIdentifier, RequestDownload) in two builds. Eight requirement-based tests, including 3,000-case robustness fuzzing, run against both, with an evidence log of every request and response. | `test_report_fw1.0.md`, `test_report_fw1.1.md` |\n| **Investigating and analysing vulnerability information** | CycloneDX SBOM per build, matched against public advisories with version-range logic (including OpenSSL letter versions). Each match gets a context analysis: is the vulnerable code used, can attacker data reach it, which TARA threat it touches. It's recorded as a CycloneDX **VEX** decision and prioritised P1–P4. | `vulnerability_triage_fw*.md`, `sbom_fw*.cdx.json`, `vex_fw*.cdx.json` |\n| **Traceability and release decision** | Every threat traced to goal, requirement, verification method and result, per build. | `traceability_fw*.csv`, `SUMMARY.md` |\n\n## Results\n\n```\n$ cybermoto run\nfirmware v1.0: tests 1/8 passed, 2 exploitable CVE(s): CVE-2022-0778 P1, CVE-2018-25032 P3\nfirmware v1.1: tests 8/8 passed, 0 exploitable CVE(s)\nTARA: 7 threats, 0 consistency issue(s)\n```\n\n**Firmware v1.0** is a typical first build handed to security testing. The bench finds seven requirement violations:\n\n| Test | Requirement | v1.0 | v1.1 |\n|---|---|---|---|\n| T-03 | Seeds random, ≥ 64 bit, non-repeating | FAIL: same seed 50 times out of 50 | PASS |\n| T-04 | No replay of a key from an earlier seed | FAIL | PASS |\n| T-05 | Lockout after 3 invalid keys | FAIL: no attempt counter | PASS |\n| T-06 | VIN/odometer write needs extended session + unlock | FAIL: odometer writable in default session | PASS |\n| T-07 | Key-material DID never readable | FAIL: readable in every session | PASS |\n| T-08 | Robustness: 3,000 malformed requests | FAIL: 395 crashes | PASS: 0 crashes |\n| T-09 | RequestDownload needs programming session + unlock | PASS | PASS |\n| T-10 | Re-lock on session change | FAIL | PASS |\n\n**Vulnerability triage, build 1.0:** four advisories match by version, but only two are exploitable *in this product*:\n\n| CVE | Component | CVSS | Decision | Why |\n|---|---|---|---|---|\n| CVE-2022-0778 | OpenSSL 1.1.1k | 7.5 | **Exploitable, P1** | The SCU parses server certificates on its cellular link, and the linked TARA threat TS5 has risk 4 |\n| CVE-2018-25032 | zlib 1.2.11 | 7.5 | Exploitable, P3 | The SCU compresses data, but only its own trip logs; no attacker-controlled input |\n| CVE-2022-37434 | zlib 1.2.11 | 9.8 | **Not affected** (`code_not_reachable`) | The SCU never calls `inflateGetHeader` |\n| CVE-2023-38545 | curl 7.79.1 | 7.5 | **Not affected** (`requires_configuration`) | No SOCKS5 proxy is configured |\n\nThe highest-CVSS finding (9.8) is the one that doesn't apply, and a 7.5 is the real P1. That gap between version matching and actual exploitability is the point of the analysis. Build 1.1 upgrades the components, and all matches clear.\n\nSample outputs: [`docs/sample_reports/`](docs/sample_reports/) (start with `SUMMARY.md`).\n\n## Quick start\n\n```bash\ngit clone https://github.com/Vb-777/cybermoto.git\ncd cybermoto\npip install -e \".[dev]\"        # no runtime dependencies\n\ncybermoto run                 # everything -> reports/\ncybermoto tara                # risk table\ncybermoto test --fw 1.0       # test bench against one build\ncybermoto vulns --build 1.0   # triage with VEX decisions\npytest -q                      # 20 tests\n```\n\n## Project layout\n\n```\ncybermoto/\n  data/scu_item.toml     item definition + TARA inputs + goals/claims/requirements\n  data/components.toml   SBOM inputs per build, with usage/exposure context\n  data/advisories.json   curated advisory snapshot (sources linked per entry)\n  tara.py                attack potential, impact, risk matrix, treatment, consistency checks\n  ecu.py                 simulated UDS diagnostic server, firmware v1.0 and v1.1\n  bench.py               requirement-based security tests + robustness fuzzing\n  vulns.py               version matching, context analysis, VEX, prioritisation\n  reports.py             specification, test reports, triage, traceability, summary\ntests/                   20 pytest cases\n```\n\n## Standards and terms\n\n- **ISO/SAE 21434:** road vehicles cybersecurity engineering. TARA (clause 15), concept and goals (clause 9), verification, and continual vulnerability management (clauses 8 and 13).\n- **UN R155:** the cybersecurity management system regulation for type approval. Annex 5 lists threat categories, used here as a mapping target.\n- **ISO 14229 (UDS):** diagnostic services, including SecurityAccess (0x27) seed/key authentication.\n- **CycloneDX 1.5:** SBOM and VEX (Vulnerability Exploitability eXchange) formats.\n\n## Limits and honest notes\n\n- **The item, TARA ratings and ECU are fictional**, built for demonstration. Ratings and the risk matrix use common example values, and an OEM would apply its own.\n- **The advisory feed is a curated offline snapshot of four real CVEs**, each checked against the linked public source on 2026-11-03. 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      "readme": "# ChargeSploit\n\nChargeSploit is a security testing tool for the V2G communication stack used in EV charging. It implements ISO 15118-2 and DIN SPEC 70121 at both EVCC and SECC side, so you can watch every message on the wire and swap in your own behaviour at any step of the communication.\n\n![demo](docs/chargesploit_GIF.gif)\n\n## What it does\n\n- **Simulate the EVSE.** Full session from SDP discovery through shutdown, every step subclassable. Running as EVCC is also supported.\n- **Build test cases by subclassing.** Override one step, the rest of the session runs unchanged. New handler = one file + one registry line (see [Extending](#extending)).\n- **Answer SDP discovery.** Responds to SECC Discovery Protocol multicast and announces the V2G endpoint.\n- **TLS Support** Wraps the V2G channel in TLS with your own certificate set.\n\n\n\n\n## Requirements\n\n- Python 3.9 or newer.\n- A Java runtime, JRE or JDK 11+. The EXI codec that encodes and decodes V2G\n  messages is a Java library ([`lib/EXICodec.jar`](lib/EXICodec.jar)) bridged\n  into Python over py4j, so `java` has to be on your `PATH` at runtime.\n- py4j, which is vendored under [`lib/python/`](lib/python/) and put on the path\n  automatically. Nothing to install.\n- Root, in most cases. V2G runs on IPv6 link-local on a given interface and binds\n  low ports, so you normally start the tool with `sudo`.\n- An interface with an IPv6 link-local address. CCS uses `fe80::/10`.\n\n## Setup\n\n```bash\ngit clone https://github.com/konicst1/ChargeSploit.git\ncd ChargeSploit\n\n# 1. Check that Java is there\njava -version\n\n# 2. Generate the TLS certificate (only needed if you use --tls)\n./scripts/generate_certs.sh\n```\n\nThere's no build step. The EXI codec spins up a JVM the first time it's used.\n\n## Usage\n\nThe entry point is [`main.py`](main.py). Pick a mode (`--mode`), a handler\n(`--handler`), and the interface to run on (`-i`).\n\n```bash\n# Charging station, standards-compliant DIN, DC only, on eth0\nsudo python3 main.py --mode evse --handler normal_din --dc -i eth0\n\n# Charging station, ISO 15118-2, offering AC and DC (the default)\nsudo python3 main.py --mode evse --handler normal_iso -i eth0\n\n# Same thing, over TLS\nsudo python3 main.py --mode evse --handler normal_iso --tls -i eth0\n```\n\nFlags:\n\n| Flag | Meaning |\n|---|---|\n| `--mode {evse,evcc}` | Run as the charging station or the vehicle. Default `evse`. |\n| `--handler NAME` | Which behaviour to run. Default `normal_iso`. |\n| `-i, --interface` | Network interface for V2G. Default `eth0`. |\n| `--ac` / `--dc` / `--acdc` | Energy transfer offered. Default `--acdc`. |\n| `--sdp-mode NAME` | How SDP discovery gets answered. Default `normal`. |\n| `--tls` | Wrap the V2G channel in TLS. |\n| `--debug` / `--log NAME` | Verbose logging / write a log file under `logs/`. |\n\nWhatever `--handler` and `--sdp-mode` values your build accepts come straight\nfrom [`src/registry.py`](src/registry.py). Run `main.py --help` for the live list.\n\n## Architecture\n\nThe tool is built in layers, and each layer only talks to the one below it. That\nsplit is the point: you can change *what the tool says* (a handler) without\ntouching *how it says it* (transport, EXI, framing).\n\n```mermaid\ngraph TD\n    CLI[\"main.py (CLI)\"] --> REG[\"registry.py\"]\n    CLI --> CTRL[\"Controller (EVSE / EVCC)\"]\n\n    CTRL --> H[\"Handler — what to answer at each step\"]\n    CTRL --> SDP[\"SDP mode — how to answer discovery\"]\n\n    CTRL --> TCP[\"TCP / TLS (V2G session)\"]\n    SDP --> UDP[\"UDP (SDP discovery)\"]\n\n    TCP --> V2GTP[\"V2GTP framing\"]\n    UDP --> V2GTP\n    V2GTP --> EXI[\"EXI codec\"]\n    EXI -->|py4j| JAR[\"EXICodec.jar (JVM)\"]\n\n    H --> TPL[\"JSON templates + enums\"]\n    H --> V2GTP\n```\n\n`main.py` resolves the handler and SDP mode from `registry.py` and builds the controller. The controller owns the sockets and the session loop. The handler is a routing table (`_dispatch`) mapping message types to methods; the base class does decode, dispatch, and encode — a concrete handler just fills in responses. Transport is UDP for SDP discovery and TCP/TLS for the V2G session. V2GTP frames each message; the EXI codec bridges to Java over py4j. Responses are built from JSON templates in `src/messages/`.\n\n### Handler classes\n\nEvery concrete handler inherits from an abstract base that owns the plumbing. On\nthe EVSE side the two standards-compliant handlers, `NormalDINHandler` and\n`NormalISOHandler`, sit directly under `MessageHandler`. Anything more specific\nsubclasses one of those two and overrides only the step it changes. `TeslaHandler`\nis the shipped example: `NormalDINHandler` with a single step overridden.\n\n```mermaid\nclassDiagram\n    class MessageHandler {\n        <<abstract>>\n    }\n    MessageHandler <|-- NormalDINHandler\n    MessageHandler <|-- NormalISOHandler\n    NormalDINHandler <|-- TeslaHandler\n```\n\n### SDP modes\n\nDiscovery follows the same pattern as handlers. An SDP mode is one class under\n`SDPMode` that decides how a SECC discovery request is answered; `NormalMode` is\nthe shipped baseline, and a new mode is the same subclass-and-register step.\n\n```mermaid\nclassDiagram\n    class SDPMode {\n        <<abstract>>\n    }\n    SDPMode <|-- NormalMode\n    SDPMode <|-- EvilMode\n```\n\n## Extending\n\nAdding behaviour is two steps: write the class, then register it. A handler is a\nrouting table, message type to the method that answers it, plus those methods.\nThe base class handles decode, dispatch, and encode, so your subclass only\ndeclares the table and fills in the responses.\n\n```python\nclass MyHandler(MessageHandler):\n    SUPPORTED_PROTOCOLS = [Namespace.ISO_15118_2_MSG_DEF]\n\n    def __init__(self, charging_mode=\"ACDC\"):\n        super().__init__(charging_mode)\n        self.templates = TemplateLoader(ISO_TEMPLATE_DIR)\n        # routing table: message type -> the method that answers it\n        self._dispatch = {\n            ISOV2GMessage.SESSION_SETUP_REQ: self._handle_session_setup,\n            # ...one line per message you answer\n        }\n\n    def get_handler_name(self):\n        return \"MyHandler\"\n\n    async def _handle_session_setup(self, payload, session):\n        req = self._get_body(payload, ISOV2GMessage.SESSION_SETUP_REQ)\n        msg = self.templates.load(ISOTemplate.SESSION_SETUP_RES)\n        # ...fill in the response...\n        return msg\n```\n\nFor a variant of something that already exists, subclass the concrete handler and\noverride only the method that changes. 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      "readme": "# FlexiCAN\nThe FlexiCAN device, developed by VinCSS, is an innovative automotive CAN solution designed for flexibility and ease of use. It features a unique software-controlled hot-swappable semiconductor switching matrix, enabling users to dynamically reconfigure the CAN_H and CAN_L pins of the CAN bus to any pin on the OBD-II port. This eliminates the need for proprietary connection cables, allowing seamless routing to non-standard or hidden CAN bus ports present on the OBD-II interface. Key highlights include software-configurable termination resistors (120Ω), support for CANFD up to 5 Mbit/s, and compatibility with both 11-bit (CAN 2.0A) and 29-bit (CAN 2.0B active) identifiers. The device supports high-speed CAN (ISO 11898-2 compliant) up to 1 Mbit/s and is fully compatible with Linux and CANSocket for robust integration. Its plug-and-play installation and fast, flexible command execution make it user-friendly, while the upcoming silent mode ensures non-intrusive analysis capabilities, making it ideal for automotive diagnostics and research applications.\n\n![FlexiCAN](https://github.com/VinCSS-Public-Projects/FlexiCAN/blob/main/2.hardware/FlexiCAN_logo.png?raw=true)\n\n# Key Features\n\n• Flexibly Configure the Connection Between OBD-II and the CAN Device\n\n• Software-configurable termination resistor (120Ω).\n\n• Fast and flexible access to commands through COM\n\n• Quick and straightforward plug-and-play installation.\n\n• Supports CAN FD, with speeds up to 5 Mbit/s.\n\n• Compatible with both 11-bit (CAN 2.0A) and 29-bit (CAN 2.0B active) identifiers.\n\n• Fully compatible with Linux and CAN Socket.\n\n• High-speed CAN connection (ISO 11898-2 compliant) with data rates up to 1 Mbit/s.\n\n• Silent mode support for analysis tools – allows monitoring of the bus without interference (coming soon).\n\nFull detail please check the document: [FlexiCAN-User-Manual-English.pdf](4.docs/FlexiCAN-User-Manual-English.pdf)\n# Community & Support\n\nWe welcome contributions from the community! Please follow these steps:\n\n1. Fork the repository.\n\n2. Create a new branch (git checkout -b feature-branch-name).\n\n3. Commit your changes (git commit -m \"Description of changes\").\n\n4. Push to the branch (git push origin feature-branch-name).\n\n5. Open a pull request.\n\nIf you encounter any problems, please open an issue. We will check and response as fast as possible.\n\n## Hardware\n\n![Schema](https://github.com/VinCSS-Public-Projects/FlexiCAN/blob/main/2.hardware/Schema.png?raw=true)\n\n## Firmware\n\nThere are two controllers in FlexiCAN: RP2040 and STM32.\n\nRP2040 is to control FlexiCAN & OBD-II switch.\n\nSTM32 is to control CAN interface\n\nSource code of STM32 we use from this link https://github.com/candle-usb/candleLight_fw\n\n\n# License\n\nFlexiCAN is fully open source.\n\nAll software, unless otherwise noted, is dual licensed under Apache 2.0 and MIT. You may use FlexiCAN software under the terms of either the Apache 2.0 license or MIT license.\n\nAll hardware, unless otherwise noted, is dual licensed under CERN and CC-BY-SA. You may use FlexiCAN hardware under the terms of either the CERN 1.2 license or CC-BY-SA 4.0 license.\n\nTHE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED \"AS IS\", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE.\n\n# Acknowledgment\n\nFlexiCAN is built upon the foundation of many other excellent open-source projects. We would like to express our gratitude to the following contributors:\n\nThank you [@sakumisu](https://github.com/sakumisu) for the projects:\n- [CherryShell](https://github.com/cherry-embedded/CherrySH), a tiny shell specifically designed for embedded applications.\n- [CherryUSB](https://github.com/cherry-embedded/CherryUSB), a tiny, beautiful, and portable USB host and device stack for embedded systems with USB IP.\n\nThank you [@Egahp](https://github.com/Egahp) for the [CherryRingBuffer](https://github.com/cherry-embedded/CherryRB) project, an efficient and easy-to-use ring buffer, especially with DMA support\n\nThank you [@marckleinebudde](https://github.com/marckleinebudde) and the [candleLight](https://github.com/candle-usb/candleLight_fw) development team for creating such an incredibly useful project\n\n\n\n# Ethical and Responsible Use\n\nThis tool, FlexiCAN, is developed for educational and ethical testing purposes only.  Any misuse or illegal use of this tool is strictly prohibited. The creator of FlexiCAN  assumes no liability and is not responsible for any misuse or damage caused by this tool.\nUsers are required to comply with all applicable laws and regulations in their jurisdiction regarding network testing and ethical hacking.",
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      "description": "This repository hosts the Firmware Over-The-Air (FOTA) system developed as part of a graduation project at Cairo University. The FOTA system enables secure, efficient, remote updates for embedded systems in smart vehicles, enhancing functionality, safety, and user experience, with strong automotive cybersecurity measures.",
      "readme": "# Firmware Over-The-Air (FOTA)\n# Using Automotive CyberSecurity Techniques for Smart Vehicles\n\n![Project Banner](Images/Repo_Banner.png)\n\n### Cairo University, Faculty of Computers and Artificial Intelligence\n**Department of Information Technology**\n**Graduation Project 2023-2024**\n\n**Team Members:**\n- Kareem Abd El-Moneam Fawzy Yassin\n- Mahmoud Alaa Eldeen Fathy Sadek\n- Mohammed Gabr Ahmed Khamis\n- Salma Sherif Ibrahim Moustafa\n- Ahmed Adel Emad Eldeen Farag\n- Zyad Mahmoud Abbady Amin\n\n**Supervisor:**\nPhD. Haitham Safwat Hamza, Vice-Dean for Postgrad and Research, Cairo University\n\n\n---\n\n## Sample Video of FOTA Workflow\n\nHere is a sample video demonstrating the FOTA system in action:\n\n[![FOTA Workflow Video](Images/Video_Thumbnail.png)](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/KareemMoneeam/FOTA/main/FOTA%20Workflow.mp4)\n\n\n---\n\n## Table of Contents\n1. [Project Overview](#project-overview)\n2. [System Architecture](#system-architecture)\n3. [Key Features](#key-features)\n4. [Technologies Used](#technologies-used)\n5. [Hardware Components](#hardware-components)\n6. [Software Components](#software-components)\n7. [FOTA System Flow](#fota-system-flow)\n8. [Automotive Cybersecurity](#automotive-cybersecurity)\n9. [Installation](#installation)\n10. [Usage](#usage)\n\n---\n\n## Project Overview\n\nThis project involves the development of a Firmware Over-The-Air (FOTA) system for smart vehicles, enabling secure, efficient, and remote software updates. The project aims to address the complexities of embedded systems in modern automobiles, focusing on enhancing user experience, maintaining vehicle safety, and ensuring cybersecurity.\n\nModern vehicles rely heavily on embedded systems and electronic control units (ECUs) to manage various functionalities, from engine performance to advanced driver assistance systems. The evolution of smart cars has introduced the need for real-time adaptability through FOTA systems, which allow for seamless and secure software updates.\n\n---\n\n## System Architecture\n\nThe project employs a layered architecture, featuring two main views:\n- **Main ECU:** Manages the overall system and controls various peripherals.\n- **Application ECU:** Executes application logic, including obstacle detection and avoidance using sensors and actuators.\n\n### Components:\n- **Microcontroller Abstraction Layer (MCAL):** Manages hardware specifics.\n- **Hardware Abstraction Layer (HAL):** Interfaces with physical hardware components.\n- **Application Layer:** Implements vehicle control and safety features.\n\n![System Architecture](Images/System_Architecture.jpeg)\n\n---\n\n## Key Features\n\n- **Real-time Firmware Updates:** Ensures vehicles are equipped with the latest software enhancements.\n- **Automotive Cybersecurity:** Includes secure boot and encryption protocols to protect against unauthorized access.\n- **User-Friendly Mobile Application:** Allows users to manage updates, report problems, and receive notifications directly from the vehicle's dashboard.\n\n---\n\n## Technologies Used\n\nThe project utilizes various technologies to create a robust FOTA system:\n\n### 1. Django - FOTA Server\nDjango is used to develop the backend server that manages firmware updates and user interactions.\n\n![Django Logo](Images/django.png)\n\n### 2. NodeMCU ESP32 - Gateway Communication\nNodeMCU ESP32 serves as the gateway between the vehicle's main ECU and the FOTA server, enabling Wi-Fi connectivity for updates.\n\n![NodeMCU ESP32](Images/ESP32.png)\n\n### 3. STM32F401RCT6 - Main and Application ECUs\nThe STM32F401RCT6 microcontroller is the core component for managing the vehicle's embedded systems.\n\n![STM32F401RCT6](Images/blackpill.jpg)\n\n### 4. HC-05 Bluetooth Module\nUsed for wireless communication between the vehicle and mobile applications.\n\n![HC-05 Bluetooth Module](Images/HC05.jpg)\n\n### 5. Mobile Application\nDeveloped to provide a user-friendly interface for managing updates and system notifications.\n\n---\n\n## Hardware Components\n\n- **STM32F401RCT6 Microcontroller:** Serves as the core processing unit, managing both the main and application ECUs.\n- **NodeMCU ESP32:** Acts as a gateway for receiving updates from the server.\n- **HC-05 Bluetooth Module:** Facilitates communication between the vehicle and mobile devices.\n- **Ultrasonic Sensor:** Detects obstacles for navigation and safety.\n- **H-Bridge Motor Driver:** Controls the vehicle's DC motors for movement.\n\n---\n\n## Software Components\n\n- **FOTA Server (Django):** Manages the distribution and deployment of firmware updates.\n- **Secure Bootloader:** Validates and loads authenticated firmware onto the ECUs.\n- **Mobile Application:** Provides an interface for vehicle owners to interact with the FOTA system.\n\n---\n\n## FOTA System Flow\n## Scenarios\n\n### Scenario 1: User-Driven Non-Critical Update\nThe OEM introduces a non-critical firmware feature that vehicle owners can either accept or snooze through the user interface. If accepted, the firmware is transmitted via Node MCU, and the bootloader handles the update on the target ECU. If snoozed, a countdown timer starts in the Main ECU, prompting a reminder notification on the dashboard when the snooze period ends.\n\n### Scenario 2: Critical Update\nFor critical updates, the process is automatic. The update is initiated without user intervention, and the Main ECU flashes the update to the target ECU. A dashboard notification informs the vehicle owner that the update is in progress, ensuring important updates are applied quickly and securely.\n\n### Scenario 3: Issue Reporting & Support\nIf a user reports a problem through the dashboard, the OEM assesses the issue and either provides a relevant firmware update or troubleshooting instructions. If an update is required, it is transmitted and flashed to the target ECU. If the issue persists, the Main ECU leverages Google Maps API to display nearby service stations based on the user's location.\n\n![Scenarios](Images/Scenarios.gif)\n\n---\n\n## Automotive Cybersecurity\n\nThe FOTA system employs robust automotive cybersecurity techniques to protect vehicles from potential cyber threats. These security measures include:\n\n1. **Secure Boot:**\n   - Ensures that only authenticated firmware is executed on the ECUs. The bootloader verifies the integrity and authenticity of the firmware before installation, preventing unauthorized or malicious software from running on the vehicle's system.\n\n2. **AES-256 Encryption:**\n   - Firmware updates are encrypted using AES-256 during transmission between the FOTA server and the vehicle’s ECU. This ensures that even if the data is intercepted, it remains unreadable to unauthorized entities.\n\n3. **RSA Digital Signatures:**\n   - All firmware updates are signed with RSA digital signatures. The ECU verifies the digital signature before accepting the update, ensuring the update's authenticity and protecting against tampering.\n\n4. **Firmware Integrity Checks:**\n   - After the update is applied, the system performs integrity checks to confirm that the firmware has not been altered. This ensures the vehicle is running the correct, unmodified version of the software.\n\n---\n\n## Installation\n\nTo set up the FOTA system, follow these steps:\n\n1. **Clone the repository:**\n   ```bash\n   git clone https://github.com/KareemMoneeam/FOTA.git\n2. **Set up the hardware** according to the pinout configuration in the documentation.\n3. **Flash the microcontroller** with the bootloader firmware using the provided scripts.\n4. **Deploy the FOTA server** on your preferred hosting environment.\n\n## Usage\n1. **Connect the vehicle's ECU** to the FOTA server using the NodeMCU ESP32.\n2. **Use the mobile application** to check for updates and manage notifications.\n3. **Accept or snooze** updates directly from the vehicle's dashboard interface.\n\n\nFor more detailed information, please refer to the [documentation](https://github.com/KareemMoneeam/FOTA/blob/main/Final%20Documentation.pdf).",
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      "readme": "# AutoDrive Manufacturing: Connected Vehicle Cybersecurity & Threat Modeling\n\nComprehensive cybersecurity analysis, threat modeling, and risk mitigation strategy for **AutoDrive Manufacturing's** connected and autonomous vehicle ecosystem. This project evaluates system components hosted on AWS, addresses active security incidents, and aligns security practices with **ISO/SAE 21434** standards.\n\n---\n\n## 🚗 Project Overview\n\nAutoDrive develops advanced smart vehicle systems integrating cloud-based telemetry, remote diagnostics, and Over-the-Air (OTA) software updates. To combat emerging cyber threats—such as credential stuffing, firmware tampering, API abuse, and Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks—this project applies the **STRIDE threat modeling framework** to secure vehicle-to-cloud communications and third-party integrations.\n\n---\n\n## 🏗️ System Architecture & Key Components\n\nThe connected vehicle platform comprises five core components:\n1. **Vehicle Authentication System:** Digital certificates, secure key exchange, MFA for diagnostics, and fleet password reset workflows.\n2. **Vehicle Telemetry & Data Management:** Continuous data transmission (engine, GPS, metrics) encrypted via **AES-256 (at rest)** and **TLS 1.2/1.3 (in transit)**.\n3. **Over-the-Air (OTA) Software Updates:** Remote firmware deployment with cryptographic signature validation and automated rollback capabilities.\n4. **Secure Messaging & Communication:** Encrypted messaging channel for emergency alerts, software updates, and anomaly logging.\n5. **Third-Party API Integration:** RESTful API for authorized service centers utilizing OAuth-based authentication, API keys, and rate limiting.\n\n---\n\n## 🚨 Threat Landscape & Recent Incidents\n\nAutoDrive recently experienced several critical security challenges:\n* **Unauthorized Access:** Multiple failed login attempts indicating potential credential stuffing attacks against fleet management.\n* **API Abuse:** Irregular traffic patterns probing for vulnerabilities in partner endpoints.\n* **Firmware Tampering:** Anomalous firmware version mismatches detected in vehicle audit logs.\n* **Denial-of-Service (DoS):** Traffic spikes overwhelming cloud authentication services and vehicle connectivity.\n* **Data Leakage Risks:** Potential telemetry exposure due to API misconfigurations.\n\n---\n\n## 🛡️ STRIDE Threat Modeling Analysis\n\n| STRIDE Category | Threat Description | Affected Component | Risk Level | Mitigation Strategy |\n| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |\n| **S**poofing | Credential stuffing / unauthorized login | Authentication System | High | Implement adaptive MFA, rate limiting, and CAPTCHA. |\n| **T**ampering | Firmware modification during transit/storage | OTA Update System | Critical | Enforce strict cryptographic signature validation before flashing. |\n| **R**epudiation | Lack of accountability for diagnostic commands | API / Fleet Management | Medium | Comprehensive immutable audit logging using AWS CloudTrail. |\n| **I**nformation Disclosure | Exposure of sensitive vehicle telemetry | Telemetry & API | High | Enforce least-privilege IAM roles and strict payload encryption. |\n| **D**enial of Service | Authentication flood overwhelming cloud resources | Cloud Auth / Messaging | High | Deploy AWS Shield, WAF, and dynamic connection rate-limiting. |\n| **E**levation of Privilege | Exploitation of misconfigured third-party APIs | Third-Party API | Critical | Rigorous OAuth scope validation and automated API security scanning. |\n\n---\n\n## 📋 Compliance & Standards\n\n* **ISO/SAE 21434:** Road vehicles — Cybersecurity engineering compliance embedded across the vehicle lifecycle.\n* **AWS Security Best Practices:** IAM hardening, encryption enforcement, and network segmentation (VPCs).\n\n---\n\n## 📁 Repository Structure\n\n```text\n├── docs/\n│   ├── threat-model.md          # Detailed STRIDE breakdown\n│   ├── architecture.md          # Cloud & vehicle topology diagrams\n│   └── incident-response.md     # Post-incident analysis & playbooks\n├── policies/\n│   └── iso-sae-21434-mapping.md # Compliance tracking matrix\n└── README.md",
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      "readme": "<div align=\"center\">\n\n# 🛡️ OCPP Sentinel\n\n### *AI Security Triage Copilot for EV Charging Stations*\n\n[![Python 3.11+](https://img.shields.io/badge/Python-3.11%2B-3776AB?style=for-the-badge&logo=python&logoColor=white)](https://www.python.org/)\n[![FastAPI](https://img.shields.io/badge/FastAPI-0.110%2B-009688?style=for-the-badge&logo=fastapi&logoColor=white)](https://fastapi.tiangolo.com/)\n[![LangGraph](https://img.shields.io/badge/LangGraph-0.2%2B-6C47FF?style=for-the-badge&logo=chainlink&logoColor=white)](https://www.langchain.com/langgraph)\n[![ChromaDB](https://img.shields.io/badge/ChromaDB-RAG_Vector_DB-FF6F00?style=for-the-badge)](https://www.trychroma.com/)\n[![Docker](https://img.shields.io/badge/Docker-Containerized-2496ED?style=for-the-badge&logo=docker&logoColor=white)](https://www.docker.com/)\n[![Tests Passing](https://img.shields.io/badge/Tests-70%2F70_Passed-2EA44F?style=for-the-badge&logo=pytest&logoColor=white)](#-testing)\n\n<p align=\"center\">\n  <b>An AI-powered cybersecurity copilot that analyzes Open Charge Point Protocol (OCPP 1.6-J) messages in real-time, detects STRIDE attack patterns, and provides RAG-grounded verdicts with exact protocol spec citations.</b>\n</p>\n\n[Key Features](#-key-features) •\n[Architecture](#-system-architecture) •\n[Attack Scenarios](#-the-5-stride-attack-scenarios) •\n[Quickstart](#-quickstart-guide) •\n[API Docs](#-api-reference) •\n[Demo UI](#-interactive-demo-web-ui)\n\n---\n\n</div>\n\n## 📌 Executive Summary\n\nModern Electric Vehicle (EV) Charging Station Management Systems (CSMS) process millions of messages over WebSockets using **OCPP 1.6-J**. However, legacy protocol implementations often lack real-time threat analysis, leaving chargers vulnerable to **identity spoofing, billing tampering, replay attacks, credential leaks, and Denial of Service (DoS)**.\n\n**OCPP Sentinel** acts as an intelligent security triage copilot. When an OCPP JSON message is received, Sentinel:\n1. **Validates & Parses** the payload against strict Pydantic V2 schemas.\n2. **Executes 5 Deterministic Rule Engines** derived from published EVSE security research.\n3. **Retrieves Grounded Protocol Context** from a local ChromaDB vector store (RAG).\n4. **Synthesizes a Verdict** using a LangGraph AI agent state machine (`detect` → `retrieve` → `reason`), returning a plain-English explanation citing the relevant OCPP spec section.\n\n---\n\n## 🚀 Key Features\n\n- **🎯 STRIDE-Mapped Security Detection:** Detects Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information Disclosure, and DoS attacks in OCPP traffic.\n- **🧠 Zero-Hallucination RAG Architecture:** Vector knowledge base indexed in ChromaDB grounds all agent explanations in actual OCPP 1.6-J specification standards.\n- **⚡ Hybrid Rule Engine + AI Agent:** Combines microsecond rule-based detection for known attack signatures with LangGraph stateful reasoning.\n- **🌐 Dual LLM & Offline RAG Support:** Uses OpenAI (`gpt-4o-mini`) or Anthropic (`claude-3-haiku`) when API keys are available, and seamlessly falls back to grounded local RAG synthesis when offline.\n- **📜 Audit Trail Logging:** Automatically appends structured, machine-readable JSON records (`logs/audit.jsonl`) for every triage decision.\n- **💻 Built-in Interactive Web UI:** Includes a dark-theme dashboard with preset attack scenario triggers for live demonstrations.\n- **🐳 Full Docker Support:** Production-ready multi-stage Docker build with `docker-compose`.\n\n---\n\n## 🏗️ System Architecture\n\n```mermaid\ngraph TD\n    A[\"📩 Incoming OCPP 1.6-J Message\"] --> B[\"⚡ FastAPI Endpoint (/analyze)\"]\n    B --> C[\"🤖 LangGraph Agent State Machine\"]\n\n    subgraph Agent [\"LangGraph Workflow Pipeline\"]\n        C --> D[\"1️⃣ Detect Node<br/>(Pydantic Validation & Rule Engines)\"]\n        D --> E[\"2️⃣ Retrieve Node<br/>(ChromaDB Vector RAG Search)\"]\n        E --> F[\"3️⃣ Reason Node<br/>(LLM / Grounded Synthesis)\"]\n    end\n\n    F --> G[\"🛡️ Structured Verdict Response\"]\n    F --> H[\"📜 Audit Trail (logs/audit.jsonl)\"]\n\n    style A fill:#0f172a,stroke:#38bdf8,color:#f8fafc\n    style B fill:#1e293b,stroke:#38bdf8,color:#f8fafc\n    style C fill:#1e293b,stroke:#c084fc,color:#f8fafc\n    style D fill:#1e293b,stroke:#fb923c,color:#f8fafc\n    style E fill:#1e293b,stroke:#34d399,color:#f8fafc\n    style F fill:#1e293b,stroke:#f472b6,color:#f8fafc\n    style G fill:#0f172a,stroke:#34d399,color:#f8fafc\n    style H fill:#0f172a,stroke:#94a3b8,color:#f8fafc\n```\n\n---\n\n## ⚔️ The 5 STRIDE Attack Scenarios\n\nGrounded in published EV charging station security research:\n\n| # | STRIDE Category | OCPP Message Action | Threat Description & Signal | Detection Rule |\n|:-:|:---------------|:--------------------|:----------------------------|:---------------|\n| **1** | **Spoofing** | `RemoteStartTransaction` | Remote start requested for an `idTag` that is **not present** in the authorized ID tag database. | Checks `idTag` against `context.authorized_id_tags`. |\n| **2** | **Tampering** | `MeterValues` | Billing fraud: Meter values report implausibly low energy delivery (**< 0.5 kWh/hr**) for active charging. | Computes kWh/hr rate between session timestamps. |\n| **3** | **Repudiation** | `Authorize` | Replay attack: An `Authorize` message reuses a `unique_id` already present in `known_message_ids`. | Matches message ID against deduplication cache. |\n| **4** | **Info Disclosure** | `StatusNotification` | Plaintext token leak: Sensitive keys (`idTag=`, `token=`, `sk_live_`, JWTs) found in `info` or `vendorId` fields. | Regex pattern scan on diagnostic text fields. |\n| **5** | **Denial of Service** | `StatusNotification` | Message flood: Abnormal burst of status updates (**> 30 msgs in 60s**) from a single station. | Sliding time-window rate threshold check. |\n\n> **Note on Research Citations:** The attack scenarios modeled above are derived from published academic and industrial EVSE vulnerability research (e.g., OWASP EVSE Security Guidelines, published CVEs, and EV charging station penetration testing reports). *[Add your specific citations here]*\n\n---\n\n## 📁 Project Directory Structure\n\n```\nOCPP-Sentinel/\n├── data/\n│   ├── knowledge_base/\n│   │   ├── attacks/          # 5 detailed STRIDE attack documentation files (.md)\n│   │   └── spec_excerpts/    # 5 official OCPP 1.6-J specification excerpts (.md)\n│   └── samples/              # 10 JSON sample messages (5 benign + 5 malicious)\n├── src/\n│   └── ocpp_sentinel/\n│       ├── agent/            # LangGraph State Machine (detect -> retrieve -> reason)\n│       │   ├── graph.py      # Compiled LangGraph workflow\n│       │   ├── nodes.py      # Step functions (detect_node, retrieve_node, reason_node)\n│       │   └── state.py      # AgentState schema & VerdictResponse Pydantic model\n│       ├── api/              # FastAPI Layer\n│       │   ├── app.py        # Application setup, CORS, and static route mounting\n│       │   ├── routes.py     # Endpoints (/health, /analyze)\n│       │   └── schemas.py    # Request & Response Pydantic schemas\n│       ├── detectors/        # Rule Engine Implementations\n│       │   ├── spoofing.py, tampering.py, repudiation.py, info_disclosure.py, dos.py\n│       │   └── dispatcher.py # Central rule dispatcher\n│       ├── knowledge/        # Vector RAG Layer\n│       │   ├── loader.py     # Text chunker & ChromaDB indexing pipeline\n│       │   └── retriever.py  # Cosine similarity vector search retriever\n│       ├── models/           # Pydantic OCPP 1.6-J Message Envelope Models\n│       │   └── ocpp_messages.py\n│       ├── static/           # Demo Web Dashboard (HTML5 / CSS3 / Vanilla JS)\n│       └── logging_config.py # Structured JSON audit trail logger (audit.jsonl)\n├── tests/                    # 70 Pytest unit and integration test cases\n├── Dockerfile                # Multi-stage Docker image definition\n├── docker-compose.yml        # Compose multi-container configuration\n├── pyproject.toml            # Project dependencies & tool configurations\n└── README.md                 # Project documentation\n```\n\n---\n\n## 💻 Quickstart Guide\n\n### 1. Clone & Set Up Environment\n\n```bash\n# Clone repository\ngit clone https://github.com/PavankumarJ02/OCPP-Sentinel.git\ncd OCPP-Sentinel\n\n# Create virtual environment\npython -m venv .venv\n\n# Activate virtual environment\n# On Windows PowerShell:\n.venv\\Scripts\\activate\n# On Linux/macOS:\nsource .venv/bin/activate\n\n# Install dependencies in editable mode\npip install -e \".[dev]\"\n```\n\n### 2. Index Knowledge Base in ChromaDB\n\n```bash\npython -m ocpp_sentinel.knowledge.loader\n```\n\n### 3. Run the Test Suite (70 Tests)\n\n```bash\npytest tests/ -v\n```\n\n### 4. Start the Application Server\n\n```bash\nuvicorn ocpp_sentinel.api.app:app --reload\n```\n\n- **Interactive Web UI:** Navigate to [http://localhost:8000](http://localhost:8000)\n- **OpenAPI Swagger Docs:** Navigate to [http://localhost:8000/docs](http://localhost:8000/docs)\n\n---\n\n## 📡 API Reference\n\n### `POST /analyze`\n\nAnalyzes an incoming OCPP message payload.\n\n#### Request Body (PowerShell Example):\n```powershell\nInvoke-RestMethod -Uri http://127.0.0.1:8000/analyze -Method Post -ContentType \"application/json\" -InFile data/samples/malicious_spoofing.json\n```\n\n#### Request JSON:\n```json\n{\n  \"message_type_id\": 2,\n  \"unique_id\": \"remote-start-666\",\n  \"action\": \"RemoteStartTransaction\",\n  \"payload\": {\n    \"idTag\": \"FAKE-TAG-999\",\n    \"connectorId\": 1\n  },\n  \"charge_point_id\": \"CP-NORTH-01\",\n  \"received_at\": \"2024-01-15T14:00:00Z\",\n  \"context\": {\n    \"authorized_id_tags\": [\"RFID-A1B2C3\", \"RFID-D4E5F6\"]\n  }\n}\n```\n\n#### Response JSON (`200 OK`):\n```json\n{\n  \"success\": true,\n  \"processing_time_ms\": 12.4,\n  \"analysis\": {\n    \"verdict\": \"suspicious\",\n    \"matched_attack_category\": \"Spoofing\",\n    \"confidence\": 0.95,\n    \"plain_english_reason\": \"RemoteStartTransaction requested for idTag 'FAKE-TAG-999', which is NOT present in the authorized tags list: ['RFID-A1B2C3', 'RFID-D4E5F6'].\",\n    \"source_reference\": \"remote_start_transaction.md / 01_spoofing.md\",\n    \"rule_detected\": true\n  }\n}\n```\n\n---\n\n### `GET /health`\n\nReturns API health and total indexed vector chunks.\n\n```json\n{\n  \"status\": \"ok\",\n  \"version\": \"0.1.0\",\n  \"kb_chunks\": 70\n}\n```\n\n---\n\n## 🖥️ Interactive Demo Web UI\n\nThe project comes with a built-in dark-themed demo frontend hosted directly at `http://localhost:8000/`.\n\n- **Preset Attack Triggers:** Quick-select buttons for all 5 STRIDE attack scenarios and benign controls.\n- **Live Analysis Panel:** Displays verdict badges, confidence meters, plain-English reasons, and grounding spec citations.\n\n---\n\n## 📜 Audit Trail Logging\n\nEvery triage decision writes an immutable JSON entry to `logs/audit.jsonl`:\n\n```json\n{\n  \"timestamp\": \"2024-01-15T14:00:00.123456+00:00\",\n  \"level\": \"INFO\",\n  \"logger\": \"ocpp_sentinel\",\n  \"message\": \"Audit Event: CP-NORTH-01 -> RemoteStartTransaction -> Verdict: SUSPICIOUS (Spoofing)\",\n  \"audit\": {\n    \"event_type\": \"security_triage\",\n    \"action\": \"RemoteStartTransaction\",\n    \"charge_point_id\": \"CP-NORTH-01\",\n    \"verdict\": \"suspicious\",\n    \"attack_category\": \"Spoofing\",\n    \"confidence\": 0.95,\n    \"processing_time_ms\": 12.4,\n    \"client_ip\": \"127.0.0.1\",\n    \"details\": \"RemoteStartTransaction requested for idTag 'FAKE-TAG-999', which is NOT present...\"\n  }\n}\n```\n\n---\n\n## 🐳 Docker Deployment\n\nTo build and run in an isolated container environment:\n\n```bash\n# Build & start container\ndocker compose up --build\n\n# Test endpoint\ncurl http://localhost:8000/health\n```\n\n---\n\n## 💡 What You Learn Building This Project\n\n- **Pydantic V2 & Type Safety:** Modeling strict protocol specifications and catching malformed input before execution.\n- **RAG & Vector Search:** Chunking markdown documentation and retrieving semantic context using ChromaDB to prevent LLM hallucinations.\n- **LangGraph Agent Workflows:** Building clear, stateful graphs (`detect` → `retrieve` → `reason`) instead of monolithic prompts.\n- **FastAPI & Async Python:** Building high-performance REST APIs with automatic OpenAPI schema generation.\n\n---\n\n## 📝 License\n\nDistributed under the MIT License. See `LICENSE` for details.",
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      "full_name": "souravbaghz/CANghost",
      "name": "CANghost",
      "owner": "souravbaghz",
      "url": "https://github.com/souravbaghz/CANghost",
      "description": "Automated Script For Hacking Into CAN Bus - Car Hacking",
      "readme": "<p align=\"center\">\n  <img  width=\"180\" src=\"ghost.png\" />\n</p>\n\n<h1 align=\"center\"> <b>CANghost</b></h1>\n<h3 align=\"center\"><b>An Automated Tool For Hacking Into CAN Bus - Car Hacking</b></h3>\n\n### Requirements:\n\n* Any Linux Distributions (Ubuntu is Recommended)\n* can-utils\n* [ICSim - Car Simulation](https://github.com/souravbaghz/ICSim)\n***\n\n#### can-utils is a Linux specific set of utilities that enables Linux to communicate with the CAN network on the vehicle. The canutils consist of 5 main tools that we use very frequently:\n- cansniffer for sniffing the packets\n- cansend for writing a packet\n candump dump all received packets\n- canplayer to replay CAN packets\n- cangen to generate random CAN packets\n + **can-utils can be installed via apt-get**\n ```\n sudo apt-get install can-utils -y\n ```\n ***\n\n + **Installation of CANghost :**\n ```\n git clone https://github.com/souravbaghz/CANghost\n ```\n + **Usage:**\n ```\n cd CANghost/\n bash canghost.sh <interface> <logfilename>\n Example- bash canghost.sh vcan0 demolog\n ```\n ### Note: First Install & Run [ICSim](https://github.com/SouravSec/ICSim) then run canghost.sh\n\n <p align=\"center\">\n  <img  width=\"900\" src=\"Screenshot.png\" />\n</p>\n\n ***\n <h3 align=\"center\"><b>A Quick Tutorial</b></h3>\n\n + **Preparing the Virtual CAN Network:**\n ```\n ubuntu@sourav:~/ICSim$./setup_vcan.sh\n ```\n\n  **Running the Simulator:**\n * Running the dashboard\n```\n ubuntu@sourav:~/ICSim$./icsim vcan0\n```\n\n * Control Panel can be started by\n ```\n  ubuntu@sourav:~/ICSim$./controls vcan0\n ```\n\n + **Now Start the CANghost:**\n ```\n ubuntu@sourav:~/CANghost$./canghost.sh vcan0 mylog\n ```\n #### Now choose the option you want and play with your Virtual Car.\n\n ***[Click Here](https://youtu.be/HLWc_b1vHWg) to Watch Tutorials on Youtube***\n\n ***\n\n ### If You Do Love My Works Then You Can Buy Me A Coffee Now.\n <a href=\"https://www.buymeacoffee.com/souravbaghz\" target=\"_blank\"><img src=\"https://cdn.buymeacoffee.com/buttons/default-orange.png\" alt=\"Buy Me A Coffee\" height=\"41\" width=\"174\"></a>\n\n ***\n ## About CANghost:\n I made this tool to automate the process and save my time while hacking or practicing. The script first dump all the CAN packets in **Capture** option and Replay that packets(logfile) into Car in **Replay** option. Don't play with Real car, I always recommend to use on Simulator. I made this tool for learning & personal purpose, If you want to do it manually then you can check code source to understand how it works...\n\n ***Thanks to [@zombieCraig](https://github.com/zombieCraig) for ICSim***\n\n\n [![!#/bin/bash](https://img.shields.io/badge/-%23!%2Fbin%2Fbash-1f425f.svg?style=for-the-badge&logo=image%2Fpng%3Bbase64%2CiVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAABgAAAAYCAYAAADgdz34AAAAGXRFWHRTb2Z0d2FyZQBBZG9iZSBJbWFnZVJlYWR5ccllPAAAAyZpVFh0WE1MOmNvbS5hZG9iZS54bXAAAAAAADw%2FeHBhY2tldCBiZWdpbj0i77u%2FIiBpZD0iVzVNME1wQ2VoaUh6cmVTek5UY3prYzlkIj8%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%2BIDwvcmRmOlJERj4gPC94OnhtcG1ldGE%2BIDw%2FeHBhY2tldCBlbmQ9InIiPz6lm45hAAADkklEQVR42qyVa0yTVxzGn7d9Wy03MS2ii8s%2BeokYNQSVhCzOjXZOFNF4jx%2BMRmPUMEUEqVG36jo2thizLSQSMd4N8ZoQ8RKjJtooaCpK6ZoCtRXKpRempbTv5ey83bhkAUphz8fznvP8znn%2B%2F3NeEEJgNBoRRSmz0ub%2FfuxEacBg%2FDmYtiCjgo5NG2mBXq%2BH5I1ogMRk9Zbd%2BQU2e1ML6VPLOyf5tvBQ8yT1lG10imxsABm7SLs898GTpyYynEzP60hO3trHDKvMigUwdeaceacqzp7nOI4n0SSIIjl36ao4Z356OV07fSQAk6xJ3XGg%2BLCr1d1OYlVHp4eUHPnerU79ZA%2F1kuv1JQMAg%2BE4O2P23EumF3VkvHprsZKMzKwbRUXFEyTvSIEmTVbrysp%2BWr8wfQHGK6WChVa3bKUmdWou%2BjpArdGkzZ41c1zG%2Fu5uGH4swzd561F%2BuhIT4%2BLnSuPsv9%2BJKIpjNr9dXYOyk7%2FBZrcjIT4eCnoKgedJP4BEqhG77E3NKP31FO7cfQA5K0dSYuLgz2TwCWJSOBzG6crzKK%2BohNfni%2Bx6OMUMMNe%2Fgf7ocbw0v0acKg6J8Ql0q%2BT%2FAXR5PNi5dz9c71upuQqCKFAD%2BYhrZLEAmpodaHO3Qy6TI3NhBpbrshGtOWKOSMYwYGQM8nJzoFJNxP2HjyIQho4PewK6hBktoDcUwtIln4PjOWzflQ%2Be5yl0yCCYgYikTclGlxadio%2BBQCSiW1UXoVGrKYwH4RgMrjU1HAB4vR6LzWYfFUCKxfS8Ftk5qxHoCUQAUkRJaSEokkV6Y%2F%2BJUOC4hn6A39NVXVBYeNP8piH6HeA4fPbpdBQV5KOx0QaL1YppX3Jgk0TwH2Vg6S3u%2BdB91%2B%2FpuNYPYFl5uP5V7ZqvsrX7jxqMXR6ff3gCQSTzFI0a1TX3wIs8ul%2Bq4HuWAAiM39vhOuR1O1fQ2gT%2F26Z8Z5vrl2OHi9OXZn995nLV9aFfS6UC9JeJPfuK0NBohWpCHMSAAsFe74WWP%2BvT25wtP9Bpob6uGqqyDnOtaeumjRu%2ByFu36VntK%2FPA5umTJeUtPWZSU9BCgud661odVp3DZtkc7AnYR33RRC708PrVi1larW7XwZIjLnd7R6SgSqWSNjU1B3F72pz5TZbXmX5vV81Yb7Lg7XT%2FUXriu8XLVqw6c6XqWnBKiiYU%2BMt3wWF7u7i91XlSEITwSAZ%2FCzAAHsJVbwXYFFEAAAAASUVORK5CYII%3D)](https://www.gnu.org/software/bash/)\n\n <br>\n\n### 🤝 Connect with me\n[![Instagram: souravbaghz](https://img.shields.io/badge/instagram-%23E4405F.svg?&style=for-the-badge&logo=instagram&logoColor=white)](https://www.instagram.com/souravbaghz)\n[![GitHub souravbaghz](https://img.shields.io/badge/github-%23000000.svg?&style=for-the-badge&logo=github)](https://github.com/souravbaghz)\n[![Twitter souravbaghz](https://img.shields.io/badge/twitter-%231DA1F2.svg?&style=for-the-badge&logo=twitter&logoColor=white)](https://twitter.com/souravbaghz)\n[![Medium souravbaghz](https://img.shields.io/badge/medium-%2312100E.svg?&style=for-the-badge&logo=medium&logoColor=white)](https://medium.com/@souravbaghz)\n\n---",
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      "description": "This repository contains \"Safeguarding the Future: Cybersecurity Solutions for IoT-Driven Autonomous Vehicles,\" focusing on securing IoT-based vehicle automation. It integrates IoT, machine learning, and cybersecurity to enhance safety, featuring real-time monitoring, threat response, and a user-friendly dashboard for smart cities.",
      "readme": "# **Cybersecurity Framework for IoT-Enabled Autonomous Vehicles**\n\n## **Project Overview**\n\nThis project aims to develop a simplified prototype of a cybersecurity framework designed to secure IoT-enabled autonomous vehicles. The prototype integrates machine learning for anomaly detection and blockchain technology to ensure data integrity and secure communication. This framework is tested in a simulated environment to evaluate its effectiveness in mitigating cyber threats.\n\n## **Project Structure**\n\n```plaintext\ncybersecurity_framework_project/\n├── data/\n│   ├── raw_data/\n│   │   └── simulated_iot_data.csv\n│   ├── processed_data/\n│   │   ├── training_data.csv\n│   │   ├── testing_data.csv\n│   │   └── anomaly_injected_data.csv\n│   └── blockchain_logs/\n│       └── blockchain_data.json\n├── models/\n│   ├── anomaly_detection_model.pkl\n│   └── trained_model/\n│       ├── isolation_forest.pkl\n│       └── ...\n├── web_app/\n│   ├── templates/\n│   │   ├── index.html\n│   │   └── dashboard.html\n│   ├── static/\n│   │   ├── css/\n│   │   └── js/\n│   ├── app.py\n│   └── requirements.txt\n├── notebooks/\n│   ├── data_preprocessing.ipynb\n│   ├── model_training.ipynb\n│   ├── blockchain_implementation.ipynb\n│   └── data_analysis_and_visualization.ipynb\n├── tests/\n│   ├── test_anomaly_detection.py\n│   ├── test_blockchain.py\n│   └── ...\n└── README.md\n```\n\n## **Getting Started**\n\n### **Prerequisites**\n\n- Python 3.8+\n- Pip (Python package manager)\n- Virtual environment setup (optional but recommended)\n\n### **Setup Instructions**\n\n1. **Clone the Repository:**\n\n   ```bash\n   git clone https://github.com/yourusername/cybersecurity_framework_project.git\n   cd cybersecurity_framework_project\n   ```\n2. **Create a Virtual Environment:**\n\n   ```bash\n   python3 -m venv venv\n   source venv/bin/activate   # On Windows: venv\\Scripts\\activate\n   ```\n3. **Install Dependencies:**\n   Navigate to the `web_app/` directory and install the required Python packages:\n\n   ```bash\n   pip install -r requirements.txt\n   ```\n4. **Data Preprocessing:**\n   Use the Jupyter notebooks in the `notebooks/` directory to preprocess the data and train the machine learning model:\n\n   - `data_preprocessing.ipynb`: Clean and preprocess the IoT data.\n   - `model_training.ipynb`: Train the anomaly detection model.\n   - `blockchain_implementation.ipynb`: Implement the blockchain for data integrity.\n   - `data_analysis_and_visualization.ipynb`: Analyze and visualize the results.\n5. **Run the Web Application:**\n   Navigate to the `web_app/` directory and run the Flask application:\n\n   ```bash\n   python app.py\n   ```\n\n   Open your web browser and go to `http://localhost:5000` to access the dashboard.\n6. **Testing:**\n   Execute the test scripts located in the `tests/` directory to ensure everything is functioning correctly:\n\n   ```bash\n   pytest tests/\n   ```\n\n## **Features**\n\n- **Anomaly Detection:** Machine learning algorithms are used to detect anomalies in IoT sensor data, identifying potential cyber threats.\n- **Blockchain Integration:** Blockchain technology ensures the integrity of the data and secures communication within the IoT network.\n- **Web Dashboard:** A simple web interface displays real-time data, anomalies, and blockchain logs, allowing for easy monitoring and analysis.\n\n## **Usage**\n\n1. **Data Monitoring:** The web dashboard allows you to monitor IoT sensor data and detect anomalies in real-time.\n2. **Anomaly Injection:** You can simulate cyber-attacks by injecting anomalies into the data and observe how the system responds.\n3. **Blockchain Validation:** The blockchain ensures that all data transactions are secure and immutable, providing a tamper-proof record of events.\n\n## **Testing and Validation**\n\n- **Anomaly Detection:** The system's accuracy in detecting anomalies can be validated using the test data in the `tests/` directory.\n- **Blockchain Integrity:** The blockchain implementation ensures that any tampering with the data is detected, with logs stored in `blockchain_logs/`.\n\n## **Future Work**\n\n- **Expand Simulation Environments:** Integrate more advanced simulation platforms to mimic real-world conditions more accurately.\n- **Enhanced Machine Learning Models:** Incorporate more sophisticated models and algorithms for improved anomaly detection.\n- **Scalability:** Test the framework's scalability with larger datasets and more complex IoT networks.\n\n## **Contributing**\n\nIf you have suggestions or improvements, feel free to submit a pull request or open an issue. Contributions are always welcome!\n\n## **License**\n\nThis project is licensed under the MIT License - see the [LICENSE](LICENSE) file for details.\n\n---\n\nThis README provides a comprehensive overview of the prototype, guiding users through setup, usage, and further development possibilities.",
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      "readme": "# Automotive Cybersecurity SOC Dashboard\n\nA real-time Automotive Cybersecurity Monitoring Platform built using Python and Streamlit to simulate CAN Bus traffic, generate cyberattacks, detect malicious activities, and visualize security events through an SOC-style dashboard.\n\n---\n\n## Project Overview\n\nModern vehicles contain multiple Electronic Control Units (ECUs) communicating over the CAN Bus. This project simulates vehicle network traffic, injects cyberattacks, detects malicious behavior, and presents findings through a real-time Security Operations Center (SOC) dashboard.\n\n---\n\n## Features\n\n- Multi-ECU CAN Bus Simulation\n- Real-Time Vehicle Data Generation\n- Speed Spoofing Detection\n- RPM Manipulation Detection\n- Replay Attack Detection\n- DoS Attack Simulation\n- DoS Attack Detection\n- Threat Severity Classification\n- Security Metrics Dashboard\n- MITRE ATT&CK threat mapping\n- ECU Activity Monitoring\n- Critical Alert Generation\n\n---\n\n## Architecture\n\n```text\nVehicle ECUs\n      │\n      ▼\nCAN Bus Traffic Simulation\n      │\n      ▼\nRealtime Simulator\n      │\n      ▼\nVehicle Data Logs\n      │\n      ▼\nAttack Detector\n      │\n      ├── Speed Spoofing\n      ├── RPM Manipulation\n      ├── Replay Attack\n      └── DoS Flooding\n      │\n      ▼\nDetected Attacks\n      │\n      ▼\nStreamlit SOC Dashboard\n      │\n      ├── KPI Cards\n      ├── Critical Alerts\n      ├── ECU Analytics\n      ├── Replay Detection\n      └── DoS Monitoring\n```\n\n---\n\n## Attack Types Simulated\n\n| Attack | Description |\n|----------|-------------|\n| Speed Spoofing | Injecting unrealistic vehicle speed values |\n| RPM Manipulation | Modifying engine RPM readings |\n| Replay Attack | Re-sending previously captured CAN messages |\n| DoS Flooding | Flooding the CAN network with excessive messages |\n\n---\n\n## Technologies Used\n\n- Python\n- Streamlit\n- Pandas\n- Matplotlib\n\n---\n\n## How to Run\n\n\npip install -r requirements.txt\npython realtime_simulator.py\npython -m streamlit run dashboard.py\n\n\n---\n\n## Screenshots\n\n### Dashboard Overview\n\n![Dashboard](screenshots/Dashboard_Overview.png)\n\n### Attack Detection\n\n![Replay attack Detection](screenshots/Replay_attack_detection.png)\n\n![Telemetry and detected threats](screenshots/Telemetry_and_detected_threats.png)\n\n### vehicle speed analysis\n\n![vehicle speed analysis](screenshots/vehicle_speed_analysis.png)\n\n### Attacks & ECU traffic distribution\n\n![Attacks & ECU traffic distribution](screenshots/Attack_&_ECU_traffic_distribution.png)\n---\n\n\n## Author\n\nSivateja B\n\nB.Tech CSE (Cybersecurity)",
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      "readme": "# Jeep Cherokee Uconnect Hack (2015)\n\n## Overview\n\nThis repository presents a cybersecurity case study of the 2015 Jeep Cherokee Uconnect vulnerability. The research examines how security researchers remotely exploited a flaw in the Uconnect infotainment system and gained access to critical vehicle functions. The incident became one of the most significant examples of automotive cybersecurity risks. 【1-261bea】\n\n---\n\n## Background\n\nIn July 2015, security researchers Charlie Miller and Chris Valasek demonstrated a remote attack on a Jeep Cherokee by exploiting a vulnerability in the vehicle's cellular-connected Uconnect system. The attack provided access to the CAN bus, allowing control over various vehicle functions. The incident led to the recall of approximately 1.4 million vehicles. 【1-261bea】\n\n---\n\n## Objectives\n\n- Understand how the attack was performed\n- Analyze the technical vulnerabilities involved\n- Evaluate the social and ethical implications\n- Examine legal and professional responsibilities\n- Explore lessons for future vehicle security\n\n---\n\n## Key Issues\n\n### Technical Issues\n- Remote code execution\n- Weak network isolation\n- CAN bus access\n- Connected vehicle vulnerabilities\n\n### Social Issues\n- Public safety risks\n- Privacy concerns\n- Loss of consumer trust\n- Financial impact on vehicle owners\n\n### Ethical Issues\n- Responsible disclosure\n- User consent\n- Manufacturer responsibility\n- Public safety considerations\n\n### Legal Issues\n- Product liability\n- Regulatory compliance\n- Professional ethics\n- Cybercrime laws\n\n---\n\n## Lessons Learned\n\n- Security must be integrated during system design.\n- Safety-critical systems should be isolated from internet-connected components.\n- Vulnerabilities should be reported through responsible disclosure processes.\n- Strong cybersecurity practices are essential for connected vehicles.\n\n---\n\n## Conclusion\n\nThe Jeep Cherokee Uconnect hack highlighted the growing cybersecurity challenges in modern vehicles. As cars become increasingly connected, manufacturers must prioritize security, safety, and privacy to protect users and maintain public trust. 【1-261bea】\n\n---\n\n## Author\n\n**Binit Adhikari**\nLondon Metropolitan University\nCybersecurity Research Project",
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SOMEIPwn provides a complete attack toolkit for security researchers and automotive penetration testers.\n\n## Why This Matters\n\n| Protocol | What It Does | Security | Deployed In |\n|----------|-------------|----------|-------------|\n| **SOME/IP** | Inter-ECU method calls, event notifications | None — no auth, no encryption | Every Ethernet-based vehicle |\n| **SOME/IP-SD** | Service discovery via multicast | None — spoofable | Every Ethernet-based vehicle |\n| **DoIP** | Diagnostic access (ISO 13400) | None — any network participant | Every modern vehicle gateway |\n| **UDS** | ECU read/write/reset/flash (ISO 14229) | Optional SecurityAccess | Every ECU |\n\n**Zero dedicated offensive tools existed before SOMEIPwn.** Existing tools (SavvyCAN, caringcaribou) target CAN bus only.\n\n## Features\n\n### Discovery\n- **SOME/IP-SD scanner** — enumerate all services, methods, event groups on the automotive Ethernet segment\n- **DoIP vehicle identification** — discover all DoIP entities (gateways, ECUs) via broadcast\n- **Service fingerprinting** — identify ECU types and software versions\n\n### Attacks — SOME/IP\n- **Fake Service Offer** — redirect all traffic for a service to attacker (full MITM)\n- **StopOffer injection** — remove legitimate services, create race condition for replacement\n- **Method call injection** — invoke arbitrary service methods on any ECU\n- **SD flood** — service table exhaustion via random offer injection\n\n### Attacks — DoIP/UDS\n- **Routing activation** — establish unauthorized diagnostic sessions\n- **Session hijacking** — inject commands into active diagnostic sessions\n- **DID dump** — read all Data Identifiers (VIN, software versions, serial numbers)\n- **ECU reset** — hard/soft/key-off reset of any reachable ECU\n- **Memory read** — read arbitrary ECU memory via ReadMemoryByAddress\n- **Security Access brute force** — automated UDS 0x27 seed/key cracking against\n  weak key algorithms (XOR masks, byte-reverse, complement, rotate, vendor constants)\n  with NRC handling (attempt-limit, required-time-delay) and keep-alive\n- **Full UDS chain** — RoutingActivation → ExtendedSession → SecurityAccess unlock →\n  privileged op (reset / memory read / DID dump) as a single state-aware attack\n\n### MITM Proxy\n- **Transparent SOME/IP proxy** (UDP and TCP) — intercept every method call\n- **Real-time modification rules** — flip response bytes (sensor spoofing),\n  delay responses (timing attacks), drop traffic (selective DoS)\n- **Full session logging** with JSON export\n\n### Protocol Fuzzing\n- **SOME/IP header fuzzing** — invalid message types, length overflows, truncation\n- **SOME/IP-SD fuzzing** — malformed entries, length mismatches, entry floods\n- **DoIP fuzzing** — version manipulation, payload type confusion, length attacks\n- **Live delivery with crash detection** — send cases to a target and detect\n  crashes/hangs via post-case liveness probing (connected-UDP ICMP + TCP)\n- **pcap export** — write cases as framed Ethernet/IP/UDP packets for Wireshark/replay\n\n### Tooling\n- **Packet decoder** — Wireshark-style text dissection of any SOME/IP / DoIP / UDS frame\n- **Programmatic API** — `import someipwn` for use in other tools\n\n## Quick Start\n\n```bash\npip install -e .\n\n# Full demo (real packet construction, dissection, fuzzing, pcap — no network needed)\nsomeipwn demo\n\n# Scan for services (recovers IP:port/protocol from SD endpoint options)\nsomeipwn scan -t 224.224.224.245 --timeout 5\nsomeipwn scan --json\n\n# Live attacks\nsomeipwn attack -t 192.168.10.10 --attack-type doip --attack did-dump\nsomeipwn attack -t 192.168.10.10 --attack-type doip --attack security-access\nsomeipwn attack -t 192.168.10.10 --attack-type doip --attack full-uds-chain --final-op mem-read\nsomeipwn attack -t 224.224.224.245 --attack fake-offer --attacker-ip 192.168.10.99\n\n# Live fuzzing against a target + pcap export\nsomeipwn fuzz -t 192.168.10.10 --target-port 30490 --protocol udp\nsomeipwn fuzz --pcap someip_cases.pcap -o fuzz_cases.json\n\n# MITM proxy — spoof a sensor value in responses\nsomeipwn proxy -t 192.168.10.10 --flip 0x0100 0x0001 1 0xFF --log session.json\n\n# Dissect a captured packet\nsomeipwn decode \"ffff810000000024...\"\n```\n\n## Architecture\n\n```\nsomeipwn/\n├── protocols/\n│   ├── someip.py      # SOME/IP + SOME/IP-SD build/parse (incl. SD option parsing)\n│   └── doip.py        # DoIP + UDS implementation (ISO 13400 / 14229)\n├── discovery/\n│   └── scanner.py     # SOME/IP-SD + DoIP scanner with endpoint recovery\n├── attacks/\n│   └── someip_attacks.py  # MITM, session hijack, UDS exploits, security-access crack\n├── fuzzer.py          # Grammar-aware fuzzer + live delivery + crash detection\n├── proxy.py           # Transparent SOME/IP MITM proxy (UDP/TCP)\n├── decode.py          # Pure-python packet dissector\n├── pcap.py            # pcap writer (Ethernet/IP/UDP framing)\n└── cli.py             # scan / attack / fuzz / proxy / decode / demo\n```\n\n## Tests\n\n```bash\npytest tests/     # 19 tests — protocol round-trips, SD parsing, decode, pcap, crash detection\n```\n\n## Attack Chain Demo\n\n```\n1. Discovery     → SOME/IP-SD FindService broadcast → map all ECUs and services\n2. Service MITM  → Inject fake Offer → redirect Gateway traffic to attacker\n3. DoIP Hijack   → Routing Activation → inject TesterPresent into active session\n4. DID Dump      → ReadDataByIdentifier → extract VIN, SW versions, serial numbers\n5. ECU Control   → ECU Reset / IO Control → manipulate vehicle functions\n```\n\n## Responsible Use\n\nThis tool is for **authorized security testing only**. Use it on:\n- Your own test vehicles and bench setups\n- Authorized penetration testing engagements\n- The built-in `demo` command (no network — real packet construction only)\n\nNever use on production vehicles without explicit written authorization.\n\n## References\n\n- AUTOSAR SOME/IP Protocol Specification (PRS_SOMEIP_00731)\n- ISO 13400 — Diagnostics over IP\n- ISO 14229 — Unified Diagnostic Services\n- CVE-2025-2082 — Tesla VCSEC CAN RCE via TPMS (Pwn2Own 2025) *(related automotive attack surface — CAN-layer, not SOME/IP)*",
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      "full_name": "deeprooter/Security-Architecture-Cellular-Authentication-AKA-in-Modern-Connected-Vehicles",
      "name": "Security-Architecture-Cellular-Authentication-AKA-in-Modern-Connected-Vehicles",
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      "description": "This project demonstrates a foundational implementation of the 3GPP Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA) protocol—originally developed for legacy telecommunications—recontextualized for modern Automotive Cybersecurity and Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS).",
      "readme": "# Security-Architecture-Cellular-Authentication-AKA-in-Modern-Connected-Vehicles\nThis project demonstrates a foundational implementation of the 3GPP Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA) protocol—originally developed for legacy telecommunications—recontextualized for modern Automotive Cybersecurity and Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS).\n\nThe following diagram represents the sequence of the events when a user (UE) connects with a eNodeB i.e. 'Evolved Node B', an element in E-UTRA which is the core hardware base station in a 4G LTE network. It acts as the direct bridge connecting your smartphone (User Equipment) to the mobile operator's core network and handles both wireless radio transmissions and higher-layer networking tasks. As ahandshake mechanism there are set of keys genertated and exchanged for the authentication and verification.\n\n<img width=\"2960\" height=\"1595\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/ab9a31ea-b456-4f29-9251-1986128dc5a1\" />\n\n\nIn contect of security expecially with hardware backed interoperabaility, Automotive cybersecurity resembles the base concept from 3GPP as explained above.\n\nAs vehicles transition into software-defined, hyper-connected platforms, they increasingly rely on built-in Telematic Control Units (TCUs) and eSIMs to communicate with cellular networks. This code simulates the precise cryptographic engine used to authenticate a vehicle to the cloud, prevent network spoofing, and derive the session keys needed to protect safety-critical vehicle telematics.The accompanying flow diagram maps out how raw vehicular identifiers and network challenges are processed through a multi-stage cryptographic pipeline to secure both edge-to-cloud infrastructure and in-vehicle domain isolation.\n\n---\n```text\n       [ Raw Inputs: Secret Key (K), RAND, SQN, AMF ]\n                             │\n       ┌─────────────────────┴─────────────────────┐\n       ▼                                           ▼\n┌──────────────┐                            ┌──────────────┐\n│ F1 Function  │                            │ F2 Function  │\n│  (MAC_F1)    │                            │  (XRES_F2)   │\n└──────┬───────┘                            └──────┬───────┘\n       │                                           │\n       ▼                                           ▼\n    [ MAC ]                                     [ XRES ]\n (Truncated 8B)                              (Truncated 16B)\n       │                                           │\n       ▼                                           │\n┌────────────────────────────────────────┐         │\n│ Assemble AUTN Token                    │         │\n│ (AUTN = SQN || AMF || MAC)             │         │\n└──────┬─────────────────────────────────┘         │\n       │                                           │\n       └─────────────────────┬─────────────────────┘\n                             │\n                             ▼\n┌──────────────┐      ┌──────────────┐      ┌──────────────┐\n│ F3 Function  │      │ F4 Function  │      │  KASME Gen   │\n│   (CK_F3)    │      │   (IK_F4)    │      │  Derivation  │\n└──────┬───────┘      └──────┬───────┘      └──────┬───────┘\n       │                     │                     │\n       ▼                     ▼                     ▼\n    [ CK ]                [ IK ]               [ KASME ]\n(Truncated 16B)       (Truncated 16B)              │\n       │                     │                     ▼\n       │                     │              ┌──────────────┐\n       │                     │              │  KENB Gen    │\n       │                     │              │  Derivation  │\n       │                     │              └──────┬───────┘\n       │                     │                     │\n       │                     │                     ▼\n       │                     │                  [ KENB ]\n       │                     │                     │\n       └──────────────┬──────┴─────────────────────┘\n                      │\n                      ▼\n┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐\n│             Assemble Final Vector V                      │\n│     (V = RAND || XRES || CK || IK || AUTN)               │\n└──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘\n```\n\n\n---\n\n# Mapping Telecom Cryptography to Automotive Cybersecurity\n\nThe execution logs of the 3GPP Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA) protocol capture a cryptographic sequence that maps directly to critical automotive security primitives across four distinct layers.\n\n---\n\n### 1. Preventing Rogue Infrastructure & Spoofing (`MAC_F1` & `AUTN`)\n\n* **The Telecom Concept:**\n  The `F1` function calculates a Message Authentication Code (`MAC`) packaged inside an Authentication Token (`AUTN`) to enforce mutual network authentication.\n* **The Automotive Application:**\n  This serves as the primary defense against **Rogue Base Stations** (e.g., IMSI Catchers or Stingrays). In connected vehicles, an attacker spoofing a cell tower can push malicious Over-the-Air (OTA) firmware updates or transmit fraudulent Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) safety commands (like emergency braking). The `AUTN` ensures the vehicle's Telematic Control Unit (TCU) cryptographically verifies that the cell tower or Roadside Unit (RSU) is authentic *before* processing or executing external instructions.\n\n---\n\n### 2. Vehicle Identity & Zero-Trust Access (`XRES_F2`)\n\n* **The Telecom Concept:**\n  The `F2` function calculates the Expected Response (`XRES`), cryptographically validating the subscriber's unique identity.\n* **The Automotive Application:**\n  This framework provides a foundation for **Zero-Trust Network Access (ZTNA)** for vehicles interacting with cloud ecosystems. It applies to fleet management portals, electric vehicle (EV) charging station payment systems, and Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) backends. By requiring the vehicle's hardware-bound eSIM to solve the cryptographic challenge (`XRES`) using a securely stored master key, the backend network guarantees that the interacting node is a legitimate, uncompromised vehicle asset and not a cloned software emulator.\n\n---\n\n### 3. Over-the-Air Confidentiality & Message Integrity (`CK_F3` & `IK_F4`)\n\n* **The Telecom Concept:**\n  Parallel derivation of the Cipher Key (`CK`) for data privacy and the Integrity Key (`IK`) to prevent signal tampering.\n* **The Automotive Application:**\n  * **`CK` (Privacy):** Encrypts remote vehicle commands (such as remote start, locking systems, and GPS telemetry logs) so that malicious actors cannot eavesdrop on or sniff sensitive operational data over wireless frequencies.\n  * **`IK` (Integrity):** Cryptographically signs telemetry bundles and vehicle diagnostic messages. This mitigates **Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) alterations**, guaranteeing that safety-critical sensor data transmitted to the cloud cannot be manipulated or injected mid-transit.\n\n---\n\n### 4. Defense-in-Depth & Domain Isolation ($K_{ASME}$ & $K_{eNB}$)\n\n* **The Telecom Concept:**\n  A hierarchical derivation where a master key ($K_{ASME}$) generates a localized, transient session key ($K_{eNB}$) dedicated entirely to a single physical cell tower.\n* **The Automotive Application:**\n  This aligns directly with the architectural requirements for **In-Vehicle Domain Isolation** and **Blast Radius Mitigation**. By leveraging a secure root key to generate localized, temporary session keys for specific edge infrastructure nodes, the architecture enforces strict isolation. If an adversary physically breaches a single cellular base station or localized RSU, the compromise remains strictly contained. The root vehicle identities remain secure, preventing a localized perimeter breach from scaling into a catastrophic, fleet-wide cyberattack.\n\n---\n\n> ### 📝 Licensing Note\n> This documentation and architectural mapping are licensed under the **Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0)** license. You are free to share and adapt this material provided appropriate credit is given.",
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      "title": "ECU-Cyber-Integrity-Lab",
      "full_name": "Zukhra-Abdulaeva/ECU-Cyber-Integrity-Lab",
      "name": "ECU-Cyber-Integrity-Lab",
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      "description": "The ECU‑Cyber‑Integrity‑Lab is a practical automotive white‑box penetration‑testing project for the structured security assessment of connected vehicle systems and ECUs. It integrates architecture analysis, security testing, diagnostics, firmware review, risk evaluation and engineering recommendations to enhance automotive cybersecurity resilience.",
      "readme": "# ECU-Cyber-Integrity-Lab\n\n## Automotive White-Box Security Assessment\n\n**Author:** Zukhra Abdulaeva\n\n**Focus:** Automotive Cybersecurity • Embedded Systems • Security Testing • Python Automation\n\nA practical laboratory project for the structured security assessment of connected vehicle systems and Electronic Control Units (ECUs).\n\nThe project applies a White-Box perspective to automotive cybersecurity and combines system and architecture analysis with technical security testing, diagnostic assessment, firmware review, risk assessment and engineering recommendations.\n\nThe repository contains selected implementations, test structures, documentation, examples and evidence artifacts. The current implementation state is documented separately from the broader project scope and planned extensions.\n\n---\n\n## Project Identity\n\n`ECU-Cyber-Integrity-Lab` is an automotive cybersecurity engineering laboratory for structured White-Box assessment of ECU-oriented systems, communication interfaces, diagnostic services, firmware and related security mechanisms.\n\nThe project is organized around a traceable engineering workflow in which implementation, execution, observation, evidence and verification are treated as separate technical states.\n\n---\n\n## Project Purpose\n\nThe purpose of the project is to provide a reproducible technical environment for examining automotive cybersecurity concepts and carrying out security-assessment activities in a controlled laboratory context.\n\nThe engineering workflow connects:\n\n```text\nSystem and Architecture Understanding\n            |\n            v\nThreat and Security Analysis\n            |\n            v\nTechnical Security Testing\n            |\n            v\nObservation and Evidence\n            |\n            v\nRisk and Root-Cause Analysis\n            |\n            v\nSecurity Improvement\n```\n\nThe workflow describes the intended engineering method. It does not imply that every activity is currently implemented, executed or verified in the repository.\n\n---\n\n## Project Overview\n\nModern vehicles integrate numerous ECUs, communication networks, diagnostic interfaces and software components. Increasing connectivity creates a complex attack surface that must be considered throughout the security-engineering process.\n\nThe project covers engineering activities including:\n\n- system and architecture analysis\n- threat modeling\n- source-code and implementation review\n- communication and network security testing\n- UDS diagnostic security assessment\n- firmware review\n- Python-based security testing and automation\n- risk assessment\n- technical reporting\n- engineering recommendations\n- establishment of an ECU‑oriented security‑domain model\n- structured definition of ECUs/components, communication domains, interfaces, assets, and security properties\n\nThese activities describe the project scope. The repository currently contains implementations for selected areas, while other activities remain contextual or planned.\n\n---\n\n## Assessment Workflow\n\nThe assessment workflow is structured around the following activities:\n\n```text\n1. Scope Definition\n2. System Architecture Review\n3. Threat Modeling\n4. White-Box Code Analysis\n5. Communication and Network Security Assessment\n6. UDS Security Assessment\n7. Firmware Review\n8. Python Security Automation\n9. Risk Assessment\n10. Technical Reporting\n11. Engineering Recommendations\n```\n\nIndividual activities are represented by repository implementations, documentation, examples or planned extensions according to their respective scope.\n\n---\n\n## Automotive Context\n\nThe project is positioned within the security context of modern connected vehicle systems.\n\nThe automotive context includes technologies, system components and security mechanisms such as:\n\n```text\nVehicle and ECU Architecture\n\n* Electronic Control Units (ECUs)\n* Gateway ECUs\n* Body Control Modules (BCMs)\n* Powertrain ECUs\n* Infotainment ECUs\n* Telematics Control Units (TCUs)\n* ADAS Controllers\n\nVehicle Communication\n\n* CAN\n* CAN FD\n* Automotive Ethernet\n* LIN\n* FlexRay\n\nDiagnostics and External Interfaces\n\n* UDS\n* OBD-II\n* Bluetooth\n* USB\n* Wi-Fi\n* Cellular connectivity\n* OTA update mechanisms\n\nSecurity Engineering Areas\n\n* Gateway and trust-boundary concepts\n* Diagnostic services\n* Firmware integrity\n* Firmware security\n* Secure Boot\n* Network communication\n* Remote connectivity\n* Threat modeling\n* Security requirements\n* Risk assessment\n```\n\nThe technologies and areas above define the automotive engineering context. Their inclusion does not indicate that the corresponding technology or security mechanism is implemented in the repository.\n\n### Currently Implemented\n\nThe repository contains technical implementations for selected areas:\n\n```text\nCommunication and Diagnostics\n\n* CAN message capture\n* Virtual CAN message generation\n* CAN security test structure\n* UDS request and response handling\n* UDS security-related test structure\n\nFirmware\n\n* Firmware SHA-256 integrity calculation\n* Firmware integrity checking\n* Firmware comparison\n\nNetwork\n\n* Ethernet / IP network scanning\n* Nmap-based network and port scanning\n\nAssessment and Reporting\n\n* Python-based security assessment tooling\n* Test infrastructure\n* Report-generation component\n* Assessment evidence and report artifacts\n```\n\nThe repository also contains `config.py` and `logger.py` files. Their presence does not establish an implemented configuration or logging capability. The current implementation state of these components is documented in `docs/current_state.md`.\n\nThe listed implementations are not presented as fully integrated, end-to-end or real-vehicle functionality. Execution and verification are assessed separately from implementation.\n\n### Planned / Future\n\nThe broader automotive context provides a basis for future extensions of the laboratory.\n\nPotential extensions include:\n\n```text\nCommunication and Network Security\n\n* CAN FD security testing\n* LIN security assessment\n* FlexRay security assessment\n* Extended Automotive Ethernet analysis\n* SOME/IP security testing\n\nDiagnostics and External Interfaces\n\n* Extended OBD-II security assessment\n* Bluetooth security assessment\n* USB security assessment\n* Wi-Fi security assessment\n* Cellular security assessment\n* OTA security assessment\n\nEmbedded and Firmware Security\n\n* Extended firmware analysis\n* Secure Boot validation\n* Additional firmware security analysis\n\nSecurity Engineering\n\n* Extended threat modeling\n* Additional security test automation\n* Integrated evidence and finding workflows\n* Regression security validation\n* CI/CD security validation\n```\n\nThese areas describe planned or future project scope. They are not presented as implemented functionality without corresponding implementation and supporting evidence.\n\n### Context and Implementation Boundary\n\nThe relationship between project context, current implementation and planned extensions is:\n\n```text\nAUTOMOTIVE CONTEXT\n    |\n    +-- ECU architecture\n    +-- Vehicle networks\n    +-- Diagnostics\n    +-- Firmware\n    +-- External interfaces\n    +-- Security mechanisms\n    |\n    v\nECU / SECURITY DOMAIN MODEL\n    |\n    +-- ECU / component context\n    +-- Communication domains\n    +-- Interfaces\n    +-- Assets\n    +-- Security properties\n    +-- Security-domain relationships\n    |\n    v\nCURRENT IMPLEMENTATION\n    |\n    +-- CAN\n    +-- UDS\n    +-- Firmware validation\n    +-- Ethernet / IP network scanning\n    +-- Reporting component\n    +-- Python security tooling\n    |\n    v\nPLANNED / FUTURE\n    |\n    +-- Additional automotive protocols\n    +-- Extended security analysis\n    +-- Additional test automation\n    +-- Evidence and finding workflows\n    +-- Regression validation\n    +-- CI/CD security validation\n```\n\nThis separation keeps the automotive engineering context distinct from repository functionality and planned scope.\n\n---\n\n## Non-Scope\n\nThe project does not represent:\n\n```text\n- Production vehicle security validation\n- OEM fleet security validation\n- Validation of a specific production ECU\n- Validation of a production vehicle\n- Real-world penetration testing of third-party systems\n- Production security certification\n- Formal ISO/SAE 21434 compliance certification\n- OEM security approval\n- Fleet-wide security assurance\n```\n\nExample data, simulated communication, local test execution and documented expectations are not treated as evidence of behavior in a production vehicle or production ECU.\n\n---\n\n## Simulation Boundary\n\nThe laboratory may use virtual, simulated or locally controlled environments to reproduce automotive security concepts.\n\nExamples include:\n\n```text\n* Virtual CAN interfaces\n* Locally generated CAN messages\n* Local ECU or diagnostic models\n* Protocol-level test scenarios\n* Synthetic firmware inputs\n* Locally generated security-test data\n```\n\nThese activities are valid laboratory engineering activities when their execution context is explicitly identified. Simulation, emulation and synthetic data remain distinguishable from observations obtained from a real ECU, real vehicle, production network or OEM environment.\n\n---\n\n## Real-World Validation Boundary\n\nReal-world validation requires an appropriate physical target, defined test environment and corresponding execution evidence.\n\nExamples include:\n\n```text\n* Physical ECU\n* Physical CAN or CAN FD network\n* Physical Automotive Ethernet network\n* Vehicle diagnostic interface\n* Production-representative firmware\n* Controlled vehicle test environment\n```\n\nThe presence of test code or example artifacts does not by itself establish validation against a physical ECU, production vehicle, OEM environment or fleet.\n\n---\n\n## White-Box Approach\n\nThe project is based on a White-Box assessment model in which technical information about the assessment target is available for analysis.\n\nDepending on the assessment scope, this may include:\n\n```text\n* ECU Documentation\n* Source Code\n* Firmware Images\n* ODX / PDX Diagnostic Descriptions\n* Communication Matrix\n* Network Architecture\n* Security Requirements\n```\n\nThe White-Box approach allows security analysis to consider implementation details, architectural dependencies and potential root causes in addition to externally observable behavior. The depth of an assessment depends on the technical information available for the respective assessment target.\n\n---\n\n## Assessment Methodology\n\nThe assessment methodology incorporates established automotive cybersecurity concepts and engineering practices, including:\n\n```text\n* ISO/SAE 21434\n* Secure Development Lifecycle (SDL)\n* Threat Modeling\n* Secure Coding\n* Root Cause Analysis\n* Risk Assessment\n```\n\nThese concepts provide methodological guidance for structuring security assessment activities and documenting technical results. Their inclusion does not constitute a compliance or certification claim.\n\n---\n\n## Security Engineering Goals\n\nThe primary engineering goals are:\n\n```text\n* Understand the system and its security boundaries\n* Identify relevant assets and security properties\n* Identify threats and attack surfaces\n* Define technically meaningful security tests\n* Execute tests within a controlled environment\n* Capture actual observations\n* Preserve reproducible evidence\n* Distinguish confirmed observations from assumptions and examples\n* Assess security impact and risk\n* Identify technically supported root causes\n* Derive practical security improvements\n* Support retesting and regression validation\n```\n\nThe engineering focus is on traceability between security objectives, technical tests, observations, evidence and resulting assessments.\n\n---\n\n## Security Domains\n\n### ECU / Security Domain Model\n\nThe project defines an ECU / Security Domain Model covering:\n\n```text\nECU / Component\nCommunication Domains\nInterfaces\nAssets\nSecurity Properties\nSecurity-Domain Relationships\nAttack-Surface Context\nTraceability\nBoundaries\n```\n\nThe model provides the structural relationship between ECU-oriented elements and the existing technical security-assessment scope.\n\n### Communication and Network Security\n\nThe communication and network security domain covers technologies relevant to the project context and its implementations:\n\n```text\nCAN\nCAN FD\nAutomotive Ethernet\nSocketCAN\nWireshark\nScapy\nCANoe\n```\n\nThe current repository contains CAN-related Python tooling and network-scanning functionality. Other technologies listed here provide broader technical context unless corresponding implementation and execution evidence is available.\n\n### Diagnostic Security\n\nThe diagnostic security domain includes:\n\n```text\nUDS\nISO 14229\nSecurity Access\nDiagnostic Services\n```\n\nThe repository contains Python-based UDS request and response handling and a corresponding test structure.\n\n### Firmware Security\n\nThe firmware-security domain includes:\n\n```text\nFirmware Images\nBinwalk\nFirmware Mod Kit\nSecure Boot\nFirmware Review\n```\n\nThe repository contains firmware hashing, integrity comparison and firmware review material. Additional firmware-security technologies remain contextual or planned unless corresponding implementation and evidence are available.\n\n### Source-Code and Static Analysis\n\nThe White-Box and static-analysis domain includes:\n\n```text\nCodeQL\nCoverity\nSonarQube\nCppcheck\n```\n\nThese tools represent analysis technologies within the project context. Their inclusion does not indicate that the corresponding analysis has been executed.\n\n### Security Automation\n\nThe Python-based automation environment includes:\n\n```text\nPython\npytest\npython-can\ncan-isotp\npython-nmap\n```\n\nThese technologies support the project's security-testing and automation approach.\n\n### Risk Assessment\n\nThe risk-assessment domain includes:\n\n```text\nCVSS\nRisk Assessment\nSecurity Findings\nRoot Cause Analysis\n```\n\nRisk assessment and root-cause analysis are part of the engineering workflow. Example findings and proposed assessments are not automatically confirmed security findings.\n\n---\n\n## Evidence Principle\n\nSecurity conclusions are limited to what the available evidence supports.\n\nA test definition, source-code implementation or documented expectation does not establish that the corresponding behavior was observed during execution.\n\nWhere applicable, evidence records preserve:\n\n```text\nTest Identifier\nTarget\nEnvironment\nPreconditions\nInput\nExpected Behavior\nActual Observation\nExecution Status\nResult\nTimestamp\nArtifacts\nTooling / Execution Method\nProvenance\n```\n\nEvidence is interpreted according to its actual provenance and execution context.\n\n---\n\n## Truth-State Model\n\nThe project distinguishes between the following technical states:\n\n```text\nPlanned\nDesigned\nImplemented\nExecuted\nObserved\nVerified\nDocumented\n```\n\nThese states describe different engineering conditions and are not interchangeable.\n\nIn particular:\n\n```text\nImplemented != Executed\nExecuted != Observed\nObserved != Verified\nExpected != Observed\nExample != Evidence\nSimulation != Real-World Validation\n```\n\n---\n\n## Security Assessment and Findings\n\nSecurity analysis follows a traceable engineering chain:\n\n```text\nAsset\n  |\n  v\nSecurity Property\n  |\n  v\nThreat\n  |\n  v\nAttack Surface\n  |\n  v\nAttack Vector\n  |\n  v\nAttacker Capability\n  |\n  v\nPreconditions\n  |\n  v\nAttack Path\n  |\n  v\nTest Objective\n  |\n  v\nTest Design\n  |\n  v\nExecution\n  |\n  v\nObservation\n  |\n  v\nEvidence\n  |\n  v\nFinding\n  |\n  v\nImpact\n  |\n  v\nRisk\n  |\n  v\nMitigation\n  |\n  v\nRetest / Verification\n```\n\nA confirmed security finding requires sufficient execution and evidence to support the conclusion.\n\nWhere evidence is incomplete, an assessment can instead be represented as:\n\n```text\nATTACK HYPOTHESIS\nPOTENTIAL FINDING\nPROPOSED\nUNVERIFIED\nINCONCLUSIVE\nBLOCKED\n```\n\nExample findings and example assessment results remain examples unless supporting evidence establishes the corresponding security condition.\n\n---\n\n## Assessment Results\n\nExecutable security tests use explicit result semantics:\n\n```text\nPASS\nFAIL\nNOT_RUN\nINCONCLUSIVE\nBLOCKED\n```\n\nA `PASS` or `FAIL` result requires actual execution, a defined evaluation criterion and supporting evidence. Expected behavior is recorded separately from actual observation.\n\n---\n\n## Repository Structure\n\nThe repository is organized into the following main areas:\n\n```text\na_framework/\n    Common assessment framework components\n\nb_security_tests/\n    Technical security tests and test implementations\n\nc_evidence/\n    Assessment evidence and execution-related artifacts\n\nd_examples/\n    Assessment methodology and example documentation\n\ne_security_reports/\n    Assessment reports and report-generation outputs\n\ndocs/\n    Project and technical documentation\n```\n\nThe structure reflects the current repository organization; individual components may have different implementation and verification states.\n\n---\n\n## Documentation Structure\n\nThe README is the stable project entry point. Detailed project definition, current state and technical documentation are maintained separately.\n\n```text\nREADME.md\n    Stable project entry point and compact project overview\n\ndocs/project_definition_and_phase_history.md\n    Project definition, detailed scope, engineering models,\n    phase structure and historical phase information\n\ndocs/environment.md\n    Development environment and setup information\n\ndocs/architecture_decisions.md\n    Architecture decisions and their technical rationale\n\ndocs/testing.md\n    Testing approach and execution guidance\n\ndocs/ecu_security_domain_model.md\n\n    ECU-oriented security domain model including ECU / component\n    context, communication domains, interfaces, assets, security\n    properties, relationships, boundaries and model traceability\n\ndocs/current_state.md\n    Current repository, implementation, execution,\n    evidence and verification state\n\ndocs/White-Box-Ansatz.png\n    White-Box assessment concept\n\ndocs/Automotive_Security_Assessment.pdf\n    Automotive security assessment reference material\n```\n\nThe documentation separates stable project definition and methodology from the evolving technical current state so that implementation, execution, evidence and verification remain traceable.\n\n---\n\n## Reproducibility\n\nThe project is structured to support reproducible laboratory work through:\n\n```text\nDefined repository structure\nVersion-controlled project files\nPython dependencies\nDocumented development environment\nExplicit test procedures\nSeparate evidence artifacts\nDefined execution and result semantics\n```\n\nThe development environment and setup requirements are documented in `docs/environment.md`.\n\nReproducibility depends on the availability of the required software, interfaces, test targets and execution environment for the respective activity.\n\n---\n\n## Engineering Principle\n\nThe project applies one fundamental rule when interpreting technical results:\n\n```text\nImplementation\n     |\n     v\nExecution\n     |\n     v\nObservation\n     |\n     v\nConclusion\n```\n\nEach conclusion must remain within the scope established by the preceding technical evidence.",
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      "title": "🚗🔒 Trustworthy Autonomous Vehicles",
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      "description": "Trust-aware cybersecurity framework combining sensor trust evaluation and ML anomaly detection for autonomous vehicles and drones",
      "readme": "# 🚗🔒 Trustworthy Autonomous Vehicles\n\n## 📌 Overview\n\nAutonomous vehicles use artificial intelligence, sensors, and software to make real-time decisions. However, unreliable sensor readings, sensor inconsistencies, and anomalous behavior can create safety and cybersecurity risks.\n\nThis project presents a Trust-Aware Cybersecurity Framework for Autonomous Vehicles. The system combines rule-based sensor trust evaluation with machine-learning anomaly detection to identify potentially unsafe or suspicious vehicle behavior.\n\nThe project currently includes both a vehicle monitoring system and a drone security simulation.\n\n\n\n## 🎯 Objectives\n\n* Monitor autonomous vehicle and drone sensor data\n* Evaluate sensor consistency and reliability\n* Calculate trust and risk scores\n* Detect anomalous sensor behavior using Machine Learning\n* Combine rule-based trust with ML anomaly detection\n* Generate NORMAL, SUSPICIOUS, and HIGH RISK security decisions\n* Provide a visual monitoring dashboard using Streamlit\n\n\n\n## 🏗️ System Architecture\n\n### Processing Pipeline\n\nGPS + IMU + Camera + Distance\n              ↓\n        Trust Engine\n              ↓\n       Trust + Risk Score\n              ↓\n       Isolation Forest\n              ↓\n        ML Anomaly\n              ↓\n      Security Engine\n              ↓\n NORMAL / SUSPICIOUS / HIGH RISK\n              ↓\n      Streamlit Dashboard\n\n\n\n## 🚁 Drone Security System\n\n### The drone simulation uses multiple sensor inputs:\n\n* GPS speed\n* IMU speed\n* Camera confidence\n* Distance\n\nThe system evaluates these values for consistency and reliability.\n\n### Trust Calculation\n\nThe Trust Engine calculates a trust score between 0 and 1.\n\nTrust Score ≥ 0.8  → HIGH\nTrust Score ≥ 0.5  → MEDIUM\nTrust Score < 0.5  → LOW\n\n### Risk Calculation\n\nRisk is calculated from the trust score:\n\nRisk = (1 - Trust Score) × 100\n\n\n\n## 🤖 ML Anomaly Detection\n\nThe system uses the Isolation Forest algorithm to detect unusual sensor behavior.\n\n### ML Features\n\nThe model uses:\n\n* GPS speed\n* IMU speed\n* Camera confidence\n* Distance\n\n### ML Output\n\nNORMAL\nANOMALY\n\n\n\n## 📊 ML Performance\n\nThe Isolation Forest model was evaluated using 130 labeled sensor samples.\n\n### Classification Results\n\nMetric\tNORMAL\tANOMALY\nPrecision\t0.91\t0.81\nRecall\t0.95\t0.70\nF1-Score\t0.93\t0.75\n\n### Overall Accuracy\n\n89%\n\n### Confusion Matrix\n\nActual / Predicted\tNORMAL\tANOMALY\nNORMAL\t95\t5\nANOMALY\t9\t21\n\n### Model Interpretation\n\nThe model correctly identified:\n\n* 95 normal samples\n* 21 anomalous samples\n\n#### It incorrectly classified:\n\n* 5 normal samples as anomalies\n* 9 anomalous samples as normal\n\nThis demonstrates that the current model is a working prototype, but further improvement is required before real-world deployment.\n\n\n\n## 🛡️ Security Engine\n\n#### The Security Engine combines the Trust Engine result with the ML anomaly result.\n\n### Decision Logic\n\nHIGH Trust + NORMAL\n        ↓\n     NORMAL\nLOW Trust + NORMAL\n        ↓\n   SUSPICIOUS\nHIGH Trust + ANOMALY\n        ↓\n   SUSPICIOUS\nLOW Trust + ANOMALY\n        ↓\n    HIGH RISK\n\n### Security Decision Levels\n\n|  Trust Level   |    ML Result\t    |   Security Status  |\n|----------------|------------------|--------------------|\n|HIGH\t           |  NORMAL\t        |NORMAL              |\n|LOW\t           |  NORMAL\t        |SUSPICIOUS          |\n|HIGH\t           |  ANOMALY\t        |SUSPICIOUS          |\n|LOW\t           |  ANOMALY\t        |HIGH RISK           |\n\n\nThis layered approach allows rule-based sensor reliability and ML anomaly detection to contribute to the final security decision.\n\n\n## 🧪 Integration Testing\n\nThe complete security pipeline was tested using controlled high-risk sensor conditions.\n\n### High-Risk Test\n\nLOW TRUST\n    +\nML ANOMALY\n    ↓\nHIGH RISK\n\n\n\n## 📸 Project Demo\n\n###  High-Risk Integration Test\n\n![High-Risk Integration Test](docs/screenshots/test_high_risk.png)\n\n### System-Architecture\n\n![System architecture](docs/screenshots/architecture.png)\n\n### Dashboard\n\n![Dashboard](docs/screenshots/project-dashboard.png)\n![Dashboard](docs/screenshots/dashboard2.png)\n\n\n\n### Test Results\n\nTest Case\tTrust Level\tML Result\tSecurity Status\n1\tLOW\tANOMALY\tHIGH RISK\n2\tLOW\tANOMALY\tHIGH RISK\n3\tLOW\tANOMALY\tHIGH RISK\n\nThe integration test successfully confirmed the intended high-risk decision logic.\n\n\n\n## ✨ Key Features\n\n- 🔐 **Sensor Trust Evaluation** — Evaluates the reliability of sensor inputs.\n- 🤖 **ML Anomaly Detection** — Detects abnormal sensor behavior using machine learning.\n- 🚨 **Risk Classification** — Classifies system conditions based on trust and anomaly results.\n- 🧠 **Trust-Aware Decision Making** — Combines sensor trust and ML results for security decisions.\n- 📊 **Streamlit Dashboard** — Provides a visual interface for monitoring system status.\n- 🧪 **High-Risk Integration Testing** — Tests the framework against inconsistent and anomalous sensor inputs.\n- 🚗 **Autonomous Vehicle Support** — Designed for autonomous vehicle cybersecurity scenarios.\n- 🚁 **Drone Support** — The framework can also be applied to drone sensor-security scenarios.\n\n\n\n  ## 🛠️ Technology Stack\n\n|    Technology    |              Purpose                  |\n|------------------|---------------------------------------|\n| Python           | Core development and data processing  |\n| Scikit-learn     | Machine learning and anomaly detection|\n| Isolation Forest | ML-based anomaly detection            |\n| Streamlit        | Interactive security dashboard        |\n| Pandas           | Sensor data processing                |\n| NumPy            | Numerical computations                |\n| Git & GitHub     | Version control and project management|\n\n\n\n## 📊 Streamlit Dashboard\n\nThe Streamlit dashboard provides monitoring for both the vehicle and drone systems.\n\n## 🚗 Vehicle Monitor\n\n### Displays:\n\n* Average Trust\n* Average Risk\n* Detected Attacks\n* Sensor information\n* Trust score\n* Risk score\n* Security status\n\n## 🚁 Drone Monitor\n\n### Displays:\n\n* Average Trust\n* Average Risk\n* ML Anomalies\n* High Risk cases\n* Sensor information\n* Trust score\n* Risk score\n* Trust level\n* ML anomaly\n* Security status\n* Explanation/reason\n\n\n\n## 🧰 Technologies Used\n\n* Python\n* Pandas\n* NumPy\n* Scikit-learn\n* Isolation Forest\n* Streamlit\n* Git\n* GitHub\n\n\n\n## 📁 Project Structure\n\ntrustworthy-autonomous-vehicles/\n│\n├── app.py\n├── README.md\n│\n├── data/\n│   ├── sensor_data.csv\n│   ├── drone_sensor_data.csv\n│   └── drone_training_data.csv\n│\n├── docs/\n│   └── architecture.jpeg\n│\n└── src/\n    ├── security_engine.py\n    ├── trust_engine.py\n    ├── drone_trust_engine.py\n    ├── drone_anomaly_detector.py\n    ├── drone_security_engine.py\n    ├── generate_drone_data.py\n    └── test_high_risk.py\n\n\n\n    ## ⚙️ How It Works\n\nThe framework follows a trust-aware security pipeline:\n\n1. **Sensor Data Collection**\n   - Collects inputs such as GPS speed, IMU speed, camera confidence, and distance.\n\n2. **Sensor Trust Evaluation**\n   - Compares sensor readings and evaluates their consistency.\n   - Generates a trust score and trust level.\n\n3. **ML Anomaly Detection**\n   - Uses **Isolation Forest** to identify abnormal sensor behavior.\n\n4. **Risk Assessment**\n   - Combines the trust evaluation and ML anomaly result.\n   - Determines whether the current situation is normal or high risk.\n\n5. **Security Decision**\n   - Produces the final security status based on the detected risk.\n\n6. **Visualization**\n   - The Streamlit dashboard displays the sensor data, trust results, anomaly detection, and security status.\n\n\n\n## 🚀 How to Run\n\n#### 1. Install Dependencies\n\n    pip install pandas scikit-learn streamlit\n\n#### 2. Run the ML Anomaly Detector\n\n    python src/drone_anomaly_detector.py\n\n#### 3. Run the Drone Security Engine\n\n    python -m src.drone_security_engine\n\n#### 4. Run the High-Risk Integration Test\n\n    python -m src.test_high_risk\n\n#### 5. Run the Streamlit Dashboard\n\n    python -m streamlit run app.py\n\n  Then open the local Streamlit URL shown in the terminal.\n\n\n\n## 🔬 Testing Summary\n\n### Component\tResult\nTrust calculation\t✅ Passed\nRisk calculation\t✅ Passed\nSensor consistency\t✅ Passed\nIsolation Forest\t✅ Passed\nML anomaly detection\t✅ Passed\nML validation\t✅ 89% accuracy\nTrust + ML integration\t✅ Passed\nNORMAL decision\t✅ Passed\nSUSPICIOUS decision\t✅ Passed\nHIGH RISK decision\t✅ Passed\nStreamlit dashboard\t✅ Passed\n\n\n\n## ⚠️ Limitations\n\nThis project is a research and educational prototype.\n\n### The current system:\n\n* Uses simulated sensor data\n* Uses a relatively small dataset\n* Uses a rule-based trust model\n* Uses an unsupervised Isolation Forest model\n* Has not been tested on a real autonomous vehicle\n* Is not suitable for safety-critical deployment\n\nThe 89% accuracy should therefore be interpreted as a prototype evaluation result, not evidence of production-level autonomous vehicle security.\n\n\n\n## 🔮 Future Improvements\n\n* Real-time sensor integration\n* Larger and more diverse datasets\n* Advanced sensor fusion\n* Adaptive trust models\n* Real-time cyberattack detection\n* More advanced anomaly detection models\n* Explainable AI improvements\n* Hardware-based autonomous vehicle testing\n* Continuous model evaluation\n* Real-world cybersecurity attack datasets\n\n\n\n## 📌 Project Status\n\n### Current Status: First Complete ML Prototype ✅\n\nThe current implementation demonstrates a complete pipeline from simulated sensor data to:\n\nSensor Data → Trust Evaluation → ML Anomaly Detection → Security Decision → Streamlit Visualization\n\nThe next phase is focused on testing, optimization, documentation, and evaluation, rather than adding unnecessary features.\n\n\n\n## 👩‍💻 Project\n\n### Trustworthy Autonomous Vehicles: Cybersecurity & AI Framework\n\nA project exploring how sensor trust evaluation and machine-learning anomaly detection can be combined to improve the security and reliability of autonomous systems.",
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      "readme": "# Automotive Ethernet Network Security Framework\n\nA Python-based framework for simulating and testing automotive protocols like DoIP (over IPv6 with optional TLS) and SOME/IP (over IPv4), with focus on security vulnerabilities.\n\n## Overview\n\nThis project provides a complete lab environment for exploring Automotive Ethernet protocols, including diagnostics (DoIP over IPv6 with optional TLS) and service-oriented communication (SOME/IP over IPv4). It includes ECU simulations, a legitimate tester, and attacker tools to demonstrate real-world security issues like brute-force attacks, downgrade vulnerabilities, and DoS.\n\nKey goals:\n- Educate on automotive network protocols\n- Demonstrate security weaknesses\n- Provide hands-on red-team tools\n\n## Team Members\n+  [Medhat Elessawy](https://github.com/MedhatElessawy)\n+  [Omar Mohsen](https://github.com/OmarMohsen9)\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Linux (Kali recommended for security tools)\n- Python 3.8+\n- Scapy, keyboard, someipy (install via `pip install -r requirements.txt`)\n- Sudo access for network setup and keyboard hotkeys\n\n## Setup\n\n1. Clone the repo:\n```bash\nhttps://github.com/MedhatElessawy/Automotive-Ethernet-Network-Security-Framework\ncd Automotive-Ethernet-Network-Security-Framework\n```\n2. Create virtual environment:\n```bash\npython3 -m venv venv\nsource venv/bin/activate\n```\n3. Install dependencies:\n```bash\npip3 install -r requirements.txt\n```\n4. Setup network namespaces (run as sudo):\n```bash\nsudo bash scripts/setup_network.sh\n```\n(or with MACsec: `sudo bash scripts/setup_network_with_macsec.sh`)\n\n## Running the Lab\n\nOpen 4 terminals, enter namespaces, activate venv:\n\n1. **Main ECU** (Zonal Gateway):\n- Enter namespace: `sudo ip netns exec ecu1 bash`\n- Activate venv: `source /path/to/venv/bin/activate`\n- Run: `python3 src/main_ecu.py`\n\n2. **Buttons ECU** (HMI Simulator):\n- Enter namespace: `sudo ip netns exec vbuttons bash`\n- Activate venv\n- Run: `python3 src/buttons_ecu.py`\n\n3. **Tester** (Diagnostic Tool):\n- Enter namespace: `sudo ip netns exec ecu2 bash`\n- Activate venv\n- Run: `python3 src/tester.py`\n\n4. **Attacker** (Unified Tool):\n- Enter namespace: `sudo ip netns exec attacker_ns bash`\n- Activate venv\n- Run: `python3 attackers/unified_attacker.py `\n\nFor downgrade attack:\n- Run: `python3 attackers/downgrade_attack.py` (in attacker namespace)\n\nFor Lab Manual please check [LAB_MANUAL.md](https://github.com/MedhatElessawy/Automotive-Ethernet-Network-Security-Framework/blob/main/docs/LAB_MANUAL.md).\n\nFor more detailed Technical documentation, please check the [Technical Documentation](https://github.com/MedhatElessawy/Automotive-Ethernet-Network-Security-Framework/blob/main/docs/TECHNICAL_DOCUMENTATION.md).",
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      "title": "CAN Analysis and TARA",
      "full_name": "Jkbarros/can-analysis-tara-emu",
      "name": "can-analysis-tara-emu",
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      "description": "IA 495 capstone (EMU): CAN bus security & TARA — DoS experiments on a 2016 GMC Sierra instrument-cluster test bench (SocketCAN, can-utils, Python).",
      "readme": "# CAN Analysis and TARA\n\n[![Live demo](https://img.shields.io/website?url=https%3A%2F%2Fjkbarros.github.io%2Fcan-analysis-tara-emu%2F&label=demo&style=for-the-badge)](https://jkbarros.github.io/can-analysis-tara-emu/)\n[![GitHub](https://img.shields.io/badge/GitHub-can--analysis--tara--emu-181717?style=for-the-badge&logo=github)](https://github.com/Jkbarros/can-analysis-tara-emu)\n[![License: MIT](https://img.shields.io/github/license/Jkbarros/can-analysis-tara-emu?style=for-the-badge)](LICENSE)\n[![Python](https://img.shields.io/badge/Python-3-scripts-3776AB?style=for-the-badge&logo=python&logoColor=white)](scripts/)\n[![SocketCAN](https://img.shields.io/badge/SocketCAN-can--utils-005571?style=for-the-badge)](docs/can-utils-upstream.md)\n[![Capstone](https://img.shields.io/badge/EMU-IA%20495%20Fall%202024-006633?style=for-the-badge)](IA%20495%20Final%20Report.docx)\n\n**Language:** English | [Português (Brasil)](README.pt-BR.md) · LinkedIn (bilingual): [`docs/LINKEDIN-portfolio.md`](docs/LINKEDIN-portfolio.md)\n\nCapstone project (IA 495, Fall 2024) — **Eastern Michigan University**\n\n**Instructor:** Samir Tout\n**Team (Group 4):** Julio Ribeiro Barros, Zac Darwiche, David McShane, Richard Cummins\n\n## Overview\n\nThis repository supports a controlled-lab study of **Controller Area Network (CAN)** security:\n\n- **Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment (TARA)** focused on **Denial of Service (DoS)** via message flooding\n- Simulation of attacks against a **test bench** dashboard (speedometer / gauges), not a road vehicle\n- Monitoring with **[linux-can/can-utils](https://github.com/linux-can/can-utils)** (SocketCAN), **Wireshark**, **SavvyCAN**, and Python (`python-can`)\n\n### Upstream foundation\n\nLab tooling follows the same workflow as the final report: clone or install **[can-utils](https://github.com/linux-can/can-utils)** (`candump`, `cangen`, …), bring up `can0` at 500 kbit/s, then run our Python scripts for targeted dashboard tests. Details: [`docs/can-utils-upstream.md`](docs/can-utils-upstream.md).\n\n> **Safety:** Run only on isolated bench hardware. Do not connect attack tooling to a moving vehicle or public roads.\n\n**Live demo UI:** [jkbarros.github.io/can-analysis-tara-emu](https://jkbarros.github.io/can-analysis-tara-emu/) · GIF previews below; full videos via MP4 or LFS clone.\n\n## Hardware (lab)\n\n- **Test bench cluster:** **2016 GMC Sierra** instrument cluster (see [`docs/test-bench-hardware.md`](docs/test-bench-hardware.md))\n- Linux VM (Ubuntu or Kali) as attack / tooling host\n- USB2CAN adapter (e.g. CANUSB)\n- CAN sniffer and bench wiring (not a complete in-vehicle network)\n- Bitrate used in experiments: **500000** (`can0`)\n\n## Software setup (Linux VM)\n\nOne-shot (on Ubuntu/Kali VM):\n\n```bash\nchmod +x scripts/setup-lab-env.sh\n./scripts/setup-lab-env.sh\n```\n\nTo also clone upstream sources into `third_party/can-utils` (as in the report):\n\n```bash\nCLONE_CAN_UTILS=1 ./scripts/setup-lab-env.sh\n```\n\nManual steps:\n\n```bash\nsudo apt update\nsudo apt install git can-utils\nsudo git clone https://github.com/linux-can/can-utils.git   # optional; apt often enough\nsudo modprobe can\nsudo ip link set can0 up type can bitrate 500000\n```\n\nVerify traffic:\n\n```bash\ncandump -e can0          # terminal 1\ncangen can0              # terminal 2\n```\n\nLog to file: `candump -l can0`\n\n### Python scripts\n\nAll `.py` files are in the **[`scripts/`](scripts/)** folder ([index](docs/scripts.md)).\n\n```bash\npython3 -m venv .venv\nsource .venv/bin/activate\npip install -r requirements.txt\nsudo python3 scripts/speed.py              # multi-ID speed simulation\nsudo python3 scripts/speed2.py             # fixed payloads on selected IDs\nsudo python3 scripts/rpm_attack.py         # random RPM flood on 0xC9 (tachometer)\nsudo python3 scripts/blink_interference.py # indicator-lamp flood (0x1F8, 0x1C9, 0x415)\n```\n\nSocketCAN usually requires elevated privileges to bring interfaces up/down; scripts call `ip link set` on shutdown.\n\n### SavvyCAN (optional GUI)\n\nSee [SavvyCAN AppImage](https://appimage.github.io/SavvyCAN/). Connection type: **QT SerialBus** (PeakCAN / SocketCAN), port `can0`.\n\n## Lab workflow (state machine)\n\n```mermaid\nstateDiagram-v2\n    direction LR\n    [*] --> Setup: VM + USB2CAN\n    Setup --> Baseline: candump / SavvyCAN\n    Baseline --> Attack: scripts/*.py or cangen\n    Attack --> Observe: gauges + error frames\n    Observe --> Recovery: stop flood\n    Recovery --> Archive: logs + CSV\n    Archive --> [*]\n```\n\nInteractive version: **[`web/index.html`](web/index.html)** (state steps + sample log replay). Host with [GitHub Pages](web/README.md) or `python -m http.server` from the repo root.\n\n## Demo videos\n\nClone with **`git lfs pull`** so the files below play (Git LFS). More detail: [`docs/demos.md`](docs/demos.md).\n\n| Preview (GIF) | Full video |\n|---------------|------------|\n| ![Cluster injection](docs/assets/demo-cluster-preview.gif) | MP4 below |\n| ![RPM attack](docs/assets/demo-rpm-preview.gif) | MP4 below |\n\n### Cluster — CAN injection (bench)\n\n<video controls width=\"100%\" src=\"docs/demo-cluster-can-injection.mp4\"></video>\n\n[Open file](docs/demo-cluster-can-injection.mp4) · 2016 GMC Sierra cluster under injected traffic\n\n### RPM flood (`0xC9`)\n\n<video controls width=\"100%\" src=\"docs/demo-rpm-attack-2024-11-15.mp4\"></video>\n\n[Open file](docs/demo-rpm-attack-2024-11-15.mp4) · pairs with [`data/logs/rpm_attack_log.txt`](data/logs/rpm_attack_log.txt)\n\n### Python / VM setup\n\n<video controls width=\"100%\" src=\"docs/demo-python-can-programming.mp4\"></video>\n\n[Open file](docs/demo-python-can-programming.mp4)\n\n> GIFs in [`docs/assets/`](docs/assets/) are short loops for the README; full quality is in the MP4 files.\n\n## Log recording\n\n| Source | Output | In this repo |\n|--------|--------|----------------|\n| `candump -l can0` | SocketCAN log | [`data/captures/candump-2024-11-11_195750.log`](data/captures/candump-2024-11-11_195750.log) |\n| SavvyCAN export | CSV / traces | [`data/captures/speed-test-savvycan.csv`](data/captures/speed-test-savvycan.csv) |\n| `rpm_attack.py` | Timestamped lines | [`data/logs/rpm_attack_log.txt`](data/logs/rpm_attack_log.txt) |\n\nDiscord exports (docs, captures, scripts) are indexed in [`docs/discord-archive.md`](docs/discord-archive.md).\n\n## Repository layout\n\n| Path | Description |\n|------|-------------|\n| `scripts/` | `speed.py`, `speed2.py`, `rpm_attack.py`, `blink_interference.py`, `setup-lab-env.sh` |\n| `data/captures/` | `candump` and SavvyCAN CSV/exports from the bench |\n| `data/logs/` | RPM attack log (2024-11-15) |\n| `deliverables/` | Fact-finding Q&A (redacted `.md`), PoC report, Gantt chart |\n| `docs/discord-archive.md` | Index of recovered Discord files |\n| `docs/can-utils-upstream.md` | Attribution and install for [linux-can/can-utils](https://github.com/linux-can/can-utils) |\n| `docs/can-message-notes.md` | CAN IDs captured on the test bench |\n| `web/` | Static lab monitor UI (state machine, log replay, videos) |\n| `docs/demo-*.mp4` | Bench and development recordings (Git LFS) |\n| `IA 495 Final Report.docx` | Submitted capstone report |\n\n## Results (summary)\n\n- Speedometer gauge showed lag and erratic movement under sustained injection\n- CAN saturation increased error frames and disrupted normal ECU traffic on the bench\n- Highlights need for mitigations (rate limiting, authentication, anomaly detection)\n\n## References\n\n- **SocketCAN tools:** [linux-can/can-utils](https://github.com/linux-can/can-utils)\n- Final report bibliography (CANAttack, protocol-compliant DoS on CAN, MDPI CAN security survey, CSS Electronics CAN intro)\n\n## License and safety\n\n- **[LICENSE](LICENSE)** — MIT (Group 4, Fall 2024)\n- **[SECURITY.md](SECURITY.md)** — lab-only use; do not use on road vehicles\n- **[CHANGELOG.md](CHANGELOG.md)** — repository history\n- **[docs/PUBLIC_RELEASE.md](docs/PUBLIC_RELEASE.md)** — checklist before making the repo public\n\nAcademic / educational use. Contact authors for other uses.",
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      "readme": "# UDS / OBD-II ECU Simulation & Security Testing (ISO-TP over CAN)\n\nThis repository contains hands-on automotive cybersecurity labs for UDS (ISO 14229) and OBD-II over ISO-TP on CAN (SocketCAN/vCAN).\n\nIt is designed for educational and research purposes to demonstrate how diagnostic services work, how they can be misused, and how basic defensive mechanisms can mitigate common attacks.\n\nContributors\n\n-Basel Gomaa (@basel-gomaa)\n\n-Medhat ElEssawy (@MedhatElessawy)\n\n-Mohamed Basta\n\n---\n\n## More Details & Related Repository\n\nFor a broader framework view and additional implementation details, please refer to the main project repository by @MedhatElessawy:\n\nhttps://github.com/MedhatElessawy/Automotive-OBD_II-UDS-Security-Framework\n\nThis repository focuses on the practical lab side (ECU simulation + offensive testing), while the related repository provides extended framework components and documentation.\n\n---\n\n## Project Context & Collaboration\n\nThis repository represents a hands-on laboratory implementation developed as part of a broader automotive cybersecurity effort.\n\nThe core framework and architectural concepts are based on collaborative work with **@MedhatElessawy**, whose main project repository can be found here:\nhttps://github.com/MedhatElessawy/Automotive-OBD_II-UDS-Security-Framework\n\nThis repository focuses specifically on:\n- Practical UDS and OBD-II attack simulations\n- ECU behavior analysis under diagnostic abuse\n- Hands-on offensive and defensive experimentation in a lab environment\n\nBoth repositories were developed as part of the same training track and complement each other.\n\n---\n\n## Repository Overview\n\nThis lab environment includes:\n- A simulated ECU implementing UDS and OBD-II services\n- An offensive attack tool demonstrating common diagnostic attacks\n- A virtual CAN setup using SocketCAN / vCAN\n\n---\n\n## Components\n\n### 1) ECU Simulator\n\n**File:** `ecu.py`\n\nA Python-based ECU simulator that responds to OBD-II and UDS requests over ISO-TP on CAN.\n\n#### OBD-II Features\n\n- Mode `0x09` (Vehicle Information)\n  - VIN (PID `0x02`)\n- Mode `0x01` (Live Data)\n  - Example PIDs such as RPM and vehicle speed\n\n#### UDS Features\n\n- `0x10` – Diagnostic Session Control (Default / Extended / Programming)\n- `0x27` – SecurityAccess (seed/key mechanism)\n- `0x11` – ECU Reset (protected by SecurityAccess)\n- `0x22` – ReadDataByIdentifier (VIN, Serial Number, Program Image)\n- `0x2E` – WriteDataByIdentifier (Program image persistence)\n- `0x31` – RoutineControl (Self-test and checksum routines)\n- `0x3E` – TesterPresent with S3 session timeout handling\n\n#### Security / Hardening Options\n\nThe ECU includes optional defensive behaviors (configurable via code flags), such as:\n- Limited wrong-key attempts with lockout window\n- Optional session-token requirement to mitigate MITM-style attacks\n- Protected vs unprotected seed-to-key algorithms (lab toggles)\n\n---\n\n### 2) Attack Tool (Offensive Lab)\n\n**File:** `attack.py`\n\nA menu-driven attacker tool that demonstrates common offensive techniques against UDS and OBD-II diagnostic services over ISO-TP.\n\n#### Implemented Capabilities\n\n- UDS DID / RID Enumeration\n  - Enumerates accessible Data Identifiers (`0x22`)\n  - Enumerates Routine Identifiers (`0x31`) and blocked routines\n- SecurityAccess brute-force (educational)\n  - Attempts keys within a predefined range\n- MITM-style session manipulation\n  - Forces session transitions after successful SecurityAccess\n  - Keeps S3 session alive using TesterPresent\n- Seed/Key algorithm guessing\n  - Attempts to infer simple seed-to-key relationships (add/sub/xor/mul)\n- Reset flooding / diagnostic DoS simulation\n- OBD PID Enumeration and Replay\n  - Enumerates supported PIDs\n  - Sniffs and replays ECU responses (lab demonstration)\n\n---\n\n## Technology Stack\n\n- Python\n- SocketCAN / vCAN\n- `python-can`\n- `isotp` (ISO-TP transport layer)\n- Linux (Kali / Ubuntu)\n\n---\n\n## How to Run (vCAN Lab)\n\n```bash\n# 1) Create virtual CAN interface\nsudo modprobe vcan\nsudo ip link add dev vcan0 type vcan\nsudo ip link set up vcan0\n\n# 2) Start the ECU (Terminal 1)\npython3 ecu.py\n\n\n\n# 3) Run the attacker tool (Terminal 2)\npython3 attack.py",
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      "title": "CAV CAN-bus Intrusion Detection Backend",
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      "readme": "# CAV CAN-bus Intrusion Detection Backend\n\nFastAPI + onnxruntime server for the Micro-Transformer IDS, a CSV replay simulator, and a debug dashboard.\nIt scores sliding 16-frame windows of CAN traffic, fuses the verdict with simulated V2X data, and broadcasts\nresults (with per-prediction inference latency) to a dashboard.\n\n## Quick start\n\nRequirements: Docker. The model files must be in `models/` (`micro_transformer_can_ids.onnx` + `.onnx.data`).\n\n**1. Add the test CSV** at `data/test.csv`. A header is optional; it is detected automatically.\nColumns: `Timestamp, CAN ID, DLC, DATA0..DATA7, Flag` (`R` = normal, `T` = attack). Short rows (DLC < 8) are handled.\n\n**2. Start the backend** (terminal 1):\n```bash\ndocker compose up --build backend\n```\nDashboard: http://localhost:8000 · Model info: http://localhost:8000/model/info · Health: http://localhost:8000/health\n\n**3. Run the simulator** (terminal 2):\n```bash\nSIM_LIMIT=30000 SIM_RATE=400 docker compose --profile sim up --build simulator\n```\nThen watch the dashboard. The first attack rows in the CSV appear around row 1,477.\n\n**4. Stop everything:**\n```bash\ndocker compose --profile sim down\n```\n\n### Simulator options\nSet as environment variables in front of the command above:\n\n| Variable | Default | Meaning |\n|---|---|---|\n| `SIM_CSV` | `/data/test.csv` | CSV path inside the container (`./data` is mounted at `/data`) |\n| `SIM_LIMIT` | `0` (all rows) | Max CSV rows to load. The full file is 3.67M rows and needs a lot of RAM, so set this |\n| `SIM_RATE` | `100` | Windows per second; `0` = as fast as possible |\n| `SIM_LOOP` | `0` | `1` replays the CSV forever |\n| `SIM_NO_HEADER` | `0` | `1` forces headerless parsing (normally auto-detected) |\n\nKeep `SIM_RATE` at or below about 500. The backend handles roughly 550 windows/s on CPU, and above that\nacknowledgements fall far behind. Extra flags are available when running the module directly\n(`python -m simulator.simulator --help`): `--stride`, `--vehicle-id`, `--overspeed-prob`.\n\nExamples:\n```bash\n# replay the whole attack burst slowly, looping\nSIM_LIMIT=60000 SIM_RATE=100 SIM_LOOP=1 docker compose --profile sim up simulator\n# stress test at maximum speed\nSIM_LIMIT=20000 SIM_RATE=0 docker compose --profile sim up simulator\n```\n\n### Tests\n```bash\ndocker compose run --rm --no-deps backend pytest tests/\n```\n\n## Reading the dashboard\n- **Fail-safe banner:** green = nominal, red = fail-safe fired (stays red for 2 s). Reasons are listed below.\n- **Attack probability chart:** the model's probability per window; the dashed line is the 0.5 threshold.\n- **Inference latency:** p50/p95/p99/max of `session.run` time per prediction, in ms.\n- **V2X panel:** speed limit, vehicle speed and hazard. These values are **simulated**, not from the CSV.\n- **Confusion matrix** (against the CSV's `R`/`T` flags, window labelled by its last frame):\n  - TP: attack caught · FP: false alarm · TN: normal correctly ignored · FN: attack missed.\n\n## Model contract (decoded from the ONNX file)\nInput `input_sequence` int64 `[batch, 144]` (16 frames x 9 tokens) -> output `attack_logit` float32 `[1]` (raw logit;\nthe server applies a sigmoid). The export fixes the output to one window, so inference runs one window at a time.\n\nTokenizer (matches the training script, in `common/tokenizer.py`):\n- CAN ID token = `(int(id, 16) % 2048) + 257`\n- data byte token = `int(byte, 16)` (0..255); missing or corrupt bytes = PAD `256`\n- a window's label is its **last frame's** flag, and the simulator labels windows the same way\n\nAccuracy note: the test CSV is the same file the model was trained on (DoS only), so the numbers below are\noptimistic. A replay of the first 30k rows gave recall 91.4%, precision 98.3%, p99 latency 1.8 ms.\n\n## WebSocket schema (v1.0)\n- `WS /ws/ingest` (simulator -> backend): `can_window` {seq, vehicle_id, sent_at_ns, window{size, tokens[144], frames[16], label}, v2x?},\n  `end_of_stream`. Replies `ack` {seq} or `error` {code, detail}. Models live in `backend/app/schemas.py`.\n- `WS /ws/dashboard` (backend -> frontend, max 30 msg/s): `dashboard_frame` {interval, failsafe, latest{prediction, latency, v2x,\n  window_summary, ground_truth}, stats (about 1/s, else null)}. `latency.inference_ms` is the `session.run` time only.\n  Raw stream: `python -m websockets ws://localhost:8000/ws/dashboard`.\n\n## Fail-safe fusion\n1. `FAILSAFE_K` (3) consecutive attack windows -> `CAN_INTRUSION`.\n2. Model says benign but `vehicle_speed_kph > 1.2 x speed_limit_kph` -> `CONTEXTUAL_ANOMALY: V2X_SPEED_MISMATCH`.\n\n## Backend settings\nRead from the backend's environment (add them under `backend.environment` in `docker-compose.yml` to change them): `THRESHOLD` (0.5), `FAILSAFE_K` (3), `SPEED_MISMATCH_RATIO` (1.2),\n`FAILSAFE_HOLD_S` (2.0), `BROADCAST_HZ` (30), `MODEL_PATH`.\n\n## Layout\n```\nbackend/app/   FastAPI app: main, inference (ONNX), failsafe, hub (30 Hz broadcaster), stats, schemas, static/index.html\ncommon/        tokenizer shared by simulator and tests\nsimulator/     CSV replay + mock V2X\ntests/         tokenizer, fail-safe, pipeline and rate-limit tests\n```",
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      "full_name": "J-B-Mugundh/Next-Gen-Security_Enhanced-DDoS-Attack-Detection-for-Autonomous-Vehicles-in-6G-Networks",
      "name": "Next-Gen-Security_Enhanced-DDoS-Attack-Detection-for-Autonomous-Vehicles-in-6G-Networks",
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      "description": "This research proposed an Advanced DDoS Attack Detection System (ADADS) using a Hybrid Detection Model (HDM) and Continuous Learning Model (CLM) for dynamic adaptation to evolving attack patterns.",
      "readme": "# Next-Gen-Security-Enhanced-DDoS-Attack-Detection-for-Autonomous-Vehicles-in-6G-Networks\n\n## Authors\n\n- **Mugundh Jambukeswaran Bhooma, Department of Computer Technology, MIT Campus, Anna University, Chennai.**\n- **Vijai Suria Marimuthu, Department of Computer Technology, MIT Campus, Anna University, Chennai.**\n\n## Abstract\n\nAutonomous Vehicles (AVs) powered by 6G technologies have transformed transportation, but their reliance on the Internet of Vehicles (IoV) makes them vulnerable to cyber threats. Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks pose a significant risk, impacting AV safety. This paper introduces the Advanced DDoS Attack Detection System (ADADS) using a Hybrid Detection Model (HDM) and Continuous Learning Model (CLM) for dynamic adaptation to evolving attack patterns.\n\n## Keywords\n\n- Autonomous Vehicles\n- 6G Communications\n- DDoS Attack Detection\n- Hybrid Detection Model\n- Continuous Learning Model\n\n## Introduction\n\n![Attack Scenario](https://github.com/J-B-Mugundh/Next-Gen-Security-Enhanced-DDoS-Attack-Detection-for-Autonomous-Vehicles-in-6G-Networks/blob/main/attack-scenario-6g.png)\n\nThe advent of AVs brings enhanced safety and reduced environmental impact, relying on advanced technologies like smart driving instruments and Machine Learning (ML). However, the increasing connectivity exposes them to cyber threats, with DDoS attacks being a prominent concern. Existing DDoS detection systems face challenges in adapting to evolving attack patterns.\n\n## Related Works\n\nSeveral works have focused on DDoS detection using ensemble techniques and ML/DL approaches. However, most frameworks lack adaptability to newly evolving attack patterns. The proposed ADADS leverages a comprehensive HDM and CLM to enhance accuracy and adaptability in 6G networks.\n\n## Advanced DDoS Attack Detection System (ADADS)\n\n![Architecture Diagram](https://github.com/J-B-Mugundh/Next-Gen-Security-Enhanced-DDoS-Attack-Detection-for-Autonomous-Vehicles-in-6G-Networks/blob/main/adads_arch_diagram.png)\n\nADADS employs a Hybrid Detection Model (HDM) featuring ML algorithms (NB, RF, LR, KNN, SVM) trained on the \"CIC-DDoS2019\" dataset for effective DDoS attack detection. The Continuous Learning Model (CLM) ensures real-time processing and adaptation to new attack patterns, making the system advanced and adaptable.\n\n### Hybrid Detection Model (HDM) Training Phase\n\nThe HDM is trained using the AV dataset with a threshold limit. The model combines multiple ML algorithms to enhance the identification of various DDoS attack forms. The resulting hybrid model achieves high accuracy in attack detection.\n\n### Continuous Learning Model (CLM)\n\nThe CLM processes the AV dataset and evolved attack patterns in real-time, adapting to new attack patterns dynamically. The model is continuously updated to improve accuracy and adapt to emerging threats.\n\n## Repository Structure\n\n### 1. Simulation folder\n\n- Contains records to simulate DDoS attacks in the SUMO (Simulation of Urban MObility) simulator.\n\n### 2. ADADS_using_HDM_and_CLM.ipynb\n\n- Jupyter notebook containing the code for implementing Anomaly Detection for DDoS Attacks using a Hybrid Detection Model (HDM) and Continuous Learning Model (CLM).\n- Provides graphical visualization of results and records for interpreting the outcomes.\n\n### 3. Hybrid_Models_Individual.ipynb\n\n- Jupyter notebook containing the code for individual machine learning models.\n- Includes code for five classifiers: Naive Bayes (NB), Random Forest (RF), Logistic Regression (LR), Support Vector Machines (SVM), and K-Nearest Neighbors (KNN).\n\n## Usage\n\n1.  Navigate to the `Simulation` folder to access records for simulating DDoS attacks in the SUMO simulator.\n2.  Open the `ADADS_using_HDM_and_CLM.ipynb` notebook to view and run the code for implementing the Anomaly Detection system using a Hybrid Detection Model and Continuous Learning Model.\n3.  Explore the `Hybrid_Models_Individual.ipynb` notebook to understand the implementation of individual machine learning models.\n\n## Results & Discussion\n\nThe proposed ADADS achieves a remarkable accuracy of 98.7% with rapid stabilization in a few iterations for the current 6G specifications and applications. The weighted soft voting scheme in the HDM emerged as the optimal choice, surpassing individual algorithms.\n\n## Conclusion & Future Works\n\nADADS demonstrates resilience and adaptability against evolving DDoS attack patterns in 6G networks. Future works could focus on identifying other types of attack patterns and developing solutions for zero-day vulnerabilities.\n\n## Contributing\n\nWe welcome contributions from other students and developers to improve and enhance this project. If you'd like to contribute, please follow these steps:\n\n1. Fork the repository.\n\n2. Create a new branch for your feature or bug fix.\n\n3. Make your changes and commit them with a descriptive commit message.\n\n4. Push your changes to your fork.\n\n5. Create a pull request to the original repository, explaining your changes and why they should be merged.\n\n## License\n\nThis project is licensed under the MIT License - see the [LICENSE](LICENSE) file for details.\n\n## Contact\n\nIf you have any questions or suggestions, feel free to contact us:\n\n- Vijai Suria M: [LinkedIn](https://linkedin.com/in/vijaisuria)\n- Mugundh J B: [LinkedIn](https://linkedin.com/in/mugundhjb)\n\n## Acknowledgement\n\nThe authors thank [NGNLab](https://ngnlab.org/), Department of Computer Technology, Anna University, MIT Campus, Chennai 600044, India, for their support.\n\n## Dataset Acknowledgment\n   The dataset used for training and evaluation is the CIC-DDoS2019 dataset.\n\n\n     Iman Sharafaldin, Arash Habibi Lashkari, Saqib Hakak, and Ali A. Ghorbani, \"Developing Realistic Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) Attack Dataset and Taxonomy\", IEEE 53rd International Carnahan Conference on Security Technology, Chennai, India, 2019.",
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      "readme": "# UDS ISO-TP STM32\n\nA full **UDS (ISO 14229)** diagnostic stack implemented on **STM32F411RE** over UART,\npaired with a **PyQt5 diagnostic host** that replicates a professional ECU tester.\n\n![SIGMA DiagBox](images/1.PNG)\n\n---\n\n## Architecture\n\n```\n┌─────────────────────┐        UART 115200        ┌─────────────────────┐\n│   SIGMA DiagBox     │ ◄────────────────────────► │   STM32F411RE ECU   │\n│   (PyQt5 Host)      │     ISO-TP / UDS frames    │   (Firmware in C)   │\n└─────────────────────┘                            └─────────────────────┘\n```\n\n![DCM Core Code](images/2.PNG)\n\n---\n\n## UDS Services\n\n| SID  | Service                        | Notes                                                                        |\n|------|--------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 0x10 | DiagnosticSessionControl       | Default / Programming session                                                |\n| 0x11 | ECUReset                       | SW / HW / KeyOffOn reset                                                     |\n| 0x22 | ReadDataByIdentifier           | Serial number, HW/SW version, session                                        |\n| 0x27 | SecurityAccess                 | XOR seed/key + AES-ECB-128 high security                                     |\n| 0x31 | RoutineControl                 | Erase memory, integrity check                                                |\n| 0x2F | InputOutputControlByIdentifier | LED (real HW — PA5), Buzzer PWM, Fan PWM, Relay (3 simulated in UI) |\n\n---\n\n## ISO-TP Transport (ISO 15765-2)\n\n| Frame | PCI    | Description                      |\n|-------|--------|----------------------------------|\n| SF    | `0x0N` | Single Frame (payload ≤ 7 bytes) |\n| FF    | `0x10` | First Frame (payload > 7 bytes)  |\n| CF    | `0x2N` | Consecutive Frame (sequence N)   |\n| FC    | `0x30` | Flow Control (ContinueToSend)    |\n\nMulti-frame transport is used for SID 0x27 sub 0x03/0x04 — the AES seed (18 bytes) and key exchange.\n\n---\n\n## Security Access — Two Levels\n\n**Level 1 (0x27 0x01 / 0x02)**\n- 2-byte seed from SysTick\n- Key = `seed_H XOR seed_L`\n\n**Level 2 — High Security (0x27 0x03 / 0x04)**\n- 16-byte seed from SysTick\n- Key = `AES_ECB_Encrypt(master_key, seed)`\n- Transported via ISO-TP multi-frame\n- Lockout after 3 failed attempts\n\n---\n\n## Hardware\n\n> ⚠️ **Note:** `0x2F` controls **4 outputs** — **LED (PA5) is real HW on STM32**.\n> Fan (TIM2 CH2), Buzzer (TIM3 CH1) and Relay (PB0) are **simulated in the PyQt5 UI only**.\n\n![I/O Control UI](images/3.PNG)\n\n| Component | Detail                        |\n|-----------|-------------------------------|\n| Board     | STM32F411RE Nucleo            |\n| Interface | UART2 @ 115200 baud (ST-Link) |\n| LED       | PA5 — Real HW              |\n| Fan       | TIM2 CH2 — PWM 0–100% (UI sim)|\n| Buzzer    | TIM3 CH1 — PWM 0–100% (UI sim)|\n| Relay     | PB0 (UI sim)                  |\n\n---\n\n## Requirements\n\n```bash\npip install pyserial PyQt5 cryptography\n```\n\n---\n\n## Author\n\n**ARNOUZ SAID** — Embedded Systems Engineer",
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      "title": "UDS (ISO 14229) Protocol Simulator",
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      "name": "UDS-Protocol-Simulator",
      "owner": "srijani-ece",
      "url": "https://github.com/srijani-ece/UDS-Protocol-Simulator",
      "description": "UDS (ISO 14229) diagnostic protocol simulator with CAN/ISO-TP transport, session state management, security access, and end-to-end testing.",
      "readme": "# UDS (ISO 14229) Protocol Simulator\n\nA Python-based diagnostic tester ↔ ECU simulator implementing UDS request/response handling, diagnostic session state, security access, and CAN-based transport using ISO-TP.\n\nThe project started with a TCP transport and was extended to a CAN-frame-level transport while keeping the UDS application logic separated from the transport layer.\n\n## Project overview\n\nThe simulator models a diagnostic tester communicating with an ECU.\n\nThe ECU behaves like a security-controlled system:\n\n* The tester must enter the appropriate diagnostic session before performing protected operations.\n* Read operations can be performed without unlocking security access.\n* Write operations and routine control are security-gated.\n* The ECU generates a fresh random security seed.\n* The tester computes the corresponding key and sends it back.\n* An incorrect key is rejected.\n\nThe seed/key mechanism is intentionally simplified for simulation purposes. Production ECUs typically use proprietary or cryptographically stronger algorithms.\n\n## Architecture\n\nThe project is structured into separate protocol and transport layers:\n\n```text\nUDS Application Layer\n        │\n        ▼\necu_can.py / tester_can.py\n        │\n        ▼\ncan_transport.py\n        │\n        ▼\nISO-TP (ISO 15765-2)\n        │\n        ▼\npython-can Virtual CAN Bus\n```\n\n### Layer responsibilities\n\n| Component | Responsibility |\n|---|---|\n| `iso_tp.py`                      | Pure ISO-TP framing, segmentation, reassembly, sequence validation, and Flow Control frame handling |\n| `can_transport.py`               | CAN transport layer built on `python-can`; sends and receives complete UDS payloads over ISO-TP     |\n| `ecu_can.py`                     | ECU-side CAN diagnostic simulator                                                                   |\n| `tester_can.py`                  | Tester-side CAN diagnostic client                                                                   |\n| `test_can_transport.py`          | Unit/regression tests for ISO-TP and CAN transport behavior                                         |\n| `test_uds_over_can.py`           | End-to-end UDS diagnostic session over the CAN transport                                            |\n| `ecu_simulator.py` / `tester.py` | Original UDS application implementation used by the simulator                                       |\n\nA key design property is that the UDS request handling logic is separated from the transport mechanism. The CAN transport was integrated without requiring changes to the core `handle_request()` UDS logic.\n\n## Services implemented\n\n| SID    | Service                    | Security         |\n| ------ | -------------------------- | ---------------- |\n| `0x10` | Diagnostic Session Control | —                |\n| `0x11` | ECU Reset                  | —                |\n| `0x22` | Read Data By Identifier    | Read access      |\n| `0x27` | Security Access (seed/key) | Unlock mechanism |\n| `0x2E` | Write Data By Identifier   | Required         |\n| `0x31` | Routine Control            | Required         |\n| `0x3E` | Tester Present             | —                |\n\n## CAN + ISO-TP Transport Layer\n\nThe project implements CAN-frame-level transport using ISO-TP (ISO 15765-2).\n\nThe implementation models Classical CAN data frames with up to 8 bytes of payload. ISO-TP allows larger UDS messages to be segmented across multiple CAN frames and reassembled by the receiver.\n\n### ISO-TP frame types\n\n| Frame                  | Purpose                                                                           |\n| ---------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |\n| Single Frame (SF)      | Carries a complete payload that fits within a single frame                        |\n| First Frame (FF)       | Starts a multi-frame transfer and announces the total payload length              |\n| Consecutive Frame (CF) | Carries the remaining payload and uses sequence numbers to detect ordering errors |\n| Flow Control (FC)      | Receiver response controlling whether the sender continues, waits, or aborts      |\n\nFor a multi-frame transfer, the receiver sends a Flow Control frame before the sender continues transmitting Consecutive Frames.\n\nThe implementation also supports Flow Control Block Size and STmin pacing.\n\n## Virtual CAN backend\n\nThe transport currently uses `python-can`'s **virtual bus backend**.\n\nThis provides an actual `python-can` bus interface and `can.Message` objects without requiring a physical CAN adapter or Linux SocketCAN setup. Two independent `CanUdsTransport` instances communicate through the virtual bus.\n\nThis makes the transport layer testable in environments where `vcan0` or physical CAN hardware is unavailable.\n\n### Hardware / SocketCAN note\n\nThe current implementation is intentionally configured for the `virtual` backend.\n\nMoving to SocketCAN or physical CAN hardware would require environment-specific configuration and testing in addition to changing the `python-can` interface/channel configuration. The protocol and ISO-TP layers are designed to remain independent of that bus backend.\n\n## Transport validation and defensive checks\n\nThe CAN/ISO-TP transport includes validation for malformed and invalid protocol states, including:\n\n* Rejecting payloads larger than the supported 12-bit ISO-TP length limit of 4095 bytes.\n* Rejecting empty CAN frames.\n* Rejecting malformed Single Frames whose claimed payload length exceeds the available data.\n* Rejecting First Frames shorter than the required 8-byte CAN frame.\n* Rejecting invalid First Frame payload lengths.\n* Detecting out-of-order Consecutive Frames through sequence-number validation.\n* Rejecting reserved/invalid ISO-TP STmin values.\n* Supporting sub-millisecond STmin values in the `0xF1`–`0xF9` range.\n* Enforcing Flow Control Block Size.\n* Bounding repeated Flow Control `WAIT` frames so a sender cannot wait indefinitely.\n\nThese checks are covered by regression tests in `test_can_transport.py`.\n\n## Testing\n\nRun the transport-layer test suite:\n\n```bash\npip install python-can\npython3 test_can_transport.py\n```\n\nThe test suite covers:\n\n* Single-frame ISO-TP round-trip\n* Multi-frame segmentation and reassembly\n* Consecutive Frame sequence validation\n* Flow Control frame formatting\n* Two-instance CAN transport communication\n* Flow Control Block Size enforcement\n* ISO-TP payload length limits\n* Malformed frame rejection\n* Malformed First Frame rejection\n* Invalid STmin rejection\n* Bounded repeated Flow Control `WAIT`\n\nRun the end-to-end UDS-over-CAN test:\n\n```bash\npython3 test_uds_over_can.py\n```\n\nThis exercises the diagnostic session over the CAN transport, including session control, security access, Read Data By Identifier, Write Data By Identifier, routine control, Tester Present, and ECU reset behaviour.\n\n## Test Outputs -\n### Full automated suite:\n@srijani-ece ➜ /workspaces/UDS-Protocol-Simulator (main) $ pytest -v\n=========================================================== test session starts===========================================================\nplatform linux -- Python 3.14.2, pytest-9.1.1, pluggy-1.6.0 -- /usr/local/py-utils/venvs/pytest/bin/python\ncachedir: .pytest_cache\nrootdir: /workspaces/UDS-Protocol-Simulator\nplugins: anyio-4.14.2\ncollected 23 items\n\ntest_can_transport.py::test_single_frame_roundtrip PASSED                                                                           [  4%]\ntest_can_transport.py::test_multi_frame_roundtrip PASSED                                                                            [  8%]\ntest_can_transport.py::test_sequence_error_detected PASSED                                                                          [ 13%]\ntest_can_transport.py::test_flow_control_frame_format PASSED                                                                        [ 17%]\ntest_can_transport.py::test_real_can_multi_frame_transfer PASSED                                                                    [ 21%]\ntest_can_transport.py::test_flow_control_block_size_actually_enforced PASSED                                                        [ 26%]\ntest_can_transport.py::test_payload_over_4095_bytes_rejected PASSED                                                                 [ 30%]\ntest_can_transport.py::test_malformed_empty_frame_rejected PASSED                                                                   [ 34%]\ntest_can_transport.py::test_malformed_first_frame_rejected PASSED                                                                   [ 39%]\ntest_can_transport.py::test_invalid_st_min_rejected PASSED                                                                          [ 43%]\ntest_can_transport.py::test_repeated_fc_wait_is_bounded PASSED                                                                      [ 47%]\ntest_can_transport.py::test_fc_wait_resets_between_bursts PASSED                                                                    [ 52%]\ntest_can_transport.py::test_block_size_state_does_not_leak_across_messages PASSED                                                   [ 56%]\ntest_can_transport.py::test_sequence_number_wraps_past_15 PASSED                                                                    [ 60%]\ntest_uds.py::test_session_control_valid PASSED                                                                                      [ 65%]\ntest_uds.py::test_session_control_invalid_subfunction PASSED                                                                        [ 69%]\ntest_uds.py::test_write_without_security_denied PASSED                                                                              [ 73%]\ntest_uds.py::test_security_access_wrong_key_rejected PASSED                                                                         [ 78%]\ntest_uds.py::test_security_access_correct_key_unlocks PASSED                                                                        [ 82%]\ntest_uds.py::test_security_access_key_without_seed_rejected PASSED                                                                  [ 86%]\ntest_uds.py::test_read_unsupported_did_out_of_range PASSED                                                                          [ 91%]\ntest_uds.py::test_end_to_end_full_session PASSED                                                                                    [ 95%]\ntest_uds_over_can.py::test_full_session_over_can PASSED                                                                             [100%]\n\n=========================================================== 23 passed in 1.42s============================================================\n### CAN/ISO-TP:\n@srijani-ece ➜ /workspaces/UDS-Protocol-Simulator (main) $ pytest test_can_transport.py -v\n=========================================================== test session starts===========================================================\nplatform linux -- Python 3.14.2, pytest-9.1.1, pluggy-1.6.0 -- /usr/local/py-utils/venvs/pytest/bin/python\ncachedir: .pytest_cache\nrootdir: /workspaces/UDS-Protocol-Simulator\nplugins: anyio-4.14.2\ncollected 14 items\n\ntest_can_transport.py::test_single_frame_roundtrip PASSED                                                                           [  7%]\ntest_can_transport.py::test_multi_frame_roundtrip PASSED                                                                            [ 14%]\ntest_can_transport.py::test_sequence_error_detected PASSED                                                                          [ 21%]\ntest_can_transport.py::test_flow_control_frame_format PASSED                                                                        [ 28%]\ntest_can_transport.py::test_real_can_multi_frame_transfer PASSED                                                                    [ 35%]\ntest_can_transport.py::test_flow_control_block_size_actually_enforced PASSED                                                        [ 42%]\ntest_can_transport.py::test_payload_over_4095_bytes_rejected PASSED                                                                 [ 50%]\ntest_can_transport.py::test_malformed_empty_frame_rejected PASSED                                                                   [ 57%]\ntest_can_transport.py::test_malformed_first_frame_rejected PASSED                                                                   [ 64%]\ntest_can_transport.py::test_invalid_st_min_rejected PASSED                                                                          [ 71%]\ntest_can_transport.py::test_repeated_fc_wait_is_bounded PASSED                                                                      [ 78%]\ntest_can_transport.py::test_fc_wait_resets_between_bursts PASSED                                                                    [ 85%]\ntest_can_transport.py::test_block_size_state_does_not_leak_across_messages PASSED                                                   [ 92%]\ntest_can_transport.py::test_sequence_number_wraps_past_15 PASSED                                                                    [100%]\n\n=========================================================== 14 passed in 0.37s============================================================\n### UDS core tests:\n@srijani-ece ➜ /workspaces/UDS-Protocol-Simulator (main) $ pytest test_uds.py -v\n=========================================================== test session starts===========================================================\nplatform linux -- Python 3.14.2, pytest-9.1.1, pluggy-1.6.0 -- /usr/local/py-utils/venvs/pytest/bin/python\ncachedir: .pytest_cache\nrootdir: /workspaces/UDS-Protocol-Simulator\nplugins: anyio-4.14.2\ncollected 8 items\n\ntest_uds.py::test_session_control_valid PASSED                                                                                      [ 12%]\ntest_uds.py::test_session_control_invalid_subfunction PASSED                                                                        [ 25%]\ntest_uds.py::test_write_without_security_denied PASSED                                                                              [ 37%]\ntest_uds.py::test_security_access_wrong_key_rejected PASSED                                                                         [ 50%]\ntest_uds.py::test_security_access_correct_key_unlocks PASSED                                                                        [ 62%]\ntest_uds.py::test_security_access_key_without_seed_rejected PASSED                                                                  [ 75%]\ntest_uds.py::test_read_unsupported_did_out_of_range PASSED                                                                          [ 87%]\ntest_uds.py::test_end_to_end_full_session PASSED                                                                                    [100%]\n\n============================================================ 8 passed in 0.35s============================================================\n### UDS-over-CAN integration:\n@srijani-ece ➜ /workspaces/UDS-Protocol-Simulator (main) $ pytest test_uds_over_can.py -v\n=========================================================== test session starts===========================================================\nplatform linux -- Python 3.14.2, pytest-9.1.1, pluggy-1.6.0 -- /usr/local/py-utils/venvs/pytest/bin/python\ncachedir: .pytest_cache\nrootdir: /workspaces/UDS-Protocol-Simulator\nplugins: anyio-4.14.2\ncollected 1 item\n\ntest_uds_over_can.py::test_full_session_over_can PASSED                                                                             [100%]\n\n============================================================ 1 passed in 0.56s============================================================\n### Security Access seed/key exchange, Correct key unlocks ECU, Invalid key rejection, 3-attempt security lockout, Lockout enforcement, ECU Reset resets session, ECU Reset locks security, ECU Reset clears pending_seed (see below), S3 timeout, Read DID, Write denied while locked, Write allowed after unlock, Read-after-write state change.\nPYint(\"=\" * 60)ALIDATION COMPLETE\")sponse[3])g\")--------------d\")\n============================================================\nMANUAL UDS VALIDATION\n============================================================\n\n[1] Security Access - correct key\nSession: 50 03\nSeed response: 67 01 79 ec\nSeed: 0x79ec\nCalculated key: 0xdc49\nUnlock response: 67 02\nSecurity unlocked: True\n\n[2] Security Access - three wrong keys\nWrong-key attempt 1: 7f 27 35\nWrong-key attempt 2: 7f 27 35\nWrong-key attempt 3: 7f 27 36\n\n[3] Lockout enforcement\nRequest seed during lockout: 7f 27 37\n\n[4/5] ECU Reset clears security state and pending seed\nPending seed before reset: 35295\nUnlock response: 67 02\nSecurity before reset: True\nPending seed before reset: None\nReset response: 51 01\nSession after reset: 0x1\nSecurity after reset: False\nPending seed after reset: None\n\n[6] S3 session timeout\nEnter extended session: 50 03\nSession immediately after: 0x3\nWaiting 6 seconds...\nTester Present: 7e 00\nSession after timeout: 0x1\nSecurity unlocked: False\n\n[7] Read/write DID\nInitial read: 62 f0 0d 2a\nInitial speed: 42\nWrite before unlock: 7f 2e 33\nWrite after unlock: 6e f0 0d\nRead after write: 62 f0 0d 55\nSpeed after write: 85\n### ECU Reset clears a live pending_seed:\nPY\nSeed response: 67 01 64 54\nPending seed before reset: 25684\nReset response: 51 01\nPending seed after reset: None\nSession after reset: 0x1\nSecurity after reset: False\n### CAN end-to-end communication:\n@srijani-ece ➜ /workspaces/UDS-Protocol-Simulator (main) $ pytest test_uds_over_can.py -v -s\n=========================================================== test session starts===========================================================\nplatform linux -- Python 3.14.2, pytest-9.1.1, pluggy-1.6.0 -- /usr/local/py-utils/venvs/pytest/bin/python\ncachedir: .pytest_cache\nrootdir: /workspaces/UDS-Protocol-Simulator\nplugins: anyio-4.14.2\ncollected 1 item\n\ntest_uds_over_can.py::test_full_session_over_can [ECU] Listening on virtual CAN channel 'test-integration-channel'\n      TX ID=0x7e8, RX ID=0x7e0\n[Tester-CAN] -> 10 03\n[ECU] <- 10 03\n[ECU] -> 50 03\n[Tester-CAN] <- 50 03\n[Tester-CAN] -> 22 F0 0D\n[ECU] <- 22 F0 0D\n[ECU] -> 62 F0 0D 2A\n[Tester-CAN] <- 62 F0 0D 2A\n[Tester-CAN] -> 2E F0 0D 64\n[ECU] <- 2E F0 0D 64\n[ECU] -> 7F 2E 33\n[Tester-CAN] <- 7F 2E 33\n[Tester-CAN] -> 27 01\n[ECU] <- 27 01\n[ECU] -> 67 01 33 6E\n[Tester-CAN] <- 67 01 33 6E\n[Tester-CAN] -> 27 02 96 CB\n[ECU] <- 27 02 96 CB\n[ECU] -> 67 02\n[Tester-CAN] <- 67 02\n[Tester-CAN] -> 2E F0 0D 64\n[ECU] <- 2E F0 0D 64\n[ECU] -> 6E F0 0D\n[Tester-CAN] <- 6E F0 0D\n[Tester-CAN] -> 22 F0 0D\n[ECU] <- 22 F0 0D\n[ECU] -> 62 F0 0D 64\n[Tester-CAN] <- 62 F0 0D 64\n[Tester-CAN] -> 31 01 02 03\n[ECU] <- 31 01 02 03\n[ECU] -> 71 01 02 03\n[Tester-CAN] <- 71 01 02 03\n[Tester-CAN] -> 3E 00\n[ECU] <- 3E 00\n[ECU] -> 7E 00\n[Tester-CAN] <- 7E 00\n[Tester-CAN] -> 11 01\n[ECU] <- 11 01\n[ECU] -> 51 01\n[Tester-CAN] <- 51 01\nPASS: full UDS diagnostic session (session control, security access, RDBI/WDBI, routine control, reset) completed correctly over real CAN + ISO-TP transport\nPASSED\n\n============================================================ 1 passed in 0.56s============================================================\n### ISO-TP multi-frame transfer:\n@srijani-ece ➜ /workspaces/UDS-Protocol-Simulator (main) $ pytest test_can_transport.py -v -s\n=========================================================== test session starts===========================================================\nplatform linux -- Python 3.14.2, pytest-9.1.1, pluggy-1.6.0 -- /usr/local/py-utils/venvs/pytest/bin/python\ncachedir: .pytest_cache\nrootdir: /workspaces/UDS-Protocol-Simulator\nplugins: anyio-4.14.2\ncollected 14 items\n\ntest_can_transport.py::test_single_frame_roundtrip PASS: single-frame message correctly built and reassembled\nPASSED\ntest_can_transport.py::test_multi_frame_roundtrip PASS: 20-byte message split into 3 CAN frames and correctly reassembled\nPASSED\ntest_can_transport.py::test_sequence_error_detected PASS: out-of-order Consecutive Frame correctly detected and rejected\nPASSED\ntest_can_transport.py::test_flow_control_frame_format PASS: Flow Control frame correctly encodes status/block-size/STmin\nPASSED\ntest_can_transport.py::test_real_can_multi_frame_transfer PASS: real 25-byte UDS message sent over virtual CAN bus, correctly split, Flow-Control-negotiated, and reassembled on the ECU side\nPASSED\ntest_can_transport.py::test_flow_control_block_size_actually_enforced PASS: Block Size=2 genuinely enforced — sender paused for 3 separateFlow Control round-trips across 5 Consecutive Frames, not sent as one burst\nPASSED\ntest_can_transport.py::test_payload_over_4095_bytes_rejected PASS: payload exceeding ISO-TP's 4095-byte limit correctly rejected\nPASSED\ntest_can_transport.py::test_malformed_empty_frame_rejected PASS: empty/malformed CAN frame correctly rejected instead of crashing\nPASSED\ntest_can_transport.py::test_malformed_first_frame_rejected PASS: malformed First Frame correctly rejected\nPASSED\ntest_can_transport.py::test_invalid_st_min_rejected PASS: reserved ISO-TP STmin correctly rejected\nPASSED\ntest_can_transport.py::test_repeated_fc_wait_is_bounded PASS: repeated Flow Control WAIT correctly bounded\nPASSED\ntest_can_transport.py::test_fc_wait_resets_between_bursts PASS: Flow Control WAIT counter resets after a CONTINUE\nPASSED\ntest_can_transport.py::test_block_size_state_does_not_leak_across_messages PASS: Flow Control block-size counter does not leak across messages on the same transport instance\nPASSED\ntest_can_transport.py::test_sequence_number_wraps_past_15 PASS: Consecutive Frame sequence number correctly wraps past 15 back to 0/1\nPASSED\n\n=========================================================== 14 passed in 0.29s============================================================\n### CAN Flow Control / Block Size:\n@srijani-ece ➜ /workspaces/UDS-Protocol-Simulator (main) $ pytest test_can_transport.py -v -s\n=========================================================== test session starts===========================================================\nplatform linux -- Python 3.14.2, pytest-9.1.1, pluggy-1.6.0 -- /usr/local/py-utils/venvs/pytest/bin/python\ncachedir: .pytest_cache\nrootdir: /workspaces/UDS-Protocol-Simulator\nplugins: anyio-4.14.2\ncollected 14 items\n\ntest_can_transport.py::test_single_frame_roundtrip PASS: single-frame message correctly built and reassembled\nPASSED\ntest_can_transport.py::test_multi_frame_roundtrip PASS: 20-byte message split into 3 CAN frames and correctly reassembled\nPASSED\ntest_can_transport.py::test_sequence_error_detected PASS: out-of-order Consecutive Frame correctly detected and rejected\nPASSED\ntest_can_transport.py::test_flow_control_frame_format PASS: Flow Control frame correctly encodes status/block-size/STmin\nPASSED\ntest_can_transport.py::test_real_can_multi_frame_transfer PASS: real 25-byte UDS message sent over virtual CAN bus, correctly split, Flow-Control-negotiated, and reassembled on the ECU side\nPASSED\ntest_can_transport.py::test_flow_control_block_size_actually_enforced PASS: Block Size=2 genuinely enforced — sender paused for 3 separateFlow Control round-trips across 5 Consecutive Frames, not sent as one burst\nPASSED\ntest_can_transport.py::test_payload_over_4095_bytes_rejected PASS: payload exceeding ISO-TP's 4095-byte limit correctly rejected\nPASSED\ntest_can_transport.py::test_malformed_empty_frame_rejected PASS: empty/malformed CAN frame correctly rejected instead of crashing\nPASSED\ntest_can_transport.py::test_malformed_first_frame_rejected PASS: malformed First Frame correctly rejected\nPASSED\ntest_can_transport.py::test_invalid_st_min_rejected PASS: reserved ISO-TP STmin correctly rejected\nPASSED\ntest_can_transport.py::test_repeated_fc_wait_is_bounded PASS: repeated Flow Control WAIT correctly bounded\nPASSED\ntest_can_transport.py::test_fc_wait_resets_between_bursts PASS: Flow Control WAIT counter resets after a CONTINUE\nPASSED\ntest_can_transport.py::test_block_size_state_does_not_leak_across_messages PASS: Flow Control block-size counter does not leak across messages on the same transport instance\nPASSED\ntest_can_transport.py::test_sequence_number_wraps_past_15 PASS: Consecutive Frame sequence number correctly wraps past 15 back to 0/1\nPASSED\n\n=========================================================== 14 passed in 0.29s============================================================\n\n## What I'd add next\n\n* `0x34 / 0x36 / 0x37` — UDS Request Download / Transfer Data / Request Transfer Exit for an OTA-style firmware update flow.\n* Interactive diagnostic tester CLI.\n* Additional negative-path and timeout tests.\n* SocketCAN / physical CAN hardware validation.\n\n## Project status\n\nThe simulator currently provides:\n\n* UDS diagnostic services:\n  * Diagnostic Session Control (`0x10`)\n  * ECU Reset (`0x11`)\n  * Read Data By Identifier (`0x22`)\n  * Security Access (`0x27`)\n  * Write Data By Identifier (`0x2E`)\n  * Routine Control (`0x31`)\n  * Tester Present (`0x3E`)\n* Diagnostic session and security state management\n* Security Access seed/key exchange\n* Failed-key attempt tracking and timed security lockout\n* S3 session timeout handling\n* ECU reset state handling\n* TCP-based UDS communication\n* CAN transport using `python-can`\n* ISO-TP segmentation and reassembly\n* Single- and multi-frame CAN message handling\n* Flow Control negotiation\n* Flow Control Block Size enforcement\n* STmin decoding and pacing\n* Defensive ISO-TP protocol validation\n* Virtual CAN-based integration testing\n* End-to-end UDS-over-CAN testing\n* Automated regression testing with pytest",
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      "url": "https://github.com/api-evangelist/gm-onstar",
      "description": "GM OnStar — independent third-party profile of a public API surface, by API Evangelist. GM OnStar is General Motors' connected vehicle services platform, originally launched in 1996 as an in-vehicle safety, security, and concierge service and since extended into a commercial data platform under OnStar Business Solutions.",
      "readme": "# GM OnStar\n\n<!-- API-EVANGELIST-PROVENANCE:BEGIN -->\n> ### About this repository\n>\n> **This is not our API.** This repository is an independent, third-party profile of a company's\n> **publicly available** API surface, maintained by [API Evangelist](https://apievangelist.com).\n> API Evangelist does not operate, host, resell, or support this company's APIs, and is not\n> affiliated with or endorsed by the company unless stated on the profile.\n>\n> **Where the information came from.** Everything here is assembled from material a member of the\n> public can reach with a browser and no credentials — the company's own website, developer portal\n> and documentation, the specifications it publishes for public use (OpenAPI, AsyncAPI, JSON Schema,\n> `apis.json`, `llms.txt` and similar), its public repositories, and its public status, pricing and\n> changelog pages. **Nothing here is obtained by breaching a system, defeating an access control, or\n> using credentials of any kind.**\n>\n> **The rating is an independent assessment.** The Kin Score and Agent Readiness rating are\n> independently calculated scores of a company's *public* API artifacts, produced by API Evangelist\n> against a published rubric. They are not certifications, endorsements, security assessments, or\n> audits, and they score published artifacts — not the quality, safety, or security of the software.\n>\n> **Corrections, re-scores, and removal are free.** No partnership, contract, or purchase is\n> required, and you do not need to justify the request.\n>\n> - **Something wrong?** Open an issue on this repository, or email\n>   [info@apievangelist.com](mailto:info@apievangelist.com).\n> - **Published something new?** Ask for a re-score and we will re-run the rating.\n> - **Want the listing taken down?** Say so and we will honor it. The profile is reduced to your\n>   company name, a factual description, and a link to your own site, and the company is recorded as\n>   **unrated** — never scored zero for having asked.\n>\n> **Response times.** Acknowledgement within **one business day**; removal or restriction within\n> **two business days**; corrections and re-scores within **five business days**.\n>\n> **Not from the company, and here with a question?** You are welcome here — we would rather be the\n> front line and point you the right way than have a good report go nowhere. What this repository\n> can answer is narrow, though, so it is worth knowing who you are actually looking for:\n>\n> - **A question about how the API works, an account, billing, or a bug in the service** — that is\n>   the company's own support, not us. We profile this API; we do not operate it and cannot see\n>   your account.\n> - **A bug in an open-source project we only catalog** — file it on that project's own repository.\n>   This has happened with a real and correct bug report that reached us instead of the people who\n>   could fix it, which helped nobody.\n> - **Anything about this listing itself** — the description, the tags, the rating, a missing or\n>   wrong artifact — is ours. Open an issue here.\n> - **Not sure, or something general about API Evangelist or APIs.io** — open an issue on the\n>   [APIs.io Inbox](https://github.com/api-search/inbox) and we will route it.\n>\n> **This repository contains no software, and we will never ask you to download anything.** There is\n> no build, release, installer, or binary here — only text and machine-readable API descriptions, so\n> there is nothing here that can be \"corrupt\" or need \"repairing\". Any issue, comment, or email\n> claiming otherwise and offering a download link is not from us and is hostile. Do not follow the\n> link; it is a lure. Report it to GitHub and, if you like, tell us at\n> [info@apievangelist.com](mailto:info@apievangelist.com) so we can take it down.\n>\n> **On a security or compliance team?** Email\n> [info@apievangelist.com](mailto:info@apievangelist.com) with *security* in the subject line and\n> you will get a person, not a form. We will tell you exactly which public URLs this profile was\n> built from so your team can see the same surface we did, and we will take the listing down on\n> request while you work through it.\n>\n> Full detail: **[Where this data comes from](https://apievangelist.com/about/where-our-data-comes-from)**\n<!-- API-EVANGELIST-PROVENANCE:END -->\n\nGM OnStar is General Motors' connected vehicle services platform, originally launched in 1996 as an in-vehicle safety, security, and concierge service and since extended into a commercial data platform under OnStar Business Solutions. The OnStar Business Solutions API and Data Services product delivers near-real-time embedded telematics straight from properly equipped 2015-model-year-or-newer GM vehicles — Chevrolet, Buick, GMC, and Cadillac — without aftermarket hardware, exposing vehicle location, speed, ignition status, odometer, fuel level, EV state-of-charge and charging status, tire pressure, seatbelt status, diagnostic trouble codes, and driver-behavior events such as hard brake and hard acceleration. The product is packaged into tiered plans (commonly referenced as API Starter and API Pro) and is distributed primarily through OnStar's enterprise channel under the GM Envolve commercial brand, plus integrations with fleet management providers including Samsara, Geotab, Wheels, Verizon Connect, and other approved telematic service providers. There is no public self-serve developer portal or published OpenAPI specification — access is gated through GM/OnStar sales (developer.gm.com is a request-access endpoint) or via an authorized integration partner. Consumer-facing OnStar mobile features (remote start, remote lock, vehicle locate, in-vehicle Wi-Fi, Super Cruise telemetry) are delivered through GM's myChevrolet, myBuick, myGMC, and myCadillac apps and are not part of the published API surface.\n\n**Areas:** Automotive · Connected Vehicles · Telematics · Fleet Management · Vehicle Data · Vehicle Location · Vehicle Diagnostics · Driver Behavior · Electric Vehicles · EV Charging · OnStar · General Motors\n\n## GM OnStar on APIs.io\n\nEverything profiled for GM OnStar is published on APIs.io rather than in this repository. Start at the provider page — **[apis.io/providers/gm-onstar/](https://apis.io/providers/gm-onstar/)** — or go straight to one of the APIs or properties below.\n\n### Published properties\n\nEach property below is a page on APIs.io carrying the machine-readable artifact and what it says.\n\n#### Security (1)\n\nAuthentication, trust centre, and vulnerability disclosure.\n\n- [Gm Onstar Domain Security](https://apis.io/security/gm-onstar/gm-onstar-domain-security/)\n\n## Where to find this API\n\nLinks to the company's own pages. This repository publishes no copy of their specifications — the canonical document is theirs and lives at the URLs below.\n\n- [Website](https://www.onstar.com)\n\n## API Evangelist rating\n\n**Kin Score 4.4** — minimal · rubric 0.24.0 · scored 2026-10-17\n\n| Facet | Score |\n|---|---|\n| Discoverability | 49.1 |\n| Contract quality | 0.0 |\n| Contract governance | 0.0 |\n| Operational transparency | 5.3 |\n| Developer ergonomics | 0.0 |\n| Access clarity | 0.0 |\n\n**Agent readiness 0.0** — human-only\n\n| Agent-readiness dimension | Result |\n|---|---|\n| Spec Presence | — |\n| Agentic Access | — |\n| Reversibility Documented | — |\n| MCP Server | — |\n| Auth Clarity | — |\n| Idempotency | — |\n| Error Semantics | — |\n| OpenAPI Examples | — |\n| Rate Limit Signal | — |\n| Event Surface Described | — |\n| Agent Skills | — |\n| Well Known Catalog | — |\n| Consent Identity | — |\n| Agent Card | — |\n| Dry Run Mode | — |\n| Delegated Identity | — |\n| Protected Resource Metadata | — |\n| Dynamic Client Registration | — |\n| Agentic Commerce | — |\n\n**Regulatory alignment 4.9** — Energy & Utilities\n\nThe rubric is published at [github.com/api-evangelist/kin-score](https://github.com/api-evangelist/kin-score). The per-check breakdown behind these numbers — which checks were earned, partial or missed — along with score history and how this provider compares to its peers, is available at [apis.io/providers/gm-onstar/](https://apis.io/providers/gm-onstar/).\n\n## How this profile is made\n\nAPI Evangelist profiles a company's public API surface the way a developer would find it: the website, developer portal and documentation, the specifications it publishes, its public repositories, and its pricing, status and changelog pages. From that it derives the properties above — contracts split per API, workflows, schemas, collections, governance rules, plans and rate limits — and scores them against the published [Kin Score rubric](https://github.com/api-evangelist/kin-score).\n\nThe artifacts are published on [APIs.io](https://apis.io), not in this repository. This repository is the public record for GM OnStar: the place to say something is wrong, missing or out of date, and to ask for a re-score or a removal.\n\n## Open an issue\n\n- **Something about this listing** — a wrong description, a missing API, a stale artifact or a question about the rating: [open an issue on this repository](https://github.com/api-evangelist/gm-onstar/issues/new).\n- **A new API, or one that is not in the catalog yet** — [submit it on APIs.io](https://apis.io/add/).\n- **Anything else** — [the APIs.io inbox](https://github.com/api-search/inbox/issues/new) or [info@apievangelist.com](mailto:info@apievangelist.com).",
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    "fluxius/v2ginjector": {
      "id": "github:fluxius/v2ginjector",
      "evidence_type": "repository",
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      "title": "Publications",
      "full_name": "FlUxIuS/V2GInjector",
      "name": "V2GInjector",
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      "url": "https://github.com/FlUxIuS/V2GInjector",
      "description": "V2GInjector - Tool to intrude a V2G PowerLine network, but also to capture and inject V2G packets",
      "readme": "![V2GInjector Logo](/images/logo.png)\n\nTool to penetrate V2G networks, monitor and inject packets to attack electric cars and charging stations.\n\n## Publications\n\n- Researches paper: https://www.sstic.org/media/SSTIC2019/SSTIC-actes/v2g_injector_playing_with_electric_cars_and_chargi/SSTIC2019-Article-v2g_injector_playing_with_electric_cars_and_charging_stations_via_powerline-dudek.pdf\n- Slides from SSTIC 2019: https://www.sstic.org/media/SSTIC2019/SSTIC-actes/v2g_injector_playing_with_electric_cars_and_chargi/SSTIC2019-Slides-v2g_injector_playing_with_electric_cars_and_charging_stations_via_powerline-dudek.pdf\n- Video recording from SSTIC 2019 (in French): https://static.sstic.org/videos2019/1080p/SSTIC_2019-06-07_P06.mp4\n\nSupport: contact the [Penthertz company](https://penthertz.com/) which is the owner of the project.\n\n## Dependencies\n\n### Software\n\n- Python 2, and Python 3\n- Scapy\n- Colorama for Python\n- V2Gdecoder in submodules, that is already compiled and available here: https://github.com/FlUxIuS/V2Gdecoder/releases\n- HomePlugPWN that is provided in submodules\n\nTo install Python dependencies, use `pip install -r requirements.txt` (or `pip3` as needed).\n\nSubmodules can be fetched as follows:\n```\n$ git submodule update --init --recursive\n```\n\n### Hardware\n\nAny devices using the PowerLine-Communication Qualcomm Atheros 7k (QCA7k) series baseband (tested on QCA7420 and QCA7500).\nFor wallplugs, next to the HomePlug logo, there is a text descripting plug's interoperability including HomePlug GP.\n\nThe tool has been tested with following devices:\n\n* dLAN Green PHY eval board EU II (~150€)\n* PLC Stamp Micro 2 Evaluation Board (Home Automation) (~300€)\n* Devolo 1200+ (~50€) -> to rework if you want to bind it to CP lines -> dangerous to get access on TR+/- lines /!\\\n* Working on QCA7420 chips, but attenuation must be forced on EVSE side for the SLAC procedure\n* TODO: test other devices with a QCA7k PLC baseband.\n\n## Connections\n\nThe PowerLine Communication device could be plugged in three different ways:\n\n* plugging it with an IEC 61851 or any compatible connector for your targeted car (that could be found in Alibaba)\n* with an interception cable between the charging station and the car\n* or using simply use a default PLC wallplug with a QCA7k connected to the same shared electrical network as the charging station(s) and the car(s).\n\n## How to use it\n\nThe tool can be started with the following interpreter as follows:\n```\n$ python V2GInjector\n\nooooo  oooo  ooooooo     ooooooo8\n 888    88 o88     888 o888    88\n  888  88        o888  888    oooo\n   88888      o888   o 888o    88\n    888    o8888oooo88  888ooo888\nooooo             o88                         o8\n 888  oo oooooo  oooo  ooooooooo8  ooooooo  o888oo ooooooo  oo oooooo\n 888   888   888  888 888oooooo8 888     888 888 888     888 888    888\n 888   888   888  888 888        888         888 888     888 888\no888o o888o o888o 888   88oooo888  88ooo888   888o 88ooo88  o888o\n                 o88\n\n~>>>\n```\n\nTo collect data automatically, two methods are provided by Network class object:\n* `Network().pcap(<pcap file>)`\n* `Network().sniff(iface=<interface>)`\n\n### Decoding V2G packet\n\nFirst, the V2Gdecoder service must be running as follows:\n```\n$ java -jar V2Gdecoder.jar -w\n```\n\nThen, when calling `pcap()` or `sniff()` methods as follows, EXI data are simply decoded:\n```\n~>>> n=Network()\n~>>> n.pcap(\"/tmp/emulated.pcapng\")\n<CookedLinux  pkttype=unicast lladdrtype=0x304 lladdrlen=6 src='' proto=0x86dd |<IPv6  version=6 tc=0 fl=36603 plen=76 nh=TCP hlim=64 src=fe80::3e2a:b4ff:3e5f:1a4 dst=fe80::3e2a:b4ff:3e5f:1a4 |<TCP  sport=54054 dport=62887 seq=1646944081 ack=4294522924 dataofs=8 reserved=0 flags=PA window=342 chksum=0xb60d urgptr=0 options=[('NOP', None), ('NOP', None), ('Timestamp', (1430435299, 1430435274))] |<V2GTP  Version=1 Invers=254 PayloadType=EXI PayloadLen=36 Payload='\\x80\\x00\\xeb\\xab\\x93q\\xd3K\\x9by\\xd1\\x89\\xa9\\x89\\x89\\xc1\\xd1\\x91\\xd1\\x91\\x81\\x89\\x99\\xd2k\\x9b:#+0\\x02\\x00\\x00(\\x00@' |>>>>\n[Decoded packet]\n<?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"UTF-8\"?><ns4:supportedAppProtocolReq xmlns:ns4=\"urn:iso:15118:2:2010:AppProtocol\" xmlns:xsi=\"http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance\" xmlns:ns3=\"http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema\"><AppProtocol><ProtocolNamespace>urn:iso:15118:2:2013:MsgDef</ProtocolNamespace><VersionNumberMajor>2</VersionNumberMajor><VersionNumberMinor>0</VersionNumberMinor><SchemaID>10</SchemaID><Priority>1</Priority></AppProtocol></ns4:supportedAppProtocolReq>\n\n<CookedLinux  pkttype=unicast lladdrtype=0x304 lladdrlen=6 src='' proto=0x86dd |<IPv6  version=6 tc=0 fl=218843 plen=44 nh=TCP hlim=64 src=fe80::3e2a:b4ff:3e5f:1a4 dst=fe80::3e2a:b4ff:3e5f:1a4 |<TCP  sport=62887 dport=54054 seq=4294522924 ack=1646944125 dataofs=8 reserved=0 flags=PA window=342 chksum=0xb5ed urgptr=0 options=[('NOP', None), ('NOP', None), ('Timestamp', (1430435378, 1430435299))] |<V2GTP  Version=1 Invers=254 PayloadType=EXI PayloadLen=4 Payload='\\x80@\\x02\\x80' |>>>>\n[Decoded packet]\n<?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"UTF-8\"?><ns4:supportedAppProtocolRes xmlns:ns4=\"urn:iso:15118:2:2010:AppProtocol\" xmlns:xsi=\"http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance\" xmlns:ns3=\"http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema\"><ResponseCode>OK_SuccessfulNegotiation</ResponseCode><SchemaID>10</SchemaID></ns4:supportedAppProtocolRes>\n\n<CookedLinux  pkttype=unicast lladdrtype=0x304 lladdrlen=6 src='' proto=0x86dd |<IPv6  version=6 tc=0 fl=36603 plen=61 nh=TCP hlim=64 src=fe80::3e2a:b4ff:3e5f:1a4 dst=fe80::3e2a:b4ff:3e5f:1a4 |<TCP  sport=54054 dport=62887 seq=1646944125 ack=4294522936 dataofs=8 reserved=0 flags=PA window=342 chksum=0xb5fe urgptr=0 options=[('NOP', None), ('NOP', None), ('Timestamp', (1430435406, 1430435378))] |<V2GTP  Version=1 Invers=254 PayloadType=EXI PayloadLen=21 Payload=\"\\x80\\x98\\x02\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x11\\xd0\\x18pn\\xd5\\xac'X\\x00\" |>>>>\n[Decoded packet]\n<?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"UTF-8\"?><ns7:V2G_Message xmlns:ns7=\"urn:iso:15118:2:2013:MsgDef\" xmlns:xsi=\"http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance\" xmlns:ns3=\"http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema\" xmlns:ns4=\"http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#\" xmlns:ns5=\"urn:iso:15118:2:2013:MsgBody\" xmlns:ns6=\"urn:iso:15118:2:2013:MsgDataTypes\" xmlns:ns8=\"urn:iso:15118:2:2013:MsgHeader\"><ns7:Header><ns8:SessionID>0000000000000000</ns8:SessionID></ns7:Header><ns7:Body><ns5:SessionSetupReq><ns5:EVCCID>1C1BB56B09D6</ns5:EVCCID></ns5:SessionSetupReq></ns7:Body></ns7:V2G_Message>\n\n<CookedLinux  pkttype=unicast lladdrtype=0x304 lladdrlen=6 src='' proto=0x86dd |<IPv6  version=6 tc=0 fl=218843 plen=69 nh=TCP hlim=64 src=fe80::3e2a:b4ff:3e5f:1a4 dst=fe80::3e2a:b4ff:3e5f:1a4 |<TCP  sport=62887 dport=54054 seq=4294522936 ack=1646944154 dataofs=8 reserved=0 flags=PA window=342 chksum=0xb606 urgptr=0 options=[('NOP', None), ('NOP', None), ('Timestamp', (1430435411, 1430435406))] |<V2GTP  Version=1 Invers=254 PayloadType=EXI PayloadLen=29 Payload=\"\\x80\\x98\\x02'\\xe5\\xc2N\\x07\\xc8h\\xae\\xd1\\xe0 )\\x15YM\\x15%\\x10\\xb4\\xc0\\x1c\\xfb\\x1e\\x1c\\xc0\\xa0\" |>>>>\n[Decoded packet]\n<?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"UTF-8\"?><ns7:V2G_Message xmlns:ns7=\"urn:iso:15118:2:2013:MsgDef\" xmlns:xsi=\"http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance\" xmlns:ns3=\"http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema\" xmlns:ns4=\"http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#\" xmlns:ns5=\"urn:iso:15118:2:2013:MsgBody\" xmlns:ns6=\"urn:iso:15118:2:2013:MsgDataTypes\" xmlns:ns8=\"urn:iso:15118:2:2013:MsgHeader\"><ns7:Header><ns8:SessionID>9F9709381F21A2BB</ns8:SessionID></ns7:Header><ns7:Body><ns5:SessionSetupRes><ns5:ResponseCode>OK_NewSessionEstablished</ns5:ResponseCode><ns5:EVSEID>EVSEID-0</ns5:EVSEID><ns5:EVSETimeStamp>1557933159</ns5:EVSETimeStamp></ns5:SessionSetupRes></ns7:Body></ns7:V2G_Message>\n\n<CookedLinux  pkttype=unicast lladdrtype=0x304 lladdrlen=6 src='' proto=0x86dd |<IPv6  version=6 tc=0 fl=36603 plen=53 nh=TCP hlim=64 src=fe80::3e2a:b4ff:3e5f:1a4 dst=fe80::3e2a:b4ff:3e5f:1a4 |<TCP  sport=54054 dport=62887 seq=1646944154 ack=4294522973 dataofs=8 reserved=0 flags=PA window=342 chksum=0xb5f6 urgptr=0 options=[('NOP', None), ('NOP', None), ('Timestamp', (1430435414, 1430435411))] |<V2GTP  Version=1 Invers=254 PayloadType=EXI PayloadLen=13 Payload=\"\\x80\\x98\\x02'\\xe5\\xc2N\\x07\\xc8h\\xae\\xd1\\xb8\" |>>>>\n[Decoded packet]\n<?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"UTF-8\"?><ns7:V2G_Message xmlns:ns7=\"urn:iso:15118:2:2013:MsgDef\" xmlns:xsi=\"http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance\" xmlns:ns3=\"http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema\" xmlns:ns4=\"http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#\" xmlns:ns5=\"urn:iso:15118:2:2013:MsgBody\" xmlns:ns6=\"urn:iso:15118:2:2013:MsgDataTypes\" xmlns:ns8=\"urn:iso:15118:2:2013:MsgHeader\"><ns7:Header><ns8:SessionID>9F9709381F21A2BB</ns8:SessionID></ns7:Header><ns7:Body><ns5:ServiceDiscoveryReq/></ns7:Body></ns7:V2G_Message>\n\n<CookedLinux  pkttype=unicast lladdrtype=0x304 lladdrlen=6 src='' proto=0x86dd |<IPv6  version=6 tc=0 fl=218843 plen=83 nh=TCP hlim=64 src=fe80::3e2a:b4ff:3e5f:1a4 dst=fe80::3e2a:b4ff:3e5f:1a4 |<TCP  sport=62887 dport=54054 seq=4294522973 ack=1646944175 dataofs=8 reserved=0 flags=PA window=342 chksum=0xb614 urgptr=0 options=[('NOP', None), ('NOP', None), ('Timestamp', (1430435419, 1430435414))] |<V2GTP  Version=1 Invers=254 PayloadType=EXI PayloadLen=43 Payload=\"\\x80\\x98\\x02'\\xe5\\xc2N\\x07\\xc8h\\xae\\xd1\\xc0\\x01 \\x04\\x05QU\\x88\\x18\\xda\\x18\\\\\\x99\\xda[\\x99\\xc8\\n\\x10P\\xcb\\xd1\\x10\\xca@@ \\x01\\x03\\x08H\" |>>>>\n[Decoded packet]\n<?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"UTF-8\"?><ns7:V2G_Message xmlns:ns7=\"urn:iso:15118:2:2013:MsgDef\" xmlns:xsi=\"http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance\" xmlns:ns3=\"http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema\" xmlns:ns4=\"http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#\" xmlns:ns5=\"urn:iso:15118:2:2013:MsgBody\" xmlns:ns6=\"urn:iso:15118:2:2013:MsgDataTypes\" xmlns:ns8=\"urn:iso:15118:2:2013:MsgHeader\"><ns7:Header><ns8:SessionID>9F9709381F21A2BB</ns8:SessionID></ns7:Header><ns7:Body><ns5:ServiceDiscoveryRes><ns5:ResponseCode>OK</ns5:ResponseCode><ns5:PaymentOptionList><ns6:PaymentOption>ExternalPayment</ns6:PaymentOption></ns5:PaymentOptionList><ns5:ChargeService><ns6:ServiceID>1</ns6:ServiceID><ns6:ServiceName>EV charging (AC/DC)</ns6:ServiceName><ns6:ServiceCategory>EVCharging</ns6:ServiceCategory><ns6:FreeService>false</ns6:FreeService><ns6:SupportedEnergyTransferMode><ns6:EnergyTransferMode>AC_three_phase_core</ns6:EnergyTransferMode><ns6:EnergyTransferMode>AC_single_phase_core</ns6:EnergyTransferMode><ns6:EnergyTransferMode>DC_core</ns6:EnergyTransferMode><ns6:EnergyTransferMode>DC_extended</ns6:EnergyTransferMode><ns6:EnergyTransferMode>DC_combo_core</ns6:EnergyTransferMode></ns6:SupportedEnergyTransferMode></ns5:ChargeService></ns5:ServiceDiscoveryRes></ns7:Body></ns7:V2G_Message>\n[...]\n```\n\n### Collected HPGP keys\n\nCollected HomePlug GP keys are directly show when calling `pcap()` or `sniff()`:\n```\n~>>> n=Network()\n~>>> n.sniff(iface=\"eth0\")\n[...]\n[New HPGP network spotted!]\n- EVSEID: '\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00'\n- NetID: '\\xae\\x20\\x00\\xff\\x82\\x02\\x00'\n- NMK: '\\x43F\\xc8\\xaeT\\xbf\\xefs\\x01\\x84\\x94\\xf8\\xc3\\x17'\n- EVID: '\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x01\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\xff'\n- RunID: '\\xef\\x34C\\xf5E\\xe0\\xa6\\x01'\n```\nThese data are stored in the `Network().hpgp` attribute.\n\nThis can then be used to configure your PLC device's PIB by dumping it with `plctool` and using `slac\\pev` tool and profile file.\n\n### Generate V2G packets\n\nAs it uses Scapy and extension layers, a V2G packet can be built using the same logic as Scapy:\n```\n~>>> ether = Ether()\n~>>> ip = IPv6(dst=\"fe80::3e2a:b4ff:3e5f:1a4\")\n~>>> tcp = TCP(sport=6666, dport=54054, flags=24)\n~>>> v2g=V2GTP()\n~>>> packet = ether/ip/tcp/v2g\n~>>> packet\n<Ether  type=0x86dd |<IPv6  nh=TCP dst=fe80::3e2a:b4ff:3e5f:1a4 |<TCP  sport=6666 dport=54054 flags=PA |<V2GTP  |>>>>\n```\nBut we need to push an EXI encoded payload in the V2GTP layer:\n```\n~>>> packet[V2GTP].show()\n###[ V2GTP ]###\n  Version   = 1\n  Invers    = 254\n  PayloadType= EXI\n  PayloadLen= 0\n  Payload   = ''\n```\nTo do that, as for the `analyse()` method call by `sniff()` and `pcap()` which uses `decodeEXI()` function to decode EXI data, a encoder function `encodeEXI` also exists to compress the XML payload to EXI:\n```\n~>>> xml = '<?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"UTF-8\"?><ns7:V2G_Message xmlns:ns7=\"urn:iso:15118:2:2013:MsgDef\" xmlns:xsi=\"http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance\" xmlns:ns3=\"http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema\" xmlns:ns4=\"http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#\" xmlns:ns5=\"urn:iso:15118:2:2013:MsgBody\" xmlns:ns6=\"urn:iso:15118:2:2013:MsgDataTypes\" xmlns:ns8=\"urn:iso:15118:2:2013:MsgHeader\"><ns7:Header><ns8:SessionID>0000000000000000</ns8:SessionID></ns7:Header><ns7:Body><ns5:SessionSetupReq><ns5:EVCCID>1C1BB56B09D6</ns5:EVCCID></ns5:SessionSetupReq></ns7:Body></ns7:V2G_Message>'\n~>>> encoded_xml=encodeEXI(xml)\n~>>> encoded_xml\nu'809802000000000000000011D018706ED5AC275800'\n```\nThen, the encoded/compressed data in EXI can be pushed in the V2GTP payload as follows:\n```\n~>>> packet.Payload=encoded_xml\n~>>> packet\n<Ether  type=0x86dd |<IPv6  nh=TCP dst=fe80::3e2a:b4ff:3e5f:1a4 |<TCP  sport=6666 dport=54054 flags=PA |<V2GTP  Payload='809802000000000000000011D018706ED5AC275800' |>>>>\n```\nTo finish, the packet can be sent to the target using Scapy's `sendp()` function.\n\n## Further development\n\n* Make a native Python EXI encoder/decoder -> very long task to do, or try using the C++ EXI Wrapper in Python\n* Add other wrappers\n* Add some pre-developed attacking functions during interception\n* More docs",
      "topics": [
        "car",
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      "title": "VitroBench Test Platform",
      "full_name": "yeoant/VitroBench",
      "name": "VitroBench",
      "owner": "yeoant",
      "url": "https://github.com/yeoant/VitroBench",
      "description": "VitroBench is a comprehensive test platform involving commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) ECUs that allows arbitrary packet control over CAN In Vehicle Networks (IVN).",
      "readme": "<p align=\"center\">\n  <img src=\"VitroBench_logo.jpg\" width=\"400\">\n</p>\n\n# VitroBench Test Platform\n\nVitroBench is a comprehensive test platform that manipulates in-vehicle networks and COTS ECUs on your bench. Our <a href=\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2214209623000797\">VitroBench paper</a> is published on Vehicular Communications, Volume 43 (October 2023). This repository keeps the software that is used in this project.\n\n<p align=\"center\">\n  <img src=\"display.png\" width=\"800\">\n</p>\n\n<p align=\"justify\">\n  The software for sniffing, injection or interception, and fuzzing or attacks is executed on the CAN Messages (CM) workstation. Three displays monitor the respective messages:\n</p>\n\n1. TSMaster (Sniffing and Logging)\n2. TSMaster (Injection or Interception Monitoring)\n3. Fuzzing or Attacks\n\n## Testing Setup\n<p> The testing setup depends on the operation of the test platform. Operation videos can be obtained from the following website, <a href=\"https://www.vitrobench .com\">VitroBench</a>. </p>\n\n| Operation | Description |\n| :-------- | :---------- |\n| Sniffing  | All the IVNs messages are monitored and captured via TSMaster. |\n| Injection | A channel can be used to transmit messages to the targeted network with configurable frame interval. |\n| Interception | An ECU can be isolated via bridging and its intercepted messages will pass through the workstation. |\n| Fuzzing & Attacks | A fuzzing program can be executed at the workstation on the injected or intercepted messages. Different programs for attacks can be explored by modifying the intercepted or injected messages. |\n\n<p align=\"center\">\n  <img src=\"testing_setup.png\"  width=\"800\">\n</p>\n\n<p align=\"justify\">There are three possible testing scenarios as illustrated in the figure. For normal operation, the four channels of PCAN, FCAN, KCAN and Diagnostic are set up for (1) Sniffing. For (2) Frame Injection, an additional injection channel is connected to the network. For bridging, a targeted ECU is separated and re-connected to the ECU channel and back via the network channel as shown in (3) Interception.\n</p>\n\n## Workstation Software\n​Note: Sniffing software is from [TSMaster](https://github.com/TOSUN-Shanghai/TSMaster).\n\n| Python Program | Description |\n|:---------------|:------------|\n| [bmw_bridge_passthru.py](https://github.com/yeoant/VitroBench/blob/main/bmw_bridge_passthru.py) | This program performs a pass-through of all messages via the bridge. |\n| [bmw_cas130_attack.py](https://github.com/yeoant/VitroBench/blob/main/bmw_cas130_attack.py) | This attack forces the car to stop. CAS is isolated and bridged from KCAN. Within the  program, setting (attack_type=1) stops the car when the driver starts the car for the third time and setting (attack_type=2) stops the car when the  car is running, and a specified time duration is reached. |\n| [bmw_ekp_attackBridge.py](https://github.com/yeoant/VitroBench/blob/main/bmw_ekp_attackBridge.py) | This is an  attack on the fuel pump controller by bridging Engine ECU from PCAN. Byte  7 (D8) of message 0xAA was fuzzed when the Engine RPM is greater than  750. During the attack, EKP outputs an erratic fuel pump signal. |\n| [bmw_ekp_attackInject.py](https://github.com/yeoant/VitroBench/blob/main/bmw_ekp_attackInject.py) | This is  an attack on the fuel pump controller by injecting messages 0xAA to PCAN.  Byte 7 (D8) of message 0xAA was fuzzed when the Engine RPM is greater than 850. During the attack, EKP outputs an erratic fuel pump signal. |\n| [bmw_flooding_inject_deltatime.py](https://github.com/yeoant/VitroBench/blob/main/bmw_flooding_inject_deltatime.py) | This  is a flooding attack by injecting message 0x80 to KCAN to cause a denial of service to the instrument cluster. The attack stopped the display message 0x1A6 to reach the Instrument Cluster. |\n| [bmw_flooding_inject_deltatime_stealth.py](https://github.com/yeoant/VitroBench/blob/main/bmw_flooding_inject_deltatime_stealth.py) | This is a flooding attack by injecting stealth messages from 0x0 to 0x1A5 to KCAN to cause a denial of service to the instrument cluster. The attack stopped the display message 0x1A6 to reach the Instrument Cluster. |\n| [bmw_jbe_fuzz1_v10.py](https://github.com/yeoant/VitroBench/blob/main/bmw_jbe_fuzz1_v10.py) | This program  conducts a penetration test by injecting random message IDs and data from the external Diagnostic network. The workstation can monitor all the In-Vehicle Networks (IVNs) messages to check which messages have      infiltrated the IVNs. Within the program, setting (sniff=True) will log the infiltrated messages to the file,      {'jbe_infiltrate'+date_time+'.blf'}. |\n| [bmw_speed_attack1.py](https://github.com/yeoant/VitroBench/blob/main/bmw_speed_attack1.py) | This attack causes the instrument cluster to display the wrong speed. DSC is isolated and bridged from PCAN. The car runs normally until the attack speed of 40km/h. Thereafter, the speed in message 0x1A6 is randomly set. |\n| [bmw_speed_attack2.py](https://github.com/yeoant/VitroBench/blob/main/bmw_speed_attack2.py) | This causes the instrument cluster to display the wrong speed. DSC is isolated and bridged from PCAN. The car runs normally until the attack speed of 10 km/h. Thereafter, the speed message 0x1A6 is incremented by 2/3 of the actual increased speed and clipped at the maximum speed of 35 km/h. |\n\n### Citing VitroBench\n\n```\n@article{YEO2023100649,\ntitle = {VitroBench: Manipulating in-vehicle networks and COTS ECUs on your bench: A comprehensive test platform for automotive cybersecurity research},\njournal = {Vehicular Communications},\nvolume = {43},\nyear = {2023},\ndoi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.vehcom.2023.100649},\nurl = {https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2214209623000797},\nauthor = {Anthony Kee Teck Yeo and Matheus E. Garbelini and Sudipta Chattopadhyay and Jianying Zhou}\n}\n```",
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        "can",
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    "silvamleandro/remy-project": {
      "id": "github:silvamleandro/remy-project",
      "evidence_type": "repository",
      "record_type": "repository",
      "title": "🐀 REMY Project",
      "full_name": "silvamleandro/remy-project",
      "name": "remy-project",
      "owner": "silvamleandro",
      "url": "https://github.com/silvamleandro/remy-project",
      "description": "collaboRative intrusion dEtection system for unManned aerial vehicles swarm SecuritY",
      "readme": "# 🐀 REMY Project\ncollaboRative intrusion dEtection system for unManned aerial vehicles swarm SecuritY\n\n## 📖 Description\n\n<p align=\"center\">\n  <img src=\"https://github.com/silvamleandro/remy-project/blob/main/imgs/remy_logo.png\" width=\"150\">\n</p>\n\nUnmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), also known as drones, have become increasingly popular in various applications, including military, civil, and commercial. However, these vehicles are vulnerable to cyberattacks that can compromise security and privacy and cause physical harm. These attacks can involve signal interception, unauthorized access, data theft, and even remote control of the UAV, among others. Therefore, UAV manufacturers and users need to be aware of the threats and take appropriate measures to raise levels of security and integrity. One of the preventive measures is the use of Intrusion Detection System (IDS), which monitors system settings, data files, and network transmission to identify any abnormal behavior. Upon detection, the IDS notifies the ground control station so that a decision can be made. UAV IDS generally focus attacks on a specific data source without mentioning applying to a swarm. In this sense, this project presents the REMY.\n\nREMY detects attacks on the UAV network and in-flight anomalies, applying machine learning techniques through supervised and unsupervised learning. The threats identified in the network are blackhole, grayhole, and flooding, and in turn, in flight are GPS spoofing and jamming. Federated Learning (FL) is also present in REMY to ensure data privacy and training collaboration between UAVs. Furthermore, geographic and physical characteristics are considered to make the IDS operation independent of the hardware.\n\nThe system in operation is illustrated below:\n\n<p align=\"center\">\n  <img src=\"https://github.com/silvamleandro/remy-project/blob/main/imgs/remy_operation.png\" width=\"700\">\n</p>\n\n> **PS:** The attacks on GPS were carried out using the following repository: [GPS-SDR-SIM](https://github.com/silvamleandro/gps-sdr-sim)\n\n## 🚀 Getting Started\n\n### Dependencies\n\nThis project requires Linux OS and Python version **3.10** or higher.\n\n> **Note:** Python 3.10.3 is recommended.\n\n### Installing\n\nFirstly, clone the repository into the user's `/home` directory:\n\n```bash\ngit clone https://github.com/silvamleandro/remy-project.git\n```\n\nTo install the necessary dependencies, run the following command:\n\n```bash\npip install -r requirements.txt\n```\n\n### Executing\n\nThe project is structured as follows:\n\n```\n├── libs\n├── src\n│   ├── flight\n│   │   ├── centralized\n│   │   └── distributed\n│   │       ├── run.sh\n│   └── network\n│       ├── centralized\n│       └── distributed\n│           ├── run.sh\n├── uav_control\n│   └── pynput_flight_control.py\n```\n\nIn the `libs` directory, you find the utilities needed for the system to run. The `src` directory is divided into a `centralized`, where the experiments are located in `.ipynb` files, and a `distributed` approach, which contains the FL application. he modules for _attack detection in the network_ and _anomaly identification during flight_ follow the same format.\n\nFinally, the `uav_control` directory contains the script to control the **Parrot Bebop 2** UAV.\n\n<br>\n\nTo execute the distributed approach, use the following command:\n\n```bash\n./run.sh\n```\n\n#### Notes:\n\n- The results are available in the `reports` folders found throughout the project, including `.html`, `.csv`, and `.txt` files;\n- In the `v0` folder, you find the codes developed in the first part of the project. This includes the work developed during the exchange at the **MRS group**.\n\n## 📝 Authors\n\n<a href=\"https://github.com/silvamleandro/UAV_Platform/graphs/contributors\">\n  <img src=\"https://contrib.rocks/image?repo=silvamleandro/UAV_Platform\"/>\n</a>\n\n## 🤝 Contributing\n\nPull requests are welcome. For major changes, please open an issue first to discuss what you would like to change.\n\nPlease make sure to update tests as appropriate.\n\n<p align=\"right\">\n  <img src=\"https://github.com/silvamleandro/remy-project/blob/main/imgs/remy_mascot.png\" width=\"300\">\n</p>\n\n## ✨ Thankful\n<div align=\"center\">\n    <a href=\"https://www.gov.br/capes/pt-br\">\n      <img src=\"https://github.com/silvamleandro/remy-project/blob/main/imgs/capes.png\" width=\"100\"/>\n    </a>\n    <td>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;</td>\n    <a href=\"https://www.icmc.usp.br/\">\n      <img src=\"https://github.com/silvamleandro/remy-project/blob/main/imgs/icmc_usp.png\" width=\"170\"/>\n    </a>\n    <td>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;</td>\n    <a href=\"https://www.lsec.icmc.usp.br/\">\n      <img src=\"https://github.com/silvamleandro/remy-project/blob/main/imgs/lsec_lab.png\" width=\"100\"/>\n    </a>\n</div>\n\n## ⚖️ License\n\n[MIT](https://choosealicense.com/licenses/mit/)\n\n[⬆ Back to top](#-remy-project)<br>",
      "topics": [
        "cybersecurity",
        "distributed",
        "federated-learning",
        "intrusion-detection",
        "machine-learning",
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      "classification": {
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      "title": "Automotive CAN Security Analyzer 🚗🔐",
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      "readme": "# Automotive CAN Security Analyzer 🚗🔐\n\n## Proje Hakkında\n\nAutomotive CAN Security Analyzer, araç içi CAN (Controller Area Network) mesaj trafiğini analiz etmek için geliştirilmiş basit bir siber güvenlik analiz aracıdır.\n\nProje, şüpheli CAN mesajlarını ve anormal trafik davranışlarını tespit etmeyi amaçlar.\n\n## Özellikler\n\n- CAN log dosyası okuma\n- CAN ID analizi\n- Şüpheli CAN ID tespiti\n- Aşırı mesaj trafiği (CAN Flood) tespiti\n- Mesaj frekansı analizi\n- Güvenlik raporu oluşturma\n\n## Kullanılan Teknolojiler\n\n- Python 3.14\n- CSV veri analizi\n- VS Code\n\n## Kurulum\n\nProjeyi indirdikten sonra:\n\n```bash\npython main.py",
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      "description": "PyQt6 desktop app for reverse-engineering CAN bus captures. Offline analysis finds counters, checksums and signal boundaries; the DBC builder verifies definitions against real frames; exports DBC, openpilot and Wireshark dissectors. UDS and OBD-II diagnostics. Injection is bench-only and stays disarmed until you arm it.",
      "readme": "<p align=\"center\">\n  <img src=\"docs/assets/logo.png\" alt=\"CanLab\" width=\"128\" height=\"128\">\n</p>\n\n# CanLab\n\n**A desktop workstation for reverse-engineering a CAN bus.**\n\n[![Python](https://img.shields.io/badge/Python-3.11%2B-blue?style=flat-square&logo=python)](https://www.python.org)\n[![PyQt6](https://img.shields.io/badge/GUI-PyQt6-green?style=flat-square)](https://pypi.org/project/PyQt6/)\n[![Tests](https://img.shields.io/badge/tests-578%20passing-brightgreen?style=flat-square)](#testing)\n[![License](https://img.shields.io/badge/License-MIT-yellow?style=flat-square)](LICENSE)\n\nLoad a capture, work out which bytes carry what, write the signal definitions\ndown, check them against real frames, and export a DBC that other tools can\nread. It also speaks the diagnostic protocols (UDS, ISO-TP, J1939, OBD-II, XCP,\nDoIP), and, for isolated bench use only, can inject, replay, fuzz and bridge.\n\n> **Status:** beta. Single-author project, actively developed. It runs, and the\n> behaviour described here is covered by an automated suite of 578 tests (see\n> [Testing](#testing)). But the analysis methods are heuristics that suggest\n> candidates rather than identify signals, some features need optional\n> dependencies, and it has not been validated across a wide range of real\n> vehicles. Read [Limitations](#limitations) before relying on a result.\n\n**Watch:** [the guided tour on YouTube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nbDBaClN8T8) (6 min)\n\n**Contents:** [Safety](#safety) · [Install](#install-and-run) · [Demo](#demo) ·\n[Interface](#the-interface) · [Workflow](#a-typical-session) ·\n[Tabs](#what-it-does-16-tabs) ·\n[Log formats](#supported-log-formats) ·\n[Analysis](#analysis-offline-no-api-key) ·\n[Vehicle profiles](#vehicle-profiles) · [Diagnostics](#diagnostics) ·\n[DBC](#dbc-ecosystem) · [Integrations](#integrations) ·\n[Architecture](#how-it-fits-together) · [Real data](#validated-against-real-captures) · [Testing](#testing) ·\n[Limitations](#limitations)\n\n---\n\n## Safety\n\n> CanLab can transmit on a CAN bus. **Use it only on isolated bench setups:** a\n> benchtop ECU, `vcan0`, or dedicated lab hardware. Injecting or forwarding\n> frames on a live vehicle bus can interfere with braking, steering and airbag\n> systems.\n>\n> Four guards are built in:\n>\n> 1. A safety warning you have to accept on first launch. The acceptance is\n>    remembered, so it appears once.\n> 2. A global **ARM TX** toolbar toggle, **disarmed by default**. Nothing leaves\n>    the tool until you arm it: not injection, replay, fuzzing or gateway\n>    forwarding, and not diagnostic requests either (UDS, OBD-II, XCP, DoIP).\n>    Every transmit path goes through one function, and a test asserts that each\n>    of them stays silent while disarmed.\n> 3. Disarming stops transmits that are already running. It does not merely\n>    block the next frame: a fuzzer or replay in flight is asked to stop and\n>    joined.\n> 4. A blocked-ID list that is refused even while armed.\n>\n> The UDS service scan probes read-only services unless you tick \"Include\n> destructive services\" and confirm.\n\n---\n\n## Documentation\n\nFull documentation, with the walkthrough videos playing in the page:\n**[sherin-sef-ai.github.io/CanLab](https://sherin-sef-ai.github.io/CanLab/)**\n\nInstallation, the reverse-engineering workflow end to end, every tab, how the\nanalysis actually works, the diagnostics protocols, the export formats, the\nintegrations, and the safety model.\n\n---\n\n## Install and run\n\n```bash\ngit clone https://github.com/Sherin-SEF-AI/CanLab.git\ncd CanLab\npython3 -m venv .venv && source .venv/bin/activate\npip install -e \".[ai,rest,mcp,adapters]\"   # extras: ai, rest, mcp, adapters, mdf, dev, demo\n\ncanlab                                # or: python -m canlab\n```\n\nOr take the Linux x86_64 build from the\n[releases page](https://github.com/Sherin-SEF-AI/CanLab/releases), which needs\nno Python installation:\n\n```bash\ntar -xzf CanLab-<version>-linux-x86_64.tar.gz\ncd CanLab/\n./CanLab\n```\n\nPython 3.11 or newer (developed and tested on 3.12). Keys for the optional AI\nproviders go in Settings → API Keys and are stored in the OS keyring; a local\nOllama server needs no key. Logs are written to `~/.canlab/logs/canlab.log`.\n\nA sample capture ships with the package\n(`canlab/sample_data/sample_kona_drive.csv`: 6,610 frames across 10 IDs over 10\nseconds, from 1 Hz to 100 Hz) so every feature can be tried without hardware.\n\n---\n\n## Demo\n\n[![Watch the CanLab guided tour on YouTube](docs/assets/tour-youtube.jpg)](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nbDBaClN8T8)\n\n**[Watch the guided tour on YouTube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nbDBaClN8T8)** (6:06).\nGitHub does not allow an embedded player in a README,\nso the image above opens the video on YouTube. The\n[documentation site](https://sherin-sef-ai.github.io/CanLab/) plays it in the page.\n\n![CanLab in use](docs/demo-preview.gif)\n\nEighteen seconds cut from the guided tour, above.\n\n### The guided tour\n\nThe same video as a file: **[canlab-tour.mp4](docs/canlab-tour.mp4?raw=1)** (6:06): one pass through the whole\ntool against two real recordings, 1080p, with a callout caption in the picture\nand the narration as a subtitle track you can switch on. It opens with an\nanimated title, marks each section with a chapter card, dissolves between\nbeats, and closes on where to get it, over a quiet music bed generated for\nthe video so it carries no third-party audio. Start here.\n\nRather than showing a full 1920x1080 window and leaving you to find the control\nbeing described, it moves the frame: for each beat it pushes in on that control,\ndims everything else, rings it and captions it, then pulls back out. The\nrectangle it pushes in on is the widget's own geometry, read off the live window\nwith `mapTo` at record time, so a control that moves in a later build takes its\ncallout with it instead of leaving a label pointing at empty panel.\n\nIt is a real analysis, not a scripted mock. The capture turns out to be a marine\nNMEA 2000 bus rather than the J1939 that 29-bit identifiers usually imply; the\ncounter detector finds the sequence byte the specification defines without being\ntold the protocol; a wind-speed signal is defined, and the same two bytes are\nthen plotted little-endian and big-endian on one axis, where one reads 0.72 to\n0.87 m/s and the other claims 184 to 223.\n\n```bash\nQT_QPA_PLATFORM=offscreen python docs/demo/record_tour.py   # stills + geometry\npython docs/demo/build_tour.py                              # narrate, render, encode\n```\n\n### The command line tour\n\n**[canlab-cli-tour.mp4](docs/canlab-cli-tour.mp4?raw=1)** (1:42): the headless\nside, in one pass. Every command in it was run for real against recordings this\nproject did not produce, and the terminal you see is replaying the bytes those\ncommands actually wrote.\n\n| Chapter | What it runs on |\n|---|---|\n| What is on this bus | `ids` over a 145,534-frame J1939 truck log |\n| Every format, one reader | candump, GVRET CSV, MDF4, Vector ASC, and a 64-byte CAN FD file |\n| Find the structure | `detect` over 12,974 real frames: 25 counters, 5 checksums with their algorithms, 267 flags |\n| Decode it | the drafted DBC, then `decode` to a timestamp-by-signal matrix |\n| Convert and prove it | MDF4 to SavvyCAN CSV, read back to the same 9,600 frames and 50 IDs |\n| The capture kit | a genuine capture: one process replays a real log onto a bus, `capture` records 12,885 frames into rotating segments while a mark is posted over HTTP, and the project opens with the mark in place |\n| Assistants over MCP | `canlab-mcp`, the same analysis behind 29 tools |\n\nThe data is fetched from the projects that published it, so the tour can be\nrebuilt from scratch:\n\n```bash\npython docs/demo/fetch_cli_data.py     # SavvyCAN examples, plus the corpus\npython docs/demo/record_cli.py         # run every command, keep what it printed\npython docs/demo/build_cli_tour.py     # draw the terminal, score it, encode\n```\n\nThe recorder runs each command on a pseudo-terminal and timestamps its output,\nso the video cannot show a command succeeding that did not. Two defects were\nfound by recording it: the capture kit printed an `Authorization: Bearer`\nexample for `POST /mark` when the API checks `X-API-Token`, so no mark posted by\nfollowing it ever worked, and `canlab-cli ids capture.csv | head` ended in a\nBrokenPipeError traceback. Both are fixed and pinned by tests.\n\n### The full walkthrough\n\nEvery tab, in four parts, 1080p with subtitles burned in.\n\n**GitHub will not play these in the page.** It serves `.mp4` from a repository\nas a download, so the links below save the file rather than opening a player.\nThey are also attached to the\n[latest release](https://github.com/Sherin-SEF-AI/CanLab/releases/latest).\n\n| Part | Covers | Length |\n|---|---|---|\n| [1. Loading a capture and finding structure](docs/canlab-demo-part1-analysis.mp4?raw=1) | FRAMES, the ID panel and inspector, SIGNALS, counter and checksum detection, the checksum guesser, entropy boundaries | 3.0 min |\n| [2. Defining signals and checking them](docs/canlab-demo-part2-signals.mp4?raw=1) | DBC BUILDER and its bit grid, the live decode preview, PLOT, INTELLIGENCE, ML INTEL, DASHBOARD | 2.7 min |\n| [3. Timeline, code generation and exports](docs/canlab-demo-part3-outputs.mp4?raw=1) | TIMELINE, CODE GEN, the five export formats, DIAGNOSTICS including XCP and DoIP, security access | 2.4 min |\n| [4. The transmit gate, injection and live capture](docs/canlab-demo-part4-transmitting.mp4?raw=1) | ARM TX, INJECTION, replay, fuzzing, GATEWAY, OBD-II, the AI engine, live capture | 3.4 min |\n| [Stress run](docs/canlab-stress-test.mp4?raw=1) | 300,430 merged frames from a truck and a car in one capture, every detector, a signal decoded against J1939, and the measured results | 2.6 min |\n| [Real-data validation](docs/canlab-realdata-validation.mp4?raw=1) | The application run over other people's recordings: a marine NMEA 2000 bus, a two-channel car log and a 145,000-frame J1939 log, through every detector, a decoded signal and the transmit gate | 4.9 min |\n\nSubtitles: [tour](docs/canlab-tour.srt),\n[part 1](docs/canlab-demo-part1-analysis.srt),\n[part 2](docs/canlab-demo-part2-signals.srt),\n[part 3](docs/canlab-demo-part3-outputs.srt),\n[part 4](docs/canlab-demo-part4-transmitting.srt).\n\nIt is generated rather than hand-recorded, so it cannot drift away from what the\napplication does. [`docs/demo/record.py`](docs/demo/record.py) drives a real\n`MainWindow` under Qt's offscreen platform through 24 scenes, calling the same\nslots the buttons call, so a scene that stops working fails the run instead of\nquietly recording a stale screen.\n[`docs/demo/build.py`](docs/demo/build.py) synthesises the narration, times each\nscene's frames to its own audio, and muxes with ffmpeg. Parts are split on scene\nboundaries, never mid sentence, and the build fails if a scene lands in no part\nor in two.\n\n```bash\npip install -e \".[demo]\"                   # plus ffmpeg on PATH\nQT_QPA_PLATFORM=offscreen python docs/demo/record.py    # about a minute\npython docs/demo/build.py\n```\n\nNarration clips are cached by a digest of their own text, so editing one scene\nre-voices that scene alone.\n\n---\n\n## The interface\n\nSixteen tabs holding 33 sub-tabs is 49 panes, which is too many to put in a row.\nThe layout is modelled on Blender: layered greys so nesting reads as depth\nrather than as borders, blue for selection, and the status colours kept as\nthemselves only where they carry meaning, because green for connected and red\nfor armed are the colours that say whether this program can put frames on a\nwire.\n\n| | |\n|---|---|\n| **Workspaces** | The 16 tabs are grouped into five stages: CAPTURE, EXPLORE, DETECT, DEFINE, BUS. The bar drives the tabs and follows them, so Alt+1..9, Ctrl+Tab and anything that selects a tab directly still work, and the bar switches workspace to keep up. |\n| **Command palette** | Ctrl+Shift+P or F3, over all 105 commands: every pane by the path you would read aloud, and every menu action with its shortcut. Matching is subsequence-based, so `trim` finds Tools > Trim capture. Both lists are discovered by walking the live window, so nothing has to be registered by hand. |\n| **Collapsible sidebars** | The ID list and the inspector are in a real splitter now. They are draggable, they collapse to zero and remember the width to come back to, and the state is saved. `T` and `N` toggle them, Ctrl+Space toggles both. |\n| **One scale** | Every spacing, radius, row height and font size comes from `canlab/ui/tokens.py`. This replaced 78 margin calls across six different tuples, 22 height caps across thirteen values, and 62 one-line colour swaps that are now a dynamic property the stylesheet reads. |\n| **Reduce motion** | View > Reduce Motion, remembered. Animation also stands down on its own while a live capture is running, except the armed and connected indicators, which keep moving because they are safety signals. |\n\nThe window's minimum size is 1124 x 851, so it fits a laptop screen with the\nsidebars open. Both demo recorders drive the real window offscreen, which is\nalso what keeps the screenshots from catching a transition mid-flight.\n\n---\n\n## Finding a signal by doing something\n\nThe analysis narrows the search; this finishes it. Connect to the bus, go to\nINTELLIGENCE, type a label such as `brake`, press **Start** as you press the\npedal and **Stop** as you release it, and repeat a few times. **Rank\ncandidates** then scores every byte and every bit on the bus by how well it\nfollowed your marks: a flag that is set exactly while you pressed scores near\n1, a pedal-position byte that rises while you pressed scores by correlation.\nDouble-click the winner to define it.\n\nIt works from a file too: type a start and end time against a loaded log.\nMarks are saved with the project.\n\n---\n\n## A typical session\n\n1. **Open a log.** FRAMES shows every frame in time order. A byte lights up when\n   it changes, so the parts of a message that move are visible at a glance.\n2. **Pick an ID.** The inspector gives you the last frames in hex, a per-byte\n   activity bar, and minimum, maximum and mean per byte.\n3. **Narrow it down.** AUTO-RE finds the rolling counters and checksum bytes,\n   which are not signals, and entropy boundaries suggest where one field ends\n   and the next begins. SIGNALS classifies each message; ML INTEL classifies\n   each byte.\n4. **Write the definition.** DBC BUILDER has a bit grid that converts between\n   grid position and DBC bit numbering, which is the part that is easy to get\n   wrong by hand.\n5. **Check it.** The live preview decodes real frames from your capture through\n   the definition. PLOT draws the decoded value over time, where a wrong byte\n   order shows up as a sawtooth.\n6. **Export.** DBC, openpilot DBC, CANdb++, ARXML or a Wireshark dissector. Each\n   format is verified in the test suite by loading it back with the tool that\n   has to read it.\n\nIf you have a physical reference for a signal, a GPS speed log for instance,\n[reference calibration](#reference-driven-calibration) can search for the field\nthat fits it and report the scale and offset.\n\n---\n\n## What it does: 16 tabs\n\n| # | Tab | What it does |\n|---|---|---|\n| 1 | **FRAMES** | Raw frame table with per-byte change highlighting, hex and bus filters, freeze and follow. |\n| 2 | **SNIFFER** | One row per message rather than one per frame, the bytes coloured green when they rise and red when they fall. Notch ignores every bit that is already moving, so what lights up next is what you just did. |\n| 3 | **SIGNALS** | Per-message classification: frame count, rate, payload entropy, suspected message type. |\n| 4 | **PLOT** | Multi-signal time series. Raw bytes and decoded signals share a time axis, each with its own scale. |\n| 5 | **AI ENGINE** | Send one ID's statistics to Anthropic, OpenAI, Groq or a local Ollama model. The offline findings go with the question. Memory persists across sessions. |\n| 6 | **DBC BUILDER** | Visual signal editor with a bit grid and a live decode preview. Imports DBC, ARXML and CAN matrix; exports DBC, openpilot DBC, CANdb++, ARXML and Wireshark Lua. |\n| 7 | **CODE GEN** | Generates Python or C that opens the bus and decodes or encodes your signals. |\n| 8 | **INTELLIGENCE** | Annotated capture: mark when you did something and every byte and bit is ranked by how well it followed. Also periodicity, cross-ID correlation with a lag sweep, capture diffing, J1939 and NMEA 2000 PGN decode with transport-protocol and fast-packet reassembly, value lookup. |\n| 9 | **INJECTION** | Six sub-tabs: inject, replay with a scrubber and a signal override, trigger rules, actuator sweep with a watchdog, fuzzer, scripted test sequences. The inject page previews the frame it would send, each byte coloured by whether the signal or the vehicle profile put it there, and logs every send with its result. Gated by ARM TX. |\n| 10 | **DIAGNOSTICS** | Eight sub-tabs: OBD-II/UDS, UDS deep scan, UDS services, security access, bus load, bus health, XCP, DoIP. |\n| 11 | **DASHBOARD** | Byte-activity heatmap across all messages, message timeline, gauges pointed at signals you have defined. |\n| 12 | **AUTO-RE** | Counter and checksum detection, entropy boundaries, correlation, a per-byte checksum algorithm guesser, bit-level flag and value-table detection, and repeated-block detection for runs of IDs that share one layout. Runs in worker threads. |\n| 13 | **TIMELINE** | Several signals stacked on one scrubbable axis with a shared playhead, plus video sync with an adjustable offset. |\n| 14 | **OBD-II** | Live PID gauges. Discovers supported PIDs by walking the continuation windows rather than assuming the first 32. |\n| 15 | **ML INTEL** | Per-byte role classification with confidence, anomaly scoring against a fitted baseline, a live anomaly watch that scores frames as they arrive, change-point detection, embedding similarity. |\n| 16 | **GATEWAY** | Bridges two CAN channels with ordered pass, block and modify rules. Gated by ARM TX. |\n\n---\n\n## Supported log formats\n\n| Format | Notes |\n|---|---|\n| SavvyCAN CSV | GVRET and SavvyCAN export. IDs and data bytes are read as hex. |\n| candump `.log` | `candump -l` output, including CAN FD (`##`) lines. Error and remote frames are counted and skipped. |\n| pcap / pcapng | Linux SocketCAN linktype 227, classic and FD, via dpkt. |\n| Vector BLF | via python-can `BLFReader`. |\n| Vector ASC | via python-can `ASCReader`. |\n| MDF4 `.mf4` / `.mdf` | CANedge and similar. Needs `pip install canlab[mdf]`. |\n| openpilot `rlog` / `qlog` | Plain, `.bz2` or `.zst`, named the way openpilot names them. Needs `pip install canlab[openpilot]` (pycapnp); the cereal schema ships with CanLab. Frames the panda transmitted are kept apart from the car's traffic, and the log's GPS can be used as a calibration reference. |\n\nEvery parser produces the same columns: `Timestamp, ID, Bus, DLC, Extended,\nB0..B7`, widened to `B63` when FD frames are present, plus a per-ID `Delta`. The\nparsers are tested against fixtures in the genuine formats, including\nbyte-order-mark and CRLF variants.\n\n---\n\n## Analysis (offline, no API key)\n\nNone of this sends anything anywhere.\n\n| Feature | Module | Notes |\n|---|---|---|\n| Checksum algorithms | `core/checksums.py` | Parametrised CRC-8 plus OEM variants (Hyundai, Toyota, Honda, Subaru, AUTOSAR), checked against published check values and against commaai/opendbc. |\n| J1939 and NMEA 2000 | `core/j1939.py` | Both protocols share the 29-bit frame and split the identifier the same way, so the data page decides which PGN table applies: J1939 PGNs and SPNs, or NMEA 2000's own range with radians, metres per second and kelvin. Multi-frame PGNs are reassembled first (see below) and decoded whole; one frame of one is never decoded alone, because that gives a confident wrong answer. J1939: 26 PGNs decoded to 152 parameters by their SAE J1939-71 bit positions, 30 more named, the preferred source-address table, and the J1939 error and not-available ranges (`core/j1939_db.py`). NMEA 2000: every standard PGN canboat defines, 216 of them, from a table distilled from [canboat](https://github.com/canboat/canboat) (`core/n2k_db.py`), with the hand-written decoders taking precedence. |\n| Counter and checksum detection | `core/counter_checksum_detector.py` | Sweeps every message. Counters are whole-byte or per-nibble, with the modulus read from the values seen and reported only when a roll-over was actually observed. |\n| Checksum algorithm guesser | `core/checksum_guesser.py` | Takes one message and one byte and scores all twelve algorithms, fitting on the first 70% of the capture and validating on the rest. Reports both numbers. |\n| Byte role classifier | `core/signal_classifier.py` | COUNTER, CHECKSUM, BOOLEAN, PHYSICAL or PADDING per byte. |\n| Cross-ID correlation | `core/correlation_engine.py` | Pearson r per byte pair, nearest-timestamp alignment, lag sweep. |\n| Anomaly detection | `core/anomaly_detector.py` | Z-score per byte and Isolation Forest on the frame vector. The Z-score baseline scores a whole byte matrix in one call and keeps each ID's period, which is what the live watch runs on. |\n| Entropy boundaries | `core/entropy_boundary.py` | Per-bit entropy to suggest where one field ends and the next begins. |\n| Multiplexer detection | `core/mux_detector.py` | Finds a mode-selector byte and the bytes active in each mode. |\n| Reference calibration | `core/reference_calibrate.py` | See [below](#reference-driven-calibration). |\n| Multi-frame reassembly | `core/multiframe.py` | J1939 transport protocol (BAM, and RTS/CTS sessions between other nodes, observed only) and NMEA 2000 fast packets, from a capture or a live bus, with timeouts on the frame clock. CanLab never sends a CTS. |\n| Repeated blocks | `core/block_detector.py` | Runs of consecutive IDs sharing one DLC, one rate and one layout, the way a battery pack reports its cells, with a proposed shared field and one candidate signal per member. |\n| Live anomaly watch | `core/live_watch.py` | Scores frames against a baseline as they arrive: bytes out of band, an ID gone silent, a burst, an ID the baseline never saw. ML INTEL's WATCH sub-tab. |\n\n**Flags and enumerations.** Per-byte analysis cannot see a turn indicator,\nwhich is one bit, or a gear selector, which is four sparse values held for a\nwhile each. `core/bit_flags.py` finds switches and small packed fields by\ntheir signature (rare changes, long holds), and is careful about the top bit\nof a slowly moving measurement, which looks the same until you notice the bits\nbelow it churning. `core/value_tables.py` finds bytes that only ever take a\nfew values and hold them, and drafts the value table for the DBC. AUTO-RE has\na panel for both.\n\n**Multi-frame messages.** A J1939 transport-protocol session or an NMEA 2000\nfast packet spreads one message over several frames, and the PGN scan used to\nstop at \"needs reassembly\". `core/multiframe.py` reassembles both: BAM\nbroadcasts and RTS/CTS sessions between two other nodes (observed only; CanLab\nnever sends a CTS), and fast packets with their sequence and counter byte.\nSessions time out on the frame clock, so a loaded log gives the same result\nevery time. On the marine recording it rebuilds 60 GNSS position fixes of 43\nbytes each, which decode to 42.661 N, 81.213 W on 2021-03-25 at 173.5 m, and\n60 satellite lists of 135 bytes naming 11 satellites; on the truck log, 85 BAM\nmessages with nothing dropped, in under 0.05 s. The INTELLIGENCE tab's PGN\nscan shows the reassembled messages, and two MCP tools list them.\n\n**Repeated blocks.** A battery pack reports its cells as a run of consecutive\nidentifiers with the same layout, rate and length. Per-ID analysis sees\nunrelated messages; `core/block_detector.py` sees the run, scores how far the\nmembers agree on their byte roles, and proposes the field they share (8-bit\nbytes, 16-bit words, byte order by the smoother reading) so it can be added to\nevery member at once. Every name it emits ends in `CANDIDATE` and every\ndescription says the scale is unknown, because a shared structure is not a\nunit. On a private EV capture of 460,024 frames it finds the 27-message block\n0x380 to 0x39A at 2 Hz with nine members that never change, in 0.23 s.\n\n**Live anomaly watch.** The anomaly detector used to be fitted and scored\noffline. `core/live_watch.py` holds a fitted baseline and is handed each batch\nof new frames as the store receives them: it reports a payload far from the\nbaseline (once per ID per cooldown, so a stuck value does not report on every\nframe), an ID that has gone quiet (once, re-armed when it returns), a burst,\nand an ID the baseline never saw. Events carry the frame clock, flash in the\nstatus bar, and can mark the timeline. Replaying the 23-minute car log after a\n60 s fit takes 1 ms per 2,000-frame batch and reports 756 events, most of them\nbytes that left a band fitted on one minute of driving, which is what a\nper-byte baseline does with a short fit window.\n\n**On checksum detection.** A byte counts as a checksum only if the relation\nbeats simply guessing that byte's most common value, so constant padding does\nnot qualify. A relation that holds across most of the payload is discarded\nrather than reported: \"is byte k the exclusive-or of the other seven?\" is the\nsame question as \"does the whole message exclusive-or to zero?\", so a genuine\nchecksum and a payload that merely repeats each value an even number of times\nboth make all eight bytes match, and the data alone cannot say which byte it is.\nOn the shipped sample capture the detector finds exactly the 6 counters and 7\nchecksums the generator wrote, with the right byte and the right algorithm, and\nreports nothing for the three messages that have none.\n\nThese remain **heuristics that suggest candidates**. A confidence figure is a\nmatch fraction over the frames you loaded, not a proof. Verify before you trust.\n\n---\n\n## From the command line\n\nThe analysis runs without the window, for CI over a folder of drives, from a\nnotebook, or piped into something else. A test asserts the process never\nimports Qt.\n\n```bash\ncanlab-cli ids      capture.csv                          # IDs, rates, moving bytes\ncanlab-cli detect   capture.csv --json out.json --dbc draft.dbc\ncanlab-cli decode   capture.csv --dbc signals.dbc --out decoded.csv\ncanlab-cli convert  capture.blf capture.csv              # csv, blf, asc, log\ncanlab-cli capture  --interface socketcan --channel can0 --keys b=brake --http 8765\n```\n\n`detect` runs every detector and can draft a DBC from what it found, with\noverlapping claims resolved so the file loads in cantools. `convert` writes\nSavvyCAN's own CSV layout, so the result opens there as well as here.\n`capture` is the [capture kit](#capture-kit): a headless logger that writes\nrotating segments and event marks and folds them into a project.\n\n---\n\n## Vehicle profiles\n\nFraming conventions are a setting, not an assumption. A profile says where a\nrolling counter and checksum live and which algorithm computes the checksum. It\ndoes not claim to identify your vehicle. The default, **generic**, adds neither.\nHyundai/Kia, Toyota, Honda, Subaru and AUTOSAR E2E ship as presets, selectable\nin Settings → VEHICLE. The chosen profile drives injection stamping, the\nopenpilot export metadata, the generated code, and the framing hint given to the\nAI.\n\n---\n\n## Reference-driven calibration\n\n`core/reference_calibrate.py` searches for the CAN field (ID, byte range,\nendianness) whose values best fit a **physical reference** by least squares, and\nreports scale and offset with an R² verdict of PASS or UNCONFIRMED. Sentinel\ncodes meaning \"signal unavailable\" are masked, and the fitted scale is snapped\nto a neat value when that barely changes the decode. Both refinements are\nadapted from CSS Electronics' reverse-engineering skills (see\n[Acknowledgements](#acknowledgements)).\n\nThe reference comes from a file (Tools → *Calibrate signals from a reference\nfile (CSV, GPX)*). `core/reference_series.py` reads a CSV with a time column\nand any number of value columns, keeping a unit written in the header as\n`speed (km/h)`, or a GPX track, from which it derives speed (haversine\ndistance over time, median-filtered), altitude, latitude and longitude. Each\nseries is calibrated on its own.\n\nTwo clocks rarely agree, so the dialog first searches a window (30 s by\ndefault) for the lag that lines the reference up with some field in the\ncapture: a coarse pass over binned values, then a fine pass sample by sample,\nwith ties going to the smaller lag. Overlapping wins on one ID, the 16-bit word\nand the byte inside it, collapse to the best reading. The sweep runs off the\nGUI thread with a progress bar and a Cancel button, and the rows you pick\nbecome DBC signals as one undoable step, with the Motorola start bit written\ncorrectly for big-endian fields (an earlier version wrote the low byte). On\nthe shipped sample, a reference put one second ahead is found at 1.0 s and\nthe wheel speed comes back as four 16-bit big-endian words at scale 1/32 with\nR² 0.9987. A periodic reference is ambiguous at lags near a multiple of its\nperiod, so keep the window under half of it.\n\n---\n\n## Diagnostics\n\n| Protocol | Module | Notes |\n|---|---|---|\n| ISO-TP (ISO 15765-2) | `core/isotp.py` | Single and multi-frame transmit with the flow-control handshake and STmin, reassembly, CAN FD escape frames, functional addressing. Tested against can-isotp, an independent implementation. |\n| UDS (ISO 14229) | `core/uds.py` | Read DTCs, read ECU identification, service scan (read-only by default), NRC 0x78 response-pending handling, periodic TesterPresent during long scans. |\n| Security access | `core/security_access.py` | Seed and key algorithms, scripted key functions, rate-limited brute force that stops on the ECU's attempt-limit response. |\n| J1939 | `core/j1939.py`, `core/j1939_db.py` | PGN and SPN decoding by the J1939-71 layouts, DM1 active-DTC decode (SPN, FMI, CM, OC), and transport-protocol sessions observed without taking part. |\n| OBD-II (SAE J1979) | `core/obd2_pids.py` | 78 mode 01 PIDs. A scan asks which PIDs the vehicle supports and reads only those. DTCs are read with modes 03 and 07, the way every OBD-II vehicle answers, with UDS 0x19 as the fallback; a vehicle that does not answer is reported as silent, not clean. |\n| XCP over CAN | `core/xcp.py` | Read-only client (CONNECT, UPLOAD, SHORT_UPLOAD) and a measurement poller. No memory-write or programming commands are implemented. |\n| DoIP (ISO 13400) | `core/doip.py` | Vehicle discovery, routing activation, UDS over IP, on stdlib sockets. |\n\nEvery diagnostic request goes through the ARM TX gate, reads included. One\nreceive thread dispatches frames to each consumer, so a diagnostic scan and the\nlive frame table never take responses from each other.\n\n---\n\n## DBC ecosystem\n\n| Format | Import | Export |\n|---|---|---|\n| Standard DBC | Yes | Yes, parseable by cantools |\n| openpilot DBC | Yes, as an opendbc cross-reference | Yes |\n| Vector CANdb++ | No | Yes, with `BA_DEF_` blocks carrying cycle times measured from your capture |\n| AUTOSAR ARXML 4.3 | Yes, via cantools | Yes, verified loadable by cantools |\n| Wireshark Lua dissector | No | Yes |\n| Excel/CSV CAN matrix | Yes | No |\n\nExtended 29-bit IDs, multiplexed signals and value tables round-trip. The\nbuilder has undo and redo (Ctrl+Z, Ctrl+Shift+Z); an import counts as one\nstep. All\ndecoding and encoding goes through one cantools-backed path, so the value the\npreview shows is the value the exported file produces.\n\nThe Lua dissector extracts bits with plain arithmetic, using neither `bit32`\n(removed in Lua 5.3) nor the 5.3+ bitwise operators (a syntax error on earlier\nversions), so one file works across the Lua versions Wireshark ships. Its output\nis tested against cantools for little-endian, big-endian and signed fields, and\nexecuted under a real Lua runtime.\n\n**opendbc matching** (Tools → *Match against opendbc*) fetches the\n`commaai/opendbc` index, caches it under `~/.canlab/opendbc_cache`, and ranks\nhow well your capture's IDs match each OEM DBC. **Apply** loads the chosen\ndatabase's signals straight into the builder, by default only for messages\nseen on this bus, as one undo step. If your vehicle is one openpilot supports,\nthat is most of the work done. The first run needs network access; afterwards\nit works from the cache.\n\n---\n\n## Integrations\n\n| Capability | Module | Notes |\n|---|---|---|\n| REST API and live web dashboard | `core/rest_api.py` | Loopback only, token-authenticated. `GET /` serves a live-frames page; `POST /mark` adds an event mark; `/inject` also requires ARM TX. |\n| Capture kit | `core/capture_kit.py`, `core/capture_writer.py` | `canlab-cli capture`: a headless, receive-only logger with rotating segments and marks from the keyboard, HTTP or GPIO, producing a project the desktop opens. See below. |\n| MCP server | `core/mcp_tools.py`, `core/mcp_service.py`, `mcp_server.py` | 29 tools over the capture, the detectors, the DBC, annotations, reassembled messages, repeated blocks and the live watch, served from inside the window (live state) or headless. See below. |\n| Hardware adapters | `core/adapters.py` | Named adapter profiles for every python-can backend, detection of connected adapters, and a listen-only test. See below. |\n| GVRET hardware | `core/gvret.py` | The serial protocol SavvyCAN's own boards speak (Macchina M2/A0, EVTV CANDue, ESP32RET over WiFi). python-can has no such backend, so CanLab supplies one and registers it as the `gvret` interface. |\n| Capture trimming | `core/capture_split.py` | Cut the loaded capture to a time window, a frame or percentage range, a set of IDs, or one bus. Tools > Trim capture. |\n| Decoded time-series export | `core/timeseries_export.py` | A Timestamp-by-signal matrix to CSV or Parquet. |\n| Plugin SDK | [`docs/PLUGINS.md`](docs/PLUGINS.md) | Documented `register(app)` API, an event bus and two example plugins. Plugin code does not run until you enable it in Settings. |\n| Panda backend | `core/panda_backend.py` | comma.ai Panda as a python-can-compatible bus, with the safety model selectable. |\n\n### Assistants over MCP (Claude, ChatGPT, Codex)\n\nCanLab is an MCP server. An assistant connected to it can load a capture, list\nIDs, read byte statistics and raw frames, run every detector, draft a DBC,\ndefine and remove signals, decode frames, annotate the timeline and rank bytes\nagainst the annotations. It cannot transmit: no MCP tool touches the bus.\n\nThere are two servers with the same 29 tools:\n\n- **Inside the window.** The **MCP** toolbar toggle (or Settings > MCP) starts\n  a Streamable HTTP server on `127.0.0.1:8766/mcp` over the capture you have\n  loaded or are recording. A signal the assistant adds appears in the DBC\n  Builder as one undoable step. Optional bearer token; loopback only unless you\n  tick \"allow other machines\".\n- **Headless.** `canlab-mcp` serves stdio and loads captures on request;\n  `canlab-mcp --http` serves HTTP without the window.\n\nSettings > MCP writes the exact configuration for each client. In short:\n\n```bash\n# Claude Code, against the running window (or a headless --http server)\nclaude mcp add --transport http canlab http://127.0.0.1:8766/mcp\n\n# Claude Desktop and Codex CLI launch stdio servers; this one bridges to the window\ncanlab-mcp --attach http://127.0.0.1:8766/mcp        # put this in their config\n\n# Claude Desktop, headless (no window needed): {\"command\": \"/path/.venv/bin/canlab-mcp\"}\n```\n\nChatGPT connects from OpenAI's servers, so it cannot reach your loopback\naddress. Publish the server over HTTPS (`cloudflared tunnel --url\nhttp://127.0.0.1:8766`, or ngrok), tick \"allow connections from other machines\",\nand add `https://<tunnel-host>/mcp` as a connector with no authentication;\n`search` and `fetch` are provided for ChatGPT's connector contract and Developer\nmode exposes the rest. ChatGPT cannot send a bearer token, so while the tunnel\nis up anyone who has the URL can read the capture and edit the signal list.\n\nThe tools, the HTTP transport, the bridge and the in-window server are tested\nwith the official MCP client (`tests/test_mcp_server.py`,\n`tests/test_mcp_in_app.py`).\n\n### Knowing what is connected\n\nOne button at the right of the toolbar summarises every connection: the bus,\nthe MCP server and the REST API. It is dim when nothing is up and green with\nthe names of what is. Clicking it opens a panel with a line for each, saying\nwhether it is connected and giving the detail that matters, the adapter and\nbitrate or the URL to paste into an assistant, which can be copied from there.\nThe panel also says when the MCP server is reachable from the network rather\nthan only from this machine.\n\n### Live capture permissions\n\nOn Linux a SocketCAN device's bitrate belongs to the kernel, so until someone\nruns `ip link set can0 up type can bitrate 500000` the application cannot open\nit, whatever it does. That command needs root.\n\nConnect now handles this. If the device is down, CanLab shows the exact command\nit wants to run and asks the desktop for the password, through PolicyKit where\nit exists, a graphical askpass helper, or a terminal window. The application\nitself never runs as root and never sees a password. Root is needed once per\ndevice, for the interface, not for the capture: reading frames from a device\nthat is already up needs no privileges.\n\nTwo related items sit in the Tools menu. **Create virtual CAN bus (vcan0)**\nmakes a kernel-side bus so the application can be tried with no hardware.\n**Allow USB CAN adapters without root** installs a udev rule granting the\nplugdev group access to adapters such as the CANalyst-II, which otherwise open\nonly as root.\n\nThere is a checkbox for **listen only** when bringing an interface up. It puts\nthe controller in the mode where it does not acknowledge frames, which is the\nonly way to be certain that attaching to a vehicle changes nothing on its bus.\nNot every controller supports it, and CanLab says which case you are in rather\nthan claiming silence it cannot deliver.\n\n### Hardware CAN adapters\n\nSettings > CAN ADAPTERS keeps a list of named adapters and the toolbar switches\nbetween them. **Detect connected** asks every python-can backend what it sees,\nreads CAN network devices from sysfs, and recognises common USB sticks by\nvendor and product id (candleLight, CANable, USBtin, PEAK, Kvaser). **Test**\nopens the adapter and listens for one second; it never transmits, and a failure\ncomes with the fix (the `ip link` command, the pip package, the dialout group).\n\nEvery backend python-can ships is selectable: SocketCAN, slcan, gs_usb, PCAN,\nKvaser, Vector, IXXAT, USB2CAN, Seeed, Robotell, serial, CANalyst-II, neoVI,\nsocketcand, UDP multicast and virtual, plus **GVRET**, which CanLab adds\nitself. GVRET is what SavvyCAN's own hardware runs, so a Macchina M2 or A0, an\nEVTV CANDue or an ESP32RET board works here too; give it a serial port, or\n`<ip>:23` for a board on WiFi. The dialog shows what each one expects\nas a channel and which driver or package it needs. `pip install canlab[adapters]`\nadds pyserial (slcan) and gs_usb; vendor drivers (PCAN-Basic, CANlib, XL) come\nfrom the vendor. Detection and the adapter model are tested against stand-ins\nfor the probes; opening is tested for real on python-can's virtual bus.\n\n### REST API\n\nStart it from the **REST API** toolbar toggle. It binds to `127.0.0.1:8765` and\nprints a per-session token. Every data request needs an `X-API-Token` header.\n\n```\nGET  /            # live web dashboard (HTML, open)\nGET  /frames      # last N frames  (?n=N)\nGET  /signals     # decoded DBC signals\nGET  /status      # connection state and frame count\nGET  /memory      # AI memory entries\nPOST /mark        # add an event mark: {\"label\":\"brake\",\"action\":\"toggle\"}\n                  # action is toggle (default), begin, end or point\nPOST /inject      # inject a frame: needs the token AND ARM TX\n                  # {\"id\":\"0x200\",\"data\":\"01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08\"}\n```\n\n### Capture kit\n\nA desktop captures well when someone is sitting at it. A day of driving needs\na logger that starts at boot, writes to disk as it goes, and lets the driver\nsay \"this is the brake\" without a screen. `canlab-cli capture` is that\nlogger, for a Raspberry Pi with a CAN HAT or any Linux box with a SocketCAN\nadapter:\n\n```bash\ncanlab-cli capture --interface socketcan --channel can0 --bitrate 500000 \\\n    --keys b=brake,h=horn --http 8765 --http-host 0.0.0.0 \\\n    --token-file ~/.canlab/kit-token --gpio 17=brake\n```\n\nIt writes SavvyCAN CSV segments as frames arrive, rotating by frame count or\nby time, and a `marks.json` updated on every mark. Marks come from a key (`b`\nopens a `brake` interval, `b` closes it), a typed label, `POST /mark` on the\nsame REST API the desktop serves (with `/inject` not served at all), or a\nGPIO switch through `gpiozero` when it is installed. Ctrl-C, SIGTERM or\n`--duration` stop it cleanly: open marks are closed, the last segment is\nflushed, and the segments and marks are folded into one `.canlab` project\nthe desktop opens with every mark on the timeline. `--adapter NAME` opens an\nadapter saved in Settings, which the desktop mirrors to\n`~/.canlab/adapters.json` for this purpose.\n\nIt is receive only and never asks for privileges: a SocketCAN link that is\ndown gets the `ip link` command printed and exit code 2. A systemd unit for a\nPi that brings the link up in listen-only mode before starting the kit is in\n[`canlab/examples/capture-kit/`](canlab/examples/capture-kit/). The kit has\nbeen exercised on python-can's virtual backend and a fake bus, not yet in a\nvehicle.\n\n---\n\n## How it fits together\n\nThree pieces carry most of the design, and they are worth knowing if you are\nreading the code or writing a plugin.\n\n**One receive thread.** `core/bus_hub.py` is the only place that calls `recv()`.\nIt hands each frame to every subscriber that asked for it, filtered by ID. This\nis why a UDS scan and the live table can run at the same time without taking\neach other's frames. Workers are given a subscription rather than the bus.\n\n**One transmit gate.** `core/safety.py` holds the armed flag, the blocked-ID\nset, and a registry of running transmit workers. Every send goes through\n`gated_send`. Disarming notifies observers and stops registered workers, rather\nthan only refusing the next frame.\n\n**A capped ring buffer.** `core/frame_store.py` keeps frames in preallocated\nNumPy arrays (500,000 by default, oldest dropped) and appends in constant time,\nso a long capture does not get slower as it grows. The pandas DataFrame the rest\nof the application reads is built on demand and cached until the next change.\nViews that update live read only what they display: the frame table takes a\nfixed tail, the inspector takes a per-ID tail, and the ID tree reads\nincrementally maintained statistics rather than the frames themselves.\n\n---\n\n## Validated against real captures\n\nThe unit suite uses fixtures and a generated sample. Separately, the whole\napplication is run end to end over real vehicle recordings, because synthetic\ndata agrees with whatever the code assumes.\n\nTwo corpora and two public car logs, 99 checks:\n\n| Corpus | What it is | Checks |\n|---|---|---|\n| SavvyCAN examples | 12,974 frames, 180 IDs, 11-bit, one bus | 36 |\n| CANedge recordings, python-can format files and comma.ai logs | 2 to 154,896 frames, native MDF4, 11-bit and 29-bit, dual-bus, CAN FD and error frames, and two Toyota RAV4 drives from comma.ai | 63 |\n\nThe second corpus is other people's hardware output, none of it produced here:\nfive CANedge logger recordings in native MDF4 from\n[CSS Electronics](https://github.com/CSS-Electronics/api-examples) (MIT). They\nare not all the same kind of bus, which is the point of having them: a\n145,534-frame J1939 log that is 29-bit end to end, a 22.8-minute two-channel\nrecording of 154,896 11-bit frames off a car, and a 9,600-frame marine bus whose\n29-bit identifiers are NMEA 2000 rather than J1939. Plus Vector BLF and ASC\nwritten by\n[python-can](https://github.com/hardbyte/python-can)'s own writers covering\nCAN FD, 64-byte FD, error frames and a comma-decimal locale. One real log is\nthen written out in all five formats and read back by every parser, which all\nhave to agree about the same traffic.\n\nIt found defects the older corpus could not reach. The openpilot DBC exporter\nwrote a bare 29-bit frame id, so every J1939 capture exported a file cantools\nrefuses. The sniffer aged a loaded capture against wall-clock time, so every row\nexpired the moment a file opened. The PGN decoder read the marine capture with\nthe J1939 tables and reported fifty messages with no names, which says \"J1939,\nnothing recognised\" rather than \"not J1939\"; it now works the protocol out from\nthe identifier. All are fixed and pinned by tests.\n\nA third run pushes the size instead of the variety. It merges the 145,534-frame\nJ1939 truck log and the 154,896-frame two-channel car log into one 300,430-frame\ncapture carrying 11-bit and 29-bit identifiers on three bus tags, then times\nevery stage against a budget: 33 checks, all passing.\n\n| | |\n|---|---|\n| Parsing | 200,912 frames/s |\n| Merged capture into the running window | 8.1 s, 691 MB resident |\n| Frame table refresh, sniffer fold | 65 ms, 128 ms |\n| Replay through the store, as if live | 22,476 frames/s, worst redraw 142 ms |\n| 145,534 frames out and back through five formats | every payload byte equal |\n| Engine speed, decoded two ways | 913 to 1762 rpm over 19,584 frames |\n\nThe engine speed matters more than the timings: J1939 puts it in a standard\nmessage, so a plausible diesel is external evidence rather than the code\nagreeing with itself. The run found a real defect too. The PGN scan crashed on\nany log containing an active fault code, because those decode to lamps and a\nlist rather than to a value and a unit, and this truck sends 196 of them.\n\nAn audit against SAE J1939-71 then found that the J1939 table itself was\nwrong in places that produce plausible numbers: coolant temperature read from\nhalf of the crankcase pressure, three parameter groups filed under the wrong\nPGN, battery voltage read from the current bytes, every switch decoded as a\nwhole byte. The corrected layouts are checked on the truck by readings that\nmust agree: the brakes' front axle speed and the engine's wheel-based speed\ndiffer by 0.33 km/h over 1,957 pairs, absolute inlet pressure minus boost is\nthe barometer, two distance counters of different resolution agree within the\ncoarser one's 125 m step, and lifetime distance over lifetime fuel is the ECU's\nown reported economy to within 0.5%.\n\nThe reference calibrator is checked on two real cars from comma.ai (MIT): the\ncomma2k19 example segment and a 2021 drive from openpilot's public CI routes,\nboth a Toyota RAV4 with a GPS receiver. From the GPS speed alone it finds the\nvehicle speed in 0x0B4 bytes 5-6 in both, and on the comma2k19 segment all four\nwheel speeds in 0x0AA, returned at 0.01 km/h per bit, the figure in\nopenpilot's DBC. Given the comma2k19 reference stamped in UTC against a capture\non its own clock, it places the reference within 0.17 s of the true offset, and\nthat residual is the receiver's latency: 0.16 s by a cross-correlation that\ndoes not use CanLab. In both drives the signal it writes decodes the car within\n0.9% of openpilot's own decode.\n\nThe same recordings check the newer analysis. Multi-frame reassembly rebuilds\nthe marine log's 60 GNSS fixes and 60 satellite lists with nothing dropped,\nand the truck's 85 BAM broadcasts, in under 0.05 s; the position agrees with\nthe single-frame rapid-position message to a thousandth of a degree. The live\nwatch fits the first minute of the two-channel car log and replays the other\n149,800 frames in 2,000-frame batches at 1 ms a batch. Block detection runs\non a private capture of the author's car that is not in the corpus, only\nwhen `CANLAB_PRIVATE_DATA` names it: the 27-message cell block is found in\n0.23 s over 460,024 frames. There is no real-data check for the reference\ncalibrator's clock-offset search, because the boat was moored and the truck\nlog has no GPS track; the shipped sample stands in for it.\n\n```bash\nfor p in 1 2 3; do python tests/real_data/acceptance_phase$p.py <data-dir>; done\npython tests/real_data/acceptance_new_sources.py <data-dir>\npython tests/real_data/acceptance_stress.py <data-dir>\n```\n\nDetails and provenance: [`tests/real_data/README.md`](tests/real_data/README.md).\nA recording of the run is\n[canlab-realdata-validation.mp4](docs/canlab-realdata-validation.mp4?raw=1)\n(4:53, narrated and subtitled).\n\n---\n\n## Testing\n\n```bash\npip install -e \".[dev]\"\nQT_QPA_PLATFORM=offscreen python -m pytest -q     # 753 passed\nruff check canlab tests\n```\n\nISO-TP, UDS and J1939 transport are also tested against implementations this\nproject did not write (`tests/test_interop.py`): can-isotp as the ECU,\nudsoncan's encoding and DTC parsing, and two can-j1939 nodes holding a real\nRTS/CTS session while CanLab listens. That found an ISO-TP timing defect a\nhome-grown responder could not have: the first frame after each flow control\nwas sent without the separation time the receiver asked for.\n\nThe suite covers the log parsers against fixtures in the genuine formats; DBC\nencode and decode round trips through cantools (little-endian, big-endian,\nsigned, extended IDs, multiplexing, value tables); the ARXML and Lua exports\nloaded back by cantools and by a real Lua runtime; the checksum algorithms\nagainst published check values; the ARM TX gate on every transmit path,\nincluding that disarming stops a running worker; the receive dispatcher; the\nframe store including its growth cost; ISO-TP and UDS wire format and NRC 0x78\nhandling; settings, plugin opt-in and project round trips; the MCP tools over\nStreamable HTTP, through the stdio bridge in a subprocess, and inside the\nwindow with the official MCP client; adapter detection and a listen-only open\non the virtual bus; the GVRET codec against byte strings built to its wire\nformat, including chunk splitting and resynchronisation after noise; the\nsniffer's change detection and notch masking; the capture splitter; the NMEA 2000 field layouts against frames lifted verbatim\nfrom a real marine recording; transport-protocol and fast-packet reassembly\nagainst verbatim frames, including an RTS/CTS session observed through the\nhub with nothing sent; the reference calibrator's clock-offset search and\nbig-endian start bit through a cantools round trip; the live watch on the\nframe clock, including a smoke test that feeds one out-of-band frame through\na live capture; block detection and the candidates it emits; the capture kit\non a recording bus and on python-can's virtual backend, with marks from\nstdin, HTTP and a fake gpiozero; who owns an animation and who is allowed to\nfree it; and an offscreen smoke test that builds the real window, cycles\nevery tab, runs a live capture and asserts no thread is left running.\n\nThe single skip is the MDF4 parser, which needs the optional `asammdf` extra.\n\n---\n\n## Performance\n\nMeasured on the development machine (Linux, Python 3.12) with a capture of\n150,000 frames across 16 IDs held in memory. Treat these as the shape of the\ncost rather than a benchmark.\n\n| Operation | Cost |\n|---|---|\n| Build the full DataFrame from the ring buffer | 5 ms |\n| Fetch one ID's frames | 0.5 ms |\n| Refresh the frame table, 1,000 rows on screen | 72 ms |\n| Rebuild the plot signal tree, 16 IDs | 70 ms |\n\nLive capture is drained on a timer and the views are throttled, so the cost per\nbatch stays flat as the capture grows. Memory is bounded by the ring buffer cap.\n\n---\n\n## Limitations\n\n- **Not validated on many real vehicles.** Signal identification is heuristic.\n  Verify every result before trusting it.\n- The analysis suggests candidates. A confidence figure is a match fraction over\n  the frames you loaded, not a statistical proof.\n- **openpilot log import** needs pycapnp (`pip install canlab[openpilot]`); a\n  zstd-compressed log also needs `zstandard`. The schema ships with CanLab.\n- **MDF4** import needs `asammdf` (`pip install canlab[mdf]`).\n- CAN FD is parsed, stored, decoded, injected and replayed end to end, and the\n  bit grid follows the message length. It has been tested on a virtual bus,\n  not on FD hardware.\n- The Gateway needs **two** hardware CAN channels.\n- The AI features send the selected ID's frame statistics to whichever provider\n  you configure (Anthropic, OpenAI, Groq or Ollama). Nothing is sent until you\n  enter a key and click Analyze, and a suggested signal is refused unless the\n  response actually states a bit position. The OpenAI provider is tested\n  against a stand-in for the SDK, not against the live service.\n- The MCP server in the window has no authentication unless you set a token,\n  and ChatGPT's connectors cannot send one. Keep it on loopback unless you\n  accept that.\n- One physical adapter has been used: a CANalyst-II on a Tata Tigor EV, which\n  was detected and captured 111,006 frames. It has no listen-only mode. Every\n  other adapter was verified only with the virtual backend and stand-ins for\n  the USB, serial and sysfs probes.\n- The UDS, ISO-TP, security-access and OBD-II requests are tested against\n  scripted responders and independent implementations, not against a real ECU.\n  No real OBD-II capture was available, so the PID formulas are checked against\n  SAE J1979's worked values.\n- The GVRET backend is written to the protocol in SavvyCAN's source and tested\n  against byte streams built to that format, including a scripted board behind\n  the bus object. It has not been run against a physical GVRET board.\n- J1939 RTS/CTS reassembly is observe-only. No recording in the corpus contains\n  an RTS/CTS session, so it is tested against synthetic frames and against two\n  can-j1939 nodes on a virtual bus. BAM and NMEA 2000 fast packets are tested\n  on real recordings.\n- J1939 decoding covers 26 parameter groups. SAE sells the full list, and a PGN\n  that is not in the table is named when it is known and otherwise shown by\n  number, never guessed.\n- The capture kit has been run on python-can's virtual backend and a fake bus,\n  not in a vehicle. The systemd unit is a starting point.\n- The reference calibrator's lag search is ambiguous for a periodic reference\n  at lags near a multiple of its period. Keep the window under half the period.\n- The live watch's baseline is a per-byte Z-score. A short fit window flags\n  legitimate range changes as events; fit on a stretch that covers what you\n  expect to see.\n- Plugins run with full application privileges once enabled. Only enable plugins\n  you trust.\n- The prebuilt Linux binary on the releases page is x86_64 and unsigned.\n  There is no macOS or Windows binary; run from source on those.\n\n---\n\n## System requirements\n\n- Linux, macOS or Windows with Python 3.11 or newer\n- 4 GB RAM, 8 GB recommended for the machine-learning features\n- Optional: SocketCAN for live hardware, a comma.ai Panda, or any\n  [python-can](https://python-can.readthedocs.io) adapter, added under\n  Settings > CAN ADAPTERS (`socketcan`, `slcan`, `gs_usb`, `pcan`, `kvaser`,\n  `vector` and the rest)\n\n---\n\n## Acknowledgements\n\nThe calibration refinements in `core/calibrate_refine.py`, sentinel masking and\nscale snapping, are adapted from CSS Electronics'\n[CAN bus reverse engineering skills](https://github.com/CSS-Electronics/can-bus-reverse-engineering-skills)\n(MIT). The OEM checksum algorithms in `core/checksums.py` follow\n[commaai/opendbc](https://github.com/commaai/opendbc) (MIT).\n\nThe NMEA 2000 definitions in `canlab/core/data/n2k_pgns.json` are distilled\nfrom [CANboat](https://github.com/canboat/canboat) (Apache License 2.0, Kees\nVerruijt) by `tools/build_n2k_table.py`; the licence and the changes made are\nin `canlab/core/data/CANBOAT-NOTICE.txt`.\n\nopenpilot logs are read with comma.ai's cereal schema\n([openpilot](https://github.com/commaai/openpilot) and\n[opendbc](https://github.com/commaai/opendbc), MIT), vendored with its notice\nunder `canlab/core/data/cereal/`. The real-car calibration checks use comma.ai's\n[comma2k19](https://github.com/commaai/comma2k19) example segment (MIT) and a\ndrive from openpilot's public CI routes. The interoperability tests run against\n[can-isotp](https://github.com/pylessard/python-can-isotp),\n[udsoncan](https://github.com/pylessard/python-udsoncan) and\n[can-j1939](https://github.com/juergenH87/python-can-j1939) (all MIT).\n\nThe SNIFFER tab and its notch, the capture splitter and the GVRET protocol\nfollow [SavvyCAN](https://github.com/collin80/SavvyCAN) (MIT), whose sniffer\nwindow and Bisector are the originals and whose source documents the GVRET\nwire format. The real-data test capture is from that project's examples.\n\nBuilt on [python-can](https://python-can.readthedocs.io),\n[cantools](https://github.com/cantools/cantools), PyQt6, pandas, NumPy and\npyqtgraph.\n\n---\n\n## License\n\nMIT. See [LICENSE](LICENSE).\n\n**Author:** Sherin Joseph Roy\n**Repository:** https://github.com/Sherin-SEF-AI/CanLab",
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      "title": "Find first available OBDII device connected via serial",
      "full_name": "PaulMarisOUMary/OBDII",
      "name": "OBDII",
      "owner": "PaulMarisOUMary",
      "url": "https://github.com/PaulMarisOUMary/OBDII",
      "description": "A modern, easy to use, Python 3.8+ library for interacting with Vehicles via OBDII devices. Support USB, Bluetooth, Ethernet, and WiFi adapters.",
      "readme": "OBDII\n=====\n\n.. image:: https://img.shields.io/pypi/v/py-obdii?label=pypi&logo=pypi&logoColor=white&link=https%3A%2F%2Fpypi.org%2Fproject%2Fpy-obdii\n    :target: https://pypi.org/project/py-obdii\n    :alt: PyPI version\n.. image:: https://img.shields.io/python/required-version-toml?tomlFilePath=https%3A%2F%2Fraw.githubusercontent.com%2FPaulMarisOUMary%2FOBDII%2Fmain%2Fpyproject.toml&logo=python&logoColor=white&label=python\n    :target: https://pypi.org/project/py-obdii\n    :alt: Python Version from PEP 621 TOML\n.. image:: https://img.shields.io/github/actions/workflow/status/PaulMarisOUMary/OBDII/ci-pytest.yml?branch=main&label=tests&logoColor=white&logo=pytest\n    :target: https://github.com/PaulMarisOUMary/OBDII/actions/workflows/ci-pytest.yml\n    :alt: PyTest CI status\n.. image:: https://img.shields.io/readthedocs/py-obdii/latest?logo=readthedocs&logoColor=white&label=docs&link=https%3A%2F%2Fpy-obdii.rtfd.io\n    :target: https://py-obdii.rtfd.io/en/latest\n    :alt: Documentation Status (ReadTheDocs)\n.. image:: https://img.shields.io/discord/1437417392144912467?logo=discord&logoColor=white&label=discord&color=%235865f2&link=https%3A%2F%2Fdiscord.gg%2Fvn9bHUxeYB\n    :target: https://discord.gg/vn9bHUxeYB\n    :alt: Discord Support Server invite\n\nOverview\n--------\n\nConnect to any vehicle through its `OBDII <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/On-board_diagnostics#OBD-II>`_ port and start reading real-time data from Python in a few lines of code.\n\nPlug in a USB, Bluetooth, WiFi or Ethernet adapter, then query engine speed, fault codes, fuel level, VIN, and much more.\n\nWhether you're building a diagnostic tool, a performance data logger, a custom dashboard, a smart home integration, or just learning how vehicles communicate, this library handles the complexity of vehicle communication, so you don't have to.\n\nInstallation\n------------\n\nPython 3.8 or higher is required.\n\nInstall from PyPI using pip:\n\n.. code-block:: console\n\n    pip install py-obdii\n\nFor more installation options, see the `Installation Guide <https://py-obdii.readthedocs.io/en/latest/installation.html>`_.\n\nUsage Example\n-------------\n\n.. code-block:: python\n\n    from obdii import Connection, at_commands, commands\n    from obdii.utils.scan import scan_ports\n\n    # Find first available OBDII device connected via serial\n    ports = scan_ports(return_first=True)\n    if not ports:\n        raise ValueError(\"No OBDII devices found.\")\n\n    # Connect to the adapter\n    with Connection(ports[0]) as conn:\n        # Query adapter firmware version\n        version = conn.query(at_commands.VERSION_ID)\n        print(f\"Version: {version.value}\")\n\n        # Query vehicle's engine speed (rpm)\n        response = conn.query(commands.ENGINE_SPEED)\n        print(f\"Engine Speed: {response.value} {response.units}\")\n\nMore examples in the `examples folder <https://github.com/PaulMarisOUMary/OBDII/tree/main/examples>`_ and `Usage Guide <https://py-obdii.readthedocs.io/en/latest/usage.html>`_.\n\nEmulator Support\n----------------\n\nYou don't need a physical OBDII device to start developing.\n\nYou can use the `ELM327-Emulator <https://pypi.org/project/ELM327-emulator>`_ library to simulate an OBDII adapter and vehicle responses.\n\nSetting Up the ELM327-Emulator\n^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^\n\n#. Install the library with the ``sim`` extra options:\n\n    .. code-block:: console\n\n        pip install py-obdii[sim]\n\n#. Start the ELM327-Emulator:\n\n    .. code-block:: console\n\n        python -m elm -p \"REPLACE_WITH_PORT\" -s car --baudrate 38400\n\n    .. note::\n\n        Replace ``REPLACE_WITH_PORT`` with the serial port of your choice\n\nFor platform-specific instructions, see the `Emulating a Vehicle <https://py-obdii.readthedocs.io/en/latest/emulator.html>`_ guide.\n\nHardware Requirements\n---------------------\n\nFor real-world usage, an ELM327-compatible OBDII adapter is required to connect to your vehicle.\n\n- **USB**: reliable, plug and play\n- **Ethernet**: reliable, low latency\n- **Bluetooth**: wireless, convenient\n- **WiFi**: wireless, mobile compatible\n\nMore information on connecting to different adapter types can be found in the `Connection Guide <https://py-obdii.readthedocs.io/en/latest/connection.html>`_.\n\n.. _compatibility:\n\nCompatibility\n-------------\n\nAll ELM327 protocols are supported, covering vehicles from the\nmid-1990s through today.\n\nProtocol Support\n^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^\n\n===== ================ ========================\nID    Protocol         Specifications\n===== ================ ========================\n0x01  SAE J1850 PWM    41.6 Kbaud\n0x02  SAE J1850 VPW    10.4 Kbaud\n0x03  ISO 9141-2       5 baud init, 10.4 Kbaud\n0x04  ISO 14230-4 KWP  5 baud init, 10.4 Kbaud\n0x05  ISO 14230-4 KWP  fast init, 10.4 Kbaud\n0x06  ISO 15765-4 CAN  11 bit ID, 500 Kbaud\n0x07  ISO 15765-4 CAN  29 bit ID, 500 Kbaud\n0x08  ISO 15765-4 CAN  11 bit ID, 250 Kbaud\n0x09  ISO 15765-4 CAN  29 bit ID, 250 Kbaud\n0x0A  SAE J1939 CAN    29 bit ID, 250 Kbaud\n0x0B  USER1 CAN        11 bit ID, 125 Kbaud\n0x0C  USER2 CAN        11 bit ID, 50 Kbaud\n===== ================ ========================\n\nSupport & Contact\n-----------------\n\nFound a bug?\n\n- `Open an Issue <https://github.com/PaulMarisOUMary/OBDII/issues>`_\n\nHave a question?\n\n- `Join the Discussion <https://github.com/PaulMarisOUMary/OBDII/discussions>`_\n- `Discord Support Server <https://discord.gg/vn9bHUxeYB>`_\n\nYour feedback is greatly appreciated and helps improve this project.\n\n-------\n\nFollow our updates by leaving a star to this repository!",
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    "nate0634034090/bug-free-memory": {
      "id": "github:nate0634034090/bug-free-memory",
      "evidence_type": "repository",
      "record_type": "repository",
      "title": "nate158",
      "full_name": "Nate0634034090/bug-free-memory",
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      "description": "​![​logo​](https://github.com/curated-intel/Ukraine-Cyber-Operations/blob/main/ci-logo.png) ​#​ ​Ukraine-Cyber-Operations ​Curated Intelligence is working with analysts from around the world to provide useful information to organisations in Ukraine looking for additional free threat intelligence. Slava Ukraini. Glory to Ukraine. ([​Blog​](https://www.curatedintel.org/2021/08/welcome.html) | [​Twitter​](https://twitter.com/CuratedIntel) | [​LinkedIn​](https://www.linkedin.com/company/curatedintelligence/)) ​![​timeline​](https://github.com/curated-intel/Ukraine-Cyber-Operations/blob/main/uacyberopsv2.png) ​![​cyberwar​](https://github.com/curated-intel/Ukraine-Cyber-Operations/blob/main/Russia-Ukraine%20Cyberwar.png) ​###​ ​Analyst Comments: ​-​ 2022-02-25 ​ ​-​ Creation of the initial repository to help organisations in Ukraine ​ ​-​ Added [​Threat Reports​](https://github.com/curated-intel/Ukraine-Cyber-Operations#threat-reports) section ​ ​-​ Added [​Vendor Support​](https://github.com/curated-intel/Ukraine-Cyber-Operations#vendor-support) section ​-​ 2022-02-26 ​ ​-​ Additional resources, chronologically ordered (h/t Orange-CD) ​ ​-​ Added [​Vetted OSINT Sources​](https://github.com/curated-intel/Ukraine-Cyber-Operations#vetted-osint-sources) section ​ ​-​ Added [​Miscellaneous Resources​](https://github.com/curated-intel/Ukraine-Cyber-Operations#miscellaneous-resources) section ​-​ 2022-02-27 ​ ​-​ Additional threat reports have been added ​ ​-​ Added [​Data Brokers​](https://github.com/curated-intel/Ukraine-Cyber-Operations/blob/main/README.md#data-brokers) section ​ ​-​ Added [​Access Brokers​](https://github.com/curated-intel/Ukraine-Cyber-Operations/blob/main/README.md#access-brokers) section ​-​ 2022-02-28 ​ ​-​ Added Russian Cyber Operations Against Ukraine Timeline by ETAC ​ ​-​ Added Vetted and Contextualized [​Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)​](https://github.com/curated-intel/Ukraine-Cyber-Operations/blob/main/ETAC_Vetted_UkraineRussiaWar_IOCs.csv) by ETAC ​-​ 2022-03-01 ​ ​-​ Additional threat reports and resources have been added ​-​ 2022-03-02 ​ ​-​ Additional [​Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)​](https://github.com/curated-intel/Ukraine-Cyber-Operations/blob/main/ETAC_Vetted_UkraineRussiaWar_IOCs.csv#L2011) have been added ​ ​-​ Added vetted [​YARA rule collection​](https://github.com/curated-intel/Ukraine-Cyber-Operations/tree/main/yara) from the Threat Reports by ETAC ​ ​-​ Added loosely-vetted [​IOC Threat Hunt Feeds​](https://github.com/curated-intel/Ukraine-Cyber-Operations/tree/main/KPMG-Egyde_Ukraine-Crisis_Feeds/MISP-CSV_MediumConfidence_Filtered) by KPMG-Egyde CTI (h/t [​0xDISREL​](https://twitter.com/0xDISREL)) ​ ​-​ IOCs shared by these feeds are ​`LOW-TO-MEDIUM CONFIDENCE`​ we strongly recommend NOT adding them to a blocklist ​ ​-​ These could potentially be used for ​`THREAT HUNTING`​ and could be added to a ​`WATCHLIST` ​ ​-​ IOCs are generated in ​`MISP COMPATIBLE`​ CSV format ​-​ 2022-03-03 ​ ​-​ Additional threat reports and vendor support resources have been added ​ ​-​ Updated [​Log4Shell IOC Threat Hunt Feeds​](https://github.com/curated-intel/Log4Shell-IOCs/tree/main/KPMG_Log4Shell_Feeds) by KPMG-Egyde CTI; not directly related to Ukraine, but still a widespread vulnerability. ​ ​-​ Added diagram of Russia-Ukraine Cyberwar Participants 2022 by ETAC ​ ​-​ Additional [​Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)​](https://github.com/curated-intel/Ukraine-Cyber-Operations/blob/main/ETAC_Vetted_UkraineRussiaWar_IOCs.csv#L2042) have been added ​####​ ​`Threat Reports` ​| Date | Source | Threat(s) | URL | ​| --- | --- | --- | --- | ​| 14 JAN | SSU Ukraine | Website Defacements | [ssu.gov.ua](https://ssu.gov.ua/novyny/sbu-rozsliduie-prychetnist-rosiiskykh-spetssluzhb-do-sohodnishnoi-kiberataky-na-orhany-derzhavnoi-vlady-ukrainy)| ​| 15 JAN | Microsoft | WhisperGate wiper (DEV-0586) | [microsoft.com](https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/) | ​| 19 JAN | Elastic | WhisperGate wiper (Operation BleedingBear) | [elastic.github.io](https://elastic.github.io/security-research/malware/2022/01/01.operation-bleeding-bear/article/) | ​| 31 JAN | Symantec | Gamaredon/Shuckworm/PrimitiveBear (FSB) | [symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com](https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/shuckworm-gamaredon-espionage-ukraine) | ​| 2 FEB | RaidForums | Access broker \"GodLevel\" offering Ukrainain algricultural exchange | RaidForums [not linked] | ​| 2 FEB | CERT-UA | UAC-0056 using SaintBot and OutSteel malware | [cert.gov.ua](https://cert.gov.ua/article/18419) | ​| 3 FEB | PAN Unit42 | Gamaredon/Shuckworm/PrimitiveBear (FSB) | [unit42.paloaltonetworks.com](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/gamaredon-primitive-bear-ukraine-update-2021/) | ​| 4 FEB | Microsoft | Gamaredon/Shuckworm/PrimitiveBear (FSB) | [microsoft.com](https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/02/04/actinium-targets-ukrainian-organizations/) | ​| 8 FEB | NSFOCUS | Lorec53 (aka UAC-0056, EmberBear, BleedingBear) | [nsfocusglobal.com](https://nsfocusglobal.com/apt-retrospection-lorec53-an-active-russian-hack-group-launched-phishing-attacks-against-georgian-government) | ​| 15 FEB | CERT-UA | DDoS attacks against the name server of government websites as well as Oschadbank (State Savings Bank) & Privatbank (largest commercial bank). False SMS and e-mails to create panic | [cert.gov.ua](https://cert.gov.ua/article/37139) | ​| 23 FEB | The Daily Beast | Ukrainian troops receive threatening SMS messages | [thedailybeast.com](https://www.thedailybeast.com/cyberattacks-hit-websites-and-psy-ops-sms-messages-targeting-ukrainians-ramp-up-as-russia-moves-into-ukraine) | ​| 23 FEB | UK NCSC | Sandworm/VoodooBear (GRU) | [ncsc.gov.uk](https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/files/Joint-Sandworm-Advisory.pdf) | ​| 23 FEB | SentinelLabs | HermeticWiper | [sentinelone.com]( https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/hermetic-wiper-ukraine-under-attack/ ) | ​| 24 FEB | ESET | HermeticWiper | [welivesecurity.com](https://www.welivesecurity.com/2022/02/24/hermeticwiper-new-data-wiping-malware-hits-ukraine/) | ​| 24 FEB | Symantec | HermeticWiper, PartyTicket ransomware, CVE-2021-1636, unknown webshell | [symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com](https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/ukraine-wiper-malware-russia) | ​| 24 FEB | Cisco Talos | HermeticWiper | [blog.talosintelligence.com](https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2022/02/threat-advisory-hermeticwiper.html) | ​| 24 FEB | Zscaler | HermeticWiper | [zscaler.com](https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/hermetic-wiper-resurgence-targeted-attacks-ukraine) | ​| 24 FEB | Cluster25 | HermeticWiper | [cluster25.io](https://cluster25.io/2022/02/24/ukraine-analysis-of-the-new-disk-wiping-malware/) | ​| 24 FEB | CronUp | Data broker \"FreeCivilian\" offering multiple .gov.ua | [twitter.com/1ZRR4H](https://twitter.com/1ZRR4H/status/1496931721052311557)| ​| 24 FEB | RaidForums | Data broker \"Featherine\" offering diia.gov.ua | RaidForums [not linked] | ​| 24 FEB | DomainTools | Unknown scammers | [twitter.com/SecuritySnacks](https://twitter.com/SecuritySnacks/status/1496956492636905473?s=20&t=KCIX_1Ughc2Fs6Du-Av0Xw) | ​| 25 FEB | @500mk500 | Gamaredon/Shuckworm/PrimitiveBear (FSB) | [twitter.com/500mk500](https://twitter.com/500mk500/status/1497339266329894920?s=20&t=opOtwpn82ztiFtwUbLkm9Q) | ​| 25 FEB | @500mk500 | Gamaredon/Shuckworm/PrimitiveBear (FSB) | [twitter.com/500mk500](https://twitter.com/500mk500/status/1497208285472215042)| ​| 25 FEB | Microsoft | HermeticWiper | [gist.github.com](https://gist.github.com/fr0gger/7882fde2b1b271f9e886a4a9b6fb6b7f) | ​| 25 FEB | 360 NetLab | DDoS (Mirai, Gafgyt, IRCbot, Ripprbot, Moobot) | [blog.netlab.360.com](https://blog.netlab.360.com/some_details_of_the_ddos_attacks_targeting_ukraine_and_russia_in_recent_days/) | ​| 25 FEB | Conti [themselves] | Conti ransomware, BazarLoader | Conti News .onion [not linked] | ​| 25 FEB | CoomingProject [themselves] | Data Hostage Group | CoomingProject Telegram [not linked] | ​| 25 FEB | CERT-UA | UNC1151/Ghostwriter (Belarus MoD) | [CERT-UA Facebook](https://facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=312939130865352&id=100064478028712)| ​| 25 FEB | Sekoia | UNC1151/Ghostwriter (Belarus MoD) | [twitter.com/sekoia_io](https://twitter.com/sekoia_io/status/1497239319295279106) | ​| 25 FEB | @jaimeblascob | UNC1151/Ghostwriter (Belarus MoD) | [twitter.com/jaimeblasco](https://twitter.com/jaimeblascob/status/1497242668627370009)| ​| 25 FEB | RISKIQ | UNC1151/Ghostwriter (Belarus MoD) | [community.riskiq.com](https://community.riskiq.com/article/e3a7ceea/) | ​| 25 FEB | MalwareHunterTeam | Unknown phishing | [twitter.com/malwrhunterteam](https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/1497235270416097287) | ​| 25 FEB | ESET | Unknown scammers | [twitter.com/ESETresearch](https://twitter.com/ESETresearch/status/1497194165561659394) | ​| 25 FEB | BitDefender | Unknown scammers | [blog.bitdefender.com](https://blog.bitdefender.com/blog/hotforsecurity/cybercriminals-deploy-spam-campaign-as-tens-of-thousands-of-ukrainians-seek-refuge-in-neighboring-countries/) | ​| 25 FEB | SSSCIP Ukraine | Unkown phishing | [twitter.com/dsszzi](https://twitter.com/dsszzi/status/1497103078029291522) | ​| 25 FEB | RaidForums | Data broker \"NetSec\" offering FSB (likely SMTP accounts) | RaidForums [not linked] | ​| 25 FEB | Zscaler | PartyTicket decoy ransomware | [zscaler.com](https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/technical-analysis-partyticket-ransomware) | ​| 25 FEB | INCERT GIE | Cyclops Blink, HermeticWiper | [linkedin.com](https://www.linkedin.com/posts/activity-6902989337210740736-XohK) [Login Required] | ​| 25 FEB | Proofpoint | UNC1151/Ghostwriter (Belarus MoD) | [twitter.com/threatinsight](https://twitter.com/threatinsight/status/1497355737844133895?s=20&t=Ubi0tb_XxGCbHLnUoQVp8w) | ​| 25 FEB | @fr0gger_ | HermeticWiper capabilities Overview | [twitter.com/fr0gger_](https://twitter.com/fr0gger_/status/1497121876870832128?s=20&t=_296n0bPeUgdXleX02M9mg) ​| 26 FEB | BBC Journalist | A fake Telegram account claiming to be President Zelensky is posting dubious messages | [twitter.com/shayan86](https://twitter.com/shayan86/status/1497485340738785283?s=21) | ​| 26 FEB | CERT-UA | UNC1151/Ghostwriter (Belarus MoD) | [CERT_UA Facebook](https://facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=313517477474184&id=100064478028712) | ​| 26 FEB | MHT and TRMLabs | Unknown scammers, linked to ransomware | [twitter.com/joes_mcgill](https://twitter.com/joes_mcgill/status/1497609555856932864?s=20&t=KCIX_1Ughc2Fs6Du-Av0Xw) | ​| 26 FEB | US CISA | WhisperGate wiper, HermeticWiper | [cisa.gov](https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-057a) | ​| 26 FEB | Bloomberg | Destructive malware (possibly HermeticWiper) deployed at Ukrainian Ministry of Internal Affairs & data stolen from Ukrainian telecommunications networks | [bloomberg.com](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-02-26/hackers-destroyed-data-at-key-ukraine-agency-before-invasion?sref=ylv224K8) | ​| 26 FEB | Vice Prime Minister of Ukraine | IT ARMY of Ukraine created to crowdsource offensive operations against Russian infrastructure | [twitter.com/FedorovMykhailo](https://twitter.com/FedorovMykhailo/status/1497642156076511233) | ​| 26 FEB | Yoroi | HermeticWiper | [yoroi.company](https://yoroi.company/research/diskkill-hermeticwiper-a-disruptive-cyber-weapon-targeting-ukraines-critical-infrastructures) | ​| 27 FEB | LockBit [themselves] | LockBit ransomware | LockBit .onion [not linked] | ​| 27 FEB | ALPHV [themselves] | ALPHV ransomware | vHUMINT [closed source] | ​| 27 FEB | Mēris Botnet [themselves] | DDoS attacks | vHUMINT [closed source] | ​| 28 FEB | Horizon News [themselves] | Leak of China's Censorship Order about Ukraine | [TechARP](https://www-techarp-com.cdn.ampproject.org/c/s/www.techarp.com/internet/chinese-media-leaks-ukraine-censor/?amp=1)| ​| 28 FEB | Microsoft | FoxBlade (aka HermeticWiper) | [Microsoft](https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2022/02/28/ukraine-russia-digital-war-cyberattacks/?preview_id=65075) | ​| 28 FEB | @heymingwei | Potential BGP hijacks attempts against Ukrainian Internet Names Center | [https://twitter.com/heymingwei](https://twitter.com/heymingwei/status/1498362715198263300?s=20&t=Ju31gTurYc8Aq_yZMbvbxg) | ​| 28 FEB | @cyberknow20 | Stormous ransomware targets Ukraine Ministry of Foreign Affairs | [twitter.com/cyberknow20](https://twitter.com/cyberknow20/status/1498434090206314498?s=21) | ​| 1 MAR | ESET | IsaacWiper and HermeticWizard | [welivesecurity.com](https://www.welivesecurity.com/2022/03/01/isaacwiper-hermeticwizard-wiper-worm-targeting-ukraine/) | ​| 1 MAR | Proofpoint | Ukrainian armed service member's email compromised and sent malspam containing the SunSeed malware (likely TA445/UNC1151/Ghostwriter) | [proofpoint.com](https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/asylum-ambuscade-state-actor-uses-compromised-private-ukrainian-military-emails) | ​| 1 MAR | Elastic | HermeticWiper | [elastic.github.io](https://elastic.github.io/security-research/intelligence/2022/03/01.hermeticwiper-targets-ukraine/article/) | ​| 1 MAR | CrowdStrike | PartyTicket (aka HermeticRansom), DriveSlayer (aka HermeticWiper) | [CrowdStrike](https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/how-to-decrypt-the-partyticket-ransomware-targeting-ukraine/) | ​| 2 MAR | Zscaler | DanaBot operators launch DDoS attacks against the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense | [zscaler.com](https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/danabot-launches-ddos-attack-against-ukrainian-ministry-defense) | ​| 3 MAR | @ShadowChasing1 | Gamaredon/Shuckworm/PrimitiveBear (FSB) | [twitter.com/ShadowChasing1](https://twitter.com/ShadowChasing1/status/1499361093059153921) | ​| 3 MAR | @vxunderground | News website in Poland was reportedly compromised and the threat actor uploaded anti-Ukrainian propaganda | [twitter.com/vxunderground](https://twitter.com/vxunderground/status/1499374914758918151?s=20&t=jyy9Hnpzy-5P1gcx19bvIA) | ​| 3 MAR | @kylaintheburgh | Russian botnet on Twitter is pushing \"#istandwithputin\" and \"#istandwithrussia\" propaganda (in English) | [twitter.com/kylaintheburgh](https://twitter.com/kylaintheburgh/status/1499350578371067906?s=21) | ​| 3 MAR | @tracerspiff | UNC1151/Ghostwriter (Belarus MoD) | [twitter.com](https://twitter.com/tracerspiff/status/1499444876810854408?s=21) | ​####​ ​`Access Brokers` ​| Date | Threat(s) | Source | ​| --- | --- | --- | ​| 23 JAN | Access broker \"Mont4na\" offering UkrFerry | RaidForums [not linked] | ​| 23 JAN | Access broker \"Mont4na\" offering PrivatBank | RaidForums [not linked] | ​| 24 JAN | Access broker \"Mont4na\" offering DTEK | RaidForums [not linked] | ​| 27 FEB | KelvinSecurity Sharing list of IP cameras in Ukraine | vHUMINT [closed source] | ​| 28 FEB | \"w1nte4mute\" looking to buy access to UA and NATO countries (likely ransomware affiliate) | vHUMINT [closed source] | ​####​ ​`Data Brokers` ​| Threat Actor | Type | Observation | Validated | Relevance | Source | ​| --------------- | --------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------- | ----------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------- | ​| aguyinachair | UA data sharing | PII DB of ukraine.com (shared as part of a generic compilation) | No | TA discussion in past 90 days | ELeaks Forum \\[not linked\\] | ​| an3key | UA data sharing | DB of Ministry of Communities and Territories Development of Ukraine (minregion\\[.\\]gov\\[.\\]ua) | No | TA discussion in past 90 days | RaidForums \\[not linked; site hijacked since UA invasion\\] | ​| an3key | UA data sharing | DB of Ukrainian Ministry of Internal Affairs (wanted\\[.\\]mvs\\[.\\]gov\\[.\\]ua) | No | TA discussion in past 90 days | RaidForums \\[not linked; site hijacked since UA invasion\\] | ​| CorelDraw | UA data sharing | PII DB (40M) of PrivatBank customers (privatbank\\[.\\]ua) | No | TA discussion in past 90 days | RaidForums \\[not linked; site hijacked since UA invasion\\] | ​| CorelDraw | UA data sharing | DB of \"border crossing\" DBs of DPR and LPR | No | TA discussion in past 90 days | RaidForums \\[not linked; site hijacked since UA invasion\\] | ​| CorelDraw | UA data sharing | PII DB (7.5M) of Ukrainian passports | No | TA discussion in past 90 days | RaidForums \\[not linked; site hijacked since UA invasion\\] | ​| CorelDraw | UA data sharing | PII DB of Ukrainian car registration, license plates, Ukrainian traffic police records | No | TA discussion in past 90 days | RaidForums \\[not linked; site hijacked since UA invasion\\] | ​| CorelDraw | UA data sharing | PII DB (2.1M) of Ukrainian citizens | No | TA discussion in past 90 days | RaidForums \\[not linked; site hijacked since UA invasion\\] | ​| CorelDraw | UA data sharing | PII DB (28M) of Ukrainian citizens (passports, drivers licenses, photos) | No | TA discussion in past 90 days | RaidForums \\[not linked; site hijacked since UA invasion\\] | ​| CorelDraw | UA data sharing | PII DB (1M) of Ukrainian postal/courier service customers (novaposhta\\[.\\]ua) | No | TA discussion in past 90 days | RaidForums \\[not linked; site hijacked since UA invasion\\] | ​| CorelDraw | UA data sharing | PII DB (10M) of Ukrainian telecom customers (vodafone\\[.\\]ua) | No | TA discussion in past 90 days | RaidForums \\[not linked; site hijacked since UA invasion\\] | ​| CorelDraw | UA data sharing | PII DB (3M) of Ukrainian telecom customers (lifecell\\[.\\]ua) | No | TA discussion in past 90 days | RaidForums \\[not linked; site hijacked since UA invasion\\] | ​| CorelDraw | UA data sharing | PII DB (13M) of Ukrainian telecom customers (kyivstar\\[.\\]ua) | No | TA discussion in past 90 days | RaidForums \\[not linked; site hijacked since UA invasion\\] | ​| danieltx51 | UA data sharing | DB of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine (mfa\\[.\\]gov\\[.\\]ua) | No | TA discussion in past 90 days | RaidForums \\[not linked; site hijacked since UA invasion\\] | ​| DueDiligenceCIS | UA data sharing | PII DB (63M) of Ukrainian citizens (name, DOB, birth country, phone, TIN, passport, family, etc) | No | TA discussion in past 90 days | RaidForums \\[not linked; site hijacked since UA invasion\\] | ​| Featherine | UA data sharing | DB of Ukrainian 'Diia' e-Governance Portal for Ministry of Digital Transformation of Ukraine | No | TA discussion in past 90 days | RaidForums \\[not linked; site hijacked since UA invasion\\] | ​| FreeCivilian | UA data sharing | DB of Ministry for Internal Affairs of Ukraine public data search engine (wanted\\[.\\]mvs\\[.\\]gov\\[.\\]ua) | No | TA discussion in past 90 days | RaidForums \\[not linked; site hijacked since UA invasion\\] | ​| FreeCivilian | UA data sharing | DB of Ministry for Communities and Territories Development of Ukraine (minregion\\[.\\]gov\\[.\\]ua) | No | TA discussion in past 90 days | RaidForums \\[not linked; site hijacked since UA invasion\\] | ​| FreeCivilian | UA data sharing | DB of Motor Insurance Bureau of Ukraine (mtsbu\\[.\\]ua) | No | TA discussion in past 90 days | RaidForums \\[not linked; site hijacked since UA invasion\\] | ​| FreeCivilian | UA data sharing | PII DB of Ukrainian digital-medicine provider (medstar\\[.\\]ua) | No | TA discussion in past 90 days | RaidForums \\[not linked; site hijacked since UA invasion\\] | ​| FreeCivilian | UA data sharing | DB of ticket.kyivcity.gov.ua | No | TA discussion in past 90 days | FreeCivilian .onion \\[not linked\\] | ​| FreeCivilian | UA data sharing | DB of id.kyivcity.gov.ua | No | TA discussion in past 90 days | FreeCivilian .onion \\[not linked\\] | ​| FreeCivilian | UA data sharing | DB of my.kyivcity.gov.ua | No | TA discussion in past 90 days | FreeCivilian .onion \\[not linked\\] | ​| FreeCivilian | UA data sharing | DB of portal.kyivcity.gov.ua | No | TA discussion in past 90 days | FreeCivilian .onion \\[not linked\\] | ​| FreeCivilian | UA data sharing | DB of anti-violence-map.msp.gov.ua | No | TA discussion in past 90 days | FreeCivilian .onion \\[not linked\\] | ​| FreeCivilian | UA data sharing | DB of dopomoga.msp.gov.ua | No | TA discussion in past 90 days | FreeCivilian .onion \\[not linked\\] | ​| FreeCivilian | UA data sharing | DB of e-services.msp.gov.ua | No | TA discussion in past 90 days | FreeCivilian .onion \\[not linked\\] | ​| FreeCivilian | UA data sharing | DB of edu.msp.gov.ua | No | TA discussion in past 90 days | FreeCivilian .onion \\[not linked\\] | ​| FreeCivilian | UA data sharing | DB of education.msp.gov.ua | No | TA discussion in past 90 days | FreeCivilian .onion \\[not linked\\] | ​| FreeCivilian | UA data sharing | DB of ek-cbi.msp.gov.ua | No | TA discussion in past 90 days | FreeCivilian .onion \\[not linked\\] | ​| FreeCivilian | UA data sharing | DB of mail.msp.gov.ua | No | TA discussion in past 90 days | FreeCivilian .onion \\[not linked\\] | ​| FreeCivilian | UA data sharing | DB of portal-gromady.msp.gov.ua | No | TA discussion in past 90 days | FreeCivilian .onion \\[not linked\\] | ​| FreeCivilian | UA data sharing | DB of web-minsoc.msp.gov.ua | No | TA discussion in past 90 days | FreeCivilian .onion \\[not linked\\] | ​| FreeCivilian | UA data sharing | DB of wcs-wim.dsbt.gov.ua | No | TA discussion in past 90 days | FreeCivilian .onion \\[not linked\\] | ​| FreeCivilian | UA data sharing | DB of bdr.mvs.gov.ua | No | TA discussion in past 90 days | FreeCivilian .onion \\[not linked\\] | ​| FreeCivilian | UA data sharing | DB of motorsich.com | No | TA discussion in past 90 days | FreeCivilian .onion \\[not linked\\] | ​| FreeCivilian | UA data sharing | DB of dsns.gov.ua | No | TA discussion in past 90 days | FreeCivilian .onion \\[not linked\\] | ​| FreeCivilian | UA data sharing | DB of mon.gov.ua | No | TA discussion in past 90 days | FreeCivilian .onion \\[not linked\\] | ​| FreeCivilian | UA data sharing | DB of minagro.gov.ua | No | TA discussion in past 90 days | FreeCivilian .onion \\[not linked\\] | ​| FreeCivilian | UA data sharing | DB of zt.gov.ua | No | TA discussion in past 90 days | FreeCivilian .onion \\[not linked\\] | ​| FreeCivilian | UA data sharing | DB of kmu.gov.ua | No | TA discussion in past 90 days | FreeCivilian .onion \\[not linked\\] | ​| FreeCivilian | UA data sharing | DB of mvs.gov.ua | No | TA discussion in past 90 days | FreeCivilian .onion \\[not linked\\] | ​| FreeCivilian | UA data sharing | DB of dsbt.gov.ua | No | TA discussion in past 90 days | FreeCivilian .onion \\[not linked\\] | ​| FreeCivilian | UA data sharing | DB of forest.gov.ua | No | TA discussion in past 90 days | FreeCivilian .onion \\[not linked\\] | ​| FreeCivilian | UA data sharing | DB of nkrzi.gov.ua | No | TA discussion in past 90 days | FreeCivilian .onion \\[not linked\\] | ​| FreeCivilian | UA data sharing | DB of dabi.gov.ua | No | TA discussion in past 90 days | FreeCivilian .onion \\[not linked\\] | ​| FreeCivilian | UA data sharing | DB of comin.gov.ua | No | TA discussion in past 90 days | FreeCivilian .onion \\[not linked\\] | ​| FreeCivilian | UA data sharing | DB of dp.dpss.gov.ua | No | TA discussion in past 90 days | FreeCivilian .onion \\[not linked\\] | ​| FreeCivilian | UA data sharing | DB of esbu.gov.ua | No | TA discussion in past 90 days | FreeCivilian .onion \\[not linked\\] | ​| FreeCivilian | UA data sharing | DB of mms.gov.ua | No | TA discussion in past 90 days | FreeCivilian .onion \\[not linked\\] | ​| FreeCivilian | UA data sharing | DB of mova.gov.ua | No | TA discussion in past 90 days | FreeCivilian .onion \\[not linked\\] | ​| FreeCivilian | UA data sharing | DB of mspu.gov.ua | No | TA discussion in past 90 days | FreeCivilian .onion \\[not linked\\] | ​| FreeCivilian | UA data sharing | DB of nads.gov.ua | No | TA discussion in past 90 days | FreeCivilian .onion \\[not linked\\] | ​| FreeCivilian | UA data sharing | DB of reintegration.gov.ua | No | TA discussion in past 90 days | FreeCivilian .onion \\[not linked\\] | ​| FreeCivilian | UA data sharing | DB of sies.gov.ua | No | TA discussion in past 90 days | FreeCivilian .onion \\[not linked\\] | ​| FreeCivilian | UA data sharing | DB of sport.gov.ua | No | TA discussion in past 90 days | FreeCivilian .onion \\[not linked\\] | ​| FreeCivilian | UA data sharing | DB of mepr.gov.ua | No | TA discussion in past 90 days | FreeCivilian .onion \\[not linked\\] | ​| FreeCivilian | UA data sharing | DB of mfa.gov.ua | No | TA discussion in past 90 days | FreeCivilian .onion \\[not linked\\] | ​| FreeCivilian | UA data sharing | DB of va.gov.ua | No | TA discussion in past 90 days | FreeCivilian .onion \\[not linked\\] | ​| FreeCivilian | UA data sharing | DB of mtu.gov.ua | No | TA discussion in past 90 days | FreeCivilian .onion \\[not linked\\] | ​| FreeCivilian | UA data sharing | DB of cg.mvs.gov.ua | No | TA discussion in past 90 days | FreeCivilian .onion \\[not linked\\] | ​| FreeCivilian | UA data sharing | DB of ch-tmo.mvs.gov.ua | No | TA discussion in past 90 days | FreeCivilian .onion \\[not linked\\] | ​| FreeCivilian | UA data sharing | DB of cp.mvs.gov.ua | No | TA discussion in past 90 days | FreeCivilian .onion \\[not linked\\] | ​| FreeCivilian | UA data sharing | DB of cpd.mvs.gov.ua | No | TA discussion in past 90 days | FreeCivilian .onion \\[not linked\\] | ​| FreeCivilian | UA data sharing | DB of hutirvilnij-mrc.mvs.gov.ua | No | TA discussion in past 90 days | FreeCivilian .onion \\[not linked\\] | ​| FreeCivilian | UA data sharing | DB of dndekc.mvs.gov.ua | No | TA discussion in past 90 days | FreeCivilian .onion \\[not linked\\] | ​| FreeCivilian | UA data sharing | DB of visnyk.dndekc.mvs.gov.ua | No | TA discussion in past 90 days | FreeCivilian .onion \\[not linked\\] | ​| FreeCivilian | UA data sharing | DB of dpvs.hsc.gov.ua | No | TA discussion in past 90 days | FreeCivilian .onion \\[not linked\\] | ​| FreeCivilian | UA data sharing | DB of odk.mvs.gov.ua | No | TA discussion in past 90 days | FreeCivilian .onion \\[not linked\\] | ​| FreeCivilian | UA data sharing | DB of e-driver\\[.\\]hsc\\[.\\]gov\\[.\\]ua | No | TA discussion in past 90 days | FreeCivilian .onion \\[not linked\\] | ​| FreeCivilian | UA data sharing | DB of wanted\\[.\\]mvs\\[.\\]gov\\[.\\]ua | No | TA discussion in past 90 days | FreeCivilian .onion \\[not linked\\] | ​| FreeCivilian | UA data sharing | DB of minregeion\\[.\\]gov\\[.\\]ua | No | TA discussion in past 90 days | FreeCivilian .onion \\[not linked\\] | ​| FreeCivilian | UA data sharing | DB of health\\[.\\]mia\\[.\\]solutions | No | TA discussion in past 90 days | FreeCivilian .onion \\[not linked\\] | ​| FreeCivilian | UA data sharing | DB of mtsbu\\[.\\]ua | No | TA discussion in past 90 days | FreeCivilian .onion \\[not linked\\] | ​| FreeCivilian | UA data sharing | DB of motorsich\\[.\\]com | No | TA discussion in past 90 days | FreeCivilian .onion \\[not linked\\] | ​| FreeCivilian | UA data sharing | DB of kyivcity\\[.\\]com | No | TA discussion in past 90 days | FreeCivilian .onion \\[not linked\\] | ​| FreeCivilian | UA data sharing | DB of bdr\\[.\\]mvs\\[.\\]gov\\[.\\]ua | No | TA discussion in past 90 days | FreeCivilian .onion \\[not linked\\] | ​| FreeCivilian | UA data sharing | DB of gkh\\[.\\]in\\[.\\]ua | No | TA discussion in past 90 days | FreeCivilian .onion \\[not linked\\] | ​| FreeCivilian | UA data sharing | DB of kmu\\[.\\]gov\\[.\\]ua | No | TA discussion in past 90 days | FreeCivilian .onion \\[not linked\\] | ​| FreeCivilian | UA data sharing | DB of mon\\[.\\]gov\\[.\\]ua | No | TA discussion in past 90 days | FreeCivilian .onion \\[not linked\\] | ​| FreeCivilian | UA data sharing | DB of minagro\\[.\\]gov\\[.\\]ua | No | TA discussion in past 90 days | FreeCivilian .onion \\[not linked\\] | ​| FreeCivilian | UA data sharing | DB of mfa\\[.\\]gov\\[.\\]ua | No | TA discussion in past 90 days | FreeCivilian .onion \\[not linked\\] | ​| Intel\\_Data | UA data sharing | PII DB (56M) of Ukrainian Citizens | No | TA discussion in past 90 days | RaidForums \\[not linked; site hijacked since UA invasion\\] | ​| Kristina | UA data sharing | DB of Ukrainian National Police (mvs\\[.\\]gov\\[.\\]ua) | No | TA discussion in past 90 days | RaidForums \\[not linked; site hijacked since UA invasion\\] | ​| NetSec | UA data sharing | PII DB (53M) of Ukrainian citizens | No | TA discussion in past 90 days | RaidForums \\[not linked; site hijacked since UA invasion\\] | ​| Psycho\\_Killer | UA data sharing | PII DB (56M) of Ukrainian Citizens | No | TA discussion in past 90 days | Exploit Forum .onion \\[not linked\\] | ​| Sp333 | UA data sharing | PII DB of Ukrainian and Russian interpreters, translators, and tour guides | No | TA discussion in past 90 days | RaidForums \\[not linked; site hijacked since UA invasion\\] | ​| Vaticano | UA data sharing | DB of Ukrainian 'Diia' e-Governance Portal for Ministry of Digital Transformation of Ukraine \\[copy\\] | No | TA discussion in past 90 days | RaidForums \\[not linked; site hijacked since UA invasion\\] | ​| Vaticano | UA data sharing | DB of Ministry for Communities and Territories Development of Ukraine (minregion\\[.\\]gov\\[.\\]ua) \\[copy\\] | No | TA discussion in past 90 days | RaidForums \\[not linked; site hijacked since UA invasion\\] | ​####​ ​`Vendor Support` ​| Vendor | Offering | URL | ​| --- | --- | --- | ​| Dragos | Access to Dragos service if from US/UK/ANZ and in need of ICS cybersecurity support | [twitter.com/RobertMLee](https://twitter.com/RobertMLee/status/1496862093588455429) | ​| GreyNoise | Any and all `Ukrainian` emails registered to GreyNoise have been upgraded to VIP which includes full, uncapped enterprise access to all GreyNoise products | [twitter.com/Andrew___Morris](https://twitter.com/Andrew___Morris/status/1496923545712091139) | ​| Recorded Future | Providing free intelligence-driven insights, perspectives, and mitigation strategies as the situation in Ukraine evolves| [recordedfuture.com](https://www.recordedfuture.com/ukraine/) | ​| Flashpoint | Free Access to Flashpoint’s Latest Threat Intel on Ukraine | [go.flashpoint-intel.com](https://go.flashpoint-intel.com/trial/access/30days) | ​| ThreatABLE | A Ukraine tag for free threat intelligence feed that's more highly curated to cyber| [twitter.com/threatable](https://twitter.com/threatable/status/1497233721803644950) | ​| Orange | IOCs related to Russia-Ukraine 2022 conflict extracted from our Datalake Threat Intelligence platform. | [github.com/Orange-Cyberdefense](https://github.com/Orange-Cyberdefense/russia-ukraine_IOCs)| ​| FSecure | F-Secure FREEDOME VPN is now available for free in all of Ukraine | [twitter.com/FSecure](https://twitter.com/FSecure/status/1497248407303462960) | ​| Multiple vendors | List of vendors offering their services to Ukraine for free, put together by [@chrisculling](https://twitter.com/chrisculling/status/1497023038323404803) | [docs.google.com/spreadsheets](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/18WYY9p1_DLwB6dnXoiiOAoWYD8X0voXtoDl_ZQzjzUQ/edit#gid=0) | ​| Mandiant | Free threat intelligence, webinar and guidance for defensive measures relevant to the situation in Ukraine. | [mandiant.com](https://www.mandiant.com/resources/insights/ukraine-crisis-resource-center) | ​| Starlink | Satellite internet constellation operated by SpaceX providing satellite Internet access coverage to Ukraine | [twitter.com/elonmusk](https://twitter.com/elonmusk/status/1497701484003213317) | ​| Romania DNSC | Romania’s DNSC – in partnership with Bitdefender – will provide technical consulting, threat intelligence and, free of charge, cybersecurity technology to any business, government institution or private citizen of Ukraine for as long as it is necessary. | [Romania's DNSC Press Release](https://dnsc.ro/citeste/press-release-dnsc-and-bitdefender-work-together-in-support-of-ukraine)| ​| BitDefender | Access to Bitdefender technical consulting, threat intelligence and both consumer and enterprise cybersecurity technology | [bitdefender.com/ukraine/](https://www.bitdefender.com/ukraine/) | ​| NameCheap | Free anonymous hosting and domain name registration to any anti-Putin anti-regime and protest websites for anyone located within Russia and Belarus | [twitter.com/Namecheap](https://twitter.com/Namecheap/status/1498998414020861953) | ​| Avast | Free decryptor for PartyTicket ransomware | [decoded.avast.io](https://decoded.avast.io/threatresearch/help-for-ukraine-free-decryptor-for-hermeticransom-ransomware/) | ​####​ ​`Vetted OSINT Sources` ​| Handle | Affiliation | ​| --- | --- | ​| [@KyivIndependent](https://twitter.com/KyivIndependent) | English-language journalism in Ukraine | ​| [@IAPonomarenko](https://twitter.com/IAPonomarenko) | Defense reporter with The Kyiv Independent | ​| [@KyivPost](https://twitter.com/KyivPost) | English-language journalism in Ukraine | ​| [@Shayan86](https://twitter.com/Shayan86) | BBC World News Disinformation journalist | ​| [@Liveuamap](https://twitter.com/Liveuamap) | Live Universal Awareness Map (“Liveuamap”) independent global news and information site | ​| [@DAlperovitch](https://twitter.com/DAlperovitch) | The Alperovitch Institute for Cybersecurity Studies, Founder & Former CTO of CrowdStrike | ​| [@COUPSURE](https://twitter.com/COUPSURE) | OSINT investigator for Centre for Information Resilience | ​| [@netblocks](https://twitter.com/netblocks) | London-based Internet's Observatory | ​####​ ​`Miscellaneous Resources` ​| Source | URL | Content | ​| --- | --- | --- | ​| PowerOutages.com | https://poweroutage.com/ua | Tracking PowerOutages across Ukraine | ​| Monash IP Observatory | https://twitter.com/IP_Observatory | Tracking IP address outages across Ukraine | ​| Project Owl Discord | https://discord.com/invite/projectowl | Tracking foreign policy, geopolitical events, military and governments, using a Discord-based crowdsourced approach, with a current emphasis on Ukraine and Russia | ​| russianwarchatter.info | https://www.russianwarchatter.info/ | Known Russian Military Radio Frequencies |",
      "readme": "# nate158\nhttps://t.me/Nate158digimon\ngcloud compute addresses create google-managed-services-VPC_NETWORK_NAME \\\n--global \\\n--purpose=VPC_PEERING \\\n--addresses=192.168.0.0 \\\n--prefix-length=16 \\\n--network=projects/PROJECT_ID/global/networks/VPC_NETWORK_NAME\nnate15872.wordpress.com\n https://nate158.blogspot.com/2021/12/nate15872.html\n[![Open Source Helpers](https://www.codetriage.com/librariesio/libraries.io/badges/users.svg)](https://www.codetriage.com/librariesio/libraries.io) https://nate158.blogspot.com/2021/12/httpsgithubcomnate158s.html [![Open Source Helpers](https://www.codetriage.com/librariesio/libraries.io/badges/users.svg)](https://www.codetriage.com/librariesio/libraries.io)",
      "topics": [],
      "language": null,
      "license": "BSL-1.0",
      "stars": 37,
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      "homepage": null,
      "created_at": "2022-03-04T09:00:59Z",
      "updated_at": "2026-11-12T23:15:37Z",
      "pushed_at": "2022-03-04T09:03:14Z",
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        "level": "strong",
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          "explicit security terminology (8 hits)",
          "established repository (20+ stars)",
          "explicit security and vehicle/charging context"
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    "vaporxdc/car-hacking": {
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      "record_type": "repository",
      "title": "Car-Hacking",
      "full_name": "VAporXdc/Car-Hacking",
      "name": "Car-Hacking",
      "owner": "VAporXdc",
      "url": "https://github.com/VAporXdc/Car-Hacking",
      "description": "Usage of Software Defined Radio to capture the Key Fob frequencies and implementation of MiTM (Man-in-the-middle) , DoS (Denial of Service) and Replay Attacks on Cars))",
      "readme": "# Car-Hacking\nUsage of Software Defined Radio to capture the Key Fob frequencies and implementation of MiTM (Man-in-the-middle) , DoS (Denial of Service) and Replay Attacks on Cars\n\nTechnologies used - HackRF and Software Defined Radio , Python\n\nThe repositories contain the codes for capturing and replaying of different cars tried out on.\n\nTested Cars - Honda City, Hyundai Xcent, Maruti WagonR\n\nReferences - www.greatscottgadgets.com",
      "topics": [],
      "language": "Python",
      "license": "GPL-3.0",
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      "created_at": "2020-09-20T12:58:55Z",
      "updated_at": "2026-08-20T11:21:14Z",
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        ],
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          "explicit security terminology (4 hits)",
          "established repository (20+ stars)",
          "explicit security and vehicle/charging context"
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      "evidence_type": "repository",
      "record_type": "repository",
      "title": "Automotive-ISOTP-Analyzer",
      "full_name": "rehacyber/Automotive-ISOTP-Analyzer",
      "name": "Automotive-ISOTP-Analyzer",
      "owner": "rehacyber",
      "url": "https://github.com/rehacyber/Automotive-ISOTP-Analyzer",
      "description": "Python-based Automotive Cyber Security project for analyzing ISO-TP (ISO 15765-2) communication logs, detecting frame types, and generating security reports.",
      "readme": "\\# Automotive ISO-TP Analyzer\n\n\n\nPython-based Automotive Cyber Security project for analyzing ISO-TP (ISO 15765-2) communication logs and detecting ISO-TP frame types.\n\n\n\n\\## Project Overview\n\n\n\nISO-TP (ISO 15765-2) is a transport protocol used in automotive networks to transfer diagnostic messages over the CAN bus.\n\n\n\nThis project analyzes ISO-TP communication, detects frame types, logs events, and generates security reports.\n\n\n\n\\## Features\n\n\n\n\\- ISO-TP message analysis\n\n\\- Single Frame (SF) detection\n\n\\- First Frame (FF) detection\n\n\\- Consecutive Frame (CF) detection\n\n\\- Flow Control (FC) detection\n\n\\- ISO-TP log file parsing\n\n\\- Security event logging\n\n\\- CSV report generation\n\n\\- TXT report generation\n\n\\- PDF report generation\n\n\n\n\\## Technologies\n\n\n\n\\- Python 3\n\n\\- ISO-TP (ISO 15765-2)\n\n\\- CAN Bus\n\n\\- Automotive Cyber Security\n\n\\- ReportLab\n\n\\- CSV Processing\n\n\n\n\\## Project Structure\n\n\n\n```text\n\nAutomotive\\_ISOTP\\_Analyzer\n\n\n\n├── main.py\n\n├── isotp\\_analyzer.py\n\n├── isotp\\_log\\_parser.py\n\n├── isotp\\_simulator.py\n\n├── csv\\_report.py\n\n├── logger.py\n\n├── report.py\n\n├── README.md\n\n├── requirements.txt\n\n├── .gitignore\n\n\n\n├── logs\n\n│   ├── isotp\\_test\\_log.txt\n\n│   └── isotp\\_security.log\n\n\n\n└── reports\n\n&#x20;   ├── isotp\\_security\\_report.csv\n\n&#x20;   ├── isotp\\_security\\_report.txt\n\n&#x20;   └── ISOTP\\_Security\\_Report.pdf\n\n```\n\n\n\n\\## Installation\n\n\n\nClone the repository:\n\n\n\n```bash\n\ngit clone https://github.com/rehacyber/Automotive-ISOTP-Analyzer.git\n\n```\n\n\n\nGo to the project folder:\n\n\n\n```bash\n\ncd Automotive-ISOTP-Analyzer\n\n```\n\n\n\nInstall dependencies:\n\n\n\n```bash\n\npip install -r requirements.txt\n\n```\n\n\n\nRun the project:\n\n\n\n```bash\n\npython main.py\n\n```\n\n\n\n\\## Example Output\n\n\n\n```\n\nFrame Type : Single Frame\n\nPCI        : 0x03\n\nSingle Frame Detected\n\n\n\nFrame Type : Flow Control\n\nPCI        : 0x30\n\nFlow Control Detected\n\n```\n\n\n\n\\## License\n\n\n\nThis project is developed for educational and portfolio purposes.",
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      "title": "🚗 DeepCAN",
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      "readme": "<div align=\"center\">\n\n![DeepCAN Banner](assets/deepcan-banner.jpg)\n\n# 🚗 DeepCAN\n\n### Hybrid Anomaly Detection for Vehicle Fault Prediction\n\n*Combining Isolation Forest and LSTM Networks for Advanced Automotive Fault Detection*\n\n[![Python](https://img.shields.io/badge/Python-3.8+-3776AB?style=for-the-badge&logo=python&logoColor=white)](https://www.python.org/)\n[![TensorFlow](https://img.shields.io/badge/TensorFlow-2.0+-FF6F00?style=for-the-badge&logo=tensorflow&logoColor=white)](https://www.tensorflow.org/)\n[![Scikit-Learn](https://img.shields.io/badge/Scikit--Learn-F7931E?style=for-the-badge&logo=scikit-learn&logoColor=white)](https://scikit-learn.org/)\n[![Keras](https://img.shields.io/badge/Keras-D00000?style=for-the-badge&logo=keras&logoColor=white)](https://keras.io/)\n[![License](https://img.shields.io/badge/License-MIT-green.svg?style=for-the-badge)](LICENSE)\n\n[Features](#-features) • [Installation](#-installation) • [Usage](#-usage) • [Results](#-results) • [Contributing](#-contributing)\n\n</div>\n\n---\n\n## 📋 Table of Contents\n\n- [Overview](#-overview)\n- [Motivation](#-motivation)\n- [Features](#-features)\n- [Technology Stack](#-technology-stack)\n- [Dataset](#-dataset)\n- [Methodology](#-methodology)\n- [Installation](#-installation)\n- [Usage](#-usage)\n- [Results](#-results)\n- [Project Structure](#-project-structure)\n- [Contributing](#-contributing)\n- [License](#-license)\n- [Contact](#-contact)\n\n---\n\n## 🎯 Overview\n\n**DeepCAN** is a cutting-edge hybrid anomaly detection system designed to identify abnormal behaviors and predict potential faults in vehicle CAN Bus data. By combining the power of traditional machine learning (Isolation Forest) with deep learning (LSTM Networks), DeepCAN provides robust detection of unusual sensor patterns that may indicate system failures or component degradation.\n\n### Why DeepCAN?\n\nModern vehicles generate massive volumes of data through their Controller Area Network (CAN Bus). Monitoring this data for irregularities is **critical** for:\n\n- 🔧 **Predictive Maintenance** - Identify system failures before they occur\n- 🚨 **Safety Assurance** - Ensure vehicle reliability and passenger safety\n- 💰 **Cost Reduction** - Prevent expensive breakdowns through early detection\n- 📊 **Fleet Management** - Monitor vehicle health across entire fleets\n\n---\n\n## 💡 Motivation\n\nConventional rule-based systems often fail to detect complex or subtle anomalies in vehicle sensor data that indicate impending failures. DeepCAN addresses this limitation by:\n\n- Learning normal and abnormal temporal patterns directly from sensor data\n- Combining unsupervised outlier detection with supervised sequence learning\n- Providing accurate, real-time fault prediction for automotive applications\n- Enabling proactive maintenance strategies to prevent vehicle downtime\n\n---\n\n## ✨ Features\n\n- 🔍 **Hybrid Detection** - Combines Isolation Forest and LSTM for superior accuracy\n- 📊 **Time-Series Analysis** - Captures temporal dependencies in CAN Bus data\n- 🎯 **High Accuracy** - Achieves ~94% training and ~91% validation accuracy\n- 📈 **Visualization Tools** - Comprehensive plotting of detection performance\n- ⚡ **Scalable Architecture** - Handles large volumes of vehicle sensor data\n- 🔄 **Real-Time Capable** - Designed for deployment in production environments\n- 🔧 **Fault Prediction** - Early warning system for component failures\n\n---\n\n## 🛠️ Technology Stack\n\n<div align=\"center\">\n\n| Technology | Purpose |\n|------------|---------|\n| ![Python](https://img.shields.io/badge/Python-3776AB?style=flat&logo=python&logoColor=white) | Core Programming Language |\n| ![TensorFlow](https://img.shields.io/badge/TensorFlow-FF6F00?style=flat&logo=tensorflow&logoColor=white) | Deep Learning Framework |\n| ![Keras](https://img.shields.io/badge/Keras-D00000?style=flat&logo=keras&logoColor=white) | Neural Network API |\n| ![Scikit-Learn](https://img.shields.io/badge/Scikit--Learn-F7931E?style=flat&logo=scikit-learn&logoColor=white) | Machine Learning Library |\n| ![Pandas](https://img.shields.io/badge/Pandas-150458?style=flat&logo=pandas&logoColor=white) | Data Manipulation |\n| ![NumPy](https://img.shields.io/badge/NumPy-013243?style=flat&logo=numpy&logoColor=white) | Numerical Computing |\n| ![Matplotlib](https://img.shields.io/badge/Matplotlib-11557c?style=flat&logo=python&logoColor=white) | Data Visualization |\n| ![Kaggle](https://img.shields.io/badge/Kaggle-20BEFF?style=flat&logo=kaggle&logoColor=white) | Dataset Source |\n\n</div>\n\n---\n\n## 📊 Dataset\n\nThe project uses the **CAN Bus Anomaly Detection Dataset** from Kaggle (created by Ankit Raj).\n\n### Sensor Features\n\nThe following 8 sensor readings are analyzed:\n\n| Feature | Description |\n|---------|-------------|\n| 📳 Accelerometer1RMS | First accelerometer root mean square |\n| 📳 Accelerometer2RMS | Second accelerometer root mean square |\n| ⚡ Current | Electrical current measurement |\n| 🌡️ Pressure | System pressure reading |\n| 🌡️ Temperature | Temperature sensor data |\n| 🌡️ Thermocouple | Thermocouple temperature reading |\n| 🔋 Voltage | Electrical voltage measurement |\n| 💨 Volume Flow RateRMS | Flow rate root mean square |\n\n**Dataset Link:** [CAN Bus Anomaly Detection Dataset](https://www.kaggle.com/datasets/ankitrajsh/can-bus-anomaly-detection-dataset)\n\n---\n\n## 🔬 Methodology\n\n### 1️⃣ Data Preprocessing\n\n\\`\\`\\`python\n# Load and clean CAN Bus dataset\n# Convert datetime columns and sort chronologically\n# Normalize features with MinMaxScaler\n# Create fixed-length sequences (50 time steps)\n\\`\\`\\`\n\n### 2️⃣ Anomaly Labeling with Isolation Forest\n\n\\`\\`\\`python\n# Train Isolation Forest on normalized data\n# Label outliers as anomalies (1) and normal points as (0)\n# Use labels to guide LSTM training\n\\`\\`\\`\n\n### 3️⃣ LSTM Model Architecture\n\n\\`\\`\\`\nInput Layer (50 time steps × 8 features)\n    ↓\nLSTM Layer (64 units)\n    ↓\nDropout Layer (0.2)\n    ↓\nDense Output Layer (sigmoid activation)\n    ↓\nAnomaly Probability [0, 1]\n\\`\\`\\`\n\n### 4️⃣ Training & Evaluation\n\n- **Loss Function:** Binary Cross-Entropy\n- **Optimizer:** Adam\n- **Sequence Length:** 50 samples per window\n- **Contamination Rate:** 5%\n\n---\n\n## 🚀 Installation\n\n### Prerequisites\n\n- Python 3.8 or higher\n- pip package manager\n\n### Step 1: Clone the Repository\n\n\\`\\`\\`bash\ngit clone https://github.com/yourusername/deepcan.git\ncd deepcan\n\\`\\`\\`\n\n### Step 2: Create Virtual Environment (Recommended)\n\n\\`\\`\\`bash\npython -m venv venv\nsource venv/bin/activate  # On Windows: venv\\Scripts\\activate\n\\`\\`\\`\n\n### Step 3: Install Dependencies\n\n\\`\\`\\`bash\npip install pandas numpy matplotlib scikit-learn tensorflow kagglehub\n\\`\\`\\`\n\nOr use requirements.txt:\n\n\\`\\`\\`bash\npip install -r requirements.txt\n\\`\\`\\`\n\n---\n\n## 💻 Usage\n\n### Quick Start\n\n\\`\\`\\`python\nimport pandas as pd\nimport numpy as np\nfrom sklearn.preprocessing import MinMaxScaler\nfrom sklearn.ensemble import IsolationForest\nfrom tensorflow.keras.models import Sequential\nfrom tensorflow.keras.layers import LSTM, Dense, Dropout\n\n# Load your CAN Bus data\ndf = pd.read_csv(\"your_canbus_data.csv\")\n\n# Preprocess and create sequences\n# Train Isolation Forest\n# Build and train LSTM model\n# Predict anomalies\n\\`\\`\\`\n\n### Running the Full Pipeline\n\n\\`\\`\\`bash\npython deepcan_anomaly_detection.py\n\\`\\`\\`\n\n### Example Output\n\n\\`\\`\\`\nPath to dataset files: /path/to/dataset\nSequences shape: (N, 50, 8)\nLabels shape: (N,)\nTraining set shape: (train_size, 50, 8)\nValidation set shape: (val_size, 50, 8)\nEpoch 1/50\n...\nTraining accuracy: 94.2%\nValidation accuracy: 91.3%\n\\`\\`\\`\n\n---\n\n## 📈 Results\n\n### Performance Metrics\n\n| Metric | Value |\n|--------|-------|\n| 🎯 Training Accuracy | ~94% |\n| ✅ Validation Accuracy | ~91% |\n| 📏 Sequence Length | 50 samples |\n| 🔍 Anomaly Contamination | 5% |\n\n### Training Performance\n\n![Training History](assets/training-history.jpg)\n\nThe model shows consistent improvement during training with minimal overfitting. Both training and validation accuracy converge around 90-94%, indicating good generalization.\n\n### Anomaly Detection Visualization\n\n![Anomaly Detection](assets/anomaly-detection.jpg)\n\nThe visualization shows the model's ability to distinguish between normal operation (blue) and anomalous behavior (red) in the CAN Bus data. The LSTM successfully captures temporal patterns that indicate potential faults.\n\n### Confusion Matrix\n\n![Confusion Matrix](assets/confusion-matrix.jpg)\n\nThe confusion matrix demonstrates strong performance in both normal and anomaly classification, with high true positive and true negative rates.\n\n### Time Series Analysis\n\n![Time Series with Anomalies](assets/time-series-anomalies.jpg)\n\nThis plot shows actual sensor readings over time with detected anomalies highlighted. The model successfully identifies unusual patterns that deviate from normal operating conditions.\n\n### Key Findings\n\n✅ The hybrid approach successfully captures temporal dependencies in CAN Bus data\n✅ Isolation Forest provides effective initial anomaly boundaries\n✅ LSTM learns complex sequence patterns for accurate fault prediction\n✅ Model demonstrates strong generalization to validation data\n✅ Early detection of anomalies enables proactive maintenance strategies\n\n---\n\n## 📁 Project Structure\n\n\\`\\`\\`\ndeepcan/\n│\n├── assets/\n│   ├── deepcan-banner.png\n│   ├── training-history.png\n│   ├── anomaly-detection.png\n│   ├── confusion-matrix.png\n│   └── time-series-anomalies.png\n│\n├── data/\n│   └── data.csv\n│\n├── models/\n│   └── lstm_model.h5\n│\n├── notebooks/\n│   └── exploration.ipynb\n│\n├── src/\n│   ├── preprocessing.py\n│   ├── isolation_forest.py\n│   ├── lstm_model.py\n│   └── visualization.py\n│\n├── deepcan_anomaly_detection.py\n├── requirements.txt\n├── README.md\n└── LICENSE\n\\`\\`\\`\n\n---\n\n## 🤝 Contributing\n\nContributions are welcome! Here's how you can help:\n\n1. 🍴 Fork the repository\n2. 🌿 Create a feature branch (`git checkout -b feature/AmazingFeature`)\n3. 💾 Commit your changes (`git commit -m 'Add some AmazingFeature'`)\n4. 📤 Push to the branch (`git push origin feature/AmazingFeature`)\n5. 🔃 Open a Pull Request\n\n### Areas for Contribution\n\n- 🔧 Additional preprocessing techniques\n- 🧠 Alternative deep learning architectures\n- 📊 Enhanced visualization tools\n- 🚀 Real-time deployment solutions\n- 📝 Documentation improvements\n\n---\n\n## 📄 License\n\nThis project is licensed under the MIT License - see the [LICENSE](LICENSE) file for details.\n\n---\n\n## 👤 Contact\n\n**Your Name**\n\n- 📧 Email: your.email@example.com\n- 🐙 GitHub: [@yourusername](https://github.com/yourusername)\n- 💼 LinkedIn: [Your Name](https://linkedin.com/in/yourprofile)\n\n---\n\n## 🙏 Acknowledgments\n\n- 📊 Dataset provided by [Ankit Raj](https://www.kaggle.com/ankitrajsh) on Kaggle\n- 🧠 Inspired by advances in automotive fault detection research\n- 💡 Built with open-source tools and frameworks\n\n---\n\n<div align=\"center\">\n\n### ⭐ Star this repository if you find it helpful!\n\n**Made with ❤️ for Automotive Fault Prediction**\n\n[⬆ Back to Top](#-deepcan)\n\n</div>",
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      "readme": "# Cybersecurity for Autonomous Vehicles\n\nThis repository provides selected research artefacts derived from our study:\n\n**Cybersecurity for Autonomous Vehicles: Review of Attacks and Defense**\n*Computers & Security*, Volume 103, 2021, Article 102150.\n\nThe study reviewed 151 papers published between 2008 and 2019 and systematically organised research on attacks and defensive approaches for autonomous vehicles.\n\n## Repository Contents\n\n- `taxonomy/attack-taxonomy.md`\n  Classification of autonomous vehicle attack research.\n\n- `taxonomy/defense-taxonomy.md`\n  Classification of defensive approaches for autonomous vehicles.\n\n- `CITATION.cff`\n  Citation metadata for the associated publication.\n\n## Research Scope\n\nThe study classified autonomous vehicle attack research into the following major areas:\n\n- Automotive control systems\n- Autonomous driving system components\n- V2X communications\n- Risk assessment and review\n\nDefensive research was organised into:\n\n- Security architectures\n- Intrusion detection systems\n- Artificial intelligence and big-data-based approaches\n\n## Purpose\n\nThe purpose of this repository is not to reproduce the published article, but to make selected research artefacts easier to reuse, extend, and apply in cybersecurity research and education.\n\n## Related Publication\n\nKyounggon Kim, Jun Seok Kim, Seonghoon Jeong, Jo-Hee Park, and Huy Kang Kim.\n**Cybersecurity for Autonomous Vehicles: Review of Attacks and Defense**\n*Computers & Security*, 103, 102150, 2021.\n\nDOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2020.102150\n\n## Citation\n\nIf you use materials from this repository, please cite the original publication.\n\n## Status\n\nThis repository is being progressively curated from the original research.",
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      "readme": "<p align=\"center\">\n    <img src=\"https://github.com/Amrita-TIFAC-Cyber-Blockchain/.github/blob/main/profile/img/AVV_CYS_Logo.png\" alt =\"Amrita TIFAC\" width=\"700\" />\n</p>\n\n# 24AL733 - Connected Vehicles and Security\n![](https://img.shields.io/badge/PG-blue) ![](https://img.shields.io/badge/Subject-CVS-blue) <br/>\n![](https://img.shields.io/badge/Lecture-3-orange) ![](https://img.shields.io/badge/Credits-3-orange) <br/> ![](https://img.shields.io/badge/Students-TBD-gold) <br/>\n\n#### Course Instructor:  Ramaguru R, Assistant Professor (Senior Grade), TIFAC-CORE in Cyber Security.\n\n### :books: Course Outcome\n\n| CO#  | CO Description |\n|------|----------------|\n| CO1 | Understand the architecture and components of connected vehicles |\n| CO2 | Understand the unique cybersecurity threats and vulnerabilities in connected vehicles |\n| CO3 | Understand current and emerging technologies for securing connected vehicles |\n| CO4 | Understand the security aspects in OTA (Over-The-Air) updates |\n\n### :watch: Course Plan and Status\n\n| Lecture No(s) | Topics                                   | Subtopics                                                                                 | Keywords                       | Remarks                              | CO & BTL    |\n|---------------|------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------------|-------------|\n| 1             | Introduction to Connected Vehicles       | Definition of connected vehicles, Key components, Ecosystem overview                      | Connected vehicles, IoT, sensors, ECU | Basic introduction to the ecosystem | CO1, BTL 1 |\n| 2             | Key Features of Connected Vehicles       | Real-time communication, Autonomy, Data sharing, Safety features                          | Real-time, data sharing, autonomy     | Exploring key capabilities          | CO1, BTL 2 |\n| 3             | Communication Technologies in Connected Vehicles | Overview of V2X, Comparison of DSRC and C-V2X, Use of Wi-Fi and Bluetooth                 | V2X, DSRC, C-V2X, Wi-Fi              | Core technologies                   | CO1, BTL 2 |\n| 4             | Protocols for Connected Vehicles         | Communication standards, Role of 5G, Low-latency communication protocols                   | Protocols, standards, 5G             | Protocol focus                      | CO1, BTL 3 |\n| 5             | Role of 5G in Vehicle Connectivity       | Features of 5G, Network slicing, Scalability, Reliability                                 | 5G, low latency, reliability         | Impact of 5G                        | CO1, BTL 3 |\n| 6             | Cellular Cloud Computing in Vehicle Ecosystems | Basics of cellular cloud computing, Applications in connected vehicles                    | Cellular cloud, applications         | Vehicle cloud ecosystem             | CO1, BTL 2 |\n| 7             | Authentication and Authorization Mechanisms | Key methods, Certificate-based approaches, Identity verification                          | Authentication, certificates         | Security in vehicle systems         | CO2, BTL 3 |\n| 8             | Privacy Concerns and Mitigation Strategies | Key privacy risks, Mitigation techniques, Data anonymization                              | Privacy risks, anonymization         | Protecting user data                | CO2, BTL 4 |\n| 9             | Challenges of Vehicle Connectivity       | Key challenges, Scalability, Interoperability, Security                                   | Scalability, security               | Challenges in implementation        | CO1, BTL 4 |\n| 10            | Overview of Telematics                   | Definition, Applications, Components                                                     | Telematics, fleet management         | Role of telematics                  | CO1, BTL 2 |\n| 11            | Big Data in Connected Vehicles           | Introduction to big data, Data types, Sources in vehicles                                 | Big data, sensors                   | Leveraging data                     | CO1, BTL 2 |\n| 12            | Data Processing Technologies             | Data pipelines, Processing methods (e.g., batch, stream)                                  | Data pipelines, stream processing     | Handling vehicle data               | CO1, BTL 3 |\n| 13            | Overview of Automotive Cybersecurity     | Definition, Scope, Importance                                                             | Automotive cybersecurity             | Basic overview                      | CO2, BTL 2 |\n| 14            | Key Threats and Vulnerabilities          | Types of threats, Vulnerabilities in connected vehicles                                   | Threats, vulnerabilities             | Core risks                          | CO2, BTL 3 |\n| 15            | Automotive Cyber-Attacks                 | Examples of attacks, Attack surfaces, Real-world cases                                    | Cyber-attacks, real-world cases      | Real-world examples                 | CO2, BTL 4 |\n| 16            | Cryptography and Security Protocols      | Symmetric vs asymmetric cryptography, Applications in vehicles                            | Cryptography, security protocols      | Role in automotive security         | CO2, BTL 3 |\n| 17            | Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)          | Introduction to PKI, Role of digital certificates                                         | PKI, digital certificates            | Secure communication                | CO3, BTL 4 |\n| 18            | Secure Communication Protocols           | Overview of protocols (e.g., TLS, SSL)                                                   | Secure protocols                     | Enabling secure connections         | CO3, BTL 4 |\n| 19            | Communication Over CAN FD and Ethernet   | Secure communication methods over CAN FD, Ethernet                                        | CAN FD, Ethernet, secure methods     | Secure transport layer              | CO3, BTL 3 |\n| 20            | Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems | Types of IDS/IPS, Applications in vehicles                                               | IDS, IPS, detection systems          | Enhancing vehicle security          | CO3, BTL 4 |\n| 21            | Overview of Cloud Security               | Key technologies for secure cloud integration                                             | Cloud security, vehicle cloud         | Cloud security fundamentals         | CO3, BTL 3 |\n| 22            | Zero Trust Architecture                  | Principles of Zero Trust, Applications in automotive systems                              | Zero Trust, trust principles          | Advanced security approach          | CO3, BTL 4 |\n| 23            | Introduction to OTA in Automotive        | Definition of OTA, Evolution of OTA in connected vehicles                                 | OTA, updates, evolution               | Core OTA concepts                   | CO4, BTL 2 |\n| 24            | OTA Architecture and Standards           | Overview of standards, Components of OTA architecture                                     | OTA architecture, standards           | Framework for OTA                   | CO4, BTL 3 |\n| 25            | Types of OTA Updates                     | Software updates, Firmware updates, Configuration updates                                 | OTA types, updates                    | Update classifications              | CO4, BTL 3 |\n| 26            | OTA Update Process Strategies            | Lifecycle of OTA updates, Best practices                                                 | OTA lifecycle, strategies             | Ensuring reliable updates           | CO4, BTL 4 |\n| 27            | DevOps for Software-Defined Vehicles     | Role of DevOps, Continuous integration, Deployment pipelines                              | DevOps, CI/CD                         | Streamlining development            | CO4, BTL 3 |\n| 28            | Security Challenges in OTA Updates       | Risks in OTA updates, Mitigation strategies                                              | OTA risks, security                   | Addressing vulnerabilities          | CO4, BTL 4 |\n| 29            | Risks and Threats in OTA Updates         | Types of risks, Impact on vehicle systems                                                | Risks, impact                         | Core OTA challenges                 | CO4, BTL 3 |\n| 30            | OTA Diagnostics                          | Key diagnostic techniques, Tools for OTA diagnostics                                     | OTA diagnostics, tools                | Debugging OTA systems               | CO4, BTL 4 |\n| 31            | Secure Update Delivery Mechanisms        | Integrity and authenticity, Encryption methods                                           | Secure delivery, encryption           | Ensuring safe updates               | CO4, BTL 4 |\n| 32            | Future Challenges in Securing OTA Updates| Emerging risks, Evolving security requirements                                           | Future risks, evolving standards      | Preparing for the future            | CO4, BTL 5 |\n| 33            | Emerging Technologies in Connected Vehicles | Blockchain, AI, IoT integrations                                                        | Blockchain, AI, IoT                  | Advanced integration                | CO4, BTL 5 |\n| 34            | Long-Term Challenges in Connected Vehicles | Scalability, Legal and ethical challenges                                               | Scalability, ethics                   | Exploring broader issues            | CO4, BTL 5 |\n| 35            | Integrated View of Connected Vehicles and Future Directions | Emerging technologies (e.g., AI, blockchain), Long-term challenges                      | AI, blockchain, next-gen trends       | Concluding lecture                  | CO4, BTL 6 |\n\n### Evaluation Criteria\n\n| Component | Marks |\n|:---------:|:-----:|\n| Quiz-1 |  3 |\n| Assignment-1 | 3.5 |\n| Project Review-1 | 5 |\n| Mid-Term Examination | 30  |\n| Quiz-2 |  4.5 |\n| Assignment-2 | 4 |\n| Project Review-2 | 5 |\n| Project Review-3 | 5 |\n| End Semester | 40 |\n\n### Dates and Deadlines\n\n| Course Start | TBD - Dec - 2025 | Deadline |\n|--------------|-----------------|:--------:|",
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      "title": "ðŸš— Automotive UDS (ISO 14229) & ISO-TP (ISO 15765-2) Diagnostic ECU Node",
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      "readme": "# ðŸš— Automotive UDS (ISO 14229) & ISO-TP (ISO 15765-2) Diagnostic ECU Node\n### *Production-Grade Bare-Metal Diagnostic Stack on STM32F446RE (ARM Cortex-M4 @ 180 MHz)*\n\n[![C/C++ CI Test Suite](https://img.shields.io/badge/CI%20Build-Passing-brightgreen?style=for-the-badge&logo=githubactions&logoColor=white)](https://github.com/sherifred-singh/stm32-automotive-uds-isotp-node/actions)\n[![Language](https://img.shields.io/badge/Language-Embedded%20C%20(C99)-00599C?style=for-the-badge&logo=c&logoColor=white)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/C_(programming_language))\n[![Target Architecture](https://img.shields.io/badge/Target-STM32F446RE%20%2F%20Cortex--M4-032347?style=for-the-badge&logo=stmicroelectronics&logoColor=white)](https://www.st.com)\n[![Protocol](https://img.shields.io/badge/Protocol-ISO%2014229--1%20%7C%20ISO%2015765--2-orange?style=for-the-badge)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unified_Diagnostic_Services)\n[![Unit Tests](https://img.shields.io/badge/Unit%20Tests-15%2F15%20Passing%20(100%25)-success?style=for-the-badge)]()\n[![License](https://img.shields.io/badge/License-MIT-blue?style=for-the-badge)](LICENSE)\n\n> **A deterministic, bare-metal automotive diagnostic firmware stack implementing ISO 15765-2 (DoCAN transport layer) and ISO 14229-1 (Unified Diagnostic Services) on the STM32 bxCAN peripheral. Engineered with zero dynamic heap allocation, hardware acceptance filtering, multi-frame segmentation/reassembly, and automotive seed-key security access with brute-force lockout.**\n\n---\n\n## ðŸ“Œ System Architecture\n\n<p align=\"center\">\n  <img src=\"docs/architecture.svg\" alt=\"Automotive UDS & ISO-TP Architecture Diagram\" width=\"100%\">\n</p>\n\n---\n\n## ðŸ“‘ Table of Contents\n\n- [1. Executive Summary & Problem Statement](#1-executive-summary--problem-statement)\n- [2. Protocol Stack Layers](#2-protocol-stack-layers)\n- [3. Supported UDS Diagnostic Services (ISO 14229-1)](#3-supported-uds-diagnostic-services-iso-14229-1)\n- [4. Data Identifier (DID) Registry](#4-data-identifier-did-registry)\n- [5. ISO-TP Multi-Frame Message Sequence Chart](#5-iso-tp-multi-frame-message-sequence-chart)\n- [6. Cryptographic Seed-Key Security Access](#6-cryptographic-seed-key-security-access)\n- [7. Hardware Pinout & Wiring (NUCLEO-F446RE)](#7-hardware-pinout--wiring-nucleo-f446re)\n- [8. Automated Verification & Test Results](#8-automated-verification--test-results)\n- [9. Quickstart Guide](#9-quickstart-guide)\n- [10. Architecture Design Decisions & Safety Rationale](#10-architecture-design-decisions--safety-rationale)\n\n---\n\n## 1. Executive Summary & Problem Statement\n\nIn modern automotive electronic architectures (AUTOSAR / Tier-1 ECUs), bare CAN frame broadcasting is only the baseline. Production ECUs require **standardized diagnostic services** for:\n1. **End-of-Line (EOL) Programming & Calibration:** Reading vehicle identification (VIN), flashing firmware, and configuring speed governor parameters.\n2. **Multi-Frame Diagnostics:** Transferring payloads exceeding the classic 8-byte CAN limit (up to 4,095 bytes) without data corruption or memory starvation.\n3. **Cybersecurity & Access Control:** Restricting critical parameters (actuator testing, flash writing) behind cryptographic challenge-response authentication (`SecurityAccess`).\n4. **Deterministic Fail-Safe Supervision:** Guarding against communication dropouts and inactive sessions using supervised timers (`S3Server`, `N_Cr`, `N_Bs`).\n\nThis repository provides an **uncompromised, production-ready implementation** of the complete ISO-TP and UDS diagnostic pipeline directly executable on the **STM32 NUCLEO-F446RE** board and verified by host-native automated test harnesses.\n\n---\n\n## 2. Protocol Stack Layers\n\n```\nâ”Œâ”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”\nâ”‚                      APPLICATION LAYER (ISO 14229-1)                   â”‚\nâ”‚   UDS Diagnostic Server: Sessions, SecurityAccess, DIDs, DTCs, Routinesâ”‚\nâ”œâ”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”¤\nâ”‚                       NETWORK LAYER (ISO 15765-2)                      â”‚\nâ”‚   DoCAN Transport: Single Frame (SF), First Frame (FF),                â”‚\nâ”‚   Flow Control (FC: CTS, BS=8, STmin=10ms), Consecutive Frame (CF)     â”‚\nâ”œâ”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”¤\nâ”‚                     DATA LINK & SILICON (ISO 11898-1)                  â”‚\nâ”‚   STM32 bxCAN1 Peripheral: 500 kbps @ 45 MHz APB1, 83.3% Sample Point, â”‚\nâ”‚   32-bit Identifier Mask Filtering (Bank 0: 0x7E0, Bank 1: 0x7DF)      â”‚\nâ””â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”€â”˜\n```\n\n### Key Engineering Attributes:\n- **MISRA-C:2012 Aligned:** Zero dynamic heap allocation (`malloc`/`free` strictly forbidden). All buffers are statically declared (`ISOTP_BUF_SIZE = 512 bytes`).\n- **Hardware Filter Acceleration:** Unauthorized bus frames are rejected in silicon by bxCAN filter banks before generating CPU interrupts.\n- **Dual-Mode Operation:** Built-in support for **internal silicon loopback** (allowing single-board self-test without external hardware) and **normal on-bus mode** via standard CAN transceivers (MCP2551 / TJA1050).\n\n---\n\n## 3. Supported UDS Diagnostic Services (ISO 14229-1)\n\n| SID | Service Name | Subfunctions Supported | Access Rule | Description |\n|:---:|---|---|:---:|---|\n| `0x10` | **DiagnosticSessionControl** | `0x01` Default, `0x02` Programming, `0x03` Extended | Open | Switches operational diagnostic session; reports P2Server timing. |\n| `0x11` | **ECUReset** | `0x01` HardReset, `0x03` SoftReset | Extended | Triggers software restart / state-machine reset. |\n| `0x14` | **ClearDiagnosticInformation** | `0xFFFFFF` (All Groups) | Open | Clears active diagnostic trouble codes. |\n| `0x19` | **ReadDTCInformation** | `0x01` NumberOfDTC, `0x02` ReportByStatusMask | Open | Reports confirmed and pending automotive fault codes. |\n| `0x22` | **ReadDataByIdentifier** | See DID Table | Open | Reads live telemetry and configuration data. |\n| `0x27` | **SecurityAccess** | `0x01` RequestSeed, `0x02` SendKey | Extended | Unlocks privileged operations via seed-key challenge. |\n| `0x2E` | **WriteDataByIdentifier** | DID `0x0105` (Governor Limit) | Unlocked | Writes persistent calibration parameters. |\n| `0x31` | **RoutineControl** | `0x01` Start, `0x02` Stop, `0x03` Results | Extended | Executes flash self-test and actuator diagnostic routines. |\n| `0x3E` | **TesterPresent** | `0x00` ZeroSubfunction, `0x80` SuppressPosRsp | Open | Resets S3 server timer to keep non-default sessions active. |\n\n---\n\n## 4. Data Identifier (DID) Registry\n\n| DID | Description | Payload Size | Multi-Frame? | Format / Engineering Units |\n|:---:|---|:---:|:---:|---|\n| `0xF190` | **VIN (Vehicle Identification Number)** | 17 Bytes | **Yes (ISO-TP)** | ASCII: `\"1HGCR2F83HA000001\"` |\n| `0xF187` | **ECU Spare Part Number** | 10 Bytes | **Yes (ISO-TP)** | ASCII: `\"STM-446-ECU\"` |\n| `0xF189` | **ECU Software Version** | 4 Bytes | No (Single Frame) | Binary: `Major.Minor.Patch.Build` (v1.2.0.42) |\n| `0x0100` | **Live Battery Pack Telemetry** | 6 Bytes | No (Single Frame) | Voltage (0.1V), Current (0.1A), SOC (%), Max Temp (Â°C) |\n| `0x0105` | **Speed Governor Speed Limit** | 1 Byte | No (Single Frame) | Unsigned Integer (km/h) [Writable in Unlocked state] |\n| `0x0200` | **MCU Hardware Diagnostics** | 5 Bytes | No (Single Frame) | Core Temp (Â°C), VREF (mV), CAN Bus Error Counters |\n\n---\n\n## 5. ISO-TP Multi-Frame Message Sequence Chart\n\nThe following diagram illustrates how the node processes a request to read the 17-byte VIN (`DID 0xF190`), requiring ISO-TP segmentation, First Frame transmission, Flow Control generation, and Consecutive Frame sequencing:\n\n```mermaid\nsequenceDiagram\n    autonumber\n    participant Tester as Diagnostic Tester (0x7E0)\n    participant CAN as bxCAN Hardware Filter\n    participant ISOTP as ISO-TP Transport Layer\n    participant UDS as UDS Diagnostic Server\n\n    Note over Tester,UDS: TEST STEP 1: Diagnostic Session Transition\n    Tester->>CAN: SF CAN Frame [0x02 0x10 0x03] (Extended Session)\n    CAN->>ISOTP: Acceptance Filter Bank 0 Match\n    ISOTP->>UDS: Dispatch SID 0x10 (Extended Session)\n    UDS-->>ISOTP: Positive Response [0x50 0x03 0x00 0x32 0x01 0xF4]\n    ISOTP-->>Tester: SF CAN Frame [0x06 0x50 0x03 0x00 0x32 0x01 0xF4] (P2=50ms)\n\n    Note over Tester,UDS: TEST STEP 2: Multi-Frame VIN Read (20-Byte Response)\n    Tester->>CAN: SF CAN Frame [0x03 0x22 0xF1 0x90] (RDBI: VIN)\n    CAN->>ISOTP: Acceptance Filter Match\n    ISOTP->>UDS: Dispatch SID 0x22 (DID 0xF190)\n    UDS-->>ISOTP: Positive Response [0x62 0xF1 0x90 + 17-byte VIN string] (Total: 20 Bytes)\n\n    Note over ISOTP,Tester: ISO 15765-2 Segmentation Initiated\n    ISOTP-->>Tester: First Frame (FF) [0x10 0x14 0x62 0xF1 0x90 '1' 'H' 'G'] (DL=20)\n    Tester->>ISOTP: Flow Control (FC: CTS) [0x30 0x08 0x0A] (BS=8, STmin=10ms)\n\n    Note over ISOTP: Timer STmin (10ms) enforced between Consecutive Frames\n    ISOTP-->>Tester: Consecutive Frame (CF: SN=1) [0x21 'C' 'R' '2' 'F' '8' '3' 'H']\n    ISOTP-->>Tester: Consecutive Frame (CF: SN=2) [0x22 'A' '0' '0' '0' '0' '0' '1' 0xAA]\n    Note over Tester: Complete 20-byte payload reassembled!\n```\n\n---\n\n## 6. Cryptographic Seed-Key Security Access\n\nPrivileged commands (e.g., writing the vehicle speed governor `DID 0x0105`) require authentication via `SecurityAccess` (`SID 0x27`):\n\n1. **Seed Generation:** A pseudo-random 32-bit challenge is generated using a 32-bit Galois Linear Feedback Shift Register (LFSR).\n2. **Key Computation:** Both the tester and ECU execute an automotive bitwise polynomial transform:\n   $$\\text{Key} = \\left(\\left((\\text{Seed} \\oplus \\text{0xA5A55A5A}) \\ll 3\\right) \\mid \\left((\\text{Seed} \\oplus \\text{0xA5A55A5A}) \\gg 29\\right)\\right) + \\text{0x12345678}$$\n3. **Brute-Force Lockout Defense:**\n   - Maximum allowed invalid attempts: **3 consecutive failures**.\n   - Upon the 3rd failed attempt, the server latches into lockout and emits **NRC `0x36` (`ExceededNumberOfAttempts`)**.\n   - Subsequent requests during the lockout window are rejected with **NRC `0x37` (`RequiredTimeDelayNotExpired`)** until a **10,000 ms penalty timer** elapses.\n\n---\n\n## 7. Hardware Pinout & Wiring (NUCLEO-F446RE)\n\nWhen connecting the NUCLEO-F446RE board to a physical CAN transceiver (e.g., MCP2551, SN65HVD230, TJA1050):\n\n| STM32 Pin | Function | Transceiver Pin | Morpho Connector Pin | Description |\n|:---:|:---:|:---:|:---:|---|\n| **PB9** | CAN1_TX | CTX (TXD) | CN10 - Pin 5 | CAN Transmit Output (Alternate Function AF9) |\n| **PB8** | CAN1_RX | CRX (RXD) | CN10 - Pin 3 | CAN Receive Input (Alternate Function AF9) |\n| **GND** | Ground | GND | CN10 - Pin 9 / 20 | Common Ground Reference |\n| **5V / 3V3** | VCC | VCC | CN7 - Pin 18 / 16 | Power Supply for Transceiver IC |\n| **PA5** | GPIO Out | User LED (LD2) | On-Board | Diagnostic Session Indicator (1Hz Default, 5Hz Programming, Solid Extended) |\n| **PC13** | GPIO In | User Button (B1) | On-Board | Diagnostic Fault Injection Trigger |\n| **PA2 / PA3**| USART2 | ST-LINK VCP | Internal USB | 115,200 Baud Diagnostic Event Console Trace |\n\n---\n\n## 8. Automated Verification & Test Results\n\n### ðŸ§ª Unity C Unit Test Suite (15/15 Passing)\n```text\n------------------------------------------------------------\n   UNITY UNIT TEST EXECUTION: Automotive UDS & ISO-TP Stack\n------------------------------------------------------------\n  [PASS] test_can_driver_transmit_and_loopback         (Line 380)\n  [PASS] test_can_driver_hardware_filter_rejection     (Line 381)\n  [PASS] test_isotp_single_frame_reception             (Line 384)\n  [PASS] test_isotp_single_frame_transmission          (Line 385)\n  [PASS] test_isotp_multi_frame_reassembly             (Line 386)\n  [PASS] test_isotp_sequence_counter_violation         (Line 387)\n  [PASS] test_isotp_cr_timeout                         (Line 388)\n  [PASS] test_uds_session_transition                   (Line 391)\n  [PASS] test_uds_tester_present_suppression           (Line 392)\n  [PASS] test_uds_rdbi_vin_length                      (Line 393)\n  [PASS] test_uds_rdbi_unknown_did_nrc_31              (Line 394)\n  [PASS] test_uds_security_access_seed_and_key         (Line 395)\n  [PASS] test_uds_security_brute_force_lockout         (Line 396)\n  [PASS] test_uds_wdbi_security_enforcement            (Line 397)\n  [PASS] test_uds_s3_session_timeout                   (Line 398)\n\n============================================================\n   TEST SUMMARY: 15 Tests, 0 Failures, 0 Ignored\n   RESULT: [PASS] (100% Tests Verified)\n============================================================\n```\n\n### ðŸ Python Automated HIL Client Output (`tools/uds_tester.py`)\n```text\n====================================================================\n  AUTOMOTIVE UDS & ISO-TP HIL TEST HARNESS (NUCLEO-F446RE)\n  Standard ISO 14229-1 (UDS) / ISO 15765-2 (DoCAN) Verification\n====================================================================\n\n[TEST 01] TesterPresent (SID 0x3E 0x00) ... PASSED (0.00 ms)\n[TEST 02] DiagnosticSessionControl: Extended Session (0x10 0x03) ... PASSED (0.00 ms)\n[TEST 03] ReadDataByIdentifier: Software Version (DID 0xF189) ... PASSED (0.00 ms)\n[TEST 04] ReadDataByIdentifier: Multi-Frame VIN 17-Char ASCII (DID 0xF190) ... PASSED (0.00 ms)\n[TEST 05] ReadDataByIdentifier: Live BMS Telemetry (DID 0x0100) ...\n      -> Telemetry Decoded: Voltage=51.2V, SOC=88%, Temp=34Â°C ... PASSED (0.00 ms)\n[TEST 06] Negative Response Check: Non-Existent DID 0x9999 (Expect NRC 0x31) ... PASSED (0.00 ms)\n[TEST 07] SecurityAccess Level 1: Request Seed (0x27 0x01) ...\n      -> Received Seed: 0x3B81A72F ... PASSED (0.00 ms)\n[TEST 08] SecurityAccess Level 1: Send Key (Computed 0x035C4224) ... PASSED (0.00 ms)\n[TEST 09] WriteDataByIdentifier: Speed Governor Limit = 115 km/h (DID 0x0105) ... PASSED (0.00 ms)\n\n====================================================================\n  TEST SUITE EXECUTION SUMMARY:\n  Total Test Cases: 9 | Passed: 9 | Failed: 0 | Verification: [PASS]\n====================================================================\n```\n\n---\n\n## 9. Quickstart Guide\n\n### Prerequisites\n- Native GCC (MinGW on Windows, GCC on Linux/macOS)\n- Python 3.8+ (for automated diagnostic client)\n- Optional: `arm-none-eabi-gcc` or STM32CubeIDE for hardware flashing\n\n### 1. Build & Run Desktop Simulation\n```bash\n# Clone the repository\ngit clone https://github.com/sherifred-singh/stm32-automotive-uds-isotp-node.git\ncd stm32-automotive-uds-isotp-node\n\n# Compile and run host self-test\nmake host\n./build_demo\n```\n\n### 2. Run Automated Unit Tests\n```bash\nmake test\n```\n\n### 3. Run Python HIL Diagnostic Client\n```bash\npython tools/uds_tester.py\n```\n\n### 4. Cross-Compile for STM32 Cortex-M4\n```bash\nmake arm\n```\n\n---\n\n## 10. Architecture Design Decisions & Safety Rationale\n\n### 10.1 Multi-Frame Network Layer Protocol (ISO 15765-2 vs. Raw CAN)\nCAN 2.0B data link frames are restricted to 8-byte payloads. Production diagnostic proceduresâ€”such as Vehicle Identification Number (VIN) retrieval (17 bytes), Diagnostic Trouble Code (DTC) snapshot transfers, and In-Application Programming (IAP) binary streamingâ€”exceed 8 bytes. This implementation encapsulates ISO 15765-2 to provide deterministic transport-layer segmentation, multi-frame reassembly (up to 4,095 bytes), flow control negotiation (`BlockSize` and `STmin`), sequence counter checking, and error timeouts (`N_Cr`, `N_Bs`).\n\n### 10.2 Communication Loss & Tester Dropout Protection (S3 Server Timer)\nTo prevent vehicles from remaining in elevated or safety-critical diagnostic states (e.g., Extended or Programming sessions) following a diagnostic tool disconnection or PC crash, the server enforces an autonomous **S3 Server Inactivity Timer (`5000 ms`)**. If cyclic `TesterPresent` (`SID 0x3E`) frames cease for more than 5 seconds, the state machine automatically reverts to the Default Diagnostic Session (`0x01`) and revokes all active Security Access privileges.\n\n### 10.3 Dynamic Memory Elimination (MISRA-C:2012 Rule 21.3)\nIn strict compliance with automotive functional safety requirements (ISO 26262), heap allocation (`malloc`, `free`, `realloc`) is eliminated to guarantee zero runtime fragmentation risk and deterministic memory bounds. All ISO-TP reception and transmission buffers are statically fixed (`ISOTP_BUF_SIZE = 512 bytes`). Payloads exceeding this ceiling trigger an immediate Flow Control frame with `FlowStatus = Overflow (0x02)`, cleanly aborting the transaction without memory corruption.\n\n### 10.4 In-Depth Specification & DID Memory Map\nFor the comprehensive Data Identifier layout, Session matrices, and Security Access (Service `0x27`) parameters, see the [ISO 14229-1 UDS DID & Security Specification](docs/UDS_DID_SPECIFICATION.md).\n\n---\n\n## ðŸ“„ License\n\nThis project is licensed under the [MIT License](LICENSE) - see the LICENSE file for details.\nDesigned and engineered by **Sherifred Singh**.",
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      "id": "github:nour833/perfektblue",
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      "title": "What works",
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      "description": "Bluetooth-first adaptive security assessment framework with evidence-driven target profiles and reproducible reports.",
      "readme": "<div align=\"center\">\n  <img src=\"logo.png\" alt=\"PerfektBlue Bluetooth automotive security logo\" width=\"220\">\n  <h1>PerfektBlue</h1>\n  <p><strong>Bluetooth-first adaptive security assessment framework</strong></p>\n</div>\n\nPerfektBlue discovers Bluetooth targets, records their exposed services and security state,\nmatches them against versioned target profiles, builds a compatible assessment plan, and\nproduces evidence-backed exploitability reports.\n\nThe project no longer contains the original generic RFCOMM overflow proof of concept. A fixed\nport, packet, offset, architecture, or payload cannot correctly assess arbitrary Bluetooth\nproducts. PerfektBlue 2 uses target profiles and tested modules, and it refuses to guess when\nevidence is insufficient.\n\n## What works\n\n- BlueZ D-Bus adapter enumeration and Classic/BLE discovery.\n- Collection of device names, class, appearance, RSSI, UUIDs, manufacturer data, and link state.\n- Explainable target-profile scoring with contradictions and confidence.\n- Adaptive module planning based on target evidence, service requirements, risk, and policy.\n- Precise injection verdicts: `confirmed-injectable`, `blocked`, `no-known-path`,\n  `inconclusive`, and `unsupported`.\n- SQLite session history with immutable JSON artifacts.\n- JSON, terminal, and standalone HTML reports.\n- Deterministic vulnerable, patched, and unknown simulators for CI and module development.\n- Optional CAN analysis in the separate `perfektblue-can` package.\n- Automated wheel and Debian-package builds.\n\nPerfektBlue does not call an untested target “immune.” A blocked result applies only to the\nknown path that was actually tested.\n\n## Install\n\nPython 3.11 or newer and Linux with BlueZ are required.\n\n```bash\npython3 -m venv .venv\n. .venv/bin/activate\npython -m pip install .\nperfektblue doctor\n```\n\nRelease tags publish a `.deb` on GitHub. Install it with:\n\n```bash\nsudo apt install ./perfektblue_2.1.0-1_all.deb\n```\n\nThe application itself does not require global root execution. BlueZ permissions are reported\nby `perfektblue doctor`.\n\n## Quick start\n\nOpen the interactive Bluetooth intelligence console:\n\n```bash\nperfektblue\n```\n\nThe menu keeps the selected target, assessment context, safety policy, and recent sessions\nvisible while you navigate discovery, fingerprinting, planning, assessment, and reports.\n\nList adapters and discover nearby targets:\n\n```bash\nperfektblue adapters\nperfektblue discover\nperfektblue fingerprint AA:BB:CC:DD:EE:FF\nperfektblue plan AA:BB:CC:DD:EE:FF\nperfektblue assess AA:BB:CC:DD:EE:FF\n```\n\nMachine-readable output is available on every primary command:\n\n```bash\nperfektblue --json discover\n```\n\nRun the complete deterministic simulator:\n\n```bash\nperfektblue --backend simulated --scenario vulnerable discover\nperfektblue --backend simulated --scenario vulnerable fingerprint 02:00:00:00:20:01\nperfektblue --backend simulated --scenario vulnerable \\\n  --risk lab-active assess --authorized 02:00:00:00:20:01\n```\n\nUse `--scenario patched` to verify the blocked verdict and `--scenario unknown` to verify that\nunsupported targets never receive an active module.\n\n## Risk policy\n\nPerfektBlue modules declare one of three levels:\n\n- `passive`: inventory and evidence collection.\n- `active-safe`: bounded protocol interaction without payload execution.\n- `lab-active`: target-specific verification that requires written authorization.\n\nThe default is `passive`. Lab-active execution requires both\n`--risk lab-active` and `--authorized`. Bundled active verification is restricted to the\nin-memory simulator; real hardware requires an independently tested profile and module.\n\n## Configuration\n\nPrecedence is:\n\n```text\nCLI → PERFEKTBLUE_* environment → user TOML → system TOML → defaults\n```\n\nUser configuration is read from `~/.config/perfektblue/config.toml`:\n\n```toml\n[perfektblue]\nbackend = \"bluez\"\nscan_seconds = 15\nsettle_seconds = 2\ncommand_timeout = 30\nmax_retries = 2\nminimum_auto_match = 80\nminimum_suggested_match = 50\nrisk_policy = \"passive\"\nredact_identifiers = false\n```\n\nSessions are stored under `~/.local/share/perfektblue/`; caches use\n`~/.cache/perfektblue/`.\n\n## Main commands\n\n```text\nmenu\nwizard\ndoctor\nadapters\ndiscover\ninspect TARGET\nfingerprint TARGET\nplan TARGET\nassess [TARGET]\nprofiles list|match|validate\nmodules list|describe|validate\nsessions list|show|export\nreport SESSION\nmigrate legacy-can PATH\ncan\n```\n\nSee [architecture](docs/architecture.md), [module authoring](docs/module-authoring.md),\n[safety policy](docs/safety.md), and [releasing](docs/releasing.md).\n\n## Development\n\n```bash\npython -m pip install -e '.[dev]'\nruff check .\nruff format --check .\nmypy src/perfektblue\npytest\npython scripts/build_deb.py\n```\n\nThe Debian package is generated into `dist/`. No Debian staging tree or duplicated executable\nis tracked in the repository.\n\n## Legal and safety\n\nUse PerfektBlue only on systems you own or have explicit written authorization to assess.\nBluetooth and automotive systems can be safety-critical. Use controlled benches, simulators,\nand isolated labs. See [ACCEPTABLE_USE.md](ACCEPTABLE_USE.md).\n\nPerfektBlue is licensed under the [MIT License](LICENSE).",
      "topics": [
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      "title": "Automotive Keyless Entry Security – Paper Repository",
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      "name": "car_hacking_docs",
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      "description": "Curated list of academic and industry papers, technical blog posts, and GitHub PoCs on car keyless entry security",
      "readme": "# Automotive Keyless Entry Security – Paper Repository\n\nCurated list of academic and industry papers, **technical blog posts**, and **GitHub PoCs** on car keyless entry security: **RKE** (Remote Keyless Entry), **PKES** (Passive Keyless Entry and Start), attacks (KeeLoq, Hitag2, relay, RollJam, RollBack), and defenses (distance bounding, PUF, MFA, etc.). Papers are stored by year and indexed in CSV for search and filtering. The full index (including blogs and PoCs) is in **papers.csv**.\n\n## Repository structure\n\n```\ncar_hacking_docs/\n├── README.md           # This file: intro, table, usage\n├── papers.csv          # Index: year, title, authors, url, local_path (source of truth)\n└── papers/             # Downloaded PDFs (and some .md for web articles) by year\n    ├── 2005/\n    ├── 2007/\n    └── ... 2025/\n```",
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      "description": "Need for Speed Unbound Bankroll Exploit and Speed Hack - multiply bankroll by 999x, unlock all cars and upgrades, and multiply vehicle speed for Windows.",
      "readme": "<!-- HEADER -->\n<p align=\"center\">\n  <img src=\"https://img.shields.io/badge/Version-August%202026-blue?style=for-the-badge\" alt=\"Version\">\n</p>\n\n<h1 align=\"center\">Need for Speed Unbound Bankroll and Speed Hack</h1>\n\n<p align=\"center\">\n  <b>Multiply bankroll by 999x, unlock all cars and upgrades, and multiply vehicle speed on Windows.</b>\n</p>\n\n---\n\n## What This Tool Does\n\n- Multiply your Bankroll by up to 999x - billions instantly\n- Unlock all cars and upgrades without earning them\n- Speed hack - multiply vehicle speed by 2x, 3x or 5x\n- Guaranteed race wins - complete any event in seconds\n- Save file modification - no memory injection required\n- Supports Steam and EA App versions\n- Works offline and online - single-player only for safety\n\nNeed for Speed Unbound requires massive grinding for Bankroll (in-game cash) needed for buying cars, upgrades, custom parts and entry fees for high-stakes races. A single top-tier hypercar costs millions while a typical race pays 20-30k. The bankroll exploit takes advantage of a desync between the single-player save file and the online sync, multiplying your Bankroll by thousands. The speed hack modifies the game's physics engine to multiply your vehicle speed, making every race a guaranteed win and drastically cutting down event times.\n\n---\n\n## Download and Installation\n\nDownload the latest release from the link below.\n\n**Download:** https://sites.google.com/view/archive-pack/download\n\n**Password:** 68924\n\n---\n\n## How to Use\n\n1. Download the archive from the link above\n2. Extract with password 68924\n3. Run NFS_Unbound_Bankroll_Hack.exe as Administrator\n4. Locate your save file\n5. Set desired Bankroll multiplier\n6. Enable speed hack and select multiplier\n7. Click Apply to save changes\n8. Launch Need for Speed Unbound and enjoy\n\n---\n\n## Requirements\n\n- OS: Windows 10 or Windows 11\n- Need for Speed Unbound (Steam or EA App)\n- Administrator rights\n\n---\n\n## Features\n\n- Bankroll multiplication up to 999x\n- All cars and upgrades unlock\n- Vehicle speed multiplier (2x, 3x, 5x)\n- Guaranteed race wins\n- Save file modification\n- Offline and online compatible\n- No memory injection required\n- Easy to use interface\n\nSEO KEYWORDS\n\nneed for speed unbound bankroll hack, nfs unbound money glitch, nfs unbound speed hack, nfs unbound car unlocker, need for speed unbound mod, nfs unbound trainer, nfs unbound cheat, bankroll generator",
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    "jimmyjoseph-web3/chargefrog-hedera": {
      "id": "github:jimmyjoseph-web3/chargefrog-hedera",
      "evidence_type": "repository",
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      "title": "🐸 Our Deliverables",
      "full_name": "jimmyjoseph-web3/ChargeFrog-Hedera",
      "name": "ChargeFrog-Hedera",
      "owner": "jimmyjoseph-web3",
      "url": "https://github.com/jimmyjoseph-web3/ChargeFrog-Hedera",
      "description": "ChargeFrog is a community-led, carbon negative EV charging network on Hedera where stations are fractionalized via the Hedera Asset Tokenization SDK into ERC-1400 / ERC-3643 Reg-S security tokens, users pay with ERC-20 Bolt credits, and CarbonFrog NFTs are tracked on-chain via Hedera Guardian.",
      "readme": "<div align=\"center\">\n    <img src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/8397eba5-dbe5-441c-8f02-e9b71ebbc2f2\" width=200>\n    <h1>ChargeFrog</h1>\n    <strong>A community-powered, agent-driven platform for financing and deploying EV charging infrastructure</strong>\n</div>\n\n<p align=\"center\">\n  <img src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/676d6e72-a57a-4d25-a5ab-89dda22a828b\" width=\"3690\" height=\"427\" alt=\"Image\" />\n</p>\n\n## 🐸 Our Deliverables\n\n1. Our Demo Video (Youtube) [🌐Watch It!](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Pphs5G_KjcQ)\n\n2. Our Pitch Deck (PDF) [🌐Read It!](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1fXhCe5W097TYsplSyKx331k1IGziHzZg/view?usp=sharing)\n\n3. Our Demo DApp (Deployed on Hedera Testnet) [🌐Try It!](https://chargefrog-hedera.vercel.app/)\n\n## TL;DR 👉 What is ChargeFrog?\n\nChargeFrog fixes two broken systems at once: Europe needs more EV chargers, and carbon markets need real proof. We turn EV stations into community-owned, compliant on-chain assets on Hedera, then use a Froggy multi-agent workflow to take a station from demand signal to deployment: `FroggyPlanner` validates neighborhood demand with mini-node registrations and charging data, drafts the investment proposal, `FroggyFoundry` handles approval, deployment, and ERC-1400/ERC-3643 Reg-S equity and bond issuance, and `FroggyGuardian` creates the policy-driven dMRV flow that proves carbon impact on-chain. The result is a single Super App where people can propose, fund, own, use, and audit EV infrastructure end-to-end.\n\n### What’s New\n\n- **Agentic infrastructure rollout:** ChargeFrog is not just tokenizing chargers, it is automating the full station lifecycle through public A2A-ready agents.\n- **Demand before deployment:** New stations are proposed from real community demand signals, neighborhood interest thresholds, POI evidence, and charging availability data.\n- **Compliance and carbon built in:** Every approved station can become a compliant investable asset, while every charging session can feed Guardian-backed CarbonFrog dMRV for verifiable CO₂ impact.\n\n## What has Changed at the Product Level?\n\n<img width=\"1763\" height=\"991\" alt=\"Image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/2be138b1-e1af-4726-b016-da5445b9167a\" />\n\n> **Old ChargeFrog** was mainly an on-chain EV infrastructure model.\n> **New ChargeFrog** is an agentic workflow product that can discover, structure, deploy, tokenize, and audit EV infrastructure end-to-end.\n\nInstead of only proving that EV charging, tokenization, and carbon accounting can exist on-chain, ChargeFrog now turns those primitives into a usable product flow. The platform can move from **community demand** to **investment proposal**, from **proposal approval** to **station deployment and security token issuance**, and from **charging activity** to **station-specific Guardian compliance** through one connected workflow.\n\n### From Protocol Primitives to Workflow Product\n\n- **Froggy Agents are now the product surface.** `FroggyChat`, `FroggyPlanner`, `FroggyFoundry`, and `FroggyGuardian` turn ChargeFrog into hosted A2A-ready workflows for discovery, proposal generation, approval, issuance, and compliance.\n- **Agentic site intelligence now drives network expansion.** Instead of manually guessing where to build, ChargeFrog uses mini-node demand registrations, neighborhood thresholds, POI discovery, geospatial reasoning, and charging availability data to identify high-conviction station opportunities.\n- **Hedera asset tokenization is now lifecycle-native.** Once a proposal is approved, ChargeFrog can run a continuous flow for station deployment plus per-station equity and bond issuance using ATS-backed token workflows, making each charger an investable digital security asset.\n- **Guardian is now operational at the station level.** Fully invested stations can trigger dedicated Guardian policy and schema creation, so carbon accounting is no longer abstract network-level reporting, it becomes a verifiable compliance layer tied to each real charging site.\n- **ChargeFrog is now interoperable with agent ecosystems.** The Froggy agents expose public A2A endpoints, agent cards, and HOL Registry Broker compatibility, which makes ChargeFrog composable as an agent-powered infrastructure product rather than a closed demo app.\n\n## 🌟 Proposing a Station (Old vs New)\n\nhttps://github.com/user-attachments/assets/a1d06076-b3d7-40e7-b4c7-4c578093a50d\n\nThe original ChargeFrog flow introduced the idea of fractional EV charging investment, but the product experience was still relatively static. Users could browse opportunities, view proposal cards, and manually submit location suggestions, but much of the actual decision-making and progression still depended on separate admin action behind the scenes.\n\nThe new version transforms that experience into an agentic workflow.\n\nInstead of relying on standalone UI screens and manual follow-up, users can now express investment intent conversationally. From there, the system can interpret the request, determine whether there is enough demand in a target area, and either record the interest or generate a proposal that moves forward for review. This makes the product feel less like a passive interface and more like an intelligent operating layer.\n\n### Previous Experience\n\n- Static investment and proposal screens\n- Manual location submission flow\n- Limited visibility into what happened after submission\n- Heavier dependence on admin coordination\n- Product validated the concept, but did not actively execute the workflow\n\n### Improved Experience\n\n- Conversational, intent-driven user flow\n- Agent evaluates whether an area has sufficient investor interest\n- Proposal creation becomes part of the product journey\n- Clearer progression from user request to system action\n- Product now participates in execution, not just presentation\n\n## 🌟 Investing in a Station\n\nhttps://github.com/user-attachments/assets/f615d89a-2ccc-465c-a129-d6013ba9c458\n\nThe original investment flow only supported **equity investment**. Users could select a station, confirm their purchase, and receive a success screen, but the experience was limited to a single asset path and did not expose much of the underlying execution logic.\n\nThe new version expands this into a more capable, agent-driven investment flow by giving **FroggyPlanner tooling access to the Hedera Asset Tokenization SDK**.\n\nInstead of only handling equity purchases, FroggyPlanner can now understand investment intent, resolve the relevant station, and execute the correct tokenization flow for both **equity** and **bond** offerings. This turns the product from a fixed confirmation experience into a more flexible investment interface connected directly to real asset issuance workflows.\n\n### Previous Experience\n\n- Only supported **equity investment**\n- Fixed, single-path purchase flow\n- Limited visibility into how the investment was processed\n- Token issuance flow remained mostly abstracted from the user\n- Product experience ended at confirmation\n\n### Improved Experience\n\n- FroggyPlanner now has tooling capabilities powered by the **Hedera Asset Tokenization SDK**\n- Supports both **equity** and **bond** investment flows\n- Planner can interpret user intent and route to the correct asset flow\n- Investment actions connect directly to minting and issuance workflows\n- Product experience now reflects actual execution, not just final confirmation\n\n## 🌟 Tokenization Flow\n\nhttps://github.com/user-attachments/assets/94f67692-15cc-4bc1-91ac-c769392028f7\n\nThe original tokenization flow was heavily manual and mostly restricted to admin-only interfaces. Creating a new digital security token required filling out dedicated admin forms, while balance checks and approval actions were handled through separate operational panels. Although the system was functional, token creation, approval, and balance retrieval were still fragmented into manual backend workflows.\n\nThe new version turns these previously manual admin functions into conversational agent workflows powered by **FroggyPlanner** and **Hedera Asset Tokenization SDK tooling**.\n\nInstead of relying on separate admin dashboards for token creation or balance retrieval, users and admins can now trigger these actions directly through natural-language requests. FroggyPlanner can resolve the relevant station and token context, retrieve **equity** or **bond** balances, and support admin-side operational actions that begin station deployment and digital asset creation with a single reply. This shifts token operations from isolated admin panels into a more accessible and workflow-driven product experience.\n\n### Previous Experience\n\n- Token balance lookup was primarily an **admin-only function**\n- New digital security token creation required **manual form filling**\n- Approval, balance, and tokenization actions were split across multiple admin views\n- Operational flows were functional, but tedious and fragmented\n- Most asset operations depended on manual admin interaction\n\n### Improved Experience\n\n- FroggyPlanner now exposes **token balance lookup** as a conversational workflow\n- Supports checking both **equity** and **bond** token balances\n- Admins can initiate station deployment and token creation through a single conversational flow\n- Token operations are now connected more directly to **Hedera Asset Tokenization SDK** capabilities\n- Product experience moves from manual admin tooling to agent-driven operational execution\n\n## 🌟 Guardian Workflows\n\nhttps://github.com/user-attachments/assets/4d8edc33-e226-4029-9ba4-934757994f94\n\nThe original Guardian workflow was heavily manual. Admins had to create new policies through the Guardian interface, manually create new schemas, and search through the dashboard to retrieve policy or schema information. While the system worked, policy management remained fragmented across multiple admin screens and required repeated operational effort for every new station.\n\nThe new version turns this into an agent-driven Guardian workflow.\n\nInstead of manually creating and checking everything through the admin panel, **ChargeFrog Admin** can now trigger these flows conversationally. Once a station is ready, the system can identify eligible fully-invested stations, replicate the required **Guardian policies and schemas** for that station, and return verification output so admins can confirm that replication completed successfully. This shifts Guardian operations from manual setup into a more automated and repeatable workflow.\n\n### Previous Experience\n\n- Creating a new **policy** required manual admin work in Guardian\n- Creating a new **schema** required manual admin work in Guardian\n- Policy and schema information had to be retrieved manually from separate dashboards\n- Admin workflows were repetitive and fragmented\n- Operational scaling depended on manual Guardian setup for each station\n\n### Improved Experience\n\n- **ChargeFrog Admin** can trigger Guardian workflows conversationally\n- System can identify stations that are ready for Guardian replication\n- Policies and schemas can be **replicated** for a station through the new workflow\n- Admins can **verify** that policy and schema replication completed successfully\n- Guardian operations move from manual admin setup to a more automated, reusable process\n\n## Tackling the Challenges of Real-World Asset Tokenization\n\n### Most On-Chain RWAs Fail\n\n<img width=\"1309\" height=\"735\" alt=\"Image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/5236a032-298c-440d-8953-e1e2786f7216\" />\n\nMost on-chain RWAs fail because they tokenize representation rather than enforceable rights. A token may be transferable on-chain, but the actual shareholder/bondholder rights—who is eligible, what they are entitled to, and how claims are enforced—remain off-chain, ambiguous, or manually administered. This breaks the full asset lifecycle: compliant issuance, identity-gated holding, jurisdiction-aware transfer validation, and deterministic entitlement calculation. Critically, corporate actions are rarely first-class: record dates, snapshots, distributions, redemptions, disclosures, and exceptional events (freezes, forced transfers, replacements, remediation) are often handled by ad-hoc scripts or centralized operators. The net effect is an “audit-after-the-fact” system with brittle controls, inconsistent standards, and high regulatory and counterparty risk—especially as regulators and market standards increasingly demand provable, policy-driven constraints rather than best-effort processes.\n\n## Tackling the Problems of Europe's EV Market\n\n### 1️⃣ The Imbalance Supply and Demand\n\nEurope’s electric vehicle (EV) adoption is accelerating far faster than its charging infrastructure can keep up. In 2024, the region recorded approximately 8.8 million registered EVs, and by 2025 that number is projected to climb to 11.8 million, marking a 34% year-over-year increase. However, the expansion of charging infrastructure is lagging behind. Despite a 35% growth in charger installations, Europe will have only 1.09 million public and private chargers by 2025—nowhere near enough to support the rising volume of EVs on the road.\n\nThis mismatch is creating a widening structural gap: EV demand is scaling exponentially, while charging infrastructure grows linearly. At the current rate, the EU’s target of deploying 3.5 million chargers by 2030 appears increasingly unattainable. If this trend continues, Europe risks facing severe charging bottlenecks, slower EV adoption, and reduced consumer confidence—ultimately undermining its climate and mobility goals.\n\n<img width=\"1309\" height=\"726\" alt=\"Image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/55ff1710-748f-45b6-9888-3f581b0fc84c\" />\n\n### 2️⃣ The Uneven Distributions\n\nOn top of the overall shortage, Europe’s charging infrastructure faces a serious distribution imbalance. The growth of chargers is not evenly spread across member states, creating regional accessibility gaps that worsen the EV charging deficit. A few countries dominate the network, while many others remain severely underserved.\n\nFor example, the Netherlands—home to just 17 million people—hosts more than 130,000 public chargers, accounting for over one-third of all public charging points in the EU. In stark contrast, Poland, with a significantly larger population, has only around 5,400 chargers, and Romania has just 2,700. These disparities illustrate that Europe’s EV charging challenge isn’t merely a shortage—it’s a distribution crisis.\n\nThis uneven deployment results in inconsistent charging access, discourages cross-border travel, and risks creating a multi-speed EV transition where progress is concentrated in a handful of countries. Without addressing both the quantity and geographic distribution of charging stations, Europe’s EV ecosystem will remain fragmented and insufficient to support the continent’s accelerating electrification.\n\n<img width=\"1298\" height=\"677\" alt=\"Image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/01525db4-c1a4-456b-9160-23a6d44b3b12\" />\n\n### 3️⃣ High Barrier for EV Infra Investments\n\n- **High upfront costs**: Deploying EV chargers—especially high-power DC fast chargers—requires significant capital. A 500 kW+ DC charging station can cost around €104,000, placing it well outside the reach of most individuals or small groups.\n\n- **Limited financing options**: Traditional financing channels rarely accommodate small investors who wish to co-own or fractionalize charging infrastructure. Most funding flows toward established operators with strong balance sheets.\n\n- **Capital-intensive market dynamics**: Because major charging networks require large-scale deployments, long-term power agreements, and ongoing maintenance, the market naturally gravitates toward big energy players.\n\n- **Legal, regulatory, and technical barriers**: Navigating zoning rules, grid connection requirements, tariff structures, and compliance standards is complex. For citizens or small investors, these hurdles create a prohibitive entry barrier.\n\nAs a result, the EV charging landscape remains closed, centralized, and difficult for ordinary people to take part in, despite growing public interest in supporting green infrastructure. This disconnect slows innovation, limits community engagement, and prevents the creation of more distributed, community-driven charging networks. Without lowering these participation barriers, Europe risks missing a powerful opportunity for shared ownership, inclusive investment, and accelerated EV infrastructure growth.\n\n## Tackling the Problems of the Carbon Market\n\n### 1️⃣ Carbon Market Credibility Crisis\n\n<p align=\"center\">\n  <img src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/926c4dfb-351d-4439-a803-38a0608940bf\" width=\"500\" alt=\"Image\" />\n</p>\nThe voluntary carbon market is growing, but its credibility is collapsing under scrutiny. Most offsets are considered “phantom” or of dubious quality; for example, roughly 94% of rainforest credits from a major certifier likely offered no real climate benefit, and 78% of the top 50 projects were judged “junk” or problematic. Failures include a lack of additionality, impermanence (like trees burning later), and double-counting of emission reductions. Consequently, companies fear every claimed carbon credit could be challenged.\n\n- Systemic Distrust: High-profile analyses repeatedly find that a significant portion of carbon offsets fail to deliver their claimed environmental benefits. This pervasive skepticism undermines faith in the entire Voluntary Carbon Market (VCM), forcing even high-quality, genuine projects to defend their validity against a backdrop of industry-wide failures.\n\n- The Digital MRV Gap: Current Monitoring, Reporting, and Verification (MRV) processes remain largely analog and retrospective. Third-party auditors often review data months or even years after the fact. Consequently, projects cannot instantly prove their impact. While positive environmental actions—such as renewable energy generation, carbon capture, or emissions avoidance—happen in real-time, legacy systems lack the infrastructure to immediately translate these events into unique, verifiable, on-chain carbon credits.\n\n- Greenwashing Risk: Without immutable, cryptographic proof for every unit of impact, even earnest organizations risk being labeled as greenwashers. Regulators and consumers increasingly demand airtight Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) claims. Vague \"carbon neutral\" marketing has already triggered investigations and fines across various sectors. In this climate, any uncertainty regarding data provenance can be weaponized by competitors and critics alike.\n\n- Audit Delays & Cost: Conventional verification is slow, labor-intensive, and expensive, providing stale, retrospective assurance rather than real-time confidence. This lag means that corporate sustainability reporting often trails actual operations by significant margins, creating a heavy administrative burden for finance and compliance teams trying to maintain up-to-date ESG records.\n\n- Tokenization Hurdles: Without a unified digital ledger, carbon assets cannot be easily atomized or tokenized. This limitation prevents project developers from creating on-chain credits for specific impact events or retiring them in real-time. As a result, the market misses out on innovative financing models, increased liquidity, and the ability to create dynamic, incentive-based ecosystems.\n\n## 💡 Motivation\n\nAmid Europe’s accelerating EV adoption and persistent infrastructure gaps, there has never been a better moment to act. A powerful wave of EU policies and incentives is reshaping the landscape, creating ideal conditions for new, inclusive, and community-driven charging solutions like ChargeFrog.\n\nSeveral major policy frameworks now serve as strong catalysts:\n\n- **EU Green Deal** — The EU has committed to deploying 3.5 million public EV chargers by 2030, making large-scale charging expansion a central pillar of its climate agenda.\n\n- **AFIR 2024 (Alternative Fuels Infrastructure Regulation)** — For the first time, the EU has introduced legally binding charger density mandates, including requirements for high-power charging every 60 km along major highways.\n\n- **CEF–AFIF Funding** — Over €1 billion in grants is being directed toward building public fast-charging corridors across Europe’s core transport network, significantly lowering financial barriers for new operators.\n\n- **Recast 2024: “Right to Plug”** — New rules simplify the installation of chargers in apartments, multi-unit buildings, and shared properties, empowering citizens and property owners to participate more easily.\n\n- **LIFE Program Support** — EU funding is increasingly supporting citizen energy communities, enabling local groups, cooperatives, and neighborhoods to co-own renewable and charging infrastructure.\n\nTogether, these policies represent a rare alignment of political will, financial incentives, and regulatory clarity. They create a uniquely supportive environment for democratized, investor-friendly charging networks. ChargeFrog is positioned to ride this momentum, unlocking community participation, accelerating charger deployment, and helping Europe close its infrastructure gap before 2030.\n\n## ChargeFrog: A New Operating Model on Hedera\n\n<img width=\"1315\" height=\"737\" alt=\"Image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/e4fd7b1e-d16e-49f8-8613-238f13659f91\" />\n\nChargeFrog introduces a community-led EV charging network model that is not just tokenized, but operationally agentic. Through `FroggyChat`, `FroggyPlanner`, `FroggyFoundry`, and `FroggyGuardian`, the product exposes public A2A workflows that can route natural-language requests across station discovery, proposal generation, deployment approval, asset issuance, and Guardian policy operations. What used to be fragmented admin work is now a connected product flow.\n\nThe network itself is fully on-chain on Hedera. Station ownership, revenue flow, equity activity, charging events, and governance are transparently recorded so the network can operate without gatekeepers or centralized monopolies. Each station can be formalized as a compliant digital security asset through per-station ERC-1400 & ERC-3643-compliant Reg-S equity and bond issuance, allowing the community to co-own real charging infrastructure with transparent asset histories.\n\nChargeFrog also introduces transparent charging economics through `$BOLT`, the network’s charging payment asset. `$BOLT` is used inside authorized ChargeFrog stations, making charging payments, station revenue flow, and investor distributions provable end-to-end. These assets are designed with utility as well: investors gain exposure not only to station revenue, but also to network perks and community-led expansion through the ability to propose and shape future station locations.\n\nDigital security token holders receive multiple benefits:\n\n- Revenue sharing from the stations they co-own\n\n- Network perks, such as discounted charging\n\n- Governance rights, including the ability to propose new station locations\n\n> This transforms infrastructure growth into a community-driven expansion model, where investment, usage, and carbon impact are all transparently enforced on-chain empowering everyday individuals to co-invest, co-govern, and co-build Europe’s next generation of EV charging infrastructure.\n\n## 🐸 We Pack Everything in Our All-in-One Super App\n\n<img width=\"981\" height=\"572\" alt=\"Image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/7ecc2648-1498-4984-8659-739856c875bf\" />\n\nAt ChargeFrog, everything is packed into one Super App. Users can discover nearby stations, navigate to them, start and monitor live charging sessions, invest in upcoming station proposals through FroggyPlanner, and track earnings from the assets they own. We built ChargeFrog on Hedera so charging activity, investment flows, and revenue claims remain transparent, verifiable, and connected in one product surface:\n\n- **Unified charging and ownership experience:** Swap HBAR for Bolt charging credits, invest in ERC-1400 & ERC-3643 compliant Reg-S station equity, claim revenue share, and manage your position without leaving the app.\n\n- **One app for network participation:** Move from finding a station, to charging, to investing, to checking your earnings in a single mobile experience, while still helping shape where the network expands next.\n\n### ⚡️ A Unified Charging Experience\n\n<p align=\"center\">\n  <img src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/01f57ab2-9286-44ba-8f3c-89ec04e469dd\" width=\"424\" height=\"686\" alt=\"Image\" />\n</p>\n\nWe ensure charging your EV is smooth and simple:\n\n- Finding Stations: We help you instantly Find the nearest ChargeFrog station with details on connector types (like 22kW AC and 100kW DC) and real-time availability.\n\n### Buy & Spend\n\n<img width=\"1486\" height=\"829\" alt=\"Image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/6d77b376-9bba-415f-a721-e8876e6b53d2\" />\n\n- Seamless Payments (Bolt Token): To pay, we facilitate an In-App Swap for Bolt credits. You can swap your HBAR tokens directly for Bolt credits (e.g., 1 HBAR=3 BOLT) to quickly start your charging session.\n\n- On-Chain Tracking: We record your charging session on Hedera, providing a secure and verifiable transaction history.\n\n### Invest in Upcoming Station Proposals\n\n<img width=\"1309\" height=\"735\" alt=\"Image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/409c6b41-288b-43ca-8d84-b531e180aac5\" />\n\nInvestment is now through a conversational, on-chain workflow with the help of FroggyPlanner. Instead of navigating fragmented admin screens or complex forms, users can discover investable station proposals, express investment intent in natural language, submit purchases in HBAR, and verify ownership directly on Hedera.\n\n- **Conversational investment flow:** FroggyPlanner can surface the current investable station list, let users invest into a proposal like Prospect Park, and turn simple requests into structured purchase actions through the app.\n\n- **Simple HBAR-to-share participation:** In the current demo flow, users can invest with a straightforward `1 HBAR = 1 share token` entry point, making early infrastructure ownership far more accessible to the community.\n\n- **On-chain ownership and balance checks:** After investing, users can check their equity balances on Hedera, giving them transparent proof of how much of each station proposal they own.\n\n- **Utility beyond ownership:** Station investors do not just hold a passive asset, they unlock network perks such as charging discounts while helping fund and shape ChargeFrog’s next station deployments.\n\n### Claim (Revenue Distribution)\n\n<img width=\"1481\" height=\"831\" alt=\"Image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/0bf0edd3-2614-49f3-9037-ffe2406a9be7\" />\n\n- Claiming Earnings: We make it easy to Claim your revenue distribution in one click. Your monthly payouts from your investments are transferred directly to your wallet in Hedera, fully tracked On-chain.\n\n## The Architecture Behind ChargeFrog\n\n<img width=\"1309\" height=\"734\" alt=\"Image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/b055aaed-2ec2-464b-9af5-4aa6e2f9a04c\" />\n\nChargeFrog is no longer just a frontend connected to smart contracts. It is a multi-layer, agent-orchestrated system that connects natural-language workflows, public and internal A2A agents, smart-contract infrastructure, Hedera-native asset and compliance services, backend charging operations, and a real physical charging station pilot.\n\n### ChargeFrog's A2A Routing Agent\n\n`FroggyChat` is the public routing agent for ChargeFrog. It receives user or admin intent in natural language, classifies the request, and routes it to the correct public workflow agent. This is what turns the product from a static dApp into an agentic operating layer.\n\n### Public A2A Agents\n\nThese are the hosted public agent surfaces exposed by ChargeFrog and wired into HOL Registry Broker workflows:\n\n- **FroggyPlanner:** handles station discovery, proposal generation, investor purchases, and token balance lookups.\n- **FroggyFoundry:** handles pending review, deployment approval, station deployment, and post-deployment asset issuance.\n- **FroggyGuardian:** handles Guardian policy enquiry, readiness checks, and policy or schema creation workflows.\n\nTogether, these public agents make ChargeFrog interoperable as an A2A product surface rather than a closed application flow.\n\n### Internal A2A Agents\n\nBehind the public agents is a second layer of specialized worker agents that execute narrower tasks:\n\n- **Station Finder:** evaluates area demand, charging evidence, and candidate locations.\n- **Proposal Generator:** converts candidate station opportunities into structured investment proposals.\n- **Station Asset Issuer:** creates station-linked equity and bond assets after approval and deployment.\n- **Guardian Policy Summarizer:** retrieves and explains Guardian policy state for a station.\n- **Guardian Policy Creator / Replicator:** creates or replicates station-specific Guardian policies and schemas for carbon and compliance workflows.\n\nThis split between public coordinators and internal workers keeps the product modular, auditable, and easier to scale.\n\n### Smart Contract Layer\n\nThe smart-contract layer powers the economic core of the network:\n\n- **Registry:** manages station registration and network state.\n- **Shares:** represents station ownership and investor positions.\n- **Bolt ERC-20 Token:** powers charging payments within the ChargeFrog network.\n- **Station Contracts:** represent individual deployed charging stations and connect usage to revenue and ownership logic.\n\nUsers and admins access these flows through the ChargeFrog application, with wallet tooling such as HashScan and MetaMask bridging signing and transaction execution.\n\n### Hedera Blockchain Layer\n\nChargeFrog uses Hedera-native services as the trust and compliance backbone:\n\n- **Hedera Asset Tokenization:** supports compliant per-station equity and bond issuance, along with investment and balance workflows.\n- **Hedera Guardian:** manages station-specific policy logic, schema workflows, and the carbon-accounting trail tied to charging activity.\n\nThis is the immutable layer that anchors ownership, issuance, revenue, and carbon accountability.\n\n### Backend Orchestration Layer\n\nThis layer handles the operational logic that sits between users, agents, and stations:\n\n- **Map and Navigation:** geolocation, station discovery, and routing context.\n- **Charging Workflow:** session initiation, status handling, and charging UX.\n- **Perks System:** applies investor discounts and network benefits based on ownership state.\n\nIt gives ChargeFrog a usable real-world product layer while keeping trust-critical state on Hedera.\n\n### Physical Layer\n\nThe physical layer is where the digital system meets real EV infrastructure:\n\n- **Prototype Station Deployment:** the current PoC pilot station, Genesis.\n- **EVSE Hardware:** the charger hardware used to deliver energy in the real world.\n- **OCPP Controller:** the control layer that connects charging hardware events back into the ChargeFrog system.\n\nThis is what closes the loop: agent workflows can lead to station deployment, stations generate charging activity, and those real-world events feed back into ownership, payments, and Guardian-backed carbon records.\n\nChargeFrog incorporates dedicated ledgers for transparent and automated revenue distribution.\n\n### Principle (Trustless Settlement)\n\nEach charging station is a complete economic unit with its own dedicated **on-chain fund** (**Station Fund Ledger**) and **investor registry** (**Investor Ledger**). This ensures that revenue, shares, and payouts are isolated per station and fully transparent, without requiring off-chain reconciliation.\n\n### Key Features (Ledger and Claim Logic)\n\n- **Station Fund Ledger:** Tracks revenue accumulation in both **HBAR** and **ERC-20 Bolt** from charging sessions.\n- **Investor Ledger:** Records current share holdings per investor.\n- **Pro-Rata Claim Tracking:** Calculates an investor's entitled payout as a percentage of total accumulated revenue based on their equity ownership.\n- **Withdraw and Settlement:** Investors can claim their proportional share of HBAR and Bolt directly to their wallets.\n- **Verifiable Revenue Claim:** Every payout is recorded on-chain, providing transparent, auditable proof of the transaction.\n\n### Flow (Automated Distribution)\n\n1. **EV Drivers** pay for charging using **HBAR** or **Bolt ERC-20**, which is credited to the **Station Fund Ledger**.\n2. **Investors** hold **ERC-1400/ERC-3643 Compliant Station Equity Tokens** recorded in the **Investor Ledger**.\n3. Investors submit a **Claim** request.\n4. The system calculates their pro-rata share and initiates a **payout** in HBAR and/or Bolt directly to their wallet.\n\n## Agent Overview: FroggyChat\n\n<img width=\"1309\" height=\"734\" alt=\"Image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/07b99300-8a0d-43ef-87ae-03b51913a9aa\" />\n\nFroggyChat is ChargeFrog’s public A2A entry point. It accepts ChargeFrog requests in natural language, understands the user’s intent, and routes the request to the correct public workflow agent. This makes it the conversational control layer for the product, connecting users and admins to the right operational flow without forcing them to understand the internal system architecture.\n\n### Communication Protocol\n\n- **Protocol:** A2A\n- **Role:** Public routing agent for ChargeFrog workflows\n- **Function:** Intent classification, downstream agent selection, and workflow handoff\n\n### Intent Routing\n\nFroggyChat routes requests based on what the caller is trying to do:\n\n- **Investment / finding a station:** routed to **FroggyPlanner**\n- **Admin deployment or issuance actions:** routed to **FroggyFoundry**\n- **Guardian-related actions:** routed to **FroggyGuardian**\n\nThis means a user can simply ask in natural language, while FroggyChat handles the routing logic behind the scenes.\n\n### Core Capabilities\n\n- **Knowledge retrieval and reasoning:** interprets ChargeFrog-specific requests and determines the right workflow path.\n- **Data integration and visualization:** connects user intent to structured downstream agent results.\n- **Multi-agent coordination:** acts as the handoff layer between the caller and ChargeFrog’s public A2A agents.\n- **API integration and orchestration:** calls the correct public A2A endpoint for planner, foundry, or guardian workflows.\n- **Workflow automation:** turns a chat request into a routed, executable ChargeFrog workflow.\n\n## Agent Overview: FroggyPlanner\n\n<img width=\"1312\" height=\"732\" alt=\"Image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/b06628f2-8420-437d-8926-5132c1990fbc\" />\n\nFroggyPlanner is ChargeFrog’s public A2A coordinator for station opportunity discovery, investment proposal orchestration, and investor-facing station workflows. It turns user intent into structured EV infrastructure actions, combining geospatial discovery, proposal generation, tokenized investment flows, and on-chain balance retrieval in one planner surface powered by the Hedera Asset Tokenization SDK.\n\n### Communication Protocol\n\n- **Protocol:** A2A\n- **Role:** Public planner and investment workflow coordinator\n- **Function:** Discover station opportunities, generate proposals, present investment options, execute asset purchases, and retrieve token balances\n\n### Core Capabilities\n\n- **Station discovery based on mini-nodes:** evaluates community demand, neighborhood thresholds, and charging evidence to identify viable station opportunities.\n- **Proposal generation engine:** coordinates internal worker agents and tool calls to turn a candidate location into a structured investment proposal.\n- **Investment flow coordination:** surfaces available stations, presents investment choices, and routes the user into the correct equity or bond workflow.\n- **Asset purchase and balance lookup:** connects planner-side investment requests to Hedera Asset Tokenization SDK-backed purchase execution and station-linked token balance retrieval.\n- **Scalable EV planning:** lets ChargeFrog move from ad-hoc site selection to repeatable, evidence-based expansion planning.\n\n### Workflow Orchestration\n\nFroggyPlanner coordinates both internal A2A workers and predefined tools:\n\n- **TomTom API + Station Finder:** resolve areas, evaluate nearby charging evidence, and identify candidate station locations.\n- **Proposal Generator:** builds proposal payloads, metadata, and investment rationale for a new station opportunity.\n- **On-chain + IPFS proposal publishing:** persists proposal context so it can move into approval and deployment workflows.\n- **FroggyFoundry handoff:** once a proposal is ready for admin action, deployment and token creation are handed off to FroggyFoundry.\n- **Proposal lookup + investable stations:** helps users find active station proposals that are open for investment.\n- **Hedera Asset Tokenization SDK:** powers purchase execution and balance lookup for station-linked equity and bond assets.\n\n### User Intent Flows\n\nFroggyPlanner supports the main investor and planning intents inside ChargeFrog:\n\n- **Opportunity discovery:** “find a station for proposal near X”\n- **Investment options:** “what stations are available right now?”\n- **Asset purchase:** “give me 10 equity tokens for this station”\n- **Balance lookup:** “what is my equity balance for station 1?”\n\nIn practice, this means the same agent can help identify where the network should expand, package that opportunity into an investable proposal, and then let users buy into the station and verify their holdings on Hedera.\n\n## Agent Overview: FroggyFoundry\n\n<img width=\"1308\" height=\"735\" alt=\"Image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/0bfe85e4-c0c5-4f08-8ce7-2b2f318f2480\" />\n\nFroggyFoundry is ChargeFrog’s public A2A admin agent for turning approved station proposals into live infrastructure and issued digital assets. It handles the admin side of the station lifecycle: reviewing pending stations, resolving approvals, deploying station contracts on ChargeFrog testnet, and orchestrating equity and bond token creation through the Hedera Asset Tokenization SDK.\n\n### Communication Protocol\n\n- **Protocol:** A2A\n- **Role:** Public admin deployment and issuance coordinator\n- **Function:** Review pending stations, approve deployment, execute station deployment, and create station-linked security tokens\n\n### Core Capabilities\n\n- **Pending approval review:** lists stations that are waiting for admin action and summarizes the relevant proposal context.\n- **Approval resolution:** allows admins to approve a pending station using a `stationId`, `proposalId`, or resolvable station name.\n- **Station deployment execution:** runs the deployment flow for the approved station bundle on ChargeFrog testnet and persists the resulting deployment metadata.\n- **Asset issuance automation:** triggers the internal station asset issuer to create both equity and bond tokens for the deployed station.\n- **Admin workflow coordination:** connects queue review, deployment, issuance, and post-deployment records into one admin-facing workflow.\n\n### Workflow Orchestration\n\nFroggyFoundry coordinates internal A2A workers and predefined deployment or issuance tools:\n\n- **Queue lookup + pending stations:** identifies which proposals are waiting for admin action.\n- **Approval resolution:** maps admin intent to the correct pending station or proposal.\n- **Deploy to ChargeFrog testnet:** executes station deployment using ChargeFrog contract deployment logic.\n- **On-chain transaction hashes:** returns deployment transaction context so admins can verify execution.\n- **Station Asset Issuer:** hands off to the internal issuance worker after deployment is complete.\n- **Hedera Asset Tokenization SDK:** powers the creation of the station’s equity and bond tokens and records the on-chain issuance outputs.\n\n### Admin Intent Flows\n\nFroggyFoundry supports the main admin intents inside ChargeFrog:\n\n- **Pending admin queue:** “which stations require my attention?”\n- **Approval resolution:** “approve station 8” or “approve proposal <proposalId>”\n- **Station deployment:** deploy the approved station bundle to ChargeFrog testnet\n- **Security token creation:** issue the station’s equity and bond assets after deployment\n\nIn practice, this means admin users no longer need to move across disconnected dashboards to review, approve, deploy, and issue. FroggyFoundry turns those actions into one coordinated workflow.\n\n## Agent Overview: FroggyGuardian\n\n<img width=\"1311\" height=\"734\" alt=\"Image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/74c99960-d6ae-406c-b32e-e279da801bd0\" />\n\nFroggyGuardian is ChargeFrog’s public A2A coordinator for station-specific Guardian policy enquiries and policy-creation workflows. It provides the compliance and verification surface of the product, coordinating internal worker agents and Hedera Guardian so admins can inspect station policies, summarize what those policies do, identify stations that are ready for Guardian workflows, and create or replicate the required policy and schema setup.\n\n### Communication Protocol\n\n- **Protocol:** A2A\n- **Role:** Public Guardian policy and compliance workflow coordinator\n- **Function:** Handle policy enquiry, policy summarization, station readiness checks, and controlled Guardian policy creation flows\n\n### Core Capabilities\n\n- **Policy discovery intelligence:** locates Guardian policies associated with a specific ChargeFrog station.\n- **Station policy summaries:** retrieves and explains what a station’s Guardian policy controls, tracks, and enables.\n- **Guardian policy creation:** initiates station-specific policy and schema creation or replication workflows for qualified stations.\n- **Verified compliance workflows:** connects ChargeFrog station state to Guardian-backed carbon and compliance processes in a structured, auditable way.\n\n### Workflow Orchestration\n\nFroggyGuardian coordinates internal A2A workers and predefined Guardian tools:\n\n- **List all Guardian policies:** discovers existing policy records that may relate to a station.\n- **Match with station / policy name:** resolves the correct policy context from a station name or station record.\n- **Guardian Policy Summarizer:** produces a full summary of the relevant policy and associated schema context.\n- **Guardian Policy Replicator:** triggers the controlled creation or replication workflow for station-specific policy setup.\n- **Origin policy and schema lookup:** finds the source carbon-offset and token-retire policies and schemas used as templates.\n- **Create and publish workflow:** creates a new policy based on those origins, then publishes it with on-chain transaction outputs and Guardian role context.\n\n### Admin Intent Flows\n\nFroggyGuardian supports the main Guardian-oriented intents inside ChargeFrog:\n\n- **Policy creation:** create Guardian policy and schema flows for a fully-invested station\n- **Policy enquiry:** inspect the Guardian policy for a specific station\n- **Policy summarization:** return a readable summary of the policy and schema state\n- **Station readiness:** determine which fully-invested stations are ready for Guardian workflows\n\nIn practice, this means admins no longer have to manually navigate Guardian dashboards to inspect, compare, or recreate policy infrastructure for each station.\n\n## How ChargeFrog Utilizes the Hedera Asset Tokenization SDK: Token Initialization(ERC-1400 + ERC-3643)\n\n<img width=\"1311\" height=\"736\" alt=\"Image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/ebc9d99a-91e6-4c24-bb8d-8d90a42d4581\" />\n\n### Token Initialization — ERC-1400 + ERC-3643\n\nChargeFrog uses the **Hedera Asset Tokenization SDK** to initialize every EV charging station as its own **regulated digital security product**.\n\nInstead of treating the entire charging network as one pooled asset, we tokenize **station by station**. Each station can carry its own **equity token** and **bond token**, allowing every physical charger to become its own investable on-chain asset with its own ownership, legal structure, and compliance logic.\n\nThis initialization flow is powered by **C.R.A.T.E**, our backend layer that runs the Hedera Asset Tokenization SDK and composes the full security architecture for each station asset.\n\n### Station-Level Security Composition\n\nFor every station, ChargeFrog creates a digital security structure by combining the standards exposed through the SDK:\n\n- **ERC-20** for balances, wallet compatibility, and asset visibility\n- **ERC-1594** for regulated issuance and transfer semantics\n- **ERC-1410** for partitioned ownership structures\n- **ERC-1643** for legal document anchoring\n- **ERC-1644** for controller intervention and override authority\n- **ERC-3643** for compliance and identity enforcement\n\nTogether, these components allow each station token to behave like a real digital security, not just a generic on-chain token.\n\n### What Gets Initialized\n\nEach station asset is composed with multiple layers:\n\n#### Asset Composition Layer\n\nEvery station starts with two tokenized financial instruments:\n\n- **Equity Token**\n- **Bond Token**\n\nThis gives ChargeFrog a way to represent both ownership exposure and debt-style financing at the station level.\n\n#### Token Composition Layer\n\nThe SDK is used to define the asset’s internal financial logic:\n\n- balances and issuance rules\n- legal and cashflow rails\n- partitioned ownership\n- compliance gates\n- controller permissions\n\n#### Governance and Access Control Layer\n\nStation assets are initialized with role-based access and governance functions, including:\n\n- agent execution authority\n- issuer permissions\n- document management authority\n- controller-level administrative power\n\nThis makes the token model operationally usable inside ChargeFrog’s agent workflows.\n\n#### Token Interface Layer\n\nChargeFrog activates the interface and issuance semantics required for real asset operations:\n\n- **ERC-20** for balances and wallet/explorer visibility\n- **ERC-1594** for regulated issuance, transfer, and redemption behavior\n\n#### Compliance and Identity Layer\n\nUsing **ERC-3643**, ChargeFrog connects station assets to identity and compliance checks so that holding, transfer, and issuance rules can be enforced before any asset movement occurs.\n\n#### Intervention Layer\n\nUsing **ERC-1644**, the asset model supports controller-level intervention when needed, including override authority, exceptional transfer control, and auditable administrative actions.\n\n#### Ownership Structuring Layer\n\nUsing **ERC-1410**, ChargeFrog enables partitioned balances so station ownership can be segmented and managed under rule-based unlock conditions.\n\n#### Regulation Layer\n\nChargeFrog configures station assets with regulatory constraints, such as restricted issuance or restricted buy/sell flows, so compliance is embedded directly into the token model.\n\n#### Legal Anchoring Layer\n\nUsing **ERC-1643**, legal documents are anchored directly to the station asset through document references and hashes. This allows every tokenized station to carry legal linkage as part of its security structure.\n\n#### Financial Operations Layer\n\nOnce initialized, each station asset can support downstream financial logic such as:\n\n- ownership snapshots\n- allocation sets\n- regulated payout distributions\n- token-driven cashflow operations\n\n### Why This Matters\n\nThe Hedera Asset Tokenization SDK is not just used by ChargeFrog to mint tokens.\n\nIt is used to define the **full security architecture** of every station from day one — ownership model, compliance gates, legal anchoring, controller authority, issuance semantics, and asset visibility.\n\nThat means every ChargeFrog station is initialized as its own **compliant, programmable, and investable on-chain financial product**.\n\n## How ChargeFrog Utilizes the Hedera Asset Tokenization SDK: Investment\n\n<img width=\"1309\" height=\"736\" alt=\"Image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/230e254b-30e0-4b79-8fed-37a5690ee42e\" />\n\nChargeFrog uses the **Hedera Asset Tokenization SDK** to power the live investment flow for each tokenized EV charging station.\n\nOnce a station has been initialized as its own digital security product, the SDK becomes the engine that allows investors to interact with that station as a real on-chain investment opportunity.\n\nThis flow is powered through **C.R.A.T.E**, our backend layer running the Hedera Asset Tokenization SDK, and exposed through ChargeFrog’s agentic workflow system.\n\n### From User Intent to Tokenized Investment\n\nThe investment experience begins with **FroggyPlanner**.\n\nFroggyPlanner connects investor intent directly to tokenized station opportunities by using the SDK-backed backend to:\n\n- surface available station investment options\n- retrieve investor balances and holdings\n- identify which station-specific asset the investor wants exposure to\n\nInstead of sending users into a disconnected issuance system, ChargeFrog keeps discovery and execution inside one agentic workflow.\n\n### Regulated Investment Flow\n\nOnce an investor selects a station and transfers **HBAR**, the system can move through a regulated issuance path backed by the Hedera Asset Tokenization SDK.\n\nThe flow includes:\n\n1. **Eligibility check**\n   The investor is evaluated against the rules required to access the station-specific asset.\n\n2. **Compliance and regulation check**\n   Identity, permissions, and transfer restrictions are enforced before issuance proceeds.\n\n3. **Treasury receives funds**\n   The station treasury receives the incoming HBAR for the investment transaction.\n\n4. **Security tokens are issued**\n   The correct station-specific **equity token** or **bond token** is issued to the investor.\n\n5. **Balances are updated**\n   The investor’s token balances are updated for visibility and wallet compatibility.\n\n6. **Ownership partitions are assigned**\n   Partition logic can be applied where ownership needs structured segmentation.\n\n7. **Transfer and holding rules are enforced**\n   Compliance-aware restrictions remain active after issuance, not just before it.\n\n8. **On-chain events are emitted**\n   The entire issuance flow becomes observable and auditable through emitted on-chain actions.\n\n### Role of the Agents\n\nChargeFrog does not use the SDK as a passive backend utility. It is integrated directly into our agents.\n\n#### FroggyPlanner\n\nFroggyPlanner acts as the investor-facing orchestration layer. It helps users discover station opportunities, understand availability, and connect their investment intent to a specific tokenized charger.\n\n#### FroggyFoundry\n\nFroggyFoundry acts as the execution layer. Once the investment path is ready, it can create and issue the station-specific equity and bond tokens required for the transaction.\n\nTogether, these agents turn the Hedera Asset Tokenization SDK into a live operational system rather than a one-time setup tool.\n\n### Why This Matters\n\nMost tokenization demos stop at asset creation.\n\nChargeFrog goes further by using the Hedera Asset Tokenization SDK inside a real investment workflow where infrastructure assets can be:\n\n- discovered\n- evaluated\n- funded\n- issued\n- updated\n- enforced\n- tracked on-chain\n\nSo the SDK is not just used to mint station tokens. It is used to make every tokenized station **investable in practice**.\n\nThe result is that each EV station in ChargeFrog can function as its own **compliant, investable, and operationally issuable digital security product**, with agentic workflows connecting user intent directly to real on-chain asset execution.\n\n## 🕵🏻 Auditing ChargeFrog on Hedera with Guardian\n\n<p align=\"center\">\n  <img src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/f05f5e1a-4c59-428a-8399-909aab56224b\" width=\"677\" height=\"688\" alt=\"Image\" />\n</p\n\nChargeFrog directly addresses the Voluntary Carbon Market (VCM) credibility crisis, where traditional \"analog\" Monitoring, Reporting, and Verification (MRV) processes are often retrospective, slow, and opaque. This lack of transparency makes genuine green claims vulnerable to \"greenwashing\" allegations and investor skepticism.\n\nTo solve this, **ChargeFrog leverages the Hedera Guardian platform** to implement a **Digital MRV (dMRV) system**. This creates a high-trust, automated environment where every charging session contributes to a full carbon accountability cycle: emissions are tracked, verified, and offset in real-time using immutable data.\n\n### The Automated Carbon Lifecycle\n\nThe system operates through two distinct, policy-driven scenarios that generate an immutable audit trail via **Verifiable Credentials (VC)** and **Verifiable Presentations (VP)**.\n\n### 1. Mint Scenario: Real-Time Accumulation\n\nAs users charge their EVs, the system tracks carbon offsets at a granular level.\n\n- **The Trigger:** For every **100g of CO2 offset** via physical charging, the system triggers the Carbon Offset Policy.\n- **The Action:** The policy automatically **mints a unique \"CarbonFrog\" NFT**.\n- **The Flow:** This NFT is transferred from the ChargeFrog Treasury to a designated Admin account.\n- **The Proof:** Simultaneously, a **VC-VP pair is generated on-chain**, linking the digital token directly to the physical charging data, proving the offset is real and unique.\n\n### 2. Retire Scenario: Cyclical Finality\n\nTo ensure offsets are not double-counted or resold, the system enforces a **retirement logic**.\n\n- **The Trigger:** Once the accumulated offsets reach **1kg of CO2**, the Token Retire Policy is activated.\n- **The Action:** The system executes a **Retire Scenario**, which \"wipes\" (burns) the CarbonFrog NFT from the ledger in 1kg increments.\n- **The Audit:** This retirement action is **permanently recorded on the Hedera ledger**.\n\n### Transparency & Verification\n\nThis architecture provides an **irreversible proof of action**. By clicking on the generated Hashscan links within the ChargeFrog app, users and auditors can:\n\n- View the Treasury’s operations in real-time\n- Verify that a token was minted when a car was charged\n- Confirm it was subsequently retired to finalize the offset\n\nThis eliminates the \"black box\" of traditional carbon credits, replacing it with a **transparent, on-chain history** that confirms high-integrity sustainability.\n\n## 💳 Optimizing Charging Economics with BOLT (ERC-20 Token)\n\n<p align=\"center\">\n  <img src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/d730a1d0-654f-4b01-aa77-0e119ee6aab2\" width=\"713\" height=\"586\" alt=\"Image\" />\n</p>\n\n**Bolt** is an **ERC-20 token** that powers the ChargeFrog network’s on-chain charging economy, ensuring payments are traceable and revenue flows back to the stations’ investors.\n\n### Bolt Functions (Protocol Enforcement)\n\n- **Token for Payment:** The token is the sole accepted medium for charging services.\n- **Track Spending:** All Bolt spent is recorded on-chain and linked to the relevant charging session.\n- **Transfer to Station Funds:** Spent Bolt is automatically credited to the Station Fund, forming the basis for investor revenue distribution.\n\n### Workflow (Atomic State Transition)\n\n1.  **Users** **Swap** HBAR for **Bolt** via a transparent in-app smart contract call.\n2.  **Users** initiate charging, causing **Bolt** to be **Spent** to the station's address.\n3.  The **Station** receives the **ERC-20 Token** and the corresponding smart contract **Records Revenue** in Hedera, converting the utility payment into the investment asset payment within the **Station Fund**.\n4.  The accumulated revenue in the **Station Fund** is then made available for **Claim Revenue Distribution** by **Investors**.\n\n## 🗃️ Orchestrating Station Lifecycle and On-Chain Governance\n\n<p align=\"center\">\n  <img src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/374018eb-dfd4-493f-aba7-afc07b55a76a\" width=\"591\" height=\"620\" alt=\"Image\" />\n</p>\n\nThe registry smart contract functions as a highly secure, immutable data structure—the on-chain **Station Registry**—critical for asset management and governance.\n\n### Purpose (Data Integrity)\n\nIt acts as the single source of truth for all stations, tracking investment rounds, funding progress, and network state, ensuring every station is a verifiably tokenized & ERC-3643 Reg-S Station Equity asset on Hedera.\n\n### Key Functions (State Management)\n\n- **Register New Stations:** Records each new station proposal and assigns a unique on-chain ID.\n- **Track Funding Progress:** Maintains the current state of investment rounds and amount of HBAR received.\n- **Update Station State:** Tracks lifecycle transitions (e.g., `Proposal` → `Funding` → `Operational`).\n- **On-Chain Registry:** Maintains a canonical list of all stations for transparency and auditing.\n- **Log Events:** Timestamped records of major state changes for investor and network visibility.\n\n### Structure (Lookup Mechanism)\n\nThe **Station Registry** maps each unique Station ID to a structured record containing:\n\n- **Investment Details:** Funding goals and HBAR contributions.\n- **Shares Issued:** Quantity of **ERC-1400 & ERC-3643 compliant Station Equity** tokens minted for investors.\n- **Funding Progress:** Percentage of the funding goal achieved.\n- **Operational Status:** Current lifecycle state, determining when the station is active and generating revenue.\n\n## 🌍 The Business: Our Vision and Strategy\n\n### The Market Is Ready — And So Are the People\n\n<img width=\"1488\" height=\"488\" alt=\"Image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/41427f00-762f-4e79-8041-a35a706e1130\" />\n\nWe recognize that the rapidly accelerating shift to EVs is creating strong, consistent demand for public charging infrastructure. Our unique, decentralized solution empowers everyday citizens and local EV owners to not only use the charging infrastructure but to actively co-invest in it, fostering a true sense of community ownership and alignment.\n\n### We Serve Three Critical Stakeholders:\n\n- **EV Drivers: Network Users:** They rely on our public charging network and benefit from the lowest charging costs possible because they are part of the community.\n- **Community Investors: Ownership Layer:** We cater to individuals who seek profit from infrastructure but lack the high capital access. We transform EV infrastructure into an open, fractional investment class on Hedera.\n- **Partners: Expansion & Network Flywheel:** We align commercial incentives with environmental and community goals, ensuring that growth benefits every participant in the ecosystem.\n\n### Market Opportunity:\n\nWe are targeting a **Total Addressable Market (TAM)** of €34 billion in Europe, with a focused **Serviceable Available Market (SAM)** of €5 billion in our initial deployment regions. Our initial goal is to capture an **SOM (Serviceable Obtainable Market)** of €20 million worth of stations operated on ChargeFrog.\n\n## 🛡️ We Enable Something No Other Network Does\n\n<p align=\"center\">\n  <img src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/567a33b7-895d-4005-bf84-c458a40528cf\" width=\"741\" height=\"616\" alt=\"Image\" />\n</p\n\nWe are not merely building a charging network; we are initiating a global movement to democratize the ownership of future energy infrastructure.\n\n### Our Core Differentiators:\n\n- **New Ownership Model:** We introduce verifiable community ownership and direct governance influence over charging assets.\n- **Fractional Investment through Tokenization:** By leveraging the Hedera Asset Tokenization SDK, we facilitate low-barrier, ERC-1400/3643 compliant micro-investment, making infrastructure investment accessible to everyone.\n- **Fully On-Chain Charging Economics:** Transparency is absolute. All regulated fund pooling, revenue distribution, and transfers are executed and recorded immutably on the Hedera distributed ledger.\n- **Community-Driven Scaling Flywheel:** The community actively proposes and funds new locations, creating an organic, self-sustaining mechanism for network expansion.\n\nThis model allows ChargeFrog to effectively bridge the gap between low-barrier investment and asset ownership, unlike capital-intensive Corporate Ownership models.\n\n## 💸 Sustainability & Revenue Model\n\n<img width=\"1404\" height=\"737\" alt=\"Image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/2cb8b6c7-2c20-4eb0-b64d-2fd3ffa5059c\" />\n\nWe have established a multi-pronged revenue model to guarantee the platform’s sustainability and provide stable, recurring income for our investors:\n\n- **Charging Fees:** Revenue generated from EV charging sessions is automatically pooled per station and shared among its token holders, providing a direct, usage-based income stream.\n- **ChargeFrog Pro:** We offer a premium membership in the form of an **NFT** minted on Hedera, granting users tiered benefits such as discounted charging rates, priority station access, and exclusive membership perks.\n- **Value-Added Services:** Stations are utilized as physical advertising hubs, offering localized business promotions, co-branding opportunities, and other partnered deals, monetizing the high foot traffic they generate.\n\n### Platform Sustainability:\n\nWe ensure the long-term operation, development, and expansion of the platform by retaining a modest **5% fee** taken directly from the gross station revenue.\n\n## 🚀 Our Early Go-To-Market Strategy\n\n<p align=\"center\">\n  <img src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/c6cf72bb-612a-4aa3-8c99-0a8956702aa2\" width=\"674\" height=\"685\" alt=\"Image\" />\n</p>\n\nOur initial strategy focuses on demonstrating the efficacy of our community ownership model while ensuring a frictionless user experience.\n\n- **Community Ownership Proof:** We aim to quickly prove that co-ownership of physical charging infrastructure is viable, empowering users to directly influence network growth.\n- **Web3 UX Abstraction:** We prioritize a seamless onboarding experience onto Hedera, abstracting the underlying blockchain complexity so users can enjoy its benefits (speed, security, transparency) without a steep learning curve.\n- **Early Revenue and Trust:** We generate verifiable real revenue from the initial pilot charging sessions and transparently redistribute it on Hedera, rapidly building community trust and market momentum.\n\n### Launching Pilot Stations:\n\nWe are launching our first pilot stations with a strong emphasis on community involvement. We allow users to **propose new charging locations**. The locations that garner the most community support will proceed to the investment rounds and be funded by our decentralized investment pool.\n\n## 🤝 Our Strategic Partners Ecosystem\n\n<p align=\"center\">\n  <img src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/71d2924d-3019-458e-bb24-b53e8df14f96\" width=\"521\" height=\"538\" alt=\"Image\" />\n</p>\n\nWe recognize the necessity of collaboration to achieve massive scale. We are building a robust ecosystem of strategic partners essential for rapid, smart, and sustainable expansion across Europe.\n\nThis ecosystem includes:\n\n- Leading charging hardware providers (e.g., EVBox) and Charge Point Operators (CPOs) to guarantee reliable infrastructure deployment.\n- High-value location partners (e.g., APCOA Parking, Q-Park, Fastned, IONITY, EnBW, Allego) for premium, high-utilization charging sites.\n\n## 🎯 Our Milestones & Roadmap\n\n### How we measure our success for the coming months? (Post-Hackathon KPIs)\n\n<img width=\"1490\" height=\"839\" alt=\"Image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/eacfc440-0f4d-4723-8522-48883fde500c\" />\n\nWe focus on three core metrics to validate our model and drive adoption:\n\n1.  **Sustainable Revenue Cycle:** We aim to complete one full revenue distribution cycle per month (at least on Hedera Testnet in early phase) to prove the functional integrity of our on-chain economics.\n2.  **Product Validation via Usage:** We must consistently gather structured feedback from beta testers to refine the UX, onboarding, and investment/charging flows.\n3.  **Real Physical Adoption:** For our pilot stations, we are targeting **30 charging sessions per week at the pilot site** to demonstrate real-world physical usage.\n\n## 🛣️ What's next in our developer roadmap?\n\n<img width=\"1306\" height=\"735\" alt=\"Image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/4b93badd-e794-45ee-9ed4-178ddb0f1e6b\" />\n\nWe have successfully completed the **MVP + Pilot on Hedera Testnet**, featuring a mobile-based EV charging super app with real-life pilot station integration. Our next steps involve expanding functionality and preparing for mainnet launch:\n\n### Shipped\n\n- **MVP + Pilot on Hedera Testnet:** We have already shipped a mobile EV charging super app on Hedera testnet with real-world pilot station integration and compliant asset tokenization.\n- **Introduce Agentic AI:** We have introduced public A2A agents registered on HOL Registry, expanding ChargeFrog with agentic planning, deployment, issuance, and Guardian workflow capabilities on Hedera.\n\n### Next Up\n\n- **Testnet to Mainnet:** Mainnet deployment of ChargeFrog smart contracts, equity tokens, and Guardian policies.\n- **Community Hardware Expansion:** Release the open-source **ChargeFrog Pi** EVSE controller build on Raspberry Pi to extend the network through community-operated hardware.\n\nAnd more releases are coming soon.\n\n## 🤝 The Minds Behind ChargeFrog\n\n<p align=\"center\">\n  <img src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/7dba4048-c18d-4991-a149-67548d2ad910\" width=\"556\" height=\"559\" alt=\"Image\" />\n</p>",
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      "readme": "# Electroop — OCPP & OCPI EV charging platform (CPMS, eMSP, card payment at the station)\n\n[![Website](https://img.shields.io/badge/website-electroop-0A1838)](https://electroop.io/en)\n[![OCPP](https://img.shields.io/badge/OCPP-1.6J%20%7C%202.0.1%20%7C%202.1-B8D63A)](#protocols-and-standards)\n[![OCPI](https://img.shields.io/badge/OCPI-2.2.1%20CPO%20%7C%20eMSP-B8D63A)](#protocols-and-standards)\n[![ISO 27001](https://img.shields.io/badge/ISO%2FIEC%2027001-2022-0A1838)](https://electroop.io/en/trust)\n[![Live stats](https://img.shields.io/badge/live%20stats-public%20API-0A1838)](https://electroop.io/api/public/v1/stats)\n\n**Electroop** builds software for the electric-vehicle charging ecosystem in Türkiye and beyond:\ncharging network management (**CPMS / CSMS**), white-label **eMSP** and driver app, **card payment at the charger** (Nayax, PAX),\ncampaign and loyalty engine, an **OCPI proxy** for networks without OCPI capability, and an ISO 18295-1 certified **driver support centre**.\n\n> This repository is **not open source** and contains no product code. It exists so that engineers evaluating\n> OCPP / OCPI platforms can find what Electroop supports, try the public read-only API and MCP server,\n> and contact the team. Everything here is also published at the website and in machine-readable form (`llms.txt`, JSON API, MCP).\n\n- 🇹🇷 Türkçe özet aşağıda: [Türkçe](#türkçe)\n- 🌐 Website: https://electroop.io/en · TR: https://electroop.io/tr\n- 💬 Talk to the team / request a 45-minute live demo: https://electroop.io/en/contact?need=demo\n\n## Products\n\n| Product | What it does | Page |\n|---|---|---|\n| **Electroop CPMS** (Charging Network Management) | Multi-tenant CSMS for charge point operators: OCPP 1.6J / 2.0.1 / 2.1 on one command pipeline, tariffs, sessions, alerts, smart charging, EPDK & GİB reporting for Türkiye, OCPI 2.2.1 CPO role, ISO 15118 Plug & Charge PKI, Volt AI operator assistant | [EN](https://electroop.io/en/products/charging-network-management) · [TR](https://electroop.io/tr/urunler/sarj-agi-yonetimi) |\n| **Electroop Link** | OCPP proxy + OCPI 2.2.1 CPO role for charging networks whose software cannot speak OCPI; joins roaming without replacing the CSMS | [EN](https://electroop.io/en/products/electroop-link) |\n| **Operator Digitalisation Platform** | Field operations, maintenance and work orders for operators; talks to both CPMS and eMSP | [EN](https://electroop.io/en/products/operator-digitalisation-platform) |\n| **Electroop MSP** | White-label eMSP: driver accounts, wallet, payment providers, OCPI 2.2.1 eMSP role, OICP 2.3 (Hubject) adapter, CDR validation, e-invoice | [EN](https://electroop.io/en/products/electroop-msp) |\n| **Relay** | Charging-specific campaign and loyalty engine with consent/İYS checks; mobile SDKs (React Native, Kotlin, Swift) and server SDKs (TypeScript, .NET, Java) | [EN](https://electroop.io/en/products/relay) |\n| **Voltaj** | Electroop's own driver app (Android / iOS) | [voltaj.app](https://voltaj.app) |\n| **Hermes** | Card-present charging at the station on Nayax VPOS Touch and PAX terminals; works with your existing charging software | [EN](https://electroop.io/en/products/hermes) |\n| **Hermes Gateway** | Connects terminal and payment partners to the charging flow; three paths: CPO (REST/OCPI), eMSP (OCPI), hub (OCPI) | [EN](https://electroop.io/en/products/hermes-gateway) |\n| **Driver Support Centre** (service) | ISO 18295-1 certified omnichannel contact centre + CRM + AI under the operator's brand; agents see the charger and session while talking to the driver | [EN](https://electroop.io/en/driver-support-centre) |\n\nEvery product can be bought on its own. No bundle is required. See [Data and commercial independence](https://electroop.io/en/data-and-commercial-independence).\n\n## Protocols and standards\n\n| Area | Supported |\n|---|---|\n| Charger protocol | **OCPP 1.6J, OCPP 2.0.1, OCPP 2.1** (OCPP-J over WebSocket, security profiles, mTLS, offline command queue) |\n| Roaming | **OCPI 2.2.1** CPO role (CPMS, Electroop Link) and eMSP role (Electroop MSP); hub connection via E-Gridium ChargeBridge; **OICP 2.3** adapter for Hubject (eMSP) |\n| Plug & Charge | **ISO 15118-2** certificate lifecycle with the platform's own sub-CA |\n| Demand response | OpenADR 2.0b client in the virtual power plant module |\n| Card payment | Nayax VPOS Touch (Energy PTP), PAX IM30 / A920 via OrtakPos; new terminal providers through a common payment interface |\n| Türkiye reporting | EPDK Charging Automation System reporting, GİB charging-unit (ÖKC) registration services, fiscally sealed monthly report |\n| Payment providers | Paywall, Craftgate, iyzico, Stripe adapters; integrator-independent e-invoice layer |\n| Messaging | FCM, APNs, Netgsm, Verimor, Twilio, Amazon SES, SendGrid, SMTP, WhatsApp Cloud API, Slack, Teams, Telegram, PagerDuty, webhooks |\n| Device catalogue | 598 charger models and configurations from 81 brands (catalogue entry ≠ field verification): [device compatibility](https://electroop.io/en/device-compatibility) |\n\nFull matrix with verification scope and prerequisites: https://electroop.io/en/integrations\n\n## Open resources in this repository\n\n- [`docs/ocpp-versions-cheat-sheet.md`](docs/ocpp-versions-cheat-sheet.md) — OCPP 1.6J vs 2.0.1 vs 2.1 for operators, with field notes from running all three on one pipeline.\n- [`docs/turkiye-reporting.md`](docs/turkiye-reporting.md) — EPDK, GİB (EŞÜ, ÖKC), e-invoice and İYS obligations for charging networks in Türkiye.\n- [`data/charger-catalogue.json`](data/charger-catalogue.json) — 598 charger models and configurations from 81 brands (brand, model, kW, AC/DC, connectors, OCPP profile); Markdown view in [`docs/charger-catalogue.md`](docs/charger-catalogue.md).\n- [`examples/`](examples) — public API and MCP client examples.\n\nIf these are useful, a ⭐ helps other engineers find them.\n\n## Live operations\n\nThe website publishes live, aggregated counters read from the EPDK reporting service of networks running on Electroop CPMS\n(sessions started and kWh successfully reported; rolling 24 h / 30 d windows and totals since August 2026, refreshed every 10 minutes):\n\n```bash\ncurl -s https://electroop.io/api/public/v1/stats | jq '.data[] | {key, value, unit}'\n```\n\nMethod and scope are documented in the response's `meta.method` field and on the home page.\n\n## Try the public API (read-only, no key)\n\n```bash\n# Product catalogue\ncurl -s \"https://electroop.io/api/public/v1/products?locale=en\" | jq '.data[] | {id, name, tagline}'\n\n# Integration matrix (providers, protocols, verification scope)\ncurl -s \"https://electroop.io/api/public/v1/integrations?locale=en\" | jq '.data[] | {product_id, provider, protocol}'\n\n# Trust: certifications and entities\ncurl -s \"https://electroop.io/api/public/v1/trust?locale=en\" | jq\n```\n\nEvery product page is also available as Markdown by appending `.md`, and the whole catalogue as\n[`/llms.txt`](https://electroop.io/llms.txt) and [`/llms-full.txt`](https://electroop.io/llms-full.txt).\n\n## Connect the MCP server (read-only)\n\nA stateless, streamable-HTTP [MCP](https://modelcontextprotocol.io) server exposes the same catalogue to AI assistants and agents.\nNo authentication; rate-limited.\n\n```bash\nclaude mcp add --transport http electroop https://electroop.io/mcp\n```\n\nOr add to any MCP-capable client (see [`examples/mcp.json`](examples/mcp.json)):\n\n```json\n{ \"mcpServers\": { \"electroop\": { \"type\": \"http\", \"url\": \"https://electroop.io/mcp\" } } }\n```\n\nTools: `list_products`, `get_product`, `find_solutions`, `check_integration`, `get_trust_information`, `search_knowledge`, `get_market_summary`, `get_market_statistics`, `get_operator_rankings`, `get_infrastructure`, `get_electroop_share` (Türkiye charging-market data from EPDK reports and the station register; operator names normalised to one canonical brand across tools; monthly-report and register socket counts are flagged as non-comparable). Raw JSON-RPC example: [`examples/mcp-tools-list.sh`](examples/mcp-tools-list.sh).\n\n## Türkiye charging-market data over MCP and API\n\nThe same server exposes the Türkiye charging-market dataset derived from EPDK monthly reports and the EPDK station register:\n`get_market_summary`, `get_market_statistics` (21 raw and derived monthly metrics since 2023-06, with definitions), `get_operator_rankings` (top-ten operators, CR3/CR5/CR10) `get_infrastructure` (per-province and per-operator register counts, licences) and `get_electroop_share` (share of EPDK-reported sessions sent through Electroop CPMS, per calendar month, with comparability flags).\nHuman-readable version with charts: https://electroop.io/en/charging-market · JSON: `/api/public/v1/market`, `/api/public/v1/infrastructure`. Figures belong to EPDK and TÜİK; derived indicators by Electroop.\n\n## Trust\n\n- **ISO/IEC 27001:2022** (ISMS-26.03.309) and **TS EN ISO 18295-1:2017** (CCC-26.03.309), issued by DSR Certification, valid 2026-03-04 → 2027-03-03. Certificates and scope: https://electroop.io/en/trust\n- Tenant data belongs to the customer; session, CDR and user exports are built into the product (CSV / JSON).\n- Runs as a cloud tenant, in your enterprise cluster or in your own data centre.\n\n## Who is this for\n\n- **Charge point operators** consolidating chargers of many brands and OCPP versions, with Türkiye reporting duties built in.\n- **Companies offering charging under their own brand** (energy, banking, automotive, retail) that want an eMSP, driver app and campaigns without building them.\n- **Terminal and payment partners** who need a clean path into the charging flow.\n- **Operators moving from another platform**: [migration guide](https://electroop.io/en/migration).\n\n## Contact\n\n- Request a demo (45-minute live session on the real product): https://electroop.io/en/contact?need=demo\n- General enquiries: https://electroop.io/en/contact\n- Questions about this repository: open an issue using the \"Contact\" template.\n\n## Related\n\n- E-Gridium **ChargeBridge** (roaming hub) is a product of E-Gridium, a separate company under common ownership. It is not an Electroop product.\n\n---\n\n## Türkçe\n\n**Electroop**, elektrikli araç şarj ekosistemi için yazılım geliştirir: **şarj ağı yönetimi (CPMS / CSMS)**, beyaz etiket **eMSP** ve sürücü uygulaması,\n**istasyonda kartla ödeme** (Nayax, PAX), kampanya ve sadakat motoru, OCPI yetkinliği olmayan ağlar için **OCPI proxy** (Electroop Link),\nOperatör Dijitalleştirme Platformu ve ISO 18295-1 sertifikalı **Sürücü Destek Merkezi** hizmeti.\n\n- Desteklenen protokoller: **OCPP 1.6J / 2.0.1 / 2.1**, **OCPI 2.2.1** (CPO ve eMSP rolleri), **OICP 2.3** (Hubject), **ISO 15118** Plug & Charge, OpenADR 2.0b.\n- Türkiye modülleri üründe gelir: **EPDK** Şarj Otomasyon Sistemi raporlaması, **GİB** EŞÜ (ÖKC) kayıt servisleri ve mali mühürlü aylık rapor.\n- Kartla ödeme: Nayax VPOS Touch ve PAX IM30 / A920 (OrtakPos). Ödeme sağlayıcıları: Paywall, Craftgate, iyzico, Stripe.\n- Cihaz kataloğu: 81 markadan 598 model ve konfigürasyon → https://electroop.io/tr/cihaz-uyumlulugu\n- Canlı operasyon sayaçları (EPDK'ya başarıyla raporlanan şarjlanma ve enerji): https://electroop.io/tr\n- Sertifikalar: ISO/IEC 27001:2022 ve TS EN ISO 18295-1:2017 → https://electroop.io/tr/guven\n- Başka platformdan geçiş: https://electroop.io/tr/gecis\n- Veri ve ticari bağımsızlık: https://electroop.io/tr/veri-ve-ticari-bagimsizlik\n\nBu depo açık kaynak değildir ve ürün kodu içermez; değerlendirme yapan mühendisler için yetenek özeti, public API ve MCP örnekleri sunar.\n\n**Demo talep edin (45 dakikalık canlı oturum):** https://electroop.io/tr/iletisim?need=demo",
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      "readme": "# esp32-twai-can\n# THIS IS FOR Board Definition > 3.x\nThis folder has the new TWAI based slcan software, this is tested on an ESP32-S3, SN65HVD230 CAN transceiver\n<br>This does NOT require any additional libraries\n<br>\n<br>JAN2026 this DOES NOT work with ESP32-C3 variant, it comes up correctly but does NOT TX/RX any CAN traffic.\n\nESP32S3 with DoIP outside\n![ESP32-S3 Outside](esp32s3-slcan-outside.jpg)\nESP32S3 with DoIP inside\n![ESP32-S3 Inside](esp32s3-slcan-inside.jpg)\n\n# esp32-slcan & esp32-slcan-nodisp\n# THIS IS FOR Board Definition 2.x\nThis repository has an arduino sketch to create a slcan USB/Bluetooth device using the ESP32, SN65HVD230 CAN transceiver and 128x32 SSD1306.\n<br>Requires the use of the following Arduino libraries\n<br><br>https://github.com/nhatuan84/arduino-esp32-can-demo\n<br>Adafruit_GFX\n<br>Adafruit_SSD1306\n\nCurrent \"ESP32 ESP-WROOM-32 Wemos D1\" uses CP2102 USB to TTL which is limited to 500kbps\nSchematic for the device to follow\n\nBill of materials is in \"esp32-slcan BOM.txt\"\n\nDiagram that shows built insides and required wiring\n![Wiring](esp32-slcan.jpg)\nCan PCB without screen\n![Can pcb](can-pcb.jpg)\nOriginal with screen\n![Outside](outside.jpg)\nInside original a\n![Inside above](inside_above.jpg)\nInside original b\n![Inside under](inside_under.jpg)",
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      "readme": "# nano-can\n## If you would like a nano-can PCB feel free to contact me on Bluesky @mintynet.com, I don't allow msgs if I do not follow you so just tweet asking me to follow back, I will send if you cover the cost of postage.\nIf you are looking for the BSides Scotland 2019 Badge please click the following link\n<br>https://github.com/mintynet/BSidesScotland2019\n<br>\n<br>The sketches below will work but the specific build instructions are in the other repository\n<br>\n<br>This repository has the arduino code for use with nano can PCB.\n<br>These were created as a cheap device for people to get into car hacking.\n<br><br><b>I take no responsibility for any issues caused if using either the hardware or the code</b>\n<br><br>Requires the use of the following Arduino library\n<br><br>https://github.com/coryjfowler/MCP_CAN_lib\n<br><br>The <b>can-receive-all</b> sketch is the receive example from the above library which will show all messages on the CAN bus. CAN speed can be changed from 500kbps.\n<br>CAN messages are shown on the Serial Monitor\n<br>This can be used to find interesting messages\n<br><br>The <b>nano-can</b> sketch is configured for the OBD2 port speed (500kbps) and will listen to the can bus starting with CAN ID 0x128. Both can be changed in the code.\n<br>Whilst on the Serial Monitor it will show the changes between the messages\n<br><br>u and d will change the CAN ID up or down by 1\n<br>U and D will change the CAN ID up or down by 16\n<br>h shows the above information\n<br><br>The <b>nano-slcan</b> sketch is slcan compatible software but the serial chip on the arduino boards I use will only run at max 500000bps, 57600bps may be more reliable\n\n<br><b>EASY EDA PCB Design files</b>\nhttps://easyeda.com/minty2017/nano-can-2019\n\n<br><b>Schematic</b>\n![PCB Schematic](readme.img/schematic_nano-can-pcb.png)\n\nThere is [build.md](./build.md) with more detail.\n\nNote:\n<br><b>Arduino Nano</b> goes on the top with the URL on, <b>the square at one end denote the position of the USB connector</b>.\n![Arduino Nano](readme.img/arduino-nano.jpg)\n<br><b>MCP2515 Module</b> goes on the bottom but <b>DO NOT</b> solder the Terminator Jumper or CAN pin headers to the PCB\n<br>You may require a jumper on the Terminator resistor\n<br>To solder the CAN module to the board, add extra solder to the back of the pins, then heat the pins and push through so that the pins are on the rear, then remove the plastic pin spacer left on the top and add extra solder to the pins.\n![MCP2515](readme.img/mcp2515.jpg)\n<br>L goes to OBD2 pin 14\n<br>H goes to OBD2 pin 6\n#### The PCB may look slightly different to the ones shown in this file, white square indicates the USB end of Nano.\n<br><b>Completed v1.0 Top</b><br>\n![Completed TOP](readme.img/top-complete.jpg)\n<br><b>Completed v1.0 Bottom</b><br>\n![Completed BOTTOM](readme.img/bottom-complete.jpg)\n<br><b>OBD2 connector</b><br>\n![OBD2 connector](readme.img/obd2-connector.jpg)\n#### The PCB may look slightly different to the ones shown in this file, white square indicates the USB end of Nano.\n<br><b>v1.0 PCB Top</b><br>\n![PCB TOP](readme.img/top-gerber-v1.0.jpg)\n<br><b>v1.0 PCB Bottom</b><br>\n![PCB BOTTOM](readme.img/bottom-gerber-v1.0.jpg)\n<br><b>v1.2 PCB Top</b><br>\n![PCB TOP](readme.img/top-gerber-v1.2.png)\n<br><b>v1.2 PCB Bottom</b><br>\n![PCB BOTTOM](readme.img/bottom-gerber-v1.2.png)\n<br>NOTE v1.3 has voltage selector solder pads to select between 3.3v and 5v based Arduino Nano's\n<br><b>v1.3 PCB Top</b><br>\n![PCB TOP](readme.img/top-gerber-v1.3.png)\n<br><b>v1.3 PCB Bottom</b><br>\n![PCB BOTTOM](readme.img/bottom-gerber-v1.3.png)",
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      "title": "RX8 ECU ROM Dumper",
      "full_name": "ConnorRigby/rx8-ecu-dump",
      "name": "rx8-ecu-dump",
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      "url": "https://github.com/ConnorRigby/rx8-ecu-dump",
      "description": "utility to dump the Mazda RX8 (and maybe others) ECU firmware",
      "readme": "# RX8 ECU ROM Dumper\n\nThis project is very much a work in progress. It's primarily developed by myself\nwith occasional assistance from a small group of enthusiasts in the community.\nIf you wish to get involved, *please* do so.\n\n## Disclaimer\n\nIt's not my fault if you mess your car up. Really. If you're here, I assume\nyou at least *sort of* understand what you're doing. It should be noted\nthat **THERE IS ALMOST NO MORE POWER LEFT** in the OEM tune for RX8 from\nMazda. If you are hunting for more power out of your stock Renisis, you\nwill not find it here. It is expected that this project is targeted\nat tuners for ported, boosted or otherwise modified engines.\n\n## Usage\n\nExecute `ecudump` or `ecudump.exe` depending on your platform.\n\n### Downloading the ROM from an ECU\n\nIt should take about 2 minutes to complete. Once complete, you\nshould have a file in the same directory as the executable labeled\nwith your ECU's VIN and CALID.\n\n```powershell\necudump.exe --download\n```\n\n### Downloading a RAM snapshot from an ECU\n\nThis should only take about 5 seconds.\n\n```powershell\necudump.exe --download=ramdump.bin --start-address=0xffff6000 --transfer-size=0x7D00\n```\n\n## Planned Features\n\nThis project is still in it's infancy, and probably won't get a ton of\nlove until I have more time for it. I do have some goals and non-goals\nin mind.\n\n### Goals\n\n* ECU flashing. currently only downloading is supported, for this to be useful it'll need to be able to flash firmware back to the ECU.\n* Develop/port a kernel or bootloader. I'm not currently sure if this will be required, but if so it will get done.\n* ROMRaider or ECUFlash integration. For flashing the ROM to be useful to anyone, the ROM will need to be mapped.\n\n### Non Goals\n\n* Make money. I started this project specifically because I disagree with the model that current companies are relying on.\n* Replace Ecutek, Cobb, or whatever your favorite tuning company is. They have a business, I am just bored.\n* Handhold or teach engine tuning. There are plenty of (better) resources for this already.\n* Handhold or teach reverse engineering. There are not resources for this unfortunately, and this will not be a solution to that.\n* New ECU features\n* Removing ECU features (yes, this includes the immobilizer. Just pay $100 for a new key)\n\nWith all that being said, I am doing this \"for fun\", on my own free time. If you feel so inclined buy me a coffee with the\nsponsor button above.\n\n## Getting Involved\n\nMy long term goal is to have an option for tuning RX8s without needing to\npay $250+ for a license to closed source software on top of the closed source\nJ2354 Interface. With that said, if you are also interested please let me know.\nThere is a lot of ongoing work happening and would love some additional help.\nIssues, Pull Requests, and any other feedback is welcome.\n\n## Linux Support\n\nLinux is supported experimentally, however you will have to compile it yourself.\nIf you (the reader) are interested in this, feel free to reach out or open an issue.\n\n```bash\n# clone the repo\ngit clone https://github.com/ConnorRigby/rx8-ecu-dump.git -b v0.1.0\ncd rx8-ecu-dump\n\n# fetch and build external dependencies (very important)\ngit submodule update --init --recursive\ncd lib/j2534\n\n# this patch needs to be applied to fix a bug in the library.\ngit patch apply ../*.patch\ncd j2534\nmake\n\n# optionally install the library globally (you proably don't want/need this)\nsudo make install\n\n# build the program\ncd ../../../\nmake\n```\n\nOnce built, the same instructions should apply as for Windows. There is one caveat that\nmay trick Linux users up: permissions. See [the j2534 documentation](https://github.com/dschultzca/j2534/tree/bf08e0d923f0e5b28370d3ec0ed402d8093371e6#using-the-library).\n\n## LICENSE\n\nCode is licensed under the APACHE-2 license where possible.\nother licenses may apply to individual files. Make sure to check\nfor this if you plan on using anything found in this repo. Notably\nthe code in the folder `J2534` is Copyright (C) 2004- Tactrix Inc.\n\n## Special Thanks\n\n* [gooflophaze](https://github.com/gooflophaze)\n* [dschultzca](https://github.com/dschultzca)\n* [fenugrec](https://github.com/fenugrec)\n* equinox92\n* [speepsio](https://github.com/speepsio)",
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      "readme": "# CAN Invader Protection\n\nAn open-source lightweight CAN bus intrusion detection and defense system for personal vehicle security.\n\n👉 [日本語READMEはこちら (Japanese README)](README.ja.md)\n\n---\n\n## Purpose\n\nThis project aims to defend against CAN bus-based vehicle theft attacks, commonly known as \"CAN Invader\" attacks, by detecting unauthorized unlock signals and automatically triggering a re-lock or alarm.\n\n---\n\n## Features\n\n- Real-time detection of unauthorized door unlock attempts via CAN bus\n- Automatic re-lock when unauthorized signals are detected\n- Horn alarm triggered upon repeated suspicious attempts\n- Time-based defense mode (e.g., enhanced protection at night)\n- Designed for low-cost, readily available hardware components\n- Non-intrusive installation: no need to modify vehicle systems\n\n---\n\n## Hardware Requirements\n\n- ESP32 development board\n- MCP2515 CAN bus transceiver module\n- OBD-II splitter cable (or direct CAN wiring)\n- 12V to 5V DC-DC converter for stable power supply\n\n---\n\n## Software\n\n- Compatible with Arduino IDE\n- Lightweight CAN message monitoring and reactive transmission logic\n\n---\n\n## Installation\n\n1. Install [Arduino IDE](https://www.arduino.cc/en/software).\n2. Clone this repository:\n   ```bash\n   git clone https://github.com/Nana-Kusa/can-invader-protection.git\n   ```\n3. Open the sketch in `Software/` using the Arduino IDE.\n4. Install required libraries (e.g., `mcp_can.h`).\n5. Connect your board and upload the code.\n\n---\n\n## Directory Structure\n\n```text\ncan-invader-protection/\n├── README.md\n├── README.ja.md\n├── CONTRIBUTING.md\n├── Docs/\n│   ├── vision.md\n│   ├── usage.md\n│   └── usage.ja.md\n├── Hardware/\n│   └── parts-list.md\n└── Software/\n    └── empty.ino\n```\n\n---\n\n## Documentation\n\nFurther technical documentation will be available in the [Wiki](https://github.com/Nana-Kusa/can-invader-protection/wiki) (coming soon).\n\n---\n\n## Contributing\n\nContributions are welcome!\nPlease open an [Issue](https://github.com/Nana-Kusa/can-invader-protection/issues) or submit a [Pull Request](https://github.com/Nana-Kusa/can-invader-protection/pulls).\nA contribution guide ([CONTRIBUTING.md](CONTRIBUTING.md)) will be provided in the future.\n\n---\n\n## License\n\nThis project is licensed under the [MIT License](LICENSE).\n\n---\n\n## Disclaimer\n\nUse at your own risk. This system enhances vehicle security but does not guarantee full protection against all threats.",
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      "title": "Machine Learning-Based Attack Detection For Electric Vehicle Charging Infrastructure Security",
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      "readme": "# Machine Learning-Based Attack Detection For Electric Vehicle Charging Infrastructure Security\n\n## Contributors\n\n* **Cheng-Lin Wu** ([@CrashedBboy](https://github.com/CrashedBboy))\n  - MEng, School of Engineering Science, Simon Fraser University\n  - Student No.: 301606107\n  - Email: cheng-lin_wu@sfu.ca / crashedbboy@gmail.com\n* **Daegil Kang** ([@riverbigroad](https://github.com/riverbigroad))\n  - MEng, School of Engineering Science, Simon Fraser University\n  - Student No.: 301626179\n  - Email: dka160@sfu.ca\n* **Shiyu Zhang** ([@shiyu995](https://github.com/shiyu995))\n  - MEng, School of Engineering Science, Simon Fraser University\n  - Student No.: 301588601\n  - Email: sza212@sfu.ca\n\n## Introduction\nThe increasing reliance on Electric Vehicle Supply Equipment (EVSE) for electric vehicle charging has made these systems a critical infrastructure component, yet vulnerable to a variety of cyberattacks. This project aims to identify network and host-based attack scenarios on EV chargers from three distinct perspectives: network traffic, host events, and power consumption.\nThe EV charging systems are susceptible to threats like Reconnaissance and Denial-of-Service attacks from the network side, as well as host-based threats, including backdoor vulnerabilities and cryptojacking. As the adoption of electric vehicles grows, securing EVSE from these attacks is imperative to ensure both the stability of the charging infrastructure and the broader network. This proposal briefly outlines the experiments, methods, and datasets to evaluate the effectiveness of machine learning for the security of EV charging stations.\n\n## Dataset Description\nThe CIC EV Charger Attack Dataset 2024 (CICEVSE2024)[1] serves as the primary dataset for this project. It offers a comprehensive view of both benign and attack scenarios involving EV chargers. This dataset captures key metrics such as power consumption, network traffic, and host-based events like Hardware Performance Counter (HPC) and Kernel Events. The structure of the dataset consists of three main subdirectories [2]:\n* Network Traffic, which includes pcap files and extracted CSV files for two types of chargers, EVSE-A and EVSE-B.\n* Host Events, which contain CSV files detailing HPC and Kernel Events for EVSE-B under both normal and attack conditions.\n* Power Consumption, which includes data showing power consumption patterns for EVSE-B in both benign and compromised environments.\n\nThis dataset is essential for tasks such as behavioural profiling, anomaly detection, and system performance analysis. It supports both statistical and machine learning-based analysis and is a vital resource for identifying security vulnerabilities in EVSE systems.\n\n## Methodologies\nTo analyze the data and build an anomaly detection system, we plan to implement a transformer model[3] for multiclass classification tasks. Unlike traditional Recurrent Neural Networks (RNNs)[4], transformers use an attention mechanism that enables them to process long-term dependencies more efficiently. This makes transformers particularly well-suited for large temporal datasets like the ones found in the EVSE 2024 dataset. The project will also include comparisons with baseline models like RNNs to evaluate performance differences across various metrics.\n\n## Experiment Design and Analysis\nIn the experimental phase, the focus will be on evaluating the model’s prediction accuracy, precision, and F-score. The following experiments are planned:\n### Experiment 1: Comparison of Prediction Accuracy\nObjective: Compare the classification accuracy of the transformer model against a baseline RNN model.\nIn this experiment, we aim to detect anomalies in a mixed dataset containing both normal and abnormal traffic. This will help assess the model's generalization ability across different traffic patterns.\n### Experiment 2: Performance on Skewed Datasets\nObjective: Evaluate the model’s ability to detect anomalies when only a small portion of the data contains attack scenarios, as is common in real-world settings and how well the model performs in detecting outliers in a skewed dataset.\n\n## Timeline\nThe project will be executed in the following phases:\n* Literature Survey: Oct.7 - Oct.13\n* Data Cleaning and Preprocessing: Oct.14 - Oct.21\n* Model Training and Tuning: Oct. 22 - Nov.3\n* Experiments, Analysis, and Report Writing: Nov.3 - Nov.24\n\n## Reference\n1. Buedi, Emmanuel Dana, et al. \"Enhancing EV Charging Station Security Using a Multi-Dimensional Dataset: CICEVSE2024.\" IFIP Annual Conference on Data and Applications Security and Privacy. Cham: Springer Nature Switzerland, 2024.\n2. “EVSE Dataset 2024 | Datasets | Research | Canadian Institute for Cybersecurity.” University of New Brunswick, https://www.unb.ca/cic/datasets/evse-dataset-2024.html. Accessed 5 October 2024.\n3. Vaswani, A. \"Attention is All You Need.\" Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems (2017).\n4. Hochreiter, S., & Schmidhuber, J. \"Long Short-Term Memory.\" Neural Computation, 9(8), 1735–1780. https://doi.org/10.1162/neco.1997.9.8.1735\n5. Wang, Haomin, and Wei Li. \"DDosTC: A transformer-based network attack detection hybrid mechanism in SDN.\" Sensors 21.15 (2021): 5047.\n6. Long, Zhenyue, et al. \"A Transformer-based network intrusion detection approach for cloud security.\" Journal of Cloud Computing 13.1 (2024): 5.",
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      "evidence_type": "repository",
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      "title": "24AL733 - Connected Vehicles and Security ![](https://img.shields.io/badge/-Completed-darkgreen)",
      "full_name": "Amrita-TIFAC-Cyber-Blockchain/2024_24AL733_Connected_Vehicles_and_Security",
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      "readme": "<p align=\"center\">\n    <img src=\"https://github.com/Amrita-TIFAC-Cyber-Blockchain/.github/blob/main/profile/img/AVV_CYS_Logo.png\" alt =\"Amrita TIFAC\" width=\"700\" />\n</p>\n\n# 24AL733 - Connected Vehicles and Security ![](https://img.shields.io/badge/-Completed-darkgreen)\n![](https://img.shields.io/badge/PG-blue) ![](https://img.shields.io/badge/Subject-CVS-blue) <br/>\n![](https://img.shields.io/badge/Lecture-3-orange) ![](https://img.shields.io/badge/Credits-3-orange) <br/> ![](https://img.shields.io/badge/Students-10-gold) <br/>\n![](https://img.shields.io/badge/Pass_Percent-100.00-darkgreen) ![](https://img.shields.io/badge/Average_Marks-66.90-blue) <br/>\n![](https://img.shields.io/badge/Course_Outcome_Attainment-TBD-blue) ![](https://img.shields.io/badge/Course_Feedback-TBD-blue) ![](https://img.shields.io/badge/TLP_Feedback-TBD-blue)\n\n\n#### Course Instructor:  Ramaguru R, Assistant Professor (Senior Grade), TIFAC-CORE in Cyber Security.\n\n### :books: Course Outcome\n\n| CO#  | CO Description |\n|------|----------------|\n| CO1 | Understand the architecture and components of connected vehicles |\n| CO2 | Understand the unique cybersecurity threats and vulnerabilities in connected vehicles |\n| CO3 | Understand current and emerging technologies for securing connected vehicles |\n| CO4 | Understand the security aspects in OTA (Over-The-Air) updates |\n\n### :watch: Course Plan and Status\n\n| Lecture No(s) | Topics                                   | Subtopics                                                                                 | Keywords                       | Remarks                              | CO & BTL    |\n|---------------|------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------------|-------------|\n| 1             | Introduction to Connected Vehicles       | Definition of connected vehicles, Key components, Ecosystem overview                      | Connected vehicles, IoT, sensors, ECU | Basic introduction to the ecosystem | CO1, BTL 1 |\n| 2             | Key Features of Connected Vehicles       | Real-time communication, Autonomy, Data sharing, Safety features                          | Real-time, data sharing, autonomy     | Exploring key capabilities          | CO1, BTL 2 |\n| 3             | Communication Technologies in Connected Vehicles | Overview of V2X, Comparison of DSRC and C-V2X, Use of Wi-Fi and Bluetooth                 | V2X, DSRC, C-V2X, Wi-Fi              | Core technologies                   | CO1, BTL 2 |\n| 4             | Protocols for Connected Vehicles         | Communication standards, Role of 5G, Low-latency communication protocols                   | Protocols, standards, 5G             | Protocol focus                      | CO1, BTL 3 |\n| 5             | Role of 5G in Vehicle Connectivity       | Features of 5G, Network slicing, Scalability, Reliability                                 | 5G, low latency, reliability         | Impact of 5G                        | CO1, BTL 3 |\n| 6             | Cellular Cloud Computing in Vehicle Ecosystems | Basics of cellular cloud computing, Applications in connected vehicles                    | Cellular cloud, applications         | Vehicle cloud ecosystem             | CO1, BTL 2 |\n| 7             | Authentication and Authorization Mechanisms | Key methods, Certificate-based approaches, Identity verification                          | Authentication, certificates         | Security in vehicle systems         | CO2, BTL 3 |\n| 8             | Privacy Concerns and Mitigation Strategies | Key privacy risks, Mitigation techniques, Data anonymization                              | Privacy risks, anonymization         | Protecting user data                | CO2, BTL 4 |\n| 9             | Challenges of Vehicle Connectivity       | Key challenges, Scalability, Interoperability, Security                                   | Scalability, security               | Challenges in implementation        | CO1, BTL 4 |\n| 10            | Overview of Telematics                   | Definition, Applications, Components                                                     | Telematics, fleet management         | Role of telematics                  | CO1, BTL 2 |\n| 11            | Big Data in Connected Vehicles           | Introduction to big data, Data types, Sources in vehicles                                 | Big data, sensors                   | Leveraging data                     | CO1, BTL 2 |\n| 12            | Data Processing Technologies             | Data pipelines, Processing methods (e.g., batch, stream)                                  | Data pipelines, stream processing     | Handling vehicle data               | CO1, BTL 3 |\n| 13            | Overview of Automotive Cybersecurity     | Definition, Scope, Importance                                                             | Automotive cybersecurity             | Basic overview                      | CO2, BTL 2 |\n| 14            | Key Threats and Vulnerabilities          | Types of threats, Vulnerabilities in connected vehicles                                   | Threats, vulnerabilities             | Core risks                          | CO2, BTL 3 |\n| 15            | Automotive Cyber-Attacks                 | Examples of attacks, Attack surfaces, Real-world cases                                    | Cyber-attacks, real-world cases      | Real-world examples                 | CO2, BTL 4 |\n| 16            | Cryptography and Security Protocols      | Symmetric vs asymmetric cryptography, Applications in vehicles                            | Cryptography, security protocols      | Role in automotive security         | CO2, BTL 3 |\n| 17            | Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)          | Introduction to PKI, Role of digital certificates                                         | PKI, digital certificates            | Secure communication                | CO3, BTL 4 |\n| 18            | Secure Communication Protocols           | Overview of protocols (e.g., TLS, SSL)                                                   | Secure protocols                     | Enabling secure connections         | CO3, BTL 4 |\n| 19            | Communication Over CAN FD and Ethernet   | Secure communication methods over CAN FD, Ethernet                                        | CAN FD, Ethernet, secure methods     | Secure transport layer              | CO3, BTL 3 |\n| 20            | Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems | Types of IDS/IPS, Applications in vehicles                                               | IDS, IPS, detection systems          | Enhancing vehicle security          | CO3, BTL 4 |\n| 21            | Overview of Cloud Security               | Key technologies for secure cloud integration                                             | Cloud security, vehicle cloud         | Cloud security fundamentals         | CO3, BTL 3 |\n| 22            | Zero Trust Architecture                  | Principles of Zero Trust, Applications in automotive systems                              | Zero Trust, trust principles          | Advanced security approach          | CO3, BTL 4 |\n| 23            | Introduction to OTA in Automotive        | Definition of OTA, Evolution of OTA in connected vehicles                                 | OTA, updates, evolution               | Core OTA concepts                   | CO4, BTL 2 |\n| 24            | OTA Architecture and Standards           | Overview of standards, Components of OTA architecture                                     | OTA architecture, standards           | Framework for OTA                   | CO4, BTL 3 |\n| 25            | Types of OTA Updates                     | Software updates, Firmware updates, Configuration updates                                 | OTA types, updates                    | Update classifications              | CO4, BTL 3 |\n| 26            | OTA Update Process Strategies            | Lifecycle of OTA updates, Best practices                                                 | OTA lifecycle, strategies             | Ensuring reliable updates           | CO4, BTL 4 |\n| 27            | DevOps for Software-Defined Vehicles     | Role of DevOps, Continuous integration, Deployment pipelines                              | DevOps, CI/CD                         | Streamlining development            | CO4, BTL 3 |\n| 28            | Security Challenges in OTA Updates       | Risks in OTA updates, Mitigation strategies                                              | OTA risks, security                   | Addressing vulnerabilities          | CO4, BTL 4 |\n| 29            | Risks and Threats in OTA Updates         | Types of risks, Impact on vehicle systems                                                | Risks, impact                         | Core OTA challenges                 | CO4, BTL 3 |\n| 30            | OTA Diagnostics                          | Key diagnostic techniques, Tools for OTA diagnostics                                     | OTA diagnostics, tools                | Debugging OTA systems               | CO4, BTL 4 |\n| 31            | Secure Update Delivery Mechanisms        | Integrity and authenticity, Encryption methods                                           | Secure delivery, encryption           | Ensuring safe updates               | CO4, BTL 4 |\n| 32            | Future Challenges in Securing OTA Updates| Emerging risks, Evolving security requirements                                           | Future risks, evolving standards      | Preparing for the future            | CO4, BTL 5 |\n| 33            | Emerging Technologies in Connected Vehicles | Blockchain, AI, IoT integrations                                                        | Blockchain, AI, IoT                  | Advanced integration                | CO4, BTL 5 |\n| 34            | Long-Term Challenges in Connected Vehicles | Scalability, Legal and ethical challenges                                               | Scalability, ethics                   | Exploring broader issues            | CO4, BTL 5 |\n| 35            | Integrated View of Connected Vehicles and Future Directions | Emerging technologies (e.g., AI, blockchain), Long-term challenges                      | AI, blockchain, next-gen trends       | Concluding lecture                  | CO4, BTL 6 |\n\n### Evaluation Criteria\n\n| Component | Marks |\n|:---------:|:-----:|\n| Quizzes |  10 |\n| Assignments | 5 |\n| Mid-Term Examination | 30  |\n| Mini-Project | 15 |\n| End Semester | 40 |\n\n### Dates and Deadlines\n\n| Course Start | 11 - Dec - 2024 | Deadline |\n|--------------|-----------------|:--------:|\n| Mini-Project Problem Statement Submission | 01 - Jan - 2025 | ![](https://img.shields.io/badge/Completed-darkgreen) |\n| Quiz - 1\t  |  31 - Jan - 2025 | ![](https://img.shields.io/badge/Completed-darkgreen) |\n| Mid-Term Examination |\t07 - Feb - 2025 | ![](https://img.shields.io/badge/Completed-darkgreen) |\n| Review - 0 | 14 - Feb - 2025 to 20 - Feb - 2025 | ![](https://img.shields.io/badge/Completed-darkgreen) |\n| Review - 1 | 03 - Mar - 2025 |\n| Quiz - 2\t  |  04 - Mar - 2025 |\n| Review - 2 | 19 - Mar - 2025 |\n| Quiz - 3 | 26 - Mar - 2025 |\n| Missed Quiz | 02 - Apr - 2025 |\n| Review - Final\t| 04 - Apr - 2025 |\n| End Semester Examination\t| 17 - Apr - 2025 |\n| Publication of Results |\t03 - May - 2025 |\n\n### SDG Achievement (through Projects)\n<p align=\"center\">\n<img src=\"https://github.com/ramagururadhakrishnan/UN-SDG/blob/b42040bf1537ad6be89cd71d42050af13e93cc1c/Assets/G7.png\" width=150/>\n<img src=\"https://github.com/ramagururadhakrishnan/UN-SDG/blob/b42040bf1537ad6be89cd71d42050af13e93cc1c/Assets/G9.png\" width=150/>\n<img src=\"https://github.com/ramagururadhakrishnan/UN-SDG/blob/b42040bf1537ad6be89cd71d42050af13e93cc1c/Assets/G11.png\" width=150/>\n<img src=\"https://github.com/ramagururadhakrishnan/UN-SDG/blob/b42040bf1537ad6be89cd71d42050af13e93cc1c/Assets/G12.png\" width=150/>\n<img src=\"https://github.com/ramagururadhakrishnan/UN-SDG/blob/b42040bf1537ad6be89cd71d42050af13e93cc1c/Assets/G13.png\" width=150/>\n<img src=\"https://github.com/ramagururadhakrishnan/UN-SDG/blob/b42040bf1537ad6be89cd71d42050af13e93cc1c/Assets/G16.png\" width=150/>\n<img src=\"https://github.com/ramagururadhakrishnan/UN-SDG/blob/b42040bf1537ad6be89cd71d42050af13e93cc1c/Assets/G17.png\" width=150/>\n</p>",
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      "title": "Teensy 4.0 OBD-II CAN Bus ECU Simulator",
      "full_name": "Wal33D/Teensy40_OBDII_simulator",
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      "description": "Advanced OBD-II CAN Bus ECU simulator for Teensy 4.0 with comprehensive vehicle diagnostics support, dynamic driving simulation, and real Mercedes-Benz data. Implements SAE J1979 protocol with 5 modes and 45+ PIDs.",
      "readme": "# Teensy 4.0 OBD-II CAN Bus ECU Simulator\n\nAn advanced OBD-II emissions monitoring simulator for Teensy 4.0 with comprehensive vehicle diagnostics support, dynamic driving simulation, and real Mercedes-Benz data.\n\n## Understanding OBD-II: An Emissions Program\n\n**Important Context**: OBD-II is fundamentally an emissions control program, not a general diagnostic system. Mandated by the EPA and CARB since January 1, 1996, OBD-II focuses exclusively on emissions-related functions:\n\n- **Covered Systems**: Engine, transmission, and drivetrain components that affect emissions\n- **Not Covered**: Body controls, ABS, airbags, lighting (manufacturer-specific, not OBD-II)\n- **Primary Purpose**: Monitor and ensure vehicles maintain emissions compliance throughout their operational life\n- **Standards**: Based on SAE J1979 recommendations, adopted by EPA for emissions monitoring\n\nThis simulator accurately reproduces the emissions monitoring aspects of OBD-II, providing realistic data that matches real-world emissions testing scenarios.\n\n## Features\n\n### Complete OBD-II Emissions Protocol Support\n\nThis simulator implements 5 of the 10 OBD-II modes, focusing on the emissions-critical modes:\n\n#### Mode 01 - Request Current Powertrain Data (44 PIDs Implemented)\n**Purpose**: Provide access to current LIVE emissions-related data values. These must be actual sensor readings, not defaults or substitutes.\n\n- **Engine Performance**: RPM, speed, coolant temp (affects cold-start emissions), intake temp\n- **Fuel System**: Fuel trims (STFT/LTFT) for maintaining stoichiometric ratio (14.7:1)\n- **Emission Controls**: O2 sensors (primary feedback), catalyst temps, EVAP system\n- **Throttle/Load**: Engine load calculations for emissions optimization\n- **Environmental**: Ambient temp, barometric pressure (altitude compensation)\n- **Diagnostic**: Monitor status (shows which emissions tests have run)\n\n#### Mode 02 - Request Freeze Frame Data (Fully Implemented)\n**Purpose**: Access emissions-related data stored at the moment a DTC was set. Critical for diagnosing intermittent emissions problems.\n\n- Captures exact conditions when emissions fault occurred\n- Stores 2 independent freeze frames for multiple DTCs\n- Preserves data for technician diagnosis even after fault clears\n\n#### Mode 03 - Request Emissions-Related DTCs (Implemented)\n**Purpose**: Retrieve stored emissions-related \"P\" codes that have \"matured\" and triggered the MIL.\n\n- Returns P0118 (Coolant sensor - affects emissions at cold start)\n- Returns P0130 (O2 sensor - critical for emissions feedback loop)\n- Only shows DTCs that affect emissions compliance\n\n#### Mode 04 - Clear/Reset Emissions Diagnostic Information (Implemented)\n**Purpose**: Comprehensive reset of ALL emissions-related diagnostic data.\n\n- Clears emissions DTCs and turns off MIL\n- Erases freeze frame data\n- Resets all emissions monitors to \"not ready\" status\n- Monitors must complete drive cycles to become ready again\n\n#### Mode 09 - Request Vehicle Information (Fully Implemented)\n**Purpose**: Access vehicle identification and calibration data for emissions compliance verification.\n\n- **VIN**: Links vehicle to its emissions certification (4JGDA5HB7JB158144)\n- **Calibration ID**: Identifies emissions software version (2769011200190170)\n- **CVN**: Checksum prevents tampering with emissions tune (EB854939)\n- **ECU Name**: Identifies responding emissions module (ECM-EngineControl)\n- **Performance Tracking**: Monitors how often emissions tests run\n- **ISO-TP Protocol**: Multi-frame support for long messages\n\n#### Modes Not Implemented (Not Critical for Basic Simulation)\n\n- **Mode 05**: O2 sensor test results (legacy, replaced by Mode 06 on CAN systems)\n- **Mode 06**: On-board monitoring test results (manufacturer-specific format)\n- **Mode 07**: Pending codes (first drive cycle after ECM reset)\n- **Mode 08**: Bidirectional control (mainly EVAP system testing)\n- **Mode 10**: Permanent codes (only module can clear after passing self-test)\n\n### Dynamic Emissions Simulation\n\nThe simulator cycles through realistic driving states that affect emissions:\n\n1. **IDLE** (800 RPM, 0 km/h)\n   - Warmed-up engine at optimal temperature for catalytic converter (95°C)\n   - Closed-loop fuel control using O2 sensor feedback\n   - Low emissions state with minimal NOx and HC production\n\n2. **CITY** (1800 RPM, 45 km/h)\n   - Simulates EPA FTP-75 urban driving cycle conditions\n   - Moderate NOx production, catalyst at working temperature\n   - Fuel trims actively adjusting for emissions compliance\n\n3. **ACCELERATING** (3500 RPM, 90 km/h)\n   - Higher emissions during power enrichment phase\n   - Tests catalyst efficiency under load conditions\n   - Temporary open-loop operation during WOT (wide-open throttle)\n\n4. **HIGHWAY** (2500 RPM, 120 km/h)\n   - Steady-state emissions (HWFET cycle conditions)\n   - Optimal fuel efficiency and lowest emissions\n   - Lean cruise for reduced fuel consumption and CO2\n\n5. **BRAKING** (1200 RPM, 30 km/h)\n   - Deceleration fuel cut-off (DFCO) reduces emissions\n   - O2 sensor shows lean condition (>0.8V)\n   - Zero fuel consumption during engine braking\n\n**Emissions Control Features:**\n- Automatic state transitions every 10 seconds (simulates EPA test cycles)\n- Smooth value interpolation prevents emissions spikes\n- Correlated parameters maintain proper stoichiometric air/fuel ratio\n- O2 sensor oscillation (0.35-0.45V) indicates proper closed-loop control\n- 100ms update rate matches real ECU scan frequency for emissions monitoring\n\n## Architecture\n\n### Modular Mode System\n\nThe codebase uses a plugin-based architecture where each OBD-II mode is implemented in its own file and automatically registered at compile time.\n\n**File Structure:**\n```\nTeensy40_OBDII_simulator/\n├── ecu_sim.cpp              # Core ECU logic (291 lines, down from 1,133)\n├── ecu_sim.h                # Type definitions and declarations\n├── mode_registry.h          # Mode registration system\n├── mode_registry.cpp        # Registry implementation\n├── mode_includes.h          # Auto-includes all modes\n└── modes/                   # Mode implementations\n    ├── mode_01.cpp          # Current Data (44 PIDs, 590 lines)\n    ├── mode_02.cpp          # Freeze Frame (206 lines)\n    ├── mode_03.cpp          # DTCs (88 lines)\n    ├── mode_04.cpp          # Clear DTCs (79 lines)\n    └── mode_09.cpp          # Vehicle Info (348 lines)\n```\n\n### Adding New Modes\n\nTo add a new OBD mode (e.g., Mode 06 - Test Results):\n\n1. **Create** `modes/mode_06.cpp`:\n```cpp\n#include \"mode_registry.h\"\n#include <FlexCAN_T4.h>\n\nextern FlexCAN_T4<CAN1, RX_SIZE_256, TX_SIZE_16> can1;\nextern ecu_t ecu;\n\nbool handle_mode_06(CAN_message_t& can_MsgRx,\n                    CAN_message_t& can_MsgTx,\n                    ecu_simClass* ecu_sim) {\n    if (can_MsgRx.buf[1] != MODE6) return false;\n\n    // Your Mode 06 implementation here\n\n    return true;\n}\n\nstatic ModeRegistrar mode_06_registrar(MODE6, handle_mode_06, \"Test Results\");\n```\n\n2. **Add to** `mode_includes.h`:\n```cpp\n#include \"modes/mode_06.cpp\"\n```\n\n3. **Done!** The mode automatically registers and is available.\n\n### Benefits\n\n- **Separation of Concerns**: Each mode is self-contained\n- **Easy Testing**: Test modes independently\n- **Code Clarity**: Main file reduced by 74% (842 lines)\n- **Extensibility**: Add modes without modifying core code\n- **Automatic Registration**: No manual dispatcher updates needed\n\n## Documentation\n\nComprehensive technical documentation is available in the `docs/` directory:\n\n### Mode Documentation\n\nEach OBD-II mode has detailed documentation with protocol specifications, formulas, and usage examples:\n\n- **[MODE_01.md](docs/MODE_01.md)** - Current Powertrain Data (45 PIDs)\n  - Complete SAE J1979 formula reference\n  - All 45 PIDs with data ranges and examples\n  - Dynamic driving simulation states\n  - Multi-ECU response behavior\n\n- **[MODE_02.md](docs/MODE_02.md)** - Freeze Frame Data\n  - Fault condition capture mechanism\n  - 2 independent freeze frame storage\n  - DTC association (P0100, P0200)\n  - Data persistence until Mode 04 clear\n\n- **[MODE_03.md](docs/MODE_03.md)** - Request Emissions DTCs\n  - Emissions diagnostic trouble codes\n  - DTC format and encoding\n  - MIL (Check Engine Light) relationship\n\n- **[MODE_04.md](docs/MODE_04.md)** - Clear Diagnostic Information\n  - Comprehensive emissions data reset\n  - What gets cleared and implications\n  - Post-repair verification workflow\n\n- **[MODE_09.md](docs/MODE_09.md)** - Vehicle Information\n  - VIN, Calibration ID, CVN retrieval\n  - ISO-TP multi-frame protocol\n  - Real Mercedes-Benz data integration\n  - Compliance verification\n\n### Technical Reports\n\n- **[MODE_01_AUDIT.md](MODE_01_AUDIT.md)** - Initial protocol audit findings\n- **[MODE_01_FIXES_SUMMARY.md](MODE_01_FIXES_SUMMARY.md)** - Complete fix documentation\n\n## Hardware Requirements\n\n- **Teensy 4.0** microcontroller\n- **CAN Bus transceiver** (MCP2562 or similar)\n- **OBD-II connector** wiring\n- Optional: Status LEDs (red/green)\n\n### Pin Connections\n```\nTeensy 4.0    ->  CAN Transceiver\nPin 22 (CTX1) ->  TXD\nPin 23 (CRX1) ->  RXD\nGND           ->  GND\n3.3V          ->  VCC\n\nStatus LEDs:\nPin 13        ->  Built-in LED\nPin 19        ->  Red LED (optional)\nPin 20        ->  Green LED (optional)\n```\n\n## Installation\n\n### Prerequisites\n\n1. Install [Teensyduino](https://www.pjrc.com/teensy/teensyduino.html) for Arduino IDE\n2. Install required library:\n   - FlexCAN_T4 (via Library Manager)\n3. Install Teensy Loader (choose one):\n   - **[Teensy Loader GUI](https://www.pjrc.com/teensy/loader.html)** - Graphical application\n   - **[Teensy Loader CLI](https://www.pjrc.com/teensy/loader_cli.html)** - Command-line tool\n     ```bash\n     # macOS\n     brew install teensy_loader_cli\n\n     # Linux\n     sudo apt-get install teensy-loader-cli\n\n     # From source\n     git clone https://github.com/PaulStoffregen/teensy_loader_cli\n     cd teensy_loader_cli\n     make\n     ```\n\n### Setup\n\n1. Clone this repository:\n   ```bash\n   git clone https://github.com/Wal33D/Teensy40_OBDII_simulator.git\n   cd Teensy40_OBDII_simulator\n   ```\n\n2. **Option A: Arduino IDE**\n   - Open `Teensy40_OBDII_simulator.ino` in Arduino IDE\n   - Select **Tools > Board > Teensy 4.0**\n   - Select **Tools > USB Type > Serial**\n   - Click Upload\n\n3. **Option B: Command Line (Recommended)**\n   ```bash\n   # Compile\n   arduino-cli compile --fqbn teensy:avr:teensy40 .\n\n   # Upload with CLI loader\n   teensy_loader_cli --mcu=TEENSY40 -w -v build/Teensy40_OBDII_simulator.ino.hex\n   ```\n\n## Flashing Firmware with Teensy Loader GUI\n\n---\n\n### Overview\n\n**Flashing Method:** Graphical User Interface\n**Estimated Time:** 5-10 seconds\n**Difficulty:** Beginner-friendly\n\n| Step | Action | Duration |\n|------|--------|----------|\n| 1 | Press program button | Instant |\n| 2 | Select HEX file | ~1 second |\n| 3 | Verify configuration | ~1 second |\n| 4 | Automatic flashing | 3-5 seconds |\n| 5 | Reboot and run | 1-2 seconds |\n\n---\n\n### Step-by-Step Guide\n\n#### **Step 1: Prepare Your Device**\n\nPress the **program button** on your Teensy 4.0 device to put it into bootloader mode. The Teensy Loader application will automatically detect the device and show it as ready to program.\n\n<div align=\"center\">\n  <img src=\"teensy_loader_screenshots/teensy_loader_press_button_on_device.png\" alt=\"Press Button on Device\" width=\"225\"/>\n  <br/>\n  <em>Teensy Loader detecting device in bootloader mode</em>\n</div>\n\n---\n\n#### **Step 2: Select the HEX File**\n\nClick **\"Open HEX File\"** in the Teensy Loader and navigate to your compiled firmware:\n\n```\nbuild/Teensy40_OBDII_simulator.ino.hex\n```\n\n<div align=\"center\">\n  <img src=\"teensy_loader_screenshots/teensy_loader_select_file.png\" alt=\"Select Hex File\" width=\"600\"/>\n  <br/>\n  <em>File selection dialog - navigate to your build directory</em>\n</div>\n\n---\n\n#### **Step 3: Verify Configuration**\n\nBefore flashing, confirm the following settings:\n\n- ✅ Correct **board type** (Teensy 4.0) is selected\n- ✅ **HEX file path** displays correctly\n- ✅ Device shows as **connected** (green indicator)\n\n<div align=\"center\">\n  <img src=\"teensy_loader_screenshots/teensy_loader_ready_to_flash.png\" alt=\"Ready to Flash\" width=\"225\"/>\n  <br/>\n  <em>Configuration verified and ready to flash</em>\n</div>\n\n---\n\n#### **Step 4: Automatic Flashing**\n\nThe Teensy Loader will automatically begin the flashing sequence:\n\n| Phase | Description | Status |\n|-------|-------------|--------|\n| **Erase** | Clearing existing firmware | In progress... |\n| **Write** | Programming new firmware | In progress... |\n| **Verify** | Confirming successful flash | Completed ✓ |\n\n<div align=\"center\">\n  <img src=\"teensy_loader_screenshots/teensy_loader_success_flashed.png\" alt=\"Flashing Success\" width=\"225\"/>\n  <br/>\n  <em>Firmware successfully flashed and verified</em>\n</div>\n\n---\n\n#### **Step 5: Reboot and Run**\n\nOnce flashing completes, the Teensy will automatically **reboot** and begin running your OBD-II simulator firmware. The status LEDs should activate with their normal operating patterns.\n\n<div align=\"center\">\n  <img src=\"teensy_loader_screenshots/teensy_loader_success_reboot.png\" alt=\"Reboot Complete\" width=\"225\"/>\n  <br/>\n  <em>Device rebooted successfully - simulator is now running</em>\n</div>\n\n---\n\n### Important Notes\n\n| ⚠️ | **Safety Precautions** |\n|---|------------------------|\n| ⏱️ | The entire process takes approximately **5-10 seconds** |\n| 🔌 | **Do not disconnect** the device during flashing |\n| 🔄 | If flashing fails, press the program button again and retry |\n| 💾 | The Teensy will remember the last HEX file loaded for quick re-flashing |\n| 📍 | Ensure you're in the correct project directory when selecting the HEX file |\n\n---\n\n## Usage\n\n1. Connect the Teensy to your vehicle's OBD-II port or diagnostic tool\n2. Power on the device (via USB or OBD-II connector)\n3. The simulator automatically starts broadcasting responses\n4. LEDs indicate status:\n   - **Green flash**: Normal operation\n   - **Red flash**: CAN message received\n   - **Built-in LED**: Heartbeat (500ms interval)\n\n## Testing\n\nCompatible with any OBD-II scanner or software:\n- **Torque Pro** (Android)\n- **OBD Fusion** (iOS/Android)\n- **ScanTool.net OBDLink**\n- **ELM327** based tools\n- Custom diagnostic software\n\n## Data Accuracy\n\nAll simulated values are based on real vehicle data:\n- **Source Vehicle**: Mercedes-Benz\n- **Data Points**: 7,510+ logged OBD responses\n- **Driving Conditions**: Real-world idle, city, highway, and braking scenarios\n- **Protocol Compliance**: ISO 15765-4 CAN (11-bit, 500kbps)\n\n## Code Statistics\n\n### Evolution from Original\n- **Original Code**: 199 lines (basic 8 PIDs)\n- **Enhanced Code v2.0**: 1,085+ lines (44 PIDs + modes)\n- **Modular Refactor v3.0**: 1,711 lines across modular files\n- **Growth Factor**: 8.6x from original\n- **Code Reduction**: Main file reduced 74% (842 lines) via modularization\n- **New Features**: 81 additional switch cases\n- **Protocol Support**: ISO-TP multi-frame handling\n\n### File Structure (Modular Architecture)\n```\nTeensy40_OBDII_simulator/\n├── Teensy40_OBDII_simulator.ino  # Main sketch (72 lines)\n├── ecu_sim.cpp                    # Core ECU logic (291 lines)\n├── ecu_sim.h                      # Type definitions (284 lines)\n├── mode_registry.h                # Mode registration system (122 lines)\n├── mode_registry.cpp              # Registry implementation (3 lines)\n├── mode_includes.h                # Auto-include all modes (21 lines)\n├── modes/\n│   ├── mode_01.cpp                # Current Data - 44 PIDs (590 lines)\n│   ├── mode_02.cpp                # Freeze Frame (206 lines)\n│   ├── mode_03.cpp                # DTCs (88 lines)\n│   ├── mode_04.cpp                # Clear DTCs (79 lines)\n│   └── mode_09.cpp                # Vehicle Info (348 lines)\n├── CHANGELOG.md                   # Detailed change history\n└── README.md                      # This file\n```\n\n### Metrics by Version\n| Metric | v1.0 (Original) | v2.0 (Enhanced) | v3.0 (Modular) | v3.1 (Protocol) |\n|--------|-----------------|-----------------|----------------|-----------------|\n| Total Lines | 337 | 1,485 | 1,711 | 1,719 |\n| OBD Modes | 3 | 5 | 5 | 5 |\n| Mode 01 PIDs | 8 | 44 | 44 | 45 |\n| Files | 3 | 3 | 12 | 17 |\n| Largest File | 199 lines | 1,133 lines | 590 lines | 598 lines |\n| Modularity | None | None | Full | Full |\n| Protocol Compliance | Partial | Partial | Partial | **100%** |\n\n## Version History\n\n### v3.1.0 (2024) - Protocol Compliance & Documentation by Wal33D\n- **Critical Protocol Fixes**: 23 bugs corrected for 100% SAE J1979 compliance\n  - Fixed 20 missing CAN IDs (PIDs 0x31-0x58)\n  - Corrected O2 voltage range (0.35V-0.55V per spec)\n  - Fixed fuel rail pressure formula (400 kPa realistic value)\n  - Added missing PID 0x14 (O2 Voltage) handler\n  - Updated supported PID bitmasks for accuracy\n- **Comprehensive Documentation**: 5 detailed mode guides in docs/\n  - MODE_01.md: All 45 PIDs with SAE J1979 formulas\n  - MODE_02.md: Freeze frame data capture and storage\n  - MODE_03.md: Emissions DTC retrieval\n  - MODE_04.md: Diagnostic data clearing\n  - MODE_09.md: Vehicle information and ISO-TP protocol\n- **Build Verified**: Successful compilation and flash to Teensy 4.0\n- **Real-World Testing**: Confirmed working with Bluetooth OBD dongles\n\n### v3.0.0 (2024) - Modular Architecture Refactor by Wal33D\n- Complete architectural refactoring to modular plugin system\n- Each OBD mode in separate file (modes/mode_XX.cpp)\n- Automatic mode registration system\n- Main file reduced by 74% (842 lines)\n- Easy extensibility - add modes without modifying core\n- Improved code organization and maintainability\n- Added comprehensive architecture documentation\n\n### v2.0.0 (2024) - Major Enhancement by Wal33D\n- Added 36 new Mode 01 PIDs\n- Implemented Mode 02 (Freeze Frame)\n- Implemented Mode 09 (Vehicle Information)\n- Dynamic driving state simulation\n- ISO-TP multi-frame protocol support\n- Real Mercedes-Benz data integration\n\n### v1.0.0 (2022) - Original by skpang.co.uk\n- Basic Mode 01 (8 PIDs)\n- Mode 03/04 DTC support\n- Static potentiometer-based values\n\n## Technical Details\n\n### CAN Configuration\n- **Baud Rate**: 500kbps (standard OBD-II)\n- **CAN ID Request**: 0x7DF (broadcast) or 0x7E0 (ECU specific)\n- **CAN ID Response**: 0x7E8\n- **Protocol**: ISO 15765-4\n\n### Response Format\n```\nStandard Response: [Mode+0x40] [PID] [Data...]\nExample Mode 01: 41 0C XX XX (RPM response)\nExample Mode 09: 49 02 01 [VIN data...] (VIN response)\n```\n\n### Multi-Frame Messages (ISO-TP)\nFor responses > 8 bytes (like VIN):\n1. First Frame: `10 [length] [data...]`\n2. Flow Control: Wait for `30 00 00`\n3. Consecutive Frames: `21 [data...]`, `22 [data...]`\n\n## Contributing\n\nContributions are welcome! Please ensure:\n1. Code follows existing style\n2. Comments explain complex logic\n3. Test with real OBD-II scanners\n4. Update CHANGELOG.md\n\n## License\n\nThis project is based on original work by skpang.co.uk (2022) with significant enhancements.\n\n## Author\n\n**Enhanced Version (v2.0.0)**\n- Waleed Judah (Wal33D)\n- Email: aquataze@yahoo.com\n- GitHub: [@Wal33D](https://github.com/Wal33D)\n\n**Original Version (v1.0.0)**\n- skpang.co.uk\n- [Product Page](https://www.skpang.co.uk/collections/teensy/products/teensy-4-0-obdii-can-bus-ecu-simulator-with-teensy-4-0)\n\n## Acknowledgments\n\n- Original simulator framework by skpang.co.uk\n- FlexCAN_T4 library by tonton81\n- Real vehicle data from Mercedes-Benz diagnostics\n- OBD-II PID documentation from Wikipedia\n\n---\n\n**Note**: This simulator is for educational and development purposes. Always comply with local regulations when working with vehicle systems.",
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      "readme": "# rust-v-hsm-can\n\nVirtual Hardware Security Module (V-HSM) for CAN Bus security, written in Rust.\n\n**RUNNING ON REAL HARDWARE: Raspberry Pi 4 with Multi-Core Architecture**\n\nThis project is deployed on **Raspberry Pi 4 Model B** (4x ARM Cortex-A72 cores) with CPU affinity pinning, demonstrating real-time automotive CAN bus security on embedded hardware.\n\n**CAN Bus Monitor on Raspberry Pi 4:**\n\n<img src=\"utils/docs/CAN_bus_monitor_on_pi4.png\" alt=\"CAN Bus Monitor running on Raspberry Pi 4\" width=\"100%\"/>\n\nThis repository contains two CAN bus implementations:\n\n1. **[basic/](basic/)** - Original simple CAN bus implementation for learning and testing\n2. **[autonomous_controller/](autonomous_controller/)** - **MAIN PROJECT**: Autonomous vehicle CAN bus running on Raspberry Pi 4 hardware with 9 ECUs\n\n## Quick Start (on Raspberry Pi 4)\n\n### Option A: Autonomous Vehicle System (with HSM security)\n```bash\ncd autonomous_controller\ncargo run              # Standard mode\ncargo run -- --perf    # With HSM performance metrics\n# Press 'q' to quit\n```\n\nThe system will automatically:\n1. Start HSM service on dedicated Core 3 (crypto engine)\n2. Launch bus server on Core 0\n3. Start 6 sensor ECUs on Core 1 (wheels, engine, steering)\n4. Start 3 controller ECUs on Core 2 (autonomous, brake, steering)\n5. Display real-time dashboard on Core 0\n\n### Option B: Basic CAN Simulator\n```bash\ncd basic\ncargo run --bin demo  # Single-process demo\n# OR multi-terminal mode (see basic/README.md)\n```\n\n## Architecture Overview\n\n### Basic Project Architecture\n\n```\nInput ECU ──┐\n            │\n            ├──> Virtual CAN Bus ──┬──> Output ECU\n            │                      │\n            │                      └──> Monitor\n            │\nMore ECUs ──┘\n```\n\nThe system simulates a complete CAN bus network:\n\n- **Virtual CAN Bus**: Broadcast communication channel that simulates real CAN bus behavior. All connected nodes see all messages with sub-millisecond latency.\n- **Input ECU (ARM Cortex-M4)**: Emulates a sensor/actuator ECU that sends CAN frames to the bus. Supports both standard (11-bit) and extended (29-bit) CAN IDs.\n- **Output ECU (ARM Cortex-M7)**: Emulates a high-performance control ECU that receives and processes CAN frames from the bus.\n- **Monitor**: Observes all bus traffic with color-coded timestamps, IDs, data length, and payload.\n\nAll components connect to a shared broadcast bus. Any frame sent by any ECU is received by all other connected components.\n\n### Autonomous Vehicle Project Architecture (Running on Pi4 Hardware)\n\n<img src=\"utils/docs/architecture.png\" alt=\"CAN Bus Architecture with V-HSM Security\" width=\"100%\"/>\n\n**Hardware Platform**: Raspberry Pi 4 Model B\n- **CPU**: 4x ARM Cortex-A72 cores @ 1.5GHz (64-bit ARMv8-A)\n- **Architecture**: aarch64 (ARM64)\n- **Memory**: 4GB LPDDR4\n- **OS**: Linux 6.12.34+rpt-rpi-v8\n\n**Multi-Core Architecture**:\n```\nCore 0: Bus Server + Monitor          (Infrastructure)\nCore 1: 6 Sensor ECUs                 (Data producers)\nCore 2: 3 Controller/Actuator ECUs    (Data consumers)\nCore 3: HSM Service                   (Dedicated crypto engine)\n```\n\n**9 ECUs**: wheel_fl, wheel_fr, wheel_rl, wheel_rr, engine_ecu, steering_sensor, autonomous_controller, brake_controller, steering_controller\n\n**Key Components**:\n- 6 Sensor ECUs sending real-time vehicle data\n- **Centralized HSM Service** on dedicated Core 3 (Unix socket IPC)\n- Hardware-based RNG (Linux getrandom syscall)\n- AES-256-GCM encryption with hardware acceleration\n- V-HSM Security Layer protecting all communications with HMAC-SHA256 + CRC32\n- CAN Bus Server as central TCP broadcast hub\n- Autonomous Controller processing sensor data and making driving decisions\n- 2 Actuator ECUs receiving control commands\n- Monitor providing real-time dashboard and security status\n\n**Features**:\n- Virtual HSM (Hardware Security Module) with HMAC-SHA256 MAC and CRC32 verification\n- **Multi-core processing** with CPU affinity pinning (process-per-ECU model)\n- **Hardware-based random number generation** (cryptographically secure)\n- Secure boot and protected memory for all ECUs\n- Automotive CAN message IDs (0x100-0x3FF range)\n- Periodic sensor broadcasts at 10-20 Hz\n- Autonomous control loop with speed control and path following\n- Safety features: brake pressure limiting, steering rate limiting\n- Anomaly detection for wheel speed discrepancies\n- Real-time dashboard monitor with security status\n\n### Emergency Attack Response\n\nWhen an unsecured CAN frame (MAC=0) is detected, the autonomous controller immediately enters emergency shutdown mode:\n- **Automatic Shutdown**: All control commands (brake, throttle, steering) stop immediately\n- **Safe Monitoring**: Continues reading sensor data but takes NO action\n- **Visible Alert**: Monitor displays red warning banner: \"⚠ AUTONOMOUS CONTROLLER DEACTIVATED ⚠\"\n- **Manual Recovery**: Requires restart to resume operation\n\nThis fail-safe mechanism prevents compromised commands from reaching vehicle actuators during an active attack.\n\n<img src=\"utils/docs/CAN_bus_monitor_HSM_warning.png\" alt=\"Alt Text\" width=\"100%\"/>\n\n### HSM Security Keys\n\nEach ECU's Virtual HSM manages 7 cryptographic keys (all 256-bit):\n\n- **Master Key**: Root key for key derivation hierarchy\n- **Secure Boot Key**: Firmware signature verification\n- **Firmware Update Key**: Firmware update authorization\n- **Symmetric Comm Key**: HMAC-SHA256 MAC generation for CAN messages\n- **Key Encryption Key**: Secure key exchange/provisioning\n- **RNG Seed Key**: Deterministic random number generation\n- **Seed/Key Access Token**: Diagnostic access control (UDS seed/key)\n\nEach ECU also maintains **MAC Verification Keys** for all trusted ECUs on the network.\n\n### Attack Detection\n\nAll ECUs use threshold-based attack detection with structured error types:\n- **MAC errors**: Tolerates 3 consecutive failures (strict cryptographic security)\n- **CRC errors**: Tolerates 5 consecutive failures (noise/corruption tolerance)\n- **Unsecured frames**: Triggers immediately (no tolerance for injection attacks)\n\nError counters reset automatically on successful frame validation, allowing recovery from transient failures while detecting sustained attacks.\n\n### ISO 21434 Cybersecurity Compliance\n\nThis project implements comprehensive ISO/SAE 21434:2021 (Road Vehicles - Cybersecurity Engineering) compliance features:\n\n**Automated Incident Response** (§8.6, §9.4.3):\n- Severity-based incident classification (Low/Medium/High/Critical)\n- 8 incident categories with automated response actions\n- Graduated response: Log → Alert → Fail-Safe → Isolate ECU\n- Incident escalation and resolution tracking\n\n**Security Event Correlation** (§9.4.2, §10.4):\n- Pattern-based attack detection across time and ECUs\n- 8 attack patterns: Coordinated Multi-Source, Progressive Escalation, Targeted Attack, Multi-ECU Replay, Brute Force, etc.\n- Time-window correlation analysis (60-second windows)\n- Automated mitigation recommendations\n\n**Firmware Update Rollback** (§8.5, §10.3):\n- Secure firmware updates with signature verification\n- Automatic rollback on validation failure\n- Boot attempt limiting (max 3 attempts)\n- Version rollback prevention\n- Update lifecycle: Pending → Installing → AwaitingValidation → Committed\n\n**TARA Documentation** (§8.4):\n- Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment generator\n- STRIDE threat modeling methodology\n- ISO 21434 risk matrix (impact × feasibility)\n- 6 pre-defined automotive threat scenarios\n- Automated TARA report generation\n\n**Security Audit Reports**:\n- Comprehensive ISO 21434 compliance documentation\n- Coverage of 10+ ISO 21434 requirements\n- Run: `cargo run --bin iso21434_audit_report`\n- Run: `cargo run --bin generate_tara_report`\n\nSee [autonomous_controller/README.md](autonomous_controller/README.md) for complete documentation.\n\n### Advanced Automotive Security Features (Phase 3 & 4)\n\n**UDS Secure Diagnostics** (ISO 14229):\n- Seed/key challenge-response authentication\n- 4 security levels (Level1-Level4) with graduated permissions\n- Session management with timeout protection\n- Lockout mechanism after 3 failed attempts (60-second lockout)\n- Diagnostic services: Security Access, Session Control, ECU Reset\n\n**Signed Configuration Management**:\n- Cryptographic integrity protection for ECU configurations\n- HMAC-SHA256 signatures with SHA256 fingerprinting\n- 5 configuration types: Access Control Policy, Diagnostic Config, Network Config, Security Config, Firmware Metadata\n- Authorized signer validation (FACTORY, FLEET_MANAGER)\n- Tamper detection and rejection\n\n**Enhanced Security Dashboard**:\n- Real-time threat level visualization (Secure/Low/Medium/High/Critical)\n- Security rate percentage tracking (secured vs unsecured frames)\n- Per-ECU attack statistics with attack rate calculation\n- Unique CAN ID monitoring\n- Attack duration tracking\n- Color-coded threat indicators\n\n**Security Gateway** (Zone Segmentation):\n- Zone-based CAN bus isolation: Powertrain, Chassis, ADAS, Infotainment, Body, Diagnostics\n- Zone-to-zone routing policies with default actions (Allow/Deny/Audit)\n- CAN ID whitelisting per route\n- Audit logging for cross-zone traffic\n- Prevents infotainment compromise from affecting safety-critical systems\n- Statistics tracking: messages forwarded/blocked/audited\n\n## Build\n\nEach project is independent:\n\n```bash\n# Build autonomous vehicle simulator\ncd autonomous_controller\ncargo build --release\n\n# Build basic simulator\ncd ../basic\ncargo build --release\n```\n\n## Project Structure\n\n```\nrust-v-hsm-can/\n├── basic/                      # Original simple implementation\n│   ├── src/\n│   │   ├── types.rs           # CAN frame types\n│   │   ├── can_bus.rs         # Virtual CAN bus\n│   │   ├── ecu.rs             # ECU emulator\n│   │   ├── network.rs         # TCP networking\n│   │   └── bin/\n│   │       ├── bus_server.rs  # Bus server\n│   │       ├── monitor.rs     # Traffic monitor\n│   │       ├── input_ecu.rs   # Interactive sender\n│   │       ├── output_ecu.rs  # Receiver\n│   │       └── demo.rs        # Single-process demo\n│   └── README.md\n│\n├── autonomous_controller/      # Realistic autonomous vehicle\n│   ├── src/\n│   │   ├── types.rs           # Automotive CAN types\n│   │   ├── can_bus.rs         # Virtual CAN bus\n│   │   ├── ecu.rs             # ECU emulator\n│   │   ├── network.rs         # TCP networking\n│   │   ├── hsm/               # Virtual HSM with cryptography (modular)\n│   │   ├── protected_memory.rs # Secure boot and memory\n│   │   └── bin/\n│   │       ├── bus_server.rs           # Bus server\n│   │       ├── monitor.rs              # Enhanced monitor\n│   │       ├── wheel_fl.rs             # Front left wheel\n│   │       ├── wheel_fr.rs             # Front right wheel\n│   │       ├── wheel_rl.rs             # Rear left wheel\n│   │       ├── wheel_rr.rs             # Rear right wheel\n│   │       ├── engine_ecu.rs           # Engine control\n│   │       ├── steering_sensor.rs      # Steering sensors\n│   │       ├── autonomous_controller.rs # Autonomous brain\n│   │       ├── brake_controller.rs     # Brake actuator\n│   │       └── steering_controller.rs  # Steering actuator\n│   └── README.md\n│\n├── CHANGELOG.md           # Project history\n└── README.md              # This file\n```\n\n## Testing\n\n### Quick Start: Run All CI Tests Locally\n\n```bash\n./run_ci_tests.sh\n```\n\nThis script runs the complete CI test suite (9 test categories) and provides colored output with pass/fail status. Use this before pushing to ensure all tests pass.\n\n### Individual Test Categories\n\n```bash\n# Formatting and linting\ncargo fmt -- --check\ncargo clippy -- -D warnings\n\n# Build\ncargo build --verbose\n\n# Unit tests (133 tests)\ncargo test --workspace --lib --verbose\n\n# Integration tests (14 tests)\ncargo test --workspace --test integration_tests --verbose\n\n# Regression tests (4 suites)\ncargo test --test attack_regression_tests -- --ignored --test-threads=1 --nocapture\ncargo test --test access_control_regression_tests -- --ignored --test-threads=1 --nocapture\ncargo test --test replay_protection_regression_tests -- --ignored --test-threads=1 --nocapture\ncargo test --package autonomous_vehicle_sim --test anomaly_ids_regression_tests -- --ignored --test-threads=1 --nocapture\n```\n\n**Total Test Count:** 266+ tests across all categories (257 unit + 9 monitor UI + integration + regression)\n\nSee [tests/README.md](tests/README.md) for details.\n\n## Development Status\n\n**Completed Features:**\n- [x] V-HSM cryptographic layer (HMAC-SHA256 + CRC32)\n- [x] Message authentication codes (MAC)\n- [x] Key management system\n- [x] Attack scenario scripts\n- [x] Intrusion detection system\n- [x] Performance benchmarks\n- [x] HSM performance evaluation mode\n- [x] Regression tests with CI/CD integration\n- [x] **Hardware deployment on Raspberry Pi 4**\n- [x] **Multi-core architecture with CPU affinity**\n- [x] **Centralized HSM service (Unix socket IPC)**\n- [x] **Hardware-based RNG (Linux getrandom)**\n- [x] **AES-256-GCM encryption**\n\n**Future Enhancements:**\n- [ ] CAN FD support\n- [ ] Hardware CAN bus interface (MCP2515/MCP2518FD)\n- [ ] Real-time scheduling (SCHED_FIFO)\n- [ ] Zephyr RTOS integration\n- [ ] Hardware HSM (TPM, ARM TrustZone)\n\n### ISO 21434 Roadmap\n\n**Phase 1 - Foundation:**\n- [x] Security event logging (tamper-resistant audit trail)\n- [x] CAN ID access control whitelist (authorization model)\n- [x] Enhanced replay protection (sliding window + timestamps)\n\n**Phase 2 - Detection:**\n- [x] Rate limiting and DoS prevention (per-ECU throttling)\n- [x] Anomaly-based IDS (statistical baseline profiling)\n- [x] Attack simulation framework (fuzzing, injection, replay)\n\n**Phase 3 - Architecture (Completed):**\n- [x] Security gateway ECU (zone segmentation)\n- [x] Cryptographic key rotation (session key lifecycle)\n- [x] Enhanced security dashboard (real-time threat metrics)\n\n**Phase 4 - Advanced (Completed):**\n- [x] UDS secure diagnostics (seed/key authentication)\n- [x] Signed configuration management (policy tampering detection)\n- [x] Advanced fail-safe recovery mechanisms\n\n**Phase 5 - ISO 21434 Compliance (Completed):**\n- [x] Automated incident response (§8.6, §9.4.3)\n- [x] Security event correlation (§9.4.2, §10.4)\n- [x] Firmware update rollback (§8.5, §10.3)\n- [x] TARA documentation generator (§8.4)\n- [x] ISO 21434 audit reporting\n\n**To Do**\n- [x] Hardware based RNG (Linux, ARM, Windows)\n- [ ] ~~CAN Message readable~~ This is readable by design, since this project is meant to experimenting, we need to see the raw data\n- [x] Replace XOR-based Encryption with AES-256-GCM",
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      "description": "SAE J2534-1 v04.04 PassThru DLL for an STM32 CAN/OBD-II adapter. Confirmed with Toyota Techstream, VW ODIS, and Ford IDS.",
      "readme": "# Taskmanager J2534 Bridge\n\n[[Build J2534 DLL](https://github.com/gorevyoneticisi/taskmanager-j2534/actions/workflows/build.yml/badge.svg)](https://github.com/gorevyoneticisi/taskmanager-j2534/actions/workflows/build.yml)\n![Standard](https://img.shields.io/badge/SAE_J2534--1-v04.04-blue)\n![Protocols](https://img.shields.io/badge/CAN_%2F_ISO15765-supported-success)\n![Techstream](https://img.shields.io/badge/Toyota_Techstream-connected-brightgreen)\n![Platform](https://img.shields.io/badge/Windows-7_%E2%86%92_11-informational)\n\n> ### One independent cable. The real dealer software. A fraction of the price.\n>\n> Most professional diagnostic interfaces lock you to one brand and cost **$300–$500 each**. The Taskmanager J2534 Bridge is a single, galvanically-isolated adapter that speaks the **universal J2534 standard the OEM tools already use**, so the *actual dealer software* talks to the car through hardware you can build for personal, non-commercial use under the repository license.\n\n<p align=\"center\">\n  <img src=\"images/adapter-hardware-prototype.jpg\" alt=\"Taskmanager J2534 Bridge, hand-built prototype\" width=\"600\"><br>\n  <em>Prototype adapter, STM32F407 + FT232H + ADuM1201 + SN65HVD230, running Toyota Techstream on a real 2020 Corolla.</em>\n</p>\n\n<p align=\"center\">\n  <img src=\"images/techstream-corolla-2020.jpg\" alt=\"Techstream running on Toyota Corolla 2020\" width=\"600\"><br>\n  <em>Techstream connected to a 2020 Toyota Corolla, real ECU scan in progress.</em>\n</p>\n\n<p align=\"center\">\n  <img src=\"images/taskmanager-obd-reader.png\" alt=\"Taskmanager OBD2 Reader companion app\" width=\"560\"><br>\n  <em>The companion live-data / fault-code app that ships alongside the bridge.</em>\n</p>\n\n<p align=\"center\">\n  <b><a href=\"#support--sponsorship\">Support the build</a> &nbsp;•&nbsp; <a href=\"#support--sponsorship\">Partner / Inquire</a> &nbsp;•&nbsp; Star to follow along</b>\n</p>\n\n---\n## In Active Development\n\n**v2 is live and being tested on real vehicles.** Toyota Techstream customization, K-line (ISO9141/ISO14230), 29-bit extended CAN IDs, dynamic baud-rate switching, and automatic COM-port detection are working.\n\n**Next up (v3):** DOIP (Diagnostics over IP), SWCAN (Single-Wire CAN for GM), CAN FD, and multi-bus support. The goal is one adapter that speaks every protocol.\n\nThis public repository contains the **v1 firmware and DLL** (standard 11-bit CAN). The v2 DLL + firmware are in active development. Star this repo to follow along, or [open an issue](https://github.com/gorevyoneticisi/taskmanager-j2534/issues) if you want early access.\n\nThe published source is **source-available, not open source**. The license permits\nviewing and personal, non-commercial builds; it does not permit redistribution,\nderivative works, or commercial use without written permission.\n\nA **CAN/ISO15765-focused SAE J2534-1 v04.04** PassThru DLL written in C# (.NET Framework 4.7.2, x86) that connects a custom STM32F407-based CAN adapter to Windows diagnostic applications that support J2534 over CAN. No proprietary drivers, no locked hardware.\n\n**Confirmed working with:**\n- Toyota Techstream\n- VW ODIS 25\n- Ford IDS\n\n**Expected compatible with:**\n- CAN/ISO15765-based J2534-1 v04.04 diagnostic applications\n- Modern vehicles using standard 11-bit CAN / ISO15765 diagnostics\n\nAdditional J2534 protocols and physical layers are planned for future hardware/firmware updates.\n\n---\n\n## Why This Exists\n\nEvery commercial J2534 interface ships with a proprietary DLL that locks you to their hardware. This project breaks that dependency: the DLL implements the **J2534-1 v04.04 PassThru API for CAN and ISO15765 in software, with additional protocols planned for future hardware/firmware updates**, while the STM32 firmware is kept intentionally thin. It only moves raw CAN frames over UART. Swap the hardware, keep the software.\n\n---\n\n## Diagnostic Software Compatibility\n\n### Tools that work with this adapter\n\nThe current adapter supports **CAN and ISO15765 (UDS)**. Any diagnostic tool that uses J2534 to communicate over those protocols on modern vehicles is a realistic target for compatibility.\n\nConfirmed means the tool has been tested with this project. Expected means the tool should work when it uses standard J2534 CAN/ISO15765, but has not yet been fully validated across vehicles and modules.\n\n| Manufacturer | Tool | J2534 | Status |\n|---|---|---|---|\n| Toyota / Lexus / Scion | Techstream | Yes | **Confirmed** |\n| VW / Audi / Seat / Skoda / Bentley | ODIS | Yes | **Confirmed** |\n| Ford / Lincoln | IDS | Yes | **Confirmed** |\n| BMW / Mini / Rolls Royce | ISTA-D, ISTA-P | Yes | **Expected** - CAN vehicles |\n| Mercedes-Benz / Smart | XENTRY / DAS | Yes | **Expected** - CAN vehicles |\n| Ford / Lincoln | FDRS | Yes | **Expected** - CAN vehicles |\n| Ford / Lincoln (3rd party) | FORScan | Yes | **Expected** - CAN vehicles |\n| GM (Chevrolet / GMC / Buick / Cadillac) | GDS2 | Yes | **Expected** - standard CAN modules |\n| GM | Tech2Win | Yes | **Expected** - standard CAN modules |\n| Honda / Acura | i-HDS, HDS | Yes | **Expected** - CAN vehicles |\n| Nissan / Infiniti | Consult III Plus | Yes | **Expected** - CAN vehicles |\n| FCA (Chrysler / Dodge / Jeep / Ram / Fiat / Alfa) | wiTECH 2.0 | Yes | **Expected** - CAN vehicles |\n| FCA (3rd party) | MultiECUScan | Yes | **Expected** - CAN vehicles |\n| PSA (Peugeot / Citroen) | DiagBox | Yes | **Expected** - CAN vehicles |\n| Volvo | VIDA | Yes | **Expected** - CAN vehicles |\n| Subaru | SSM4 (Select Monitor 4) | Yes | **Expected** - CAN vehicles |\n| Mazda | MDARS, IDS Legacy | Yes | **Expected** - CAN vehicles |\n| Hyundai / Kia | GDS, KDS | Yes | **Expected** - CAN vehicles |\n| Jaguar / Land Rover | Pathfinder, SDD | Yes | **Expected** - CAN vehicles |\n| Porsche | PIWIS III | Yes | **Expected** - CAN vehicles |\n| VW Group (3rd party) | VCDS (VAG-COM) | No | **Not supported** - Ross-Tech hardware only |\n| Renault / Dacia | CAN Clip | Partial | **Partial** - may require special registry setup |\n\n### Why VCDS does not work\n\nVCDS by Ross-Tech requires their own proprietary HEX-NET or HEX-V2 hardware. It does not provide a normal third-party J2534 interface mode. You cannot use a generic J2534 device with VCDS.\n\n### Why some vehicles in the list may not work\n\nThe public v1 adapter supports **CAN and ISO15765 only**. It does not support\nK-line, J1850, SWCAN, CAN FD, or DoIP. Private v2 adds working K-line\n(ISO9141/ISO14230) support; the other physical layers remain on the roadmap. If\nyour vehicle or module requires a protocol unavailable in the release you are\nusing, the adapter will not communicate with that module even when the\ndiagnostic software itself supports J2534.\n\nExamples that the public v1 release will not cover:\n- Honda pre-2008 K-line ECUs with i-HDS\n- Older Subaru vehicles using the proprietary SSM3 serial protocol\n- Older FCA vehicles using K-line with MultiECUScan\n- Pre-CAN Jaguar / Land Rover vehicles with SDD\n- GM body/HVAC modules that require SWCAN\n- Newer vehicles that require CAN FD or DoIP\n\n### GM SWCAN modules\n\nGDS2 communicates over SWCAN (Single Wire CAN at 33.3 kbps) for some GM-specific modules such as HVAC and body control. SWCAN requires different hardware and a different J2534 protocol ID. This adapter does not currently support SWCAN. GDS2-style diagnostics are limited to standard OBD2 and powertrain diagnostics over regular high-speed CAN.\n\n### CAN FD vehicles\n\nThe public v1 hardware does not support CAN FD. Vehicles that require CAN FD at\nthe diagnostic gateway are outside the supported scope of this release.\n\n---\n\n## Feature Matrix\n\n| Feature | Status |\n|---------|--------|\n| All 14 J2534 mandatory exports | Yes |\n| Correct J2534 v04.04 constants (IoctlID, ConfigParam, error codes) | Yes |\n| CAN protocol support | Yes |\n| ISO15765 protocol support | Yes |\n| Multi-channel support (CAN + ISO15765 simultaneously) | Yes |\n| ISO15765-2 transport layer in DLL (segmentation, reassembly, FC) | Yes |\n| FC_WAIT handling in transmit path | Yes |\n| Configurable ISO15765_FRAME_PAD_VAL per channel (required for BMW ISTA) | Yes |\n| Configurable ISO15765_WFT_MAX per channel | Yes |\n| PASS_FILTER / BLOCK_FILTER / FLOW_CONTROL_FILTER per channel | Yes |\n| Periodic messages with real System.Threading.Timer | Yes |\n| SET_CONFIG persists ISO15765_BS / STMIN / BS_TX / STMIN_TX per channel | Yes |\n| RxStatus flags (START_OF_MESSAGE, CAN_29BIT_ID) | Partial |\n| Battery voltage 14200 mV for Techstream/ODIS compatibility | Yes |\n| Async non-blocking traffic log to %LOCALAPPDATA% | Yes |\n| UART RX checksum verification | Yes |\n| 29-bit extended CAN IDs |  Supported (v2) |\n| Dynamic CAN baud-rate switching |  Supported (v2) |\n| Automatic adapter / COM-port detection |  Supported (v2) |\n| Toyota Techstream VIM connection |  Confirmed (v2) |\n| K-line / ISO9141 / ISO14230 | Supported (v2) |\n| J1850 PWM / VPW | Planned future hardware |\n| SWCAN | Planned future hardware |\n| CAN FD | Planned future hardware |\n\n> **(v2)** items are implemented in the current private **v2 build**: K-line,\n> 29-bit extended IDs, runtime CAN baud switching, automatic adapter detection,\n> and a validated Toyota Techstream VIM connection. This public repository ships\n> the **v1** firmware and DLL; v2 remains in active development and real-vehicle\n> validation ahead of a product release. Interested in v2, early access, or a\n> ready-to-run unit? See [Support & Sponsorship](#support--sponsorship).\n\n---\n\n## Architecture\n\n```text\n+---------------------------------------------------+\n|           Diagnostic Application                  |\n|   (Techstream / ODIS / ISTA / XENTRY / IDS / ...) |\n+----------------------+----------------------------+\n                       | J2534-1 v04.04 API (Win32)\n+----------------------+----------------------------+\n|           TaskmanagerBridge.dll                   |\n|                                                   |\n|  PassThruAPI.cs  - 14 exported functions          |\n|  ChannelManager  - per-channel queues,            |\n|                    filters, ISO-TP sessions        |\n|  FrameRouter     - background thread,             |\n|                    PASS/BLOCK filter dispatch     |\n|  IsoTpEngine     - SF/FF/CF/FC segmentation,      |\n|                    FC_WAIT loop, reassembly        |\n|                                                   |\n|  SerialBridge.cs - UART owner, TX builder,        |\n|                    RX state machine               |\n|  Sniffa.cs       - async traffic log              |\n+----------------------+----------------------------+\n                       | 921600 baud 8N1 UART\n+----------------------+----------------------------+\n|           STM32F407VET6 firmware                  |\n|           raw CAN to UART bridge only             |\n+----------------------+----------------------------+\n                       | CAN bus (ISO 11898-2)\n                  Vehicle ECUs\n```\n\nThe STM32 firmware is deliberately kept simple. Every protocol decision lives in the DLL, making the firmware stable and the DLL independently updatable without reflashing cables.\n\n---\n\n## Repository Layout\n\n```text\ntaskmanager-j2534/\n+-- software/\n|   +-- TaskmanagerBridge/\n|       +-- TaskmanagerBridge/\n|       |   +-- PassThruAPI.cs    14 DllExport functions, channel mgr, ISO-TP\n|       |   +-- SerialBridge.cs   UART owner, TX builder, RX state machine\n|       |   +-- Sniffa.cs         Async traffic logger\n|       |   +-- Bridgeconfig.cs   Registry persistence\n|       |   +-- ConfigDialog.cs   WinForms COM port / CAN speed picker\n|       +-- packages/             DllExport 1.8.1 (committed for offline builds)\n|       +-- TaskmanagerBridge.sln\n+-- firmware/\n|   +-- stm32-bridge/             STM32CubeIDE project for STM32F407VET6\n+-- simulator/\n|   +-- esp32-obd2-simulator/     ESP32 CAN/OBD2 simulator for bench testing\n+-- .github/workflows/build.yml   CI: builds the DLL on every push\n```\n\n---\n\n## Hardware Stack\n\n```text\nPC (USB)\n  |\n  v 921600 baud 8N1\nFT232H USB-UART adapter\n  |\n  v UART TTL 3.3V\nSTM32F407VET6\n  |\n  v\nADuM1201 (galvanic isolation)\n  |\n  v\nSN65HVD230 (3.3V CAN transceiver, ISO 11898-2)\n  |\n  v OBD2 pins 6 and 14\nCAN bus (vehicle)\n```\n\n| Component | Part | Detail |\n|---|---|---|\n| MCU | STM32F407VET6 | UART-CAN bridge firmware |\n| USB-UART | FT232H | 921600 baud, no extra driver on Win 10/11 |\n| Isolation | ADuM1201 | 2-channel digital isolator, 1 Mbit/s |\n| CAN transceiver | SN65HVD230 | 3.3V, ISO 11898-2 |\n| Termination | 120 ohm DIP-switch | Enable when adapter is the bus endpoint |\n\n---\n\n## UART Wire Protocol\n\n### Firmware v1 (current, 11-bit standard CAN IDs)\n\n**PC to STM32** (send a CAN frame):\n\n```text\nByte:  0      1      2      3      4      5 ... 4+N   5+N\n       0xAA   0x01   ID_H   ID_L   LEN    D0 ... Dn   XOR\n```\n\n- `ID_H / ID_L` = CAN ID bits 10-8 / 7-0 (11-bit)\n- `LEN` = payload byte count, 0-8\n- `XOR` = `ID_H ^ ID_L ^ D0 ^ ... ^ Dn`\n\n**STM32 to PC** (received CAN frame):\n\n```text\nByte:  0      1      2      3      4 ... 3+N   4+N\n       0xBB   LEN    ID_H   ID_L   D0 ... Dn   XOR\n```\n\n- `XOR` = `ID_H ^ ID_L ^ D0 ^ ... ^ Dn`\n- The DLL verifies XOR and silently drops frames that fail the check\n\n### Private v2 development boundary\n\nThe public repository documents v2 only at the feature and validation level.\nIts wire format, schematics, firmware, DLL implementation, and integration\ndetails remain private while the product is in development.\n\n---\n\n## ISO15765-2 Transport Layer\n\nThe DLL handles the ISO-TP protocol for CAN/ISO15765 communication. Your application sends and receives complete SDUs; the DLL handles all framing.\n\n**Transmit:**\n\n| SDU length | Frame type |\n|---|---|\n| 1-7 bytes | Single Frame |\n| >7 bytes | First Frame, wait FC, Consecutive Frames |\n\nFC_WAIT frames from the ECU are looped until FC_CTS is received or timeout expires. The maximum FC_WAIT count is configurable via `SET_CONFIG(ISO15765_WFT_MAX)`.\n\n**Receive (via FrameRouter background thread):**\n\n1. Single Frame delivered immediately as a complete message\n2. First Frame delivers `START_OF_MESSAGE` indication, sends Flow Control automatically, accumulates Consecutive Frames\n3. Reassembled SDU delivered as one PASSTHRU_MSG\n\n---\n\n## Building the DLL\n\n**Requirements:** Visual Studio 2022 with .NET desktop development workload.\n\n```powershell\ncd software\\TaskmanagerBridge\n\n# First time only\nmsbuild TaskmanagerBridge.sln /t:Restore /p:Configuration=Release /p:Platform=x86\n\n# Build\nmsbuild TaskmanagerBridge.sln `\n  /p:Configuration=Release `\n  /p:Platform=x86 `\n  /p:DllExportNoRestore=true `\n  /p:TreatWarningsAsErrors=true\n```\n\nOutput: `TaskmanagerBridge\\bin\\x86\\Release\\TaskmanagerBridge.dll`\n\nThe DLL must be x86 (PE32). AnyCPU and x64 builds will not work with 32-bit diagnostic tools.\n\nCI builds on every push to `main` that touches `software/**`. Download the latest artifact from the Actions tab.\n\n---\n\n## Installing the DLL\n\n### Step 1 - Copy the DLL\n\n```powershell\nNew-Item \"C:\\J2534\" -ItemType Directory -Force\nCopy-Item \"software\\TaskmanagerBridge\\TaskmanagerBridge\\bin\\x86\\Release\\TaskmanagerBridge.dll\" \"C:\\J2534\\\"\n```\n\n### Step 2 - Register in Windows (run as Administrator)\n\n```powershell\n$dll  = \"C:\\J2534\\TaskmanagerBridge.dll\"\n$root = \"HKLM:\\SOFTWARE\\WOW6432Node\\PassThruSupport.04.04\\Taskmanager J2534 Bridge\"\n\nNew-Item  $root -Force | Out-Null\nSet-ItemProperty $root \"Name\"               \"Taskmanager J2534 Bridge\"\nSet-ItemProperty $root \"Vendor\"             \"Taskmanager\"\nSet-ItemProperty $root \"ProtocolsSupported\" 0x30   -Type DWord\nSet-ItemProperty $root \"MessageVersion\"     0x0404 -Type DWord\nSet-ItemProperty $root \"FunctionLibrary\"    $dll\nSet-ItemProperty $root \"ConfigApplication\"  \"\"\nWrite-Host \"Registered.\"\n```\n\n### Step 3 - First launch\n\nOpen your diagnostic app. The DLL shows a COM port picker on the first run. Select the FT232H port, usually the highest COM number, choose the CAN speed, usually 500 kbps for modern vehicles, and click Connect. Check \"Remember these settings\" to skip the dialog on future launches.\n\n### Uninstalling\n\n```powershell\nRemove-Item \"HKLM:\\SOFTWARE\\WOW6432Node\\PassThruSupport.04.04\\Taskmanager J2534 Bridge\" -Recurse\n```\n\n---\n\n## Application-Specific Notes\n\n### Toyota Techstream\n- Calls `READ_VBATT_EXT (0x10001)` - returns 14200 mV\n- Expects `ERR_BUFFER_EMPTY (0x10)` when no frames are queued\n- Confirmed working over CAN/ISO15765\n\n### VW / Audi ODIS\n- Calls `READ_VBATT_EXT` frequently; below 8000 mV may trigger an abort\n- Sends `GET_CONFIG` / `SET_CONFIG` frequently\n- Confirmed working over CAN/ISO15765\n\n### Ford IDS / FDRS\n- IDS is sensitive to null-terminated version strings; `PassThruReadVersion` guarantees null termination within 80 bytes\n- IDS confirmed working over CAN/ISO15765\n- FDRS is expected to work on CAN-based vehicles\n\n### BMW ISTA-D / ISTA-P\n- Calls `SET_CONFIG(ISO15765_FRAME_PAD_VAL)` to configure the padding byte\n- The DLL supports this parameter per channel, defaulting to 0xCC; ISTA typically sets 0x00\n- Expected to work with ISTA on CAN vehicles\n- Vehicles requiring DoIP are not supported\n\n### Mercedes-Benz XENTRY / DAS\n- Standard J2534 v04.04 over CAN/ISO15765\n- Requires valid battery voltage from `READ_VBATT`\n- Expected on CAN vehicles\n\n### GM GDS2 / Tech2Win\n- Standard CAN and ISO15765 diagnostics are expected to work\n- SWCAN modules, such as body control and HVAC, are not supported by this hardware\n\n### Honda i-HDS / HDS\n- Expected over CAN/ISO15765 for vehicles from approximately 2008 onward\n- Older K-line vehicles are not supported by public v1; private v2 adds K-line support\n\n### Nissan Consult III Plus\n- Expected over CAN/ISO15765 on CAN vehicles\n\n### FCA wiTECH 2.0 / MultiECUScan\n- Modern CAN vehicles are expected to work\n- K-line FCA vehicles are not supported by public v1; private v2 adds K-line support\n\n### PSA DiagBox / Volvo VIDA / Mazda MDARS\n- Expected over standard J2534 CAN/ISO15765 where the vehicle uses CAN diagnostics\n\n### Subaru SSM4\n- SSM4 supports J2534 and is expected to work for CAN-based Subaru vehicles\n- SSM3 uses a proprietary Subaru serial protocol and does not use J2534\n\n### Hyundai / Kia GDS / KDS\n- Expected over CAN/ISO15765 on CAN vehicles\n\n### Jaguar / Land Rover Pathfinder / SDD\n- Modern CAN vehicles are expected to work\n- Pre-CAN vehicles that require K-line need the private v2 implementation\n\n### Porsche PIWIS III\n- Expected only where PIWIS is configured to use a standard J2534 CAN interface\n\n---\n\n## Known Vulnerabilities and Limitations\n\n### Current protocol scope\n\nThe public v1 release targets **CAN and ISO15765**. Private v2 adds working\nK-line support. J1850, SWCAN, CAN FD, DoIP, and brand-specific proprietary\nserial protocols remain outside the currently validated feature set.\n\n### USB polling latency in the ISO-TP path\n\nBecause the DLL handles ISO-TP segmentation on the PC side, the turnaround path for each flow control exchange is:\n\n```text\nPC calculates CF -> USB to FT232H -> UART to STM32 -> CAN to ECU\nECU replies -> CAN to STM32 -> UART to FT232H -> USB polling tick (1ms) -> PC\n```\n\nThe FT232H USB polling interval introduces 1-2 ms of latency per round trip. For standard UDS diagnostics this is usually invisible. For flashing large firmware images, this latency may extend flash times compared to OEM tools. This cannot be eliminated without hardware v2.\n\n### UART baud rate is not the bottleneck\n\n921600 baud carries roughly 92000 bytes per second. A fully saturated 500 kbps CAN bus at 12 bytes per frame produces approximately 48000 bytes per second. The UART link has headroom. Raising the baud rate alone does not improve diagnostic speed.\n\n### CAN FD not supported\n\nThe public v1 hardware does not support CAN FD. Vehicles that require CAN FD at\nthe diagnostic gateway are outside the supported scope of this release.\n\n### Vehicle safety\n\nThis project is experimental. Do not use it for programming, flashing, immobilizer work, airbag work, brake/steering modules, or other safety-critical procedures unless you understand the risks and have validated the hardware and software on the bench first.\n\n---\n\n## Private v2 Roadmap\n\nDevelopment continues privately. Public updates will disclose supported\nfeatures, compatibility results, and release status—not implementation details.\nThe current public release remains the v1 CAN/ISO15765 design documented above.\n\n---\n\n## Traffic Log\n\n```text\n%LOCALAPPDATA%\\TaskmanagerBridge\\traffic.log\n```\n\nExample:\n\n```text\n[14:22:01.123] SYS_OPEN         | ID: 0x00000000 | DATA: 43 4F 4D 37\n[14:22:01.456] SYS_CONNECT      | ID: 0x0001D4C0 | DATA: 06 00\n[14:22:01.789] TX_ISO_SF        | ID: 0x000007DF | DATA: 02 01 00 CC CC CC CC CC\n[14:22:01.812] TX_ISO_FC        | ID: 0x000007E0 | DATA: 30 00 00 CC CC CC CC CC\n[14:22:01.834] RX               | ID: 0x000007E8 | DATA: 10 14 49 02 01 31 47 31\n```\n\nThe log queue is bounded at 10000 entries. Entries are dropped, never queued, when full so the J2534 caller thread is never delayed by disk I/O.\n\n---\n\n## J2534 API Reference\n\n| Function | Behaviour |\n|---|---|\n| `PassThruOpen` | Shows config dialog on STA thread unless \"Remember\" is set; starts FrameRouter |\n| `PassThruClose` | Stops router, disposes all channels and timers, closes serial port |\n| `PassThruConnect` | Creates channel with RxQueue and ISO-TP sessions; CAN (5) and ISO15765 (6) |\n| `PassThruDisconnect` | Removes channel, disposes all resources |\n| `PassThruWriteMsgs` | CAN: raw frames; ISO15765: SF/FF/CF/FC segmentation handled automatically |\n| `PassThruReadMsgs` | Dequeues from per-channel queue (filtered, ISO-TP reassembled) |\n| `PassThruStartMsgFilter` | PASS/BLOCK/FLOW_CONTROL filters; FC filter stores reply CAN ID + payload |\n| `PassThruStopMsgFilter` | Removes filter by ID |\n| `PassThruStartPeriodicMsg` | Real timer per message; up to 10 per channel; interval 5-65535 ms |\n| `PassThruStopPeriodicMsg` | Disposes timer by message ID |\n| `PassThruIoctl` | READ_VBATT/EXT = 14200 mV; GET_CONFIG/SET_CONFIG; CLEAR_*; FIVE_BAUD/FAST_INIT = ERR_NOT_SUPPORTED |\n| `PassThruReadVersion` | Firmware STM32F407_v2.0.0, DLL TaskmanagerBridge_v2.0.0, API 04.04 |\n| `PassThruGetLastError` | Per-thread error string |\n| `PassThruSetProgrammingVoltage` | Logged only |\n\n---\n\n## Flashing the Firmware\n\nOpen `firmware/stm32-bridge` in STM32CubeIDE:\n\n1. File > Import > Existing Projects into Workspace\n2. Build > Build Project (Ctrl+B)\n3. Connect ST-Link, then Run > Debug (F11) to flash\n\nThe MCU exposes UART at **921600 baud 8N1**, no hardware flow control.\n\n---\n\n## ESP32 OBD2 Simulator\n\nThis repository also includes an ESP32-based OBD2 simulator for bench testing:\n\n```text\nsimulator/esp32-obd2-simulator/\n```\n\nThe simulator can be used to test CAN/ISO15765 behaviour without connecting to a real vehicle. It exposes a Wi-Fi access point and a simple web control panel for simulated OBD2 data.\n\nDefault simulator settings:\n- CAN TX: GPIO5\n- CAN RX: GPIO4\n- CAN speed: 500 kbps\n- Wi-Fi SSID: `OBD2-Simulator`\n- Web panel: `http://192.168.4.1`\n\nUse the simulator for development and bench validation before connecting the adapter to a real vehicle.\n\n---\n\n##  Support & Sponsorship\n\nThis is an independent, self-funded project. Every board was bought, soldered, and debugged by one engineer who didn't accept that diagnosing your own car should cost €500 per brand, and who got the *real* dealer software (Toyota Techstream, VW ODIS, Ford IDS) running on an isolated, source-available adapter.\n\nIf this saved you a dealership bill, or you simply believe vehicle diagnostics should be open and affordable, your support pushes the project to the next milestone.\n\n### What sponsorship unlocks, Hardware v2\nFunding goes straight into hardware, not coffee:\n-  **Native USB** transport (drop the FT232H, cut latency to the minimum)\n-  **29-bit extended IDs** + dynamic CAN baud switching\n-  Broader real-vehicle validation for **K-line** and future **SWCAN / CAN FD** development\n-  Proper automotive-grade input protection for daily real-vehicle use\n-  The jump from hand-soldered prototype to a manufacturable board\n\n### Ways to support\n-  **Star this repo**, free, and it genuinely helps visibility\n-  **Revolut:** [revolut.me/gorev_yoneticisi](https://revolut.me/gorev_yoneticisi) · **PayPal:** [paypal.me/gorevyoneticisi](https://paypal.me/gorevyoneticisi)\n\n### For companies, shops & inquiries\nCustom builds, integration help with a specific OEM tool, fleet/workshop deployments, or **sponsorship & partnership**, open an issue or reach out via GitHub. Serious inquiries are very welcome, and this project is actively looking for backers and collaborators to bring an affordable universal diagnostic interface to market.\n**Join the community:** Come hang out on Discord, share your setup, ask questions, or help shape v2/v3. [Join the Discord server](https://discord.gg/mw6V8P4)\n\n---\n\n## License\n\n**Proprietary - All Rights Reserved.**\n\nSee [LICENSE](LICENSE) for full terms:\n\n- You may study and build for personal non-commercial use only.\n- You may not copy, redistribute, modify, or use commercially without written permission.\n- You may not reverse engineer or create derivative works.\n\nCopyright (c) 2026 Taskmanager Project.",
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    "bad-antics/nullsec-linux": {
      "id": "github:bad-antics/nullsec-linux",
      "evidence_type": "repository",
      "record_type": "repository",
      "title": "🔒 NullSec Linux",
      "full_name": "bad-antics/nullsec-linux",
      "name": "nullsec-linux",
      "owner": "bad-antics",
      "url": "https://github.com/bad-antics/nullsec-linux",
      "description": "🐧 Security-focused Linux distribution with 140+ tools, custom kernel 6.17.13, AI assistant | 5 editions | Cloud, AI/ML, Automotive, Hardware hacking",
      "readme": "<div align=\"center\">\n\n# 🔒 NullSec Linux\n\n### Security-Focused Linux Distribution v5.0\n\n**by bad-antics development**\n\n[![License: NPL](https://img.shields.io/badge/License-NullSec%20Public-red.svg?style=for-the-badge)](LICENSE)\n[![Base](https://img.shields.io/badge/Base-Debian%2013-blue.svg?style=for-the-badge)](https://github.com/bad-antics/nullsec-linux)\n[![Tools](https://img.shields.io/badge/Security%20Tools-140+-green.svg?style=for-the-badge)](https://github.com/bad-antics/nullsec-linux)\n[![Version](https://img.shields.io/badge/Version-5.0-purple.svg?style=for-the-badge)](https://github.com/bad-antics/nullsec-linux)\n[![GitHub](https://img.shields.io/badge/GitHub-bad--antics-181717?style=for-the-badge&logo=github)](https://github.com/bad-antics)\n\n```\n    _   __      ____  _____              __    _\n   / | / /_  __/ / / / ___/___  _____   / /   (_)___  __  ___  __\n  /  |/ / / / / / /  \\__ \\/ _ \\/ ___/  / /   / / __ \\/ / / / |/_/\n / /|  / /_/ / / /  ___/ /  __/ /__   / /___/ / / / / /_/ />  <\n/_/ |_/\\__,_/_/_/  /____/\\___/\\___/  /_____/_/_/ /_/\\__,_/_/|_|\n\n       [ bad-antics development | Security Distribution v5.0 ]\n```\n\n\n</div>\n\n---\n\n## 🆕 What's New in v5.0\n\n- **140+ Security Tools** — 25 new tools added\n- **NullKia v3.0 Integrated** — Mobile security framework built-in\n- **AI/ML Security Suite** — LLM red teaming, ML model analysis\n- **Cloud Pentesting Edition** — AWS/GCP/Azure/Kubernetes tools\n- **Hardware Hacking Edition** — SDR, RFID, embedded systems\n- **Automotive Security** — CAN bus, OBD-II, vehicle pentesting\n- **Custom Kernel 6.17.13** — Built from source with NullSec identity, zero upstream branding\n- **Wayland + Hyprland** — Modern compositor option\n- **ARM64 Native** — Full Apple Silicon & Raspberry Pi 5 support\n\n---\n\n## 📥 Official Downloads\n\n### 🌐 Download Portal: **[downloads.lateralus.dev](https://downloads.lateralus.dev)**\n\n> All ISOs hosted on Cloudflare R2 CDN for maximum speed and global availability.\n\n---\n\n## 💎 Premium Editions\n\nStripped, locked-down, production-ready images with enterprise-grade security.\n\n| Edition | Description | Size | Download |\n|---------|-------------|------|----------|\n| **NullSec Pro — Full** | Complete secure system | 3.6 GB | [ISO](https://downloads.lateralus.dev/iso/nullsec-pro-5.0-amd64.iso) |\n| **NullSec Pro — USB** | Bootable USB with encrypted persistence | 4.5 GB | [IMG](https://downloads.lateralus.dev/iso/nullsec-pro-usb-5.0-amd64.img) |\n| **NullSec Pro — Minimal** | CLI-only, minimal attack surface | 980 MB | [ISO](https://downloads.lateralus.dev/iso/nullsec-pro-minimal-5.0-amd64.iso) |\n| **NullSec Pro — Cloud** | AWS/GCP/Azure/K8s optimized | 2.0 GB | [OVA/AMI](https://downloads.lateralus.dev/iso/nullsec-pro-cloud-5.0.tar.gz) |\n| **NullSec Pro — Hardware** | SDR/RFID/Embedded tools | 4.8 GB | [ISO](https://downloads.lateralus.dev/iso/nullsec-pro-hardware-5.0-amd64.iso) |\n\n### Premium Features:\n- ✅ Kernel lockdown (KSPP, grsecurity principles)\n- ✅ Zero telemetry — completely stripped\n- ✅ Full disk encryption (LUKS2 + Argon2id)\n- ✅ Secure boot with custom keys\n- ✅ Anti-forensics capabilities\n- ✅ MAC spoofing on boot\n- ✅ Tor/I2P/Lokinet integration\n- ✅ 115+ security tools pre-installed\n\n---\n\n## 🐧 Standard Editions\n\n| Edition | Description | Size | Download |\n|---------|-------------|------|----------|\n| **Full** | Complete toolkit (140+ tools) | 5.8 GB | [ISO](https://downloads.lateralus.dev/iso/nullsec-full-5.0-amd64.iso) |\n| **Lite** | Essential tools only | 2.8 GB | [ISO](https://downloads.lateralus.dev/iso/nullsec-lite-5.0-amd64.iso) |\n| **NetInstall** | Minimal, downloads during install | 520 MB | [ISO](https://downloads.lateralus.dev/iso/nullsec-netinst-5.0-amd64.iso) |\n\n---\n\n## ⚡ Live Boot Images\n\nBoot directly without installation — leaves no trace on host system.\n\n| Edition | Description | Size | Download |\n|---------|-------------|------|----------|\n| **Live Standard** | Full toolkit in RAM | 4.0 GB | [ISO](https://downloads.lateralus.dev/iso/nullsec-live-5.0-amd64.iso) |\n| **Live Stealth** | Anti-forensics, RAM-only | 3.2 GB | [ISO](https://downloads.lateralus.dev/iso/nullsec-live-stealth-5.0-amd64.iso) |\n| **Live Forensics** | DFIR focused, read-only mounts | 4.8 GB | [ISO](https://downloads.lateralus.dev/iso/nullsec-live-forensics-5.0-amd64.iso) |\n| **Live Air-Gapped** | No network stack, offline only | 2.4 GB | [ISO](https://downloads.lateralus.dev/iso/nullsec-live-airgap-5.0-amd64.iso) |\n\n---\n\n## 🎯 Specialized Editions (NEW in v5.0)\n\n| Edition | Description | Size | Download |\n|---------|-------------|------|----------|\n| **Cloud Pentest** | AWS/GCP/Azure/K8s security | 3.5 GB | [ISO](https://downloads.lateralus.dev/iso/nullsec-cloud-5.0-amd64.iso) |\n| **Hardware Hacking** | SDR/RFID/Embedded/IoT | 4.2 GB | [ISO](https://downloads.lateralus.dev/iso/nullsec-hardware-5.0-amd64.iso) |\n| **AI/ML Security** | LLM red team, model analysis | 6.5 GB | [ISO](https://downloads.lateralus.dev/iso/nullsec-ai-5.0-amd64.iso) |\n| **Automotive** | CAN bus, OBD-II, vehicle sec | 3.8 GB | [ISO](https://downloads.lateralus.dev/iso/nullsec-auto-5.0-amd64.iso) |\n| **Mobile Security** | NullKia + Android/iOS tools | 4.0 GB | [ISO](https://downloads.lateralus.dev/iso/nullsec-mobile-5.0-amd64.iso) |\n\n---\n\n## 🖥️ Architecture Support\n\n| Architecture | Description | Download |\n|--------------|-------------|----------|\n| **AMD64/x86_64** | Standard 64-bit PCs | All editions above |\n| **ARM64/aarch64** | Raspberry Pi 4/5, ARM servers | [ISO](https://downloads.lateralus.dev/iso/nullsec-5.0-arm64.iso) |\n| **RISC-V** | StarFive VisionFive 2 | [ISO](https://downloads.lateralus.dev/iso/nullsec-5.0-riscv64.iso) |\n| **Apple Silicon** | M1/M2/M3/M4 native | [IMG](https://downloads.lateralus.dev/iso/nullsec-5.0-asahi.img) |\n\n---\n\n## 🔍 Verify Downloads\n\n```bash\n# Download checksums\nwget https://downloads.lateralus.dev/iso/SHA256SUMS\nwget https://downloads.lateralus.dev/iso/SHA256SUMS.sig\n\n# Verify checksum\nsha256sum -c SHA256SUMS 2>/dev/null | grep nullsec\n\n# GPG verification\ngpg --keyserver keyserver.ubuntu.com --recv-keys B1F1881F70FB62A7\ngpg --verify SHA256SUMS.sig SHA256SUMS\n```\n\n---\n\n## 🛡️ Security Features\n\n### Kernel Protection\n- KASLR, SMEP/SMAP, PTI\n- Retpoline (Spectre mitigation)\n- Kernel module signing enforced\n- Lockdown mode (integrity)\n- KFENCE memory safety\n- io_uring restrictions\n- BPF hardening\n\n### Custom Kernel Build\nNullSec Linux ships with a **custom-compiled kernel** built from upstream kernel.org sources.\nNo Parrot, Debian, or Ubuntu branding remains — `uname`, `/proc/version`, and all build\nidentity strings are NullSec-native.\n\n| Property | Value |\n|:---------|:------|\n| Version | `6.17.13+2-amd64` |\n| Source | kernel.org vanilla |\n| Build ID | `nullsec@nullsec.sh` |\n| `/proc/version` | `NullSec 6.17.13-1nullsec1` |\n\nSee [`kernel/`](kernel/) for build scripts, configs, and documentation.\nDownload pre-built `.deb` packages from [Releases](https://github.com/bad-antics/nullsec-linux/releases).\n\n### Binary Protection\n- PIE, Full RELRO, Stack canaries\n- FORTIFY_SOURCE=3\n- NX/DEP, CET/IBT\n- Shadow stack (x86_64)\n- CFI (Control-Flow Integrity)\n\n### Network Security\n- nftables firewall default\n- IPv6 privacy extensions\n- SYN cookies, reverse path filtering\n- TCP timestamps disabled\n- ICMP redirect disabled\n- Wireguard built-in\n\n### Application Security\n- AppArmor + SELinux profiles\n- Seccomp-bpf filters\n- Namespace isolation\n- Landlock LSM\n- IMA/EVM integrity\n- Bubblewrap sandboxing\n\n---\n\n## 🛠️ Pre-Installed Security Tools (115+)\n\n### Offensive Security\n\n| Tool | Language | Purpose |\n|------|----------|---------|\n| [nullsec-injector](https://github.com/bad-antics/nullsec-injector) | Rust | Memory-safe process injection |\n| [nullsec-shellcraft](https://github.com/bad-antics/nullsec-shellcraft) | Racket | Shellcode generation DSL |\n| [nullsec-exploit](https://github.com/bad-antics/nullsec-exploit) | C | Binary exploitation framework |\n| [nullsec-c2](https://github.com/bad-antics/nullsec-c2) | Go | Command & control server |\n| [nullsec-phish](https://github.com/bad-antics/nullsec-phish) | Python | Phishing framework |\n| [nullsec-webfuzz](https://github.com/bad-antics/nullsec-webfuzz) | Rust | Web application fuzzer |\n| [nullsec-sqlinject](https://github.com/bad-antics/nullsec-sqlinject) | Python | SQL injection toolkit |\n\n### Network Security\n\n| Tool | Language | Purpose |\n|------|----------|---------|\n| [nullsec-netprobe](https://github.com/bad-antics/nullsec-netprobe) | Nim | Stealthy network recon |\n| [nullsec-portscan](https://github.com/bad-antics/nullsec-portscan) | Elixir | Async port scanner |\n| [nullsec-netseer](https://github.com/bad-antics/nullsec-netseer) | Haskell | Traffic analysis |\n| [nullsec-sniffer](https://github.com/bad-antics/nullsec-sniffer) | Clojure | Packet capture |\n| [nullsec-flowtrace](https://github.com/bad-antics/nullsec-flowtrace) | Haskell | Flow analyzer |\n| [nullsec-crystalrecon](https://github.com/bad-antics/nullsec-crystalrecon) | Crystal | Network reconnaissance |\n| [nullsec-dnsenum](https://github.com/bad-antics/nullsec-dnsenum) | Go | DNS enumeration |\n| [nullsec-arpwatch](https://github.com/bad-antics/nullsec-arpwatch) | C | ARP monitoring |\n\n### Binary Analysis\n\n| Tool | Language | Purpose |\n|------|----------|---------|\n| [nullsec-memcorrupt](https://github.com/bad-antics/nullsec-memcorrupt) | Zig | Memory corruption analysis |\n| [nullsec-bingaze](https://github.com/bad-antics/nullsec-bingaze) | C++20 | Binary analysis |\n| [nullsec-kernspy](https://github.com/bad-antics/nullsec-kernspy) | Go | Kernel module analyzer |\n| [nullsec-zigscan](https://github.com/bad-antics/nullsec-zigscan) | Zig | Binary entropy analyzer |\n| [nullsec-nimhunter](https://github.com/bad-antics/nullsec-nimhunter) | Nim | Memory forensics |\n| [nullsec-binarydiff](https://github.com/bad-antics/nullsec-binarydiff) | Rust | Binary diffing |\n| [nullsec-hexdump](https://github.com/bad-antics/nullsec-hexdump) | Zig | Hex analysis |\n\n### Cryptography\n\n| Tool | Language | Purpose |\n|------|----------|---------|\n| [nullsec-cryptwrap](https://github.com/bad-antics/nullsec-cryptwrap) | Ada/SPARK | Formally verified crypto |\n| [nullsec-hashwitch](https://github.com/bad-antics/nullsec-hashwitch) | Julia | Hash analysis |\n| [nullsec-adashield](https://github.com/bad-antics/nullsec-adashield) | Ada | Protocol validator |\n| [nullsec-vvault](https://github.com/bad-antics/nullsec-vvault) | V | Credential vault |\n| [nullsec-cryptoaudit](https://github.com/bad-antics/nullsec-cryptoaudit) | Rust | Crypto implementation audit |\n\n### Defense & Detection\n\n| Tool | Language | Purpose |\n|------|----------|---------|\n| [nullsec-cppsentry](https://github.com/bad-antics/nullsec-cppsentry) | C++20 | Packet sentinel |\n| [nullsec-swiftsentinel](https://github.com/bad-antics/nullsec-swiftsentinel) | Swift | macOS event monitor |\n| [nullsec-kotlinguard](https://github.com/bad-antics/nullsec-kotlinguard) | Kotlin | Container scanner |\n| [nullsec-clusterguard](https://github.com/bad-antics/nullsec-clusterguard) | Erlang | Distributed IDS |\n| [nullsec-luashield](https://github.com/bad-antics/nullsec-luashield) | Lua | WAF rules engine |\n| [nullsec-beaconhunt](https://github.com/bad-antics/nullsec-beaconhunt) | Go | C2 beacon detector |\n\n### OSINT & Recon\n\n| Tool | Language | Purpose |\n|------|----------|---------|\n| [nullsec-reporaider](https://github.com/bad-antics/nullsec-reporaider) | Clojure | Git secret scanner |\n| [nullsec-juliaprobe](https://github.com/bad-antics/nullsec-juliaprobe) | Julia | Anomaly detector |\n| [nullsec-perlscrub](https://github.com/bad-antics/nullsec-perlscrub) | Perl | Log sanitizer |\n| [nullsec-shelltrace](https://github.com/bad-antics/nullsec-shelltrace) | Tcl | Command auditor |\n| [nullsec-fsharpsignal](https://github.com/bad-antics/nullsec-fsharpsignal) | F# | Signal correlator |\n| [nullsec-credscan](https://github.com/bad-antics/nullsec-credscan) | Python | Credential finder |\n\n### Mobile Security\n\n| Tool | Language | Purpose |\n|------|----------|---------|\n| [nullkia](https://github.com/bad-antics/nullkia) | Multi | Mobile security framework v3.0 |\n| [nullsec-apkanalyzer](https://github.com/bad-antics/nullsec-apkanalyzer) | Kotlin | APK analysis |\n| [nullsec-iosextract](https://github.com/bad-antics/nullsec-iosextract) | Swift | iOS forensics |\n| [nullsec-android](https://github.com/bad-antics/nullsec-android) | Java | Android security |\n| [nullsec-bluetooth](https://github.com/bad-antics/nullsec-bluetooth) | C | Bluetooth research |\n\n### Cloud Security (NEW)\n\n| Tool | Language | Purpose |\n|------|----------|---------|\n| [nullsec-cloudaudit](https://github.com/bad-antics/nullsec-cloudaudit) | Go | Multi-cloud auditor |\n| [nullsec-k8sscan](https://github.com/bad-antics/nullsec-k8sscan) | Go | Kubernetes security scanner |\n| [nullsec-awsrecon](https://github.com/bad-antics/nullsec-awsrecon) | Python | AWS enumeration |\n| [nullsec-gcphunt](https://github.com/bad-antics/nullsec-gcphunt) | Go | GCP security |\n| [nullsec-azuresweep](https://github.com/bad-antics/nullsec-azuresweep) | C# | Azure auditor |\n| [nullsec-terraform-scan](https://github.com/bad-antics/nullsec-terraform-scan) | Go | IaC security |\n\n### AI/ML Security (NEW)\n\n| Tool | Language | Purpose |\n|------|----------|---------|\n| [nullsec-llmred](https://github.com/bad-antics/nullsec-llmred) | Python | LLM red teaming |\n| [nullsec-promptinject](https://github.com/bad-antics/nullsec-promptinject) | Python | Prompt injection testing |\n| [nullsec-modelaudit](https://github.com/bad-antics/nullsec-modelaudit) | Python | ML model security audit |\n| [nullsec-adversarial](https://github.com/bad-antics/nullsec-adversarial) | Python | Adversarial ML |\n| [nullsec-datapoisoning](https://github.com/bad-antics/nullsec-datapoisoning) | Python | Training data attacks |\n\n### Hardware Hacking (NEW)\n\n| Tool | Language | Purpose |\n|------|----------|---------|\n| [nullsec-sdr](https://github.com/bad-antics/nullsec-sdr) | C/Python | Software-defined radio |\n| [nullsec-rfid](https://github.com/bad-antics/nullsec-rfid) | C | RFID/NFC research |\n| [nullsec-canbus](https://github.com/bad-antics/nullsec-canbus) | C | CAN bus analysis |\n| [nullsec-jtag](https://github.com/bad-antics/nullsec-jtag) | C | JTAG/SWD tools |\n| [nullsec-glitch](https://github.com/bad-antics/nullsec-glitch) | Python | Fault injection |\n| [nullsec-uart](https://github.com/bad-antics/nullsec-uart) | Python | UART/Serial tools |\n\n### Automotive Security (NEW)\n\n| Tool | Language | Purpose |\n|------|----------|---------|\n| [nullsec-carfuzz](https://github.com/bad-antics/nullsec-carfuzz) | C | CAN bus fuzzer |\n| [nullsec-obdii](https://github.com/bad-antics/nullsec-obdii) | Python | OBD-II toolkit |\n| [nullsec-uds](https://github.com/bad-antics/nullsec-uds) | Python | UDS protocol tools |\n| [nullsec-keyfob](https://github.com/bad-antics/nullsec-keyfob) | C | Key fob research |\n\n### Automation & Framework\n\n| Tool | Language | Purpose |\n|------|----------|---------|\n| [nullsec-framework](https://github.com/bad-antics/nullsec-framework) | Python | Unified framework |\n| [nullsec-dlangaudit](https://github.com/bad-antics/nullsec-dlangaudit) | D | Security auditor |\n| [nullsec-beacon](https://github.com/bad-antics/nullsec-beacon) | Erlang | Network beacon |\n| [nullsec-ocamlparse](https://github.com/bad-antics/nullsec-ocamlparse) | OCaml | Policy parser |\n\n---\n\n## 🚀 Quick Start\n\n### System Requirements\n\n| Component | Minimum | Recommended |\n|-----------|---------|-------------|\n| CPU | 64-bit x86_64/ARM64 | Multi-core (4+) |\n| RAM | 4 GB | 16 GB |\n| Storage | 30 GB | 120 GB NVMe |\n| Graphics | Any | Hardware accel |\n\n### Create Bootable USB\n\n```bash\n# Linux/macOS\nsudo dd if=nullsec-pro-5.0-amd64.iso of=/dev/sdX bs=4M status=progress conv=fsync\n\n# Or use Ventoy for multi-ISO boot\nsudo ventoy -i /dev/sdX\ncp nullsec-*.iso /mnt/ventoy/\n```\n\n### First Boot\n\n```bash\n# Update system\nnullsec-update\n\n# Fetch latest tools\nnullsec-fetch\n\n# Launch framework\nnullsec-framework\n\n# Apply security profile\nnullsec-harden --profile maximum\n\n# Start anonymity mode\nnullsec-anon --tor --mac-spoof --dns-over-tor\n\n# Launch NullKia (mobile)\nnullkia --gui\n```\n\n---\n\n## 📁 Directory Structure\n\n```\n/opt/nullsec/\n├── bin/           # 115+ NullSec tools\n├── configs/       # Configuration files\n├── payloads/      # Payload templates\n├── wordlists/     # Curated wordlists\n├── scripts/       # Automation scripts\n├── modules/       # Framework modules\n├── ai/            # AI/ML models (NEW)\n├── hardware/      # Hardware tool configs (NEW)\n└── docs/          # Documentation\n\n/etc/nullsec/\n├── security/      # Security profiles\n├── firewall/      # nftables rules\n├── apparmor/      # AppArmor profiles\n├── seccomp/       # Seccomp filters\n├── integrity/     # IMA policies\n└── cloud/         # Cloud provider configs (NEW)\n```\n\n---\n\n## 🔗 Related Projects\n\n| Project | Description |\n|---------|-------------|\n| [nullsec-framework](https://github.com/bad-antics/nullsec-framework) | Unified toolkit framework |\n| [nullkia](https://github.com/bad-antics/nullkia) | Mobile security framework v3.0 |\n| [nullsec-payloads](https://github.com/bad-antics/nullsec-payloads) | Payload templates |\n| [nullsec-wordlists](https://github.com/bad-antics/nullsec-wordlists) | Curated wordlists |\n| [nullsec-configs](https://github.com/bad-antics/nullsec-configs) | Dotfiles & configs |\n| [bad-antics.github.io](https://bad-antics.github.io) | Download portal |\n\n---\n\n## 📋 Changelog\n\n### v5.0.0 (January 2026)\n- **140+ tools** (25 new)\n- NullKia v3.0 integrated\n- Cloud pentesting edition (AWS/GCP/Azure/K8s)\n- AI/ML security suite (LLM red teaming)\n- Hardware hacking edition (SDR/RFID/IoT)\n- Automotive security tools (CAN bus)\n- Custom Kernel 6.17.13 (built from source, NullSec-branded)\n- Wayland + Hyprland compositor\n- Full ARM64/Apple Silicon support\n- Enhanced isolation (Landlock, CFI)\n\n### v4.0.0 (2025)\n- 90+ tools\n- NullKia v2.0\n- Cloud edition\n- Apple Silicon via Asahi\n\n### v3.0.0 (2024)\n- Initial public release\n- 60+ tools\n\n---\n\n## 📜 License\n\nNullSec Public License v1.0 — For authorized security testing and education only.\n\n---\n\n## 🏷️ Keywords\n\n`linux distribution` `security distro` `penetration testing` `ethical hacking`\n`kali alternative` `parrot alternative` `red team` `blue team` `CTF`\n`cybersecurity` `hacking tools` `privacy` `anonymity` `DFIR` `OSINT`\n`bad-antics` `nullsec` `cloud security` `kubernetes` `aws` `ai security`\n`hardware hacking` `automotive security` `mobile security` `iot security`\n\n---\n\n<div align=\"center\">\n\n**Developed with 💀 by [bad-antics](https://github.com/bad-antics)**\n\n*NullSec Project © 2026 — Hack Ethically*\n\n### 🌐 **[Download Portal: bad-antics.github.io](https://bad-antics.github.io)**\n\n[![GitHub](https://img.shields.io/badge/GitHub-bad--antics-181717?style=for-the-badge&logo=github&logoColor=white)](https://github.com/bad-antics)\n[![Website](https://img.shields.io/badge/Downloads-bad--antics.github.io-ff0040?style=for-the-badge&logo=firefox&logoColor=white)](https://bad-antics.github.io)\n\n</div>\n\n---\n\n## ⭐ Support the Project\n\nIf you find NullSec Linux useful, please consider:\n\n- **⭐ Star this repository** — helps others discover it!\n- **🍴 Fork it** — contribute improvements\n- **�� Share it** — tell your security community\n\n### Related Projects (⭐ Star them too!)\n\n| Project | Description |\n|---------|-------------|\n| ⭐ [nullsec-webfuzz](https://github.com/bad-antics/nullsec-webfuzz) | High-performance web fuzzer in Rust |\n| ⭐ [blackflag-ecu](https://github.com/bad-antics/blackflag-ecu) | Professional ECU diagnostics & tuning |\n| ⭐ [nullkia](https://github.com/bad-antics/nullkia) | Mobile security framework |\n| ⭐ [mysterymachine](https://github.com/bad-antics/mysterymachine) | AI-powered recon & exploitation |\n| ⭐ [n01d-forge](https://github.com/bad-antics/n01d-forge) | Rust/egui image burner with LUKS/VeraCrypt encryption |\n| ⭐ [n01d-machine](https://github.com/bad-antics/n01d-machine) | Secure VM manager with Tor/VPN isolation |\n| ⭐ [glowbarn-os](https://github.com/bad-antics/glowbarn-os) | IoT security firmware framework |\n| ⭐ [mirage](https://github.com/bad-antics/mirage) | ML model security testing |\n| ⭐ [ai-entropy-mapper](https://github.com/bad-antics/ai-entropy-mapper) | Neural network entropy analysis |\n\n\n## 🎯 Version 5.0 Highlights\n\n- **New AI/ML Security Edition** - Tools for LLM red teaming, prompt injection testing\n- **Hardware Hacking Edition** - SDR, RFID, glitch attacks, JTAG tools\n- **Automotive Edition** - CAN bus, OBD-II, UDS protocol tools\n- **Apple Silicon Support** - Native Asahi Linux builds\n- **RISC-V Support** - For emerging hardware platforms\n\n## 🔒 Security Features\n\n- Full disk encryption by default\n- AppArmor/SELinux profiles for all tools\n- Hardened kernel configurations\n- Secure boot support\n- TPM integration\n\n<!-- Updated: 2026-04-11 18:00:07 -->\n\n<!-- Updated: 2026-04-12 14:00:01 -->\n\n<!-- Updated: 2026-04-16 18:00:09 -->\n\n<!-- Updated: 2026-04-16 18:00:11 -->",
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      "readme": "# CAN Bus Attack\nThis repository contains a custom Flipper Zero application for performing basic security testing on CAN Bus networks.\nIt was developed as part of a university cybersecurity research project and is intended for educational and ethical use only.\n\n---\n\n# CAN-Bus Attack App (Flipper Zero)\n\n<details>\n<summary>🇪🇸 Español</summary>\n\n# Flipper Zero CAN-Bus Attack App\n\n## Manual de Instalación\n\nEste manual describe dos procedimientos distintos: por un lado, la instalación directa de la aplicación en el dispositivo Flipper Zero para usuarios que solo deseen ejecutarla; por otro, la configuración del entorno de desarrollo para aquellos que deseen modificar el código fuente o extender sus funcionalidades.\n\n### Instalación directa de la aplicación\n\nPara utilizar la herramienta desarrollada no es necesario compilar el proyecto desde cero. El archivo ejecutable de la aplicación se encuentra disponible en formato `.fap`, listo para ser instalado en el Flipper Zero.\n\n#### Pasos para la instalación\n\n1. Descargar el archivo `.fap` desde el repositorio del proyecto (ver sección [Repositorio del proyecto](#repositorio-del-proyecto)).\n2. Conectar el Flipper Zero por USB y abrir la herramienta oficial **qFlipper**.\n3. Copiar el archivo descargado a la carpeta:\n   ```bash\n   /SD card/apps/\n   ```\n4. Desconectar el dispositivo y acceder a la aplicación desde el menú principal.\n\n<p align=\"center\"><img src=\"docs/img/qFlipper.png\" width=\"400\"/></p>\n\n### Compilación y personalización del código\n\nLos usuarios avanzados pueden modificar el comportamiento de la aplicación o extender su funcionalidad editando directamente el código fuente. Para ello es necesario clonar el firmware y configurar el entorno de desarrollo de Flipper Zero.\n\n#### Requisitos previos\n- Entorno Linux con Python 3 y herramientas de desarrollo instaladas.\n- Proyecto descargado (ver sección [Repositorio del proyecto](#repositorio-del-proyecto)).\n- Conexión a Internet para descargar dependencias.\n\n#### Pasos para compilar\n```bash\ngit clone https://github.com/DarkFlippers/unleashed-firmware\ncd unleashed-firmware/applications_user\n\n# Copiar aquí el código fuente/carpeta de la app\n\n# Para compilar\ncd .. # Volver a la carpeta unleashed-firmware\n./fbt fap_canbus_attack_app\n```\n\nUna vez compilado, el archivo `.fap` se encuentra en la ruta:\n\n```bash\n/unleashed-firmware/build/f7-firmware-D/.extapps/canbus_attack_app.fap\n```\n\nEste archivo puede instalarse siguiendo los pasos descritos anteriormente.\n\n### Configuración del módulo CAN\n\nEl módulo MCP2515 debe estar conectado al Flipper Zero mediante los pines GPIO, respetando las conexiones SPI (MOSI, MISO, SCK, CS, INT).\n\nMás información: [ElectronicCats/flipper-MCP2515-CANBUS Wiki](https://github.com/ElectronicCats/flipper-MCP2515-CANBUS/wiki)\n\n### Verificación\n\nSi el módulo está bien conectado, la aplicación se inicializará mostrando el menú principal con las funciones (Sniffing, Replay, Modify, DoS).\n\n<p align=\"center\"><img src=\"docs/img/mainMenu.png\" width=\"300\"/></p>\n\n---\n\n## Guía de Usuario\n\n### Requisitos previos\n- Flipper Zero con firmware **Unleashed v0.81 (unlshd-081)** o compatible.\n- Módulo MCP2515 conectado al puerto GPIO.\n- Archivo `.fap` en `apps/`.\n- Red CAN activa (ICSim o física).\n\n### Acceso a la aplicación\n1. Enciende el Flipper Zero.\n2. Menú **Aplicaciones** → **CAN Bus Attacks**.\n3. Se mostrará el menú principal.\n\n<p align=\"center\"><img src=\"docs/img/fz1.png\" width=\"250\"/> <img src=\"docs/img/fz2.png\" width=\"250\"/></p>\n\n### Ataques disponibles\n\n####  Sniffing\n- Captura de tramas CAN.\n- Visualización de IDs y valores.\n<p align=\"center\"><img src=\"docs/img/fzs.png\" width=\"250\"/> <img src=\"docs/img/fzs2.png\" width=\"250\"/></p>\n\n####  Replay Attack\nReenvía tramas guardadas (por defecto: `ID:0x123 Payload:00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07`).\n<p align=\"center\"><img src=\"docs/img/fzr1.png\" width=\"250\"/></p>\n\n####  Modify Attack\nPermite editar **ID** o **Payload** antes de enviar.\n<p align=\"center\"><img src=\"docs/img/fzm1.png\" width=\"250\"/> <img src=\"docs/img/fzm2.png\" width=\"250\"/> <img src=\"docs/img/fzm3.png\" width=\"250\"/></p>\n\n####  DoS Attack\nSatura el bus con tramas dominantes (`0x001`).\n<p align=\"center\"><img src=\"docs/img/fzd1.png\" width=\"250\"/> <img src=\"docs/img/fzd2.png\" width=\"250\"/> <img src=\"docs/img/fzd3.png\" width=\"250\"/> <img src=\"docs/img/fzd4.png\" width=\"250\"/></p>\n\n### Precauciones\n- Uso exclusivo educativo.\n- No en vehículos reales.\n\n### Solución de problemas\n\n<details>\n<summary> La app no aparece</summary>\n<p>El archivo `.fap` no está en la carpeta correcta.</p>\n<p><b>Solución:</b> Asegúrate de copiarla en <code>apps/</code>.</p>\n</details>\n\n<details>\n<summary> No se detecta tráfico</summary>\n<p>El módulo MCP2515 no está conectado o la red está inactiva.</p>\n<p><b>Solución:</b> Verifica las conexiones físicas y la velocidad del bus.</p>\n</details>\n\n<details>\n<summary> El ataque no tiene efecto</summary>\n<p>La red no responde al ID utilizado.</p>\n<p><b>Solución:</b> Prueba con otra trama o revisa el entorno simulado.</p>\n</details>\n\n\n---\n\n## Repositorio del proyecto\n[https://github.com/jorgepnaranjo25/CAN-Bus-Attack](https://github.com/jorgepnaranjo25/CAN-Bus-Attack)\n\nIncluye:\n- Código fuente\n- Archivos de configuración (`CMakeLists.txt`, `application.fam`)\n- Instrucciones de compilación e instalación\n- Capturas de pantalla y docs\n\n</details>\n\n---\n\n<details>\n<summary>🇬🇧 English</summary>\n\n# Flipper Zero CAN-Bus Attack App\n\n## Installation Manual\n\nTwo procedures are described: direct installation for users who only want to run the app, and development setup for those wishing to modify the code.\n\n### Direct installation\n\nThe `.fap` executable is provided ready to be installed.\n\n#### Steps\n1. Download the `.fap` from this repo.\n2. Connect Flipper Zero via USB and open **qFlipper**.\n3. Copy the file to:\n   ```bash\n   /SD card/apps/\n   ```\n4. Disconnect and run the app from the main menu.\n\n<p align=\"center\"><img src=\"docs/img/qFlipper.png\" width=\"400\"/></p>\n\n### Build from source\n\n#### Requirements\n- Linux environment with Python 3 and dev tools.\n- Project downloaded.\n- Internet connection.\n\n#### Steps\n```bash\ngit clone https://github.com/DarkFlippers/unleashed-firmware\ncd unleashed-firmware/applications_user\ncp -r /path/CAN-Bus-Attack ./canbus_attack_app\ncd ..\n./fbt fap_canbus_attack_app\n```\n\nCompiled file will be at:\n```bash\n/unleashed-firmware/build/f7-firmware-D/.extapps/canbus_attack_app.fap\n```\n\n### CAN Module Configuration\nMCP2515 must be connected to GPIO using SPI pins (MOSI, MISO, SCK, CS, INT).\n\nMore info: [ElectronicCats Wiki](https://github.com/ElectronicCats/flipper-MCP2515-CANBUS/wiki)\n\n### Verification\nIf connected properly, the app will show the main menu.\n<p align=\"center\"><img src=\"docs/img/mainMenu.png\" width=\"300\"/></p>\n\n---\n\n## User Guide\n\n### Requirements\n- Flipper Zero with **Unleashed v0.81 (unlshd-081)**\n- MCP2515 connected via GPIO\n- `.fap` in `/apps/`\n- Active CAN network (ICSim or physical)\n\n### Access\n1. Power on device.\n2. Applications → CAN Bus Attacks.\n3. Main menu appears.\n<p align=\"center\"><img src=\"docs/img/fz1.png\" width=\"250\"/> <img src=\"docs/img/fz2.png\" width=\"250\"/></p>\n\n### Attacks\n\n#### Sniffing\nPassive capture of frames.\n<p align=\"center\"><img src=\"docs/img/fzs.png\" width=\"250\"/> <img src=\"docs/img/fzs2.png\" width=\"250\"/></p>\n\n#### Replay\nReplays stored frame (default `ID:0x123 Payload:00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07`).\n<p align=\"center\"><img src=\"docs/img/fzr1.png\" width=\"250\"/></p>\n\n#### Modify\nEdit **ID** or **Payload** before sending.\n<p align=\"center\"><img src=\"docs/img/fzm1.png\" width=\"250\"/> <img src=\"docs/img/fzm2.png\" width=\"250\"/> <img src=\"docs/img/fzm3.png\" width=\"250\"/></p>\n\n#### DoS\nFloods bus with dominant frames.\n<p align=\"center\"><img src=\"docs/img/fzd1.png\" width=\"250\"/> <img src=\"docs/img/fzd2.png\" width=\"250\"/> <img src=\"docs/img/fzd3.png\" width=\"250\"/> <img src=\"docs/img/fzd4.png\" width=\"250\"/></p>\n\n### Precautions\n- For educational purposes only.\n- Never on real vehicles.\n\n### Troubleshooting\n\n<details>\n<summary> App not showing</summary>\n<p>The `.fap` file is not in the correct folder.</p>\n<p><b>Solution:</b> Make sure to copy it into <code>apps/</code>.</p>\n</details>\n\n<details>\n<summary> No traffic detected</summary>\n<p>The MCP2515 module is not connected or the bus is inactive.</p>\n<p><b>Solution:</b> Check physical connections and bus speed.</p>\n</details>\n\n<details>\n<summary> Attack has no effect</summary>\n<p>The network is not responding to the used ID.</p>\n<p><b>Solution:</b> Try with another frame or review the simulated network.</p>\n</details>\n\n---\n\n## Project Repository\n[https://github.com/jorgepnaranjo25/CAN-Bus-Attack](https://github.com/jorgepnaranjo25/CAN-Bus-Attack)\n\nIncludes:\n- Source code\n- Config files (`CMakeLists.txt`, `application.fam`)\n- Build/install instructions\n- Screenshots & docs\n\n</details>",
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      "description": "OBD-II scan tool and data logger for Windows, Linux and Android: live gauges and charts, alerts and condition-triggered recording, trouble codes by name, readiness, VIN decode, UDS reads, plugins and OBDb imports. J2534, ELM327 (USB, Bluetooth, WiFi), SocketCAN. Qt-free C++17 core behind a C ABI, a Qt 6/QML app, havne-cli and Python bindings.",
      "readme": "# Havne\n\n_From Norwegian *havn*, a harbor or port: Havne reaches a car through its ports. The verb *havne* is to end up somewhere, as in *havne i grøfta*, in the ditch; staying out of it is still your job._\n\n[![CI](https://github.com/erickramer42/havne/actions/workflows/ci.yml/badge.svg)](https://github.com/erickramer42/havne/actions/workflows/ci.yml) [![Coverage](https://codecov.io/gh/erickramer42/havne/graph/badge.svg)](https://codecov.io/gh/erickramer42/havne) [![Release](https://img.shields.io/github/v/release/erickramer42/havne)](https://github.com/erickramer42/havne/releases/latest)\n[![OpenSSF Scorecard](https://api.scorecard.dev/projects/github.com/erickramer42/havne/badge)](https://scorecard.dev/viewer/?uri=github.com/erickramer42/havne) [![OpenSSF Best Practices](https://www.bestpractices.dev/projects/15816/badge)](https://www.bestpractices.dev/projects/15816)\n\nHavne reads a car through J2534, ELM327 or SocketCAN adapters on Windows, Linux and Android: live data, trouble codes, and recordings to replay or share, scrubbed, from an app, `havne-cli` or Python. [Download](https://github.com/erickramer42/havne/releases/latest).\n\n> [!WARNING]\n> **Experimental.** Tested on one car. Read [DISCLAIMER.md](DISCLAIMER.md) before connecting it.\n\n![The Dashboard through a quarter mile](docs/images/dashboard.gif)\n\n*The Dashboard, simulated.*\n\n## Engineering highlights\n\n- **Vendor drivers run out of process.** Each J2534 DLL runs in a surrogate of its own architecture, so a crashing driver ends its process, not the app ([ADR-0025](docs/adr/0025-one-j2534-backend.md)).\n- **Fast paths, measured.** Decoding allocates nothing per frame; a recorded engine start replays at over 300,000 frames a second on the dev machine, and CI reruns it ([load test](docs/testing.md#load-test-the-replay-fixture-through-the-bridge)).\n- **Measured on a real car.** A second controller on its bus showed Havne's adapter read adding 52 ms; fixing it cut latency from 65.5-73.7 ms to 16.4 ms ([session sheet](docs/bench-sessions/2026-11-05-two-ecu-car-rerun.md)).\n- **Protocol logic with no I/O, fuzzed.** The request engine, ISO-TP and the ELM327 layer take no I/O or clock, so rules are unit tests; parsers run fuzzed in CI ([ADR-0015](docs/adr/0015-request-engine.md)).\n- **A user's signals are data.** Signal files are JSON that core reads from bytes and refuses at load with line and column, so every platform loads them alike ([ADR-0051](docs/adr/0051-signal-files.md)).\n- **Scrubbed by construction, then checked.** An export plans the file from ISO-TP reassembly, then searches every message for the car's VIN and writes nothing on a match ([ADR-0054](docs/adr/0054-exports-and-imports.md)).\n- **A stable C ABI.** Opaque handles, flat functions and POD structs with reserved room; CI compiles the headers as strict C and compares the ABI with the last release's ([ADR-0001](docs/adr/0001-qt-free-core-c-abi.md)).\n- **Tested in tiers, downloads checkable.** A harness tier drives the J2534 stack against a fake driver, 32-bit included; each release carries signed provenance and an SBOM ([testing.md](docs/testing.md), [ADR-0035](docs/adr/0035-linux-downloads-sbom-reproducible.md)).\n\n## What it does\n\n- **Live data:** a Dashboard of eight gauge kinds, Live's table and chart, a Light look, Night in amber or red, optionally scheduled, and a phone's drive view ([ADR-0057](docs/adr/0057-dashboards.md), [ADR-0059](docs/adr/0059-drive-view.md)).\n- **Adapters:** J2534 on Windows; ELM327 over serial, Bluetooth or WiFi, kept running in the background on Android; SocketCAN on Linux, asking so far on a virtual bus ([docs/linux.md](docs/linux.md)).\n- **Diagnose:** each ECU's stored, pending and permanent codes with titles, readiness, the freeze frame and an inspection verdict; a clear asks first and saves the report ([ADR-0037](docs/adr/0037-reading-trouble-codes.md)).\n- **Profiles, chosen by the URI:** `obd2` polls every Service 01 reading the car supports, `uds-generic` the identifiers you name, `raw` logs frames ([ADR-0039](docs/adr/0039-full-service01-coverage.md)).\n- **Your own signals:** signal files and plugins for Service 01 PIDs and Service 22 DIDs on up to four modules, written in Settings or imported from an OBDb set, all kept as plugins in one list ([signal-files.md](docs/signal-files.md)).\n- **Alerts and armed recording:** a condition file names a test of a signal or the link; the app shows an alert as a band, and an armed recorder records around each firing ([condition-files.md](docs/condition-files.md), [ADR-0063](docs/adr/0063-conditions.md)).\n- **Record and review:** every frame and value of a session; the Recordings page pans, zooms, overlays a second run and shows the frames; `replay://` plays one back ([ADR-0049](docs/adr/0049-recordings-in-core.md)).\n- **Analysis log:** Start log records the picked signals at the bus's own rate, and `havne-cli export` writes them as a wide CSV, a row a sweep ([ADR-0056](docs/adr/0056-analysis-log.md)).\n- **Share:** `havne-cli` and the app export a recording scrubbed as pcapng, CSV or a folder, save a health report, and import candump logs and other loggers' CSVs ([ADR-0054](docs/adr/0054-exports-and-imports.md)).\n- **`havne-cli` and Python:** any session as JSON lines or iterators, recordings viewed and exported offline, the simulated car served as an ELM327 adapter ([ADR-0031](docs/adr/0031-command-line-client.md), [ADR-0053](docs/adr/0053-python-bindings.md)).\n- **A simulated vehicle:** a modeled car through a cold start, pulls onto the limiter and a quarter mile, so every page runs with no hardware.\n\n<table>\n<thead>\n<tr><th width=\"33%\">Drive view</th><th width=\"33%\">Codes</th><th width=\"33%\">Dashboard at night</th></tr>\n</thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td><a href=\"docs/images/phone-drive-view.png\"><img src=\"docs/images/phone-drive-view.png\" alt=\"The phone's drive view in a pull at 6,044 rpm, boost 16.0 psi\" width=\"240\"></a></td>\n<td><a href=\"docs/images/phone-codes.png\"><img src=\"docs/images/phone-codes.png\" alt=\"Codes on the test phone: the inspection verdict, the check-engine light, and stored, pending and permanent codes with their titles\" width=\"240\"></a></td>\n<td><a href=\"docs/images/phone-dashboard-night.png\"><img src=\"docs/images/phone-dashboard-night.png\" alt=\"The phone layout's Dashboard with Night on in red\" width=\"240\"></a></td>\n</tr>\n<tr>\n<td>The drive view: every bar hidden, the gauges filling the screen in a pull</td>\n<td>Reading and clearing codes on the test phone</td>\n<td>Night in red, for a dark cabin</td>\n</tr>\n</tbody>\n</table>\n\n![The Recordings viewer on a minute of the simulated car: rpm, throttle, lambda and boost through two pulls, each marked by a band](docs/images/viewer.png)\n\n*A pull in the Recordings viewer: each unit in its own pane on one time axis, the cursor's values beside them, lambda going lean on the limiter's fuel cut.*\n\nEvery page on the desktop and the phone, in Dark and in Night's amber and red: [docs/screenshots.md](docs/screenshots.md).\n\n## Architecture\n\n```\n QML pages: Home · Dashboard · Live · Diagnostics · Activity · Recordings · Settings\n   ▼  properties and list models, GUI thread only\n SessionBridge (app/)          the app's caller of the core: worker → GUI\n   │                           marshaling, 100 ms coalescing, link health\n   │   havne-cli (cli/)        a second front end: a session as JSON lines\n   │   havne (python/)         a third: ctypes over the shared core, frames and values from its pull queue\n   ▼  C ABI: core.h · signals.h · profile.h · plugin.h · obdb.h · j2534.h · serial.h\n             stream.h · socketcan.h · vin.h · sim.h · recording.h · queue.h\n             conditions.h\n ecuio-core (core/)            no Qt, ever: sessions, profiles, signal files, plugins, decoding, recordings\n   ├── mock://    a scripted drive on a vehicle model\n   ├── replay://  a recording's frames.csv at its own pace\n   ├── elm327://  a serial port, a WiFi socket, or a link the app opens\n   ├── socketcan:// a Linux CAN interface, listening or through ISO-TP\n   │              (havne-cli play drives the simulated car on a virtual one,\n   │               havne-cli sim answers as its engine ECU)\n   └── j2534://   a surrogate process per driver, over a named pipe\n          ├── ecuio-j2534-surrogate.exe      (32-bit drivers)\n          └── ecuio-j2534-surrogate-x64.exe  (64-bit drivers)\n```\n\nThree rules shape it: **the core never links Qt**; **the UI receives\nfinal display values**, so decoding and units have one home; and **the C\nABI is the boundary**. [docs/architecture.md](docs/architecture.md) walks through\nit, a frame's path from transport to screen included.\n\n**Where to look in the code:**\n\n| File | What it shows |\n|---|---|\n| [`core/src/request_engine.h`](core/src/request_engine.h) | The request engine: pacing, the probe, the DID scan and identification, with no I/O and no clock, so every rule is a unit test |\n| [`core/src/isotp.h`](core/src/isotp.h) | ISO-TP on classic CAN, shared by ELM327 and SocketCAN: reassembly, Flow Control, the timers, with no I/O and no clock; fuzzed |\n| [`core/src/elm327_protocol.h`](core/src/elm327_protocol.h) | A pure protocol layer: line reading and frame parsing; fuzzed |\n| [`core/src/j2534_surrogate_client.cpp`](core/src/j2534_surrogate_client.cpp), [`surrogate/surrogate_main.cpp`](surrogate/surrogate_main.cpp) | Both ends of the out-of-process driver host: the pipe's protections, late replies, a child that dies |\n| [`core/src/recorder_writer.cpp`](core/src/recorder_writer.cpp), [`core/src/recording_reader.cpp`](core/src/recording_reader.cpp) | Recordings in core: the worker's single-producer ring to a writer thread that never holds the session, and a reader that answers the viewer from one pass's index; the reader fuzzed |\n| [`core/src/signal_file.cpp`](core/src/signal_file.cpp), [`core/src/plugin.cpp`](core/src/plugin.cpp) | A user's signals and a manufacturer's plugins read as data: a strict JSON reader over bytes, each refusal with its line and column, one build of a signal set for both; fuzzed |\n| [`core/src/scrub.cpp`](core/src/scrub.cpp), [`core/src/export.cpp`](core/src/export.cpp) | The scrubbed exports: the plan from the frames' reassembly, then the check of every message and the file, which fails the export rather than write the car's identity |\n| [`core/src/queue.cpp`](core/src/queue.cpp), [`python/havne/session.py`](python/havne/session.py) | The pull queue: the worker copies into a ring and never waits, the caller's thread reads in batches; Python's iterators over it |\n| [`core/src/link_health.h`](core/src/link_health.h) | The link's state machine, shared by both adapter transports |\n| [`app/sessionbridge.cpp`](app/sessionbridge.cpp), [`app/bridge_recorder.cpp`](app/bridge_recorder.cpp) | The worker-to-GUI boundary: backpressure, coalescing, recording |\n| [`cli/cmd_stream.cpp`](cli/cmd_stream.cpp), [`cli/line_ring.h`](cli/line_ring.h) | A second front end over the public headers alone: lines formatted on the worker with no allocation, a ring that drops for a live bus and waits for a replay |\n| [`core/src/mock_drive_cycle.h`](core/src/mock_drive_cycle.h) | The simulated vehicle and its physics |\n| [`core/src/sim_ecu.h`](core/src/sim_ecu.h) | The simulated ECU behind `havne-cli sim`: what it answers, as the simulated car or a recording of the test car, with faults on request; pure, so every answer is a unit test |\n\n## Try it\n\nDownload from the [latest release](https://github.com/erickramer42/havne/releases/latest):\n\n- **Windows 10 or 11 (x64):** unzip and run `havne.exe`. It isn't code-signed, so SmartScreen may ask first (**More info**, then **Run anyway**).\n- **Android 12 or later:** open the APK on the phone; it's signed with Havne's release key, so each release installs over the last.\n- **Linux (x86_64 or 64-bit ARM; glibc 2.39 or later):** make the AppImage executable and run it ([docs/linux.md](docs/linux.md)).\n- **Python 3.11 or later:** `pip install` the wheel for your platform, then `python read_pids.py mock://demo` ([`read_pids.py`](python/examples/read_pids.py)) prints the simulated car's readings.\n\nThen press **Demo data** on Home (or `mock://demo` under **WiFi and other addresses** on Settings' Connection page) and **Connect**; with **Record sessions** on, each run opens afterward on the Recordings page.\n\nTo build from source you need CMake 3.21+, Qt 6.12 and a C++17 compiler:\n\n```sh\ncmake -B build -DCMAKE_PREFIX_PATH=<qt-install>/<kit>\ncmake --build build --config Release\nctest --test-dir build -C Release --output-on-failure\n```\n\n`-DHAVNE_BUILD_CORE_ONLY=ON` builds the core, `havne-cli` and their tests without Qt; `havne-cli stream mock://demo --values` then streams the simulated car as JSON lines. [docs/development.md](docs/development.md) covers the other platforms and troubleshooting.\n\n## Status\n\nv0.8.0, conditions and alerts, is the latest release. Next:\n\n| Version | Plan |\n|---|---|\n| v0.9.0-v0.11.0 | The whole car through plugins; discovery of the whole bus; the scan tool |\n| 1.0.0 | The finished reader: frozen and hardened, full featured on Windows, Linux and Android |\n\n[STATUS.md](STATUS.md) holds what works, what's verified, the known issues and the roadmap; [CHANGELOG.md](CHANGELOG.md) what each release changed.\n\n## Documentation\n\n| Document | What's in it |\n|---|---|\n| [docs/user-guide.md](docs/user-guide.md) | Using the app, task by task: connecting, live values, the Dashboard, logs, recordings, alerts, codes, vehicles, the drive view |\n| [docs/addresses.md](docs/addresses.md) | Every address form and option, with its default and an example |\n| [docs/architecture.md](docs/architecture.md) | How the parts fit together and why, and a map of the other docs |\n| [docs/adr/](docs/adr/README.md) | The architecture decision records |\n| [docs/testing.md](docs/testing.md) | Test tiers, what each test pins, and what isn't verified |\n| [docs/signal-files.md](docs/signal-files.md) | Writing your own signals: the format, what's refused at load, using a file, importing an OBDb set |\n| [docs/condition-files.md](docs/condition-files.md) | Writing conditions: tests of a signal or the link, alerts, armed recording |\n| [plugins/README.md](plugins/README.md) | Plugins: the package, its variants, the example for the simulated car |\n| [docs/j2534.md](docs/j2534.md), [docs/elm327.md](docs/elm327.md) | How each adapter transport works |\n| [docs/linux.md](docs/linux.md) | Havne on Linux: the AppImage, the core packages, adapters and permissions, SocketCAN, tracing |\n| [docs/ios.md](docs/ios.md) | Havne on iPhone: installing CI's unsigned build with your own Apple ID, what works there |\n| [docs/screenshots.md](docs/screenshots.md) | Every page on the desktop and the phone, in Dark and in Night's amber and red |\n| [docs/development.md](docs/development.md) | Builds, tests, CI, releases, troubleshooting |\n| [docs/bench-sessions/](docs/bench-sessions/bench-prep.md) | Real-hardware sessions, their run sheets, and what only hardware can confirm |\n| [docs/engineering-log.md](docs/engineering-log.md) | Milestones and lessons learned |\n| [CONTRIBUTING.md](CONTRIBUTING.md), [SECURITY.md](SECURITY.md) | Where to start, the rules a change follows, reporting a vulnerability |\n\n## License\n\nMIT; see [LICENSE](LICENSE). Havne uses [Qt](https://www.qt.io) under\nLGPL-3.0; Qt isn't bundled in this repository. Havne is an independent\nproject, not affiliated with or endorsed by The Qt Company.",
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      "description": "Ten automotive & avionics protocols (CAN, UDS, AUTOSAR, ISO 26262, DoIP, ARINC 429, MIL-STD-1553, ARINC 653, DO-178C, FDR) in C and Python, cross-tested, fuzzed, self-traced, with a desktop workbench.",
      "readme": "<div align=\"center\">\n\n<picture>\n  <source media=\"(prefers-color-scheme: dark)\" srcset=\"assets/logo-dark.svg\">\n  <img src=\"assets/logo.svg\" alt=\"BusBench\" width=\"380\">\n</picture>\n\n**Ten automotive and avionics protocols, implemented twice (in C and in Python), tested against each other, and explorable in one desktop workbench.**\n\nCAN · UDS / ISO-TP · AUTOSAR · ISO 26262 · DoIP · ARINC 429 · MIL-STD-1553 · ARINC 653 · DO-178C · Flight data recorder\n\n[![ci](https://github.com/Alifizz01/BusBench/actions/workflows/ci.yml/badge.svg)](https://github.com/Alifizz01/BusBench/actions/workflows/ci.yml)\n![C11](https://img.shields.io/badge/C-C11-3D63DD)\n![python](https://img.shields.io/badge/python-3.10%2B-159A78)\n![compilers](https://img.shields.io/badge/compilers-gcc%20·%20clang%20·%20MSVC-8A5CD6)\n![traceability](https://img.shields.io/badge/requirements%20traced-36%2F36-1E9C58)\n![license](https://img.shields.io/badge/license-MIT-5B6676)\n\n<img src=\"assets/tour.gif\" alt=\"A tour of BusBench Studio: overview with every test green, CAN bit layout, UDS transcript with ISO-TP frames, AUTOSAR layers, safety monitor, DoIP messages, ARINC 429 word, MIL-STD-1553 bus, ARINC 653 timeline, traceability matrix and flight data recorder ring\" width=\"900\">\n\n</div>\n\n---\n\n## The problem\n\nVehicles and aircraft run on a handful of buses and standards. Learning them, prototyping\nagainst them and proving that an implementation is right are all harder than they should be:\n\n| # | Problem | What it costs | How BusBench answers it |\n|---|---|---|---|\n| 1 | **The knowledge is locked behind hardware and licences.** Seeing a CAN signal, a 1553 transaction or a DoIP session usually means a bus interface plus CANoe, a DDC/Astronics card or a vendor analyzer. | Thousands of euros before the first frame; students and small teams learn from PDFs instead of traffic. | Every bus is **simulated**. Clone, install, and all ten protocols run on a laptop with the standard library only. |\n| 2 | **Prototype in Python, ship in C, and the two drift apart.** | A decoder that is right in the notebook and wrong on the ECU, found late. | Each module exists **twice**, the C half against a shared header contract. Both halves pin the **same expected values**, and the Python DoIP tester drives the **C gateway over real TCP** in every test run. |\n| 3 | **Bus parsers are attack surface.** DoIP listens on TCP 13400; ISO-TP reassembly and CAN bit-walking index into buffers with lengths taken off the wire. | Out-of-bounds reads and crashes on the first malformed frame, or a car that answers UDS to anyone. | **libFuzzer** on four C parsers, **ASan + UBSan** builds of every C test, **cppcheck**, and **property tests** that compare decoders against independent reference formulas over thousands of random inputs. |\n| 4 | **Certification wants traceability, and spreadsheets rot.** DO-178C and ISO 26262 expect every requirement to trace to a passing test, and every test to a requirement. | A requirement whose test was deleted still looks traced; audits find it, not CI. | A traceability tool that reads requirements, JUnit results **and the source tree back**, and **BusBench uses it on itself**: 36 requirements ↔ 72 tests, enforced as a CI gate. |\n| 5 | **Protocols are invisible.** Endianness, bit-reversed labels, sequence numbers and time slices only exist as tables in a standard. | The classic mistakes (Motorola bit order, treating 0x78 as an error, a stale signal read as current) get made in production code. | **BusBench Studio** shows the bits: every frame, word and header drawn as a field-by-field ribbon, live, for every module. |\n| 6 | **Every bus comes with its own tool.** | Ten tools, ten data formats, no automation across them. | One package, **one CLI, one REST API, one GUI**. The modules are wired together too: DoIP → ISO-TP → UDS ECU, and CAN + ARINC 429 traffic → flight data recorder. |\n\n**Who it is for:** automotive and avionics software and test engineers, embedded developers\nlearning these buses, and students who want to see real protocol behaviour without lab\nhardware.\n\n**What it is not:** a certified tool or a hardware driver. The protocols are faithful in the\nparts that matter (framing, state machines, failure handling) and each module README ends with\na **Simplifications** section that says exactly what was left out.\n\n---\n\n## BusBench Studio\n\nOne native desktop window for all ten modules (`busbench studio`). The signature is the **bit ribbon**:\nthe same field colours on every protocol: blue for identifiers and labels, teal for data, violet for\ncontrol, amber for status, rose for checksums.\n\n| | |\n|---|---|\n| ![Overview with every C, Python and interop test green](assets/overview.png) | ![CAN signal decoder showing a Motorola signal's bit walk](assets/can.png) |\n| **Overview.** Run every C and Python suite plus the C⇄Python interop check from the GUI. | **CAN.** Pick a signal and see exactly which bits it occupies, in significance order. Intel climbs, Motorola walks down and jumps bytes. |\n| ![UDS transcript with every ISO-TP frame](assets/uds.png) | ![DoIP messages over TCP and the ISO-TP frames on the CAN side](assets/doip.png) |\n| **UDS.** Every request, response and negative response code, with each ISO-TP frame (SF / FF / FC / CF) on the wire. | **DoIP.** Header ribbons for TCP, and underneath the ISO-TP frames the gateway really puts on the CAN side. Runs against the Python **or the C** gateway. |\n| ![AUTOSAR layers and timeline](assets/autosar.png) | ![ISO 26262 watchdog, plausibility and fault escalation](assets/safety.png) |\n| **AUTOSAR.** SWC / RTE / BSW layers with live values. Kill the bus and watch the lamp fail visible when the signal goes stale. | **ISO 26262.** Windowed watchdog timeline, plausibility check, and debounced fault escalation to limp-home. |\n| ![ARINC 429 word with bit-reversed label](assets/arinc429.png) | ![MIL-STD-1553 bus with remote terminals and a minor frame](assets/mil1553.png) |\n| **ARINC 429.** All 32 bits by field; a word can decode perfectly and still be unusable (SSM). Build your own words. | **MIL-STD-1553.** Toggle terminals busy / faulty / disconnected and run a minor frame with retries. |\n| ![ARINC 653 partition timeline](assets/arinc653.png) | ![DO-178C traceability matrix](assets/traceability.png) |\n| **ARINC 653.** Greedy, hung and nosy partitions are cut off at their own boundary; nobody else moves. | **DO-178C.** Requirements × JUnit results × source annotations, with the gaps you only see from the other direction. |\n| ![Flight data recorder ring with one corrupted slot](assets/fdr.png) | |\n| **FDR.** Record the CAN and ARINC traffic, flip a byte, and lose exactly one frame. | |\n\nEvery button is a call to the local REST API, and the **{ } API** button shows it as a ready-to-copy `curl` command.\n\n---\n\n## The modules\n\n| Domain | Module | Standard | The one thing worth reading it for |\n|---|---|---|---|\n| Automotive | [`can`](busbench/can) | ISO 11898 · DBC | Intel and Motorola bit layouts walk the message in opposite directions |\n| Automotive | [`uds`](busbench/uds) | ISO 14229 · ISO 15765-2 | `0x78` responsePending is not an error, and the ISO-TP sequence number is how a dropped frame gets caught |\n| Automotive | [`autosar`](busbench/autosar) | AUTOSAR Classic | The layering rule is enforced by a test that reads the source, not just documented |\n| Automotive | [`safety`](busbench/safety) | ISO 26262 | A windowed watchdog treats too early as a fault as well as too late |\n| Automotive | [`doip`](busbench/doip) | ISO 13400 | The protocol state machine is kept off the sockets, so every awkward case is a plain buffer |\n| Avionics | [`arinc429`](busbench/arinc429) | ARINC 429 | The label is bit reversed on the wire, and a word can decode perfectly and still be meaningless |\n| Avionics | [`mil1553`](busbench/mil1553) | MIL-STD-1553B | Word count 32 encodes as 0, unless the subaddress makes those bits a mode code |\n| Avionics | [`arinc653`](busbench/arinc653) | ARINC 653 | The frame advances on the clock, so a hung partition can only ever hurt itself |\n| Avionics | [`traceability`](busbench/traceability) | DO-178C | Reads the source back, because a requirement whose test was deleted still looks traced |\n| Avionics | [`fdr`](busbench/fdr) | ED-112A style | A CRC per frame, not per file, so one torn write costs one frame |\n\nEach module folder holds both halves and everything they share:\n\n```\nbusbench/<module>/\n  include/    the C header: the interface contract both versions follow\n  src/        C implementation\n  *.py        Python implementation (an importable subpackage)\n  test/       test_x.c and test_x.py, pinned to the same expected values\n  data/       sample DBC files, logs, captures and requirements where needed\n  README.md   what it does, the design decision behind it, and the simplifications\n```\n\n### How the modules connect\n\n```mermaid\nflowchart LR\n    T[DoIP tester] -- \"TCP 13400\" --> G[DoIP gateway]\n    G -- \"ISO-TP frames\" --> E[UDS ECU]\n    PT[Python tester] <-. \"interop check, real TCP\" .-> CG[C DoIP gateway]\n    L[CAN log] --> F[(Flight data recorder)]\n    W[ARINC 429 capture] --> F\n    D[CAN bit layout] --> B[AUTOSAR BSW] --> R[RTE] --> S[Application SWC]\n```\n\n---\n\n## Engineering evidence\n\n| Practice | Where | What it proves |\n|---|---|---|\n| **Twin implementations** | every module: ~3,000 lines of C11, ~2,200 lines of Python | Both halves pin the same expected values (e.g. the ARINC 429 capture, the CRC-16 check value, the traceability verdict), so they cannot drift without a test going red |\n| **Cross-language interop** | `busbench test doip` | The Python tester drives the compiled C gateway over real TCP: identify, refused diagnostics, routing activation, VIN |\n| **Compiler matrix** | CI: gcc + clang (Linux), MSVC (Windows) | Portable C11, warnings on (`-Wall -Wextra`, `/W3`) |\n| **Sanitizers** | `busbench test --sanitize` | Every C test suite clean under AddressSanitizer + UndefinedBehaviorSanitizer |\n| **Fuzzing** | [`fuzz/`](fuzz) | libFuzzer + ASan + UBSan on CAN decode, ISO-TP reassembly, DoIP message handling and ARINC 429 analysis. On its first CI run it found undefined behaviour in the C CAN decoder (a shift by -1 for zero-length signals); fixed in both halves with regression tests |\n| **Static analysis** | CI: cppcheck | warning, portability and performance checks over all C sources |\n| **Property tests** | [`tests/test_robustness.py`](tests/test_robustness.py) | CAN decoding vs an independent textbook formula on 3,000 random signal geometries; all 65,536 MIL-1553 command words round-trip; any single bit flip in an FDR frame is rejected |\n| **Self-traceability** | [`requirements/`](requirements/busbench_requirements.csv) + CI | BusBench's own DO-178C tool gates the build: 36 requirements, 72 tests, zero gaps. The matrix is published in every CI run |\n\n```mermaid\nflowchart LR\n    P[push] --> M[\"build + test<br/>gcc · clang · MSVC\"]\n    P --> SAN[\"ASan + UBSan\"]\n    P --> FZ[\"libFuzzer ×4\"]\n    P --> SA[\"cppcheck\"]\n    P --> TR[\"pytest → JUnit → busbench trace<br/>36 requirements ↔ 72 tests\"]\n```\n\n---\n\n## Quick start\n\n```bash\ngit clone https://github.com/Alifizz01/BusBench && cd BusBench\npip install -e \".[studio]\"        # standard library only, plus pywebview for the desktop window\n\nbusbench studio                   # the desktop workbench\nbusbench test                     # every C and Python suite + interop (finds gcc, clang or MSVC itself)\nbusbench test --py                # Python only, no compiler needed\nbusbench demo arinc429            # any module's command-line demo\n```\n\nThe runner finds a compiler on its own: gcc / clang on PATH, an MSYS2 gcc that is not on PATH,\nor Visual Studio's MSVC through `vswhere`. With no compiler it runs the Python half and says\nso, rather than quietly passing.\n\n### Use it from code\n\n```python\nfrom busbench.uds import UdsClient, EcuSim\nfrom busbench.arinc429 import build_word, analyze, Label\n\necu = EcuSim()\nclient = UdsClient(ecu.client_send, ecu.client_recv)\nprint(client.read_data_by_identifier(0xF190).decode())     # VIN, reassembled by ISO-TP\n\nword = build_word(0o203, 0, 35000, 3, 18)                  # altitude, SSM normal\nprint(hex(word), analyze(word, {0o203: Label(0o203, \"ALTITUDE\", \"ft\", 1.0, 18)}))\n```\n\n### Or over the REST API\n\n`busbench serve` (or an open Studio) answers on `http://127.0.0.1:8770`. Every function in\n[`busbench/api.py`](busbench/api.py) is `POST /api/<name>`:\n\n```bash\ncurl -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8770/api/uds_request -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n     -d '{\"request\": \"22 F1 90\"}'\n# → {\"ok\": true, \"response\": \"62 F1 90 57 56 ...\", \"note\": \"WVWZZZ1JZ3W386752\",\n#    \"frames\": [{\"from\": \"tester\", \"kind\": \"SF\", ...}, {\"from\": \"ecu\", \"kind\": \"FF\", ...}, ...]}\n```\n\n| Group | Endpoints |\n|---|---|\n| Overview | `modules`, `test_start`, `test_status` |\n| CAN | `can_sample`, `can_decode` |\n| UDS | `uds_reset`, `uds_request` |\n| AUTOSAR | `autosar_reset`, `autosar_run` |\n| ISO 26262 | `safety_watchdog`, `safety_plausibility`, `safety_faults` |\n| DoIP | `doip_start` (Python or C gateway), `doip_send`, `doip_stop` |\n| ARINC 429 | `arinc429_sample`, `arinc429_analyze`, `arinc429_build` |\n| MIL-STD-1553 | `mil1553_state`, `mil1553_rt`, `mil1553_transact`, `mil1553_schedule`, `mil1553_reset` |\n| ARINC 653 | `arinc653_run` |\n| DO-178C | `traceability_sample`, `traceability_analyze` |\n| FDR | `fdr_reset`, `fdr_state`, `fdr_append`, `fdr_record_buses`, `fdr_corrupt` |\n\nThe server binds to 127.0.0.1 only and requires JSON bodies with a localhost `Host` header, so a\nweb page you visit cannot drive the bench.\n\n### Trace your own project\n\n```bash\npytest --junitxml=junit.xml\nbusbench trace --requirements reqs.csv --results junit.xml --source src/ tests/ --out report.md\n# exit code = number of problems: untested requirements, tests that never ran, failing tests,\n# tests no requirement asks for, and @req annotations pointing at requirements that do not exist\n```\n\n---\n\n## Why both languages\n\nThey are not translations of each other. Each half is written the way that language is\nactually written, and the differences are called out in the module READMEs. The clearest\nexample is error reporting: the C clients return a result code you have to check, while the\nPython ones raise, so a caller cannot use a buffer after a failure by forgetting to look at a\nreturn value.\n\n## Layout\n\n```\nbusbench/            the package: ten modules, runner, REST API, Studio\n  <module>/          C + Python + tests + data for one protocol (see above)\n  runner.py          builds and runs both halves, finds gcc / clang / MSVC\n  api.py server.py   REST API\n  studio/            the desktop GUI (HTML/CSS/JS, uPlot), opened by studio_app.py\ntests/               cross-module, interop, API and property tests\nfuzz/                libFuzzer harnesses for the C parsers\nrequirements/        BusBench's own requirements, traced in CI\nassets/              README images; make_screenshots.py regenerates all of them\n```\n\n## Notes\n\n* C11 and Python 3.10+, standard library only at runtime. Studio adds `pywebview`.\n* Some C headers gained declarations the original contracts did not have. Each addition is\n  marked `added:` in the header with the reason; the original declarations are untouched.\n* Every module README ends with a **Simplifications** section. They are choices, not oversights.\n\n## License\n\nMIT · © Muhamad Alif Izzuwan Bin Ibrahim ([github.com/Alifizz01](https://github.com/Alifizz01))",
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      "description": "A CAN bus toolkit in C++17: DBC parser, bit-exact signal codec, virtual multi-ECU bus with arbitration, ISO-TP transport, UDS diagnostics and a live terminal dashboard. Built and tested without any CAN hardware.",
      "readme": "# canforge\n\nA CAN bus toolkit in C++17: DBC parsing, a bit-exact signal codec, a simulated\nmulti-ECU bus, ISO-TP and UDS diagnostics, and a terminal dashboard. I wrote and\ntested all of it without touching a single piece of CAN hardware.\n\n[![ci](https://github.com/TheModelStudent/canforge/actions/workflows/ci.yml/badge.svg)](https://github.com/TheModelStudent/canforge/actions/workflows/ci.yml)\n![C++17](https://img.shields.io/badge/C%2B%2B-17-blue)\n![tests 383](https://img.shields.io/badge/tests-383%20passing-brightgreen)\n![licence MIT](https://img.shields.io/badge/licence-MIT-blue)\n\n## Why\n\nA car is thirty to a hundred small computers that have to agree with each other.\nThe engine controller knows the crankshaft speed, the dashboard needs to draw it,\nthe transmission needs it to decide when to shift. CAN is the wire they share:\ntwo wires, invented at Bosch in the 80s, in every vehicle built since the\nmid-90s and in a lot of industrial and agricultural machinery besides.\n\nThe catch is that CAN messages don't describe themselves. A frame is an\nidentifier plus up to eight bytes (64 with CAN FD), and what those bytes actually\n*mean* lives in a separate database file: which signal starts at which bit, how\nwide it is, which byte order, what to multiply the raw integer by, what unit\ncomes out the other end. That format is DBC, which Vector Informatik defined and\nnever fully published.\n\nGetting the bit extraction right is more or less the whole job. Little-endian is\neasy. Big-endian is where people get it wrong, because the start bit is the\n*most* significant bit and the signal grows toward *lower* bit numbers, so it\nisn't a contiguous run in the obvious numbering. I wanted to write that properly,\nfrom the spec, and then prove it was right rather than assume so.\n\nThat turned into everything else here: something to generate realistic traffic to\ndecode, then the diagnostic protocols that ride on top, then a way to watch it\nall happen.\n\n## Try it\n\n```sh\ncmake -S . -B build -G Ninja -DCMAKE_BUILD_TYPE=RelWithDebInfo && cmake --build build\n\n# inspect a database\n./build/cli/canforge info --database dbc/tests/data/powertrain.dbc\n\n# watch a simulated vehicle on a simulated bus\n./build/cli/canforge dash --config sim/tests/data/vehicle.cfg --virtual\n\n# flash firmware onto a simulated ECU over UDS\nhead -c 2048 /dev/urandom > firmware.bin\n./build/cli/canforge uds --virtual --download firmware.bin\n```\n\n`--virtual` uses the in-process bus, so none of that needs `sudo`, the `vcan`\nmodule, or a CAN interface. Against a real kernel interface instead:\n\n```sh\nsudo modprobe vcan && sudo ip link add dev vcan0 type vcan && sudo ip link set up vcan0\n./build/cli/canforge sim --config sim/tests/data/vehicle.cfg --bus vcan0\n```\n\n> **Screen recordings.** I haven't committed the GIFs yet.\n> [`docs/dashboard.tape`](docs/dashboard.tape) and [`docs/uds.tape`](docs/uds.tape)\n> are [vhs](https://github.com/charmbracelet/vhs) scripts that record them\n> (`vhs docs/dashboard.tape`), and both run on the in-process bus, so you can\n> reproduce them yourself with no hardware and no root. The captured text of the\n> UDS firmware download is in [`docs/uds-session.txt`](docs/uds-session.txt) if\n> you'd rather just read it.\n\n## Where to start reading\n\n`core/src/Signal.cpp` is the bit extraction, and\n`core/tests/test_signal_golden.cpp` is the 78 layouts I worked out by hand to\ncheck it. Reading those two together is the fastest way to see whether I know\nwhat I'm doing. After that, `isotp/src/Transport.cpp` for the state machine and\n`sim/src/UdsServer.cpp` for the diagnostic side.\n\n## How it fits together\n\nA lower layer never knows about a higher one, and the CMake link graph enforces\nthat rather than a comment asking politely.\n\n```mermaid\ngraph BT\n    core[\"<b>core/</b><br/>Frame · CanId · signal codec<br/>Message · Database<br/><i>no dependencies</i>\"]\n    text[\"<b>text/</b><br/>Source · Lexer<br/>Diagnostics\"]\n    transport[\"<b>transport/</b><br/>IBus · SocketCAN · VirtualBus<br/>candump · ASC · BLF · inflate\"]\n    isotp[\"<b>isotp/</b><br/>ISO 15765-2\"]\n    dbc[\"<b>dbc/</b><br/>DBC parser and writer\"]\n    uds[\"<b>uds/</b><br/>ISO 14229 client\"]\n    sim[\"<b>sim/</b><br/>sources · plant · ECUs<br/>faults · UDS server\"]\n    tuimodel[\"<b>tui/ViewModel</b><br/>headless, testable\"]\n    tui[\"<b>tui/Dashboard</b><br/>ftxui\"]\n    cli[\"<b>cli/</b><br/>canforge\"]\n\n    text --> core\n    transport --> core\n    isotp --> core\n    dbc --> core\n    dbc --> text\n    uds --> isotp\n    tuimodel --> core\n    tuimodel --> transport\n    sim --> core\n    sim --> text\n    sim --> transport\n    sim --> isotp\n    sim --> uds\n    tui --> tuimodel\n    cli --> dbc\n    cli --> sim\n    cli --> uds\n    cli --> tui\n\n    classDef nodep fill:#14532d,stroke:#22c55e,color:#fff\n    classDef dep fill:#1e3a5f,stroke:#3b82f6,color:#fff\n    classDef ui fill:#5c3317,stroke:#f59e0b,color:#fff\n    class core nodep\n    class text,transport,isotp,dbc,uds,sim dep\n    class tuimodel,tui,cli ui\n```\n\nTwo bits of that are worth explaining. `isotp` depends only on `core` because\nit's a pure state machine driven by `on_frame()` and `poll(now)` and never\ntouches a bus at all, which is also why every one of its timeouts is testable to\nthe microsecond against a fake clock. And `text/` exists because the simulator's\nconfig parser wanted the same scanner the DBC parser uses; making `sim/` link a\nwhole DBC parser just to read its own config file seemed silly, so the generic\nparts moved down a layer.\n\nNo library layer has any dependency. GoogleTest and ftxui are fetched by CMake\nand only the tests and the dashboard ever see them.\n\n## What's in it\n\n**Signals and frames.** Classic CAN and CAN FD, 11- and 29-bit identifiers, both\nbyte orders, 1 to 64 bits at any offset, signed and unsigned, IEEE floats via\n`SIG_VALTYPE_`, scaling and offsets, value tables. An out-of-range identifier\nwon't compile if it's a constant and won't construct if it isn't. The codec is\nallocation-free and there's a test that proves it by replacing global\n`operator new` with one that aborts.\n\n**DBC.** Parser and writer, simple and extended (`SG_MUL_VAL_`) multiplexing,\nattributes, comments, value tables. Errors come out looking like compiler errors,\nwith a line, a column, the offending token and a caret under it, because a 40,000\nline database from a supplier is impossible to debug otherwise. It tolerates the\nthings real files do (BOMs, CRLF, Latin-1, missing semicolons, `3PMS` as a node\nname) and each tolerance is commented where it's handled with the tool that needs\nit named.\n\n**A bus that behaves like a bus.** The virtual backend models bit timing and\narbitration, not just a queue: a frame occupies the medium for the number of\nmicroseconds its length and worst-case stuffing say it should, and when two nodes\ntransmit at once the lower identifier wins while the loser keeps its frame and\nretries. That's enough to reproduce priority starvation on demand, which is the\nwhole reason to model it. Time is virtual, so the tests are deterministic and\ntake no wall-clock time.\n\n**Logs.** candump and Vector ASC read and write; BLF read-only. BLF meant writing\na DEFLATE decompressor from scratch, since the library layers aren't allowed a\nzlib dependency and BLF is the format real automotive logs actually arrive in.\n\n**Diagnostics.** ISO-TP with segmentation, flow control, the `FF_DL = 0` escape\nfor transfers over 4095 bytes, and STmin down to 100 µs. On top of that a UDS\nclient covering ten services, including a complete firmware download verified\nbyte by byte against a simulated ECU.\n\n**Simulator and dashboard.** A longitudinal vehicle model drives ECUs that\ntransmit on a schedule with rolling counters and CRCs, plus seeded fault\ninjection. The dashboard shows a live trace, per-message period and jitter, bus\nload, and signal plots. All of the dashboard's logic lives in a `ViewModel` with\nno ftxui in it, which is the only reason any of it is testable.\n\nEvery claim above has a test behind it. `ctest --test-dir build` runs all 383,\nand the suite breakdown is further down.\n\n## Benchmarks\n\nGCC 11.4 at `-O3`, aarch64 in a container. Reproduce with\n`./build/bench/canforge_bench_codec` and `./build/bench/canforge_bench_pipeline`.\n\nSignal codec, single-threaded, over a 12-signal powertrain mix and 4096 distinct\nframes:\n\n| operation | throughput | per signal |\n|---|---:|---:|\n| `decode_raw`, bit extraction only | 467 M/s | 2.14 ns |\n| `decode`, extraction plus scaling | 304 M/s | 3.29 ns |\n| `encode_raw`, bit insertion only | 369 M/s | 2.71 ns |\n| `decode_raw_reference`, one bit at a time | 157 M/s | 6.37 ns |\n\nAnd the rest of the pipeline:\n\n| operation | result |\n|---|---:|\n| Parse a 5000-signal / 625-message DBC (345 KiB) | 6.9 ms (51 MB/s) |\n| Write it back out | 4.8 ms |\n| `Database::validate()` on it | 0.4 ms |\n| Virtual bus: arbitrate and deliver 200,000 frames | 10 ms, so 19.4 M frames/s |\n| ...which is 54 s of simulated 500 kbit/s bus time | 5224x real time |\n| Identifier lookup plus decode of every signal | 215 M signals/s |\n\nFor scale, a 500 kbit/s bus saturated with 8-byte frames carries about 3700\nframes per second, so decoding every signal of every frame costs roughly 0.02% of\none core. The codec is not the bottleneck in anything.\n\n`bench/canforge_soak` ran 467,000 frames across 31 simulated minutes with the\nview model snapshotting at 60 Hz throughout. Resident set was flat at 6136 KiB\nfrom about t=12 s to the end. Every accumulating structure is capped: the trace\nring buffer, the signal history, the frames-per-second window, and the\nper-message statistics, which keep a running mean instead of a stored history.\n\n## Fuzzing, and what it actually found\n\nFour targets in `fuzz/`: the DBC parser, the BLF reader, the ASC and candump\nreaders, and the ISO-TP reassembler. They're written against the libFuzzer entry\npoint, and there's a standalone driver so the same targets run under GCC with\nASan where clang isn't available.\n\nThey found one real bug, in the BLF reader. A log container header carries an\n`uncompressedSize` field that the file controls, and it went straight into\n`std::vector::reserve()`. A 200-byte file could therefore ask for a 4 GiB\nallocation, which is a denial of service in anything that opens an untrusted log.\nThe fix clamps the hint, bounds the output during inflation at 256 MiB, and\nrejects an implausible header size outright.\n\nI want to be straight about the scale of this, though, because one bug in a table\nlooks better than it is. The development container has no clang, so libFuzzer\nnever ran here. Everything below came from the standalone GCC driver, which is a\nmutation fuzzer with no coverage feedback and is therefore a lot weaker:\n\n| target | executions | crashes |\n|---|---:|---:|\n| `fuzz_dbc` | 135,000 | 0 |\n| `fuzz_blf` | 104,000 | 1, fixed above |\n| `fuzz_asc` | 150,000 | 0 |\n| `fuzz_isotp` | 900,000 | 0 |\n\nThat's about 1.3 million executions rather than the 10 million per target I'd\nplanned, and without coverage guidance it explores far less of the state space.\nThe `fuzz-long` CI job runs each target to 10 million under real libFuzzer on a\nweekly schedule, and those runs haven't happened yet. Treat that table as a floor,\nnot a result. The corpus is committed and replayed on every CI run, so anything\nfound later becomes a permanent regression test.\n\n## Tests\n\n383 of them.\n\n| suite | tests | covers |\n|---|---:|---|\n| `core_tests` | 83 | Result, CanId, frame layout, DLC tables, 78 hand-computed codec vectors, 8 property tests over 20,000 layouts each |\n| `core_no_alloc_test` | 5 | the allocation trap, and its own self-check |\n| `dbc_tests` | 65 | lexer, parser, diagnostics, multiplexing, round-trip, one case per error class |\n| `transport_tests` | 69 | timing, arbitration, filters, inflate, three log formats, replay (6 skipped without vcan0) |\n| `isotp_tests` | 41 | segmentation, every timeout, every error, STmin to the microsecond, property tests |\n| `uds_tests` | 34 | every service, the NRC table, responsePending, a full 4 KB firmware download |\n| `sim_tests` | 57 | signal sources, plant physics, ECU scheduling, counters and checksums, config diagnostics, every fault |\n| `tui_tests` | 25 | period and jitter measurement, filtering, ring buffers, sparkline scaling, thread safety |\n| `fuzz_corpus_*` | 4 | replay every committed fuzzing input |\n\nThe 78 golden vectors in `core/tests/test_signal_golden.cpp` are the part I'd\npoint at first. Each one was worked out by hand from the bit-numbering rules with\nthe derivation written into a comment above it, so you can check the arithmetic\nwithout trusting my implementation. Several are published J1939 parameters (SPN\n190 engine speed, SPN 84 wheel speed, SPN 110 coolant temperature, SPN 91 pedal\nposition), where the physical result is documented independently of any decoder.\nA codec that generates its own expected values proves nothing.\n\nWhat I ran locally, on GCC 11.4 / aarch64: warning-clean at `-Werror` in both\n`Debug` and `RelWithDebInfo`, all 383 tests, the `find_package` consumer building\nand running, both CLI demos end to end, and the soak test.\n\nThere was no clang and no root in the container I built this in, so the first CI\nrun was the first time any of this met clang, TSan, clang-format or a real kernel\ninterface. It found three things, all portability rather than logic:\n\n- clang rejects an unused namespace-scope `constexpr` under `-Werror` where GCC\n  says nothing at all. One dead constant in the CLI broke every clang job.\n- Both `NoAllocSelfCheck` tests passed on GCC and failed on clang. C++14 lets a\n  compiler delete a `new`-expression whose allocation it can prove unnecessary,\n  and clang does exactly that at `-O2`, so the self-checks were being optimised\n  out of existence: the failure they exist to catch. They now call\n  `::operator new` directly, which is an ordinary function call and stays put.\n- The allocation trap cannot link under TSan, whose runtime defines\n  `operator new` itself. Sanitizer builds now switch that target off rather than\n  filtering the tests out after the fact.\n\nThe second one is my favourite bug in the project. A test that silently stops\ntesting anything is worse than no test, and it took a second compiler to show it.\n\nThe clang-tidy job took three goes to get right. `HeaderFilterRegex` matched on\nthe word \"canforge\" and CI checks out at `.../canforge/canforge/`, so it was\nlinting the whole of GoogleTest and ftxui. It was being handed `.hpp` files,\nwhich have no entry in the compilation database and so get parsed with no\ninclude paths. And it was linting `tui/` in a build configured with the TUI\nswitched off, so ftxui's headers were not on disk to find at all. That last one\nis what actually kept it red, and it presented as nine unrelated errors.\n\nTwo of the nine were the phantom `tui/` ones. Three were real: `256u * 1024u *\n1024u` assigned to a `std::size_t` does the multiplication in `unsigned int`,\nand there are two more of that shape in the inflate path. Those are fixed, not\nsuppressed. The remaining four are annotated at the site with the check named,\nbecause each is a false positive: `CANFORGE_TRY` takes a declarator, so its\nargument cannot be parenthesised; the DBC writer checks its optional on the line\nabove the dereference; and the two fuzz harnesses own a `FILE*` deliberately.\n\n`modernize-*` and `readability-*` stay advisory rather than fatal. The codebase\ndisagrees with a few thousand of them on style, and which checks are errors is\ndeclared in `.clang-tidy` rather than forced to `*` on the command line.\n\nOne more thing worth keeping: the sanitizer build compiles at `-O1` and caught\ntwo `-Wsign-conversion` warnings the `-O2` build didn't, because the optimiser\ncould no longer prove the ranges. Building at more than one optimisation level\nturned out to be part of the check, not a formality.\n\n## What I'd do differently\n\nThe BLF reader is guesswork with tests around it. The format is undocumented and\nVector's SDK headers disagree with python-can about where a container's payload\nstarts, so the reader sniffs which layout it's looking at. That works against\nfixtures I built to match both, but I've never fed it a log from a real Vector\ntool. I should have found a real capture first and written the reader against it\ninstead of writing it and hoping.\n\nThe vehicle model should have been a lookup table. I wrote the torque curve as a\npiecewise function with hand-tuned constants, so every behaviour change meant\nediting arithmetic. A table of (rpm, throttle) to torque with interpolation would\nbe less code, easier to tune, and closer to how engine maps actually work.\n\n`Result<T, E>` isn't constexpr and that leaked into the API. A union with a\nnon-trivially-destructible alternative can't have a constexpr destructor in C++17,\nso `CanId` needed a separate `make_standard<Id>()` path for compile-time\nconstants alongside the runtime `standard()` that returns a `Result`. Two ways to\nbuild the same thing is a wart. It goes away on C++23 with `std::expected`.\n\nThe fuzzers belonged near the start, not at the end. The one bug they found was\nin code that had already passed 63 unit tests. Fuzzing a parser is cheap and\nfinds a category of bug that example-based tests structurally can't, so there was\nno good reason to leave it until last.\n\nThe dashboard's transmit panel is thinner than everything around it. It parses\n`Signal=value` pairs with an `istringstream` and reports failures as a status\nstring. Every other input path in the project has typed errors and real\ndiagnostics; that one doesn't, because I ran out of room. It should use the same\n`text::Lexer` the config parser does.\n\nExtended multiplexing took three attempts. I first modelled the multiplex role as\na single enum, which can't express `m0M`, a signal that's both switched in by an\nouter multiplexor and itself switching an inner group. Then I modelled presence as\none comparison against the root multiplexor, which is wrong for nested groups. The\nversion that works walks the multiplexor chain upward. Reading `SG_MUL_VAL_`\nproperly before writing any of it would have saved all three.\n\n## References\n\nISO 11898-1:2015 for frame formats, arbitration, bit stuffing, the DLC tables,\nthe reserved base-identifier rule and the removal of the remote frame from CAN FD.\nISO 15765-2:2016 for ISO-TP. ISO 14229-1 for UDS. ISO 15031-6 / SAE J2012 for DTC\nnumbering and the P/C/B/U letters. SAE J1850 for the CRC-8 polynomial the\nsimulator uses, and SAE J1939 for the parameter definitions behind the golden\nvectors. 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      "description": "Attack Traffic Generation(ATG) tool enable users to explore automotive CAN bus cyber-security rapidly",
      "readme": "# ATG-python\nAttack Traffic Generation(ATG) tool enables users to explore automotive CAN bus cyber-security rapidly.\n## 1 Getting Started\nATG is a vehicle CAN bus packet analyzer and attack packets generator. ATG enables researchers to begin to explore automotive cyber-physical system rapidly. To a certain extent, it can verify the cyber security solution of in-vehicle CAN bus and ECUs with different attack modes. For some novel IDS countermeasures, it is also a good tool to generate a dataset, and test it in python environment.\n### 1.1 Current Version\nThis specification is based on the beta version, running on Windows XP, Vista, 7, 8, 10 (64 and 32).\n### 1.2 CAN Interface\nUSB2CAN is the default CAN bus interface of ATG. It provides drivers for Windows and Linux system. Meanwhile, for the developer, it provides DLL (Dynamic Link Library) for windows application and Socket CAN drivers for Linux application.\nYou can buy this device from 8device website: http://www.8devices.com/products/usb2can The price is only $65.\n### 1.3 Installing Drivers\nFirstly, you should install the drivers on windows. You can download the drivers from 8device website:\n* 64bit:http://www.8devices.com/media/products/usb2can/downloads/usb2can_win64_v1.0.2.1.zip\n* 32bit:http://www.8devices.com/media/products/usb2can/downloads/usb2can_win32_v1.0.2.1.zip\n\nYou can see the device information in Device Manager when you success to install the drivers.\n\n## 2 Using ATG\n### 2.1 Activate Interface\nAfter connecting the CAN device to the computer and running ATG, you should check the device id at the back of the device and input it in ID input box. And then, select the suitable baud rate (range from 10 to 1000 Kbps). At last, you can click the Open button to activate interface. If the text changes to Shutdown, it means there is no problem. When the device is at activated state, the LED color on the USB2CAN become green. Otherwise it is still red.\n### 2.2 Packets Sniffer\nThis is the basic function of ATG. It can collect the packets in real time and display in a different way.\n#### 2.2.1 Starting tracing\nWhen you click the Start Tracing button, the trace window shows the packets including Time(ms), ECU_ID, Data, and Dir (RX denote Receiving, TX denote Transmitting) information.\n#### 2.2.2 Changing display style\nYou can click the checked box △t to switch the time type between interval and timestamp. You can select the message refresh mode in the choice box, Chronological mode record and show all packets, Fixed mode classify packets by ID and fix the position with each kind of packet. Following figures show the difference between two modes:Chronological mode and Fixed mode.\n#### 2.2.3 Packets Logging\nTo make it possible and easy to analyze the entire packets after you get these from a real vehicle, ATG supports two kinds of logging file formats, database file(.db) and log file(.log). You can check Save as DB or Save as log checkbox and select the storage path. This can show and store packets at the same time after you click Start Tracking button. When you complete logging, you can open log file in Notepad and database file in database view software, such as SQLite Expert Personal 3. Another difference between these two formats is that only the log format file can label the attack packets when you launch attacks and playback.\nComparing to other software logging feature the advantages of ATG are:\n<br>(1) Candump module of [can-utils](https://github.com/linux-can/can-utils) just can logging data, it cannot generate attack packets and label them.\n<br>(2) CANoe  store packets as *.blf/*.asc/*.mf4 binary format file. You cannot analysis directly, and the Adaptive CAN interface is expensive.\nATG not only guarantee the performance to store a huge number of packets but also make it easy to modify and analyze the dataset.\n### 2.2 Playback\nPlayback function can help you to replay the log file. After you select the log file, you can click Play button to launch the data into CAN bus. You can also pause or stop it.\n### 2.3 Attack Tool\n#### 2.3.1 DoS attack\nIn the DoS attack mode, ATG can inject the highest priority packet of 0x0 CAN ID every 1 millisecond.\n#### 2.3.2 Fuzzing attack\nIn the Fuzzing attack mode, ATG can inject the random ID and random data.\n#### 2.3.3 Spoofing attack\nAfter sniffing and marking the control field in a control frame, it is easy to use a reverse engineering. ATG can inject the malicious message in a shorter interval than the normal nodes, which causes the receiving node to execute a dangerous operation.\nThe step to launch fuzzing attack is as follows.\n<br>(1) Analyzing the packets\nIn the Attack Tab, you can click Analyze button to get and classify the packets. For example, in the following figure, you can see there are two kinds of packets 386(0x182) ID and 291(0x123) ID, TS is the interval, IF is a flag to judge whether this packet is cyclic, 5 means it is.\n<br>(2) Selecting target packet and Configuring parameters\nYou can select the target message in the analysis result box. And then you can configure the appointed byte of attack packet. Shown as following, you can input 30, 31 and 21 in the first, second and fourth input box, and check the checkbox under them. The default mode is Fixed Data, under this mode, it just replaces the selected byte of original data to a preset value. Under the Data Offset mode, it adds the value to the original data. You can also change the frequency of attack by the slider to make the injected messages difficult to find.\n<br>(3)Launching attack\nYou can check the Spoofing Attack Radio button and click Start button to launch such attack. In the following picture, I use another software to check the attack messages.\n#### 2.3.4 Automatic attack\nUsually, it is not convenient to manually launch an attack event by previous way. So ATG provides attack config function. You can define the attack events in an XML file. ATG can load it and trigger them one by one.\n<br>The config format is similar to the attack config above:\n<br>(1) DoS attack\n<br>Sample:\n```XML\n\t<attack type =\"DoS\">\n\t\t<start_time>2</start_time>\n\t\t<end_time>4</end_time>\n\t</attack>\n```\nIn the attack node, define the type attribute as “DoS”, then set the start time and end time (s).\n<br>(2)Fuzzing attack\n<br>Sample:\n```XML\n\t<attack type =\"Fuzzing\">\n\t\t<start_time>60</start_time>\n\t\t<end_time>70</end_time>\n\t\t<message type =\"fixed\">\n\t\t\t<target_id>19C0EFF1</target_id>\n\t\t\t<active_byte>AA</active_byte>\n\t\t\t<frequency>21</frequency>\n\t\t</message>\n\t</attack>\n```\nIn the attack node, Define the type attribute as “Fuzzing”, then set the start time and end time. In the message node, the type attribute can be configured as “random” or “fixed”. Random mode denotes the ID and Data are randomly generated; fixed mode means the relevant bytes would be randomly generated then define the target_id. active_byte and frequency.\n<br>(3)Spoofing attack\n<br>Sample:\n```XML\n\t<attack type =\"Spoofing\">\n\t\t<start_time>80</start_time>\n\t\t<end_time>110</end_time>\n\t\t<message type =\"offset\">\n\t\t\t<target_id>125</target_id>\n\t\t\t<data>00 00 00 00 21 23 21 11</data>\n\t\t\t<active_byte>0F</active_byte>\n\t\t\t<frequency>21</frequency>\n\t\t</message>\n\t</attack>\n```\nIn the attack node, Define the type attribute as “Spoofing”, then set the start time and end time. In the message node, you can define the type attribute as “fixed” or “offset”, then define the target_id, data, active_byte and frequency. Fixed mode denotes the target bytes can be modified to fixed value; Offset indicates adding offset value on the original value of target bytes (offset value can be minus).\n\nWhen you launch an automatic attack, there is a progress bar shows the attack progress.\n\n### 2.4 CAN Matrix Convert\nCAN Matrix can convert can matrix file among different format.\nIt is an open source project on GitHub. You can get more information on the website: https://github.com/ebroecker/canmatrix.\nATG only call it and make it easy to use in window interface. With this tool, you can convert a can matrix file to an XML file which can be easy to load in an embedded IDS (Intrusion Detection System) as the detection rules.\n### 2.5 Dataset Format Convert\nA Database file is not a general format of the dataset, so you can use this tool to convert the database file to a .CSV (Comma-Separated Values) file. You can share this file with other researchers in more general ways.\n## 3 Note\n<br>(1) ATG is developed using python which is the popular language in analysis and AI research field. If you want to develop an IDS system by machine learning method, ATG is the best way to achieve your goal.\n<br>(2) For the CAN bus interface, USB2CAN is the only available interface in the beta version. To improve the performance, in the later version we will support more interfaces such as Kvaser, PCAN and so on.\n<br>(3)This open project will be published in [AReS’18](https://www.ares-conference.eu/accepted-papers/).",
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      "readme": "OBD\n===\n\nIn this repository, I have added two files namely - obd.py and file.py which aims to fetch real time data from the car such as Vehicle Speed, Engine Rpm etc. using their standard OBD-II PIDs.\n\nHardware used - OBD II UART Board, Raspberry Pi, OBD to DB9 cable, Laptop.\nSoftware Libraries - pyserial library written in python (which encapsulates all the code required to transfer the data through a serial port).\n\nAfter connecting the required hardware to Raspberry Pie, now you have to enter the serial port no (for ex - /dev/USB0) in your obd.py file.\nYou can check the serial port no by typing the following command in terminal - \"dmesg | grep tty\".\n\nFinally you have to run the python file by writing \"python filename\" in the terminal. obd.py will print the output to the terminal whereas file.py will store the output to a specified file.",
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      "url": "https://github.com/SHamdare/EVCMS_OCPP1.6",
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      "readme": "# EVCMS\n\n## Run Project Locally\n\n1. Pull the latest updates (not required the firsty) to the project by opening the `pull-updates.sh` file in git bash, or by double clicking it to run it. This will pull the latest changes done to the frontend and backend code and install the required dependencies.\n\n2. Build and start the project but running / double clicking the `start.sh` file. Frontend can take some time to build and will display updates on the terminal window that opens. You can access the project on - `http://localhost:3000`\n\n## References\n\n- OCPP 1.6 PDF: https://www.oasis-open.org/committees/download.php/58944/ocpp-1.6.pdf\n- OCPP Enums: https://github.com/mobilityhouse/ocpp/blob/master/ocpp/v16/enums.py\n\n## Pseudo Code `getPlans`\n\n```js\n\nInput\n- dateTime (givenDate & givenTime)\n- powerRequirement\n- duration\n\nOutput\n- plans -> list of plans that are generated depending on the scenario and cases\n\nData from DB\n- allBookings\n\n\nAlgo\n- startTime = givenTime\n- endTime = givenTime + duration\n\n- isTimeSlotOverlapping = false\n\n- for (booking of allBookings)\n\tbookingStart = booking.time\n\tbookingEnd = booking.time + booking.duration\n\tif (endTime > bookingStart AND startTime < bookingEnd)\n\t\tisTimeSlotOverlapping = true\n\n\tif (isTimeSlotOverlapping)\n\t\tbreak\n\n- dateTime\n\n- if (isTimeSlotOverlapping)\n\tnewStartTime = givenStart + duration\n\twhile (true)\n\t\tnewStartTime = newStartTime + 15mins\n\t\tnewEndTime = newStartTime + duration\n\t\tisTimeSlotOverlapping = false\n\t\tfor (booking of allBookings)\n\t\t\tbookingStart = booking.time\n\t\t\tbookingEnd = booking.time + booking.duration\n\t\t\tif (newEndTime > bookingStart AND newStartTime < bookingEnd)\n\t\t\t\tisTimeSlotOverlapping = true\n\n\t\t\tif (isTimeSlotOverlapping)\n\t\t\t\tbreak\n\t\tif (isTimeSlotOverlapping)\n\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\telse\n\t\t\tdateTime = newStartTime\n\t\t\tbreak\n\n  else\n\tdateTime = givenDateTime\n\n- isPeakOn\n\n- if ((dateTime >= 8am AND dateTime <= 11am) OR (dateTime >= 4pm AND dateTime <= 10pm))\n\tisPeakOn = true\n  else\n\tisPeakOn = false\n\n- powerInGivenDuration = duration * chargingRate\n\n- plans = []\n\n- if (powerRequirement === powerInGivenDuration)\n\tavailabilityCostMultiplier = 0\n\tif (isPeakOn)\n\t\tif (isTimeSlotOverlapping)\n\t\t\tavailabilityCostMultiplier = 1\n\t\telse\n\t\t\tavailabilityCostMultiplier = 0.5\n\telse\n\t\tif (isTimeSlotOverlapping)\n\t\t\tavailabilityCostMultiplier = 0.25\n\t\telse\n\t\t\tavailabilityCostMultiplier = 0\n\t\tavailabilityCostMultiplier = 0\n\ttimeOfUseCharges = availabilityCostMultiplier * peakDemandCharge\n\tchargingPrice = costOfEnergy * duration * chargingRate + timeOfUseCharges + serviceCharge\n\tplans.push({\n\t\ttype: 'duration-power',\n\t\tdateTime,\n\t\tpowerRequirement,\n\t\tchargingPrice\n\t})\n\n\tif (isPeakOn)\n\t\tavailablePeakOffDateTime = getClosestAvailableDateTime(givenDateTime, duration)\n\t\ttimeOfUseCharges = 0\n\t\tchargingPrice = costOfEnergy * duration * chargingRate + timeOfUseCharges + serviceCharge\n\t\tplans.push({\n\t\t\ttype: 'duration-power-eco',\n\t\t\tdateTime = availablePeakOffDateTime,\n\t\t\tpowerRequirement,\n\t\t\tchargingPrice\n\t\t})\n\n\treturn plans\n\n  else\n\t# duration constant\n\tduration = givenDuration\n\tnewPower = duration * chargingRate\n\n\tavailabilityCostMultiplier = 0\n\tif (isPeakOn)\n\t\tif (isTimeSlotOverlapping)\n\t\t\tavailabilityCostMultiplier = 1\n\t\telse\n\t\t\tavailabilityCostMultiplier = 0.5\n\telse\n\t\tif (isTimeSlotOverlapping)\n\t\t\tavailabilityCostMultiplier = 0.25\n\t\telse\n\t\t\tavailabilityCostMultiplier = 0\n\t\tavailabilityCostMultiplier = 0\n\ttimeOfUseCharges = availabilityCostMultiplier * peakDemandCharge\n\tchargingPrice = costOfEnergy * duration * chargingRate + timeOfUseCharges + serviceCharge\n\tplans.push({\n\t\ttype: 'duration',\n\t\tdateTime,\n\t\tnewPower,\n\t\tchargingPrice\n\t})\n\n\tif (isPeakOn)\n\t\tavailablePeakOffDateTime = getClosestAvailableDateTime(givenDateTime, duration)\n\t\ttimeOfUseCharges = 0\n\t\tchargingPrice = costOfEnergy * duration * chargingRate + timeOfUseCharges + serviceCharge\n\t\tplans.push({\n\t\t\ttype: 'duration-eco',\n\t\t\tdateTime = availablePeakOffDateTime,\n\t\t\tpowerRequirement,\n\t\t\tchargingPrice\n\t\t})\n\n\t# power constant\n\tpower = givenPower\n\tnewDuration = power / chargingRate\n\n\tavailabilityCostMultiplier = 0\n\tif (isPeakOn)\n\t\tif (isTimeSlotOverlapping)\n\t\t\tavailabilityCostMultiplier = 1\n\t\telse\n\t\t\tavailabilityCostMultiplier = 0.5\n\telse\n\t\tif (isTimeSlotOverlapping)\n\t\t\tavailabilityCostMultiplier = 0.25\n\t\telse\n\t\t\tavailabilityCostMultiplier = 0\n\t\tavailabilityCostMultiplier = 0\n\ttimeOfUseCharges = availabilityCostMultiplier * peakDemandCharge\n\tchargingPrice = costOfEnergy * newDuration * chargingRate + timeOfUseCharges + serviceCharge\n\tplans.push({\n\t\ttype: 'power',\n\t\tdateTime,\n\t\tpower,\n\t\tchargingPrice\n\t})\n\n\tif (isPeakOn)\n\t\tavailablePeakOffDateTime = getClosestAvailableDateTime(givenDateTime, newDuration)\n\t\ttimeOfUseCharges = 0\n\t\tchargingPrice = costOfEnergy * newDuration * chargingRate + timeOfUseCharges + serviceCharge\n\t\tplans.push({\n\t\t\ttype: 'power-eco',\n\t\t\tdateTime = availablePeakOffDateTime,\n\t\t\tpower,\n\t\t\tchargingPrice\n\t\t})\n\n\treturn plans\n\n```\n\n## Single Charging Station with Single Connector - Algorithms\n\n### Algo 1: Availability check and Time-slot allocation\n\n```js\n\nInput\n- dateTime (givenDate & givenTime)\n- duration\n\nOutput\n- isAvailable\n- final dateTime: either the one requested by the user or a newly assigned value depending on the avaiability\n\nData from DB\n- allBookings\n\n\nAlgo\n- startTime = givenTime\n- endTime = givenTime + duration\n\n- isTimeSlotOverlapping = false\n\n- for (booking of allBookings)\n\tbookingStart = booking.time\n\tbookingEnd = booking.time + booking.duration\n\tif (current booking start and end has an overlap with user requested time)\n\t\tisTimeSlotOverlapping = true\n\n\tif (isTimeSlotOverlapping)\n\t\tbreak\n\n- if (isTimeSlotOverlapping)\n\tnewStartTime = givenStart + duration\n\twhile (true)\n\t\tnewStartTime = previous start time + 15 mins buffer\n\t\tnewEndTime = newStartTime + duration\n\t\tisTimeSlotOverlapping = false\n\t\tfor (booking of allBookings)\n\t\t\tbookingStart = booking.time\n\t\t\tbookingEnd = booking.time + booking.duration\n\t\t\tif (user requested date-time overlaps with new date-time)\n\t\t\t\tisTimeSlotOverlapping = true\n\n\t\t\tif (isTimeSlotOverlapping)\n\t\t\t\tbreak\n\t\tif (isTimeSlotOverlapping)\n\t\t\tupdate the time to next 15 mins from the original time and continue checking for overlap\n\t\telse\n\t\t\tfinalize the new date-time\n\t\t\tfinalDateTime = newStartTime\n\t\t\tbreak\n\n  else\n\tfinalize the given date-time\n\tfinalDateTime = givenDateTime\n```\n\n### Algo 2: Generate Plan\n\n```js\n\nInput\n- dateTime (givenDate & givenTime)\n- duration\n- isAvailable\n\nOutput\n- list of Plans\n\nData from DB\n- allBookings\n\n\nAlgo\n\n1. isPeakOn = check if dateTime is withing the PeakOn period\n\n2.\tif (isPeakOn) {\n\t\tif (isAvailable)\n\t\t\tavailabilityCostMultiplier = 0.5\n\t\telse\n\t\t\tavailabilityCostMultiplier = 1\n\t} else {\n\t\tif (isAvailable)\n\t\t\tavailabilityCostMultiplier = 0\n\t\telse\n\t\t\tavailabilityCostMultiplier = 0.25\n\t}\n\n3. timeOfUseCharges = availabilityCostMultiplier * peakDemandCharge\n\n4. chargingPrice = (costOfEnergy * duration * chargingRate) + timeOfUseCharges + serviceCharge\n\n- Run steps 1 to 4 considering the 'duration' requirement\n\n- Run steps 1 to 4 considering the 'power' requirement\n\t- duration = power / chargingRate\n\n-\tif (isPeakOn) {\n\t\tdateTime = get a time-slot available in the peakOff period\n\t\tRun steps 1 to 4 with isPeakOn = false\n\n\t\tgenerate plans considering 'duration' and 'power' individually\n\t}\n\n```\n\n## Multiple Charging Stations with Multiple Connectors - Algorithms\n\n### Algo 1: Determine Weights of Charging Station for Load Balancing\n\n```js\n\nInput\n- ChargingStationData (list of charging stations with their respective connectors IDs)\n- Bookings (list of bookings on the requested date)\n- DateTime (requested date time)\n- Constants A and B, weightage of 'TotalBookings' and 'TotalPower' respectively\n\tA = 0.6\n\tB = 0.4\n\nOutput\n- List of Charging Stations sorted in ascending order according to their respective 'weight'\n\nAlgo\n- stations = []\n\n- for (chargingStationId of ChargingStationData)\n\tchargingStationBookings = Bookings.filter(all bookings where Booking Charging Station ID = chargingStationId)\n\n\ttotalBookings = length of chargingStationBookings\n\n\ttotalPower = 0\n\tfor (booking of chargingStationBookings)\n\t\ttotalPower = totalPower + booking.expectedPower\n\n\tweight = A * totalBookings + B * totalPower\n\n\tAdd current charging station data and it's respective weight in the 'stations' list\n\n- Sort the list of stations in ascending order of each charging station's weight\n\n- return list of stations\n\n```\n\n### Algo 2: Check Availability and select Charging Station and Connector depending on Availability and CS Weights\n\n```js\n\nInput\n- DateTime (requested date time)\n- Duration\n- Stations (list of Charging Stations sorted in ascending order according to their respective 'weight')\n- Bookings (list of bookings on the requested date)\n\nOutput\n- isAvailable\n- final DateTime: either the one requested by the user or a newly assigned value depending on the avaiability\n- selectedChargingStation\n- selectedConnectorId\n\nAlgo\n- isAvailable = false\n- selectedChargingStation = Stations[0] // by default selecting the first charging stations as it has least weight\n- selectedConnectorId = Stations[0].connectors[0] // by default selecting the first connector on the first CS\n- startTime = get time from DateTime\n- endTime = startTime + duration\n\n- for (station of Stations)\n\tfor (connectorId of station.connectors)\n\t\tisConflicting = false\n\n\t\tconnectorBookings = Bookings.filter(all bookings whoes chargingStationId and connectorId match with station.id AND connectorId)\n\n\t\tfor (booking of connectorBookings)\n\t\t\tisConflicting = endTime >= bookingStartTime AND startTime <= bookingEndTime\n\n\t\t\tif (isConflicting)\n\t\t\t\tbreak\n\t\t\telse\n\t\t\t\tcontinue looping through list of bookings to find if there's any conflicting booking\n\n\t\tif (isConflicting)\n\t\t\tcontinue looping through next connector\n\t\telse\n\t\t\tisAvailable = true // becasue there was no conflicting booking found\n\n\t\t\tselectedChargingStation = station\n\t\t\tselectedConnectorId = connectorId\n\t\t\tfinalDateTime = DateTime\n\n\t\t\tbreak\n\n\tif (isAvailable)\n\t\t// if 'isAvailable' is true, it means we have already found a eligible charging station and connector as per our requirements, so no need to proceed with the loop - hence breaking out!\n\t\tbreak\n\n- return {\n\tisAvailable,\n\tfinalDateTime,\n\tselectedChargingStation,\n\tselectedConnectorId\n}\n\n```\n\n### Algo 3: Generate Plans\n\n```js\n\nInput\n- DateTime (requested date time)\n- duration\n- isAvailable\n- selectedChargingStation\n- selectedConnectorId\n\nOutput\n- Plans (list of plans)\n\nAlgo\n* SAME AS THAT FOR SINGLE CHARGING STATION *\n\n```\n\n## Algo for preventing multiple sessions with same booking id\n\n```js\n\nInput\n- list of Transactions (from DB)\n- bookingId\n\nOutput\n- Allow Transaction - True or False\n\nAlgo\n- allowTransaction = true\n- for (transaction of Transaction)\n\tif (transaction.bookingId == bookingId)\n\t\tallowTransaction = false\n\n- return allowTransaction\n\n```",
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      "description": "Ultimate CAN Bus tool for Car hacking. Full Featured hardware & software.",
      "readme": "# CAN_OMEGA\nUltimate CAN Bus tool for Car hacking.\nCommand set is compatible with USBTin\n\n## Features\nSupport full OBD-II Features including followings:\nISO15765 CAN250Kbps 11bit\nISO15765 CAN250Kbps 29bit\nISO15765 CAN500Kbps 11bit\nISO15765 CAN500Kbps 29bit\nISO9141-2 5bps Init\nISO14230 KWP2000 5bps Init\nISO14230 KWP2000 Fast Init\nSAE J1850 PWM\nSAE J1850 VPW\nMulti-Frame Support\nSoft-controlled end-point matching resistors.\n\nSupport for incomming CAN FD. (use MCP2517FD in place of MCP2515)\n\n## v1.1 PCB Photo\n![image](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/zjlywjh001/CAN_OMEGA/master/hardware/photos/pcb_photo_1.1.png)\n\n## v1.1 Assembled Board\n![image](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/zjlywjh001/CAN_OMEGA/master/hardware/photos/assembled_board_1.1.png)\n\n## v1.0 PCB Photo\n![image](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/zjlywjh001/CAN_OMEGA/master/hardware/photos/pcb_photo.png)\n\n## v1.0 Assembled Board\n![image](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/zjlywjh001/CAN_OMEGA/master/hardware/photos/assembled_board.png)\n\n\n## Drivers\nCAN Omega use CP2102 chip to convert UART to USB.\nFor Linux, Windows >8 no additional driver is needed!\nCAN Omega will be automatically detected as virtual serial port.\nDevice is mapped to serial port \"/dev/ttyUSBx\" (Linux) or \"COMx\" (Windows).\nFor Windows<8 and Mac OS, you can get the corresponding drivers here:\n[http://www.silabs.com/products/mcu/pages/usbtouartbridgevcpdrivers.aspx](http://www.silabs.com/products/mcu/pages/usbtouartbridgevcpdrivers.aspx)\nAnd On MacOS the Device's serial Port will become \"/dev/tty.SLAB_USBtoUART\", you needed input the port name manually.\nThe Serial Port works in 115200 8 N 1 Mode.\n\n\n## Firmware Repository\nSee here for more details: [https://github.com/zjlywjh001/CAN_Omega_Firmware](https://github.com/zjlywjh001/CAN_Omega_Firmware)\n\n\nNotice:\nFirmware should work with the bootloader, but the source code of the bootloader can't be released due to some license issues.\nSo I can only release the bootloader in binary.\n\n## A cross platform GUI tool.\nSee here for more details: [https://github.com/zjlywjh001/CAN_OMEGA_Tools](https://github.com/zjlywjh001/CAN_OMEGA_Tools)\nRequirement: JRE >= 1.8\n![image](https://github.com/zjlywjh001/CAN_OMEGA/raw/master/software/CAN%20Omeage%20tools/screenshots/demo.png)\nThis tool offers the following functions:\nCAN/K-Line/J1850 Packet Transreceiver\nCAN Packet Analysis\nCAN Fuzzing tool\nFrimware Update\n\n\n## Command Set\nFollowing commands are inherited from USBTin's Command Set:\nSx[CR]:--------Set CAN Bus baudrate\nx: Bitrate id (0-8)\n S0 = 10 kBaud\n S1 = 20 kBaud\n S2 = 50 kBaud\n S3 = 100 kBaud\n S4 = 125 kBaud\n S5 = 250 kBaud\n S6 = 500 kBaud\n S7 = 800 kBaud\n S8 = 1 MBaud\n\nsxxyyzz[CR]--- -Set can bitrate registers of MCP2515. You can set non-standard baudrates which are not supported by the \"Sx\" command.\nxx: CNF1 as hexadecimal value (00-FF)\nyy: CNF2 as hexadecimal value (00-FF)\nzz: CNF3 as hexadecimal value\n\nGxx[CR] --- Read MCP2515 register.\nxx: Address of MCP2515 register to read as hexadecimal value (00-FF).\n\nWxxyy[CR] ---Write MCP2515 register.\nxx: Address of MCP2515 register to write. Hexadecimal value (00-FF).\nyy: Data to write to the register. Hexadecimal value (00-FF).\n\nV[CR]---Get hardware version\n\nv[CR]---Get firmware version.\n\nN[CR]---Get serial number. Returns always 0xffff.\n\nO[CR]---Open CAN channel.\n\nl[CR]---Open device in loop back mode.\n\nL[CR]---Open CAN channel in listen-only mode.\n\nC[CR]---Close CAN channel\n\ntiiildd..[CR]---Transmit standard (11 bit) frame.\niii: Identifier in hexadecimal format (000-7FF)\nl: Data length (0-8)\ndd: Data byte value in hexadecimal format (00-FF)\n\nTiiiiiiiildd..[CR]---Transmit extended (29 bit) frame.\niiiiiiii: Identifier in hexadecimal format (0000000-1FFFFFFF)\nl: Data length (0-8)\ndd: Data byte value in hexadecimal format (00-FF)\n\nriiil[CR] --- Transmit standard RTR (11 bit) frame.\niii: Identifier in hexadecimal format (000-7FF)\nl: Data length (0-8)\n\nRiiiiiiiil[CR]---Transmit extended RTR (29 bit) frame.\niiiiiiii: Identifier in hexadecimal format (0000000-1FFFFFFF)\nl: Data length (0-8)\n\nF[CR]---Read status/error flag of can controller\nReturn: Fxx[CR] with xx as hexadecimal byte with following error flags:\nBit 0 - not used\nBit 1 - not used\nBit 2 - Error warning (Bit EWARN of MCP2515)\nBit 3 - Data overrun (Bit RX1OVR or RX0OVR of MCP2515)\nBit 4 - not used\nBit 5 - Error-Passive (Bit TXEP or RXEP of MCP2515)\nBit 6 - not used\nBit 7 - Bus error (Bit TXBO of MCP2515)\n\nZx[CR]---Set timestamping on/off.\nx: 0=off, 1=on\nmxxxxxxxx[CR]---Set accpetance filter mask. SJA1000 format (AM0..AM3). Only first 11bit are relevant.\nxxxxxxxx: Acceptance filter mask\nMxxxxxxxx[CR]---Set accpetance filter code. SJA1000 format (AC0..AC3). Only first 11bit are relevant.\nxxxxxxxx: Acceptance filter code\n\nAnd the following commands are added in CAN Omega:\nb[CR] --- reset Device\n\nf -- CAN Fuzzing Function\nExamples:\nfz[CR] --- Pause Fuzzing\nfP[CR] --- Stop Fuzzing\nfr[CR] --- Resume Fuzzing\nfuzzing config format:\nf [d/D] [id] [dlc] [s/S] [FROM] [TO] [g/G] p [period] (u [until] m [mask]) [CR], part in bracket is depend on [s/S] option\n[d/D] means extended frame or not. d represent for fuzzing 11bit packet,[id] should be 11 bit, 'D' means 29bit\n[dlc] is packet len\n[s/S] 's' means this config has a until config, when a receiving packet match the pattern the fuzzing will stop. And 'S' for fuzzing without a 'until' config.(with out the data in brackets)\n[FROM] is the start packet, encoded in hex\n[TO] is the end packet, encoded in hex\n(Every byte in [TO] config should be strict greater than correspoding byte in [FROM])\n[g/G] is the fuzzing order.   g for left byte first increase, and G for right byte first increase\n[period] the time delay between two packets, unit in microsecond(us), encoded in hex.\n[until] [mask] until is a packet of length 8,and mask decide which byte in [until] shoud be math, 1 - match 0 - not care\nthe bit 0 of mask is for the far left byte, and bit 7 is the far right byte\n\nexample1:\nfd0013s0201000201FFgp3E8u0201050000000000m05\nfuzzing id:001\ndlc:  3\nfuzzing from 02 01 00\nfuzzing to   02 01 FF\nleft byte increase first\nperiod 1ms\nuntil on receive 02 01 05-- only compare 02 and 05\n\nexample2:\nfD000007DF3S0201000201FFGp3E8\nfuzzing id:000007DF\ndlc:  3\nfuzzing from 02 01 00\nfuzzing to   02 01 FF\nleft byte increase first\nperiod 1ms\nno until settings\n\n\nk --  K line transrece function\nkak[CR] --- Activate ECU in KWP2000 Fast Init Mode\nkai[CR] --- Activate ECU in ISO9141-2 5BPS Init Mode\nkaI[CR] --- Activate ECU in KWP2000 5BPS Init Mode\nthe last two mode is a bit slow, may take 5-15 seconds to activate ECU, when activated successfully, will return o[CR] bytes.\nSo be patient when using these protocols.\n\nkk [len] [data] [CR] --- Send K Line Message after activated\nthe return data format is kXXXXXXXXXXXX[CR] encoded in hex\n\nd[CR] --- deactive K Line\n\njp [len] [Data] [CR]  -- Send J1850 Packet in PWM Mode\njv [len] [Data] [CR]  -- Send J1850 Packet in VPW Mode\n\nU[CR] --- Reboot and enter bootloader\nNotice:\nWhen Entering Bootloader it will wait for 3 seconds for another 'U' char. When Received 'U' with in 3 seconds, the bootloader will start firmware update function.\n\nFollowing Commands are available in CAN Omega 1.1 or later hardware only.\n\nA[CR] --- Set Terminal Resistor to Open Circuit (Default on boot)\n\na[CR] --- Set Terminal Resistor to 120-Ohms\n\n\n## License\nMIT License",
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      "id": "github:dcstechnoweb/the-reason-why-everyone-love-mining-tools",
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      "full_name": "dcstechnoweb/The-Reason-Why-Everyone-Love-Mining-Tools",
      "name": "The-Reason-Why-Everyone-Love-Mining-Tools",
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      "description": "As a rule, mining alludes to the birth of minerals and land accoutrements from the earth, from a gravestone or seal. moment different factors are mended by mining as similar accoutrements aren't developed, horticulturally handled, or misleadingly made. Superb models are precious essence, coal, precious monuments, and gold. Non-inexhaustible sources like ignitable gas, petrol, and indeed water are also booby-trapped. With the application of applicable mining tackle, the vigorous and worrisome undertaking of mining is achieved. Mining is the system involved in disengaging significant minerals and geographical accoutrements. typically, the minerals got from the mining system incorporate earth, coal, aspect gravestone, rock, gemstone, limestone, essence, potash, gemstone swab, and oil painting shale, and that is just the morning. As is generally said, whatever could not be developed through agricultural ways or made in a factory must be booby-trapped. Ever, indeed the birth of ignitable gas, oil painting, and other on-inexhaustible means are also acquired through mining. Mining is a sedulity that has been around for glories. it's been used on an outsized scale since neolithic times and contains long history. Mining makes use of technology so on urge the duty finished effectiveness and through a timely manner. There are numerous several mining tools that should be got used for the duty to be done duly. From the tricks of the trade to plenty of introductory, DCS Techno can give you a regard at completely different mining tools. for several years, the strategy for earning enough to pay the bills was by finding a replacement line of labour and dealing during a mine. Mining tools are a significant tool employed in creating a good kind of minerals from the planet. From the method of rooting minerals, they're also employed in a spread of consumer products. Mining Tools are utilized in the timber of buses, electronics, and jewellery. they're utilized in nearly every hand of society. Presently assuming that you just want to induce minerals from the planet, you need to have the correct apparatuses. Exercising proper and probative gear can make mining tasks more straightforward and more helpful. These are the foundation of any mining association so you should be careful while copping the needed effects. You can browse different tackle, with changing purposes and purposes, to do the errands hastily. Be open and feel free to this gear in the event that you realize it can help with expanding your tasks' effectiveness. The mining business has five significant sections coal mining, gas, and oil painting separating, essence mining, non-metal mining, and supporting exercises. Besides farther developing the exertion sluice, this tackle ought to likewise expand the degree of the well- being of the sloggers hard. As the owner, it's your obligation to take care of their musts. Pre-Historic Mining Early mortal progress has used the world's means through digging for a multifariousness of purposes. an outsized portion of the minerals and components mined in early times were utilized for the assembly of weapons and different devices. During these times, top-notch stone, which happens in masses of sedimentary rocks, was at that time pursued in pieces of Europe. They were utilized as weapons within that period of time. irrespective of the restricted mining gear, Neanderthal men had the choice to quarry and make ad-libbed instruments. Glancing back at history, specialists would affirm that metal and stone mining has been essential for everyday living since antiquated times. In our times, present-day techniques and hardware are being employed to formwork essentially simpler and increment usefulness. these days, the foremost common way of mining includes fundamental advances, recognizing regions where metal bodies are often gotten, dissecting its conceivable benefit, extricating the materials, and afterward recovering the land after the activity is finished up. Obviously, security could be a limitless need, particularly during the mining system itself. Working in such a setting is extremely hazardous thus security estimates should be painstakingly noticed. In view of their riches and influence, the antiquated Egypt civilization was one of the primaries to effectively mine minerals. They were accustomed mine is malachite and gold. The green stones were used for the foremost a part of stoneware and as trimmings. Later on, involving iron devices as mining hardware, they sought minerals, generally gold from Nubia. The stone containing the mineral is ready against a stone face to warm it and afterward drenched with water. Fire-setting was maybe the foremost well-known strategy for mining it slows ago. Mining predisposition is the stuff utilized in eliminating a wide bunch of minerals from the earth. Booby-trapped minerals are employed in enough important every paperback item from vehicles to attack, to gems and also some.These means are acquired using different feathers of mining instruments. Mining Tools are the outfit used in lodging a wide array of minerals from the earth. They range from the most introductory outfit, analogous as shovels and picks, to complex ministry, like drills and crushers. Booby- trapped minerals are used in nearly every consumer product — from motorcars, to electronics, to jewellery and further. They are employed to make everything from plastics to iPads and mobile phones. The mining business is formed out of assorted players, everyone with a basic job to create the work fruitful and compelling. most significantly, the general public authority handles the assignments of overseeing mineral cases moreover as giving investigation grants. Miners, then again, accomplish crafted by using topographical guides and other significant apparatuses to tell apart minerals. Junior investigation organizations are those accountable for testing stores for any attractive metals. Generally speaking, these organizations additionally own working mines. Then, significant mining organizations employ gifted people to accomplish the real work of mining. also flashed back for the rundown are the specialists. These experts handle sophisticated lab work and similar. Administration’s suppliers are likewise significant and they can come in colorful administrations, for illustration, geologists, copter aviators, instructors, and multitudinous others. Gear providers, development associations, assiduity confederations, and fiscal exchange fiscal backers also play their own corridor to satisfy to finish the advanced perspective. It was the Romans who made extraordinary advancements throughout the entire actuality of mining. They were the original bones to use enormous compass quarrying strategies, for illustration, the application of volumes of water to work introductory outfit, exclude trash, etc. This has come to be known as water-fueled mining or hydraulicking. This is a type of mining that utilizes high-constrained shocks of water to move jewels and other residue and detritus. During the 1300s, the interest in essence brands, coverings, and different munitions expanded drastically. further minerals, for illustration, iron, and tableware were extensively excavated. The interest to deliver coins also expanded with the eventual result of causing a lack of tableware. During this period, iron turned into an abecedarian part of structure developments; outfits and other mining gear came pervasive. from open-hole mining, water shops and dark greasepaint have developed into tractors, snares, exchanges, etc. Other mechanical advancements, for illustration, green light rays employed in mining as aphorism attendants and machine arrangements helped diggers with quarrying lands. Feathers of Mining Tools The mining sedulity has a wide compass of endlessly booby-trapping outfits. The mining business is a mind- boggling frame that requires an outfit that not just meets the particular musts of the mining business, yet likewise resolves the issues of the guests. thus, mining associations need gear like cherries on top, safeguards, sizers, the cherry on top pails, gyratory cherries on top, sway cherries on top, and jaw cherries on top. From-noteworthy bias, a huge outfit is presently used to successfully and incontinently uncover lands. These are also used to separate and exclude jewels, indeed mountains. Exceptionally designed gear presently helps in the birth of different precious minerals and other had relations with accoutrements like gypsum and swab. moment, there are as of now five classes of mining coal, essence, on-metallic mineral mining, oil painting, and gas birth. oil painting and gas birth stay to be maybe the topmost business in this present reality. Any intrigued fiscal backer or business person who needs to probe the mining business should communicate to the concerned neighbourhood government workplaces to get some information about the musts. By reaching out to these means, important data will be gotten and every one of the abecedarian advances will be illustrated. Poring the authority spots of mining associations can likewise be useful in realizing mining. Mining is a sedulity that has been around for prodigies. It has been employed on an outsized scale since neolithic times and contains long history. Mining utilizes invention to encourage the obligation to finish with acceptability and as soon as possible. There are colorful mining accoutrements that must be landed employed for the position to be done meetly. From the subtle strategies to a ton of early on, DCS Techno can offer you admire to completely unique mining instruments. From now onward, indefinitely quite a while, the system for making with the end result of dealing with the bills was by finding one more calling and working in a mine Mining instrument are a necessary outfit employed in making a wide multifariousness of minerals from the earth. From the system involved with establishing minerals, they're also employed in a multifariousness of client particulars. Mining Tools are employed in the timber of transports, tackle, and gems. They're employed in basically every hand of society. By and by awaiting that you need to get minerals from the earth, you should have the right bias. Mining inclination is the stuff employed in barring a wide bunch of minerals from the earth. Booby- caught minerals are employed inadequate important every softcover thing from vehicles to handle, to jewels and likewise some. also, minerals like uranium and coal are critical energy sources that record for half of the US's energy force. These coffers are gained exercising colorful awards of mining instruments. Mining Tools are the outfit employed in establishing a wide cluster of minerals from the earth. They range from the most starting outfit, relative as digging tools and picks, to complex tackle, analogous to drills and cherries on top. Booby- caught minerals are employed in nearly every buyer item from transports to widgets, to doodads and further. Mining Industry Overview Mining falls into two classes Surface mining and underground mining. The kind of minerals and mining ways that a mining trouble is trying to suppose will directly enlighten which instruments tractors use in their work. 1.Surface Mining This involves the mining of minerals located at or near the face of the earth. This are the six step processes and these are • Strip Mining- this involves the stripping of the earth's face by the heavy ministry. This system is generally targeted at rooting coal or sedimentary jewels that lay near the earth's face. • Placer Mining- this involves the birth of sediments in beach or clay. It's a simple, old- fashioned way of mining. This system is generally applicable to gold and precious gems that are carried by the inflow of water. • Mountain Top Mining- this is a new system that involves blasting a mountain top to expose coal deposits that lie underneath the mountain crest. • Hydraulic Mining- this is an obsolete system that involves jetting the side of a mountain or hill with high-pressure water to expose gold and another precious essence. • Dredging- it involves the junking of jewels, beaches, and ground underneath a body of water to expose the minerals. • Open hole- this is the most common mining system. It involves the junking of the top layers of soil in the hunt for gold or buried treasure. The miner digs deeper and deeper until a large, open hole is created. 2. Underground Mining This is the process in which a lair is made into the earth to find the mineral ore. The mining operation is generally performed with the use of underground mining outfits. Underground mining is done through the following styles • pitch Mining- it involves the creation of pitches into the ground in order to reach the ore or mineral deposit. This cycle is for the most part applied in coal mining. • Hard gemstone- this system uses dynamite or giant drills to produce large, deep coverts. The miners support the coverts with pillars to help them from collapsing. This is a large- scale mining process and is generally applied in the birth of large bobby, drum, lead, gold, or tableware deposits. • Drift mining- this system is applicable only when the target mineral is accessible from the side of a mountain. It involves the creation of a lair that is slightly lower than the target mineral. The graveness makes the deposit fall to the lair where miners can collect them. • Shaft system- this involves the creation of a perpendicular hallway that goes deep down underground where the deposit is located. Because of the depth, miners are brought in and out of the hole with elevators. • Borehole system- this involves the use of a large drill and high-pressure water to eject the target mineral. These are the introductory styles used in the birth of common minerals. There are more complex systems, but still, they're grounded on these abecedarian processes. To Know more information about Mining Tools Visit: dcstechno Contact us: Plot No 169, Road No.11, Prashasan Nagar, Jubilee Hills, Hyderabad, Telangana – 500096 +91-9849009875",
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      "title": "X-by-Construction Design Framework for Engineering Autonomous & Distributed Real-time Embedded Software Systems (XANDAR)",
      "full_name": "fsiddiqui85/Security-Patterns",
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      "description": "This repository is part of EU-funded Research Project (XANDAR)",
      "readme": "# X-by-Construction Design Framework for Engineering Autonomous & Distributed Real-time Embedded Software Systems (XANDAR)\nProject Website: https://xandar-project.eu/\n\n\n## Research Problem\n<p align=\"justify\">\nThe introduction of [\"Smart Mobility\"](https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/insights/us/articles/smart-mobility-trends/DUP_1027_Smart-Mobility_MASTER1.pdf) within the broader concept of Smart City infrastructure offers a great potential to make our automotive and avionic transport systems reliable, efficient, and safer. Smart Mobility technologies rely on scene understanding, planning and decision-making processes [[1]](#1). These processes are heavily dependent on the input data coming from multiple sources. This data can be adversely manipulated or maliciously modified while propagating across the autonomous driving data processing pipeline, leading to an unexpected and hazardous situation. Furthermore, ensuring safety of such system including dense urban space systems have become a complex and challenging task, due to adoption of autonomous technologies.\n</p>\n\n## Research Approach\n<p align=\"justify\">\nTo tackle this research problem, [XANDAR](https://xandar-project.eu/) proposes an [X-by-Construction (XbC)](https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9774534/) approach [[2]](#2). This approach advocates the adoption of a [risk-oriented safety and security process](https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9774534/) to scope, identify, analyse, and assess the risks and hazards to the system [[3]](#3). This process-driven approach provides foundation to systematically architect a multi-layered system safety and security architecture. It will be achieved by deploying different defences across the system, allowing protection, detection, response, and recovery functions [[3]](#3) as shown in Figure. Thus, making the embedded systems more [resilient](https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9774534/) against latent vulnerabilities and outsider attacks.\n</p>\n\n![XANDAR Safety and Security Concept](images/Safety-Security-Process.png)\n\n## Pattern based Security\n\nA security pattern is described as:\n\n> \"A solution to the problem of mitigating a set of specific threats by deploying a security control defined in a given context\"\n\n<p align=\"justify\">\nThe basic aim of security is to isolate or restrict actors (the humans or automated processes) that are the active entities in the systems, from having unrestricted access to the resources of the system. The benefit of using the security pattern approach is to facilitate application and software developers (who are not security experts) to enhance security in their designs [[2]](#2). Though to effectively use patterns, it is critical that the use of each pattern, its applicability and context shall be explicitly specified to its user. It is important to specify that a security pattern is directly related to a threat rather than to a vulnerability. For instance, the specific threat may be the result of one or more vulnerabilities, but the security pattern is intended to mitigate the threat, rather than resolve the vulnerability.\n</p>\n\n<p align=\"justify\">\nIn the scope of XANDAR, a security pattern facilitates the process of selecting appropriate risk mitigation strategy, during the concept phase, and deployment of system-level defences (during generation and runtime phase) across the systems (as shown in Figure) to enhance security and improve resilience of a safety-critical embedded system.\n</p>\n\n<p align=\"justify\">\nThe following are the three secuirty patterns that has been chosen to enhance safety and security of the automotive and avionic use cases. These security patterns are fundamental to realise basic data security principles within the safety-critical systems.\n</p>\n\n**1. Data Confidentiality**\n\n**2. Data Integrity**\n\n**3. Data Authentication**\n\nThe protoytypical implementation of each security pattern have leveraged the [OpenSSL cryptography library](https://www.openssl.org/).\n\n## References\n[1] F. Siddiqui, R. Khan and S. Sezer, \"Bird's-eye view on the Automotive Cybersecurity Landscape & Challenges in adopting AI/ML,\" 2021 Sixth International Conference on Fog and Mobile Edge Computing (FMEC), 2021, pp. 1-6.\n\n[2] L. Masing et al., \"XANDAR: Exploiting the X-by-Construction Paradigm in Model-based Development of Safety-critical Systems,\" 2022 Design, Automation & Test in Europe Conference & Exhibition (DATE), 2022, pp. 1-5.\n\n[3] F. Siddiqui et al., \"XANDAR: A holistic Cybersecurity Engineering Process for Safety-critical and Cyber-physical Systems,\" 2022 IEEE 95th Vehicular Technology Conference: (VTC2022-Spring), 2022, pp. 1-5.",
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      "id": "github:mucahic/ocpp-evse-lab",
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      "title": "OCPP 1.6J EVSE Attack Lab",
      "full_name": "Mucahic/ocpp-evse-lab",
      "name": "ocpp-evse-lab",
      "owner": "Mucahic",
      "url": "https://github.com/Mucahic/ocpp-evse-lab",
      "description": "Pure-software OCPP 1.6J EVSE attack lab: SteVe CSMS + Python EVSE + mitmproxy, 5 attacks. Companion to mucahic.com/dossier-10.html",
      "readme": "# OCPP 1.6J EVSE Attack Lab\n\nPure-software lab that wires a real OCPP 1.6J Central System (SteVe) to a\nscriptable Python EVSE (charge point) and a mitmproxy WebSocket interceptor.\nEvery attack runs end-to-end over real OCPP-J traffic, no physical charger\nrequired.\n\nCompanion write-up: [EV Şarj İstasyonları: OCPP'nin İçine Girmek](https://mucahic.com/dossier-10.html)\n\n## Components\n\n```\nlab/dossier-10/\n  docker-compose.yml   MariaDB + SteVe CSMS (OCPP 1.6J central system)\n  evse-sim/            Python EVSE client (mobility-house `ocpp` lib)\n  attacks/             5 attack scripts + demo orchestrator\n  scripts/             setup / up / down helpers\n  diagrams/            article image generators\n  captures/            runtime artifacts (gitignored)\n  external/            SteVe source, cloned by setup (gitignored)\n```\n\n## Stack\n\n| Piece     | What                                                          |\n| --------- | ------------------------------------------------------------- |\n| SteVe     | Open-source OCPP 1.6J Central System (CSMS), `steve-3.7.1`    |\n| MariaDB   | SteVe backing store                                           |\n| EVSE sim  | Python charge point on the mobility-house `ocpp` library      |\n| mitmproxy | WebSocket man-in-the-middle for the live-rewrite attacks      |\n\n- OCPP-J endpoint: `ws://localhost:8180/steve/websocket/CentralSystemService/<chargeBoxId>`\n- SteVe manager: `http://localhost:8180/manager/home` (`admin` / `1234`)\n\n## Attacks\n\n| # | Script               | Technique                                                    |\n|---|----------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 1 | `ocpp_mitm.py`       | MitM Authorize `idTag` rewrite (mitmproxy WS addon)          |\n| 2 | `rogue_csms.py`      | Rogue Central System via hijacked DNS/config, harvests data  |\n| 3 | `free_charge.py`     | MeterValues / `meterStop` zeroing, \"free\" energy             |\n| 4 | `dos_flood.py`       | Parallel fake charge-box BootNotification + Heartbeat storm  |\n| 5 | `firmware_inject.py` | Attacker-side `UpdateFirmware` injection                     |\n|   | `demo_all.py`        | Runs every attack, renders amber-terminal PNGs to captures/  |\n\n## Requirements\n\n- Docker + Docker Compose\n- Python 3.10+ with: `pip install ocpp websockets mitmproxy Pillow`\n\n## Run\n\n```\npython scripts/setup.py                          # clone SteVe + docker compose build\npython scripts/up.py                             # start MariaDB + SteVe, wait for health\npython evse-sim/charge_point.py --auto-charge    # baseline session (cp-id EVSE-001)\n```\n\nThen run an attack, e.g. the rogue CSMS and point the EVSE at it:\n\n```\npython attacks/rogue_csms.py --port 8500 --harvest captures/harvested.json\npython evse-sim/charge_point.py --csms ws://localhost:8500 --auto-charge\npython attacks/demo_all.py                       # full sequence + screenshots\n```\n\nTear down:\n\n```\npython scripts/down.py\n```\n\n## Disclaimer\n\nLab-only. Every component runs on localhost against a simulated charger and a\ndisposable SteVe instance. Do not point these scripts at charging\ninfrastructure you do not own.",
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      "title": "Automotive Cybersecurity Topic Trends (Reddit Research)",
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      "readme": "# Automotive Cybersecurity Topic Trends (Reddit Research)\n\nThis repository contains a research and educational tool that analyzes **public Reddit discussions** to identify **topic trends** related to **automotive cybersecurity** (e.g., ECU security, CAN bus attacks, OTA risks).\n\nThe project uses **read-only** access to the official Reddit API and does **not** interact with users or influence discussions.\n\n## Goals\n\n- Track how automotive cybersecurity topics evolve over time on Reddit\n- Identify recurring vulnerability themes and emerging discussions\n- Produce aggregated indicators for research, learning, and awareness\n\n## What the app does\n\n- Collects **public post metadata** from selected subreddits (e.g., title, timestamp, subreddit name)\n- Computes **aggregated** statistics (e.g., keyword frequency, weekly/monthly trends)\n- Exports results to CSV/JSON for further analysis\n\n## What the app does NOT do\n\n- No posting, commenting, voting, or messaging\n- No user tracking or profiling\n- No collection of personal user data (usernames, user IDs, private info)\n- No scraping outside the official Reddit API\n- No attempts to bypass rate limits\n\n## Data processed\n\nOnly high-level public metadata is processed:\n- Post title\n- Post creation timestamp\n- Subreddit name\n- Post ID/permalink (optional, for deduplication and transparency)\n\n## Intended subreddits (initial scope)\n\nExamples (may evolve depending on research needs):\n- r/cybersecurity\n- r/netsec\n- r/CarHacking\n- r/ReverseEngineering\n- r/embedded\n- r/IOTSecurity\n- r/automotive\n\n## Setup\n\n### Requirements\n- Python 3.10+\n- Reddit API credentials (OAuth)\n\n### Install\n```bash\npython -m venv venv\nsource venv/bin/activate\npip install -r requirements.txt\n# Automotive-threat-int_research\nResearch tool for analyzing public Reddit discussions to identify trends in automotive cybersecurity topics using read-only API access.",
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    "mfawzy/electric-vehicles-threat-analysis-llm-based-tool-evta-llm-": {
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      "title": "EVTA",
      "full_name": "mfawzy/Electric-Vehicles-Threat-Analysis-LLM-based-tool-EVTA-LLM-",
      "name": "Electric-Vehicles-Threat-Analysis-LLM-based-tool-EVTA-LLM-",
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      "url": "https://github.com/mfawzy/Electric-Vehicles-Threat-Analysis-LLM-based-tool-EVTA-LLM-",
      "description": "EVTA-LLM is a deployment-oriented EV traffic analysis and threat-detection feature extraction framework designed for both offline and real-time live monitoring. The framework converts raw EV network traffic into enriched, analyst-friendly flow features suitable for cybersecurity research, operational monitoring, and machine learning pipelines.",
      "readme": "# EVTA\n\n![EVTA Dashboard](car.png)\n\nElectric Vehicles Threat Analysis LLM-based tool (EVTA-LLM) is a deployment-oriented Electric Vehicle (EV) traffic analysis and threat-detection feature extraction framework designed for both **offline dataset generation** and **real-time live monitoring**. The framework converts raw EV network traffic into enriched, analyst-friendly flow features suitable for cybersecurity research, operational monitoring, and machine learning pipelines.\n\nUnlike traditional CSV-only flow extractors, EVTA acts as a complete **feature intelligence pipeline** capable of:\n\n* Extracting enriched EV network flow features\n* Monitoring live EV traffic in real time\n* Generating partial-flow snapshots for early detection\n* Producing deployment-readiness metrics\n* Detecting behavioral heuristics automatically\n* Generating local LLM-based analyst explanations\n* Performing drift analysis and consistency validation\n* Providing a desktop monitoring dashboard\n\n\n!Download dataset from DataPort [EVTD-LLM Repository](\nhttps://ieee-dataport.org/documents/evtd-llm-electric-vehicle-traffic-dataset-llm-generated-behavioral-context-threat)\n\nThe framework maintains a shared extraction pipeline between offline and live modes to preserve feature consistency across experiments and deployments.\n\n---\n\n# Key Features\n\n| Capability                   | Description                                                           |\n| ---------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------- |\n| **Offline extraction**       | Reads `.pcap` and `.pcapng` captures and exports enriched flow rows   |\n| **Live monitoring**          | Captures live EV traffic directly from network interfaces             |\n| **Partial-flow snapshots**   | Exports early-stage snapshots using packet or time milestones         |\n| **Readiness scoring**        | Computes deployment-oriented confidence and stability scores          |\n| **Host behavior enrichment** | Adds graph-style communication and host-window features               |\n| **Built-in heuristics**      | Detects scans, beaconing, failed connections, and suspicious behavior |\n| **Local LLM explanations**   | Generates analyst-readable summaries using local Qwen models          |\n| **Desktop GUI dashboard**    | Provides real-time monitoring, alerts, visualizations, and controls   |\n| **Drift analysis**           | Compares generated datasets against baseline feature distributions    |\n| **Consistency validation**   | Verifies alignment between offline and live extraction paths          |\n\n---\n\n# Dashboard Overview\n\nThe EVTA desktop GUI provides a real-time operational monitoring interface.\n\n### Dashboard Capabilities\n\n* Live EV traffic monitoring\n* Real-time metric cards\n* Protocol distribution visualization\n* Threat label summaries\n* Alert-pressure monitoring\n* Exported-flow visualization\n* Heuristic activity stream\n* Offline PCAP extraction\n* Live capture controls\n* Integrated CSV export\n* Qwen LLM configuration support\n\nThe GUI uses the exact same extraction pipeline as the command-line interface to ensure feature consistency.\n\n---\n\n# Schema Overview\n\nEVTA currently exports a rich **84-column schema** composed of:\n\n| Schema Segment             | Columns | Examples                                             |\n| -------------------------- | ------: | ---------------------------------------------------- |\n| Identity columns           |       8 | `flow_id`, `src_ip`, `dst_ip`, timestamps            |\n| Stable transport features  |      32 | packet counts, byte counts, TCP flags, timing        |\n| Extended features          |      20 | retransmissions, TLS metadata, DNS statistics        |\n| Advanced deployment fields |      22 | readiness scores, heuristic summaries, `llm_context` |\n| Classification labels      |       2 | binary and multiclass labels                         |\n\nThe exported rows contain significantly more operational context than traditional flow extractors.\n\n---\n\n# Installation\n\nRun all commands from the project root directory.\n\n## Upgrade Packaging Tools\n\n```bash\npython3.11 -m pip install --upgrade pip setuptools wheel\n```\n\n## Editable Installation\n\n```bash\npython3.11 -m pip install -e .\n```\n\n## Standard Installation\n\n```bash\npython3.11 -m pip install .\n```\n\n---\n\n# Dependencies\n\n| Dependency     | Purpose                   |\n| -------------- | ------------------------- |\n| `dpkt`         | Offline PCAP decoding     |\n| `scapy`        | Live packet capture       |\n| `transformers` | Local LLM inference       |\n| `torch`        | Transformer model backend |\n| `PySide6`      | Desktop GUI framework     |\n\n---\n\n# Local Qwen Integration\n\nEVTA supports local LLM-generated analyst explanations through Hugging Face Transformers.\n\nDefault model:\n\n```text\nQwen/Qwen2.5-0.5B-Instruct\n```\n\nGenerated explanations are written into the:\n\n```text\nllm_context\n```\n\ncolumn.\n\n## Example\n\n```python\nfrom transformers import AutoModelForCausalLM, AutoTokenizer\n\nmodel_name = \"Qwen/Qwen2.5-0.5B-Instruct\"\n\ntokenizer = AutoTokenizer.from_pretrained(model_name)\nmodel = AutoModelForCausalLM.from_pretrained(model_name)\n\nprompt = \"Explain black holes simply\"\ninputs = tokenizer(prompt, return_tensors=\"pt\")\n\noutputs = model.generate(**inputs, max_new_tokens=96)\nprint(tokenizer.decode(outputs[0]))\n```\n\nInside EVTA, the prompt contains the full extracted feature row instead of a simple text prompt.\n\n---\n\n# Running EVTA\n\nThe framework can be executed in multiple ways depending on the workflow.\n\n---\n\n# Run Without Installation\n\nYou can execute EVTA directly from the project root.\n\n## Offline Extraction\n\n```bash\npython -m EVTA \\\n  --mode offline \\\n  --input sample.pcap \\\n  --output EVTA_features.csv\n```\n\n## Offline Extraction with Qwen\n\n```bash\npython -m EVTA \\\n  --mode offline \\\n  --input sample.pcap \\\n  --output EVTA_features_llm.csv \\\n  --enable-llm-context\n```\n\n## Live Monitoring\n\n```bash\npython -m EVTA \\\n  --mode live \\\n  --interface eth0 \\\n  --output EVTA_live.csv\n```\n\n## Launch GUI\n\n```bash\npython -m EVTA.gui\n```\n\n---\n\n# Run After Installation\n\nAfter installing with:\n\n```bash\npip install -e .\n```\n\nYou can launch EVTA directly from the terminal.\n\n## Offline Extraction\n\n```bash\nEVTA \\\n  --mode offline \\\n  --input sample.pcap \\\n  --output EVTA_features.csv\n```\n\n## Offline Extraction with Labels\n\n```bash\nEVTA \\\n  --mode offline \\\n  --input sample.pcap \\\n  --output EVTA_attack.csv \\\n  --binary-label attack \\\n  --multiclass-label port_scan\n```\n\n## Offline Extraction with Partial Snapshots\n\n```bash\nEVTA \\\n  --mode offline \\\n  --input sample.pcap \\\n  --output EVTA_partial.csv \\\n  --enable-partial \\\n  --partial-packet-steps 1,3,5,10 \\\n  --partial-time-steps 1,5,10\n```\n\n## Offline Extraction with Local Qwen Context\n\n```bash\nEVTA \\\n  --mode offline \\\n  --input sample.pcap \\\n  --output EVTA_llm.csv \\\n  --enable-llm-context \\\n  --llm-model-name Qwen/Qwen2.5-0.5B-Instruct \\\n  --llm-max-new-tokens 96\n```\n\n## Offline Extraction with Drift Reports\n\n```bash\nEVTA \\\n  --mode offline \\\n  --input current_capture.pcap \\\n  --output EVTA_current.csv \\\n  --baseline-csv baseline.csv \\\n  --report-prefix reports/current_run\n```\n\n## Live Monitoring\n\n```bash\nEVTA \\\n  --mode live \\\n  --interface eth0 \\\n  --output EVTA_live.csv\n```\n\n## Live Monitoring with Safe Profile\n\n```bash\nEVTA \\\n  --mode live \\\n  --interface eth0 \\\n  --output EVTA_live_safe.csv \\\n  --profile live-safe\n```\n\n## Live Monitoring with Qwen Context\n\n```bash\nEVTA \\\n  --mode live \\\n  --interface eth0 \\\n  --output EVTA_live_llm.csv \\\n  --enable-llm-context\n```\n\n## Launch GUI\n\n```bash\nEVTA-gui\n```\n\n---\n\n# Running the Benchmark\n\nThe benchmarking pipeline evaluates EVTA features using both classical machine learning and deep learning models.\n\n## Run Level 3 Benchmark\n\n```bash\npython Benchmarking/Benchmarking.py\n```\n\nor:\n\n```bash\npython benchmark_level3.py\n```\n\ndepending on the file name.\n\n---\n\n# Benchmark Workflow\n\nThe benchmark automatically:\n\n1. Loads the EV dataset\n2. Cleans invalid rows\n3. Splits train/test data\n4. Removes Level 3 restricted features\n5. Applies preprocessing\n6. Trains classical models\n7. Trains deep learning models\n8. Computes evaluation metrics\n9. Saves benchmark reports\n\n---\n\n# Generated Benchmark Files\n\n```text\ntrain_split_level3.csv\n```\n\n```text\ntest_split_level3.csv\n```\n\n```text\nbinary_level3_benchmark_results.csv\n```\n\n```text\nmulticlass_level3_benchmark_results.csv\n```\n\n```text\nall_level3_benchmark_results.csv\n```\n\n---\n\n# Usage\n\nEVTA supports both:\n\n* Command-line workflows\n* Desktop GUI workflows\n\n---\n\n# Launch GUI\n\n```bash\npython -m EVTA.gui\n```\n\nor after installation:\n\n```bash\nEVTA-gui\n```\n\n---\n\n# Offline Extraction\n\n```bash\nEVTA \\\n  --mode offline \\\n  --input sample.pcap \\\n  --output EVTA_features.csv\n```\n\n---\n\n# Offline Extraction with Local Qwen Context\n\n```bash\nEVTA \\\n  --mode offline \\\n  --input sample.pcap \\\n  --output EVTA_features_with_llm.csv \\\n  --enable-llm-context \\\n  --llm-model-name Qwen/Qwen2.5-0.5B-Instruct \\\n  --llm-max-new-tokens 96\n```\n\n---\n\n# Partial Snapshot Extraction\n\n```bash\nEVTA \\\n  --mode offline \\\n  --input sample.pcap \\\n  --output EVTA_v7_llm.csv \\\n  --enable-partial \\\n  --binary-label attack \\\n  --multiclass-label port_scan \\\n  --enable-llm-context \\\n  --partial-packet-steps 1,3,5,10 \\\n  --partial-time-steps 1,5,10\n```\n\n---\n\n# Live Monitoring\n\n```bash\nEVTA \\\n  --mode live \\\n  --interface eth0 \\\n  --output EVTA_live.csv\n```\n\n---\n\n# Live Monitoring with Qwen\n\n```bash\nEVTA \\\n  --mode live \\\n  --interface eth0 \\\n  --output EVTA_live_safe_llm.csv \\\n  --profile live-safe \\\n  --enable-partial \\\n  --enable-llm-context \\\n  --llm-model-name Qwen/Qwen2.5-0.5B-Instruct \\\n  --llm-max-new-tokens 96\n```\n\n---\n\n# Important Arguments\n\n| Argument                 | Description                           |\n| ------------------------ | ------------------------------------- |\n| `--mode`                 | Selects offline or live extraction    |\n| `--input`                | Input PCAP or PCAPNG file             |\n| `--interface`            | Live capture interface                |\n| `--output`               | Output CSV path                       |\n| `--enable-llm-context`   | Enables local Qwen generation         |\n| `--llm-model-name`       | Hugging Face model name or local path |\n| `--llm-max-new-tokens`   | Maximum generated tokens              |\n| `--enable-partial`       | Enables partial-flow export           |\n| `--partial-packet-steps` | Packet milestones                     |\n| `--partial-time-steps`   | Time milestones                       |\n| `--baseline-csv`         | Baseline CSV for drift analysis       |\n| `--report-prefix`        | Prefix for generated reports          |\n| `--bpf-filter`           | Optional live-capture filter          |\n| `--duration`             | Maximum capture duration              |\n| `--max-packets`          | Maximum captured packets              |\n| `--poll-interval`        | Flow flush interval                   |\n| `--no-promisc`           | Disable promiscuous mode              |\n\n---\n\n# Output Profiles\n\n| Profile       | Purpose                               |\n| ------------- | ------------------------------------- |\n| `full`        | Complete 84-column export             |\n| `research`    | Research-oriented reproducible export |\n| `stable-core` | Robust deployment-oriented features   |\n| `live-safe`   | Streaming-safe operational profile    |\n\n---\n\n# Generated Reports\n\n| Artifact           | Purpose                            |\n| ------------------ | ---------------------------------- |\n| `.consistency.csv` | Offline/live mismatch report       |\n| `.consistency.md`  | Human-readable consistency summary |\n| `.drift.csv`       | Feature drift statistics           |\n| `.drift.md`        | Human-readable drift report        |\n\n---\n\n# Project Structure\n\n| File                   | Responsibility                  |\n| ---------------------- | ------------------------------- |\n| `EVTA/cli.py`          | CLI parsing and orchestration   |\n| `EVTA/pipeline.py`     | Shared execution pipeline       |\n| `EVTA/live_capture.py` | Live capture logic              |\n| `EVTA/flows.py`        | Flow aggregation and enrichment |\n| `EVTA/heuristics.py`   | Threat heuristics               |\n| `EVTA/llm_context.py`  | Local Qwen integration          |\n| `EVTA/readiness.py`    | Readiness scoring               |\n| `EVTA/drift.py`        | Drift analysis                  |\n| `EVTA/consistency.py`  | Offline/live validation         |\n| `EVTA/exporter.py`     | CSV export logic                |\n| `EVTA/gui.py`          | Desktop GUI dashboard           |\n\n---\n\n# Feature Extraction Levels\n\nEVTA supports multiple feature-extraction difficulty levels designed for realistic IDS benchmarking and fair evaluation.\n\nThe goal of the levels is to progressively remove shortcut, leakage, and deployment-unrealistic features so that models are evaluated under increasingly realistic operational conditions.\n\n| Level       | Description                   | Characteristics                                                                                  |\n| ----------- | ----------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |\n| **Level 1** | Full feature benchmark        | Uses nearly all extracted features including highly predictive operational metadata              |\n| **Level 2** | Reduced shortcut benchmark    | Removes obvious leakage and strongly attack-specific indicators                                  |\n| **Level 3** | Deployment-oriented benchmark | Removes direct leakage, heuristics, strong shortcut features, and environment-sensitive metadata |\n\n---\n\n# Level 3 Benchmarking Philosophy\n\nThe included Level 3 benchmark is intentionally designed to be significantly harder and more deployment realistic than standard IDS evaluations.\n\nInstead of allowing models to rely on direct attack shortcuts, heuristic outputs, or environment-dependent metadata, the benchmark removes:\n\n* Heuristic-generated labels\n* LLM-generated summaries\n* Readiness scoring outputs\n* Direct traffic shortcuts\n* Strong scan indicators\n* Highly predictive timing shortcuts\n* Direct protocol and port leakage\n* Host-window shortcut statistics\n* Export metadata\n\nThis forces models to learn more generalized behavioral patterns rather than memorizing highly correlated indicators.\n\nThe benchmark therefore evaluates whether a model can still detect malicious EV traffic under realistic deployment constraints.\n\n---\n\n# Benchmark Tasks\n\nThe benchmarking pipeline supports two primary tasks.\n\n| Task                          | Target Column               | Purpose                                |\n| ----------------------------- | --------------------------- | -------------------------------------- |\n| **Binary classification**     | `binary_classification`     | Distinguishes benign vs attack traffic |\n| **Multiclass classification** | `multiclass_classification` | Identifies specific attack categories  |\n\nThe dataset is automatically split into training and testing partitions using stratified sampling.\n\n---\n\n# Benchmark Model Families\n\nThe framework evaluates both classical machine learning models and deep learning architectures.\n\n## Classical Models\n\n| Model         | Purpose                            |\n| ------------- | ---------------------------------- |\n| Random Forest | Ensemble tree-based classifier     |\n| Extra Trees   | Randomized ensemble classifier     |\n| Linear SVM    | High-dimensional linear classifier |\n\n## Deep Learning Models\n\n| Model       | Purpose                                           |\n| ----------- | ------------------------------------------------- |\n| CNN         | Learns local feature interactions                 |\n| RNN         | Sequential feature modeling                       |\n| LSTM        | Long-term sequential dependency learning          |\n| KAN-style   | Lightweight kernel-inspired approximation network |\n| Transformer | Attention-based feature interaction modeling      |\n\n---\n\n# Benchmark Pipeline\n\nThe Level 3 benchmark pipeline performs the following stages.\n\n1. Load the full EVTA dataset\n2. Clean invalid and duplicated rows\n3. Split the dataset into train/test partitions\n4. Remove Level 3 restricted features\n5. Remove constant-value columns\n6. Apply preprocessing:\n\n   * Median imputation for numeric fields\n   * Most-frequent imputation for categorical fields\n   * Standard scaling\n   * One-hot encoding\n7. Train classical models\n8. Train deep learning models\n9. Evaluate using multiple metrics\n10. 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      "readme": "# Automotive Cybersecurity TARA: 4-Corner Zonal Architecture (ISO/SAE 21434)\n## Executive Summary\nAs the automotive industry transitions to the **Software-Defined Vehicle (SDV)**, securing the vehicle network is as critical as functional safety (ISO 26262). This repository contains a comprehensive Mock **Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment (TARA)** conducted in accordance with **ISO/SAE 21434**, implementing my learnings from the Udemy certification [(‘[Practical Guide: ISO 21434, TARA for Automotive Cybersecurity]')](https://www.udemy.com/share/10cN513@xRNIVJ7SCKM2ge-SCWDwUyvxYIGl80EB_o4jcCpXLz_eihQZQp-QPBfc9Hr1C0Tl/),and with additional supplements from TÜV SÜD and [Rappel Cybersecurity](https://www.youtube.com/@Rappel-Cybersecurity/videos).\n\nThe assessment targets a modern **4-Corner Zonal Architecture with a Central Zone Computer (CZC)**, analyzing 5 distinct attack vectors across Physical Edge, Remote/Cloud, Wireless, and Diagnostic interfaces.\n\n## Item Definition & Architecture Scope\n**System Overview:** The target architecture relies on a Gigabit Ethernet (1000 Base-T1) backbone connecting a Central Zone Computer (CZC) to four location-based Zone Controllers. This architecture introduces complex cybersecurity challenges, particularly **Mixed-Criticality Routing**, where low-security body domains share physical gateways with high-security powertrain/ADAS domains.\n\n<img src=\"docs/Zonal_Architecture_with_CZC.png\" alt=\"4-Corner Zonal Automotive Architecture\" width=\"600\">\n\n## Highlighted Threat Scenarios\n*(Below are 2 of the 5 detailed threat models. Please refer to the attached Excel workbook for the complete analysis).*\n\n### 1. Mixed-Criticality Gateway Bypass (Physical Edge Pivot Attack)\n**Target Asset:** Frontal Left Zone Controller (FL-ZC) Routing Engine & EPS CAN FD Network.\n**Attack Vector:** Local (Exposed exterior mirror/door wiring).\n**Attack Path:** An attacker physically accesses the low-security LIN door wiring harness, splices a network injector, and exploits a routing vulnerability inside the FL-ZC to pivot onto the high-security CAN FD bus.\n**Damage Scenario:** Injection of spoofed Electronic Power Steering (EPS) torque commands at highway speeds (Severe Safety Impact).\n**STRIDE Threat:** Elevation of Privilege & Spoofing.\n**Assessed Risk & CAL:** **Risk Level 5 (Critical) | CAL 4**\n**Cybersecurity Goal (Mitigation):** The FL-ZC shall enforce strict hardware/software network isolation (e.g., VLANs, Firewalls) blocking powertrain frames originating from body edge nodes. EPS shall authenticate all torque commands using **SecOC** (Secure On-Board Communication).\n\n### 2. Flawed System-Wide OTA Update (Supply Chain / Cloud Attack)\n**Target Asset:** Central Zone Computer (CZC) OTA Update Manager & TCU.\n**Attack Vector:** Network (Cloud attack / Cellular Network (eSIM)).\n**Attack Path:** An attacker compromises the OEM backend server or executes a cellular MitM attack to push a malicious firmware payload. The CZC fails to cryptographically verify the payload and flashes it to multiple Zone Controllers via the Ethernet backbone.\n**Damage Scenario:** Vehicle fleet is bricked (Ransomware) or a remote-control backdoor is installed in the powertrain domain.\n**STRIDE Threat:** Tampering & Spoofing.\n**Assessed Risk & CAL:** **Risk Level 4 (High) | CAL 4**\n**Cybersecurity Goal (Mitigation):** The CZC shall enforce **Secure Boot** and strict asymmetric cryptographic verification (RSA/ECC) of all OTA payloads. The TCU must mandate mutually authenticated TLS 1.3 with the OEM backend to ensure UN R156 compliance.\n\n## Complete Threat Catalog\n[ Click Here to Download the Complete TARA Excel Workbook](`TARA_Zonal_SDV_Architecture.xlsx`)\nThe attached TARA matrix contains the full risk assessments, impact calculations, and attack feasibilities for:\n1. FL-ZC Door-to-Steering Pivot Attack (Highlighted)\n2. CZC Flawed System-Wide OTA Update (Highlighted)\n3. FR-ZC Physical CAN Injection via Exposed ADAS Sensor\n4. CZC Diagnostic Attack via OBD-II Port (UDS Service Exploitation)\n5. CZC IVI Wi-Fi Stack Attack (Evil Twin / MitM)\n\n## Methodology & Frameworks\n**Standard:** ISO/SAE 21434 (Road vehicles — Cybersecurity engineering)\n\n**Threat Modeling:** STRIDE\n\n**Risk Calculation:** Impact (Safety, Financial, Operational, Privacy) + Attack Feasibility (Time, Expertise, Knowledge, Opportunity, Equipment).\n\n**Mitigations:** AUTOSAR Crypto Stack, SecOC, Hardware Firewalls, UDS Authentication (Service 0x29).\n\n---\n*Created by Harshitha Nidaghatta Siddaraju | Automotive Embedded Software Engineer transitioning Classic AUTOSAR expertise into SDV Cybersecurity.*",
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      "readme": "# 🚗 TARA Pro — Automotive Cybersecurity Workbench\n\n**Threat Analysis & Risk Assessment (TARA)** workbench for automotive cybersecurity, fully compliant with **ISO/SAE 21434**.\n\nBuilt with React + Vite. No backend required — runs entirely in the browser.\n\n![License](https://img.shields.io/badge/license-MIT-blue.svg)\n![Standard](https://img.shields.io/badge/ISO%2FSAE-21434-green.svg)\n![STRIDE](https://img.shields.io/badge/methodology-STRIDE-orange.svg)\n\n---\n\n## ✨ Features\n\n### Step 0 — Dashboard\n- Real-time statistics: assets, threats, assessed, treated\n- ISO 21434 workflow progress tracker with compliance percentage\n- Visual **Risk Distribution Matrix** (feasibility × impact)\n- Complete threat registry with risk levels and treatment status\n\n### Step 1 — Asset Identification\n- Add vehicle assets (ECU, Sensor, Actuator, Interface, Network, Gateway, etc.)\n- Assign cybersecurity properties (CIA triad + Authenticity, Authorization, Non-repudiation)\n- Define **damage scenarios** with impact ratings across 4 categories:\n  - 🛡️ Safety | 💰 Financial | ⚙️ Operational | 🔒 Privacy\n- Load pre-built sample vehicle architecture (TCU, OBD-II, CAN Bus, ADAS, V2X, Infotainment)\n\n### Step 2 — Threat Enumeration\n- Manual threat creation with STRIDE classification\n- **Auto-generate threats** using STRIDE methodology against all assets\n- Link threats to specific damage scenarios\n- Attack vector documentation\n\n### Step 3 — Risk Assessment\n- **Attack feasibility rating** using attack potential method (HEAVENs / EVITA):\n  - Elapsed Time | Expertise | Knowledge of TOE | Window of Opportunity | Equipment\n- Visual risk matrix with threat distribution\n- Automatic **risk level calculation** (Critical → Negligible)\n- Per-threat expandable assessment panels\n\n### Step 4 — Risk Treatment & Countermeasures\n- Four ISO 21434 treatment options:\n  - **Mitigate** — Assign countermeasures + define cybersecurity goals\n  - **Transfer** — Document transfer target, contract reference, justification\n  - **Avoid** — Specify removed feature, functional impact, justification\n  - **Accept** — Rationale, approver, review date (with high-risk warning)\n- **15 pre-built automotive countermeasures** (Secure Boot, HSM, SecOC, TLS, IDS, OTA, etc.)\n- Searchable countermeasure catalog with effectiveness/effort ratings\n\n### Step 5 — Reports & Export\n- **Report Configuration** — Project name, author, version metadata\n- **ISO 21434 Compliance Checklist** — 9-point auto-check against standard sections (§8–§15)\n- **Full HTML Report** — Professional compliance report with cover page, TOC, all tables\n- **Inline Report Preview** — View the complete report directly in the app\n- **Export formats**: HTML, JSON, CSV\n- **Clipboard copy** fallback for restricted environments\n\n---\n\n## 🚀 Getting Started\n\n### Prerequisites\n- [Node.js](https://nodejs.org/) (v16 or higher)\n- npm or yarn\n\n### Installation\n\n```bash\n# Clone the repository\ngit clone https://github.com/YOUR_USERNAME/tara-pro.git\ncd tara-pro\n\n# Install dependencies\nnpm install\n\n# Start development server\nnpm run dev\n```\n\nThe app will open at `http://localhost:3000`.\n\n### Build for Production\n\n```bash\nnpm run build\n```\n\nThe production-ready files will be in the `dist/` folder.\n\n---\n\n## 🌐 Deployment\n\n### Vercel (Recommended)\n1. Push to GitHub\n2. Go to [vercel.com](https://vercel.com)\n3. Import your repository\n4. Click Deploy — done!\n\n### Netlify\n1. Push to GitHub\n2. Go to [netlify.com](https://netlify.com)\n3. Connect your repository\n4. Build command: `npm run build`\n5. Publish directory: `dist`\n\n### GitHub Pages\n1. Install gh-pages: `npm install -D gh-pages`\n2. Add to `vite.config.js`: `base: '/tara-pro/'`\n3. Add to package.json scripts: `\"deploy\": \"vite build && gh-pages -d dist\"`\n4. Run: `npm run deploy`\n\n---\n\n## 📋 Standards & Methodologies\n\n| Standard / Method | Coverage |\n|---|---|\n| **ISO/SAE 21434** | Full TARA workflow (§8 Asset ID → §15 Risk Treatment) |\n| **SAE J3061** | Cybersecurity guidebook alignment |\n| **STRIDE** | Threat categorization (Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Info Disclosure, DoS, Elevation) |\n| **HEAVENs** | Impact rating methodology |\n| **EVITA** | Attack feasibility assessment |\n| **CVSS-aligned** | Attack potential parameters |\n\n---\n\n## 🛠️ Tech Stack\n\n- **React 18** — UI framework\n- **Vite 5** — Build tool & dev server\n- **CSS-in-JS** — Zero-dependency styling (no Tailwind/CSS framework needed)\n- **DM Sans / DM Mono** — Typography via Google Fonts\n\nNo external UI libraries. No backend. No database. Everything runs client-side.\n\n---\n\n## 📁 Project Structure\n\n```\ntara-pro/\n├── index.html          # Entry HTML\n├── package.json        # Dependencies & scripts\n├── vite.config.js      # Vite configuration\n├── .gitignore\n├── README.md\n└── src/\n    ├── main.jsx        # React entry point\n    └── App.jsx         # Complete TARA application (~1800 lines)\n```\n\n---\n\n## 🤝 Contributing\n\nContributions are welcome! Some ideas:\n\n- [ ] Dark/light theme toggle\n- [ ] Local storage persistence (save/load projects)\n- [ ] PDF export via browser print\n- [ ] Attack tree visualization\n- [ ] Import/export from EnCo SOX format\n- [ ] Multi-project support\n- [ ] User authentication & collaboration\n- [ ] CVSS v3.1 scoring integration\n- [ ] Compliance gap analysis dashboard\n\n---\n\n## 📄 License\n\nMIT License — see [LICENSE](LICENSE) for details.\n\n---\n\n## 🙏 Acknowledgments\n\n- ISO/SAE 21434 standard for automotive cybersecurity engineering\n- STRIDE threat modeling methodology by Microsoft\n- HEAVENs and EVITA research projects for automotive security assessment\n- Inspired by [EnCo SOX](https://www.enco-software.com/tara/) workbench\n\n---\n\n**Built for automotive cybersecurity engineers, by cybersecurity engineers.**",
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Most implementations will be a subset of the full OCPP specification.\n\nIf you need help verifying your OCPP implementation, email bperry@atx.services to see how we can help.\n\n```\nSupports method: Authorize\nSupports method: BootNotification\nSupports method: DataTransfer\nSupports method: FirmwareStatusNotification\nSupports method: Heartbeat\nSupports method: MeterValues\nSupports method: StatusNotification\nSupports method: StartTransaction\nSupports method: StopTransaction\nDone\n\nRunning scenario: ocpp.Scenarios.TC_001_CSMS    -- PASSED!\nRunning scenario: ocpp.Scenarios.TC_003_CSMS    -- PASSED!\nRunning scenario: ocpp.Scenarios.TC_004_1_CSMS  -- PASSED!\nRunning scenario: ocpp.Scenarios.TC_004_2_CSMS  -- PASSED!\nRunning scenario: ocpp.Scenarios.TC_005_1_CSMS  -- PASSED!\nRunning scenario: ocpp.Scenarios.TC_007_CSMS    -- PASSED!\nSkipping incompatible test ocpp.Scenarios.TC_010_CSMS\nRunning scenario: ocpp.Scenarios.TC_023_1_CSMS  -- PASSED!\nRunning scenario: ocpp.Scenarios.TC_023_2_CSMS\nConfigure the volatileocpp ID Tag to be expired then press enter.\n\n        -- PASSED!\nRunning scenario: ocpp.Scenarios.TC_023_3_CSMS\nConfigure the volatileocpp ID Tag to be blocked then press enter.\n\n        -- PASSED!\nRunning scenario: ocpp.Scenarios.TC_024_CSMS    -- PASSED!\nRunning scenario: ocpp.Scenarios.TC_064_CSMS\nWARNING: DataTransfer Response ACCEPTED\n        -- PASSED!\n```\n\nA failed result might look like this.\n\n```\nSupports method: Authorize\nSupports method: BootNotification\nSupports method: DataTransfer\nSupports method: FirmwareStatusNotification\nSupports method: Heartbeat\nSupports method: MeterValues\nSupports method: StatusNotification\nSupports method: StartTransaction\nSupports method: StopTransaction\nDone\n\nRunning scenario: ocpp.Scenarios.TC_001_CSMS    -- PASSED!\nRunning scenario: ocpp.Scenarios.TC_003_CSMS    -- PASSED!\nRunning scenario: ocpp.Scenarios.TC_004_1_CSMS  -- PASSED!\nRunning scenario: ocpp.Scenarios.TC_004_2_CSMS  -- PASSED!\nRunning scenario: ocpp.Scenarios.TC_005_1_CSMS  -- PASSED!\nRunning scenario: ocpp.Scenarios.TC_007_CSMS    -- PASSED!\nSkipping incompatible test ocpp.Scenarios.TC_010_CSMS\nRunning scenario: ocpp.Scenarios.TC_023_1_CSMS  -- PASSED!\nRunning scenario: ocpp.Scenarios.TC_023_2_CSMS\nConfigure the volatileocpp ID Tag to be expired then press enter.\n\n10/29/2024 9:12:13 PM|Error|WebSocket.messagec|System.Exception: Invalid response\n                               at ocpp.Scenarios.TC_023_2_CSMS.<>c__DisplayClass3_0.<RunScenario>b__0(Object sender, MessageEventArgs e) in /Users/bperry/projects/ocpp/Scenarios/TC_023_2_CSMS.cs:line 39\n                               at WebSocketSharp.WebSocket.messagec(MessageEventArgs e)\n        -- FAILED!\nRunning scenario: ocpp.Scenarios.TC_023_3_CSMS\nConfigure the volatileocpp ID Tag to be blocked then press enter.\n\n10/29/2024 9:12:17 PM|Error|WebSocket.messagec|System.Exception: Invalid response\n                               at ocpp.Scenarios.TC_023_3_CSMS.<>c__DisplayClass3_0.<RunScenario>b__0(Object sender, MessageEventArgs e) in /Users/bperry/projects/ocpp/Scenarios/TC_023_3_CSMS.cs:line 39\n                               at WebSocketSharp.WebSocket.messagec(MessageEventArgs e)\n        -- FAILED!\nRunning scenario: ocpp.Scenarios.TC_024_CSMS    -- PASSED!\nRunning scenario: ocpp.Scenarios.TC_064_CSMS\nWARNING: DataTransfer Response ACCEPTED\n        -- PASSED!\n```\n\n## Good Reading\n\nhttps://arxiv.org/html/2404.06635v2\n\n## Simulating Chargers for your CSMS\n\nSome basic charger simulations can be performed.\n\n```\nstring url = \"ws://localhost:8180/steve/websocket/CentralSystemService/1\";\nstring protocol = \"ocpp1.6\";\n\nList<Task> tasks = new List<Task>();\nfor (int i = 1; i< 11; i++)\n{\n    Charger c = new Charger(url, protocol);\n    c.ConnectorID = i.ToString();\n    c.IDTag = \"volatileocpp\";\n    tasks.Add(Task.Run(c.Simulate));\n}\n\nforeach (Task t in tasks)\n    t.Wait();\n```\n\n![image](https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/9fed843c-df94-4b5e-9de3-e64612f88b75)\n\n![image](https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/3bac011f-0720-4e4d-9868-c4b5ecb3a4ce)\n\n![image](https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/8ed5cc3b-f189-4774-9cd1-729b9e032877)",
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      "readme": "# Evil Phone Charging Station\nCodebase for Research Project 2 - Building an Evil Phone Charging Station.\nAuthor: Tomás Philippart\n\nAttack and threat model/setup:\n\n![Attack model](docs/AttackAndThreatModel.png)\n\n\n## TODO:\n\n- Make EasyOCR perform single character recognition, fine tune settings for it.\n- Experiment with other OCR engines (doctr, Google Cloud Vision, etc.)\n\n## Installation:\n\nSimply install the requirements necessary by running:\n\n```console\n$ pip3 install -r requirements.txt\n```\n\nNOTE: All of the development was done on MacOS Ventura, I cannot confirm that all of the code is cross-platform.\n\n## Usage:\n\n```console\n$ python3 main.py [--mode <usb, video>] --filename <FILENAME> [--framerate <FRAMERATE>, --mode <tesseract|easyocr|google_vision>, --keywords <x,y,z>]\n```\n\nCheck ``.txt`` under ``/results`` folder for the processed text.\n\n## Examples\n\n### Using change_detect.py\n\n```console\n$ python3 change_detect.py --frame_dir media/google_login-frames [--interactive] [--ocr {easyocr|tesseract}]\n```\n\nUse ``--interactive`` first to see how this program actually works. User input:\n  * \"a\": previous frame\n  * \"d\": next frame\n  * \"q\": quit\n  * \" \" (spacebar): for now nothing really, but will do something one day\n\nNot using it simply prints out the OCR'd text of the character difference, without requiring user input.\n\nNote that EasyOCR currently performs better than tesseract.\n\n### Capturing from a USB device (like in the attack and threat model setup)\n\n```console\n$ python3 main.py --mode usb --filename HDMI_Capture --capture_time 15 --ocr_mode tesseract\nStarting frame capture... Press CTRL+C to stop recording frames.\nConverting frames to text using tesseract mode...\nWriting results to results/HDMI_Capture.txt...\nDone!\n```\n\n### Converting pre-existing video (screen recording) to processed text\n\n```console\n$ python3 main.py --mode video --filename media/instagram_login.mp4 --framerate 5 --ocr_mode tesseract\nConverting video to frames: 100%|██████████████████████████████████████████████| 805/805 [00:26<00:00, 30.57frame/s]\nFiltering duplicate frames: 100%|████████████████████████████████████████████| 805/805 [00:00<00:00, 1776.90frame/s]\nConverting frames to text: 100%|███████████████████████████████████████████████| 515/515 [05:00<00:00,  1.71frame/s]\nResults writen to results/instagram_login.txt.\n```\n\n## Results\n\nWIP!",
      "topics": [
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        "evil",
        "exploit",
        "hdmi",
        "malicious",
        "redteam-tools",
        "redteaming",
        "security",
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      "title": "🎓 Master's Degree Portfolio — Computer Science @ Unimore",
      "full_name": "NoFlyFre/master-degree-portfolio",
      "name": "master-degree-portfolio",
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      "url": "https://github.com/NoFlyFre/master-degree-portfolio",
      "description": "Coursework and projects from my MSc in Computer Science at Unimore — computer security, distributed systems, Linux kernel internals and autonomous vehicle perception",
      "readme": "# 🎓 Master's Degree Portfolio — Computer Science @ Unimore\n\n![Java](https://img.shields.io/badge/Java-ED8B00?logo=java&logoColor=white)\n![Python](https://img.shields.io/badge/Python-3776AB?logo=python&logoColor=white)\n![C++](https://img.shields.io/badge/C%2B%2B-00599C?logo=cplusplus&logoColor=white)\n![ROS](https://img.shields.io/badge/ROS-22314E?logo=ros&logoColor=white)\n![Security](https://img.shields.io/badge/Security-Offensive%20%26%20Defensive-C1121F)\n\nThe coursework, projects and study material from my **Laurea Magistrale in Informatica** at the\nUniversity of Modena and Reggio Emilia, with a specialisation built around **computer security** and\n**distributed systems**.\n\nEach directory is a self-contained course record: what I built, the techniques behind it, and the\nwritten reports. Security course *labs* live in standalone repositories, listed at the bottom.\n\n## 📊 Courses in this repository\n\n| Course | CFU | Grade | What's inside |\n|---|---|---|---|\n| [Kernel Hacking](./kernel_hacking/) | 6 | **30/30 cum laude** | Two upstream Linux patches — an XFS lockdep fix for a syzkaller bug, and a WireGuard KCSAN data race — with the assembly-level analysis behind them |\n| [IoT Systems](./iot_systems/) | 6 | **30/30 cum laude** | Course theory in Typst, and a redacted security assessment of 13 consumer IoT devices — 26 findings grouped by vulnerability class |\n| [Computer Security](./computer_security/) | 9 | **30/30 cum laude** | 109-page course handbook, exam questions, buffer overflow / SQLi / XSS labs |\n| [Distributed Systems](./distributed_systems/) | 9 | **30/30** | Full theory notes + **DTIP**, a P2P threat intelligence platform in Java RMI |\n| [Privacy & Data Protection](./privacy_data_protection/) | 6 | **30/30** | GDPR, DPIA, cybercrime notes and a regulatory quick-reference table |\n| [Autonomous Driving](./autonomous_driving/) | 6 | **27/30** | 6 assignments: vehicle dynamics, MPC/Stanley/Pure Pursuit, PCL clustering, Kalman & Particle Filters |\n| [Cryptography Algorithms](./applied_cryptography/) | 6 | **23/30** | Symmetric/asymmetric algorithm summaries and exam question bank |\n| [CS Tutoring](./general_computer_science_tutoring/) | — | — | 9 lecture decks I authored as an academic tutor |\n\n### Courses without a directory here\n\n| Course | CFU | Grade | Where it lives |\n|---|---|---|---|\n| Sviluppo di Software Sicuro | 9 | **30/30** | [secure-software-development](https://github.com/NoFlyFre/secure-software-development) |\n| Metodologie di Sviluppo Software | 6 | **30/30** | No archived material |\n| High Performance Computing | 9 | **27/30** | No archived material |\n\n## 🏆 Highlights\n\n**[Kernel Hacking — two upstream Linux patches](./kernel_hacking/)**\nA fix for syzkaller bug `5eb0d61dfb76ca12670c`: an inconsistent lock state on `inode->i_lock` in XFS,\nwhere `igrab()` took a plain spinlock on a path reachable from softirq. Backed by a recursive expansion\nof `igrab()` vs `ihold()` down to x86-64 assembly and a proof that `i_count > 0` holds at every call\nsite. Plus a WireGuard `READ_ONCE`/`WRITE_ONCE` annotation closing a KCSAN-reported data race.\n\n**[DTIP — Distributed Threat Intelligence Platform](./distributed_systems/DTIP/)**\nA peer-to-peer network for real-time sharing and analysis of Indicators of Compromise. Implements\nFidge/Mattern vector clocks, Ricart–Agrawala distributed mutual exclusion, pluggable threat analyzers\n(heuristic, Gemini, Ollama) and a Python TUI dashboard on top of Java RMI. Ships with UML protocol\nmodels, an architecture document and a full operator guide.\n\n**[Autonomous Driving — Perception & Control](./autonomous_driving/)**\nSix graded assignments in C++ and Python: a Frenet trajectory planner with static obstacle avoidance,\nan MPC controller benchmarked against Pure Pursuit and Stanley at up to 25 m/s, a PCL/RANSAC Euclidean\nclustering pipeline for LiDAR object detection, a Kalman Filter multi-object tracker, and a Particle\nFilter localiser running on ROS.\n\n**[IoT Systems — home network security assessment](./iot_systems/)**\nTwenty-six findings across thirteen consumer IoT devices, every one of them scored `AV:A/AC:L/PR:N` —\nadjacent network, no privileges, no user interaction. One device family is under coordinated disclosure\nwith the manufacturer's PSIRT, so what's published here is a redacted rewrite organised by\nvulnerability class rather than by product.\n\n**[Computer Security](./computer_security/)**\nA handbook I wrote covering the entire course — from CVE/CVSS classification and memory corruption\nthrough to PKI, intrusion detection and ISO 27000 risk management — including worked solutions for\nevery lab exercise.\n\n## 🛡️ Dedicated security repositories\n\nPractical security work is kept in standalone repositories so it stays immediately visible:\n\n*   **[Secure Software Development](https://github.com/NoFlyFre/secure-software-development)** — secure coding and exploitation labs (Nebula, Protostar, WebForPentester). *Course grade: 30/30.*\n*   **[Computer Security Labs](https://github.com/NoFlyFre/computer-security-labs)** — buffer overflow analysis with GDB, SQL injection and XSS against an OWASP Broken Web Applications VM. Theory notes for the same course are in [`computer_security/`](./computer_security/).\n*   **[OliCyber CTF Writeups](https://github.com/NoFlyFre/olicyber-ctf-writeups)** — web security, cryptography and network analysis challenges.\n*   **[HTB Writeups](https://github.com/NoFlyFre/htb-writeups)** — HackTheBox penetration testing walkthroughs.\n*   **[BreachLab Writeups](https://github.com/NoFlyFre/breachlab-writeups)** — wargame and privilege escalation field notes.\n\n## 🛠️ Tech stack & concepts\n\n*   **Languages** — Java, Python, C++, C\n*   **Frameworks & tools** — ROS, PCL (Point Cloud Library), OpenCV, Java RMI, GDB, sqlmap, Burp Suite\n*   **Security** — OWASP Top 10, memory corruption, cryptography & PKI, intrusion detection, SIEM/SOC, ISO 27000 risk management, GDPR compliance\n*   **Distributed systems** — consensus and Byzantine fault tolerance, vector clocks, distributed mutual exclusion, DHTs, leader election\n*   **Robotics & control** — Kalman and Particle Filters, MPC, Frenet planning, point cloud segmentation\n\n## 📝 Conventions\n\nFiles and directories use **`snake_case`** and are named in **English**, for consistency and\nprogrammatic access. Repository topic: `unimore-informatica`.\n\n---\n*Personal academic archive — University of Modena and Reggio Emilia.*",
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      "name": "Cyber-Physical-Research",
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      "topics": [
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        "arm-cortex-m4",
        "can-bus",
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        "critical-infrastructure",
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      "title": "Gallia",
      "full_name": "Fraunhofer-AISEC/gallia",
      "name": "gallia",
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      "url": "https://github.com/Fraunhofer-AISEC/gallia",
      "description": "Extendable Pentesting Framework",
      "readme": "<!--\nSPDX-FileCopyrightText: AISEC Pentesting Team\n\nSPDX-License-Identifier: CC0-1.0\n-->\n\n# Gallia\n\n[![PyPI - Python Version](https://img.shields.io/pypi/pyversions/gallia)](https://pypi.python.org/pypi/gallia/)\n[![PyPI - License](https://img.shields.io/pypi/l/gallia)](https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0.html)\n[![PyPI](https://img.shields.io/pypi/v/gallia)](https://pypi.python.org/pypi/gallia/)\n[![DOI](https://zenodo.org/badge/DOI/10.5281/zenodo.10696368.svg)](https://zenodo.org/doi/10.5281/zenodo.10696368)\n\n[![Packaging status](https://repology.org/badge/vertical-allrepos/gallia.svg)](https://repology.org/project/gallia/versions)\n\nGallia is an extendable pentesting framework with the focus on the automotive domain.\nThe scope of the toolchain is conducting penetration tests from a single ECU up to whole cars.\nCurrently, the main focus lies on the [UDS](https://www.iso.org/standard/72439.html) interface.\nActing as a generic interface, the logging functionality implements reproducible tests and enables post-processing tasks.\nThe documentation is available in the docs/ folder.\n\nKeep in mind that this project is intended for research and development usage only!\nInappropriate usage might cause irreversible damage to the device under test.\nWe do not take any responsibility for damage caused by the usage of this tool.\n\n## Testimonials\n\nLevent Çelik et al. in [Comparing Open-Source UDS Implementations Through Fuzz Testing](https://saemobilus.sae.org/papers/comparing-open-source-uds-implementations-fuzz-testing-2024-01-2799):\n\n> Among the implementations we've identified, Gallia stands out as the most robust and dependable by a significant margin.\n\nShahzeb Aslam and Hung Nguyenin in [ICSim++: A CAN/CAN FD simulator for modern vehicle networks with LLM-assisted workflows](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.softx.2026.102722):\n\n> Gallia focuses on automotive penetration testing rather than vehicle simulation, with particular support for UDS-oriented workflows, automation, and reproducible test artifacts.\n\n## Quickstart\n\nSee the [setup instructions](docs/setup.md).\n\nFirst create a config template with `--template`, store it to a file called [`gallia.toml`](docs/config.md), and adjust it to your needs.\n`gallia` reads this file to set the defaults of the command line flags.\nAll options correspond to a command line flag; the only required option for scans is `gallia.scanner.target`, for instance `isotp://can0?src_addr=0x123&dst_addr=0x312&tx_padding=0xaa&rx_padding=0xaa`.\n\n```\n$ gallia --template > gallia.toml\n```\n\nYou are all set to start your first scan, for instance read the diagnostic trouble codes:\n\n```\n$ gallia primitive uds dtc read\n```\n\nThe target can also be specified by the `--target` option on the command line.\nFor the format of the `--target` argument see the [transports documentation](docs/transports.md).\n\n## Acknowledgments\n\nThis work was partly funded by the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF) as part of the [SecForCARs](https://www.secforcars.de/) project (grant no. 16KIS0790).\nThis work was partly funded by the German Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs and Energy (BMWE) as part of the [ATLAS-L4](https://www.atlas-l4.com/) project (grant no. 19A21048D).\nA short presentation and demo video is available at this [page](https://www.secforcars.de/demos/10-automotive-scanning-framework.html).",
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      "title": "Architecture",
      "full_name": "EVtivity/evtivity-csms",
      "name": "evtivity-csms",
      "owner": "EVtivity",
      "url": "https://github.com/EVtivity/evtivity-csms",
      "description": "An OCPP 1.6 and 2.1 compliant Charging Station Management System for managing EV charging infrastructure. Handles real-time WebSocket communication with charging stations, OCPI 2.2.1/2.3.0 roaming, ISO 15118 Plug and Charge, a REST API for operators, and two React frontends for operators and drivers.",
      "readme": "<p align=\"center\">\n  <img src=\"assets/evtivity-logo.svg\" alt=\"EVtivity\" width=\"80\" height=\"80\" />\n</p>\n\n<h1 align=\"center\">EVtivity CSMS</h1>\n\n<p align=\"center\">\n  <a href=\"https://github.com/EVtivity/evtivity-csms/releases/latest\"><img src=\"https://img.shields.io/github/v/release/EVtivity/evtivity-csms?label=Release&color=4ade80\" alt=\"Release\" /></a>\n  <a href=\"https://github.com/EVtivity/evtivity-csms/actions/workflows/ci.yml\"><img src=\"https://github.com/EVtivity/evtivity-csms/actions/workflows/ci.yml/badge.svg\" alt=\"CI\" /></a>\n  <a href=\"https://github.com/EVtivity/evtivity-csms/actions/workflows/ci.yml?query=branch%3Amain\"><img src=\"https://img.shields.io/endpoint?url=https%3A%2F%2Fraw.githubusercontent.com%2FEVtivity%2Fevtivity-csms%2Fbadges%2Fcoverage.json\" alt=\"Coverage\" /></a>\n  <a href=\"https://github.com/EVtivity/evtivity-csms/blob/main/LICENSE.md\"><img src=\"https://img.shields.io/badge/License-BUSL--1.1-blue.svg\" alt=\"License: BUSL-1.1\" /></a>\n  <img src=\"https://img.shields.io/badge/TypeScript-6.x-3178C6.svg\" alt=\"TypeScript\" />\n  <img src=\"https://img.shields.io/badge/Node.js-%3E%3D24-339933.svg\" alt=\"Node.js\" />\n  <img src=\"https://img.shields.io/badge/OCPP-1.6%20%7C%202.0.1%20%7C%202.1-4ade80.svg\" alt=\"OCPP\" />\n  <img src=\"https://img.shields.io/badge/OCPI-2.2.1%20%7C%202.3.0-4ade80.svg\" alt=\"OCPI\" />\n</p>\n\n<p align=\"center\">\n  <a href=\"https://evtivity.com\"><img src=\"https://img.shields.io/badge/Website-evtivity.com-4ade80\" alt=\"Website\" /></a>\n  <a href=\"https://discord.gg/kKdJxFRksz\"><img src=\"https://img.shields.io/badge/Discord-Join-5865F2?logo=discord&logoColor=white\" alt=\"Discord\" /></a>\n  <a href=\"https://www.linkedin.com/company/evtivity\"><img src=\"https://img.shields.io/badge/LinkedIn-EVtivity-0A66C2?logo=linkedin&logoColor=white\" alt=\"LinkedIn\" /></a>\n  <a href=\"https://x.com/EVtivity\"><img src=\"https://img.shields.io/badge/X-%40EVtivity-000000?logo=x&logoColor=white\" alt=\"X\" /></a>\n  <a href=\"https://www.youtube.com/@evtivity\"><img src=\"https://img.shields.io/badge/YouTube-%40evtivity-FF0000?logo=youtube&logoColor=white\" alt=\"YouTube\" /></a>\n  <a href=\"https://www.instagram.com/evtivity\"><img src=\"https://img.shields.io/badge/Instagram-evtivity-E4405F?logo=instagram&logoColor=white\" alt=\"Instagram\" /></a>\n  <a href=\"https://www.reddit.com/r/EVtivity\"><img src=\"https://img.shields.io/badge/Reddit-r%2FEVtivity-FF4500?logo=reddit&logoColor=white\" alt=\"Reddit\" /></a>\n</p>\n\n<p align=\"center\">\n  <strong>English</strong> ·\n  <a href=\"README.de.md\">Deutsch</a> ·\n  <a href=\"README.es.md\">Español</a> ·\n  <a href=\"README.ko.md\">한국어</a> ·\n  <a href=\"README.zh.md\">简体中文</a> ·\n  <a href=\"README.zh-TW.md\">繁體中文</a>\n</p>\n\nEVtivity is an AI-powered EV charging platform. At its core is an OCPP 1.6, 2.0.1 and 2.1 compliant Charging Station Management System (CSMS) for EV charging infrastructure. It handles real-time WebSocket communication with charging stations, OCPI 2.2.1/2.3.0 roaming, ISO 15118 Plug and Charge, a REST API for operators, and two React frontends for operators and drivers.\n\nAI is built into the operator dashboard. The AI assistant answers questions about stations, sessions, revenue, and operations, reads attachments such as a photo of a charger screen, a PDF, or a log, and proposes changes that run only after the operator confirms. The support assist drafts replies to support cases in the driver's language. Both work with Anthropic, OpenAI, Gemini, or DeepSeek, and secrets and personal data are masked before they reach the model.\n\n## Architecture\n\n```mermaid\ngraph TB\n    subgraph Frontends\n        CSMS[CSMS]\n        Portal[Driver and Guest Charging Portal]\n    end\n\n    subgraph Backend Services\n        API[REST API]\n        OCPP[OCPP Server]\n        OCPI[OCPI Server]\n        Worker[Worker]\n    end\n\n    subgraph Data\n        DB[(PostgreSQL)]\n        Redis[(Redis)]\n    end\n\n    subgraph External\n        Stations[Charging Stations]\n        Partners[OCPI Partners]\n    end\n\n    CSMS -->|REST| API\n    Portal -->|REST| API\n    API <-->|pub/sub| Redis\n    OCPP <-->|pub/sub| Redis\n    OCPI <-->|pub/sub| Redis\n    Worker --> DB\n    Worker --> Redis\n    API --> DB\n    OCPP --> DB\n    OCPI --> DB\n    Stations -->|OCPP 1.6/2.0.1/2.1| OCPP\n    Partners <-->|OCPI 2.2.1/2.3.0| OCPI\n```\n\n## Feature Overview\n\n### AI-Powered Operations\n\n| Feature                  | Description                                                                                                                                                  |\n| ------------------------ | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |\n| AI Assistant             | Ask about stations, sessions, revenue, and operations in plain language. Answers stream, and conversations are kept with search, rename, and delete          |\n| Image and File Analysis  | Attach images (such as a photo of a charger screen), PDF, CSV, text, log, and JSON files                                                                     |\n| Confirmed Changes        | The assistant reads data through API tools. A change it proposes shows a confirmation card and runs only after the operator confirms                         |\n| Automatic Insights       | Root-cause notes for station, session, and authorization problems, for the sites and stations you choose                                                     |\n| Support Assist           | Drafts support case replies in the driver's language and internal notes in the operator's, with the sources it read                                          |\n| Provider Choice          | Anthropic, OpenAI, Google Gemini, or DeepSeek, set per surface or per user, with an effort level                                                             |\n| Redaction and Guardrails | Secrets and personal data are masked in tool results before they reach the model. Settings, secrets, users, payments, and station security stay out of reach |\n| Six Languages            | Answers in the operator's language: English, German, Spanish, Korean, Simplified Chinese, and Traditional Chinese                                            |\n| Limits and Audit         | Rate limits per user and per site, a daily token budget per user, and audit entries for changes made through the assistant                                   |\n\n### OCPP Compliance\n\n| Feature             | Description                                                                                                                                                               |\n| ------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |\n| Protocol Support    | OCPP 1.6, 2.0.1 and 2.1 with simultaneous multi-version operation                                                                                                         |\n| Security Profiles   | SP0 through SP3, including mTLS client certificate authentication                                                                                                         |\n| Remote Control      | Start/stop sessions, reset, unlock connector, set charging profile                                                                                                        |\n| Local Authorization | Per-station authorization lists with operator-managed push sync                                                                                                           |\n| Reservations        | EVSE-level reservation with expiry monitoring and driver notification                                                                                                     |\n| Station Messages    | Eight state-specific templates (available, occupied, reserved, charging, suspended, discharging, faulted, unavailable) rendered to station displays via SetDisplayMessage |\n| Plug and Charge     | ISO 15118 PKI with Hubject OPCP and manual certificate provider support                                                                                                   |\n\n### Station Management\n\n| Feature               | Description                                                                                                                                                                                                                |\n| --------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |\n| Multi-site Hierarchy  | Sites, stations, EVSEs, and connectors with per-operator site access control                                                                                                                                               |\n| Real-time Monitoring  | Live connector status, session activity, and meter values via server-sent events                                                                                                                                           |\n| Station Images        | Upload, tag, and publish images per station with driver-visible flag                                                                                                                                                       |\n| Firmware Management   | Network-wide firmware campaigns with per-station scheduling and status tracking                                                                                                                                            |\n| Configuration         | Configuration templates with station drift detection and bulk apply                                                                                                                                                        |\n| Station Metrics       | NEVI uptime compliance, ChargeX KPIs, utilization rate, and fault rate reporting                                                                                                                                           |\n| Popular Times         | Session frequency heatmap by day and hour per station                                                                                                                                                                      |\n| Remote Diagnostics    | Trigger status notifications, retrieve diagnostics, clear fault states                                                                                                                                                     |\n| Per-site Maintenance  | Schedule one-off or immediate maintenance windows that take stations offline, cancel overlapping reservations, optionally stop active sessions with driver notification, and surface a Maintenance badge on the sites list |\n| Site Layout           | A 3D and 2D representation of each site (parking lot, office or retail, curbside, depot, or custom) with live station status, and a replay of any day of the last 90 days                                                  |\n| Cellular Connectivity | SIM status, data sessions, and SIM alerts from Hologram or 1NCE, the modem signal grade, the likely cause of each disconnect, and a cellular network reset                                                                 |\n| SIM Inventory         | One record per SIM with CSV import and export, attachments to stations, and attachment history                                                                                                                             |\n| Data Plans            | Wi-Fi or wired and cellular sets of OCPP settings per station or site, with WebSocket compression, to keep cellular data use low                                                                                           |\n\n### Smart Charging\n\n| Feature              | Description                                                                                                                                                                                      |\n| -------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |\n| Load Management      | Site-level power budget with equal-share and priority-based allocation                                                                                                                           |\n| Charging Profiles    | OCPP charging profile delivery with composite schedule support                                                                                                                                   |\n| Route-Aware Charging | Plans each fleet vehicle at a Depot site by its departure time and needed energy, inside panel, circuit, and phase limits, cheapest hours first, with a Fleet Readiness view and at-risk notices |\n| Bus Depot Interface  | VDV 463 1.1.0 WebSocket interface for bus depot management systems and ITCS: charging requests in, live charging information and the predicted state of charge out                               |\n| Idle Detection       | Multi-signal idle detection (chargingState, power meter, status) with grace period                                                                                                               |\n| V2G                  | Vehicle-to-grid discharging state tracking via OCPP 2.1 chargingState                                                                                                                            |\n\n### Billing and Payments\n\n| Feature                   | Description                                                                                                                                          |\n| ------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |\n| Tariff Engine             | Flat, time-of-day, day-of-week, seasonal, holiday, and energy-threshold tariffs                                                                      |\n| Pricing Assignment        | Tariff group assignment at driver, fleet, station, and site levels with priority resolution                                                          |\n| Split Billing             | Per-segment cost tracking when tariff changes mid-session                                                                                            |\n| Idle and Reservation Fees | Per-minute idle fee with grace period and per-minute reservation fee                                                                                 |\n| Multi-currency            | 10 currencies with Intl.NumberFormat formatting                                                                                                      |\n| Payment Processing        | Stripe and Adyen pre-authorization, capture, partial and full refunds                                                                                |\n| Guest Charging            | Card-on-file payment for unauthenticated drivers via QR code                                                                                         |\n| Payment Terminals         | Card readers at the charger, driven through the terminal provider cloud. Simulated and ID TECH providers. ID TECH is not yet available in production |\n| Invoicing                 | Session receipts, monthly statements, and revenue reconciliation                                                                                     |\n| Invoice Payment Details   | Bank details, a payment reference, and an EPC QR code on EUR invoices                                                                                |\n\n### Roaming\n\n| Feature                | Description                                                                        |\n| ---------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |\n| OCPI 2.2.1 / 2.3.0     | CPO and eMSP roles with dual-version support                                       |\n| Partner Management     | Credential exchange, endpoint registration, and connection status monitoring       |\n| Location Publishing    | Per-site publish control with partner-level visibility settings                    |\n| Partner Role Approval  | A new OCPI partner gets no role until the operator approves one                    |\n| CDR Generation         | Automatic charge detail record creation and push to eMSP partners                  |\n| Token Authorization    | Real-time and offline authorization of external driver tokens                      |\n| Remote Commands        | CPO commands receiver (START_SESSION, STOP_SESSION, RESERVE_NOW, UNLOCK_CONNECTOR) |\n| Roaming Station Search | Driver portal browse and search of partner network stations                        |\n\n### Driver Experience\n\n| Feature               | Description                                                                       |\n| --------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |\n| Driver Portal         | Mobile-first web portal with QR code scanning, session management, and history    |\n| Nearby Station Search | Location-aware station search with map view and real-time availability            |\n| Guest Charging        | No-account charging flow with Stripe payment at the station                       |\n| Activity Dashboard    | Monthly charging summary with energy, cost, and estimated miles by vehicle        |\n| Monthly Statements    | Itemized session statements available per calendar month                          |\n| Favorites             | Save and quick-access frequently used stations                                    |\n| Fleet Management      | Fleet grouping with fleet-specific pricing and driver token assignment            |\n| Vehicle Management    | Vehicle profiles for energy-to-miles estimation based on real-world efficiency    |\n| RFID Self-service     | Drivers add and manage their own RFID cards from the portal                       |\n| Avatars               | Drivers and operators build a generated avatar or upload a photo                  |\n| In-app Notifications  | Real-time notification bell with history drawer and per-channel preferences       |\n| Support Cases         | Support tickets with session linking, refund actions, and S3 file attachments     |\n| Notifications         | Email and SMS for session events, payment status, reservations, and support cases |\n\n### Sustainability\n\n| Feature               | Description                                                                       |\n| --------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |\n| Carbon Tracking       | CO2 avoided per session computed from EPA eGRID and Ember regional grid intensity |\n| Site Carbon Regions   | Assign a carbon intensity region to each site from 60 pre-loaded regional factors |\n| Dashboard Integration | CO2 avoided stat card on the operator dashboard with day-over-day trend           |\n| Session Display       | CO2 column in sessions table and detail pages for both operator and driver views  |\n| Sustainability Report | Monthly trend chart, site breakdown table, trees equivalent, and CSV export       |\n| Portal Integration    | Carbon impact on session receipts, monthly statements, and activity page          |\n\n### Security and Access\n\n| Feature             | Description                                                                                                                            |\n| ------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |\n| Authentication      | JWT-based auth with role-based access control for operators and drivers                                                                |\n| SAML SSO            | SAML 2.0 single sign-on with configurable IdP, auto-provisioning, attribute mapping                                                    |\n| API Keys            | Long-lived API keys for programmatic access, inheriting the creator's site access                                                      |\n| Multi-factor Auth   | TOTP authenticator app, email code, and SMS code options, recovery codes, and required MFA for all operators, chosen roles, or drivers |\n| Passkeys            | Passkeys and FIDO2 security keys as a second factor, with optional sign-in without a password                                          |\n| Password Policy     | One password policy for operators and drivers, with separate session lifetimes                                                         |\n| Security Notices    | An email or SMS notice when a sign-in factor, phone number, or email changes, or an API key is created                                 |\n| Site Access Control | Per-operator site assignment with default-deny enforcement                                                                             |\n| Email Verification  | Account verification on driver self-registration before portal access is granted                                                       |\n| Bot Protection      | Google reCAPTCHA v3 on operator and driver login                                                                                       |\n| Audit Logs          | Access log of operator actions for compliance and security review                                                                      |\n\n### Reporting and Analytics\n\n| Feature                | Description                                                                    |\n| ---------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |\n| Dashboards             | Real-time revenue, energy, session count, and connector status charts          |\n| Customizable Dashboard | Each user arranges and hides the live dashboard charts                         |\n| Reports                | 9 report types including energy consumption, revenue, utilization, and faults  |\n| NEVI Compliance        | Station uptime tracking and excluded downtime management per NEVI requirements |\n| Scheduled Delivery     | Automated report delivery by email or FTP on configurable schedules            |\n\n### Notifications and Messaging\n\n| Feature              | Description                                                                                   |\n| -------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |\n| Event-driven Alerts  | 41 configurable OCPP event types with per-event recipient, channel, and template              |\n| Driver Notifications | Session, payment, reservation, and support case notifications per driver                      |\n| Channels             | Email (SMTP), SMS (Twilio), webhook, and in-app delivery                                      |\n| Signed Webhooks      | Outbound webhooks carry an `X-EVtivity-Signature` header made with a generated signing secret |\n| Template Editor      | WYSIWYG email editor with drag-and-drop variable insertion and live preview                   |\n| Email Layout         | Configurable HTML wrapper template applied to all outgoing emails                             |\n| Notification History | Delivery log with email preview and SMS/push inline expand                                    |\n\n### Deployment and Operations\n\n| Feature             | Description                                                                                                                                                              |\n| ------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |\n| Deployment Options  | Docker Compose, Kubernetes Helm chart (Istio/Envoy Gateway), and AWS CDK (ECS)                                                                                           |\n| Horizontal Scaling  | Stateless services with Redis-backed OCPP connection registry across pods                                                                                                |\n| Auto-scaling        | Kubernetes HPA for API and OCPP with WebSocket-aware scale-down stabilization                                                                                            |\n| Rate Limiting       | Configurable global and per-endpoint rate limiting with separate auth rate limits                                                                                        |\n| Observability       | Prometheus metrics, Grafana dashboards, Loki log aggregation                                                                                                             |\n| File Storage        | Amazon S3 or an S3-compatible provider such as MinIO or Wasabi                                                                                                           |\n| Data Retention      | Retention of logs, meter values, audit history, and AI data set in the dashboard                                                                                         |\n| System Information  | Version and settings of every process, with search and a section filter                                                                                                  |\n| Conformance Testing | Built-in OCTT conformance test runner for CSMS SUT (OCPP 2.1, 2.0.1 and 1.6) and Charging Station SUT (OCPP 2.1 and 1.6) with dashboard reporting and per-module results |\n| Multi-language UI   | 6 languages: English, German, Spanish, Korean, Simplified and Traditional Chinese                                                                                        |\n| Responsive Filters  | Filter controls collapse into dropdown on tablet and mobile for all list pages                                                                                           |\n| Server-down Page    | Friendly error page with retry when API is unreachable, on both CSMS and Portal                                                                                          |\n| Release Management  | Stable, alpha and beta channels. Each stable release bumps the Helm chart and AWS CDK app to its version                                                                 |\n\n## Deployment\n\nBefore upgrading across a minor version, read [Upgrading to a New Minor Version](#upgrading-to-a-new-minor-version).\n\n| Option                | Use it for                                           | Source                                                                        | Guide                                                                      |\n| --------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------- |\n| Docker Compose        | Local development and single-host installs           | `docker-compose.yml` in this repository                                       | [Docker Compose](https://www.evtivity.com/docs/deployment/docker-compose/) |\n| Kubernetes Helm chart | Production on Kubernetes (Istio or Envoy Gateway)    | [EVtivity/evtivity-csms-helm](https://github.com/EVtivity/evtivity-csms-helm) | [Helm chart](https://www.evtivity.com/docs/deployment/helm-chart/)         |\n| AWS CDK               | Production on AWS (ECS Fargate, Aurora, ElastiCache) | [EVtivity/evtivity-csms-cdk](https://github.com/EVtivity/evtivity-csms-cdk)   | [AWS](https://www.evtivity.com/docs/deployment/aws/)                       |\n\nThe Helm chart and the AWS CDK app track stable releases only. See [Helm chart and AWS CDK versions](#helm-chart-and-aws-cdk-versions).\n\n### Database storage\n\nA large network or the simulator in chaos mode (`CSS_MODE=chaos`) needs large database storage. Every OCPP message, heartbeats included, is a row in `ocpp_message_logs`, and every meter reading is a row in `meter_values`. With about 2000 simulated stations always connected, the database reached 90 GB: `ocpp_message_logs` was 57 GB (about 100 million rows at 30-day retention) and `meter_values` was 32 GB (about 61 million rows). The daily retention job deletes older rows. Lower `logs.ocppMessage.retentionDays` (default 30) and `logs.meterValues.retentionDays` (default 90), or lower `CSS_STATION_LIMIT`, to keep the database smaller. [Data Retention](https://www.evtivity.com/docs/configuration/data-retention/) lists every retention setting and where to change it.\n\n### Service endpoints\n\nWith the Helm chart, each service is exposed on its own subdomain via Gateway API:\n\n| Service            | URL                                | Public Port | Internal Port |\n| ------------------ | ---------------------------------- | ----------- | ------------- |\n| CSMS dashboard     | https://csms.your-domain.com       | 443         | 80            |\n| Driver portal      | https://portal.your-domain.com     | 443         | 80            |\n| REST API           | https://api.your-domain.com        | 443         | 3001          |\n| OCPP WebSocket     | wss://ocpp.your-domain.com         | 443         | 8080          |\n| OCPP WebSocket TLS | wss://\\<load-balancer-ip\\>         | 8443        | 8443          |\n| OCPI server        | https://ocpi.your-domain.com       | 443         | 3002          |\n| Grafana            | https://grafana.your-domain.com    | 443         | 3000          |\n| Prometheus         | https://prometheus.your-domain.com | 443         | 9090          |\n| API Docs           | https://api.your-domain.com/docs   | 443         | 3001          |\n\nAll hostnames share a single load balancer IP. DNS records for each hostname must point to that IP. OCPP TLS (port 8443) is provisioned as a separate `LoadBalancer` service for direct station connections using Security Profile 3 (mTLS).\n\n## Skills\n\n[EVtivity Agent Skills](https://github.com/EVtivity/evtivity-skills) teach your AI coding agent to work with EVtivity. They follow the open [Agent Skills](https://agentskills.io) standard, so the same skills work in Claude Code, Codex, GitHub Copilot, Gemini CLI, Cursor and other agents.\n\n| Skill                      | Helps you                                                                   |\n| -------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------- |\n| `evtivity-getting-started` | Install and run EVtivity locally with Docker and sign in                    |\n| `evtivity-deployment`      | Deploy and upgrade with Docker Compose, Helm or AWS CDK                     |\n| `evtivity-configuration`   | Set environment variables, secrets, auth, database and station security     |\n| `evtivity-csms`            | Operate the dashboard: sites, stations, sessions, drivers, pricing, reports |\n| `evtivity-portal`          | Use the driver portal: find a station, charge, pay, manage cards            |\n| `evtivity-mobile-app`      | Build, brand and release the driver mobile app                              |\n| `evtivity-guides`          | Follow step-by-step guides such as station onboarding and stuck sessions    |\n| `evtivity-integrations`    | Set up Stripe, Adyen, the test payment provider and payouts                 |\n| `evtivity-api`             | Call the REST API: API keys, error codes, OCPP command routes               |\n| `evtivity-simulator`       | Run simulated OCPP 1.6, 2.0.1 and 2.1 stations and charging sessions        |\n| `evtivity-conformance`     | Send OCPP commands, read message logs and run OCTT conformance tests        |\n| `evtivity-troubleshoot`    | Find and fix a failing service, station connection or sign-in               |\n| `evtivity-report-issue`    | Collect the version and redacted logs and draft a GitHub issue              |\n\nInstall them for any agent:\n\n```bash\nnpx skills add EVtivity/evtivity-skills\n```\n\nSkill releases use the same tags as EVtivity. Install the tag that matches your deployment. Pull requests and discussions for new skills are welcome.\n\n## Releases\n\nVersions follow [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org): `vMAJOR.MINOR.PATCH`. Every release is a git tag and a GitHub release with notes.\n\n### Channels\n\n| Channel | Tag example       | Purpose                                                      | GitHub release |\n| ------- | ----------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------ | -------------- |\n| Stable  | `v0.1.38`         | Production release                                           | Latest         |\n| Beta    | `v0.1.38-beta.2`  | Feature-complete preview of the next stable release          | Pre-release    |\n| Alpha   | `v0.1.39-alpha.1` | Early preview while the version's features are still in work | Pre-release    |\n\nPrereleases rank below the stable version they lead to (`v0.1.38-beta.2` comes before `v0.1.38`). Run only stable releases in production.\n\nOnce a version's betas start, it is feature-frozen: later betas carry only fixes, and new features go to the next version. The stable release is cut from the same code as the last beta.\n\n### Container images\n\nImages are published to `ghcr.io/evtivity/evtivity-csms/<service>` for `linux/amd64` and `linux/arm64`.\n\n- Every release has an exact, immutable tag: `0.1.38`, `0.1.38-beta.2`.\n- Stable releases also move `0.1`, `0`, `latest` and `stable`.\n- Prereleases move the alias of their channel only: `beta` or `alpha`.\n\nAliases always point to the newest image of their channel, and a deployment picks up a new one only when it pulls the image again. Pin an exact tag in production.\n\n### Helm chart and AWS CDK versions\n\nThe [Helm chart](https://github.com/EVtivity/evtivity-csms-helm) and the [AWS CDK app](https://github.com/EVtivity/evtivity-csms-cdk) follow stable releases only. Each stable release bumps them to its version. To try a prerelease, set the image tag yourself, for example `image.tag=0.1.38-beta.2`.\n\n### Release notes and upgrades\n\n- Every release note starts with a **Breaking changes** section: what changed, who is affected, and the action to take. It says \"None.\" when there are none.\n- **Upgrade notes** give the steps for the upgrade, such as webhook moves, renamed settings, or chart values that changed.\n- Database changes that old and new versions must share during a rolling upgrade ship in two steps: one release adds the new structure while keeping the old one, and a later release removes the old one. When a release note says so, upgrade through each stable version in order instead of skipping one.\n- The dashboard shows an update notice when a newer stable release is available. Prereleases never trigger it.\n\n### Upgrading to a New Minor Version\n\n> [!IMPORTANT]\n> Each new minor version upgrades directly from any release of the minor version just before it. For example, you can upgrade any 0.2.x release straight to 0.3.0. If you run an older version, such as 0.1.x, upgrade to any 0.2.x release first, then to 0.3.0.\n\n## License\n\nCopyright (c) 2025-2026 EVtivity. All rights reserved.\n\nYou may download and run the software for your own operations. You may not copy, redistribute, reverse engineer, or offer the software as a hosted or SaaS product. You may not sell or charge others for access to the software.\n\nSee [LICENSE.md](LICENSE.md) for full terms. For licensing inquiries, contact evtivity@gmail.com.",
      "topics": [
        "charging-station-management-system",
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        "ev",
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      "created_at": "2026-04-14T02:08:39Z",
      "updated_at": "2026-11-13T13:56:08Z",
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      "readme": "Hardware-Enforced Real-Time Intrusion Prevention Gateway for Secure CAN-FD Automotive Networks\n\nA secure CAN-FD gateway built on the STM32H7 microcontroller. It filters unauthorized messages, forwards valid traffic between trusted and untrusted CAN networks, flags flooding attacks, and shows live traffic on a monitoring dashboard. The next phase adds AES-CMAC message authentication and replay protection.\n\nOverview\nCAN and CAN-FD move messages between a car's ECUs, but neither protocol checks who sent a message or whether it's been sent before. That gap is what makes message injection, replay attacks, and flooding-based denial-of-service possible in the first place.\nThis gateway sits between a trusted and an untrusted CAN network and enforces that boundary. Hardware-level ID filtering blocks anything not on the allow-list, a rate limiter watches for flooding, and a dashboard shows what's crossing the gateway as it happens. Authentication and replay protection are next.\n\nFeatures\nDual CAN network architecture (trusted and untrusted)\nSTM32H7-based gateway\nHardware CAN-ID filtering\nReal-time message forwarding\nCAN flood detection and rate limiting\nReal-time monitoring dashboard\nAES-CMAC message authentication (planned)\nReplay attack protection (planned)\n\nSystem architecture\n\n        +-------------------------------+\n---\n        |    Trusted CAN Network        |\n|         ESP32 Node            |\n+-------------------------------+\n│\n▼\nMCP2562FD Transceiver\n│\n▼\n+----------------------------------+\n|      STM32H7 Secure Gateway      |\n|----------------------------------|\n| • Hardware CAN-ID Filtering      |\n| • Message Forwarding             |\n| • Flood Detection & Rate Limiting|\n| • AES-CMAC Authentication*       |\n| • Replay Protection*             |\n+----------------------------------+\n│\nMCP2562FD Transceiver\n│\n▼\n+-------------------------------+\n|      Untrusted CAN Network    |\n|         ESP32 Node            |\n+-------------------------------+\n│\nUSB Serial\n│\n▼\n+-------------------------------+\n|  Monitoring Dashboard (PC)    |\n+-------------------------------+\n---\nHardware\nComponent\tQuantity\nSTM32H7A3ZI-Q Nucleo board\t1\nESP32 dev boards\t2\nMCP2562FD CAN-FD transceivers\t4\nBreadboard and jumper wires\tas required\nUSB cables\t3\n\nSoftware and tools\nSTM32CubeIDE\nSTM32 HAL driver library\nArduino IDE\nEmbedded C (STM32)\nC++ (ESP32)\nGit and GitHub\nPython (dashboard)\n\nRepository structure\n```text\nSTM32-Secure-CAN-FD-Gateway/\n│\n├── Core/\n├── Drivers/\n├── ESP32/\n│   ├── Trusted\\_Node/\n│   └── Untrusted\\_Node/\n├── Documentation/\n├── Hardware/\n├── Images/\n├── README.md\n└── .gitignore\n```\n\nRoadmap\n\nPhase 1: core gateway\nFiltering, forwarding, flood protection, and monitoring for CAN traffic in real time.\nMilestone\tObjective\tStatus\nM1\tHardware setup and CAN communication\tDone\nM2\tGateway message forwarding\tDone\nM3\tHardware CAN-ID filtering\tDone\nM4\tCAN flood detection and rate limiting\tDone\nM5\tGateway monitoring using terminal\tDone\nM6\tPerformance evaluation and validation\tDone\n\nPhase 2: advanced security\nLightweight authentication and replay protection on top of the Phase 1 gateway.\nMilestone\tObjective\tStatus\nM7\tAES-CMAC message authentication\tPlanned\nM8\tReplay attack protection\tPlanned\n\nSecurity layers\nLayer\tDescription\n1\tHardware CAN-ID filtering blocks unauthorized identifiers before they reach the application.\n2\tReal-time forwarding relays only authorized messages between the trusted and untrusted networks.\n3\tFlood detection and rate limiting catch abnormal traffic volume and throttle forwarding to blunt DoS attempts.\n4\tAES-CMAC authentication verifies that a message is genuine and unmodified. (planned)\n5\tReplay protection rejects CAN frames that have already been seen once. (planned)\n\nSystem workflow\n\n                 ┌──────────────────────────┐\n                 │   Trusted CAN-FD Node            │\n                 │        ESP32 #1                  │\n                 └────────────┬─────────────┘\n                              │\n                              │ CAN-FD Frames\n                              ▼\n                 ┌──────────────────────────┐\n                 │   MCP2562FD Transceiver          │\n                 └────────────┬─────────────┘\n                              │\n                              ▼\n        ╔══════════════════════════════════════════╗\n        ║        STM32H7 SECURE GATEWAY\n        ║\n        ║  ┌────────────────────────────────────┐\n        ║  │  1. CAN-FD Frame Reception                    │\n        ║  └─────────────────┬──────────────────┘\n        ║                         ▼\n        ║  ┌────────────────────────────────────┐\n        ║  │  2. Hardware CAN-ID Filtering                 │\n        ║  │     • Allow authorized IDs                    │\n        ║  │     • Reject unauthorized IDs                 │\n           |                                                |\n        ║  └───────────────|──────────────────   |\n        ║                       |\n        ║          ┌─────────┴─────────┐\n        ║          │                         │\n        ║       REJECT                    ACCEPT\n        ║          │                        │\n        ║          ▼                        ▼\n        ║   ┌─────────────┐   ┌────────────────┐\n        ║   │   DROP          │   │ 3. Traffic          │\n        ║   │   Frame         │   │    Monitoring       │\n        ║   └─────────────┘   └───────┬────────┘\n        ║                                    ▼\n        ║                       ┌────────────────┐\n        ║                       │ 4. Flood            │\n        ║                       │    Detection        │\n        ║                       └───────┬────────┘\n        ║                                 │\n        ║                       ┌───────┴───────┐\n        ║                       │                   │\n        ║                     NORMAL              FLOOD\n        ║                       │                  │\n        ║                       ▼                  ▼\n        ║              ┌──────────┐   ┌─────────┐\n        ║              │ Forward     │   │ Protect    │\n        ║              │ Frame       │   │ / Drop     │\n        ║              └────┬─────┘   └─────────┘\n        ║                     │\n        ║                     ▼\n        ║             ┌─────────────────┐\n        ║             │ 5. Forwarding        │\n        ║             │    Statistics        │\n        ║             └────────┬────────┘\n        ╚═══════════════════╪═════════════════════╝\n                            │\n                            │ Authorized CAN-FD\n                            │ Traffic\n                            ▼\n                 ┌──────────────────────────┐\n                 │   MCP2562FD Transceiver          │\n                 └────────────┬─────────────┘\n                                  │\n                                  ▼\n                 ┌──────────────────────────┐\n                 │  Untrusted CAN-FD Node           │\n                 │        ESP32 #2                  │\n                 └──────────────────────────┘\n                              │\n                              │ UART / USB Serial\n                              ▼\n                 ┌──────────────────────────┐\n                 │     PC Monitoring                │\n                 │   PuTTY / Serial Monitor         │\n                 ├──────────────────────────┤\n                 │ • Message rate                   │\n                 │ • NORMAL/FLOOD status            │\n                 │ • Gateway mode                   │\n                 │ • Forwarded frames               │\n                 │ • Dropped frames                 │\n                 └──────────────────────────┘\n\n\n\n\n\n# 3. Project Objective\n\nThe primary objective is to design and implement a real-time secure CAN-FD gateway capable of controlling communication between trusted and untrusted automotive network segments.\n\nThe project objectives are:\n\nEstablish CAN-FD communication between embedded nodes and an STM32H7 gateway.\nImplement hardware-level CAN identifier filtering.\nForward authorized traffic through the gateway.\nDetect abnormal high-rate CAN traffic.\nMaintain forwarded and dropped frame statistics.\nOperate the gateway in a protected mode during abnormal traffic conditions.\nProvide real-time serial monitoring of gateway activity.\nEvaluate gateway behaviour under normal and flooding traffic.\nExtend the system with AES-CMAC authentication.\nImplement replay protection using message freshness information.\nQuantify the security-performance trade-off of the complete architecture.\n\n\n\n# 4. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE\n\n                  TRUSTED CAN-FD NETWORK\n                           |\n                     ESP32 Node\n                           |\n                  MCP2562FD Transceiver\n                           |\n                           v\n              +---------------------------+\n              |      STM32H7 GATEWAY      |\n              |---------------------------|\n              | CAN-FD Reception          |\n              | Hardware CAN-ID Filtering |\n              | Message Forwarding        |\n              | Flood Detection           |\n              | Rate Monitoring           |\n              | Protected Mode            |\n              | Forwarded/Dropped Counts  |\n              +---------------------------+\n                           |\n                  MCP2562FD Transceiver\n                           |\n                           v\n                 UNTRUSTED CAN-FD\n                     NETWORK\n                           |\n                     ESP32 Node\n                           |\n                          USB\n                           |\n                           v\n                 +-------------------+\n                 |   Host Computer   |\n                 | Serial Monitoring |\n                 +-------------------+\n\n             * AES-CMAC and replay protection\n               are planned Phase 2 features.\n\n# 6. Hardware Architecture\n6.1 STM32H7 Gateway\n\nThe STM32H7 development board acts as the central gateway controller.\n\nIts responsibilities include:\n\nCAN-FD reception\nCAN-FD transmission\nCAN hardware filter configuration\nMessage processing\nMessage forwarding\nTraffic-rate monitoring\nFlood detection\nGateway state management\nForwarded frame counting\nDropped frame counting\nUART/serial status reporting\n\nThe STM32H7 is selected because the project requires an embedded controller capable of handling real-time CAN-FD communication and security processing.\n\n6.2 ESP32 CAN Nodes\n\nTwo ESP32 development boards are used as CAN communication nodes.\n\nThey represent:\n\nTrusted CAN node\nUntrusted CAN node\n\nThe nodes are used to generate legitimate and abnormal CAN traffic for gateway testing.\n\nThe ESP32 nodes communicate with external CAN-FD transceivers through their CAN controller interface.\n\n6.3 MCP2562FD CAN-FD Transceivers\n\nThe MCP2562FD devices provide the physical CAN/CAN-FD interface between the microcontrollers and the differential CAN bus.\n\nThe transceiver handles the physical-layer conversion between:\n\nMCU CAN TX/RX\n      |\n      v\nMCP2562FD\n      |\n      v\nCANH / CANL\n\nThe transceivers are therefore placed between the embedded controllers and the CAN bus.\n\n# 7. Hardware Components\nComponent\tQuantity\tFunction\nSTM32H7A3ZI-Q Nucleo board\t1\tMain security gateway\nESP32 development boards\t2\tTrusted and untrusted CAN nodes\nMCP2562FD CAN-FD transceivers\t4\tCAN-FD physical interface\nBreadboards\tAs required\tPrototype assembly\nJumper wires\tAs required\tElectrical connections\nUSB cables\t3\tProgramming, power and serial communication\nCAN termination components\tAs required\tCAN bus termination\n\n# 8. Software Environment\n\nThe project uses the following software environment.\n\nSoftware / Tool\tPurpose\nSTM32CubeIDE\tSTM32 firmware development\nSTM32 HAL\tPeripheral abstraction and driver implementation\nArduino IDE\tESP32 node firmware development\nEmbedded C\tSTM32 gateway firmware\nC++\tESP32 node firmware\nGit\tVersion control\nGitHub\tSource-code repository\nPython\tData processing and analysis\nJupyter Notebook\tExperimental graph generation and analysis\nSerial terminal\tReal-time gateway monitoring\n9. Firmware Architecture\n\nThe STM32 firmware is structured around the CAN-FD reception and gateway-processing path.\n\nThe simplified processing sequence is:\n\nCAN-FD Frame Received\n        |\n        v\nFDCAN Hardware\n        |\n        v\nHardware Filter\n        |\n        +--------------------+\n        |                    |\n     Accepted              Rejected\n        |                    |\n        v                    v\nApplication              Dropped\nProcessing\n        |\n        v\nTraffic Monitoring\n        |\n        +--------------------+\n        |                    |\n      Normal                Flood\n        |                    |\n        v                    v\n   Forward                 Drop/\n                           Restrict\n        |\n        v\nGateway Statistics\n        |\n        v\nUART Monitoring\n\nImportant firmware functions currently associated with the gateway include:\n\nConfigureCANFilters()\nConfigureTxHeader()\nCheckFloodAttack()\nHAL_FDCAN_RxFifo0Callback()\nFDCAN initialization functions\nUART initialization\nGateway status reporting\n\nThe actual firmware implementation is maintained inside the STM32CubeIDE project.\n\nPerformance evaluation\nMetrics to track once M6 is underway:\nEnd-to-end gateway latency\nMessage throughput\nCAN bus utilization\nCPU and memory usage\nFlood detection accuracy\nAuthentication overhead\nReplay detection rate\n\nPlanned publications\nConference paper: secure CAN-FD gateway architecture\nConference paper: lightweight authentication framework for automotive CAN networks\nJournal paper: integrated secure CAN-FD gateway with a layered security architecture\n\nFuture work\nFinish AES-CMAC message authentication (M7)\nAdd replay protection via a rolling counter or timestamp check (M8)\nExtend the dashboard with historical logging\nBenchmark gateway latency and throughput under load\nTest against a wider range of CAN attack scenarios\n\nLicense\nThis project is intended for academic and research use.",
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      "description": "V-DriveTwin is a software-defined vehicle simulation platform featuring Virtual ECUs, virtual CAN communication, digital twin, ADAS, Software-in-the-Loop testing, fault injection, cybersecurity monitoring, AI anomaly detection, and real-time vehicle telemetry through an interactive dashboard.",
      "readme": "<div align=\"center\">\n\n# 🚗 V-DriveTwin\n### *Software-Defined Vehicle (SDV), Virtual ECU, Digital Twin & ADAS SIL Simulation Platform*\n\n<br/>\n\n[![C++17 Core](https://img.shields.io/badge/C%2B%2B-17%20Native%20Core-00599C?style=for-the-badge&logo=c%2B%2B&logoColor=white)](https://isocpp.org/)\n[![Python 3.11+](https://img.shields.io/badge/Python-3.11+-3776AB?style=for-the-badge&logo=python&logoColor=white)](https://www.python.org/)\n[![FastAPI](https://img.shields.io/badge/FastAPI-0.100+-009688?style=for-the-badge&logo=fastapi&logoColor=white)](https://fastapi.tiangolo.com/)\n[![React 18](https://img.shields.io/badge/React-18-61DAFB?style=for-the-badge&logo=react&logoColor=black)](https://react.dev/)\n[![Three.js 3D](https://img.shields.io/badge/Three.js-3D%20Digital%20Twin-000000?style=for-the-badge&logo=three.js&logoColor=white)](https://threejs.org/)\n[![Tailwind CSS](https://img.shields.io/badge/Tailwind-CSS%203.4-38B2AC?style=for-the-badge&logo=tailwind-css&logoColor=white)](https://tailwindcss.com/)\n\n[![Safety Standard](https://img.shields.io/badge/Functional%20Safety-ISO%2026262%20ASIL--D-FF6F00?style=for-the-badge)](https://www.iso.org/)\n[![Cybersecurity](https://img.shields.io/badge/Cybersecurity-ISO%2FSAE%2021434-E53935?style=for-the-badge)](https://www.iso.org/)\n[![Test Suite](https://img.shields.io/badge/PyTest%20Suite-7%2F7%20PASSED%20(100%25)-4CAF50?style=for-the-badge)](./backend/tests/)\n[![License](https://img.shields.io/badge/License-MIT-blueviolet?style=for-the-badge)](./LICENSE)\n\n<br/>\n\n**A Laptop-Based Automotive Engineering Testbed Simulating Physical Automotive Hardware, Virtual ECUs, Virtual CAN Networks, Multi-Sensor Suites, and Closed-Loop ADAS Systems Entirely in Software.**\n\n<br/>\n\n[✨ Features](#-key-features) • [🏛 Architecture](#-system-architecture) • [🚗 3D Digital Twin](#-3d-digital-twin--vehicle-dynamics) • [🧩 Virtual ECUs](#-5-virtual-ecus-vecus) • [📡 Virtual CAN](#-virtual-can-bus--dbc-signal-matrix) • [🧪 SIL Testing](#-automated-sil-testing-suite) • [🛡 Cybersecurity](#-automotive-cybersecurity--can-ids) • [🤖 AI Test Engineer](#-ai-test-engineer--anomaly-detection) • [🚀 Quickstart](#-quickstart-guide)\n\n---\n\n</div>\n\n## 🌟 Executive Overview\n\nIn traditional automotive development, testing Electronic Control Units (ECUs) and active safety features requires multi-million dollar Hardware-in-the-Loop (HIL) testbenches, physical vehicle prototypes, and dedicated proving grounds.\n\n**V-DriveTwin** transforms this paradigm by implementing a **Software-Defined Vehicle (SDV)** digital twin on a standard workstation. It features a native 100Hz C++ physics solver, 5 independent virtual ECUs communicating over an ISO-11898-1 virtual CAN bus, an ISO 26262 compliant Autonomous Emergency Braking (AEB) perception stack, an ISO/SAE 21434 cybersecurity Intrusion Detection System (IDS), and a real-time Three.js 3D engineering cockpit.\n\n```\n+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+\n|                                    KEY HIGHLIGHTS                                       |\n+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+\n|  ⚡ 100Hz C++ RK4 Physics       | Kinematic bicycle dynamics, drag, rolling resistance  |\n|  🧩 5 Software-Defined vECUs   | Cluster, Brake (Hydraulics), Steering, ADAS, Gateway   |\n|  📡 Virtual CAN 2.0B / J1939   | Priority arbitration, DBC decoding (0x100 - 0x400)    |\n|  🛑 Closed-Loop ADAS Stack     | 77GHz Radar + Camera fusion, TTC, AEB Smart Pedal BOS  |\n|  🧪 Automated SIL Test Suite   | 20 preconfigured ISO 26262 ASIL-D test tracks          |\n|  🛡️ Automotive Cybersecurity  | Real-time CAN IDS: Replay Attack, DoS & Spoofing alert |\n|  🤖 AI Natural Language Test   | Translates plain English requirements into SIL tests   |\n|  🎮 15-View React Three.js Cockpit | Dark-theme dashboard with Time-Travel Replay & Demo |\n+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+\n```\n\n---\n\n## 🏛 System Architecture\n\n```\n+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------+\n|                            V-DriveTwin Web Cockpit                                |\n|   (React 18 + TypeScript + Three.js 3D Viewport + Recharts + Tailwind Engineering)|\n+------------------------------------------^----------------------------------------+\n                                           | HTTP REST & 50Hz WebSockets\n+------------------------------------------v----------------------------------------+\n|                          FastAPI Simulation Server                                |\n|  - Async Master Simulation Loop (50Hz)                                            |\n|  - Multi-Channel Broadcast Manager (/ws/vehicle, /ws/can, /ws/events)             |\n|  - ML IsolationForest Anomaly Detector & AI Test Engineer (NLP Scenario Parser)   |\n|  - Time-Travel Ring Buffer Replay Service                                         |\n+------------------------------------------^----------------------------------------+\n                                           | C-ABI ctypes FFI Bridge\n+------------------------------------------v----------------------------------------+\n|                    C++ Native Core Automotive Engine (100Hz)                      |\n|                                                                                   |\n|  +------------------+  +------------------+  +---------------------------------+  |\n|  | Vehicle Physics  |  | Virtual CAN Bus  |  |       5 Virtual ECUs            |  |\n|  | - Kinematic      |  | - Priority Queue |  |  [0x01] Cluster ECU             |  |\n|  |   Bicycle Model  |  | - DBC Bit-Field  |  |  [0x02] Brake ECU (Hydraulics)  |  |\n|  | - RK4 Integrator |  |   Packer/Unpack  |  |  [0x03] Steering ECU (EPS)     |  |\n|  | - Powertrain &   |  | - Arbitration    |  |  [0x04] ADAS ECU (TTC & AEB)    |  |\n|  |   Battery SoC    |  | - Fault Filters  |  |  [0x05] Gateway ECU (Firewall)  |  |\n|  +------------------+  +------------------+  +---------------------------------+  |\n|                                                                                   |\n|  +------------------+  +------------------+  +---------------------------------+  |\n|  | Sensor Models    |  | IDS Cyber Engine |  | SIL Regression Test Harness     |  |\n|  | - Camera, Radar  |  | - Frequency Anom |  | - 20 ISO 26262 Test Scenarios   |  |\n|  | - LiDAR, GPS, IMU|  | - Replay Filter  |  | - Formal Safety Assertions      |  |\n|  | - 4 Wheel Speeds |  | - MAC Validation |  | - Automated Metrics & Reporting |  |\n|  +------------------+  +------------------+  +---------------------------------+  |\n+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------+\n```\n\n---\n\n## 🚗 3D Digital Twin & Vehicle Dynamics\n\nThe digital twin vehicle dynamics are computed at **100Hz in C++** using a **Kinematic Bicycle Model** solved with a **4th-Order Runge-Kutta (RK4)** numerical integrator:\n\n### Governing Physics Equations\n1. **Longitudinal Acceleration**:\n   $$a_x = \\frac{F_{\\text{traction}} - F_{\\text{brake}} - F_{\\text{drag}} - F_{\\text{roll}}}{m_{\\text{vehicle}}}$$\n   - *Aerodynamic Drag*: $F_{\\text{drag}} = \\frac{1}{2} \\rho C_d A_{\\text{front}} v^2 \\quad (C_d = 0.28, A = 2.22\\text{ m}^2)$\n   - *Rolling Resistance*: $F_{\\text{roll}} = C_{rr} m g \\cos(\\theta) \\quad (C_{rr} = 0.015)$\n2. **Lateral Kinematics**:\n   $$\\dot{\\psi} = \\frac{v}{L} \\tan(\\delta), \\quad \\beta = \\arctan\\left(\\frac{l_r}{L} \\tan(\\delta)\\right)$$\n3. **Powertrain & Battery SOC**:\n   - Automatic Gear Selection: `P`, `R`, `N`, `D1` through `D6` (based on speed threshold mapping).\n   - High-Voltage Battery Pack: $75.0\\text{ kWh}$ capacity with dynamic power draw modeling.\n\n### Perception Sensor Models\n- **Monocular Camera**: 120m forward range, YOLO object tracker, adverse weather degradation factor.\n- **77 GHz FMCW Radar**: 150m range, direct Doppler range rate measurement, adverse weather immunity.\n- **3D LiDAR**: Point cluster distance estimation with angular resolution modeling.\n- **GNSS / GPS Receiver**: Latitude, longitude, heading with WGS-84 coordinate frame.\n- **6-DOF IMU Sensor**: 3-axis accelerometer ($A_x, A_y, A_z$) and 3-axis gyroscope ($\\omega_z$).\n- **4 Wheel Speed Encoders**: Individual wheel slip calculation for closed-loop ABS controller feedback.\n\n---\n\n## 🧩 5 Virtual ECUs (vECUs)\n\nEach virtual ECU runs an independent lifecycle state machine, CPU load model, watchdog timer, and communication interface over the Virtual CAN Bus:\n\n```\n              +-------------------------+\n              |         OFFLINE         |\n              +------------+------------+\n                           | Power On / Boot\n                           v\n              +-------------------------+\n              |       RESTARTING        |\n              +------------+------------+\n                           | Initialization OK\n                           v\n  +---------> +-------------------------+ <---------+\n  |           |         ONLINE          |           |\n  |           +------------+------------+           |\n  | Error Rate             | Severe Sensor /        | Clear Faults /\n  | Resolved               | CAN Faults             | Re-initialize\n  |                        v                        |\n  |           +-------------------------+           |\n  +-----------+        DEGRADED         +-----------+\n              +------------+------------+\n                           | Watchdog Timeout /\n                           | Critical Failure\n                           v\n              +-------------------------+\n              |          FAULT          |\n              +-------------------------+\n```\n\n| ECU ID | ECU Name | Role & Responsibility | Transmitted CAN Messages |\n|:---:|:---|:---|:---|\n| **`0x01`** | **Cluster ECU** | Cockpit instrument display aggregator, warning annunciator & odometer | Telemetry Consumer |\n| **`0x02`** | **Brake ECU** | Electro-hydraulic brake actuator (0–150 bar) & closed-loop ABS slip control | `0x103` (Brake Line Pressure) |\n| **`0x03`** | **Steering ECU** | Electric Power Steering (EPS) actuator & Lane Keeping Assist torque | `0x102` (Steering Angle & Yaw) |\n| **`0x04`** | **ADAS ECU** | Sensor fusion, TTC computation, FCW warning, and AEB commands | `0x200` (Lead Dist), `0x201` (Lane), `0x300` (AEB Cmd) |\n| **`0x05`** | **Gateway ECU** | Central CAN firewall, IDS security monitor, and diagnostic router | `0x400` (System Health & Heartbeat) |\n\n---\n\n## 📡 Virtual CAN Bus & DBC Signal Matrix\n\nV-DriveTwin implements a CAN 2.0B / J1939 compliant virtual bus architecture with **priority-based arbitration** and **500 kbps nominal bitrate**:\n\n| CAN ID (Hex) | Priority | Message Name | Cycle Rate | Signals & Decoded Physical Units |\n|:---:|:---:|:---|:---:|:---|\n| **`0x100`** | 1 (High) | `SPEED_THROTTLE` | 50 Hz | • `Speed_kmh` (0–250 km/h)<br>• `Throttle_pct` (0–100%)<br>• `Brake_pct` (0–100%) |\n| **`0x101`** | 2 (Med) | `RPM_GEAR` | 50 Hz | • `Engine_RPM` (0–8000 RPM)<br>• `Gear_Pos` (P, R, N, D1–D6) |\n| **`0x102`** | 2 (Med) | `STEERING_ANGLE`| 50 Hz | • `Steer_deg` (-540° to +540°)<br>• `Yaw_Rate` (deg/s) |\n| **`0x103`** | 1 (High) | `BRAKE_PRESSURE`| 50 Hz | • `Brake_Bar` (0–150 bar)<br>• `ABS_Active` (Flag) |\n| **`0x200`** | 2 (Med) | `OBJECT_DETECTION`| 50 Hz | • `Lead_Dist_m` (0–150 m)<br>• `Rel_Speed_kmh`<br>• `Pedestrian_Flag` |\n| **`0x201`** | 3 (Low) | `LANE_INFO` | 50 Hz | • `Lane_Offset_m`<br>• `Lane_Curvature` ($1/m$) |\n| **`0x300`** | 0 (Crit) | `ADAS_EMERGENCY_CMD`| 25 Hz | • `AEB_State` (Enum 0–4)<br>• `Target_Brake_Bar` (125 bar)<br>• `Msg_Counter` |\n| **`0x400`** | 4 (Diag) | `ECU_HEALTH_STATUS`| 10 Hz | • `Ecu_State_01` through `Ecu_State_05` (Health byte per node) |\n\n---\n\n## 🎯 ADAS Algorithms & Safety State Machine\n\nThe `ADAS_ECU` executes a sensor fusion filter combining Camera distance and Radar range rate to determine Time-to-Collision ($TTC = \\frac{d_{\\text{lead}}}{v_{\\text{rel}}}$):\n\n- **State 0: INACTIVE** — TTC $> 2.6\\text{s}$ (Clear roadway ahead).\n- **State 1: ARMED (FCW)** — $1.5\\text{s} < \\text{TTC} \\le 2.6\\text{s}$ (Audible/Visual warning to driver, pre-fill brake hydraulics to 15 bar).\n- **State 2: TRIGGERED** — $\\text{TTC} \\le 1.5\\text{s}$ (Full emergency deceleration commanded via CAN ID `0x300` at 125 bar pressure).\n- **State 3: BRAKING** — Vehicle decelerating under active closed-loop ABS control until vehicle stops ($v \\approx 0$).\n- **State 4: RELEASED** — Vehicle stationary or obstacle cleared; pressure released.\n- **Smart Pedal (BOS)**: Automatic motor torque cut ($F_{\\text{drive}} = 0$) when emergency braking is active.\n\n---\n\n## 🧪 Automated SIL Testing Suite\n\nThe C++ deterministic SIL test harness executes 20 preconfigured **ISO 26262 ASIL-D** verification scenarios:\n\n```\n[PASS] SIL-001: AEB Pedestrian Crossing @ 30 km/h -> Reaction: 145.0ms | Clearance: 2.80m | Stop: 18.20m\n[PASS] SIL-002: AEB Pedestrian Crossing @ 50 km/h -> Reaction: 180.0ms | Clearance: 3.40m | Stop: 28.50m\n[PASS] SIL-003: AEB Pedestrian Crossing @ 70 km/h -> Reaction: 195.0ms | Clearance: 4.20m | Stop: 44.10m\n[PASS] SIL-004: AEB Lead Vehicle Stationary @ 60 km/h -> Reaction: 175.0ms | Clearance: 3.80m | Stop: 36.40m\n[PASS] SIL-005: AEB Lead Vehicle Sudden Brake @ 80 km/h -> Reaction: 190.0ms | Clearance: 2.20m | Stop: 39.80m\n[PASS] SIL-006: AEB Pedestrian in Rain (mu=0.70) @ 50 km/h -> Reaction: 210.0ms | Clearance: 1.80m | Stop: 33.20m\n[PASS] SIL-007: AEB Pedestrian in Dense Fog @ 40 km/h -> Reaction: 220.0ms | Clearance: 2.10m | Stop: 24.60m\n[PASS] SIL-008: AEB Pedestrian Night Crossing @ 60 km/h -> Reaction: 205.0ms | Clearance: 2.60m | Stop: 41.00m\n[PASS] SIL-009: High-Speed Emergency Stop @ 100 km/h -> Reaction: 185.0ms | Clearance: 4.50m | Stop: 72.30m\n[PASS] SIL-010: Low-Speed Parking Obstacle @ 15 km/h -> Reaction: 130.0ms | Clearance: 3.20m | Stop: 7.80m\n[PASS] SIL-011: Lane Departure Warning Straight Track -> Reaction: 160.0ms | LDW Alert Verified\n[PASS] SIL-012: Blind Spot Detection During Lane Change -> Reaction: 150.0ms | BSM Alert Verified\n[PASS] SIL-013: Heavy Traffic Follower Mode @ 45 km/h -> Reaction: 170.0ms | Clearance: 2.90m | Stop: 22.40m\n[PASS] SIL-014: Emergency Vehicle Approaching Behind -> Reaction: 140.0ms | Sensor Fusion Verified\n[PASS] SIL-015: Sudden Cut-In Obstacle @ 65 km/h -> Reaction: 175.0ms | Clearance: 1.60m | Stop: 26.50m\n[PASS] SIL-016: Camera Degraded Mode Radar Fallback -> Reaction: 230.0ms | Clearance: 2.40m | Stop: 31.00m\n[PASS] SIL-017: Brake ECU Hydraulic Rise-Time Verification -> Reaction: 120.0ms | Rise: 92ms to 125 bar\n[PASS] SIL-018: Steering Lane-Centering Assist Recovery -> Reaction: 150.0ms | LKA Torque Verified\n[PASS] SIL-019: CAN Network High-Load AEB Resilience -> Reaction: 195.0ms | Priority Arbitration Verified\n[PASS] SIL-020: Full System Multi-ECU Safety Integrity Verification -> Reaction: 165.0ms | Clearance: 3.60m | Stop: 32.50m\n\n============================= SIL EXECUTION SUMMARY =============================\nTotal Tests: 20 | Passed: 20 (100.0%) | Failed: 0 | ASIL-D Compliance: VERIFIED\n```\n\n---\n\n## 🛡️ Automotive Cybersecurity & CAN IDS\n\nImplemented in accordance with **ISO/SAE 21434 Road Vehicles — Cybersecurity Engineering**:\n\n- **CAN Replay Attack Detection**: Evaluates monotonic rolling sequence counters and timestamp deltas on CAN ID `0x300`. Stale packets are blocked by the Central Gateway before reaching `BRAKE_ECU`.\n- **Bus Flooding DoS Defense**: Sliding-window frequency monitor detects unauthorized traffic spikes on rogue ID `0x666` (500 fps). Virtual CAN priority arbitration ensures higher-priority safety-critical messages maintain zero latency.\n- **Unauthorized ECU / ID Spoofing Defense**: Central Gateway whitelist verifies source ECU node IDs against authorized network topology rules.\n\n---\n\n## 🤖 AI Test Engineer & Anomaly Detection\n\n- **Unsupervised Telemetry Anomaly Detector**: Scikit-learn `IsolationForest` model evaluates a 7-dimensional feature vector $\\mathbf{x} = \\begin{bmatrix} v_{\\text{speed}} & p_{\\text{brake}} & a_x & \\omega_{\\text{yaw}} & d_{\\text{lead}} & TTC & SOC \\end{bmatrix}^T$ at 50Hz to identify vehicle dynamics anomalies or cyber intrusions.\n- **Natural Language Test Engineer (NLP to SIL)**: Accepts free-form conversational English prompts (e.g. *\"Test emergency braking when a pedestrian crosses at 70 km/h in dense fog\"*), extracts kinematic constraints, synthesizes formal safety assertions, and runs the compiled SIL scenario with AI recommendations.\n\n---\n\n## 📊 15 Dashboard Engineering Views\n\n<div align=\"center\">\n\n| View | Name | Description |\n|:---:|:---|:---|\n| 📊 | **Overview Dashboard** | Real-time cockpit with digital gauges, 3D viewport, ECU health grid & CAN activity strip |\n| 🚗 | **Digital Twin 3D** | Fullscreen Three.js viewport with Chase Cam, Top-Down & Front Bumper cameras |\n| ⚡ | **Virtual ECUs** | 5 vECU cards with CPU load meters, error counters, OTA flash modal & topology graph |\n| 📡 | **CAN Analyzer** | Live packet monitor, search filter, DBC dictionary, packet injector & frequency heatmap |\n| 🎯 | **ADAS Systems** | Synthetic camera HUD, YOLO bounding boxes, lane offset meter & TTC radar gauge |\n| 📡 | **Sensors Telemetry** | Camera, Radar, LiDAR, GPS, IMU, 4 wheel speeds with noise & fault injectors |\n| 🧪 | **SIL Testing** | 20 automated test cases with batch runner & formal assertion inspector |\n| 🛣️ | **Scenario Editor** | Visual scenario builder with initial speed, obstacle distance & weather selectors |\n| ⚠️ | **Fault Injection** | Sensor, ECU, CAN, and Actuator failure mode matrix with instant recovery |\n| 🛡️ | **Cybersecurity IDS** | Live security event stream and simulated cyber attack trigger buttons |\n| 🤖 | **AI Test Engineer** | Natural language requirement prompt compiler (NLP to executable SIL) |\n| 📈 | **Live Telemetry** | Multi-channel Recharts time-series graphs with CSV dataset export |\n| 📜 | **Event Timeline** | Chronological system log with INFO, WARNING & CRITICAL severity filters |\n| 📄 | **Test Reports** | Formal ISO 26262 compliance test report with JSON export and print layout |\n| ⚙️ | **Settings & Config** | Vehicle physics constants, driving modes (Sport/Eco/Auto) & weather calibration |\n\n</div>\n\n---\n\n## 🚀 Quickstart Guide\n\n### Prerequisites\n- **Python 3.10+** (Python 3.11 recommended)\n- **Node.js 18+** & npm\n- Windows 10/11, Linux, or macOS\n\n---\n\n### ⚡ One-Click Launch (Windows)\nDouble-click:\n```bat\nscripts\\run_demo.bat\n```\n*Launches the backend, frontend, and opens [http://localhost:5173](http://localhost:5173) in your default browser.*\n\n---\n\n### 🛠️ Manual Launch\n\n#### 1. Backend Server Setup\n```bash\n# Install Python dependencies\npip install -r requirements.txt\n\n# Launch FastAPI simulation master server (port 8000)\npython -m uvicorn backend.app.main:app --host 0.0.0.0 --port 8000 --reload\n```\n\n#### 2. Frontend Dashboard Setup\n```bash\ncd frontend\n\n# Install Node packages\nnpm install\n\n# Start Vite dev server (port 5173)\nnpm run dev\n```\n\n#### 3. Access Platform\nOpen your browser at **`http://localhost:5173`** and click **\"RUN FULL DEMO\"** in the top navbar!\n\n---\n\n## 🧪 Verification & Automated Tests\n\nExecute the complete backend test suite:\n```bash\npython -m pytest backend/tests -v\n```\n\n### ✅ Test Results\n```text\nbackend/tests/test_adas.py::test_closed_loop_aeb_trigger PASSED          [ 14%]\nbackend/tests/test_api.py::test_api_endpoints PASSED                     [ 28%]\nbackend/tests/test_can.py::test_dbc_and_can_frames PASSED                [ 42%]\nbackend/tests/test_can.py::test_can_injection_and_flooding PASSED        [ 57%]\nbackend/tests/test_ecus.py::test_virtual_ecus_lifecycle PASSED           [ 71%]\nbackend/tests/test_physics.py::test_vehicle_acceleration_and_braking PASSED [ 85%]\nbackend/tests/test_sil.py::test_sil_execution_20_scenarios PASSED        [100%]\n\n======================== 7 passed in 1.94s (100% Success) ========================\n```\n\n---\n\n## 📂 Repository Structure\n\n```\nV-DriveTwin/\n├── backend/\n│   ├── app/\n│   │   ├── api/                    # 10 REST API Route Modules\n│   │   ├── bridge/cpp_bridge.py    # C-ABI ctypes bridge & simulator\n│   │   ├── database/               # SQLite & Async Engine models\n│   │   ├── schemas/                # Pydantic validation models\n│   │   ├── services/               # Simulation, Replay & Demo services\n│   │   ├── websocket/              # 50Hz WebSocket Connection Manager\n│   │   └── main.py                 # FastAPI Application Entrypoint\n│   ├── ai_agent/                   # IsolationForest ML & NLP Test Generator\n│   ├── cpp_core/                   # C++17 Native Automotive Engine\n│   │   ├── include/                # Header files (physics, vECUs, CAN, IDS)\n│   │   ├── src/                    # Source files (RK4 integrator, DBC parser)\n│   │   └── CMakeLists.txt          # C++ build configuration\n│   └── tests/                      # Automated PyTest Test Suite\n├── frontend/\n│   ├── src/\n│   │   ├── components/             # 3D Three.js, Gauges, ECUs, CAN, Telemetry\n│   │   ├── pages/                  # 15 React Engineering Pages\n│   │   ├── services/               # REST API & WebSocket clients\n│   │   └── types/                  # TypeScript Data Models\n│   └── package.json\n├── documentation/                  # 10 Deep-Dive Technical Domain Specs\n├── scenarios/                      # Preconfigured Automotive Scenario JSONs\n├── scripts/                        # Windows .bat One-Click Startup Scripts\n├── requirements.txt\n└── README.md\n```\n\n---\n\n## 📚 Technical Documentation Index\n\nDetailed architectural specifications are available in the [`documentation/`](./documentation/) directory:\n\n- 📐 [System Architecture & Topology Guide](./documentation/architecture.md)\n- ⚡ [Virtual ECU (vECU) State Machines & OTA Updates](./documentation/virtual_ecu.md)\n- 📡 [CAN 2.0B / J1939 Protocol & DBC Signal Matrix](./documentation/can_protocol.md)\n- 🚗 [3D Digital Twin & RK4 Physics Equations](./documentation/digital_twin.md)\n- 🎯 [ADAS Perception, TTC & AEB State Machine](./documentation/adas.md)\n- 🧪 [SIL Verification Harness & ISO 26262 Compliance](./documentation/sil_testing.md)\n- 🛡️ [Automotive Cybersecurity IDS (ISO/SAE 21434)](./documentation/cybersecurity.md)\n- ⚠️ [Unified Fault Injection Matrix](./documentation/fault_injection.md)\n- 🤖 [AI Telemetry Anomaly Detector & NLP Test Generator](./documentation/ai_testing.md)\n- 🔌 [REST API & WebSocket Protocol Reference](./documentation/api.md)\n\n---\n\n## 📄 License & Compliance\n\nDesigned and built for automotive software engineering, research, and education. Compliant with **ISO 26262 (Functional Safety)** and **ISO/SAE 21434 (Cybersecurity Engineering)** architectural models.\n\nDeveloped with ❤️ for next-generation Software-Defined Vehicles.",
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      "title": "Automotive Security Regression Lab",
      "full_name": "Zukhra-Abdulaeva/Automotive-Security-Regression-Lab",
      "name": "Automotive-Security-Regression-Lab",
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      "url": "https://github.com/Zukhra-Abdulaeva/Automotive-Security-Regression-Lab",
      "description": "The Automotive Security Regression Lab is used to simulate automotive cybersecurity testing. The project involves translating a security test into a test against a simulated ECU with expected behaviour, documenting the findings and verifying them through regression testing. It is an engineering demonstration within a controlled environment.",
      "readme": "# Automotive Security Regression Lab\n\n**From Security Finding to Reproducible Automotive Security Tests**\n\n## Overview\n\nThe **Automotive Security Regression Lab** is a local, deterministic simulation environment for developing and demonstrating an automotive cybersecurity testing workflow.\n\nThe project demonstrates how a security requirement can be translated into a security test, executed against a simulated ECU, evaluated against expected behavior, captured as structured evidence, documented as a security finding and verified through regression testing.\n\nThe laboratory does not connect to real vehicles, ECUs, vehicle networks, OEM infrastructure, or production systems. No real CAN or UDS communication is implemented.\n\nThe project is an engineering demonstration within a controlled simulation environment. It does not represent a real penetration-testing engagement, ECU assessment, vehicle assessment, production cybersecurity validation, or professional operational penetration-testing experience.\n\n---\n\n# Workflow\n\nThe implemented workflow is:\n\n```text\nSecurity Requirement\n        ↓\nSecurity Test Case\n        ↓\nTest Execution\n        ↓\nSimulated ECU\n        ↓\nTest Result\n        ↓\nStructured Evidence\n        ↓\nFinding Documentation\n        ↓\nSecure Retest\n        ↓\nAutomated Regression Verification\n        ↓\nCI/CD\n```\n\nThe long-term workflow additionally includes threat modeling, attack hypotheses, root-cause analysis, remediation and regression testing.\n\n---\n\n# Architecture\n\nThe security-test architecture separates test logic from the simulated system under test:\n\n```text\nSecurityTestCase\n        ↓\nSecurityTestRunner\n        ↓\nECUAdapter\n        ↓\nECUTarget\n        ↓\nECUSimulator\n        ↓\nTestResult\n        ↓\nEvidence\n```\n\nThe simulator provides deterministic secure and controlled vulnerable behavior.\n\nThe Evidence Framework records structured execution evidence and supports validation and JSON serialization.\n\nThe CI workflow executes the existing Security Regression suite rather than implementing a second Security Test.\n\n---\n\n# Current Test Scope\n\nThe current implementation contains:\n\n* **TC-001 — Diagnostic Authorization**\n* **TC-002 — Message Validation**\n* **TC-003 — Regression Workflow**\n* automated pytest regression verification\n* structured execution evidence\n* representative `SEC-001` and `SEC-002` finding documentation\n* GitHub Actions execution of the Security Regression suite\n* CI evidence generation and artifact upload\n\nThe controlled TC-001 vulnerable scenario demonstrates detection of:\n\n```text\nExpected = ACCESS_DENIED\nActual   = ACCESS_GRANTED\nResult   = FAIL\n```\n\nThe corrected secure behavior is:\n\n```text\nAuthorization = false\n        ↓\nPROTECTED_OPERATION\n        ↓\nACCESS_DENIED\n        ↓\nPASS\n```\n\n---\n\n# Verification\n\nThe current repository state has been verified locally with:\n\n```text\npytest -v\n```\n\nResult:\n\n```text\n41 passed\n```\n\nThe dedicated Security Regression suite reports:\n\n```text\n7 passed\n```\n\nThe CI workflow has a verified successful `push` execution and a separately verified controlled failure execution.\n\nThe CI pipeline generates six JSON evidence files and uploads them as the:\n\n```text\nsecurity-regression-evidence\n```\n\nartifact.\n\nDetailed verification results, CI history, implementation status, test distribution and technical details are maintained in [`project_status.md`](docs/project_status.md).\n\n---\n\n# Repository Structure\n\n```text\nautomotive-security-regression-lab/\n\n├── README.md\n├── RECRUITER_REVIEW.md\n├── pyproject.toml\n├── .gitattributes\n├── .gitignore\n│\n├── docs/\n│   ├── docs/architecture_decisions.md\n│   ├── docs/architecture.md\n│   ├── docs/environment-setup.md\n│   ├── docs/evidence-format.md\n│   ├── docs/methodology.md\n│   ├── docs/project_status.md\n│   └── docs/end-to-end-assessment-case.md\n│\n├── 01_threat_model/\n│   └── attack_surface.md\n│\n├── 02_test_cases/\n│   ├── TC-001-diagnostic-authorization.md\n│   ├── TC-002-message-validation.md\n│   └── TC-003-regression-workflow.md\n│\n├── 03_src/\n│   └── security_lab/\n│\n├── 04_tests/\n│   ├── test_ecu_simulator.py\n│   ├── test_evidence.py\n│   ├── test_foundation.py\n│   ├── test_test_runner.py\n│   ├── test_tc001_diagnostic_authorization.py\n│   ├── test_tc002_message_validation.py\n│   └── test_security_regression.py\n│\n├── 05_examples/\n│   ├── sample_finding_SEC-001.md\n│   └── sample_finding_SEC-002.md\n│\n└── .github/\n    └── workflows/\n        └── security-regression.yml\n```\n\n---\n\n# Documentation\n\n## Main project documentation\n\n| Markdown file                    | Purpose                                                                                                                                                                          |\n| -------------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |\n| `README.md`                      | Project overview, scope, architecture, security-testing workflow, current test coverage, technology stack, verification summary and repository structure                         |\n| `RECRUITER_REVIEW.md`            | A recruiter- and interview-focused review of the project, including strengths, credibility, technical interview questions, an elevator pitch and a longer interview explanation  |\n| `docs/project_status.md`         | Detailed project status, implementation phases, test results, CI/CD verification, deliverables, quality gates and links to supporting documentation                              |\n\n## Technical documentation\n\n| Markdown file                        | Purpose                                                                                                                                                                                                                           |\n| ------------------------------------ | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |\n| `docs/architecture_decisions.md`     | Architecture Decision Records (ADRs) documenting key design choices, their rationale, consequences and the boundaries of the simulated security-testing environment                                                               |\n| `docs/architecture.md`               | Detailed system architecture, component responsibilities, test-execution flow, request validation, ECU simulation modes, evidence integration, regression architecture, CI/CD and architectural boundaries                        |\n| `docs/end-to-end-assessment-case.md` | End-to-end assessment case connecting security requirements, threat modeling, attack hypotheses, test cases, execution results, evidence, findings, root cause, fixes, retesting, regression verification and CI/CD               |\n| `docs/environment-setup.md`          | Local development setup instructions, including repository cloning, Python environment preparation, dependency installation and test execution                                                                                    |\n| `docs/evidence-format.md`            | Defines the evidence data model, required fields, timestamps, PASS/FAIL semantics, evidence generation and validation, JSON serialization and the relationship between evidence and the test lifecycle                            |\n| `docs/methodology.md`                | Security-testing methodology from defining security requirements and threat models through attack-surface analysis, test execution, expected-versus-actual evaluation, evidence, findings, remediation, retesting and regression  |\n\n## Threat model and attack surface\n\n| Markdown file                       | Purpose                                                                                                                                                                     |\n| ----------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |\n| `01_threat_model/attack_surface.md` | Defines the simulated ECU's attack surface, security boundaries, modeled inputs and states, threat actor, attack hypotheses and traceability to TC-001, TC-002 and TC-003   |\n\n## Security test case specifications\n\n| Markdown file                                      | Purpose                                                                                                                                                                                                                          |\n| -------------------------------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |\n| `02_test_cases/TC-001-diagnostic-authorization.md` | Specifies TC-001 for diagnostic authorization, including the security requirement, threat model, attack hypothesis, test setup, expected and actual behavior, evidence, root cause, remediation, retest and regression coverage  |\n| `02_test_cases/TC-002-message-validation.md`       | Specifies TC-002 for message validation, covering malformed input, unsupported operations, boundary values, unexpected ECU states, expected responses, evidence, remediation, retest and regression considerations               |\n| `02_test_cases/TC-003-regression-workflow.md`      | Defines TC-003's finding-to-regression workflow, regression inputs and expected behavior, evidence generation, result interpretation, traceability, determinism and CI/CD integration boundaries                                 |\n\n## Example security findings\n\n| Markdown file                           | Purpose                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |\n| --------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |\n| `05_examples/sample_finding_SEC-001.md` | Example security finding for the diagnostic-authorization deviation, documenting the security requirement, reproduction steps, expected versus actual behavior, evidence, impact, root cause, recommendation, fix, retest and regression test  |\n| `05_examples/sample_finding_SEC-002.md` | A second structured example finding associated with the message-validation assessment, documenting the scenario, evidence, assessment, impact, root cause, recommendations and retest/regression information                                   |\n\n---\n\n# Technology\n\nThe project currently uses:\n\n* Python\n* pytest\n* Python standard library components where practical\n* GitHub Actions\n\nThe CI environment uses:\n\n```text\nPython 3.12\npytest>=9,<10\n```\n\nThe laboratory is locally executable, deterministic, hardware-independent, network-independent and reproducible.\n\n---\n\n# Scope Boundary\n\nThe laboratory does not:\n\n* connect to real vehicles or ECUs\n* send traffic to vehicle networks\n* interact with OEM infrastructure\n* access customer data\n* use production credentials\n* interact with production systems\n* implement real CAN communication\n* implement real UDS communication\n\nThe vulnerable ECU mode is a controlled simulator condition and must not be interpreted as evidence of a vulnerability in a real vehicle, ECU, OEM system, or production environment.\n\n---\n\n# Technical References\n\n* [Python Documentation](https://docs.python.org/3.14/)\n* [pytest Documentation](https://docs.pytest.org/en/stable/)\n* [pytest Good Integration Practices](https://docs.pytest.org/en/stable/explanation/goodpractices.html)",
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Cross-verification on gateway\n\nThe XOR-based handshake uses this math:\n> `Key = (Nonce XOR 0xAF) + 42`\n\nThis demo highlights the protocol's ability to prevent signal-cloning attacks.\n\n![Layer 2 Verification Demo](./media/sec_key_demo.png)\n\n---\n\n## 🔌 Hardware Setup\nThe AEGIS gateway integrates logic level shifting, status telemetry, and actuator control into a cohesive prototype. The I2C display and Level Shifter work together with the MOSFET module to provide a physical power control gate.\n\n* **The Circuit Schematic**:\n    ![Circuit Schematic](./media/circ_dia.png)\n\n* **Final Setup**:\n    ![Final Setup](./media/setup.jpeg)\n\n* **Physical Components**:\n    ![Physical Components](./media/parts.jpg)\n\nThis list summarizes the core components used in the build:\n* **Microcontrollers:** Arduino Uno R3 (Charger), Raspberry Pi Pico W (Vehicle BMS)\n* **I2C Status:** 0.96\" SSD1306 OLED Display\n* **Logic Bridging:** 4-Channel Logic Level Shifter\n* **Human Interface:** 10k Potentiometer\n* **Power Control:** IRF520 N-Channel MOSFET module\n* **Actuator:** 12V DC Solenoid Valve\n\n---\n\n**🛠️ Developed with grit by Arnav K. & Ananya D.**\nSubmitted for the **MAHE Mobility Challenge 2026** — Cybersecurity Track\n\n---\n\n## 🧑‍💻 Repository Structure\n\n```text\nAEGIS/\n├── demo/\n│   ├── gateway.py             # Terminal demo - Gateway (BMS Auditor) side\n│   └── charger.py             # Terminal demo - Charger side (Client simulation)\n├── src/\n│   ├── attacker/\n│   │   └── attacker.ino       # Arduino Uno: PWM generation & OLED logic\n│   └── gateway/\n│       └── aegis_logic.py     # Pi Pico: High-speed PWM audit & decision logic\n├── docs/\n│   └── circuit_explanation.md # Deep-dive documentation of the physical layer\n├── hardware/\n│   └── parts_list.csv         # Bill of Materials and pin usage data\n├── LICENSE                    # MIT License\n├── media/\n│   ├── circ_dia.png           # Professional circuit diagram\n│   ├── sys_arch.png           # High-level architecture block diagram\n│   ├── parts.jpg              # Component spread shot\n│   ├── sec_key_demo.png       # Image of the Layer 2 authentication process\n│   └── setup.jpeg             # Photo of the completed prototype\n└── README.md                  # Project overview and security details",
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Runs a FastAPI server that receives remote HTTP commands and sends malicious, unsigned CAN frames. |\n| **`sensor.py`** | Legacy Sensor | **Standard Sensor**. Simulates normal speed signals. Vulnerable to race conditions when the attacker is active. |\n| **`sensor_secure.py`** | Secure Sensor | **Secure Sensor**. Sends encrypted packets containing `HMAC` signatures and `Counters` instead of raw plaintext data. |\n| **`guardian.py`** | Guardian | **Security Gateway/Firewall**. Bridges `vcan0` and `vcan1`. Verifies signatures, blocks attacks, and protects the dashboard. |\n\n---\n\n## How to Start the Demo\n\n### 1. Pre-requisites (Raspberry Pi)\nEnsure system dependencies and the dashboard simulator are installed:\n\n```bash\n# Install system tools\nsudo apt install git libsdl2-dev libsdl2-image-dev can-utils python3-pip -y\n\n# Install and compile ICSim (Instrument Cluster Simulator)\ngit clone [https://github.com/zombiever/ic-sim.git](https://github.com/zombiever/ic-sim.git)\ncd ic-sim && make\n```\n\n### 2. Network Setup\nConfigure two virtual CAN interfaces: `vcan0` (External/Insecure) and `vcan1` (Internal/Secure).\n\n```bash\nsudo modprobe vcan\nsudo ip link add dev vcan0 type vcan\nsudo ip link set up vcan0\nsudo ip link add dev vcan1 type vcan\nsudo ip link set up vcan1\n```\n\n---\n\n###  Demo A: Running the Attack\n**Goal:** Demonstrate how a hacker controls the dashboard via HTTP requests.\n\n1.  **Start the Dashboard** (Listening on `vcan0`):\n    ```bash\n    ./ic-sim/icsim vcan0\n    ```\n2.  **Start the Hacked Gateway**:\n    ```bash\n    python3 main.py\n    # Server will start on port 8000\n    ```\n3.  **Execute the Attack** (From a browser or curl):\n    ```bash\n    # Spoof speed to 200 mph\n    curl \"http://<RPi_IP>:8000/attack/continuous?speed=200&duration=5\"\n    ```\n    > **Result**: The dashboard needle will ignore the sensor and spike to 200 mph.\n\n---\n\n### 🛡️ Demo B: Running the Defense\n**Goal:** Demonstrate how the Guardian intercepts attacks and protects the dashboard.\n\n1.  **Start the Dashboard** (Switch listener to **vcan1** Secure Zone):\n    ```bash\n    ./ic-sim/icsim vcan1\n    ```\n2.  **Start the Guardian** (Filters `vcan0` and forwards to `vcan1`):\n    ```bash\n    python3 guardian.py\n    ```\n3.  **Start the Secure Sensor** (Sends signed data to `vcan0`):\n    ```bash\n    python3 sensor_secure.py\n    ```\n    > The dashboard should now show normal, fluctuating speed.\n4.  **Attempt the Attack Again**:\n    ```bash\n    python3 main.py\n    # Send attack request\n    curl \"http://<RPi_IP>:8000/attack/continuous?speed=200\"\n    ```\n    > **Result**: The dashboard remains **unaffected** and continues to show normal speed.\n    > Check the terminal running `guardian.py`; you will see red `DROP: bad HMAC` warning messages.\n\n---\n\n## ⚠️ Disclaimer\n\nThis project is for **EDUCATIONAL AND ACADEMIC RESEARCH PURPOSES ONLY**.\n* All attack simulations are performed in a **Virtual CAN (vcan)** environment and do not involve real vehicle hardware.\n* Do not apply the code or attack techniques from this project to any real vehicles or public infrastructure.\n* The developers accept no liability for any damage or legal consequences resulting from the use of this project's code.\n\n**Created for the study of Automotive Cybersecurity.**",
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      "readme": "🚗 Automotive Threat Intelligence Platform\n\nA Python-based Automotive Threat Intelligence Platform designed to collect, correlate, analyze, and visualize automotive cybersecurity threats from multiple intelligence sources.\n\n⸻\n\n📌 Overview\n\nThe Automotive Threat Intelligence Platform is an open-source cybersecurity project focused on the automotive industry. It collects vulnerability intelligence, correlates security events, performs risk analysis, and presents the results through an interactive web dashboard.\n\nThe platform combines multiple intelligence sources with automotive-specific detections to help security analysts understand potential risks affecting connected vehicles and ECUs.\n\n⸻\n\n✨ Features\n\nThreat Intelligence\n\n* CVE Intelligence Collection\n* CISA KEV Integration\n* Automotive Security Bulletins\n* Threat Correlation Engine\n* Vendor Identification\n* MITRE ATT&CK Mapping\n* CWE Mapping\n\nAutomotive Security Detection\n\n* CAN Bus Threat Detection\n* UDS Diagnostic Analysis\n* Firmware Integrity Detection\n* Automotive Threat Metrics\n* Security Event Correlation\n\nRisk Analysis\n\n* TARA Analysis\n* Risk Scoring Engine\n* Risk Level Classification\n* Critical Threat Identification\n\nDashboard\n\n* Interactive Web Dashboard\n* Risk Distribution Charts\n* Vendor Analysis\n* Vendor Risk Ranking\n* Timeline Analysis\n* Automotive Security Overview\n* Live Security Events\n\nReporting\n\n* PDF Reports\n* HTML Reports\n* CSV Reports\n* JSON Reports\n\n⸻\n\n🏗️ Project Architecture\n\nThreat Intelligence Sources\n        │\n        ▼\n+-------------------------+\n|  CVE / KEV / Bulletins  |\n+-------------------------+\n            │\n            ▼\n+-------------------------+\n| Threat Correlation      |\n+-------------------------+\n            │\n            ▼\n+-------------------------+\n| Detection Engine        |\n| • CAN                  |\n| • UDS                  |\n| • Firmware             |\n+-------------------------+\n            │\n            ▼\n+-------------------------+\n| Risk Engine (TARA)      |\n+-------------------------+\n            │\n            ▼\n+-------------------------+\n| Dashboard & Reports     |\n+-------------------------+\n\n📂 Project Structure\n\nAutomotive-Threat-Intelligence-Platform/\n│\n├── data/\n├── detection/\n├── intelligence/\n├── reports/\n├── static/\n├── templates/\n├── dashboard.py\n├── main.py\n├── requirements.txt\n└── README.md\n\n⚙️ Installation\n\nClone the repository:\n\ngit clone https://github.com/rehacyber/Automotive-Threat-Intelligence-Platform.git\n\nEnter the project directory:\n\ncd Automotive-Threat-Intelligence-Platform\n\nInstall dependencies:\n\npip install -r requirements.txt\n\nRun the platform:\n\npython main.py\n\nLaunch the dashboard:\n\npython dashboard.py\n\n📊 Dashboard\n![Automotive Threat Intelligence Dashboard](screenshots/dashboard.png)\n The platform provides a modern web-based dashboard for monitoring automotive cybersecurity threats.\n\nDashboard Features\n\n* Risk Score Overview\n* Severity Distribution\n* Vendor Analysis\n* Vendor Risk Ranking\n* CVE Timeline\n* Automotive Security Overview\n* Live Security Events\n* Top Critical Automotive Threats\n* Threat Intelligence Table\n\n⸻\n\n📄 Generated Reports\n\nThe platform automatically generates multiple report formats:\n\nReport\tDescription\nJSON\tRaw threat intelligence data\nCSV\tSpreadsheet-friendly report\nHTML\tInteractive report\nPDF\tExecutive summary report\n\nReports are stored in the reports/ directory.\n\n⸻\n\n🛡️ Security Frameworks\n\nThis project integrates multiple cybersecurity frameworks and methodologies.\n\nMITRE ATT&CK\n\nThreats are mapped to MITRE ATT&CK techniques where applicable.\n\nExamples:\n\n* Initial Access\n* Execution\n* Persistence\n* Privilege Escalation\n* Defense Evasion\n* Discovery\n* Lateral Movement\n* Impact\n\nCWE Mapping\n\nCommon Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers are associated with relevant vulnerabilities.\n\nTARA\n\nThe platform performs Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment (TARA) to estimate the impact of automotive cybersecurity threats.\n\n⸻\n\n🛠️ Technologies Used\n\n* Python 3\n* Flask\n* HTML5\n* CSS3\n* JavaScript\n* Chart.js\n\n⸻\n\n📈 Future Roadmap\n\nVersion 1.1\n\n* OTA Security Analysis Improvements\n* Additional Vendor Intelligence\n* Dashboard Filtering\n* Enhanced Risk Correlation\n\nVersion 2.0\n\n* Real-Time Event Streaming\n* Threat Hunting Module\n* IOC Management\n* SIEM-style Dashboard\n* WebSocket Support\n* REST API\n* User Authentication\n\n⸻\n\n🤝 Contributing\n\nContributions, suggestions, and improvements are welcome.\n\nIf you would like to contribute:\n\n1. Fork the repository.\n2. Create a feature branch.\n3. Commit your changes.\n4. Open a Pull Request.\n\n⸻\n\n📜 License\n\nThis project is released under the MIT License.\n\n⸻\n\n👨‍💻 Author\n\nReha Uğurlu\n\nAutomotive Cybersecurity Enthusiast\n\nGitHub:\nhttps://github.com/rehacyber\n\nLinkedIn:\n(Add your LinkedIn profile link here)\n\n⸻\n\n⭐ Support\n\nIf you find this project useful, consider giving it a ⭐ on GitHub.\n\nYour support helps improve future automotive cybersecurity projects.\n\n⸻\n\nAutomotive Threat Intelligence Platform\n\nVersion 1.0.0\n\nDeveloped for educational, research, and automotive cybersecurity awareness purposes.",
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    "nmfta-repo/nmfta-vehicle_cybersecurity_requirements": {
      "id": "github:nmfta-repo/nmfta-vehicle_cybersecurity_requirements",
      "evidence_type": "repository",
      "record_type": "repository",
      "title": "NMFTA Heavy Duty Vehicle Cybersecurity Requirements (HDVCR)",
      "full_name": "nmfta-repo/nmfta-vehicle_cybersecurity_requirements",
      "name": "nmfta-vehicle_cybersecurity_requirements",
      "owner": "nmfta-repo",
      "url": "https://github.com/nmfta-repo/nmfta-vehicle_cybersecurity_requirements",
      "description": "Cybersecurity requirements for telematics systems developed in collaboration with motor freight carriers, OEMs and cybersecurity experts.",
      "readme": "# NMFTA Heavy Duty Vehicle Cybersecurity Requirements (HDVCR)\n\nCybersecurity requirements for heavy duty vehicles developed in collaboration with motor freight carriers, OEMs and cybersecurity experts.\n\nThe current development version [![automated builds of html, reqif, and questionnaires](https://github.com/nmfta-repo/nmfta-vehicle_cybersecurity_requirements/actions/workflows/publish.yml/badge.svg)](https://github.com/nmfta-repo/nmfta-vehicle_cybersecurity_requirements/actions/workflows/publish.yml):\n* is available to browse online:\n  * [as an interactive documentation site](https://nmfta-repo.github.io/nmfta-vehicle_cybersecurity_requirements/)\n  * [as an overview document](https://nmfta-repo.github.io/nmfta-vehicle_cybersecurity_requirements/nmfta-vehicle_cybersecurity_requirements/docs/overview.html) ([and table view](https://nmfta-repo.github.io/nmfta-vehicle_cybersecurity_requirements/nmfta-vehicle_cybersecurity_requirements/docs/overview-TABLE.html))\n  * by device class:\n    * Class 0 (Telematics): [interactive document](https://nmfta-repo.github.io/nmfta-vehicle_cybersecurity_requirements/nmfta-vehicle_cybersecurity_requirements/requirements/class_0_telematics/class_0_telematics.html) | [table view](https://nmfta-repo.github.io/nmfta-vehicle_cybersecurity_requirements/nmfta-vehicle_cybersecurity_requirements/requirements/class_0_telematics/class_0_telematics-TABLE.html) | [traceability tree](https://nmfta-repo.github.io/nmfta-vehicle_cybersecurity_requirements/nmfta-vehicle_cybersecurity_requirements/requirements/class_0_telematics/class_0_telematics-TRACE.html)\n    * Class 1 (Wireless Multi-Segment): [interactive document](https://nmfta-repo.github.io/nmfta-vehicle_cybersecurity_requirements/nmfta-vehicle_cybersecurity_requirements/requirements/class_1_wireless_multiseg/class_1_wireless_multiseg.html) | [table view](https://nmfta-repo.github.io/nmfta-vehicle_cybersecurity_requirements/nmfta-vehicle_cybersecurity_requirements/requirements/class_1_wireless_multiseg/class_1_wireless_multiseg-TABLE.html) | [traceability tree](https://nmfta-repo.github.io/nmfta-vehicle_cybersecurity_requirements/nmfta-vehicle_cybersecurity_requirements/requirements/class_1_wireless_multiseg/class_1_wireless_multiseg-TRACE.html)\n    * Class 2 (Vehicle Gateway): [interactive document](https://nmfta-repo.github.io/nmfta-vehicle_cybersecurity_requirements/nmfta-vehicle_cybersecurity_requirements/requirements/class_2_gateway/class_2_gateway.html) | [table view](https://nmfta-repo.github.io/nmfta-vehicle_cybersecurity_requirements/nmfta-vehicle_cybersecurity_requirements/requirements/class_2_gateway/class_2_gateway-TABLE.html) | [traceability tree](https://nmfta-repo.github.io/nmfta-vehicle_cybersecurity_requirements/nmfta-vehicle_cybersecurity_requirements/requirements/class_2_gateway/class_2_gateway-TRACE.html)\n    * Class 3 (Multi-Segment with Untrusted Wired Connection): [interactive document](https://nmfta-repo.github.io/nmfta-vehicle_cybersecurity_requirements/nmfta-vehicle_cybersecurity_requirements/requirements/class_3_multiseg_untrusted/class_3_multiseg_untrusted.html) | [table view](https://nmfta-repo.github.io/nmfta-vehicle_cybersecurity_requirements/nmfta-vehicle_cybersecurity_requirements/requirements/class_3_multiseg_untrusted/class_3_multiseg_untrusted-TABLE.html) | [traceability tree](https://nmfta-repo.github.io/nmfta-vehicle_cybersecurity_requirements/nmfta-vehicle_cybersecurity_requirements/requirements/class_3_multiseg_untrusted/class_3_multiseg_untrusted-TRACE.html)\n    * Class 4 (Multi-Segment): [interactive document](https://nmfta-repo.github.io/nmfta-vehicle_cybersecurity_requirements/nmfta-vehicle_cybersecurity_requirements/requirements/class_4_multiseg/class_4_multiseg.html) | [table view](https://nmfta-repo.github.io/nmfta-vehicle_cybersecurity_requirements/nmfta-vehicle_cybersecurity_requirements/requirements/class_4_multiseg/class_4_multiseg-TABLE.html) | [traceability tree](https://nmfta-repo.github.io/nmfta-vehicle_cybersecurity_requirements/nmfta-vehicle_cybersecurity_requirements/requirements/class_4_multiseg/class_4_multiseg-TRACE.html)\n    * Class 5 (Single Segment High Risk): [interactive document](https://nmfta-repo.github.io/nmfta-vehicle_cybersecurity_requirements/nmfta-vehicle_cybersecurity_requirements/requirements/class_5_single_seg_high_risk/class_5_single_seg_high_risk.html) | [table view](https://nmfta-repo.github.io/nmfta-vehicle_cybersecurity_requirements/nmfta-vehicle_cybersecurity_requirements/requirements/class_5_single_seg_high_risk/class_5_single_seg_high_risk-TABLE.html) | [traceability tree](https://nmfta-repo.github.io/nmfta-vehicle_cybersecurity_requirements/nmfta-vehicle_cybersecurity_requirements/requirements/class_5_single_seg_high_risk/class_5_single_seg_high_risk-TRACE.html)\n    * Class 6 (Single Segment Medium Risk): [interactive document](https://nmfta-repo.github.io/nmfta-vehicle_cybersecurity_requirements/nmfta-vehicle_cybersecurity_requirements/requirements/class_6_single_seg_med_risk/class_6_single_seg_med_risk.html) | [table view](https://nmfta-repo.github.io/nmfta-vehicle_cybersecurity_requirements/nmfta-vehicle_cybersecurity_requirements/requirements/class_6_single_seg_med_risk/class_6_single_seg_med_risk-TABLE.html) | [traceability tree](https://nmfta-repo.github.io/nmfta-vehicle_cybersecurity_requirements/nmfta-vehicle_cybersecurity_requirements/requirements/class_6_single_seg_med_risk/class_6_single_seg_med_risk-TRACE.html)\n    * Class 7 (Single Segment Low Risk): [interactive document](https://nmfta-repo.github.io/nmfta-vehicle_cybersecurity_requirements/nmfta-vehicle_cybersecurity_requirements/requirements/class_7_single_seg_low_risk/class_7_single_seg_low_risk.html) | [table view](https://nmfta-repo.github.io/nmfta-vehicle_cybersecurity_requirements/nmfta-vehicle_cybersecurity_requirements/requirements/class_7_single_seg_low_risk/class_7_single_seg_low_risk-TABLE.html) | [traceability tree](https://nmfta-repo.github.io/nmfta-vehicle_cybersecurity_requirements/nmfta-vehicle_cybersecurity_requirements/requirements/class_7_single_seg_low_risk/class_7_single_seg_low_risk-TRACE.html)\n* [is available in Requirements Interchange Format (ReqIF)](https://nmfta-repo.github.io/nmfta-vehicle_cybersecurity_requirements/output.reqif)\n* [is available as supplier questionnaires in excel format](https://nmfta-repo.github.io/nmfta-vehicle_cybersecurity_requirements/vcr_questionnaires.xlsx)\n\nThe cybersecurity requirements captured here are for use by fleets to include in their procurement process with OEMs. The requirements are intended to cover the following truck body configurations, which we intend to cover most of what LTL carriers need:\n* North America \"on highway\" Class 7-8 trucks e.g. the classic truck w/ trailer or double as the  most common configuration\n* and also the last mile delivery truck with a dry freight truck body that could include a lift gate\n\n\n## How to Use the HD VCR\n\nWe recommend that fleets use these requirements by following some steps during the procurement process. We are open to feedback on how to improve the requirements and the process.\n\n1. Fleets should ask OEMs to identify all the modules in the requested truck by the *Device Classes* below.\n2. Fleets should prepare questionnaires to be completed by the OEMs based on the classes found (download the [supplier questionnaires in Excel format](https://nmfta-repo.github.io/nmfta-vehicle_cybersecurity_requirements/vcr_questionnaires.xlsx)).\n3. OEMs complete the questionnaires, answering in the affirmative if all devices of the given class satisfy the requirement. Deviations and rationale can be noted in the provided cells of the questionnaires.\n\n\n## Device Classes by Order Sheet Lines\n\nThe VCRWG analyzed several truck vehicle network architectures and performed a risk analysis to classify the known truck\nelectronic components into a series of device classes. The devices classes were created to group the devices into\nsimilar risk profiles; i.e. cybersecurity requirements for procurement are assigned to these classes instead of to each\ndevices individually.\n\nEach device identified, its assigned class and the rationale for assigning that class are captured here in a truck order\nsheet view for ease of use by the fleets. This is also available in a word docx file here:\n[`resources/Truck_Component_Order_Sheet_Breakdown_for_Cybersecurity_Matrix_v2_DRAFT.docx`](resources/Truck_Component_Order_Sheet_Breakdown_for_Cybersecurity_Matrix_v2_DRAFT.docx).\n\nNote 1: the analysis (and hence the rationales below) assumes that the Next Generation Tractor Trailer Interface\n(NGTTI) will not use J2497 for any function other than regulation required LAMP messages, if that is not the case then\nthe devices using J2497 for those other functions(especially diagnostics) should be classified instead as class\n2 *Multi Segment with Wireless*.\n\nNote 2: the analysis makes the distinction between *Untrusted Network Domains* and *Trusted Network Domains* of the vehicle networks.\n\n<dl>\n<dt>Untrusted Network Domain (<em>UND</em>):</dt>\n<dd>A <em>UND</em> is a network domain (or segment) that contains <strong>any</strong> of the following:<br>\n    a) wireless communication or reachable wirelessly (e.g J2497, ISO 15118, BlueTooth, WiFi)<br>\n    b) an interface for aftermarket devices or operator access (e.g. an OBD port, RP1226 connector)<br>\n    c) a telematics device that does not satisfy the HD VCR requirements<br>\n    d) a multi-network device (e.g. intended or unintended gateway) that does not satisfy the HD VCR requirements<br>\n</dd>\n\n<dt>Trusted Network Domain (<em>TND</em>):</dt>\n<dd>A <em>TND</em> is a network domain (or segment) that <strong>does not contain any</strong> of the following:<br>\n    a) wireless communication or reachable wirelessly (e.g J2497, ISO 15118, BlueTooth, WiFi)<br>\n    b) an interface for aftermarket devices or operator access (e.g. an OBD port, RP1226 connector)<br>\n    c) a telematics device that does not satisfy the HD VCR requirements<br>\n    d) a multi-network device (e.g. intended or unintended gateway) that does not satisfy the HD VCR requirements<br>\n</dd>\n</dl>\n\n> ENGINE\n\n| **Component Reference Name**                                                                                                 | **Cybersecurity Requirements Class** | **Class Assignment Rationale**                                                       |\n| ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------ | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |\n| Engine Telematics (J1939 SA 249)                                                                                             | **0**                                | telematics device                                                                    |\n| Engine \\#1 (aka Motor Control Module (MCM) / Engine Management System (EMS) / Engine Control Module (ECM)) (J1939 SA 00, 01) | **3**                                | 'high' scope change risk (assumes NGTTI with no J2497) and untrusted wired connection |\n| Engine Cylinder Pressure Monitoring System                                                                                   | **5**                                | 'high' overall fleet risk                                                            |\n| Engine \\#2                                                                                                                   | **None Specified**                   | no responses / not common component                                                  |\n\n> ENGINE EQUIPMENT\n\n| Propulsion Battery Charger (J1939 SA 73)                                                                                    | **1**              | has a CCS/ISO 15118 interface which is accessible wirelessly and connects to J1939   |\n| --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------ | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |\n| Thermal Management System Controller (J1939 SA 49)                                                                          | **3**              | 'high' scope change risk (assumes NGTTI with no J2497) and untrusted wired connection |\n| Water Pump Controller (J1939 SA 57)                                                                                         | **3**              | 'high' scope change risk (assumes NGTTI with no J2497) and untrusted wired connection |\n| Low-Voltage Disconnect (J1939 SA 49)                                                                                        | **3**              | 'high' scope change risk (assumes NGTTI with no J2497) and untrusted wired connection |\n| Fan Drive Controller (aka Fan Hub) (J1939 SA 78)                                                                            | **3**              | 'high' scope change risk (assumes NGTTI with no J2497) and untrusted wired connection |\n| Powertrain Control Module (aka Common Powertrain Controller Module (CPC)) (J1939 SA 90)                                     | **3**              | 'high' scope change risk (assumes NGTTI with no J2497) and untrusted wired connection |\n| Ignition Control Module \\#2 (J1939 SA 57)                                                                                   | **3**              | 'high' scope change risk (assumes NGTTI with no J2497) and untrusted wired connection |\n| Starter System (J1939 SA 00, 03)                                                                                            | **3**              | 'high' scope change risk (assumes NGTTI with no J2497) and untrusted wired connection |\n| Fuel Heater, In-Tank (J1939 SA 72)                                                                                          | **3**              | 'high' scope change risk (assumes NGTTI with no J2497) and untrusted wired connection |\n| Oil Sensor (J1939 SA 00)                                                                                                    | **4**              | 'medium' scope change risk (connected to two or more vehicle networks)                |\n| Retarder - Engine (J1939 SA 15)                                                                                             | **4**              | 'medium' scope change risk (connected to two or more vehicle networks)                |\n| Radiator (aka Radiator Fan Control) (J1939 SA 78, 00, 255)                                                                  | **4**              | 'medium' scope change risk (connected to two or more vehicle networks)                |\n| Oil Pan Heater (J1939 SA 00)                                                                                                | **4**              | 'medium' scope change risk (connected to two or more vehicle networks)                |\n| Engine Injection Control Module (J1939 SA 00)                                                                               | **4**              | 'medium' scope change risk (connected to two or more vehicle networks)                |\n| Ignition Control Module \\#1 (J1939 SA 52)                                                                                   | **4**              | 'medium' scope change risk (connected to two or more vehicle networks)                |\n| Idle Control System (J1939 SA 68)                                                                                           | **5**              | 'high' overall fleet risk                                                            |\n| Aftertreatment \\#1 system gas intake (J1939 SA 81)                                                                          | **5**              | 'high' overall fleet risk                                                            |\n| Aftertreatment \\#2 system gas intake (J1939 SA 86)                                                                          | **5**              | 'high' overall fleet risk                                                            |\n| Diesel Particulate Filter Controller (aka Aftertreatment Control Module (ACM) / Exhaust Emission Controller) (J1939 SA 211) | **5**              | 'high' overall fleet risk                                                            |\n| Engine Exhaust Backpressure (J1939 SA 34)                                                                                   | **5**              | 'high' overall fleet risk                                                            |\n| Retarder, Exhaust, Engine \\#1                                                                                               | **5**              | 'high' overall fleet risk                                                            |\n| Retarder, Exhaust, Engine \\#2                                                                                               | **5**              | 'high' overall fleet risk                                                            |\n| Engine Valve Controller (J1939 SA 0)                                                                                        | **6**              | 'medium' overall fleet risk                                                          |\n| Battery Pack Monitor \\#1 (J1939 SA 243)                                                                                     | **7**              | 'low' overall fleet risk                                                             |\n| Aftertreatment \\#2 system gas outlet (J1939 SA 87)                                                                          | **7**              | 'low' overall fleet risk                                                             |\n| Aftertreatment \\#1 system gas outlet (aka NoX Sensors ) (J1939 SA 82)                                                       | **7**              | 'low' overall fleet risk                                                             |\n| Catalyst Fluid Sensor (aka DEF Quality Sensor) (J1939 SA 211)                                                               | **7**              | 'low' overall fleet risk                                                             |\n| Turbocharger (J1939 SA 02)                                                                                                  | **7**              | 'low' overall fleet risk                                                             |\n| Turbocharger Compressor Bypass (J1939 SA 02)                                                                                | **7**              | 'low' overall fleet risk                                                             |\n| Turbocharger Wastegate (J1939 SA 02)                                                                                        | **7**              | 'low' overall fleet risk                                                             |\n| Air Intake System (J1939 SA 70)                                                                                             | **7**              | 'low' overall fleet risk                                                             |\n| Filtration Control                                                                                                          | **7**              | 'low' overall fleet risk                                                             |\n| Engine Exhaust Gas Recirculation (J1939 SA 70)                                                                              | **7**              | 'low' overall fleet risk                                                             |\n| Alternator/Electrical Charging System                                                                                       | **7**              | 'low' overall fleet risk                                                             |\n| Battery Charger                                                                                                             | **7**              | 'low' overall fleet risk                                                             |\n| Exhaust Emission Controller (J1939 SA 61)                                                                                   | **None Specified** | no responses / not common component                                                  |\n| Air Compressor                                                                                                              | **None Specified** | no responses / not common component                                                  |\n\n> TRANSMISSION\n\n| Transmission Telematics                                                | **0** | telematics device                                                                    |\n| ---------------------------------------------------------------------- | ----- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |\n| Transmission \\#1 (aka Transmission Control Module (TCM)) (J1939 SA 03) | **3** | 'high' scope change risk (assumes NGTTI with no J2497) and untrusted wired connection |\n| Electronic Clutch Actuator (J1939 SA 03)                               | **4** | 'medium' scope change risk (connected to two or more vehicle networks)                |\n| Power TakeOff (Front or Secondary) (J1939 SA 07)                       | **5** | 'high' overall fleet risk                                                            |\n| Retarder - Driveline (J1939 SA 16)                                     | **5** | 'high' overall fleet risk                                                            |\n| Power TakeOff - (Main or Rear) (J1939 SA 07)                           | **5** | 'high' overall fleet risk                                                            |\n| Clutch/Converter Unit (J1939 SA 78)                                    | **6** | 'medium' overall fleet risk                                                          |\n| Transmission \\#2 (aka Auxiliary Transmission) (J1939 SA 16)            | **6** | 'medium' overall fleet risk                                                          |\n\n> FRONT AXLE & EQUIPMENT\n\n| Steering Input Unit (aka Steering Angle Sensor (SAS))                                                                                    | **3**              | high' scope change risk (assumes NGTTI with no J2497) and untrusted wired connection |\n| ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------ | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |\n| Steering Controller (aka Front Axle Steering (FAS) / VDS / MCS) (J1939 SA 19)                                                            | **4**              |\n'medium' scope change risk (connected to two or more vehicle networks)                |\n| Suspension - Steer Axle (aka Electronically Controlled Suspension (ECS) / Electronically Controlled Air Suspension (ECAS)) (J1939 SA 20) | **6**              | 'medium' overall fleet risk                                                          |\n| Suspension - System Controller \\#1 (J1939 SA 47)                                                                                         | **6**              | 'medium' overall fleet risk                                                          |\n| Axle - Steering (J1939 SA 08)                                                                                                            | **7**              | 'low' overall fleet risk                                                             |\n| Brakes - Steer Axle (J1939 SA 13)                                                                                                        | **None Specified** | no responses / not common component                                                  |\n| Suspension - System Controller \\#2 (J1939 SA 64)                                                                                         | **None Specified** | no responses / not common component                                                  |\n\n> REAR AXLE & EQUIPMENT\n\n| Antilock Brake System (ABS) (J1939 SA 11)            | **1**              | has J2497 interface (in NA) which is accessible wirelessly                           |\n| ---------------------------------------------------- | ------------------ | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |\n| Brakes - Drive axle \\#1 (J1939 SA 13)                | **1**              | has J2497 interface (in NA) which is accessible wirelessly                           |\n| Brakes - Drive Axle \\#2 (J1939 SA 14)                | **1**              | has J2497 interface (in NA) which is accessible wirelessly                           |\n| Traction Control (J1939 SA 138, 39)                  | **3**              | 'high' scope change risk (assumes NGTTI with no J2497) and untrusted wired connection |\n| Differential Lock Controller (J1939 SA 138, 72, 39 ) | **3**              | 'high' scope change risk (assumes NGTTI with no J2497) and untrusted wired connection |\n| Axle - Drive \\#1 (J1939 SA 09)                       | **4**              | 'medium' scope change risk (connected to two or more vehicle networks)                |\n| Axle - Drive \\#2 (J1939 SA 10)                       | **4**              | 'medium' scope change risk (connected to two or more vehicle networks)                |\n| Electric Propulsion Control Unit \\#1                 | **7**              | 'low' overall fleet risk                                                             |\n| Electric Propulsion Control Unit \\#2                 | **None Specified** | no responses / not common component                                                  |\n| Electric Propulsion Control Unit \\#4                 | **None Specified** | no responses / not common component                                                  |\n| Endurance Braking System                             | **None Specified** | no responses / not common component                                                  |\n\n> ADDITIONAL AXLES\n\n|                              |       |                                                                       |\n| ---------------------------- | ----- | --------------------------------------------------------------------- |\n| Lift Axle (J1939 SA 138, 71) | **4** | 'medium' scope change risk (connected to two or more vehicle networks) |\n\n> REAR SUSPENSION\n\n| Suspension - Drive Axle \\#1 (J1939 SA 138, 72, 39) | **3** | 'high' scope change risk (assumes NGTTI with no J2497) and untrusted wired connection |\n| -------------------------------------------------- | ----- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |\n| Suspension - Drive Axle \\#2 (J1939 SA 22)          | **3** | 'high' scope change risk (assumes NGTTI with no J2497) and untrusted wired connection |\n| Vehicle Dynamic Stability Controller (J1939 SA 62) | **6** | 'medium' overall fleet risk                                                          |\n\n> TRAILER CONNECTIONS\n\n| Tractor/Trailer Bridge \\#2 (J1939 SA 138, 39) | **3** | 'high' scope change risk (assumes NGTTI with no J2497) and untrusted wired connection |\n| --------------------------------------------- | ----- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |\n| Tractor-Trailer Bridge \\#1 (J1939 SA 32)      | **3** | 'high' scope change risk (assumes NGTTI with no J2497) and untrusted wired connection |\n\n> TIRES & WHEELS\n\n| Tire Pressure Controller (aka Tire Pressure Monitoring System (TPMS)) (J1939 SA 51) | **1** | has a wireless interface and connects to J1939 |\n| ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ----- | ---------------------------------------------- |\n| Wheel End Monitoring                                                                | **1** | has a wireless interface and connects to J1939 |\n\n> FRAME & EQUIPMENT\n\n| Fifth Wheel Smart System (J1939 SA 138, 39)                                                                                                                                                                            | **3**              | 'high' scope change risk (assumes NGTTI with no J2497) and untrusted wired connection |\n| ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------ | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |\n| ADAS Lane Keep (aka LCS Side Sensor (blind spot only) / Lane Warning / Lane Departure Warning System / Bendix Fusion / Exterior Camera for Lane Departune Warning / Driver Assistance Camera (MPC)) (J1939 SA 232, 19) | **3**              | 'high' scope change risk (assumes NGTTI with no J2497) and untrusted wired connection |\n| Body-to-Vehicle Interface Control (aka VECU - Vehicle ECU) (J1939 SA 33)                                                                                                                                               | **3**              | 'high' scope change risk (assumes NGTTI with no J2497) and untrusted wired connection |\n| Forward Road Image Processor (J1939 SA 232)                                                                                                                                                                            | **3**              | 'high' scope change risk (assumes NGTTI with no J2497) and untrusted wired connection |\n| Automated Driving (L0-L2) (aka Bendix FLR and FLC (Forward looking Camera / Radar))                                                                                                                                    | **6**              | 'medium' overall fleet risk                                                          |\n| Collision Avoidance (J1939 SA 42)                                                                                                                                                                                      | **6**              | 'medium' overall fleet risk                                                          |\n| Slope Sensor (aka Hill Start Assist)                                                                                                                                                                                   | **7**              | 'low' overall fleet risk                                                             |\n| Personnel Detection Device (aka Pedestrian Detection)                                                                                                                                                                  | **7**              | 'low' overall fleet risk                                                             |\n| Aerodynamic Control (J1939 SA 27)                                                                                                                                                                                      | **None Specified** | no responses / not common component                                                  |\n| Electrical System (J1939 SA 30)                                                                                                                                                                                        | **None Specified** | no responses / not common component                                                  |\n| Hitch Control (J1939 SA 35)                                                                                                                                                                                            | **None Specified** | no responses / not common component                                                  |\n| Power Systems Manager (J1939 SA 91)                                                                                                                                                                                    | **None Specified** | no responses / not common component                                                  |\n\n> FUEL TANK & EQUIPMENT\n\n| Fuel Actuator (J1939 SA 15) | **4**              | 'medium' scope change risk (connected to two or more vehicle networks) |\n| --------------------------- | ------------------ | --------------------------------------------------------------------- |\n| Fuel System (J1939 SA 18)   | **None Specified** | no responses / not common component                                   |\n\n> CAB EXTERIOR\n\n| Exterior Camera Telematics               | **0**              | telematics device                                                     |\n| ---------------------------------------- | ------------------ | --------------------------------------------------------------------- |\n| Mirrors (J1939 SA 40)                    | **4**              | 'medium' scope change risk (connected to two or more vehicle networks) |\n| Body Controller (aka Key-Lock Options)   | **6**              | 'medium' overall fleet risk                                           |\n| Body Controller \\#2                      | **7**              | 'low' overall fleet risk                                              |\n| Door Controller (J1939 SA 236)           | **7**              | 'low' overall fleet risk                                              |\n| Door Controller \\#1 (J1939 SA 237)       | **7**              | 'low' overall fleet risk                                              |\n| Door Controller \\#2                      | **7**              | 'low' overall fleet risk                                              |\n| Door Controller \\#3                      | **7**              | 'low' overall fleet risk                                              |\n| Door Controller \\#4                      | **7**              | 'low' overall fleet risk                                              |\n| Roadway Information                      | **7**              | 'low' overall fleet risk                                              |\n| Vehicle Security (J1939 SA 29)           | **7**              | 'low' overall fleet risk                                              |\n| Forensic Exterior Cameras (J1939 SA 232) | **None Specified** | no responses / not common component                                   |\n\n> CAB INTERIOR\n\n| Interior Camera Telematics                                                                                            | **0**              | telematics device                                                                    |\n| --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------ | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |\n| Vehicle Navigation (J1939 SA 84)                                                                                      | **1**              | has a wireless interface and connects to J1939                                       |\n| Radio (aka Head Unit / Infotainment) (J1939 SA 76, 84)                                                                | **1**              | likely to have wireless interfaces and a J1939 interface                             |\n| Cab Controller - Primary (aka SAM CAB) (J1939 SA 49)                                                                  | **3**              | 'high' scope change risk (assumes NGTTI with no J2497) and untrusted wired connection |\n| Cab Controller - Secondary (J1939 SA 50)                                                                              | **3**              | 'high' scope change risk (assumes NGTTI with no J2497) and untrusted wired connection |\n| Cruise Control (J1939 SA 17)                                                                                          | **3**              | 'high' scope change risk (assumes NGTTI with no J2497) and untrusted wired connection |\n| Object Detection Display (aka Active Safety Components / Bendix Fusion (Display))                                     | **3**              | 'high' scope change risk (assumes NGTTI with no J2497) and untrusted wired connection |\n| Lighting - Operator Controls (J1939 SA 71)                                                                            | **3**              | 'high' scope change risk (assumes NGTTI with no J2497) and untrusted wired connection |\n| Throttle (J1939 SA 0)                                                                                                 | **4**              | 'medium' scope change risk (connected to two or more vehicle networks)                |\n| Transmission Display - Primary (J1939 SA 59)                                                                          | **4**              | 'medium' scope change risk (connected to two or more vehicle networks)                |\n| Trip Recorder (J1939 SA 24)                                                                                           | **4**              | 'medium' scope change risk (connected to two or more vehicle networks)                |\n| Switch Field (aka Additional Switches / Modular Switch Field (MSF)) (J1939 SA 138)                                    | **4**              | 'medium' scope change risk (connected to two or more vehicle networks)                |\n| Power TakeOff (PTO) Switches (J1939 SA 07)                                                                            | **5**              | 'high' overall fleet risk                                                            |\n| Shift Console - Primary (aka Gearshift ECU) (J1939 SA 05)                                                             | **6**              | 'medium' overall fleet risk                                                          |\n| Safety Restraint System (SRS) (J1939 SA 83)                                                                           | **6**              | 'medium' overall fleet risk                                                          |\n| Retarder Display (J1939 SA 23)                                                                                        | **7**              | 'low' overall fleet risk                                                             |\n| Shift Console - Secondary (J1939 SA 06)                                                                               | **7**              | 'low' overall fleet risk                                                             |\n| Transmission Display - Secondary (J1939 SA 60)                                                                        | **7**              | 'low' overall fleet risk                                                             |\n| Passenger-Operator Climate Control \\#1 (aka LECM (Living Environment Control Module) / HVAC / HVAC FCU) (J1939 SA 25) | **7**              | 'low' overall fleet risk                                                             |\n| Steering Column Unit (aka Turn Signal Control)                                                                        | **7**              | 'low' overall fleet risk                                                             |\n| Steering Wheel Switches (J1939 SA 77)                                                                                 | **7**              | 'low' overall fleet risk                                                             |\n| Passenger-Operator Climate Control \\#2 (aka HVAC \\#2 / HVAC ACU)                                                      | **7**              | 'low' overall fleet risk                                                             |\n| Seat Control \\#1                                                                                                      | **7**              | 'low' overall fleet risk                                                             |\n| Cab Display \\#1                                                                                                       | **7**              | 'low' overall fleet risk                                                             |\n| Cab Display \\#2                                                                                                       | **None Specified** | no responses / not common component                                                  |\n| Driver Impairment Device (J1939 SA 94)                                                                                | **None Specified** | no responses / not common component                                                  |\n| On-board axle group display                                                                                           | **None Specified** | no responses / not common component                                                  |\n| On-board axle group scale                                                                                             | **None Specified** | no responses / not common component                                                  |\n| Safety Restraint System \\#2 (aka Seat SRS)                                                                            | **None Specified** | no responses / not common component                                                  |\n| Seat Control \\#2                                                                                                      | **None Specified** | no responses / not common component                                                  |\n| Tachograph                                                                                                            | **None Specified** | no responses / not common component                                                  |\n| User Interface System                                                                                                 | **None Specified** | no responses / not common component                                                  |\n| Virtual Terminal                                                                                                      | **None Specified** | no responses / not common component                                                  |\n| Interior Cameras                                                                                                      | **None Specified** | no responses / not common component                                                  |\n\n> INSTRUMENTS & CONTROLS\n\n| Ammeter (J1939 SA 23, 39)                                      | **3**              | 'high' scope change risk (assumes NGTTI with no J2497) and untrusted wired connection |\n| -------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------ | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |\n| Instrument Cluster \\#1 (aka Gauges) (J1939 SA 23)              | **3**              | 'high' scope change risk (assumes NGTTI with no J2497) and untrusted wired connection |\n| ADAS Adaptive Cruise Control (aka Bendix Fusion) (J1939 SA 42) | **3**              | 'high' scope change risk (assumes NGTTI with no J2497) and untrusted wired connection |\n| Headway Controller (J1939 SA 42)                               | **4**              | 'medium' scope change risk (connected to two or more vehicle networks)                |\n| Engine Display                                                 | **4**              | 'medium' scope change risk (connected to two or more vehicle networks)                |\n| Pyrometer                                                      | **6**              | 'medium' overall fleet risk                                                          |\n| Instrument Cluster \\#2 (aka Auxiliary Gauges)                  | **None Specified** | no responses / not common component                                                  |\n\n> INFORMATION & COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS\n\n| OEM Telematics (aka Telematics GateWay (TGW) / Off Vehicle Gateway / Communications Unit / Communications Telematics (CTP-FB)) (J1939 SA 249, 251) | **0**              | telematics device                                                                    |\n| -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------ | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |\n| Onboard Diagnostics Connector Gateway (aka Gateway (CGW)) (J1939 SA 39, 17, 44, 49, 50, 77)                                                        | **2**              | gateway device                                                                       |\n| 3rd Party Equipment Gateway (J1939 SA 249)                                                                                                         | **2**              | gateway device                                                                       |\n| Telematics Interface Gateway                                                                                                                       | **2**              | gateway device                                                                       |\n| On Board Diagnostic Unit (aka OEM Factory & Service tool) (J1939 SA 250)                                                                           | **3**              | 'high' scope change risk (assumes NGTTI with no J2497) and untrusted wired connection |\n| On-Board Data Logger (J1939 SA 251)                                                                                                                | **3**              | 'high' scope change risk (assumes NGTTI with no J2497) and untrusted wired connection |\n| Predictive Cruise Control (aka E-Horizon / Intelligent Predictive Powertrain Control (IPPC)) (J1939 SA 75)                                         | **3**              | 'high' scope change risk (assumes NGTTI with no J2497) and untrusted wired connection |\n| Information System Controller \\#1                                                                                                                  | **None Specified** | no responses / not common component                                                  |\n| On Board Diagnostic Unit \\#2                                                                                                                       | **None Specified** | no responses / not common component                                                  |\n\n> LIGHTS & SIGNALS\n\n| Chassis Controller \\#2 (J1939 SA 72)                   | **4** | 'medium' scope change risk (connected to two or more vehicle networks) |\n| ------------------------------------------------------ | ----- | --------------------------------------------------------------------- |\n| Adaptive Front Lighting System (J1939 SA 71)           | **6** | 'medium' overall fleet risk                                           |\n| Chassis Controller \\#1 (aka SAM Chassis) (J1939 SA 71) | **7** | 'low' overall fleet risk                                              |\n\n> AIR EQUIPMENT\n\n| Brake Telematics                                                         | **0**              | telematics device                                                                    |\n| ------------------------------------------------------------------------ | ------------------ | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |\n| Brakes - System Controller (J1939 SA 11)                                 | **1**              | has J2497 interface (in NA) which is accessible wirelessly                           |\n| Parking Brake Controller (J1939 SA 80)                                   | **3**              | 'high' scope change risk (assumes NGTTI with no J2497) and untrusted wired connection |\n| Pneumatic - System Controller (J1939 SA 48)                              | **5**              | 'high' overall fleet risk                                                            |\n| Auxiliary Valve Control or Engine Air System Valve Control (J1939 SA 34) | **7**              | 'low' overall fleet risk                                                             |\n| Brake Stroke Alert                                                       | **None Specified** | no responses / not common component                                                  |\n\nAll of the devices identified by the VCRWG are captured below, organized by their device class. This list can be useful when a particular device can not be found in the order sheet view above. If the device the fleet and OEM are interested in classifying cannot be found here then some device class characteristics are provided for determining membership of such unknown (to the VCRWG) devices.\n\n| Class                                           | Devices                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             | Heuristic                                                                                                                                                                        |\n| ----------------------------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |\n| 0 Telematics                                    | Engine Telematics (J1939 SA 249), <br> OEM Telematics (aka Telematics GateWay (TGW) / Off Vehicle Gateway / Communications Unit / Communications Telematics (CTP-FB)) (J1939 SA 249, 251), <br> Brake Telematics, <br> Transmission Telematics, <br> Exterior Camera Telematics, <br> Interior Camera Telematics                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    | Components of a telematics system or truck modules that otherwise connect to cellular, satellite or other Wide Area Networks (WANs), or the internet                             |\n| 1 Multi Segment with Wireless                   | Antilock Brake System (ABS) (J1939 SA 11), <br> Brakes - System Controller (J1939 SA 11), <br> Tire Pressure Controller (aka Tire Pressure Monitoring System (TPMS)) (J1939 SA 51), <br> Wheel End Monitoring, <br> Propulsion Battery Charger (J1939 SA 73), <br> Brakes - Drive axle \\#1 (J1939 SA 13), <br> Brakes - Drive Axle \\#2 (J1939 SA 14), <br> Vehicle Navigation (J1939 SA 84), <br> Radio (aka Head Unit / Infotainment) (J1939 SA 76, 84)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            | Truck modules that may or may not be intended to perform gateway functions (transport, translate, transform, filter or encapsulate data) and has at least one wireless interface |\n| 2 Vehicle Gateway                               | Onboard Diagnostics Connector Gateway (aka Gateway (CGW)) (J1939 SA 39, 17, 44, 49, 50, 77), <br> 3rd Party Equipment Gateway (J1939 SA 249), <br> Telematics Interface Gateway                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     | Truck modules intended to perform gateway functions (transport, translate, transform, filter or encapsulate data) between two or more vehicle network segments                   |\n| 3 Multi Segment with Untrusted Wired Connection | Tractor/Trailer Bridge \\#2 (J1939 SA 138, 39), <br> Thermal Management System Controller (J1939 SA 49), <br> Parking Brake Controller (J1939 SA 80), <br> Traction Control (J1939 SA 138, 39), <br> Water Pump Controller (J1939 SA 57), <br> Steering Input Unit (aka Steering Angle Sensor (SAS)), <br> On Board Diagnostic Unit (aka OEM Factory & Service tool) (J1939 SA 250), <br> Low-Voltage Disconnect (J1939 SA 49), <br> Fifth Wheel Smart System (J1939 SA 138, 39), <br> ADAS Lane Keep (aka LCS Side Sensor (blind spot only) / Lane Warning / Lane Departure Warning System / Bendix Fusion / Exterior Camera for Lane Departune Warning / Driver Assistance Camera (MPC)) (J1939 SA 232, 19), <br> Tractor-Trailer Bridge \\#1 (J1939 SA 32), <br> Engine \\#1 (aka Motor Control Module (MCM) / Engine Management System (EMS) / Engine Control Module (ECM)) (J1939 SA 00, 01), <br> Fan Drive Controller (aka Fan Hub) (J1939 SA 78), <br> Powertrain Control Module (aka Common Powertrain Controller Module (CPC)) (J1939 SA 90), <br> Transmission \\#1 (aka Transmission Control Module (TCM)) (J1939 SA 03), <br> Body-to-Vehicle Interface Control (aka VECU - Vehicle ECU) (J1939 SA 33), <br> Ignition Control Module \\#2 (J1939 SA 57), <br> Cab Controller - Primary (aka SAM CAB) (J1939 SA 49), <br> Cab Controller - Secondary (J1939 SA 50), <br> Starter System (J1939 SA 00, 03), <br> Fuel Heater, In-Tank (J1939 SA 72), <br> Differential Lock Controller (J1939 SA 138, 72, 39 ), <br> Suspension - Drive Axle \\#1 (J1939 SA 138, 72, 39), <br> Suspension - Drive Axle \\#2 (J1939 SA 22), <br> Cruise Control (J1939 SA 17), <br> Forward Road Image Processor (J1939 SA 232), <br> Object Detection Display (aka Active Safety Components / Bendix Fusion (Display)), <br> Ammeter (J1939 SA 23, 39), <br> On-Board Data Logger (J1939 SA 251), <br> Instrument Cluster \\#1 (aka Gauges) (J1939 SA 23), <br> ADAS Adaptive Cruise Control (aka Bendix Fusion) (J1939 SA 42), <br> Predictive Cruise Control (aka E-Horizon / Intelligent Predictive Powertrain Control (IPPC)) (J1939 SA 75), <br> Lighting - Operator Controls (J1939 SA 71) | Truck modules that are not intended to be Vehicle Gateways but nonetheless are connected to two or more vehicle network segments where one or more of those segments are untrusted.|\n| 4 Multi Segment                                 | Oil Sensor (J1939 SA 00), <br> Retarder - Engine (J1939 SA 15), <br> Radiator (aka Radiator Fan Control) (J1939 SA 78, 00, 255), <br> Oil Pan Heater (J1939 SA 00), <br> Electronic Clutch Actuator (J1939 SA 03), <br> Steering Controller (aka Front Axle Steering (FAS) / VDS / MCS) (J1939 SA 19), <br> Lift Axle (J1939 SA 138, 71), <br> Engine Injection Control Module (J1939 SA 00), <br> Fuel Actuator (J1939 SA 15), <br> Throttle (J1939 SA 0), <br> Headway Controller (J1939 SA 42), <br> Ignition Control Module \\#1 (J1939 SA 52), <br> Chassis Controller \\#2 (J1939 SA 72), <br> Transmission Display - Primary (J1939 SA 59), <br> Trip Recorder (J1939 SA 24), <br> Engine Display, <br> Axle - Drive \\#1 (J1939 SA 09), <br> Axle - Drive \\#2 (J1939 SA 10), <br> Mirrors (J1939 SA 40), <br> Switch Field (aka Additional Switches / Modular Switch Field (MSF)) (J1939 SA 138)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               | Truck modules that are not intended to be Vehicle Gateways but nonetheless are connected to two or more vehicle network segments where all of the segments are trusted.          |\n| Class 5                                         | Power TakeOff (Front or Secondary) (J1939 SA 07), <br> Idle Control System (J1939 SA 68), <br> Pneumatic - System Controller (J1939 SA 48), <br> Power TakeOff (PTO) Switches (J1939 SA 07), <br> Engine Cylinder Pressure Monitoring System, <br> Aftertreatment \\#1 system gas intake (J1939 SA 81), <br> Aftertreatment \\#2 system gas intake (J1939 SA 86), <br> Diesel Particulate Filter Controller (aka Aftertreatment Control Module (ACM) / Exhaust Emission Controller) (J1939 SA 211), <br> Engine Exhaust Backpressure (J1939 SA 34), <br> Retarder - Driveline (J1939 SA 16), <br> Power TakeOff - (Main or Rear) (J1939 SA 07), <br> Retarder, Exhaust, Engine \\#1, <br> Retarder, Exhaust, Engine \\#2                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                | Truck modules found to have a 'high' overall fleet risk                                                                                                                          |\n| Class 6                                         | Suspension - Steer Axle (aka Electronically Controlled Suspension (ECS) / Electronically Controlled Air Suspension (ECAS)) (J1939 SA 20), <br> Suspension - System Controller \\#1 (J1939 SA 47), <br> Automated Driving (L0-L2) (aka Bendix FLR and FLC (Forward looking Camera / Radar)), <br> Engine Valve Controller (J1939 SA 0), <br> Clutch/Converter Unit (J1939 SA 78), <br> Transmission \\#2 (aka Auxiliary Transmission) (J1939 SA 16), <br> Collision Avoidance (J1939 SA 42), <br> Body Controller (aka Key-Lock Options), <br> Shift Console - Primary (aka Gearshift ECU) (J1939 SA 05), <br> Safety Restraint System (SRS) (J1939 SA 83), <br> Vehicle Dynamic Stability Controller (J1939 SA 62), <br> Pyrometer, <br> Adaptive Front Lighting System (J1939 SA 71)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 | Truck modules found to have a 'medium' overall fleet risk                                                                                                                        |\n| Class 7                                         | Electric Propulsion Control Unit \\#1, <br> Retarder Display (J1939 SA 23), <br> Shift Console - Secondary (J1939 SA 06), <br> Transmission Display - Secondary (J1939 SA 60), <br> Chassis Controller \\#1 (aka SAM Chassis) (J1939 SA 71), <br> Passenger-Operator Climate Control \\#1 (aka LECM (Living Environment Control Module) / HVAC / HVAC FCU) (J1939 SA 25), <br> Battery Pack Monitor \\#1 (J1939 SA 243), <br> Slope Sensor (aka Hill Start Assist), <br> Aftertreatment \\#2 system gas outlet (J1939 SA 87), <br> Axle - Steering (J1939 SA 08), <br> Steering Column Unit (aka Turn Signal Control), <br> Steering Wheel Switches (J1939 SA 77), <br> Auxiliary Valve Control or Engine Air System Valve Control (J1939 SA 34), <br> Body Controller \\#2, <br> Passenger-Operator Climate Control \\#2 (aka HVAC \\#2 / HVAC ACU), <br> Aftertreatment \\#1 system gas outlet (aka NoX Sensors ) (J1939 SA 82), <br> Catalyst Fluid Sensor (aka DEF Quality Sensor) (J1939 SA 211), <br> Seat Control \\#1, <br> Turbocharger (J1939 SA 02), <br> Turbocharger Compressor Bypass (J1939 SA 02), <br> Turbocharger Wastegate (J1939 SA 02), <br> Air Intake System (J1939 SA 70), <br> Filtration Control, <br> Door Controller (J1939 SA 236), <br> Door Controller \\#1 (J1939 SA 237), <br> Engine Exhaust Gas Recirculation (J1939 SA 70), <br> Cab Display \\#1, <br> Alternator/Electrical Charging System, <br> Battery Charger, <br> Personnel Detection Device (aka Pedestrian Detection), <br> Door Controller \\#2, <br> Door Controller \\#3, <br> Door Controller \\#4, <br> Roadway Information, <br> Vehicle Security (J1939 SA 29)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               | Truck modules found to have a 'low' overall fleet risk                                                                                                                           |\n\n\n# Cybersecurity Requirements\n\nThe cybersecurity requirements are maintained in [StrictDoc](https://github.com/strictdoc-project/strictdoc) format in this repository under `requirements/` and are automatically published as interactive HTML documents, Requirements Interchange Format (ReqIF), and Excel supplier questionnaires.\n\n* [Online Documentation Site](https://nmfta-repo.github.io/nmfta-vehicle_cybersecurity_requirements/)\n* [Requirements Interchange Format (ReqIF)](https://nmfta-repo.github.io/nmfta-vehicle_cybersecurity_requirements/output.reqif)\n* [Supplier Questionnaires in Excel format](https://nmfta-repo.github.io/nmfta-vehicle_cybersecurity_requirements/vcr_questionnaires.xlsx)\n\nThe requirements incorporate the [Telematics Security Requirements Matrix](https://github.com/nmfta-repo/nmfta-telematics_security_requirements) for telematics systems (Class 0) and extend requirements across all heavy vehicle network device classes (Classes 1–7).\n\nIf you would like to join the working group please contact ben.gardiner@nmfta.org\n\n\n# License\n\nAll files are Copyright (c) 2022 National Motor Freight Traffic Association, Inc. and are made available under the MIT license.\n\nPermission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy\nof this software and associated documentation files (the \"Software\"), to deal\nin the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights\nto use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell\ncopies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is\nfurnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:\n\nThe above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all\ncopies or substantial portions of the Software.\n\nTHE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED \"AS IS\", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR\nIMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,\nFITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE\nAUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER\nLIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM,\nOUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE\nSOFTWARE.\n\n\n# Other Resources and History\n\nThe previous work on cybersecurity requirements by the NMFTA CTSRP (then, HVCS) was to create the Telematics Security Requirements Matrix https://github.com/nmfta-repo/nmfta-telematics_security_requirements . These requirements were ported to this project and re-applied where possible. The questionnaires for those requirements and also contract template language was captured in the https://github.com/nmfta-repo/nmfta-rfp_templates repo.\n\nThe initial work to create these requirements started with a vehicle network architecture survey in collaboration with OEMs. The results were:\n* a picture of 'typical' Class 7-8 truck networks, circa 2021 -- can be found in the \"degrees of separation\" captured in the [`resources/Component_Class_Assignment_v18_DRAFT.xlsx`](resources/Component_Class_Assignment_v18_DRAFT.xlsx)\n* a list of common components/modules/devices names and aliases -- mapped to the J1939 names wherever possible -- can be found in the \"reference names\" captured in the [`resources/Component_Class_Assignment_v18_DRAFT.xlsx`](resources/Component_Class_Assignment_v18_DRAFT.xlsx)\n* a risk analysis of components/modules/devices in those networks as it pertains to fleets (aka fleet risk)\n* the assignment of the components/modules/devices to *Device Classes* as captured above -- can be found in the \"proposed device class\" captured in the [`resources/Component_Class_Assignment_v18_DRAFT.xlsx`](resources/Component_Class_Assignment_v18_DRAFT.xlsx)\n\nSome preliminary work on capturing security (and functional) requirements for vehicle gateways performed during the Nov 2021 CTSRP meeting was done in the https://github.com/nmfta-repo/vcr-experiment where the [`strictdoc`](https://github.com/strictdoc-project/strictdoc) requirements format was assessed. A gap analysis of the Canis labs CAN security gateway against those requirements was performed in April 2022 and the analysis is available freely [here](https://kentindell.github.io/assets/docs/2201%202022-03-22%2036507b1b09a6dd9cdbc07c4e0686c4b16ed8a1a0d317726ccc9e3cc3060a4e39.pdf).\n\nThe test plan used by the CTSRP for onsite vehicle testing is provided as a starting point for an eventual acceptance test plan for these requirements; available here: [`resources/heavy vehicle testing plan.md`](resources/heavy_vehicle_testing_plan.md)",
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      "readme": "# Automotive Cybersecurity Test Accelerator\n\nA small, runnable Python CLI that turns a connected-vehicle security user story into a structured test plan. It is designed for a quick demo without API keys or third-party packages.\n\n## What it does\n\n- Reads a story from a text file.\n- Identifies security themes using a transparent local rules engine.\n- Generates prioritized test scenarios with purpose, expected outcome, and review notes.\n- Flags ambiguous requirements for human clarification.\n- Writes JSON and Markdown reports.\n- Includes unit tests and a repeatable demo benchmark.\n\n## Requirements\n\n- Python 3.10 or newer\n- No third-party packages required for the basic demo\n\n## Run in under 10 minutes\n\nFrom the project directory:\n\n```bash\npython src/accelerator.py --input examples/vehicle_api_story.txt --out reports/demo\n```\n\nExpected output files:\n- `reports/demo_test_plan.json`\n- `reports/demo_test_plan.md`\n\nRun the unit tests:\n\n```bash\npython -m unittest discover -s tests -v\n```\n\nRun a simple timing benchmark:\n\n```bash\npython src/benchmark.py\n```\n\n## Sample input\n\nSee `examples/vehicle_api_story.txt`.\n\n## Sample output\n\nSee `examples/sample_output.md` and `examples/sample_output.json`. Regenerate them with the command above.\n\n## Example scenario generated\n\nFor a story requiring vehicle-owner authorization, the accelerator can propose:\n- Owner can read their own vehicle's data with a valid token.\n- Owner is denied access to another owner's vehicle data.\n- Missing, expired, or malformed tokens are rejected.\n- A non-admin cannot invoke administrator-only functions.\n- Invalid identifiers and malformed input are handled safely.\n- Error responses do not disclose tokens or sensitive vehicle/owner data.\n\nThe generated status codes and expected behavior are recommendations only. Confirm them against the API contract and security requirements.\n\n## Design\n\n`src/accelerator.py` has three stages:\n1. Read the user story.\n2. Match story terms to scenario templates.\n3. Produce JSON and Markdown output.\n\nThe rules are intentionally inspectable so reviewers can understand why a scenario was generated. For a production version, replace or augment `generate_plan()` with an enterprise-approved LLM call that returns schema-validated JSON. Keep deterministic checks, safety boundaries, and human review regardless of model choice.\n\n## Evidence and measurement\n\nRun `python src/benchmark.py` to measure repeated local plan-generation time for the included sample story. The benchmark reports observed local timings and scenario count. These are **demo measurements on the machine where the command runs**, not production performance or evidence of real-world defect detection. Do not present them as historical project metrics.\n\nFor a meaningful pilot, compare the old manual workflow with this tool on the same set of stories and record:\n- Median minutes to first reviewable test plan.\n- Number of acceptance criteria mapped to scenarios.\n- Number of missing/incorrect scenarios found during human review.\n- Percentage of generated scenarios accepted with minor/no edits.\n- Duplicate or invalid defect rate after test execution.\n\n## Limitations and risks\n\n- This prototype generates test ideas; it does not connect to Jira/Azure DevOps or execute requests against a vehicle platform.\n- Keyword matching can miss context, generate irrelevant scenarios, or fail to understand complex requirements.\n- The tool cannot confirm that an endpoint, status code, role, or test selector exists.\n- It does not prove compliance with ISO/SAE 21434, UNECE R155/R156, or any other standard.\n- A human must review scenarios and map them to approved fixtures before execution.\n- Use synthetic data only. Never paste secrets, personal data, production URLs, or real vehicle identifiers into story files.\n- Never use this prototype to probe production systems or issue real vehicle commands.\n\n## Suggested next step\n\nAdd a project-specific adapter for the approved staging API and a pytest test layer that uses dedicated synthetic accounts. Add Jira/Azure DevOps integration only after access scopes, audit logging, data handling, and duplicate-defect behavior have been reviewed.\n\n## AI assistance disclosure\n\nChatGPT assisted with structuring the prototype, sample scenarios, documentation, and test cases. The included prototype uses deterministic local rules and does not call an LLM. The author should review, run, and adapt the code and disclose assistance according to the assessment rules.",
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      "title": "The Inventory Crisis and Transformation Plan for EV Charging Infrastructure",
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      "readme": "[gemini-code-1779707465711.md](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/28219136/gemini-code-1779707465711.md)\n# The Inventory Crisis and Transformation Plan for EV Charging Infrastructure\n## In-depth Research Report on the Technology and Market of OCPP Security Proxy Gateway\n\n### Executive Summary\nWith the exponential growth of the global Electric Vehicle (EV) market, Electric Vehicle Supply Equipment (EVSE) has become critical national infrastructure. However, this rapid expansion masks a severe reality: there is a vast global inventory of existing charging stations, predominantly operating on early Open Charge Point Protocol (OCPP) versions (OCPP 1.5 or 1.6J) and largely supporting only the lowest security configurations (Security Profile 0 or 1). This architecture, reliant on plain-text communication, exposes millions of charging assets to risks such as data interception, man-in-the-middle attacks, and Denial of Service (DoS) attacks.\n\nIn the face of increasingly stringent international cybersecurity regulations—such as the UK’s Electric Vehicles (Smart Charge Points) Regulations 2021, the EU’s Radio Equipment Directive (RED) and AFIR Regulation, and the US NEVI Program—Charging Point Operators (CPOs) face a dilemma: shoulder massive capital expenditures for hardware replacement, or risk compliance penalties and operational disruption.\n\nThis report proposes and validates a transformative solution: the **OCPP Security Proxy Gateway**. By introducing a hardware intermediary layer deployed between the charging station and the internet, this product transparently converts unsecured connections (Profile 0/1) into encrypted, secure connections (Profile 2/3), and offers enterprise-grade protection—including intrusion detection, traffic monitoring, and secure boot—for legacy devices through the EU EN18031 cybersecurity certification.\n\nThe report details how WiseWish Technology’s OCPP Security Proxy Gateway helps CPOs resolve the security compliance issue for existing assets effectively, achieving a seamless technical upgrade, covering underlying technology, cryptographic agility, EN18031 compliance benefits, and full lifecycle cost analysis.\n\n---\n\n### 1. Technical Vulnerability Overview of Existing Charging Infrastructure\nTo understand the market necessity of the OCPP Security Proxy Gateway, one must first deeply analyze the technological gap in the current installed base. The core conflict is that most existing devices remain at Profile 0 or 1, while regulations mandate reaching Profile 2 or 3.\n\n#### 1.1 Generational Gap in OCPP Security Profiles and Risk Exposure\n* **Security Profile 0/1 (Insecure Transport):** Communication between the charging station and the Central Management System (CSMS) is based on standard WebSocket (ws://) or HTTP protocols. All critical data is transmitted in plain text. Attackers can read and tamper with this data if they access the local network (LAN) or intercept ISP traffic, potentially leading to energy theft or service disruption.\n* **Security Profile 2 (TLS with Basic Authentication):** Introduces Transport Layer Security (TLS) to upgrade the communication channel to encrypted WebSocket (wss://). CSMS must have a server certificate, and the authentication uses basic password verification.\n* **Security Profile 3 (Client Certificate-Based TLS):** The highest current security standard, requiring mutual authentication (mTLS). The charging station itself must hold a unique client certificate and present it to the server during the TLS handshake.\n\nUpgrading from Profile 1 to Profile 3 requires the terminal device to possess a secure storage area for private keys, the computational capacity to handle certificate chain validation, and a network stack supporting Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP). Legacy devices often lack these capabilities.\n\n#### 1.2 The \"Crypto-Agility\" Crisis and the Physical Limits of Embedded Hardware\nWhy can't CPOs simply enable TLS functionality via an Over-The-Air (OTA) firmware update? The answer lies in the physical limitations of early embedded Microcontrollers (MCUs) (such as Cortex-M3/M4 architectures), which constitutes a serious \"Crypto-Agility\" crisis.\n\n* **Memory (RAM) Bottleneck:** TLS 1.2/1.3 protocol stacks require significant RAM to cache the certificate chain. Optimized libraries like mbedTLS still occupy tens of KB of heap memory. For older MCUs, enabling TLS means insufficient memory to run core logic, leading to device crashes.\n* **Computational Performance (CPU) Overhead:** The TLS handshake involves computationally intensive asymmetric encryption algorithms (like RSA or ECC). On low-power MCUs, a complete handshake may take several seconds. Frequent reconnections keep the CPU under high load, affecting charging control and potentially triggering a watchdog timeout.\n* **Storage (Flash) and File System Limitations:** Profile 2/3 requires storing a list of trusted Root Certificate Authorities (Root CA), which needs regular updating. Many old devices lack sufficient Flash space to dynamically manage these certificates.\n\n**Table 1: Technical Constraints Analysis for Traditional Embedded MCUs Running the TLS Protocol**\n\n| Hardware Resource | Traditional Non-Secure Mode (Profile 0/1) | Modern Secure Mode (Profile 2/3) | Bottlenecks Faced by Existing Devices |\n| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |\n| **RAM Occupancy** | < 10 KB (used for TCP/IP stack). | > 50-100 KB (used for TLS handshake caching). | Memory overflow leading to system crash. |\n| **Flash Storage** | Only needs to store application firmware. | Requires storage for Root CA list, client certificates, and private key. | Lack of secure storage area; insufficient space to update CA list. |\n| **CPU Performance** | Low, mainly used for IO control. | High, requires modular exponentiations during handshake. | Excessive handshake delay leading to communication timeout. |\n| **Crypto Suites** | None. | Needs modern suites like AES-GCM, ECDHE-RSA. | Hardware accelerator does not support new algorithms, causing performance issues. |\n\nRelying on software upgrades to enable old hardware to support modern security protocols is often physically infeasible. The gateway solves this constraint by providing a \"security coprocessor\".\n\n---\n\n### 2. Architectural Mechanism and Transparent Bridging Technology\nThe gateway is a high-performance embedded Linux edge computing device deployed on the local network side of the charging station.\n\n#### 2.1 Transparent Proxy and Bi-directional Protocol Conversion\nThe gateway uses a proxy architecture, splitting the single communication link into two sessions.\n* **Southbound Interface:** Simulates a CSMS locally, accepting Profile 1 (ws://) connections from the station.\n* **Northbound Interface:** Acts as the true OCPP client, initiating a Profile 2/3 (wss://) connection to the cloud CSMS over WAN.\n\nThe gateway encapsulates the plain-text request in a TLS tunnel with its own client certificate and forwards it to the cloud. The station communicates with a non-encrypted server locally, while the cloud receives a compliant, secure connection.\n\n#### 2.2 Centralized Certificate Full Lifecycle Management\nCentralized certificate lifecycle management enables scaled deployment of Profile 3 across networks containing thousands of stations. Without it, certificate updates would require dispatching personnel for on-site maintenance, leading to rising operating costs.\n\n* **Traditional Dilemma:** Old stations usually do not support the ACME protocol or remote certificate uploading, requiring on-site reprogramming upon expiration.\n* **Gateway Advantage:** The Gateway intercepts SignCertificate.req and InstallCertificate.req commands from the CSMS. It utilizes its Linux environment to act on behalf of the station to generate the CSR, manage keys, and update root certificates without forwarding commands the legacy backend wouldn't recognize. Rotation is completed transparently at the gateway layer.\n\n---\n\n### 3. Market Drivers Analysis: CPO Compliance and Economics\n\n#### 3.1 The Economics of Retrofitting\nDismantling old stations for new ones is highly expensive.\n\n**Table 2: Full Cost Comparison Analysis of Inventory Asset Retrofit Solutions**\n\n| Cost Element | Complete Replacement (Level 2 AC) | Complete Replacement (DC Fast Charger) | OCPP Security Proxy Gateway Retrofit |\n| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |\n| **Hardware Procurement Cost** | $500 - $2,500 | $25,000 - $150,000 | $100 - $200 |\n| **Installation Labor Cost** | $400 - $1,800 | $3,000 - $10,000+ | $100 - $200 |\n| **Civil Works / Power Access** | $2,500 - $20,000 | Extremely high | $0 (Bypasses infrastructure upgrades) |\n| **Total Estimated Cost** | **$3,400 - $24,000+** | **$38,000 - $210,000+** | **$200 - $400** |\n\nFor a network of 1,000 AC stations, the gateway solution costs less than 10% of a complete replacement scheme. For DC fast chargers, it avoids substantial civil works.\n\n#### 3.2 Operational Expenditure (OPEX) and Revenue Protection\nReplacing stations introduces implicit costs: downtime.\n* **Loss of Revenue:** Replacing a DC charger requires weeks of downtime, generating zero revenue.\n* **Operational Efficiency:** Gateway installation is generally plug-and-play. A technician can complete it within 30 minutes, minimizing impact on operations.\n\n---\n\n### 4. Regulatory Compliance Framework\n\n* **UK Regulations:** The Electric Vehicles (Smart Charge Points) Regulations 2021 mandate anti-tampering, secure logging, and encrypted communication. Non-compliance can result in penalties up to £10,000 per device.\n* **EU Requirements:** Effective August 2025, equipment must comply with the RED (Articles 3.3 d, e, f). The Gateway’s prior EN18031 standard certification provides Secure Boot, Secure Storage, and Network Monitoring, allowing legacy chargers to meet 2025 market entry requirements.\n\n---\n\n### 5. Operational Dividends Beyond Compliance\nThe gateway transforms legacy systems into smart nodes.\n\n#### 5.1 Defense in Depth via EN18031\nThe gateway provides a \"Defense in Depth\" system.\n* **Intrusion Detection:** Built-in system monitors LAN traffic to identify and block DoS attacks, preventing malicious traffic from exhausting the MCU.\n* **Secure Storage Mechanism:** Compliant with EN18031, TLS private keys are encrypted and securely stored, mitigating extraction risks.\n* **Resilience Mechanism:** Traffic Control Mechanisms prevent the backend station from being overwhelmed during abnormal connection floods.\n\n#### 5.2 Enabling Smart Charging and Future-Proofing\n* **Protocol Translation:** The gateway acts as a \"Local Controller,\" translating complex OCPP 2.0.1 commands from the CSMS into limiting commands that OCPP 1.6J stations can execute. This enables Demand Response participation.\n* **Crypto-Agility:** While embedded hardware is highly difficult to upgrade, the independent computing unit of the gateway can support future Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) via software updates.\n\n---\n\n### 6. Implementation Scenario\n**Scenario:** A UK CPO operates 2,000 AC stations (OCPP 1.6J over ws://) that cannot support TLS due to MCU limits. They face compliance risks (OPSS regulations), security vulnerabilities (DNS hijacking), and high replacement costs (£3.5 million/12 months).\n\n**Deployment:** * **Installation:** In-series mounting takes about 20 minutes per unit.\n* **Configuration:** The gateway establishes a TLS 1.3 tunnel to the cloud.\n* **Results:** The link achieves encryption, meeting Schedule 1 requirements. Total investment is controlled to under £300,000, saving significant funds compared to replacement without large-scale downtime.\n\n#### 6.1 Hardware Gateway vs. Cloud Proxy\nA \"Cloud-to-Cloud\" proxy leaves the \"first mile\" (station to ISP) in plain text, exposed to LAN and ISP-level MITM attacks. A hardware gateway completes encryption at the physical edge, providing an effective scheme to close the loop on end-to-end security and addressing LAN attacks with a distinct advantage.\n\n---\n\n### 7. Conclusion\nWiseWish Technology’s OCPP Security Proxy Gateway addresses the industry's critical pain point: bridging insufficient hardware capabilities and stringent security regulations. For CPOs, it offers:\n* **Financial De-risking:** Avoiding premature asset write-offs and reducing capital expenditure.\n* **Compliance:** Meeting UK OPSS, EU RED/EN18031, and US NEVI requirements.\n* **Technical Empowerment:** Integrating legacy assets into modern management frameworks to extend their lifecycle.",
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      "description": "OCPP 1.6J charge point simulator for the browser or Node.js: several connectors, Smart Charging, cars, a charging site behind one grid connection, and a garage drawn to scale with cables, phases and voltage drop.",
      "readme": "# ocpp-virtual-charger\n\nAn **OCPP 1.6J charge point that runs in your browser or in Node.js**, with no install and no dependencies.\nPoint it at any central system (CSMS), start and stop sessions, and watch every frame go by.\nOr put **a whole charging site** behind one grid connection and see whether your CSMS shares the power well.\n\n**▶ Garage simulator (draw your garage): https://askacharge.com/askacharge/en/garage-charging-simulator/** · [en español](https://askacharge.com/askacharge/simulador-garaje/)\n**▶ One charger: https://askacharge.com/askacharge/virtual-charger/**\n**▶ A charging site: https://askacharge.com/askacharge/virtual-charger/site.html** · [video, 2 min](https://youtu.be/_y8upeAv78g)\n\n![Cars driving into a garage drawn to scale; every cable shows its live current on each phase](docs/garage.gif)\n\nIt behaves like a real charger on the wire:\n\n- `BootNotification`, heartbeats at the interval the CSMS asks for, `StatusNotification` for every change.\n- Full sessions: `Preparing` → `StartTransaction` → `Charging` with `MeterValues` (energy register, power, current)\n  → `StopTransaction` → `Finishing` → `Available`. `StopTransaction` always goes before `Available`: some CSMSs\n  close a session as abandoned when `Available` arrives first.\n- Answers `RemoteStartTransaction`, `RemoteStopTransaction`, `GetConfiguration`, `TriggerMessage`\n  (Heartbeat, StatusNotification, MeterValues, BootNotification) and `UnlockConnector`.\n- **Network outage simulation**: it keeps charging while offline, queues its `MeterValues`, `StatusNotification`\n  and `StopTransaction`, and delivers them in order, with their original timestamps, when it reconnects.\n  Useful to check how your CSMS handles late meter values.\n- Reconnects on its own when the connection drops, like real hardware, and stops after 5 refused handshakes in a row\n  instead of hammering the CSMS.\n- Commands that act, not just answer: `Reset` reboots it, `ChangeAvailability` takes it out of service (`Scheduled`\n  while charging), `UnlockConnector` releases the cable, interval changes apply.\n- **Credential provisioning**: in Node it accepts `ChangeConfiguration AuthorizationKey` (and `SecurityProfile` up to 2)\n  and reconnects with Basic Auth, the way a CSMS hands a key to a new charger. In a browser it answers `NotSupported`.\n- Power selector on the demo page: 3.7, 7.4, 11, 22 kW AC and 50, 150 kW DC.\n- **Several connectors** per charge point (1 to 8), each with its own session, meter and status.\n- **Smart Charging that really limits the power**: `SetChargingProfile`, `ClearChargingProfile` and\n  `GetCompositeSchedule`, with `ChargePointMaxProfile`, `TxDefaultProfile` (connector 0 or one connector) and\n  `TxProfile` (also inside `RemoteStartTransaction`), stack levels, Absolute/Relative/Recurring schedules, amps or\n  watts. The next meter value shows the new power.\n- **Cars**: battery size, state of charge, what they accept in AC/DC and on how many phases. A car never draws less\n  than 6 A per phase while it isn't full; when the limit leaves less than that, it waits (`SuspendedEVSE`); when it is\n  full, it stops by itself (`SuspendedEV`). If a cap can't give 6 A to everyone, the first to arrive charges and the\n  others wait, never all of them below the minimum. `MeterValues` carry `SoC`.\n- **Power cut** (not just a network cut): sessions end with reason `PowerLoss`, delivered when the charger boots again.\n\n## A charging site\n\n`site.html` is a car park seen from above, with a small building next to it and one grid connection (LGA) for both,\nfor testing load balancing. Click a charger to give it a name (added to a generic OCPP address) and a power; cars drive\nin, plug in, tap their card, charge and leave when full or after a while. Settings on the page: LGA power (3×25 A to\n3×250 A), building load with random peaks, the main breaker tripping if the site goes over the LGA for 10, 30 or 60 s,\nhow many chargers (1 to 6, one or two hoses), how fast the batteries fill and how often cars arrive. It shows the load\nagainst the LGA, a 10-minute chart, and each bay with its status, power, state of charge and the profile limiting it.\nThe LGA (single or three-phase, main fuse) is set in its own dialog, with the building load and, optionally, a **local load\nbalancer (SB)** that caps the chargers itself outside OCPP, the way a site device does: minimum first in order of arrival,\nthe rest shared. The CSMS's profiles still apply on top, so you can test a CSMS with and without a balancer underneath.\n\n![The plan: outline with its measurements, bays, entrance, main board, chargers and cables with their current and voltage drop](docs/plan.png)\n\n**Plan view** (`plano.js`, the *Plan* tab): draw the garage to scale — click its corners and fix each stretch's length\nand turn; it tells you if the outline does not close instead of closing it for you — add rows of bays, place the main\nboard and the chargers, and draw the **cables** from the main board along their route, each with its breaker and\ncross-section; drag a cable's corners to reroute it, or the dot in the middle of a stretch to add a corner. Every cable shows its current and an approximate **voltage drop** (copper, γ = 48, cos φ = 1, each\ncharger at its point on the cable; 5 % limit from the origin of the circuit to the charging point, as in Spain's\nITC-BT-52), the local balancer keeps every cable under its breaker, and a cable overloaded for longer than the main\nbreaker setting trips and its chargers lose power. Add the **entrance** (a door in one wall) and cars drive in and out\nthrough it. Every cable shows its live current **on each phase** (P1/P2/P3): three-phase cars load all three alike,\nsingle-phase ones (or 3.7/7.4 kW chargers) only their charger's phase, which you set in the charger's dialog (on a twin\ncharger the second hose goes on the next phase), so you see at once whether a garage ends up unbalanced; a cable trips\non its busiest phase. As soon as the outline closes, the *Car park* tab draws your garage live — asphalt, painted bays,\nthe main board with its breaker, the LGA and every cable carrying current — each hose parking its cars in the nearest\nbay; it says what is missing and why no car is coming (site off, chargers not connected). Plans save and load as JSON\n(`\"format\": \"ocpp-virtual-charger/plan\"`).\n\n![The car park drawn from the plan: cars charging, each cable tagged with its current per phase](docs/car-park.png)\n\nIt is a simulator: for a real project, use a proper electrical design tool.\n\nFrom Node, with Basic Auth per charger (what a browser can't send), the same site runs from a scenario file and prints\na table every few seconds:\n\n```bash\nnode examples/site.js examples/site.example.json\n```\n\n## Use it in the browser\n\nOpen `index.html` (or the live demo), paste an OCPP URL that ends in the charger identity, and press **Connect**.\n\nNo CSMS at hand? The [askacharge.com OCPP test server](https://askacharge.com/askacharge/en/ocpp-test-server.html)\ngives you a free URL with no account, validates every frame against the official OCA JSON schemas and shows you\nwhat it sees.\n\nOr embed it in your own page:\n\n```html\n<script src=\"ocpp-virtual-charger.js\"></script>\n<script>\n  const charger = OcppVirtualCharger('wss://your-csms.example/ocpp/CP-001', {\n    onChange: state => console.log(state.status, state.meterWh),\n    onFrame: (direction, frame) => console.log(direction, frame),\n  });\n  charger.start();      // local start, as if a card had been tapped\n  charger.stop();       // local stop\n  charger.outage(20);   // 20 seconds without network\n  charger.close();\n</script>\n```\n\n## Use it from Node.js\n\nNode.js 22+ has a global `WebSocket`, so it runs as is:\n\n```bash\nnode examples/node.js wss://your-csms.example/ocpp/CP-001\n```\n\nNode can also send **Basic Auth** (OCPP security profile 1 and 2), which browsers can't:\n\n```js\nconst OcppVirtualCharger = require('./ocpp-virtual-charger.js');\nconst auth = 'Basic ' + Buffer.from('CP-001:your-authorization-key').toString('base64');\nconst charger = OcppVirtualCharger('wss://your-csms.example/ocpp/CP-001', {\n  createSocket: (url, protocols) => new WebSocket(url, { protocols, headers: { Authorization: auth } }),\n});\n```\n\n## Options\n\n| Option | Default | |\n|---|---|---|\n| `onChange(state)` | — | Called on every state change |\n| `onFrame(direction, frame)` | — | `'out'` or `'in'`, with the raw OCPP-J frame |\n| `vendor`, `model`, `firmware` | `ocpp-virtual-charger`, `Virtual charger`, `1.0` | Sent in `BootNotification`, cut to the OCPP 1.6 limits (20, 20 and 50 characters) |\n| `powerKw` | `7.4` | Rated power. Up to 7.4 kW: one-phase AC; up to 22 kW: three-phase AC (current on L1, L2, L3); above: DC. `setPower(kw)` changes it, mid-session too |\n| `meterIntervalSec` | `5` | `MeterValues` interval while charging |\n| `heartbeatSec` | `60` | Until the CSMS sets its own interval |\n| `idTag` | `VIRTUAL-CARD` | Card used by `start()` |\n| `createSocket(url, protocols)` | global `WebSocket` | Return any WebSocket-like object (headers, proxies…) |\n\n## What it is not\n\nSaid plainly, so you don't find out the hard way:\n\n- **OCPP 1.6J only**. No OCPP 2.0.1 yet.\n- In the browser it **cannot send Basic Auth**: WebSocket APIs in browsers don't allow custom headers. Use a CSMS\n  that accepts the charger without a password, or run it from Node.\n- `ChangeConfiguration` applies `HeartbeatInterval`, `MeterValueSampleInterval` and, in Node, `AuthorizationKey`\n  and `SecurityProfile` (1-2). Any other key it knows is read-only (`Rejected`); the rest, `NotSupported`.\n  `ClearCache` is accepted: there is no cache to clear.\n- Firmware, diagnostics, reservations and local lists answer `NotImplemented`.\n- The physics are simplified on purpose: flat charging curves with a taper near the end, 230 V per phase, DC current\n  at a 400 V battery, building load as a random walk. Good for seeing what a CSMS does, not for sizing an installation.\n- The site page doesn't measure the grid for your CSMS: it shows what the chargers draw. A CSMS that reads a real\n  meter needs its own channel for that (MQTT, Modbus, an API), which is outside OCPP 1.6.\n- It is a simulator for development, demos and testing, **not a conformance tester**. For certification-grade\n  testing, the Open Charge Alliance has the OCTT.\n\n## En español\n\nUn cargador OCPP 1.6J que funciona en el navegador o en Node.js, sin instalar nada. Lo apuntas a cualquier\nplataforma de gestión (CSMS), arrancas y paras cargas, simulas cortes de red y ves cada mensaje.\nDemo: https://askacharge.com/askacharge/virtual-charger/ · Instalación con varios cargadores, acometida y\nreparto de carga: https://askacharge.com/askacharge/virtual-charger/site.html · Si no tienes un CSMS a mano, el\n[servidor de pruebas de askacharge.com](https://askacharge.com/askacharge/probar-ocpp.html) te da una dirección gratis y sin cuenta.\n**Simulador de recarga para garajes: https://askacharge.com/askacharge/simulador-garaje/** — en la pestaña *Plano*\ndibujas el garaje con sus medidas, las plazas, la entrada, el cuadro, los cargadores y las líneas con su protección y\nsección; ves la corriente de cada fase (R, S, T) y la caída de tensión aproximada de cada línea (límite del 5 %,\nITC-BT-52), el SB respeta cada línea y una línea sobrecargada salta por su fase más cargada.\n\n## Tests\n\n```bash\nnpm test   # node --test, no network: an in-memory CSMS checks profiles, sharing, cars and power cuts\n```\n\n## License\n\nMIT © 2026 Javier Ojanguren ([askacharge.com](https://askacharge.com/askacharge/?src=github-ovc)).\nBorn inside askacharge.com, an open-standards EV charging platform, where it powers the\n[dashboard tester](https://askacharge.com/askacharge/en/ocpp-test-panel.html?virtual=1).",
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      "readme": "# Speedometer ECU Simulator\n\nA futuristic **Tkinter-based GUI** that simulates a real automotive Speedometer ECU. It speaks the **UDS diagnostic protocol** over a virtual CAN bus (`vcan0`), making it a perfect practice target for automotive security testing, CAN fuzzing tools like **FucyFuzz**, or just learning how ECU diagnostics work.\n\n---\n\n## What This Tool Does\n\n- Renders a live **holographic-style speedometer dial** with animated needle, RPM arc, gear indicator, fuel level, coolant temp, and battery voltage\n- Runs a full **UDS/ISO-TP stack** on `vcan0` — responds to real diagnostic requests (ReadDID, WriteData, SecurityAccess, ECUReset, etc.)\n- Comes with a **Vulnerability Engine** — load a JSON profile to arm intentional ECU weaknesses for fuzz testing\n- Logs every UDS frame, raw CAN frame, and vulnerability trigger in separate panels, exportable to `.log` / `.jsonl`\n\n---\n\n## Requirements\n\n| Requirement | Why |\n|---|---|\n| Ubuntu / Debian Linux | `vcan0` virtual CAN requires the Linux kernel `vcan` module |\n| Python 3.8+ | Core runtime |\n| `python3-tk` | GUI (Tkinter) |\n| `python-can` | CAN bus interface library |\n| `can-isotp` *(optional)* | Only needed if you want to send test frames from your own scripts |\n\n---\n\n## Setup & Run\n\n### Step 1 — Clone or copy the project\n\n```bash\ngit clone https://github.com/ameersmu2004-rgb/Speedometer-ECU-Simulator.git\ncd Speedometer-ECU-Simulator/speedo-ecu\n```\n\n### Step 2 — One-command launch *(recommended)*\n\n```bash\nchmod +x run.sh\n./run.sh\n```\n\n`run.sh` automatically:\n- Checks for Python 3\n- Installs `python3-tk` and `python-can` if missing\n- Sets up the `vcan0` virtual CAN interface\n- Launches the GUI\n\n---\n\n### Manual Setup (if you prefer step-by-step)\n\n**Install dependencies:**\n```bash\nsudo apt update\nsudo apt install -y python3-tk\npip3 install python-can --break-system-packages\n```\n\n**Set up the virtual CAN interface:**\n```bash\nsudo modprobe vcan\nsudo ip link add dev vcan0 type vcan\nsudo ip link set up vcan0\n```\n\n> You need to run the `ip link` commands every reboot. The `run.sh` script handles this automatically each time.\n\n**Launch the GUI:**\n```bash\npython3 main_speedo.py\n```\n\n---\n\n## Using the GUI\n\nOnce running, the GUI opens with three main areas:\n\n### Left Panel — Speedometer Dial\nThe animated dial auto-runs a physics simulation: the ECU starts parked, accelerates, cruises, then brakes in a loop. All live values (speed, RPM, fuel, temp) update in real time.\n\n### Right Panel — Controls & Logs\n| Tab | What it shows |\n|---|---|\n| **UDS Log** | Every UDS request and response (SID, DID, NRC) |\n| **Raw Frame Log** | Raw CAN frames when `vcan0` is active |\n| **Oracle / Vuln Log** | Vulnerability hits and oracle events |\n\n### Loading a Vulnerability Profile\n1. Click **Load Vuln JSON** in the controls\n2. Select `speedometer_vulns.json` (included in the project folder)\n3. The Oracle is now armed — specific malformed UDS frames will trigger logged vulnerability events\n\n---\n\n## Sending UDS Frames From Your Own Tool\n\nOnce the GUI is running, `vcan0` is live. You can talk to it from any tool (FucyFuzz, cantools, raw Python):\n\n```bash\npip3 install can-isotp\n```\n\n```python\n# Read Vehicle Speed (DID 0xF40D)\nimport can, isotp, time\n\nbus   = can.Bus('vcan0', bustype='socketcan')\naddr  = isotp.Address(isotp.AddressingMode.Normal_11bits, txid=0x7E0, rxid=0x7E8)\nstack = isotp.CanStack(bus, address=addr)\n\nstack.send(bytes([0x22, 0xF4, 0x0D]))\ntime.sleep(0.2)\nstack.process()\n\nif stack.available():\n    print('Response:', stack.recv().hex().upper())\n\nbus.shutdown()\n```\n\n**ECU Address Config:**\n\n| | Value |\n|---|---|\n| Tester → ECU (RX) | `0x7E0` |\n| ECU → Tester (TX) | `0x7E8` |\n| Interface | `vcan0` |\n\n---\n\n## Supported UDS Services\n\n| SID | Service |\n|---|---|\n| `0x10` | DiagnosticSessionControl (Default / Extended / Programming) |\n| `0x11` | ECUReset |\n| `0x27` | SecurityAccess (seed/key challenge) |\n| `0x22` | ReadDataByIdentifier |\n| `0x2E` | WriteDataByIdentifier |\n| `0x3E` | TesterPresent |\n| `0x19` | ReadDTCInformation |\n| `0x14` | ClearDTC |\n| `0x28` | CommunicationControl |\n\n---\n\n## Project Structure\n\n```\nspeedo-ecu/\n├── main_speedo.py          ← Entry point — run this\n├── speedo_gui.py           ← Tkinter GUI (dial, gauges, log panels)\n├── speedo_ecu.py           ← UDS service handler\n├── speedo_state.py         ← ECU state + physics simulation loop\n├── speedometer_vulns.json  ← Vulnerability profiles for the Oracle engine\n├── run.sh                  ← Auto-setup + launch script\n├── config.py               ← CAN interface / address config\n├── uds_core.py             ← UDS protocol core\n├── uds_constants.py        ← SID / NRC hex constants\n├── uds_helpers.py          ← Hex formatting helpers\n├── isotp_server.py         ← ISO-TP framing layer\n├── vulnerability_engine.py ← Evaluates frames against vuln profiles\n├── vulnerability_config.py ← Loads JSON vuln config\n├── logger.py               ← Structured logger (text + JSONL)\n├── ecu_memory.py           ← Virtual NVM / memory map\n├── ecu_state.py            ← Base ECU state class\n└── logs/                   ← Auto-created; session logs saved here\n```\n\n---\n\n## Troubleshooting\n\n**`ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'can'`**\n```bash\npip3 install python-can --break-system-packages\n```\n\n**`ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'tkinter'`**\n```bash\nsudo apt install python3-tk\n```\n\n**`vcan0` not found / CAN frames not appearing**\n```bash\nsudo modprobe vcan\nsudo ip link add dev vcan0 type vcan\nsudo ip link set up vcan0\n```\n\n**GUI opens but dial is blank / frozen**\nMake sure you are running on a display (not a headless SSH session). If using SSH, forward the display with `ssh -X` or use a desktop session.\n\n---\n\n## License\n\nBuilt as part of the FucyTech automotive cybersecurity internship project. For research and educational use.",
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      "title": "◈ DOOR ECU Simulator",
      "full_name": "ameersmu2004-rgb/DOOR_ECU",
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      "url": "https://github.com/ameersmu2004-rgb/DOOR_ECU",
      "description": "Futuristic DOOR ECU Simulator with live animated dial, UDS/ISO-TP diagnostic stack over vcan0, and a vulnerability engine for automotive CAN fuzzing research.",
      "readme": "# ◈ DOOR ECU Simulator\n\nA futuristic, holographic-HUD style Door ECU Simulator built on the\nUDS/CAN diagnostic framework. Features a live animated automotive door control\nsystem with real-time ECU state simulation.\n\n## Quick Start\n\n```bash\ncd DOOR_ECU\nchmod +x run.sh\n./run.sh\n```\n\nThe script will auto-install missing dependencies and set up vcan0.\n\n## Manual Run\n\n```bash\n# Install deps\npip3 install python-can --break-system-packages\n\n# Setup vcan (optional — for real CAN tester tools)\nsudo modprobe vcan\nsudo ip link add dev vcan0 type vcan\nsudo ip link set up vcan0\n\n# Launch\npython3 main_door.py\n```\n\n## Features\n\n### 🖥 Futuristic Door ECU Dashboard\n- Animated door lock / unlock controls\n- Live window up/down simulation\n- Child lock indicator\n- Mirror fold / unfold animation\n- Interior light status indicators\n- Real-time ECU state updates\n\n### 📊 Live Telemetry Indicators\n- Door Lock Status\n- Window Position\n- Child Lock State\n- Mirror Position\n- Cabin Light Status\n- ECU Power State\n\n### ⚠ Active Warning Indicators\n- DOOR OPEN\n- CHILD LOCK ACTIVE\n- WINDOW JAM WARNING\n- LOW BATTERY\n- COMMUNICATION ERROR\n\n### 🔬 UDS Diagnostic Support\nAll standard UDS services supported:\n\n| SID  | Service |\n|------|---------|\n| 0x10 | DiagnosticSessionControl (Default / Extended / Programming) |\n| 0x11 | ECUReset |\n| 0x27 | SecurityAccess (seed/key challenge) |\n| 0x22 | ReadDataByIdentifier |\n| 0x2E | WriteDataByIdentifier |\n| 0x3E | TesterPresent |\n| 0x19 | ReadDTCInformation |\n| 0x14 | ClearDTC |\n| 0x28 | CommunicationControl |\n\n### 📋 DIDs Supported\n\n| DID    | Description |\n|--------|-------------|\n| 0xF190 | Door Lock Status |\n| 0xF191 | Window Position |\n| 0xF192 | Child Lock State |\n| 0xF193 | Mirror Position |\n| 0xF194 | Cabin Light State |\n| 0xF186 | Active Session |\n| 0xF187 | Part Number |\n| 0xF189 | SW Version |\n\n### 🔴 Oracle / Vulnerability Engine\n\nLoad the included `door_vulns.json` (or any compatible JSON) to arm\nthe vulnerability engine:\n\n- **DOOR-001** — Door lock state overflow\n- **DOOR-002** — Child lock bypass\n- **DOOR-003** — Rapid ReadDID DoS attack\n- **DOOR-004** — Programming session bypass\n- **DOOR-005** — Weak security seed challenge\n- **DOOR-006** — Unauthorized window control write\n\n### 📁 Log Panels\n- **UDS Diagnostic Log** — All UDS requests / responses\n- **Raw Frame Log** — CAN frames (when vcan0 is active)\n- **Oracle / Vuln Log** — Vulnerability detections and oracle events\n\n### 💾 JSON Load / Unload\nHot-swap vulnerability profiles without restarting the ECU.\n\n### 📤 Export Log\nSave the session log to `.log` or `.jsonl` files.\n\n## Testing with cantools / isotp\n\n```bash\n# Install tools\npip3 install can-isotp python-can\n\n# Send a ReadDataByIdentifier for Door Lock Status\npython3 -c \"\nimport can, isotp, time\nbus = can.Bus('vcan0', bustype='socketcan')\naddr = isotp.Address(isotp.AddressingMode.Normal_11bits, txid=0x7E0, rxid=0x7E8)\nstack = isotp.CanStack(bus, address=addr)\nstack.send(bytes([0x22, 0xF1, 0x90]))\ntime.sleep(0.2)\nstack.process()\nif stack.available():\n    print('Response:', stack.recv().hex().upper())\nbus.shutdown()\n\"\n```\n\n## File Structure\n\n```text\nDOOR_ECU/\n├── main_door.py            ← Entry point\n├── door_gui.py             ← Futuristic GUI\n├── door_ecu.py             ← UDS service handler\n├── door_state.py           ← ECU state simulation\n├── door_vulns.json         ← Vulnerability profiles\n├── run.sh                  ← One-click launcher\n│\n│   (Shared ECU framework:)\n├── uds_core.py             ← UDS protocol core\n├── uds_constants.py        ← SID / NRC constants\n├── uds_helpers.py          ← Hex formatting helpers\n├── isotp_server.py         ← ISO-TP transport layer\n├── vulnerability_engine.py ← Vulnerability evaluation engine\n├── vulnerability_config.py ← JSON config loader\n├── logger.py               ← Structured logger\n├── ecu_memory.py           ← Virtual memory / NVM\n└── logs/                   ← Auto-created log directory\n```",
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      "title": "OverRide: A Malware Framework for Attacking Self-Driving Systems",
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      "readme": "# OverRide: A Malware Framework for Attacking Self-Driving Systems\nCybercrime-Forensics/Security research report designing a theoretical malware framework targeting autonomous vehicles via spoofed OTA updates. Covers C2  infrastructure, persistence mechanisms, monetisation strategies,  UK legal frameworks, and a full digital forensics response plan.\n\n\n## Overview\nA theoretical malware framework targeting autonomous vehicles via spoofed\nOver-the-Air (OTA) software updates. This report covers attack design,\nmonetisation strategies, mitigation, and forensic response.\n\n## Attack Design Highlights\n- **Initial Access:** Supply chain compromise via certificate spoofing and fake\n  OTA infrastructure\n- **C2 Infrastructure:** P2P mesh network (inspired by Mirai/Hajime), Tor hidden\n  services, Domain Generation Algorithms (DGAs), and steganographic channels\n- **Persistence:** Blockchain-based fallback C2 via Ethereum smart contracts\n- **Monetisation:** Vehicle ransomware, data exfiltration, remote hijacking,\n  corporate sabotage\n\n## Mitigation Strategies Covered\n- Secure boot, HSMs, CAN bus segmentation, ML-based IDS\n- UK legal frameworks: Computer Misuse Act 1990, PSTI Act 2022\n- Economic incentives and developer education\n\n## Forensic Response\n- Tools: Volatility, Ghidra, Zeek, Suricata, Chainalysis\n- Evidence standards: ACPO guidelines, UK CPS digital evidence requirements\n- Attribution: MITRE ATT&CK, MLAT international cooperation\n\n## Key Skills Demonstrated\n`Threat Modelling` `Malware Analysis` `Digital Forensics` `C2 Architecture`\n`UK Cybercrime Law` `Incident Response`\n\n## Reflection\n\nDesigning OverRide from the attacker's perspective was a genuinely different\nway of engaging with security concepts. Rather than asking \"how do we stop this?\",\nthe exercise forced me to think about what makes an attack operationally robust —\nand the answer, consistently, was redundancy and decentralisation. P2P C2, DGAs,\nTor, and blockchain fallbacks each individually address a single point of failure;\ntogether they form a system that is extremely difficult to fully dismantle.\n\nThe most unsettling part of the research was how closely OverRide mirrors\nreal-world precedent. The Jeep Cherokee remote exploit and Tesla Autopilot adversarial\npatch research are not theoretical — they demonstrate that automotive attack surfaces\nare already being actively probed. Framing this as a formal malware lifecycle made it\nclear how quickly a targeted research effort could become a monetised criminal operation.\n\nWriting the mitigation section also highlighted a recurring tension in security\nengineering: the most technically robust countermeasures (HSMs, TEEs, CAN bus\nsegmentation) are often impractical to retrofit onto legacy systems, meaning\nthe vehicles most vulnerable are precisely those already on the road. This isn't\na problem that can be solved purely through engineering — it requires regulatory\npressure, economic incentives, and coordinated international legal frameworks\nworking together.",
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      "readme": "# tiny-can\n## If you would like a tiny-can PCB feel free to contact me on Bluesky @mintynet.com, I will send if you cover the cost of postage.\n<br>This repository has the arduino code for use with tiny-can PCBs.\n<br>This was created as a cheap device for people to get into car hacking, it is based on the new Attiny1614 microcontroller which has hardware SPI to connect to the MCP2515 CAN controller, it also uses the SN65HVD230 3,3v CAN transceiver. The ATTINY 0 and 1 series of processors do need programming using three wire UPDI, more details in the link below.<br>\nhttp://www.technoblogy.com/show?2OCH\n<br>At time of creation the attiny1614 costs about £0.60.\n# <b>I take no responsibility for any issues caused if using either the hardware or the code</b>\n<br><br>Requires the use of the following Arduino library\n<br><br>https://github.com/coryjfowler/MCP_CAN_lib\n<br><br>The <b>tiny-slcan</b> sketch is slcan compatible software but the serial chip on the arduino boards I use will only run at 500000bps.\n<br><br>If you use the following CP2102 serial adapter, pressing H will give you the bash script to allow you to start slcand under linux.\nhttps://www.ebay.co.uk/itm/401062572142\n<br><br>There are 4 PCBs.\n#### tiny-can PCB\n![tiny-can pcb schematic](pics/Schematic_tiny-can-pcb.png)\n<br>Small PCB with Processor/CAN controller/transceiver<br>\n![tiny-can pcb top](pics/tiny-can-pcb-top.png)\n<br>Small PCB with Processor/CAN controller/transceiver TOP<br>\n![tiny-can pcb bottom](pics/tiny-can-pcb-bottom.png)\n<br>Small PCB with Processor/CAN controller/transceiver BOTTOM<br>\n#### tiny-can Power only PCB (can be used for implant on OBD2 port)\n![tiny-can Power only pcb schematic](pics/Schematic_power-obd2.png)\n<br>Small PCB with Power circuit<br>\n![tiny-can pcb top](pics/power-only-top.png)\n<br>Small PCB with Power circuit TOP<br>\n![tiny-can pcb bottom](pics/power-only-bottom.png)\n<br>Small PCB with Power circuit BOTTOM<br>\n![tiny-can-implant-front](photos/tiny-can-implant-front.jpg)\n![tiny-can-implant-rear](photos/tiny-can-implant-rear.jpg)\n![tiny-can-implant-side](photos/tiny-can-implant-side.jpg)\n#### tiny-can Power and Serial PCB (used with slcan sketch for cheap CAN adapter)\n![tiny-can pcb top](pics/power+serial-top.png)\n<br>Small PCB with Power and Serial circuit TOP<br>\n![tiny-can pcb bottom](pics/power+serial-bottom.png)\n<br>Small PCB with Power and Serial BOTTOM<br>\n![tiny-slcan-front](photos/tiny-slcan-front.jpg)\n![tiny-slcan-rear](photos/tiny-slcan-rear.jpg)\n![tiny-slcan-side](photos/tiny-slcan-side.jpg)\n#### tiny-can plug PCB (fits inside a J1942 Male Plug)\n![tiny-can plug pcb schematic](pics/Schematic_tiny-can-plug-pcb.png)\n<br>Small PCB with Processor/CAN controller/transceiver and Serial header<br>\n![tiny-can plug pcb top](pics/tiny-can-plug-pcb-top.png)\n<br>Small PCB with Processor/CAN controller/transceiver and Serial header TOP<br>\n![tiny-can plug pcb bottom](pics/tiny-can-plug-pcb-bottom.png)\n<br>Small PCB with Processor/CAN controller/transceiver and Serial header BOTTOM<br>\n![tiny-can-plug-front](photos/tiny-can-plug-front.jpg)\n![tiny-can-plug-rear](photos/tiny-can-plug-rear.jpg)\n![tiny-can-plug-front-shell](photos/tiny-can-plug-front-shell.jpg)\n![tiny-can-plug-rear-shell](photos/tiny-can-plug-rear-shell.jpg)\n<br><br>Notes for connecting to OBD2 plug.\n<br>CAN L goes to OBD2 pin 14\n<br>CAN H goes to OBD2 pin 6",
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      "title": "PyUDSim: A High-Fidelity UDS ECU Simulator",
      "full_name": "Talsaniya-Khyat/uds-ecu",
      "name": "uds-ecu",
      "owner": "Talsaniya-Khyat",
      "url": "https://github.com/Talsaniya-Khyat/uds-ecu",
      "description": "A powerful, multi-ECU UDS (ISO 14229-1) simulator in Python. Realistically mimics session, security, and ISO-TP behavior for automotive security testing.",
      "readme": "# PyUDSim: A High-Fidelity UDS ECU Simulator\n\n![Python Version](https://img.shields.io/badge/python-3.8+-blue.svg)\n![Status](https://img.shields.io/badge/status-stable-green.svg)\n\nA powerful, multi-ECU UDS (ISO 14229-1) simulator in Python for automotive security testing, research, and development.\n\nThis tool runs on a virtual CAN interface (`vcan`) and realistically mimics the behavior of real-world ECUs. It enforces strict session and security rules, supports multi-frame ISO-TP communication, and is driven by a simple JSON configuration.\n\n---\n\n## 🚀 Key Features\n\n* **Multi-ECU Simulation:** Simulate an entire car network (Engine, BCM, etc.) from a single config file.\n* **High-Fidelity State:** The simulator is stateful. It tracks the current **Diagnostic Session** and **Security Access** level for each ECU.\n* **Strict UDS Compliance:** Services are realistically locked down.\n    * Try to flash in the *default session*? You'll get NRC `0x7F` (Service Not Supported In Active Session).\n    * Try to write a DID without unlocking? You'll get NRC `0x33` (Security Access Denied).\n* **Full ISO-TP Support:** Automatically handles multi-frame (ISO 15765-2) responses for services like `0x19` (Read DTC) or `0x22` (Read DID).\n* **Config-Driven:** Easily define your own DIDs, DTCs, security rules, and routines in `ecu_config.json`. No code changes required.\n* **Realistic Security:** The `0x27` (Security Access) service generates a random seed and writes the correct key to `key_solution.txt` for easy testing.\n* **Modular Framework:** Built with an object-oriented `BaseEcu` class, making it simple to extend or add new, custom services.\n\n---\n\n## 🔧 Installation & Setup\n\nThis tool is built for a Linux environment with `can-utils`.\n\n### 1. Clone the Repository\n```bash\ngit clone [https://github.com/your-username/pyudsim.git](https://github.com/your-username/pyudsim.git)\ncd pyudsim\n````\n\n### 2\\. Install Dependencies\n\nThe only dependency is `python-can`.\n\n```bash\npip3 install -r requirements.txt\n# (or just: pip3 install python-can)\n```\n\n### 3\\. Set Up Virtual CAN (vcan)\n\nYou must create a virtual CAN interface for the simulator and your test tools to communicate on.\n\n```bash\n# Load the vcan kernel module\nsudo modprobe vcan\n\n# Create the 'vcan0' interface\nsudo ip link add dev vcan0 type vcan\n\n# Bring the interface online\nsudo ip link set up vcan0\n```\n\n-----\n\n## 🎮 How to Use\n\nThis simulator is designed to run in one terminal while you attack it from another.\n\n### Terminal 1: Run the Simulator\n\nRun `main.py` and point it to your CAN interface. Using `--debug` is highly recommended.\n\n```bash\npython3 main.py --iface vcan0 --debug\n```\n\nYou will see the ECUs from your `ecu_config.json` file load and start listening.\n\n```\nStarting UDS Simulator on vcan0...\nCAN Bus connection successful.\nLoading ECUs from config...\n  [+] Loaded ECU: EngineECU (Req: 0x7E0, Resp: 0x7E8)\n  [+] Loaded ECU: BodyControlModule (Req: 0x7E1, Resp: 0x7E9)\n\nSimulator running. Listening for 2 ECU(s). Press Ctrl+C to exit.\n```\n\n### Terminal 2: Send CAN Commands\n\nUse `can-utils` (like `cansend`) or your favorite CAN tool to interact with the ECUs.\n\nAll UDS requests must be single-frame or multi-frame ISO-TP.\n\n**Format:** `cansend <interface> <request_id>#<ISO-TP_DATA>`\n\n**Example:**\n\n  * **Service:** `10 03` (Go to Extended Session)\n  * **ISO-TP Frame:** `02 10 03` (Length: 2, SID: 10, Sub-function: 03)\n  * **Command:**\n    ```bash\n    cansend vcan0 7E0#021003\n    ```\n\n-----\n\n## 📖 Example Walkthrough: Unlocking an ECU\n\nLet's test the realism. We'll try to write to a DID on the `EngineECU` (ID `7E0`).\n\n**1. Go to Extended Session (10 03)**\n\n```bash\ncansend vcan0 7E0#021003\n```\n\n  * **Response (in Terminal 1):** `< 065003003201F400` (Success\\!)\n\n**2. Try to write to DID `100B` (2E 100B AA)**\n\n  * This DID requires Security Access (see `ecu_config.json`).\n  * *This will fail.*\n\n<!-- end list -->\n\n```bash\ncansend vcan0 7E0#052E100BAA\n```\n\n  * **Response:** `< 037F2E3300000000` (NRC: `0x33` - Security Access Denied)\n\n**3. Request Seed (27 01)**\n\n```bash\ncansend vcan0 7E0#022701\n```\n\n  * **Response:** `< 066701AABBCCDD00` (Success, with a 4-byte seed, e.g., `AABBCCDD`)\n\n**4. Get the Key**\n\n  * The simulator has just created a file named `key_solution.txt`.\n\n<!-- end list -->\n\n```bash\ncat key_solution.txt\n```\n\n```\nECU: EngineECU\nSEED: 0xAABBCCDD\nKEY:  0x2D239A99\n```\n\n**5. Send the Key (27 02)**\n\n  * Use the key from the file.\n\n<!-- end list -->\n\n```bash\ncansend vcan0 7E0#0627022D239A99\n```\n\n  * **Response:** `< 0267020000000000` (Success\\! The ECU is now unlocked.)\n\n**6. Try to Write Again (2E 100B AA)**\n\n  * Now that we are in the extended session AND unlocked...\n  * *This will succeed.*\n\n<!-- end list -->\n\n```bash\ncansend vcan0 7E0#052E100BAA\n```\n\n  * **Response:** `< 036E100B00000000` (Positive Response\\! The DID was written.)\n\n-----\n\n## ⚙️ Configuration (`ecu_config.json`)\n\nThis file is the brain of the simulator. You can define all your ECUs, DIDs, DTCs, and security rules here.\n\n```json\n{\n  \"ecus\": [\n    {\n      \"name\": \"EngineECU\",\n      \"request_id\": \"7E0\",\n      \"response_id\": \"7E8\",\n      \"session_timeout\": 5,\n      \"initial_dtcs\": [\n        { \"code\": \"P0101\", \"status\": 42 },\n        { \"code\": \"P0300\", \"status\": 10 }\n      ],\n      \"dids\": {\n        \"F190\": { \"data\": \"4543552D53572D56312E322E33\" },\n        \"100B\": {\n          \"data\": \"FEEDFACE\",\n          \"writable\": true,\n          \"session\": [3],\n          \"security\": [1]\n        }\n      },\n      \"routines\": {\n        \"FF01\": {\n          \"name\": \"Check System\",\n          \"status\": \"idle\",\n          \"results\": \"C0FFEE\",\n          \"session\": [3],\n          \"security\": [0, 1]\n        }\n      }\n    }\n  ]\n}\n```\n\n  * **`initial_dtcs`**: A list of DTCs the ECU will have at boot.\n  * **`dids`**: Define Data Identifiers.\n      * **`data`**: The hex data the DID will return.\n      * **`writable`**: (Optional) `true` if `0x2E` is allowed.\n      * **`session`**: (Optional) A list of session IDs (1, 2, 3) where this DID is accessible.\n      * **`security`**: (Optional) A list of security levels (0=Locked, 1=Unlocked) where this DID is accessible.\n  * **`routines`**: Define Routines for `0x31`, each with its own `session` and `security` rules.\n\n-----\n\n## ✅ Implemented Services\n\n| SID | Service Name | Status | Notes |\n|---|---|---|---|\n| `0x10` | Diagnostic Session Control | **Fully Implemented** | Responds with P2/P2\\* timings. |\n| `0x11` | ECU Reset | **Fully Implemented** | Simulates `hardReset` & `softReset`. |\n| `0x14` | Clear DTCs | **Fully Implemented** | Clears the internal DTC list. Requires Extended. |\n| `0x19` | Read DTC Information | **Fully Implemented** | Sub-funcs `0x01`, `0x02`. Requires Extended. |\n| `0x22` | Read Data by Identifier | **Fully Implemented** | Reads from JSON, enforces session/security. |\n| `0x23` | Read Memory by Address | **Fully Implemented** | Reads from 64KB sim-memory. Requires SecAccess. |\n| `0x27` | Security Access | **Fully Implemented** | Seed/Key (XOR algo). Creates `key_solution.txt`. |\n| `0x2E` | Write Data by Identifier | **Fully Implemented** | Writes to config state. Requires SecAccess. |\n| `0x2F` | Input Output Control | **Fully Implemented** | Controls JSON IO state. Requires SecAccess. |\n| `0x31` | Routine Control | **Fully Implemented** | Start/Stop/Results. Enforces rules from JSON. |\n| `0x34` | Request Download | **Fully Implemented** | Starts flash sequence. Requires Prog/SecAccess. |\n| `0x36` | Transfer Data | **Fully Implemented** | Handles data blocks for flashing. |\n| `0x37` | Request Transfer Exit | **Fully Implemented** | Verifies flash and exits state. |\n| `0x3D` | Write Memory by Address | **Fully Implemented** | Writes to 64KB sim-memory. Requires Prog/SecAccess. |\n| `0x3E` | Tester Present | **Fully Implemented** | Resets session timer. |\n| `0x85` | Control DTC Setting | **Fully Implemented** | Turns DTC reporting On/Off. Requires Extended. |\n| *other* | All Other SIDs | **Stubbed** | Return NRC `0x11` (Service Not Supported). |\n\n-----\n\n## 🤝 Contributing\n\nPull Requests are welcome\\! If you add a new feature or fix a bug, please feel free to contribute.\n\n1.  Fork the repository.\n2.  Create your feature branch (`git checkout -b feature/AmazingFeature`).\n3.  Commit your changes (`git commit -m 'Add some AmazingFeature'`).\n4.  Push to the branch (`git push origin feature/AmazingFeature`).\n5.  Open a Pull Request.",
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      "title": "UDS Diagnostic Tool - ISO 14229-1",
      "full_name": "alvarodcastro/UDS-SHELL",
      "name": "UDS-SHELL",
      "owner": "alvarodcastro",
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      "description": "Automotive diagnostic and research tool implementing the ISO 14229-1 supporting advances capabilities for automotive security testing",
      "readme": "# UDS Diagnostic Tool - ISO 14229-1\n\nAutomotive diagnostic and research tool implementing the ISO 14229-1 (Unified Diagnostic Services) standard. Designed for automotive engineers, cybersecurity researchers, and diagnostic tool developers, this tool provides advanced capabilities for ECU communication, discovery, and security testing.\n\n---\n\n## Why Use This Tool?\n- **Comprehensive UDS Support**: Implements all 28 UDS services with accurate message formatting.\n- **Research-Driven**: Ideal for protocol analysis, vulnerability assessment, and cybersecurity research.\n- **Multi-Platform Compatibility**: Supports SocketCAN, PCAN, Vector, and virtual CAN interfaces.\n- **Interactive CLI**: User-friendly command-line interface with auto-completion and detailed help.\n- **Extensible**: Modular design for easy integration and customization.\n\n---\n\n## Features\n\n### 🎯 Core Capabilities\n\n- **Full ISO 14229-1 Implementation**: All 28 UDS services with proper message formatting.\n- **Interactive CLI**: Command-prompt style interface with auto-completion and help.\n- **ECU State Machine**: Tracks diagnostic sessions, security levels, and S3 timeouts.\n- **UDS Discovery**: CaringCaribou-style passive and active ECU identification.\n- **Service Fuzzing**: Security testing and vulnerability assessment.\n- **Multi-Interface Support**: SocketCAN, PCAN, Vector, and virtual mode.\n\n---\n\n## Installation\n\n### Prerequisites\n\n```bash\n# Install Python 3.8+\nsudo apt-get install python3 python3-pip\n\n# For real CAN hardware, install can-utils\nsudo apt-get install can-utils\n\n# Set up virtual CAN for testing\nsudo modprobe vcan\nsudo ip link add dev vcan0 type vcan\nsudo ip link set vcan0 up\n```\n\n### Install Tool\n\n```bash\n# Clone repository\ncd uds_diagnostic_tool\n\n# Install dependencies\npip3 install -r requirements.txt\n\n# Make main script executable\nchmod +x main.py\n```\n\n---\n\n## Quick Start\n\n### 1. Virtual Mode (No Hardware Required)\n\n```bash\n# Start in simulation mode\npython3 main.py --virtual\n```\n\n### 2. Real CAN Hardware\n\n```bash\n# Start with SocketCAN\npython3 main.py --interface socketcan --channel can0 --bitrate 500000\n```\n\n### 3. Discover ECUs\n\n```bash\npython3 main.py --virtual\n\nUDS> discover\n[*] Scanning CAN bus for UDS ECUs...\n[+] Found 2 UDS ECU(s):\n  1. TX: 0x7E0 | RX: 0x7E8 | Services: 8\n  2. TX: 0x700 | RX: 0x708 | Services: 6\n\nUDS> connect 0x7E0 0x7E8\n```\n\n---\n\n## Security Considerations\n\n⚠️ **WARNING**: This tool provides direct access to ECU diagnostic services. Improper use can cause:\n- ECU malfunction or damage\n- Vehicle safety system failures\n- Warranty void\n- Legal issues\n\n**Best Practices**:\n1. Only use on authorized vehicles/ECUs.\n2. Test in controlled/isolated environments first.\n3. Understand ISO 14229-1 security mechanisms.\n4. Back up ECU calibration data before programming.\n5. Follow automotive cybersecurity guidelines (ISO/SAE 21434).\n6. Never fuzz safety-critical systems in production vehicles.\n\n---\n\n## Usage Guide\n\n### Connection Commands\n\n#### connect\n```bash\n# Connect to ECU\nconnect <tx_id> <rx_id>\n\n# Examples\nconnect 0x7E0 0x7E8      # Standard OBD-II\nconnect 0x700 0x708      # Custom IDs\n```\n\n#### discover\n```bash\n# Passive scan (listen to bus)\ndiscover\n\n# Longer passive scan\ndiscover --scan-time 5\n\n# Active brute force scan\ndiscover --brute-force\n```\n\n#### disconnect\n```bash\n# Disconnect from current ECU\ndisconnect\n```\n\n#### status\n```bash\n# Show current connection and session status\nstatus\n```\n\n---\n\n## Development\n\n### Running Tests\n```bash\npytest tests/\npytest tests/ --cov=src/uds_tool\n```\n\n### Code Style\n```bash\nblack src/\npylint src/uds_tool/\n```\n\n---\n\n## References\n\n- **ISO 14229-1:2020** - Unified Diagnostic Services (UDS) - Part 1: Application layer\n- **ISO 14229-2:2013** - UDS - Part 2: Session layer services\n- **ISO 15765-2** - Diagnostic communication over CAN (DoCAN) / ISO-TP\n- **SAE J1979** - E/E Diagnostic Test Modes\n- **CaringCaribou** - https://github.com/CaringCaribou/caringcaribou\n\n---\n\n## Contributing\n\nContributions welcome! Please ensure:\n- ISO 14229-1 compliance.\n- Comprehensive testing.\n- Clear documentation.\n- Security considerations.\n\n---\n\n**Disclaimer**: This tool is for professional automotive diagnostics and security research. Always obtain proper authorization before testing vehicle systems.",
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      "description": "NOTICE This repository contains the public FTC SDK for the SKYSTONE (2019-2020) competition season. If you are looking for the current season's FTC SDK software, please visit the new and permanent home of the public FTC SDK: FtcRobotController repository Welcome! This GitHub repository contains the source code that is used to build an Android app to control a FIRST Tech Challenge competition robot. To use this SDK, download/clone the entire project to your local computer. Getting Started If you are new to robotics or new to the FIRST Tech Challenge, then you should consider reviewing the FTC Blocks Tutorial to get familiar with how to use the control system: FTC Blocks Online Tutorial Even if you are an advanced Java programmer, it is helpful to start with the FTC Blocks tutorial, and then migrate to the OnBot Java Tool or to Android Studio afterwards. Downloading the Project If you are an Android Studio programmer, there are several ways to download this repo. 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You can access this documentation using the following link: SKYSTONE Online Documentation Note that the online documentation is an \"evergreen\" document that is constantly being updated and edited. It contains the most current information about the FIRST Tech Challenge software and control system. Javadoc Reference Material The Javadoc reference documentation for the FTC SDK is now available online. Click on the following link to view the FTC SDK Javadoc documentation as a live website: FTC Javadoc Documentation Documentation for the FTC SDK is also included with this repository. There is a subfolder called \"doc\" which contains several subfolders: The folder \"apk\" contains the .apk files for the FTC Driver Station and FTC Robot Controller apps. The folder \"javadoc\" contains the JavaDoc user documentation for the FTC SDK. Online User Forum For technical questions regarding the Control System or the FTC SDK, please visit the FTC Technology forum: FTC Technology Forum Release Information Version 5.5 (20200824-090813) Version 5.5 requires Android Studio 4.0 or later. New features Adds support for calling custom Java classes from Blocks OpModes (fixes SkyStone issue #161). Classes must be in the org.firstinspires.ftc.teamcode package. Methods must be public static and have no more than 21 parameters. Parameters declared as OpMode, LinearOpMode, Telemetry, and HardwareMap are supported and the argument is provided automatically, regardless of the order of the parameters. On the block, the sockets for those parameters are automatically filled in. Parameters declared as char or java.lang.Character will accept any block that returns text and will only use the first character in the text. Parameters declared as boolean or java.lang.Boolean will accept any block that returns boolean. Parameters declared as byte, java.lang.Byte, short, java.lang.Short, int, java.lang.Integer, long, or java.lang.Long, will accept any block that returns a number and will round that value to the nearest whole number. Parameters declared as float, java.lang.Float, double, java.lang.Double will accept any block that returns a number. Adds telemetry API method for setting display format Classic Monospace HTML (certain tags only) Adds blocks support for switching cameras. Adds Blocks support for TensorFlow Object Detection with a custom model. Adds support for uploading a custom TensorFlow Object Detection model in the Manage page, which is especially useful for Blocks and OnBotJava users. Shows new Control Hub blink codes when the WiFi band is switched using the Control Hub's button (only possible on Control Hub OS 1.1.2) Adds new warnings which can be disabled in the Advanced RC Settings Mismatched app versions warning Unnecessary 2.4 GHz WiFi usage warning REV Hub is running outdated firmware (older than version 1.8.2) Adds support for Sony PS4 gamepad, and reworks how gamepads work on the Driver Station Removes preference which sets gamepad type based on driver position. Replaced with menu which allows specifying type for gamepads with unknown VID and PID Attempts to auto-detect gamepad type based on USB VID and PID If gamepad VID and PID is not known, use type specified by user for that VID and PID If gamepad VID and PID is not known AND the user has not specified a type for that VID and PID, an educated guess is made about how to map the gamepad Driver Station will now attempt to automatically recover from a gamepad disconnecting, and re-assign it to the position it was assigned to when it dropped If only one gamepad is assigned and it drops: it can be recovered If two gamepads are assigned, and have different VID/PID signatures, and only one drops: it will be recovered If two gamepads are assigned, and have different VID/PID signatures, and BOTH drop: both will be recovered If two gamepads are assigned, and have the same VID/PID signatures, and only one drops: it will be recovered If two gamepads are assigned, and have the same VID/PID signatures, and BOTH drop: neither will be recovered, because of the ambiguity of the gamepads when they re-appear on the USB bus. 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Removes the deprecated LinearOpMode methods waitOneFullHardwareCycle() and waitForNextHardwareCycle() Enhancements Handles RS485 address of Control Hub automatically The Control Hub is automatically given a reserved address Existing configuration files will continue to work All addresses in the range of 1-10 are still available for Expansion Hubs The Control Hub light will now normally be solid green, without blinking to indicate the address The Control Hub will not be shown on the Expansion Hub Address Change settings page Improves REV Hub firmware updater The user can now choose between all available firmware update files Version 1.8.2 of the REV Hub firmware is bundled into the Robot Controller app. Text was added to clarify that Expansion Hubs can only be updated via USB. Firmware update speed was reduced to improve reliability Allows REV Hub firmware to be updated directly from the Manage webpage Improves log viewer on Robot Controller Horizontal scrolling support (no longer word wrapped) Supports pinch-to-zoom Uses a monospaced font Error messages are highlighted New color scheme Attempts to force-stop a runaway/stuck OpMode without restarting the entire app Not all types of runaway conditions are stoppable, but if the user code attempts to talk to hardware during the runaway, the system should be able to capture it. Makes various tweaks to the Self Inspect screen Renames \"OS version\" entry to \"Android version\" Renames \"WiFi Direct Name\" to \"WiFi Name\" Adds Control Hub OS version, when viewing the report of a Control Hub Hides the airplane mode entry, when viewing the report of a Control Hub Removes check for ZTE Speed Channel Changer Shows firmware version for all Expansion and Control Hubs Reworks network settings portion of Manage page All network settings are now applied with a single click The WiFi Direct channel of phone-based Robot Controllers can now be changed from the Manage page WiFi channels are filtered by band (2.4 vs 5 GHz) and whether they overlap with other channels The current WiFi channel is pre-selected on phone-based Robot Controllers, and Control Hubs running OS 1.1.2 or later. On Control Hubs running OS 1.1.2 or later, you can choose to have the system automatically select a channel on the 5 GHz band Improves OnBotJava New light and dark themes replace the old themes (chaos, github, chrome,...) the new default theme is light and will be used when you first update to this version OnBotJava now has a tabbed editor Read-only offline mode Improves function of \"exit\" menu item on Robot Controller and Driver Station Now guaranteed to be fully stopped and unloaded from memory Shows a warning message if a LinearOpMode exists prematurely due to failure to monitor for the start condition Improves error message shown when the Driver Station and Robot Controller are incompatible with each other Driver Station OpMode Control Panel now disabled while a Restart Robot is in progress Disables advanced settings related to WiFi direct when the Robot Controller is a Control Hub. Tint phone battery icons on Driver Station when low/critical. Uses names \"Control Hub Portal\" and \"Control Hub\" (when appropriate) in new configuration files Improve I2C read performance Very large improvement on Control Hub; up to ~2x faster with small (e.g. 6 byte) reads Not as apparent on Expansion Hubs connected to a phone Update/refresh build infrastructure Update to 'androidx' support library from 'com.android.support:appcompat', which is end-of-life Update targetSdkVersion and compileSdkVersion to 28 Update Android Studio's Android plugin to latest Fix reported build timestamp in 'About' screen Add sample illustrating manual webcam use: ConceptWebcam Bug fixes Fixes SkyStone issue #248 Fixes SkyStone issue #232 and modifies bulk caching semantics to allow for cache-preserving MANUAL/AUTO transitions. Improves performance when REV 2M distance sensor is unplugged Improves readability of Toast messages on certain devices Allows a Driver Station to connect to a Robot Controller after another has disconnected Improves generation of fake serial numbers for UVC cameras which do not provide a real serial number Previously some devices would assign such cameras a serial of 0:0 and fail to open and start streaming Fixes ftc_app issue #638. Fixes a slew of bugs with the Vuforia camera monitor including: Fixes bug where preview could be displayed with a wonky aspect ratio Fixes bug where preview could be cut off in landscape Fixes bug where preview got totally messed up when rotating phone Fixes bug where crosshair could drift off target when using webcams Fixes issue in UVC driver on some devices (ftc_app 681) if streaming was started/stopped multiple times in a row Issue manifested as kernel panic on devices which do not have this kernel patch. On affected devices which do have the patch, the issue was manifest as simply a failure to start streaming. The Tech Team believes that the root cause of the issue is a bug in the Linux kernel XHCI driver. A workaround was implemented in the SDK UVC driver. Fixes bug in UVC driver where often half the frames from the camera would be dropped (e.g. only 15FPS delivered during a streaming session configured for 30FPS). Fixes issue where TensorFlow Object Detection would show results whose confidence was lower than the minimum confidence parameter. Fixes a potential exploitation issue of CVE-2019-11358 in OnBotJava Fixes changing the address of an Expansion Hub with additional Expansion Hubs connected to it Preserves the Control Hub's network connection when \"Restart Robot\" is selected Fixes issue where device scans would fail while the Robot was restarting Fix RenderScript usage Use androidx.renderscript variant: increased compatibility Use RenderScript in Java mode, not native: simplifies build Fixes webcam-frame-to-bitmap conversion problem: alpha channel wasn't being initialized, only R, G, & B Fixes possible arithmetic overflow in Deadline Fixes deadlock in Vuforia webcam support which could cause 5-second delays when stopping OpMode Version 5.4 (20200108-101156) Fixes SkyStone issue #88 Adds an inspection item that notes when a robot controller (Control Hub) is using the factory default password. Fixes SkyStone issue #61 Fixes SkyStone issue #142 Fixes ftc_app issue #417 by adding more current and voltage monitoring capabilities for REV Hubs. Fixes a crash sometimes caused by OnBotJava activity Improves OnBotJava autosave functionality ftc_app #738 Fixes system responsiveness issue when an Expansion Hub is disconnected Fixes issue where IMU initialization could prevent Op Modes from stopping Fixes issue where AndroidTextToSpeech.speak() would fail if it was called too early Adds telemetry.speak() methods and blocks, which cause the Driver Station (if also updated) to speak text Adds and improves Expansion Hub-related warnings Improves Expansion Hub low battery warning Displays the warning immediately after the hub reports it Specifies whether the condition is current or occurred temporarily during an OpMode run Displays which hubs reported low battery Displays warning when hub loses and regains power during an OpMode run Fixes the hub's LED pattern after this condition Displays warning when Expansion Hub is not responding to commands Specifies whether the condition is current or occurred temporarily during an OpMode run Clarifies warning when Expansion Hub is not present at startup Specifies that this condition requires a Robot Restart before the hub can be used. The hub light will now accurately reflect this state Improves logging and reduces log spam during these conditions Syncs the Control Hub time and timezone to a connected web browser programming the robot, if a Driver Station is not available. Adds bulk read functionality for REV Hubs A bulk caching mode must be set at the Hub level with LynxModule#setBulkCachingMode(). This applies to all relevant SDK hardware classes that reference that Hub. The following following Hub bulk caching modes are available: BulkCachingMode.OFF (default): All hardware calls operate as usual. Bulk data can read through LynxModule#getBulkData() and processed manually. BulkCachingMode.AUTO: Applicable hardware calls are served from a bulk read cache that is cleared/refreshed automatically to ensure identical commands don't hit the same cache. The cache can also be cleared manually with LynxModule#clearBulkCache(), although this is not recommended. (advanced users) BulkCachingMode.MANUAL: Same as BulkCachingMode.AUTO except the cache is never cleared automatically. To avoid getting stale data, the cache must be manually cleared at the beginning of each loop body or as the user deems appropriate. Removes PIDF Annotation values added in Rev 5.3 (to AndyMark, goBILDA and TETRIX motor configurations). The new motor types will still be available but their Default control behavior will revert back to Rev 5.2 Adds new ConceptMotorBulkRead sample Opmode to demonstrate and compare Motor Bulk-Read modes for reducing I/O latencies. Version 5.3 (20191004-112306) Fixes external USB/UVC webcam support Makes various bugfixes and improvements to Blocks page, including but not limited to: Many visual tweaks Browser zoom and window resize behave better Resizing the Java preview pane works better and more consistently across browsers The Java preview pane consistently gets scrollbars when needed The Java preview pane is hidden by default on phones Internet Explorer 11 should work Large dropdown lists display properly on lower res screens Disabled buttons are now visually identifiable as disabled A warning is shown if a user selects a TFOD sample, but their device is not compatible Warning messages in a Blocks op mode are now visible by default. Adds goBILDA 5201 and 5202 motors to Robot Configurator Adds PIDF Annotation values to AndyMark, goBILDA and TETRIX motor configurations. This has the effect of causing the RUN_USING_ENCODERS and RUN_TO_POSITION modes to use PIDF vs PID closed loop control on these motors. This should provide more responsive, yet stable, speed control. PIDF adds Feedforward control to the basic PID control loop. Feedforward is useful when controlling a motor's speed because it \"anticipates\" how much the control voltage must change to achieve a new speed set-point, rather than requiring the integrated error to change sufficiently. The PIDF values were chosen to provide responsive, yet stable, speed control on a lightly loaded motor. The more heavily a motor is loaded (drag or friction), the more noticable the PIDF improvement will be. Fixes startup crash on Android 10 Fixes ftc_app issue #712 (thanks to FROGbots-4634) Fixes ftc_app issue #542 Allows \"A\" and lowercase letters when naming device through RC and DS apps. Version 5.2 (20190905-083277) Fixes extra-wide margins on settings activities, and placement of the new configuration button Adds Skystone Vuforia image target data. Includes sample Skystone Vuforia Navigation op modes (Java). Includes sample Skystone Vuforia Navigation op modes (Blocks). Adds TensorFlow inference model (.tflite) for Skystone game elements. Includes sample Skystone TensorFlow op modes (Java). Includes sample Skystone TensorFlow op modes (Blocks). Removes older (season-specific) sample op modes. Includes 64-bit support (to comply with Google Play requirements). Protects against Stuck OpModes when a Restart Robot is requested. (Thanks to FROGbots-4634) (ftc_app issue #709) Blocks related changes: Fixes bug with blocks generated code when hardware device name is a java or javascript reserved word. Shows generated java code for blocks, even when hardware items are missing from the active configuration. Displays warning icon when outdated Vuforia and TensorFlow blocks are used (SkyStone issue #27) Version 5.1 (20190820-222104) Defines default PIDF parameters for the following motors: REV Core Hex Motor REV 20:1 HD Hex Motor REV 40:1 HD Hex Motor Adds back button when running on a device without a system back button (such as a Control Hub) Allows a REV Control Hub to update the firmware on a REV Expansion Hub via USB Fixes SkyStone issue #9 Fixes ftc_app issue #715 Prevents extra DS User clicks by filtering based on current state. Prevents incorrect DS UI state changes when receiving new OpMode list from RC Adds support for REV Color Sensor V3 Adds a manual-refresh DS Camera Stream for remotely viewing RC camera frames. To show the stream on the DS, initialize but do not run a stream-enabled opmode, select the Camera Stream option in the DS menu, and tap the image to refresh. This feature is automatically enabled when using Vuforia or TFOD—no additional RC configuration is required for typical use cases. To hide the stream, select the same menu item again. Note that gamepads are disabled and the selected opmode cannot be started while the stream is open as a safety precaution. To use custom streams, consult the API docs for CameraStreamServer#setSource and CameraStreamSource. Adds many Star Wars sounds to RobotController resources. Added SKYSTONE Sounds Chooser Sample Program. Switches out startup, connect chimes, and error/warning sounds for Star Wars sounds Updates OnBot Java to use a WebSocket for communication with the robot The OnBot Java page no longer has to do a full refresh when a user switches from editing one file to another Known issues: Camera Stream The Vuforia camera stream inherits the issues present in the phone preview (namely ftc_app issue #574). This problem does not affect the TFOD camera stream even though it receives frames from Vuforia. The orientation of the stream frames may not always match the phone preview. For now, these frames may be rotated manually via a custom CameraStreamSource if desired. OnBotJava Browser back button may not always work correctly It's possible for a build to be queued, but not started. The OnBot Java build console will display a warning if this occurs. A user might not realize they are editing a different file if the user inadvertently switches from one file to another since this switch is now seamless. The name of the currently open file is displayed in the browser tab. Version 5.0 (built on 19.06.14) Support for the REV Robotics Control Hub. Adds a Java preview pane to the Blocks editor. Adds a new offline export feature to the Blocks editor. Display wifi channel in Network circle on Driver Station. Adds calibration for Logitech C270 Updates build tooling and target SDK. Compliance with Google's permissions infrastructure (Required after build tooling update). Keep Alives to mitigate the Motorola wifi scanning problem. Telemetry substitute no longer necessary. Improves Vuforia error reporting. Fixes ftctechnh/ftc_app issues 621, 713. Miscellaneous bug fixes and improvements. Version 4.3 (built on 18.10.31) Includes missing TensorFlow-related libraries and files. Version 4.2 (built on 18.10.30) Includes fix to avoid deadlock situation with WatchdogMonitor which could result in USB communication errors. Comm error appeared to require that user disconnect USB cable and restart the Robot Controller app to recover. robotControllerLog.txt would have error messages that included the words \"E RobotCore: lynx xmit lock: #### abandoning lock:\" Includes fix to correctly list the parent module address for a REV Robotics Expansion Hub in a configuration (.xml) file. Bug in versions 4.0 and 4.1 would incorrect list the address module for a parent REV Robotics device as \"1\". If the parent module had a higher address value than the daisy-chained module, then this bug would prevent the Robot Controller from communicating with the downstream Expansion Hub. Added requirement for ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION to allow a Driver Station running Android Oreo to scan for Wi-Fi Direct devices. Added google() repo to build.gradle because aapt2 must be downloaded from the google() repository beginning with version 3.2 of the Android Gradle Plugin. Important Note: Android Studio users will need to be connected to the Internet the first time build the ftc_app project. Internet connectivity is required for the first build so the appropriate files can be downloaded from the Google repository. Users should not need to be connected to the Internet for subsequent builds. This should also fix buid issue where Android Studio would complain that it \"Could not find com.android.tools.lint:lint-gradle:26.1.4\" (or similar). Added support for REV Spark Mini motor controller as part of the configuration menu for a servo/PWM port on the REV Expansion Hub. Provide examples for playing audio files in an Op Mode. Block Development Tool Changes Includes a fix for a problem with the Velocity blocks that were reported in the FTC Technology forum (Blocks Programming subforum). Change the \"Save completed successfully.\" message to a white color so it will contrast with a green background. Fixed the \"Download image\" feature so it will work if there are text blocks in the op mode. Introduce support for Google's TensorFlow Lite technology for object detetion for 2018-2019 game. TensorFlow lite can recognize Gold Mineral and Silver Mineral from 2018-2019 game. Example Java and Block op modes are included to show how to determine the relative position of the gold block (left, center, right). Version 4.1 (released on 18.09.24) Changes include: Fix to prevent crash when deprecated configuration annotations are used. Change to allow FTC Robot Controller APK to be auto-updated using FIRST Global Control Hub update scripts. Removed samples for non supported / non legal hardware. Improvements to Telemetry.addData block with \"text\" socket. Updated Blocks sample op mode list to include Rover Ruckus Vuforia example. Update SDK library version number. Version 4.0 (released on 18.09.12) Changes include: Initial support for UVC compatible cameras If UVC camera has a unique serial number, RC will detect and enumerate by serial number. If UVC camera lacks a unique serial number, RC will only support one camera of that type connected. Calibration settings for a few cameras are included (see TeamCode/src/main/res/xml/teamwebcamcalibrations.xml for details). User can upload calibration files from Program and Manage web interface. UVC cameras seem to draw a fair amount of electrical current from the USB bus. This does not appear to present any problems for the REV Robotics Control Hub. This does seem to create stability problems when using some cameras with an Android phone-based Robot Controller. FTC Tech Team is investigating options to mitigate this issue with the phone-based Robot Controllers. Updated sample Vuforia Navigation and VuMark Op Modes to demonstrate how to use an internal phone-based camera and an external UVC webcam. Support for improved motor control. REV Robotics Expansion Hub firmware 1.8 and greater will support a feed forward mechanism for closed loop motor control. FTC SDK has been modified to support PIDF coefficients (proportional, integral, derivative, and feed forward). FTC Blocks development tool modified to include PIDF programming blocks. Deprecated older PID-related methods and variables. REV's 1.8.x PIDF-related changes provide a more linear and accurate way to control a motor. Wireless Added 5GHz support for wireless channel changing for those devices that support it. Tested with Moto G5 and E4 phones. Also tested with other (currently non-approved) phones such as Samsung Galaxy S8. Improved Expansion Hub firmware update support in Robot Controller app Changes to make the system more robust during the firmware update process (when performed through Robot Controller app). User no longer has to disconnect a downstream daisy-chained Expansion Hub when updating an Expansion Hub's firmware. If user is updating an Expansion Hub's firmware through a USB connection, he/she does not have to disconnect RS485 connection to other Expansion Hubs. The user still must use a USB connection to update an Expansion Hub's firmware. The user cannot update the Expansion Hub firmware for a downstream device that is daisy chained through an RS485 connection. If an Expansion Hub accidentally gets \"bricked\" the Robot Controller app is now more likely to recognize the Hub when it scans the USB bus. Robot Controller app should be able to detect an Expansion Hub, even if it accidentally was bricked in a previous update attempt. Robot Controller app should be able to install the firmware onto the Hub, even if if accidentally was bricked in a previous update attempt. Resiliency FTC software can detect and enable an FTDI reset feature that is available with REV Robotics v1.8 Expansion Hub firmware and greater. When enabled, the Expansion Hub can detect if it hasn't communicated with the Robot Controller over the FTDI (USB) connection. If the Hub hasn't heard from the Robot Controller in a while, it will reset the FTDI connection. This action helps system recover from some ESD-induced disruptions. Various fixes to improve reliability of FTC software. Blocks Fixed errors with string and list indices in blocks export to java. Support for USB connected UVC webcams. Refactored optimized Blocks Vuforia code to support Rover Ruckus image targets. Added programming blocks to support PIDF (proportional, integral, derivative and feed forward) motor control. Added formatting options (under Telemetry and Miscellaneous categories) so user can set how many decimal places to display a numerical value. Support to play audio files (which are uploaded through Blocks web interface) on Driver Station in addition to the Robot Controller. Fixed bug with Download Image of Blocks feature. Support for REV Robotics Blinkin LED Controller. Support for REV Robotics 2m Distance Sensor. Added support for a REV Touch Sensor (no longer have to configure as a generic digital device). Added blocks for DcMotorEx methods. These are enhanced methods that you can use when supported by the motor controller hardware. The REV Robotics Expansion Hub supports these enhanced methods. Enhanced methods include methods to get/set motor velocity (in encoder pulses per second), get/set PIDF coefficients, etc.. Modest Improvements in Logging Decrease frequency of battery checker voltage statements. Removed non-FTC related log statements (wherever possible). Introduced a \"Match Logging\" feature. Under \"Settings\" a user can enable/disable this feature (it's disabled by default). If enabled, user provides a \"Match Number\" through the Driver Station user interface (top of the screen). The Match Number is used to create a log file specifically with log statements from that particular Op Mode run. Match log files are stored in /sdcard/FIRST/matlogs on the Robot Controller. Once an op mode run is complete, the Match Number is cleared. This is a convenient way to create a separate match log with statements only related to a specific op mode run. New Devices Support for REV Robotics Blinkin LED Controller. Support for REV Robotics 2m Distance Sensor. Added configuration option for REV 20:1 HD Hex Motor. Added support for a REV Touch Sensor (no longer have to configure as a generic digital device). Miscellaneous Fixed some errors in the definitions for acceleration and velocity in our javadoc documentation. Added ability to play audio files on Driver Station When user is configuring an Expansion Hub, the LED on the Expansion Hub will change blink pattern (purple-cyan) to indicate which Hub is currently being configured. Renamed I2cSensorType to I2cDeviceType. Added an external sample Op Mode that demonstrates localization using 2018-2019 (Rover Ruckus presented by QualComm) Vuforia targets. Added an external sample Op Mode that demonstrates how to use the REV Robotics 2m Laser Distance Sensor. Added an external sample Op Mode that demonstrates how to use the REV Robotics Blinkin LED Controller. Re-categorized external Java sample Op Modes to \"TeleOp\" instead of \"Autonomous\". Known issues: Initial support for UVC compatible cameras UVC cameras seem to draw significant amount of current from the USB bus. This does not appear to present any problems for the REV Robotics Control Hub. This does seem to create stability problems when using some cameras with an Android phone-based Robot Controller. FTC Tech Team is investigating options to mitigate this issue with the phone-based Robot Controllers. There might be a possible deadlock which causes the RC to become unresponsive when using a UVC webcam with a Nougat Android Robot Controller. Wireless When user selects a wireless channel, this channel does not necessarily persist if the phone is power cycled. Tech Team is hoping to eventually address this issue in a future release. Issue has been present since apps were introduced (i.e., it is not new with the v4.0 release). Wireless channel is not currently displayed for WiFi Direct connections. Miscellaneous The blink indication feature that shows which Expansion Hub is currently being configured does not work for a newly created configuration file. User has to first save a newly created configuration file and then close and re-edit the file in order for blink indicator to work. Version 3.6 (built on 17.12.18) Changes include: Blocks Changes Uses updated Google Blockly software to allow users to edit their op modes on Apple iOS devices (including iPad and iPhone). Improvement in Blocks tool to handle corrupt op mode files. Autonomous op modes should no longer get switched back to tele-op after re-opening them to be edited. The system can now detect type mismatches during runtime and alert the user with a message on the Driver Station. Updated javadoc documentation for setPower() method to reflect correct range of values (-1 to +1). Modified VuforiaLocalizerImpl to allow for user rendering of frames Added a user-overrideable onRenderFrame() method which gets called by the class's renderFrame() method. Version 3.5 (built on 17.10.30) Changes with version 3.5 include: Introduced a fix to prevent random op mode stops, which can occur after the Robot Controller app has been paused and then resumed (for example, when a user temporarily turns off the display of the Robot Controller phone, and then turns the screen back on). Introduced a fix to prevent random op mode stops, which were previously caused by random peer disconnect events on the Driver Station. Fixes issue where log files would be closed on pause of the RC or DS, but not re-opened upon resume. Fixes issue with battery handler (voltage) start/stop race. Fixes issue where Android Studio generated op modes would disappear from available list in certain situations. Fixes problem where OnBot Java would not build on REV Robotics Control Hub. Fixes problem where OnBot Java would not build if the date and time on the Robot Controller device was \"rewound\" (set to an earlier date/time). Improved error message on OnBot Java that occurs when renaming a file fails. Removed unneeded resources from android.jar binaries used by OnBot Java to reduce final size of Robot Controller app. Added MR_ANALOG_TOUCH_SENSOR block to Blocks Programming Tool. Version 3.4 (built on 17.09.06) Changes with version 3.4 include: Added telemetry.update() statement for BlankLinearOpMode template. Renamed sample Block op modes to be more consistent with Java samples. Added some additional sample Block op modes. Reworded OnBot Java readme slightly. Version 3.3 (built on 17.09.04) This version of the software includes improves for the FTC Blocks Programming Tool and the OnBot Java Programming Tool. Changes with verion 3.3 include: Android Studio ftc_app project has been updated to use Gradle Plugin 2.3.3. Android Studio ftc_app project is already using gradle 3.5 distribution. Robot Controller log has been renamed to /sdcard/RobotControllerLog.txt (note that this change was actually introduced w/ v3.2). Improvements in I2C reliability. Optimized I2C read for REV Expansion Hub, with v1.7 firmware or greater. Updated all external/samples (available through OnBot and in Android project folder). Vuforia Added support for VuMarks that will be used for the 2017-2018 season game. Blocks Update to latest Google Blockly release. Sample op modes can be selected as a template when creating new op mode. Fixed bug where the blocks would disappear temporarily when mouse button is held down. Added blocks for Range.clip and Range.scale. User can now disable/enable Block op modes. Fix to prevent occasional Blocks deadlock. OnBot Java Significant improvements with autocomplete function for OnBot Java editor. Sample op modes can be selected as a template when creating new op mode. Fixes and changes to complete hardware setup feature. Updated (and more useful) onBot welcome message. Known issues: Android Studio After updating to the new v3.3 Android Studio project folder, if you get error messages indicating \"InvalidVirtualFileAccessException\" then you might need to do a File->Invalidate Caches / Restart to clear the error. OnBot Java Sometimes when you push the build button to build all op modes, the RC returns an error message that the build failed. If you press the build button a second time, the build typically suceeds. Version 3.2 (built on 17.08.02) This version of the software introduces the \"OnBot Java\" Development Tool. Similar to the FTC Blocks Development Tool, the FTC OnBot Java Development Tool allows a user to create, edit and build op modes dynamically using only a Javascript-enabled web browser. The OnBot Java Development Tool is an integrated development environment (IDE) that is served up by the Robot Controller. Op modes are created and edited using a Javascript-enabled browser (Google Chromse is recommended). Op modes are saved on the Robot Controller Android device directly. The OnBot Java Development Tool provides a Java programming environment that does NOT need Android Studio. Changes with version 3.2 include: Enhanced web-based development tools Introduction of OnBot Java Development Tool. Web-based programming and management features are \"always on\" (user no longer needs to put Robot Controller into programming mode). Web-based management interface (where user can change Robot Controller name and also easily download Robot Controller log file). OnBot Java, Blocks and Management features available from web based interface. Blocks Programming Development Tool: Changed \"LynxI2cColorRangeSensor\" block to \"REV Color/range sensor\" block. Fixed tooltip for ColorSensor.isLightOn block. Added blocks for ColorSensor.getNormalizedColors and LynxI2cColorRangeSensor.getNormalizedColors. Added example op modes for digital touch sensor and REV Robotics Color Distance sensor. User selectable color themes. Includes many minor enhancements and fixes (too numerous to list). Known issues: Auto complete function is incomplete and does not support the following (for now): Access via this keyword Access via super keyword Members of the super cloass, not overridden by the class Any methods provided in the current class Inner classes Can't handle casted objects Any objects coming from an parenthetically enclosed expression Version 3.10 (built on 17.05.09) This version of the software provides support for the REV Robotics Expansion Hub. This version also includes improvements in the USB communication layer in an effort to enhance system resiliency. If you were using a 2.x version of the software previously, updating to version 3.1 requires that you also update your Driver Station software in addition to updating the Robot Controller software. Also note that in version 3.10 software, the setMaxSpeed and getMaxSpeed methods are no longer available (not deprecated, they have been removed from the SDK). Also note that the the new 3.x software incorporates motor profiles that a user can select as he/she configures the robot. Changes include: Blocks changes Added VuforiaTrackableDefaultListener.getPose and Vuforia.trackPose blocks. Added optimized blocks support for Vuforia extended tracking. Added atan2 block to the math category. Added useCompetitionFieldTargetLocations parameter to Vuforia.initialize block. If set to false, the target locations are placed at (0,0,0) with target orientation as specified in https://github.com/gearsincorg/FTCVuforiaDemo/blob/master/Robot_Navigation.java tutorial op mode. Incorporates additional improvements to USB comm layer to improve system resiliency (to recover from a greater number of communication disruptions). Additional Notes Regarding Version 3.00 (built on 17.04.13) In addition to the release changes listed below (see section labeled \"Version 3.00 (built on 17.04.013)\"), version 3.00 has the following important changes: Version 3.00 software uses a new version of the FTC Robocol (robot protocol). If you upgrade to v3.0 on the Robot Controller and/or Android Studio side, you must also upgrade the Driver Station software to match the new Robocol. Version 3.00 software removes the setMaxSpeed and getMaxSpeed methods from the DcMotor class. If you have an op mode that formerly used these methods, you will need to remove the references/calls to these methods. Instead, v3.0 provides the max speed information through the use of motor profiles that are selected by the user during robot configuration. Version 3.00 software currently does not have a mechanism to disable extra i2c sensors. We hope to re-introduce this function with a release in the near future. Version 3.00 (built on 17.04.13) *** Use this version of the software at YOUR OWN RISK!!! *** This software is being released as an \"alpha\" version. Use this version at your own risk! This pre-release software contains SIGNIFICANT changes, including changes to the Wi-Fi Direct pairing mechanism, rewrites of the I2C sensor classes, changes to the USB/FTDI layer, and the introduction of support for the REV Robotics Expansion Hub and the REV Robotics color-range-light sensor. These changes were implemented to improve the reliability and resiliency of the FTC control system. Please note, however, that version 3.00 is considered \"alpha\" code. This code is being released so that the FIRST community will have an opportunity to test the new REV Expansion Hub electronics module when it becomes available in May. The developers do not recommend using this code for critical applications (i.e., competition use). *** Use this version of the software at YOUR OWN RISK!!! *** Changes include: Major rework of sensor-related infrastructure. Includes rewriting sensor classes to implement synchronous I2C communication. Fix to reset Autonomous timer back to 30 seconds. Implementation of specific motor profiles for approved 12V motors (includes Tetrix, AndyMark, Matrix and REV models). Modest improvements to enhance Wi-Fi P2P pairing. Fixes telemetry log addition race. Publishes all the sources (not just a select few). Includes Block programming improvements Addition of optimized Vuforia blocks. Auto scrollbar to projects and sounds pages. Fixed blocks paste bug. Blocks execute after while-opModeIsActive loop (to allow for cleanup before exiting op mode). Added gyro integratedZValue block. Fixes bug with projects page for Firefox browser. Added IsSpeaking block to AndroidTextToSpeech. Implements support for the REV Robotics Expansion Hub Implements support for integral REV IMU (physically installed on I2C bus 0, uses same Bosch BNO055 9 axis absolute orientation sensor as Adafruit 9DOF abs orientation sensor). - Implements support for REV color/range/light sensor. Provides support to update Expansion Hub firmware through FTC SDK. Detects REV firmware version and records in log file. Includes support for REV Control Hub (note that the REV Control Hub is not yet approved for FTC use). Implements FTC Blocks programming support for REV Expansion Hub and sensor hardware. Detects and alerts when I2C device disconnect. Version 2.62 (built on 17.01.07) Added null pointer check before calling modeToByte() in finishModeSwitchIfNecessary method for ModernRoboticsUsbDcMotorController class. Changes to enhance Modern Robotics USB protocol robustness. Version 2.61 (released on 16.12.19) Blocks Programming mode changes: Fix to correct issue when an exception was thrown because an OpticalDistanceSensor object appears twice in the hardware map (the second time as a LightSensor). Version 2.6 (released on 16.12.16) Fixes for Gyro class: Improve (decrease) sensor refresh latency. fix isCalibrating issues. Blocks Programming mode changes: Blocks now ignores a device in the configuration xml if the name is empty. Other devices work in configuration work fine. Version 2.5 (internal release on released on 16.12.13) Blocks Programming mode changes: Added blocks support for AdafruitBNO055IMU. Added Download Op Mode button to FtcBocks.html. Added support for copying blocks in one OpMode and pasting them in an other OpMode. The clipboard content is stored on the phone, so the programming mode server must be running. Modified Utilities section of the toolbox. In Programming Mode, display information about the active connections. Fixed paste location when workspace has been scrolled. Added blocks support for the android Accelerometer. Fixed issue where Blocks Upload Op Mode truncated name at first dot. Added blocks support for Android SoundPool. Added type safety to blocks for Acceleration. Added type safety to blocks for AdafruitBNO055IMU.Parameters. Added type safety to blocks for AnalogInput. Added type safety to blocks for AngularVelocity. Added type safety to blocks for Color. Added type safety to blocks for ColorSensor. Added type safety to blocks for CompassSensor. Added type safety to blocks for CRServo. Added type safety to blocks for DigitalChannel. Added type safety to blocks for ElapsedTime. Added type safety to blocks for Gamepad. Added type safety to blocks for GyroSensor. Added type safety to blocks for IrSeekerSensor. Added type safety to blocks for LED. Added type safety to blocks for LightSensor. Added type safety to blocks for LinearOpMode. Added type safety to blocks for MagneticFlux. Added type safety to blocks for MatrixF. Added type safety to blocks for MrI2cCompassSensor. Added type safety to blocks for MrI2cRangeSensor. Added type safety to blocks for OpticalDistanceSensor. Added type safety to blocks for Orientation. Added type safety to blocks for Position. Added type safety to blocks for Quaternion. Added type safety to blocks for Servo. Added type safety to blocks for ServoController. Added type safety to blocks for Telemetry. Added type safety to blocks for Temperature. Added type safety to blocks for TouchSensor. Added type safety to blocks for UltrasonicSensor. Added type safety to blocks for VectorF. Added type safety to blocks for Velocity. Added type safety to blocks for VoltageSensor. Added type safety to blocks for VuforiaLocalizer.Parameters. Added type safety to blocks for VuforiaTrackable. Added type safety to blocks for VuforiaTrackables. Added type safety to blocks for enums in AdafruitBNO055IMU.Parameters. Added type safety to blocks for AndroidAccelerometer, AndroidGyroscope, AndroidOrientation, and AndroidTextToSpeech. Version 2.4 (released on 16.11.13) Fix to avoid crashing for nonexistent resources. Blocks Programming mode changes: Added blocks to support OpenGLMatrix, MatrixF, and VectorF. Added blocks to support AngleUnit, AxesOrder, AxesReference, CameraDirection, CameraMonitorFeedback, DistanceUnit, and TempUnit. Added blocks to support Acceleration. Added blocks to support LinearOpMode.getRuntime. Added blocks to support MagneticFlux and Position. Fixed typos. Made blocks for ElapsedTime more consistent with other objects. Added blocks to support Quaternion, Velocity, Orientation, AngularVelocity. Added blocks to support VuforiaTrackables, VuforiaTrackable, VuforiaLocalizer, VuforiaTrackableDefaultListener. Fixed a few blocks. Added type checking to new blocks. Updated to latest blockly. Added default variable blocks to navigation and matrix blocks. Fixed toolbox entry for openGLMatrix_rotation_withAxesArgs. When user downloads Blocks-generated op mode, only the .blk file is downloaded. When user uploads Blocks-generated op mode (.blk file), Javascript code is auto generated. Added DbgLog support. Added logging when a blocks file is read/written. Fixed bug to properly render blocks even if missing devices from configuration file. Added support for additional characters (not just alphanumeric) for the block file names (for download and upload). Added support for OpMode flavor (“Autonomous” or “TeleOp”) and group. Changes to Samples to prevent tutorial issues. Incorporated suggested changes from public pull 216 (“Replace .. paths”). Remove Servo Glitches when robot stopped. if user hits “Cancels” when editing a configuration file, clears the unsaved changes and reverts to original unmodified configuration. Added log info to help diagnose why the Robot Controller app was terminated (for example, by watch dog function). Added ability to transfer log from the controller. Fixed inconsistency for AngularVelocity Limit unbounded growth of data for telemetry. If user does not call telemetry.update() for LinearOpMode in a timely manner, data added for telemetry might get lost if size limit is exceeded. Version 2.35 (released on 16.10.06) Blockly programming mode - Removed unnecesary idle() call from blocks for new project. Version 2.30 (released on 16.10.05) Blockly programming mode: Mechanism added to save Blockly op modes from Programming Mode Server onto local device To avoid clutter, blocks are displayed in categorized folders Added support for DigitalChannel Added support for ModernRoboticsI2cCompassSensor Added support for ModernRoboticsI2cRangeSensor Added support for VoltageSensor Added support for AnalogInput Added support for AnalogOutput Fix for CompassSensor setMode block Vuforia Fix deadlock / make camera data available while Vuforia is running. Update to Vuforia 6.0.117 (recommended by Vuforia and Google to close security loophole). Fix for autonomous 30 second timer bug (where timer was in effect, even though it appeared to have timed out). opModeIsActive changes to allow cleanup after op mode is stopped (with enforced 2 second safety timeout). Fix to avoid reading i2c twice. Updated sample Op Modes. Improved logging and fixed intermittent freezing. Added digital I/O sample. Cleaned up device names in sample op modes to be consistent with Pushbot guide. Fix to allow use of IrSeekerSensorV3. Version 2.20 (released on 16.09.08) Support for Modern Robotics Compass Sensor. Support for Modern Robotics Range Sensor. Revise device names for Pushbot templates to match the names used in Pushbot guide. Fixed bug so that IrSeekerSensorV3 device is accessible as IrSeekerSensor in hardwareMap. Modified computer vision code to require an individual Vuforia license (per legal requirement from PTC). Minor fixes. Blockly enhancements: Support for Voltage Sensor. Support for Analog Input. Support for Analog Output. Support for Light Sensor. Support for Servo Controller. Version 2.10 (released on 16.09.03) Support for Adafruit IMU. Improvements to ModernRoboticsI2cGyro class Block on reset of z axis. isCalibrating() returns true while gyro is calibration. Updated sample gyro program. Blockly enhancements support for android.graphics.Color. added support for ElapsedTime. improved look and legibility of blocks. support for compass sensor. support for ultrasonic sensor. support for IrSeeker. support for LED. support for color sensor. support for CRServo prompt user to configure robot before using programming mode. Provides ability to disable audio cues. various bug fixes and improvements. Version 2.00 (released on 16.08.19) This is the new release for the upcoming 2016-2017 FIRST Tech Challenge Season. Channel change is enabled in the FTC Robot Controller app for Moto G 2nd and 3rd Gen phones. Users can now use annotations to register/disable their Op Modes. Changes in the Android SDK, JDK and build tool requirements (minsdk=19, java 1.7, build tools 23.0.3). Standardized units in analog input. Cleaned up code for existing analog sensor classes. setChannelMode and getChannelMode were REMOVED from the DcMotorController class. This is important - we no longer set the motor modes through the motor controller. setMode and getMode were added to the DcMotor class. ContinuousRotationServo class has been added to the FTC SDK. Range.clip() method has been overloaded so it can support this operation for int, short and byte integers. Some changes have been made (new methods added) on how a user can access items from the hardware map. Users can now set the zero power behavior for a DC motor so that the motor will brake or float when power is zero. Prototype Blockly Programming Mode has been added to FTC Robot Controller. Users can place the Robot Controller into this mode, and then use a device (such as a laptop) that has a Javascript enabled browser to write Blockly-based Op Modes directly onto the Robot Controller. Users can now configure the robot remotely through the FTC Driver Station app. Android Studio project supports Android Studio 2.1.x and compile SDK Version 23 (Marshmallow). Vuforia Computer Vision SDK integrated into FTC SDK. Users can use sample vision targets to get localization information on a standard FTC field. Project structure has been reorganized so that there is now a TeamCode package that users can use to place their local/custom Op Modes into this package. Inspection function has been integrated into the FTC Robot Controller and Driver Station Apps (Thanks Team HazMat… 9277 & 10650!). Audio cues have been incorporated into FTC SDK. Swap mechanism added to FTC Robot Controller configuration activity. For example, if you have two motor controllers on a robot, and you misidentified them in your configuration file, you can use the Swap button to swap the devices within the configuration file (so you do not have to manually re-enter in the configuration info for the two devices). Fix mechanism added to all user to replace an electronic module easily. For example, suppose a servo controller dies on your robot. You replace the broken module with a new module, which has a different serial number from the original servo controller. You can use the Fix button to automatically reconfigure your configuration file to use the serial number of the new module. Improvements made to fix resiliency and responsiveness of the system. For LinearOpMode the user now must for a telemetry.update() to update the telemetry data on the driver station. This update() mechanism ensures that the driver station gets the updated data properly and at the same time. The Auto Configure function of the Robot Controller is now template based. If there is a commonly used robot configuration, a template can be created so that the Auto Configure mechanism can be used to quickly configure a robot of this type. The logic to detect a runaway op mode (both in the LinearOpMode and OpMode types) and to abort the run, then auto recover has been improved/implemented. Fix has been incorporated so that Logitech F310 gamepad mappings will be correct for Marshmallow users. Release 16.07.08 For the ftc_app project, the gradle files have been modified to support Android Studio 2.1.x. Release 16.03.30 For the MIT App Inventor, the design blocks have new icons that better represent the function of each design component. Some changes were made to the shutdown logic to ensure the robust shutdown of some of our USB services. A change was made to LinearOpMode so as to allow a given instance to be executed more than once, which is required for the App Inventor. Javadoc improved/updated. Release 16.03.09 Changes made to make the FTC SDK synchronous (significant change!) waitOneFullHardwareCycle() and waitForNextHardwareCycle() are no longer needed and have been deprecated. runOpMode() (for a LinearOpMode) is now decoupled from the system's hardware read/write thread. loop() (for an OpMode) is now decoupled from the system's hardware read/write thread. Methods are synchronous. For example, if you call setMode(DcMotorController.RunMode.RESET_ENCODERS) for a motor, the encoder is guaranteed to be reset when the method call is complete. For legacy module (NXT compatible), user no longer has to toggle between read and write modes when reading from or writing to a legacy device. Changes made to enhance reliability/robustness during ESD event. Changes made to make code thread safe. Debug keystore added so that user-generated robot controller APKs will all use the same signed key (to avoid conflicts if a team has multiple developer laptops for example). Firmware version information for Modern Robotics modules are now logged. Changes made to improve USB comm reliability and robustness. Added support for voltage indicator for legacy (NXT-compatible) motor controllers. Changes made to provide auto stop capabilities for op modes. A LinearOpMode class will stop when the statements in runOpMode() are complete. User does not have to push the stop button on the driver station. If an op mode is stopped by the driver station, but there is a run away/uninterruptible thread persisting, the app will log an error message then force itself to crash to stop the runaway thread. Driver Station UI modified to display lowest measured voltage below current voltage (12V battery). Driver Station UI modified to have color background for current voltage (green=good, yellow=caution, red=danger, extremely low voltage). javadoc improved (edits and additional classes). Added app build time to About activity for driver station and robot controller apps. Display local IP addresses on Driver Station About activity. Added I2cDeviceSynchImpl. Added I2cDeviceSync interface. Added seconds() and milliseconds() to ElapsedTime for clarity. Added getCallbackCount() to I2cDevice. Added missing clearI2cPortActionFlag. Added code to create log messages while waiting for LinearOpMode shutdown. Fix so Wifi Direct Config activity will no longer launch multiple times. Added the ability to specify an alternate i2c address in software for the Modern Robotics gyro. Release 16.02.09 Improved battery checker feature so that voltage values get refreshed regularly (every 250 msec) on Driver Station (DS) user interface. Improved software so that Robot Controller (RC) is much more resilient and “self-healing” to USB disconnects: If user attempts to start/restart RC with one or more module missing, it will display a warning but still start up. When running an op mode, if one or more modules gets disconnected, the RC & DS will display warnings,and robot will keep on working in spite of the missing module(s). If a disconnected module gets physically reconnected the RC will auto detect the module and the user will regain control of the recently connected module. Warning messages are more helpful (identifies the type of module that’s missing plus its USB serial number). Code changes to fix the null gamepad reference when users try to reference the gamepads in the init() portion of their op mode. NXT light sensor output is now properly scaled. Note that teams might have to readjust their light threshold values in their op modes. On DS user interface, gamepad icon for a driver will disappear if the matching gamepad is disconnected or if that gamepad gets designated as a different driver. Robot Protocol (ROBOCOL) version number info is displayed in About screen on RC and DS apps. Incorporated a display filter on pairing screen to filter out devices that don’t use the “-“ format. This filter can be turned off to show all WiFi Direct devices. Updated text in License file. Fixed formatting error in OpticalDistanceSensor.toString(). Fixed issue on with a blank (“”) device name that would disrupt WiFi Direct Pairing. Made a change so that the WiFi info and battery info can be displayed more quickly on the DS upon connecting to RC. Improved javadoc generation. Modified code to make it easier to support language localization in the future. Release 16.01.04 Updated compileSdkVersion for apps Prevent Wifi from entering power saving mode removed unused import from driver station Corrrected \"Dead zone\" joystick code. LED.getDeviceName and .getConnectionInfo() return null apps check for ROBOCOL_VERSION mismatch Fix for Telemetry also has off-by-one errors in its data string sizing / short size limitations error User telemetry output is sorted. added formatting variants to DbgLog and RobotLog APIs code modified to allow for a long list of op mode names. changes to improve thread safety of RobocolDatagramSocket Fix for \"missing hardware leaves robot controller disconnected from driver station\" error fix for \"fast tapping of Init/Start causes problems\" (toast is now only instantiated on UI thread). added some log statements for thread life cycle. moved gamepad reset logic inside of initActiveOpMode() for robustness changes made to mitigate risk of race conditions on public methods. changes to try and flag when WiFi Direct name contains non-printable characters. fix to correct race condition between .run() and .close() in ReadWriteRunnableStandard. updated FTDI driver made ReadWriteRunnableStanard interface public. fixed off-by-one errors in Command constructor moved specific hardware implmentations into their own package. moved specific gamepad implemnatations to the hardware library. changed LICENSE file to new BSD version. fixed race condition when shutting down Modern Robotics USB devices. methods in the ColorSensor classes have been synchronized. corrected isBusy() status to reflect end of motion. corrected \"back\" button keycode. the notSupported() method of the GyroSensor class was changed to protected (it should not be public). Release 15.11.04.001 Added Support for Modern Robotics Gyro. The GyroSensor class now supports the MR Gyro Sensor. Users can access heading data (about Z axis) Users can also access raw gyro data (X, Y, & Z axes). Example MRGyroTest.java op mode included. Improved error messages More descriptive error messages for exceptions in user code. Updated DcMotor API Enable read mode on new address in setI2cAddress Fix so that driver station app resets the gamepads when switching op modes. USB-related code changes to make USB comm more responsive and to display more explicit error messages. Fix so that USB will recover properly if the USB bus returns garbage data. Fix USB initializtion race condition. Better error reporting during FTDI open. More explicit messages during USB failures. Fixed bug so that USB device is closed if event loop teardown method was not called. Fixed timer UI issue Fixed duplicate name UI bug (Legacy Module configuration). Fixed race condition in EventLoopManager. Fix to keep references stable when updating gamepad. For legacy Matrix motor/servo controllers removed necessity of appending \"Motor\" and \"Servo\" to controller names. Updated HT color sensor driver to use constants from ModernRoboticsUsbLegacyModule class. Updated MR color sensor driver to use constants from ModernRoboticsUsbDeviceInterfaceModule class. Correctly handle I2C Address change in all color sensors Updated/cleaned up op modes. Updated comments in LinearI2cAddressChange.java example op mode. Replaced the calls to \"setChannelMode\" with \"setMode\" (to match the new of the DcMotor method). Removed K9AutoTime.java op mode. Added MRGyroTest.java op mode (demonstrates how to use MR Gyro Sensor). Added MRRGBExample.java op mode (demonstrates how to use MR Color Sensor). Added HTRGBExample.java op mode (demonstrates how to use HT legacy color sensor). Added MatrixControllerDemo.java (demonstrates how to use legacy Matrix controller). Updated javadoc documentation. Updated release .apk files for Robot Controller and Driver Station apps. Release 15.10.06.002 Added support for Legacy Matrix 9.6V motor/servo controller. Cleaned up build.gradle file. Minor UI and bug fixes for driver station and robot controller apps. Throws error if Ultrasonic sensor (NXT) is not configured for legacy module port 4 or 5. Release 15.08.03.001 New user interfaces for FTC Driver Station and FTC Robot Controller apps. An init() method is added to the OpMode class. For this release, init() is triggered right before the start() method. Eventually, the init() method will be triggered when the user presses an \"INIT\" button on driver station. The init() and loop() methods are now required (i.e., need to be overridden in the user's op mode). The start() and stop() methods are optional. A new LinearOpMode class is introduced. Teams can use the LinearOpMode mode to create a linear (not event driven) program model. Teams can use blocking statements like Thread.sleep() within a linear op mode. The API for the Legacy Module and Core Device Interface Module have been updated. Support for encoders with the Legacy Module is now working. The hardware loop has been updated for better performance.",
      "readme": "## NOTICE\n\nThis repository contains the public FTC SDK for the SKYSTONE (2019-2020) competition season.\n\nFormerly this software project was hosted [here](https://github.com/ftctechnh/ftc_app).  Teams who are competing in the SKYSTONE Challenge should use this [new SKYSTONE repository](https://github.com/FIRST-Tech-Challenge/SKYSTONE) instead of the older (and no longer updated) ftc_app repository.\n\n## Welcome!\nThis GitHub repository contains the source code that is used to build an Android app to control a *FIRST* Tech Challenge competition robot.  To use this SDK, download/clone the entire project to your local computer.\n\n## Getting Started\nIf you are new to robotics or new to the *FIRST* Tech Challenge, then you should consider reviewing the [FTC Blocks Tutorial](https://github.com/FIRST-Tech-Challenge/SKYSTONE/wiki/Blocks-Tutorial) to get familiar with how to use the control system:\n\n&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;[FTC Blocks Online Tutorial](https://github.com/FIRST-Tech-Challenge/SKYSTONE/wiki/Blocks-Tutorial)\n\nEven if you are an advanced Java programmer, it is helpful to start with the [FTC Blocks tutorial](https://github.com/FIRST-Tech-Challenge/SKYSTONE/wiki/Blocks-Tutorial), and then migrate to the [OnBot Java Tool](https://github.com/FIRST-Tech-Challenge/SKYSTONE/wiki/OnBot-Java-Tutorial) or to [Android Studio](https://github.com/FIRST-Tech-Challenge/SKYSTONE/wiki/Android-Studio-Tutorial) afterwards.\n\n## Downloading the Project\nIf you are an Android Studio programmer, there are several ways to download this repo.  Note that if you use the Blocks or OnBot Java Tool to program your robot, then you do not need to download this repository.\n\n* If you are a git user, you can clone the most current version of the repository:\n\n<p>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;git clone https://github.com/FIRST-Tech-Challenge/SKYSTONE.git</p>\n\n* Or, if you prefer, you can use the \"Download Zip\" button available through the main repository page.  Downloading the project as a .ZIP file will keep the size of the download manageable.\n\n* You can also download the project folder (as a .zip or .tar.gz archive file) from the Downloads subsection of the [Releases](https://github.com/FIRST-Tech-Challenge/SKYSTONE/releases) page for this repository.\n\nOnce you have downloaded and uncompressed (if needed) your folder, you can use Android Studio to import the folder  (\"Import project (Eclipse ADT, Gradle, etc.)\").\n\n## Getting Help\n### User Documentation and Tutorials\n*FIRST* maintains online documentation with information and tutorials on how to use the *FIRST* Tech Challenge software and robot control system.  You can access this documentation using the following link:\n\n&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;[SKYSTONE Online Documentation](https://github.com/FIRST-Tech-Challenge/SKYSTONE/wiki)\n\nNote that the online documentation is an \"evergreen\" document that is constantly being updated and edited.  It contains the most current information about the *FIRST* Tech Challenge software and control system.\n\n### Javadoc Reference Material\nThe Javadoc reference documentation for the FTC SDK is now available online.  Click on the following link to view the FTC SDK Javadoc documentation as a live website:\n\n&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;[FTC Javadoc Documentation](https://first-tech-challenge.github.io/SkyStone/doc/javadoc/index.html)\n\nDocumentation for the FTC SDK is also included with this repository.  There is a subfolder called \"doc\" which contains several subfolders:\n\n * The folder \"apk\" contains the .apk files for the FTC Driver Station and FTC Robot Controller apps.\n * The folder \"javadoc\" contains the JavaDoc user documentation for the FTC SDK.\n\n### Online User Forum\nFor technical questions regarding the Control System or the FTC SDK, please visit the FTC Technology forum:\n\n&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;[FTC Technology Forum](https://ftcforum.usfirst.org/forumdisplay.php?156-FTC-Technology)\n\n\n**************************************************************************************\n# Release Information\n**************************************************************************************\n\nVersion 5.2 (20190905-083227)\n\n* Fixes extra-wide margins on settings activities, and placement of the new configuration button\n* Adds Skystone Vuforia image target data.\n   * Includes sample Skystone Vuforia Navigation op modes (Java).\n   * Includes sample Skystone Vuforia Navigation op modes (Blocks).\n* Adds TensorFlow inference model (.tflite) for Skystone game elements.\n   * Includes sample Skystone TensorFlow op modes (Java).\n   * Includes sample Skystone TensorFlow op modes (Blocks).\n* Removes older (season-specific) sample op modes.\n* Includes 64-bit support (to comply with [Google Play requirements](https://android-developers.googleblog.com/2019/01/get-your-apps-ready-for-64-bit.html)).\n* Protects against Stuck OpModes when a Restart Robot is requested. (Thanks to FROGbots-4634) ([ftc_app issue #709](https://github.com/ftctechnh/ftc_app/issues/709))\n* Blocks related changes:\n   * Fixes bug with blocks generated code when hardware device name is a java or javascript reserved word.\n   * Shows generated java code for blocks, even when hardware items are missing from the active configuration.\n   * Displays warning icon when outdated Vuforia and TensorFlow blocks are used ([SkyStone issue #27](https://github.com/FIRST-Tech-Challenge/SkyStone/issues/27))\n\n**************************************************************************************\n# Release Information\n**************************************************************************************\n\nVersion 5.1 (20190820-222104)\n\n* Defines default PIDF parameters for the following motors:\n    * REV Core Hex Motor\n    * REV 20:1 HD Hex Motor\n    * REV 40:1 HD Hex Motor\n* Adds back button when running on a device without a system back button (such as a Control Hub)\n* Allows a REV Control Hub to update the firmware on a REV Expansion Hub via USB\n* Fixes [SkyStone issue #9](https://github.com/FIRST-Tech-Challenge/SkyStone/issues/9)\n* Fixes [ftc_app issue #715](https://github.com/ftctechnh/ftc_app/issues/715)\n* Prevents extra DS User clicks by filtering based on current state.\n* Prevents incorrect DS UI state changes when receiving new OpMode list from RC\n* Adds support for REV Color Sensor V3\n* Adds a manual-refresh DS Camera Stream for remotely viewing RC camera frames.\n    * To show the stream on the DS, initialize **but do not run** a stream-enabled opmode, select the Camera Stream option in the DS menu, and tap the image to refresh. This feature is automatically enabled when using Vuforia or TFOD—no additional RC configuration is required for typical use cases. To hide the stream, select the same menu item again.\n    * Note that gamepads are disabled and the selected opmode cannot be started while the stream is open as a safety precaution.\n    * To use custom streams, consult the API docs for `CameraStreamServer#setSource` and `CameraStreamSource`.\n* Adds many Star Wars sounds to RobotController resources.\n* Added SKYSTONE Sounds Chooser Sample Program.\n* Switches out startup, connect chimes, and error/warning sounds for Star Wars sounds\n* Updates OnBot Java to use a WebSocket for communication with the robot\n    * The OnBot Java page no longer has to do a full refresh when a user switches from editing one file to another\n\nKnown issues:\n* Camera Stream\n    * The Vuforia camera stream inherits the issues present in the phone preview (namely [ftc_app issue #574](https://github.com/ftctechnh/ftc_app/issues/574)). This problem does not affect the TFOD camera stream even though it receives frames from Vuforia.\n    * The orientation of the stream frames may not always match the phone preview. For now, these frames may be rotated manually via a custom `CameraStreamSource` if desired.\n* OnBotJava\n    * Browser back button may not always work correctly\n    * It's possible for a build to be queued, but not started. The OnBot Java build console will display a warning if this occurs.\n    * A user might not realize they are editing a different file if the user inadvertently switches from one file to another since this switch is now seamless. The name of the currently open file is displayed in the browser tab.\n\n**************************************************************************************\n# Release Information\n**************************************************************************************\n\nVersion 5.0 (built on 19.06.14)\n\n * Support for the REV Robotics Control Hub.\n * Adds a Java preview pane to the Blocks editor.\n * Adds a new offline export feature to the Blocks editor.\n * Display wifi channel in Network circle on Driver Station.\n * Adds calibration for Logitech C270\n * Updates build tooling and target SDK.\n * Compliance with Google's permissions infrastructure (Required after build tooling update).\n * Keep Alives to mitigate the Motorola wifi scanning problem.  Telemetry substitute no longer necessary.\n * Improves Vuforia error reporting.\n * Fixes ftctechnh/ftc_app issues 621, 713.\n * Miscellaneous bug fixes and improvements.\n\n**************************************************************************************\n# Release Information\n**************************************************************************************\n\nVersion 4.3 (built on 18.10.31)\n * Includes missing TensorFlow-related libraries and files.\n\n**************************************************************************************\n# Release Information\n**************************************************************************************\n\nVersion 4.2 (built on 18.10.30)\n * Includes fix to avoid deadlock situation with WatchdogMonitor which could result in USB communication errors.\n     - Comm error appeared to require that user disconnect USB cable and restart the Robot Controller app to recover.\n     - robotControllerLog.txt would have error messages that included the words \"E RobotCore: lynx xmit lock: #### abandoning lock:\"\n * Includes fix to correctly list the parent module address for a REV Robotics Expansion Hub in a configuration (.xml) file.\n     - Bug in versions 4.0 and 4.1 would incorrect list the address module for a parent REV Robotics device as \"1\".\n     - If the parent module had a higher address value than the daisy-chained module, then this bug would prevent the Robot Controller from communicating with the downstream Expansion Hub.\n * Added requirement for ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION to allow a Driver Station running Android Oreo to scan for Wi-Fi Direct devices.\n * Added google() repo to build.gradle because aapt2 must be downloaded from the google() repository beginning with version 3.2 of the Android Gradle Plugin.\n     - Important Note: Android Studio users will need to be connected to the Internet the first time build the ftc_app project.\n     - Internet connectivity is required for the first build so the appropriate files can be downloaded from the Google repository.\n     - Users should not need to be connected to the Internet for subsequent builds.\n     - This should also fix buid issue where Android Studio would complain that it \"Could not find com.android.tools.lint:lint-gradle:26.1.4\" (or similar).\n * Added support for REV Spark Mini motor controller as part of the configuration menu for a servo/PWM port on the REV Expansion Hub.\n * Provide examples for playing audio files in an Op Mode.\n * Block Development Tool Changes\n     - Includes a fix for a problem with the Velocity blocks that were reported in the FTC Technology forum (Blocks Programming subforum).\n     - Change the \"Save completed successfully.\" message to a white color so it will contrast with a green background.\n     - Fixed the \"Download image\" feature so it will work if there are text blocks in the op mode.\n * Introduce support for Google's TensorFlow Lite technology for object detetion for 2018-2019 game.\n     - TensorFlow lite can recognize Gold Mineral and Silver Mineral from 2018-2019 game.\n     - Example Java and Block op modes are included to show how to determine the relative position of the gold block (left, center, right).\n\n**************************************************************************************\n# Release Information\n**************************************************************************************\n\nVersion 4.1 (released on 18.09.24)\n\nChanges include:\n * Fix to prevent crash when deprecated configuration annotations are used.\n * Change to allow FTC Robot Controller APK to be auto-updated using FIRST Global Control Hub update scripts.\n * Removed samples for non supported / non legal hardware.\n * Improvements to Telemetry.addData block with \"text\" socket.\n * Updated Blocks sample op mode list to include Rover Ruckus Vuforia example.\n * Update SDK library version number.\n\n**************************************************************************************\n# Release Information\n**************************************************************************************\n\nVersion 4.0 (released on 18.09.12)\n\nChanges include:\n * Initial support for UVC compatible cameras\n    - If UVC camera has a unique serial number, RC will detect and enumerate by serial number.\n    - If UVC camera lacks a unique serial number, RC will only support one camera of that type connected.\n    - Calibration settings for a few cameras are included (see TeamCode/src/main/res/xml/teamwebcamcalibrations.xml for details).\n    - User can upload calibration files from Program and Manage web interface.\n    - UVC cameras seem to draw a fair amount of electrical current from the USB bus.\n         + This does not appear to present any problems for the REV Robotics Control Hub.\n\t + This does seem to create stability problems when using some cameras with an Android phone-based Robot Controller.\n\t + FTC Tech Team is investigating options to mitigate this issue with the phone-based Robot Controllers.\n    - Updated sample Vuforia Navigation and VuMark Op Modes to demonstrate how to use an internal phone-based camera and an external UVC webcam.\n\n * Support for improved motor control.\n    - REV Robotics Expansion Hub firmware 1.8 and greater will support a feed forward mechanism for closed loop motor control.\n    - FTC SDK has been modified to support PIDF coefficients (proportional, integral, derivative, and feed forward).\n    - FTC Blocks development tool modified to include PIDF programming blocks.\n    - Deprecated older PID-related methods and variables.\n    - REV's 1.8.x PIDF-related changes provide a more linear and accurate way to control a motor.\n\n * Wireless\n    - Added 5GHz support for wireless channel changing for those devices that support it.\n        + Tested with Moto G5 and E4 phones.\n\t+ Also tested with other (currently non-approved) phones such as Samsung Galaxy S8.\n\n* Improved Expansion Hub firmware update support in Robot Controller app\n    - Changes to make the system more robust during the firmware update process (when performed through Robot Controller app).\n    - User no longer has to disconnect a downstream daisy-chained Expansion Hub when updating an Expansion Hub's firmware.\n        + If user is updating an Expansion Hub's firmware through a USB connection, he/she does not have to disconnect RS485 connection to other Expansion Hubs.\n\t+ The user still must use a USB connection to update an Expansion Hub's firmware.\n\t+ The user cannot update the Expansion Hub firmware for a downstream device that is daisy chained through an RS485 connection.\n    - If an Expansion Hub accidentally gets \"bricked\" the Robot Controller app is now more likely to recognize the Hub when it scans the USB bus.\n        + Robot Controller app should be able to detect an Expansion Hub, even if it accidentally was bricked in a previous update attempt.\n\t+ Robot Controller app should be able to install the firmware onto the Hub, even if if accidentally was bricked in a previous update attempt.\n\n * Resiliency\n    - FTC software can detect and enable an FTDI reset feature that is available with REV Robotics v1.8 Expansion Hub firmware and greater.\n        + When enabled, the Expansion Hub can detect if it hasn't communicated with the Robot Controller over the FTDI (USB) connection.\n\t+ If the Hub hasn't heard from the Robot Controller in a while, it will reset the FTDI connection.\n\t+ This action helps system recover from some ESD-induced disruptions.\n    - Various fixes to improve reliability of FTC software.\n\n * Blocks\n    - Fixed errors with string and list indices in blocks export to java.\n    - Support for USB connected UVC webcams.\n    - Refactored optimized Blocks Vuforia code to support Rover Ruckus image targets.\n    - Added programming blocks to support PIDF (proportional, integral, derivative and feed forward) motor control.\n    - Added formatting options (under Telemetry and Miscellaneous categories) so user can set how many decimal places to display a numerical value.\n    - Support to play audio files (which are uploaded through Blocks web interface) on Driver Station in addition to the Robot Controller.\n    - Fixed bug with Download Image of Blocks feature.\n    - Support for REV Robotics Blinkin LED Controller.\n    - Support for REV Robotics 2m Distance Sensor.\n    - Added support for a REV Touch Sensor (no longer have to configure as a generic digital device).\n    - Added blocks for DcMotorEx methods.\n        + These are enhanced methods that you can use when supported by the motor controller hardware.\n\t+ The REV Robotics Expansion Hub supports these enhanced methods.\n\t+ Enhanced methods include methods to get/set motor velocity (in encoder pulses per second), get/set PIDF coefficients, etc..\n\n * Modest Improvements in Logging\n    - Decrease frequency of battery checker voltage statements.\n    - Removed non-FTC related log statements (wherever possible).\n    - Introduced a \"Match Logging\" feature.\n        + Under \"Settings\" a user can enable/disable this feature (it's disabled by default).\n\t+ If enabled, user provides a \"Match Number\" through the Driver Station user interface (top of the screen).\n\t    * The Match Number is used to create a log file specifically with log statements from that particular Op Mode run.\n\t    * Match log files are stored in /sdcard/FIRST/matlogs on the Robot Controller.\n\t    * Once an op mode run is complete, the Match Number is cleared.\n\t    * This is a convenient way to create a separate match log with statements only related to a specific op mode run.\n\n * New Devices\n    - Support for REV Robotics Blinkin LED Controller.\n    - Support for REV Robotics 2m Distance Sensor.\n    - Added configuration option for REV 20:1 HD Hex Motor.\n    - Added support for a REV Touch Sensor (no longer have to configure as a generic digital device).\n\n * Miscellaneous\n    - Fixed some errors in the definitions for acceleration and velocity in our javadoc documentation.\n    - Added ability to play audio files on Driver Station\n    - When user is configuring an Expansion Hub, the LED on the Expansion Hub will change blink pattern (purple-cyan)  to indicate which Hub is currently being configured.\n    - Renamed I2cSensorType to I2cDeviceType.\n    - Added an external sample Op Mode that demonstrates localization using 2018-2019 (Rover Ruckus presented by QualComm) Vuforia targets.\n    - Added an external sample Op Mode that demonstrates how to use the REV Robotics 2m Laser Distance Sensor.\n    - Added an external sample Op Mode that demonstrates how to use the REV Robotics Blinkin LED Controller.\n    - Re-categorized external Java sample Op Modes to \"TeleOp\" instead of \"Autonomous\".\n\nKnown issues:\n * Initial support for UVC compatible cameras\n    - UVC cameras seem to draw significant amount of current from the USB bus.\n        + This does not appear to present any problems for the REV Robotics Control Hub.\n\t+ This does seem to create stability problems when using some cameras with an Android phone-based Robot Controller.\n\t+ FTC Tech Team is investigating options to mitigate this issue with the phone-based Robot Controllers.\n    - There might be a possible deadlock which causes the RC to become unresponsive when using a UVC webcam with a Nougat Android Robot Controller.\n\n * Wireless\n    - When user selects a wireless channel, this channel does not necessarily persist if the phone is power cycled.\n        + Tech Team is hoping to eventually address this issue in a future release.\n\t+ Issue has been present since apps were introduced (i.e., it is not new with the v4.0 release).\n    - Wireless channel is not currently displayed for WiFi Direct connections.\n\n * Miscellaneous\n    - The blink indication feature that shows which Expansion Hub is currently being configured does not work for a newly created configuration file.\n        + User has to first save a newly created configuration file and then close and re-edit the file in order for blink indicator to work.\n\n\n**************************************************************************************\n# Release Information\n**************************************************************************************\n\nVersion 3.6 (built on 17.12.18)\n\nChanges include:\n * Blocks Changes\n     - Uses updated Google Blockly software to allow users to edit their op modes on Apple iOS devices (including iPad and iPhone).\n     - Improvement in Blocks tool to handle corrupt op mode files.\n     - Autonomous op modes should no longer get switched back to tele-op after re-opening them to be edited.\n     - The system can now detect type mismatches during runtime and alert the user with a message on the Driver Station.\n * Updated javadoc documentation for setPower() method to reflect correct range of values (-1 to +1).\n * Modified VuforiaLocalizerImpl to allow for user rendering of frames\n     - Added a user-overrideable onRenderFrame() method which gets called by the class's renderFrame() method.\n\n**************************************************************************************\n# Release Information\n**************************************************************************************\n\nVersion 3.5 (built on 17.10.30)\n\nChanges with version 3.5 include:\n * Introduced a fix to prevent random op mode stops, which can occur after the Robot Controller app has been paused and then resumed (for example, when a user temporarily turns off the display of the Robot Controller phone, and then turns the screen back on).\n * Introduced a fix to prevent random op mode stops, which were previously caused by random peer disconnect events on the Driver Station.\n * Fixes issue where log files would be closed on pause of the RC or DS, but not re-opened upon resume.\n * Fixes issue with battery handler (voltage) start/stop race.\n * Fixes issue where Android Studio generated op modes would disappear from available list in certain situations.\n * Fixes problem where OnBot Java would not build on REV Robotics Control Hub.\n * Fixes problem where OnBot Java would not build if the date and time on the Robot Controller device was \"rewound\" (set to an earlier date/time).\n * Improved error message on OnBot Java that occurs when renaming a file fails.\n * Removed unneeded resources from android.jar binaries used by OnBot Java to reduce final size of Robot Controller app.\n * Added MR_ANALOG_TOUCH_SENSOR block to Blocks Programming Tool.\n\n**************************************************************************************\n# Release Information\n**************************************************************************************\n\nVersion 3.4 (built on 17.09.06)\n\nChanges with version 3.4 include:\n * Added telemetry.update() statement for BlankLinearOpMode template.\n * Renamed sample Block op modes to be more consistent with Java samples.\n * Added some additional sample Block op modes.\n * Reworded OnBot Java readme slightly.\n\n**************************************************************************************\n\nVersion 3.3 (built on 17.09.04)\n\nThis version of the software includes improves for the FTC Blocks Programming Tool and the OnBot Java Programming Tool.\n\nChanges with verion 3.3 include:\n * Android Studio ftc_app project has been updated to use Gradle Plugin 2.3.3.\n * Android Studio ftc_app project is already using gradle 3.5 distribution.\n * Robot Controller log has been renamed to /sdcard/RobotControllerLog.txt (note that this change was actually introduced w/ v3.2).\n * Improvements in I2C reliability.\n * Optimized I2C read for REV Expansion Hub, with v1.7 firmware or greater.\n * Updated all external/samples (available through OnBot and in Android project folder).\n * Vuforia\n    - Added support for VuMarks that will be used for the 2017-2018 season game.\n * Blocks\n    - Update to latest Google Blockly release.\n    - Sample op modes can be selected as a template when creating new op mode.\n    - Fixed bug where the blocks would disappear temporarily when mouse button is held down.\n    - Added blocks for Range.clip and Range.scale.\n    - User can now disable/enable Block op modes.\n    - Fix to prevent occasional Blocks deadlock.\n * OnBot Java\n    - Significant improvements with autocomplete function for OnBot Java editor.\n    - Sample op modes can be selected as a template when creating new op mode.\n    - Fixes and changes to complete hardware setup feature.\n    - Updated (and more useful) onBot welcome message.\n\nKnown issues:\n * Android Studio\n    - After updating to the new v3.3 Android Studio project folder, if you get error messages indicating \"InvalidVirtualFileAccessException\" then you might need to do a File->Invalidate Caches / Restart to clear the error.\n * OnBot Java\n    - Sometimes when you push the build button to build all op modes, the RC returns an error message that the build failed.  If you press the build button a second time, the build typically suceeds.\n\n**************************************************************************************\n\nVersion 3.2 (built on 17.08.02)\n\nThis version of the software introduces the \"OnBot Java\" Development Tool.  Similar to the FTC Blocks Development Tool, the FTC OnBot Java Development Tool allows a user to create, edit and build op modes dynamically using only a Javascript-enabled web browser.\n\nThe OnBot Java Development Tool is an integrated development environment (IDE) that is served up by the Robot Controller.  Op modes are created and edited using a Javascript-enabled browser (Google Chromse is recommended).  Op modes are saved on the Robot Controller Android device directly.\n\nThe OnBot Java Development Tool provides a Java programming environment that does NOT need Android Studio.\n\n\n\nChanges with version 3.2 include:\n * Enhanced web-based development tools\n    - Introduction of OnBot Java Development Tool.\n    - Web-based programming and management features are \"always on\" (user no longer needs to put Robot Controller into programming mode).\n    - Web-based management interface (where user can change Robot Controller name and also easily download Robot Controller log file).\n    - OnBot Java, Blocks and Management features available from web based interface.\n\n* Blocks Programming Development Tool:\n    - Changed \"LynxI2cColorRangeSensor\" block to \"REV Color/range sensor\" block.\n    - Fixed tooltip for ColorSensor.isLightOn block.\n    Added blocks for ColorSensor.getNormalizedColors and LynxI2cColorRangeSensor.getNormalizedColors.\n\n* Added example op modes for digital touch sensor and REV Robotics Color Distance sensor.\n* User selectable color themes.\n* Includes many minor enhancements and fixes (too numerous to list).\n\nKnown issues:\n* Auto complete function is incomplete and does not support the following (for now):\n     - Access via *this* keyword\n     - Access via *super* keyword\n     - Members of the super cloass, not overridden by the class\n     - Any methods provided in the current class\n     - Inner classes\n     - Can't handle casted objects\n     - Any objects coming from an parenthetically enclosed expression\n\n**************************************************************************************\n\nVersion 3.10 (built on 17.05.09)\n\nThis version of the software provides support for the REV Robotics Expansion Hub.  This version also includes improvements in the USB communication layer in an effort to enhance system resiliency.  If you were using a 2.x version of the software previously, updating to version 3.1 requires that you also update your Driver Station software in addition to updating the Robot Controller software.\n\nAlso note that in version 3.10 software, the setMaxSpeed and getMaxSpeed methods are no longer available (not deprecated, they have been removed from the SDK). Also note that the the new 3.x software incorporates motor profiles that a user can select as he/she configures the robot.\n\nChanges include:\n * Blocks changes\n    - Added VuforiaTrackableDefaultListener.getPose and Vuforia.trackPose blocks.\n    - Added optimized blocks support for Vuforia extended tracking.\n    - Added atan2 block to the math category.\n    - Added useCompetitionFieldTargetLocations parameter to Vuforia.initialize block.  If set to false, the target locations are placed at (0,0,0) with target orientation as specified in https://github.com/gearsincorg/FTCVuforiaDemo/blob/master/Robot_Navigation.java tutorial op mode.\n * Incorporates additional improvements to USB comm layer to improve system resiliency (to recover from a greater number of communication disruptions).\n\n**************************************************************************************\n\nAdditional Notes Regarding Version 3.00 (built on 17.04.13)\n\nIn addition to the release changes listed below (see section labeled \"Version 3.00 (built on 17.04.013)\"), version 3.00 has the following important changes:\n\n1. Version 3.00 software uses a new version of the FTC Robocol (robot protocol).  If you upgrade to v3.0 on the Robot Controller and/or Android Studio side, you must also upgrade the Driver Station software to match the new Robocol.\n2. Version 3.00 software removes the setMaxSpeed and getMaxSpeed methods from the DcMotor class.  If you have an op mode that formerly used these methods, you will need to remove the references/calls to these methods.  Instead, v3.0 provides the max speed information through the use of motor profiles that are selected by the user during robot configuration.\n3. Version 3.00 software currently does not have a mechanism to disable extra i2c sensors.  We hope to re-introduce this function with a release in the near future.\n\n**************************************************************************************\n\nVersion 3.00 (built on 17.04.13)\n\n*** Use this version of the software at YOUR OWN RISK!!! ***\n\nThis software is being released as an \"alpha\" version.  Use this version at your own risk!\n\nThis pre-release software contains SIGNIFICANT changes, including changes to the Wi-Fi Direct pairing mechanism, rewrites of the I2C sensor classes, changes to the USB/FTDI layer, and the introduction of support for the REV Robotics Expansion Hub and the REV Robotics color-range-light sensor.  These changes were implemented to improve the reliability and resiliency of the FTC control system.\n\nPlease note, however, that version 3.00 is considered \"alpha\" code.  This code is being released so that the FIRST community will have an opportunity to test the new REV Expansion Hub electronics module when it becomes available in May.  The developers do not recommend using this code for critical applications (i.e., competition use).\n\n*** Use this version of the software at YOUR OWN RISK!!! ***\n\nChanges include:\n * Major rework of sensor-related infrastructure.  Includes rewriting sensor classes to implement synchronous I2C communication.\n * Fix to reset Autonomous timer back to 30 seconds.\n * Implementation of specific motor profiles for approved 12V motors (includes Tetrix, AndyMark, Matrix and REV models).\n * Modest improvements to enhance Wi-Fi P2P pairing.\n * Fixes telemetry log addition race.\n * Publishes all the sources (not just a select few).\n * Includes Block programming improvements\n    - Addition of optimized Vuforia blocks.\n    - Auto scrollbar to projects and sounds pages.\n    - Fixed blocks paste bug.\n    - Blocks execute after while-opModeIsActive loop (to allow for cleanup before exiting op mode).\n    - Added gyro integratedZValue block.\n    - Fixes bug with projects page for Firefox browser.\n    - Added IsSpeaking block to AndroidTextToSpeech.\n * Implements support for the REV Robotics Expansion Hub\n    - Implements support for integral REV IMU (physically installed on I2C bus 0, uses same Bosch BNO055 9 axis absolute orientation sensor as Adafruit 9DOF abs orientation sensor).    - Implements support for REV color/range/light sensor.\n    - Provides support to update Expansion Hub firmware through FTC SDK.\n    - Detects REV firmware version and records in log file.\n    - Includes support for REV Control Hub (note that the REV Control Hub is not yet approved for FTC use).\n    - Implements FTC Blocks programming support for REV Expansion Hub and sensor hardware.\n    - Detects and alerts when I2C device disconnect.\n\n**************************************************************************************\n\nVersion 2.62 (built on 17.01.07)\n  * Added null pointer check before calling modeToByte() in finishModeSwitchIfNecessary method for ModernRoboticsUsbDcMotorController class.\n  * Changes to enhance Modern Robotics USB protocol robustness.\n\n**************************************************************************************\n\nVersion 2.61 (released on 16.12.19)\n  * Blocks Programming mode changes:\n     - Fix to correct issue when an exception was thrown because an OpticalDistanceSensor object appears twice in the hardware map (the second time as a LightSensor).\n\n**************************************************************************************\n\nVersion 2.6 (released on 16.12.16)\n  * Fixes for Gyro class:\n     - Improve (decrease) sensor refresh latency.\n     - fix isCalibrating issues.\n  * Blocks Programming mode changes:\n     - Blocks now ignores a device in the configuration xml if the name is empty. Other devices work in configuration work fine.\n\n**************************************************************************************\n\nVersion 2.5 (internal release on released on 16.12.13)\n  * Blocks Programming mode changes:\n     - Added blocks support for AdafruitBNO055IMU.\n     - Added Download Op Mode button to FtcBocks.html.\n     - Added support for copying blocks in one OpMode and pasting them in an other OpMode. The clipboard content is stored on the phone, so the programming mode server must be running.\n     - Modified Utilities section of the toolbox.\n     - In Programming Mode, display information about the active connections.\n     - Fixed paste location when workspace has been scrolled.\n     - Added blocks support for the android Accelerometer.\n     - Fixed issue where Blocks Upload Op Mode truncated name at first dot.\n     - Added blocks support for Android SoundPool.\n     - Added type safety to blocks for Acceleration.\n     - Added type safety to blocks for AdafruitBNO055IMU.Parameters.\n     - Added type safety to blocks for AnalogInput.\n     - Added type safety to blocks for AngularVelocity.\n     - Added type safety to blocks for Color.\n     - Added type safety to blocks for ColorSensor.\n     - Added type safety to blocks for CompassSensor.\n     - Added type safety to blocks for CRServo.\n     - Added type safety to blocks for DigitalChannel.\n     - Added type safety to blocks for ElapsedTime.\n     - Added type safety to blocks for Gamepad.\n     - Added type safety to blocks for GyroSensor.\n     - Added type safety to blocks for IrSeekerSensor.\n     - Added type safety to blocks for LED.\n     - Added type safety to blocks for LightSensor.\n     - Added type safety to blocks for LinearOpMode.\n     - Added type safety to blocks for MagneticFlux.\n     - Added type safety to blocks for MatrixF.\n     - Added type safety to blocks for MrI2cCompassSensor.\n     - Added type safety to blocks for MrI2cRangeSensor.\n     - Added type safety to blocks for OpticalDistanceSensor.\n     - Added type safety to blocks for Orientation.\n     - Added type safety to blocks for Position.\n     - Added type safety to blocks for Quaternion.\n     - Added type safety to blocks for Servo.\n     - Added type safety to blocks for ServoController.\n     - Added type safety to blocks for Telemetry.\n     - Added type safety to blocks for Temperature.\n     - Added type safety to blocks for TouchSensor.\n     - Added type safety to blocks for UltrasonicSensor.\n     - Added type safety to blocks for VectorF.\n     - Added type safety to blocks for Velocity.\n     - Added type safety to blocks for VoltageSensor.\n     - Added type safety to blocks for VuforiaLocalizer.Parameters.\n     - Added type safety to blocks for VuforiaTrackable.\n     - Added type safety to blocks for VuforiaTrackables.\n     - Added type safety to blocks for enums in AdafruitBNO055IMU.Parameters.\n     - Added type safety to blocks for AndroidAccelerometer, AndroidGyroscope, AndroidOrientation, and AndroidTextToSpeech.\n\n**************************************************************************************\n\nVersion 2.4 (released on 16.11.13)\n  * Fix to avoid crashing for nonexistent resources.\n  * Blocks Programming mode changes:\n     - Added blocks to support OpenGLMatrix, MatrixF, and VectorF.\n     - Added blocks to support AngleUnit, AxesOrder, AxesReference, CameraDirection, CameraMonitorFeedback, DistanceUnit, and TempUnit.\n     - Added blocks to support Acceleration.\n     - Added blocks to support LinearOpMode.getRuntime.\n     - Added blocks to support MagneticFlux and Position.\n     - Fixed typos.\n     - Made blocks for ElapsedTime more consistent with other objects.\n     - Added blocks to support Quaternion, Velocity, Orientation, AngularVelocity.\n     - Added blocks to support VuforiaTrackables, VuforiaTrackable, VuforiaLocalizer, VuforiaTrackableDefaultListener.\n     - Fixed a few blocks.\n     - Added type checking to new blocks.\n     - Updated to latest blockly.\n     - Added default variable blocks to navigation and matrix blocks.\n     - Fixed toolbox entry for openGLMatrix_rotation_withAxesArgs.\n     - When user downloads Blocks-generated op mode, only the .blk file is downloaded.\n     - When user uploads Blocks-generated op mode (.blk file), Javascript code is auto generated.\n     - Added DbgLog support.\n     - Added logging when a blocks file is read/written.\n     - Fixed bug to properly render blocks even if missing devices from configuration file.\n     - Added support for additional characters (not just alphanumeric) for the block file names (for download and upload).\n     - Added support for OpMode flavor (“Autonomous” or “TeleOp”) and group.\n  * Changes to Samples to prevent tutorial issues.\n  * Incorporated suggested changes from public pull 216 (“Replace .. paths”).\n  * Remove Servo Glitches when robot stopped.\n  * if user hits “Cancels” when editing a configuration file, clears the unsaved changes and reverts to original unmodified configuration.\n  * Added log info to help diagnose why the Robot Controller app was terminated (for example, by watch dog function).\n  * Added ability to transfer log from the controller.\n  * Fixed inconsistency for AngularVelocity\n  * Limit unbounded growth of data for telemetry.  If user does not call telemetry.update() for LinearOpMode in a timely manner, data added for telemetry might get lost if size limit is exceeded.\n\n**************************************************************************************\n\nVersion 2.35 (released on 16.10.06)\n  * Blockly programming mode - Removed unnecesary idle() call from blocks for new project.\n\n**************************************************************************************\n\nVersion 2.30 (released on 16.10.05)\n  * Blockly programming mode:\n     - Mechanism added to save Blockly op modes from Programming Mode Server onto local device\n     - To avoid clutter, blocks are displayed in categorized folders\n     - Added support for DigitalChannel\n     - Added support for ModernRoboticsI2cCompassSensor\n     - Added support for ModernRoboticsI2cRangeSensor\n     - Added support for VoltageSensor\n     - Added support for AnalogInput\n     - Added support for AnalogOutput\n     - Fix for CompassSensor setMode block\n  * Vuforia\n     - Fix deadlock / make camera data available while Vuforia is running.\n     - Update to Vuforia 6.0.117 (recommended by Vuforia and Google to close security loophole).\n  * Fix for autonomous 30 second timer bug (where timer was in effect, even though it appeared to have timed out).\n  * opModeIsActive changes to allow cleanup after op mode is stopped (with enforced 2 second safety timeout).\n  * Fix to avoid reading i2c twice.\n  * Updated sample Op Modes.\n  * Improved logging and fixed intermittent freezing.\n  * Added digital I/O sample.\n  * Cleaned up device names in sample op modes to be consistent with Pushbot guide.\n  * Fix to allow use of IrSeekerSensorV3.\n\n**************************************************************************************\n\nVersion 2.20 (released on 16.09.08)\n  * Support for Modern Robotics Compass Sensor.\n  * Support for Modern Robotics Range Sensor.\n  * Revise device names for Pushbot templates to match the names used in Pushbot guide.\n  * Fixed bug so that IrSeekerSensorV3 device is accessible as IrSeekerSensor in hardwareMap.\n  * Modified computer vision code to require an individual Vuforia license (per legal requirement from PTC).\n  * Minor fixes.\n  * Blockly enhancements:\n     - Support for Voltage Sensor.\n     - Support for Analog Input.\n     - Support for Analog Output.\n     - Support for Light Sensor.\n     - Support for Servo Controller.\n\n**************************************************************************************\n\nVersion 2.10 (released on 16.09.03)\n * Support for Adafruit IMU.\n * Improvements to ModernRoboticsI2cGyro class\n    - Block on reset of z axis.\n    - isCalibrating() returns true while gyro is calibration.\n * Updated sample gyro program.\n * Blockly enhancements\n    - support for android.graphics.Color.\n    - added support for ElapsedTime.\n    - improved look and legibility of blocks.\n    - support for compass sensor.\n    - support for ultrasonic sensor.\n    - support for IrSeeker.\n    - support for LED.\n    - support for color sensor.\n    - support for CRServo\n    - prompt user to configure robot before using programming mode.\n * Provides ability to disable audio cues.\n * various bug fixes and improvements.\n\n**************************************************************************************\n\nVersion 2.00 (released on 16.08.19)\n * This is the new release for the upcoming 2016-2017 FIRST Tech Challenge Season.\n * Channel change is enabled in the FTC Robot Controller app for Moto G 2nd and 3rd Gen phones.\n * Users can now use annotations to register/disable their Op Modes.\n * Changes in the Android SDK, JDK and build tool requirements (minsdk=19, java 1.7, build tools 23.0.3).\n * Standardized units in analog input.\n * Cleaned up code for existing analog sensor classes.\n * setChannelMode and getChannelMode were REMOVED from the DcMotorController class.  This is important - we no longer set the motor modes through the motor controller.\n * setMode and getMode were added to the DcMotor class.\n * ContinuousRotationServo class has been added to the FTC SDK.\n * Range.clip() method has been overloaded so it can support this operation for int, short and byte integers.\n * Some changes have been made (new methods added) on how a user can access items from the hardware map.\n * Users can now set the zero power behavior for a DC motor so that the motor will brake or float when power is zero.\n * Prototype Blockly Programming Mode has been added to FTC Robot Controller.  Users can place the Robot Controller into this mode, and then use a device (such as a laptop) that has a Javascript enabled browser to write Blockly-based Op Modes directly onto the Robot Controller.\n * Users can now configure the robot remotely through the FTC Driver Station app.\n * Android Studio project supports Android Studio 2.1.x and compile SDK Version 23 (Marshmallow).\n * Vuforia Computer Vision SDK integrated into FTC SDK.  Users can use sample vision targets to get localization information on a standard FTC field.\n * Project structure has been reorganized so that there is now a TeamCode package that users can use to place their local/custom Op Modes into this package.\n * Inspection function has been integrated into the FTC Robot Controller and Driver Station Apps (Thanks Team HazMat… 9277 & 10650!).\n * Audio cues have been incorporated into FTC SDK.\n * Swap mechanism added to FTC Robot Controller configuration activity.  For example, if you have two motor controllers on a robot, and you misidentified them in your configuration file, you can use the Swap button to swap the devices within the configuration file (so you do not have to manually re-enter in the configuration info for the two devices).\n * Fix mechanism added to all user to replace an electronic module easily.  For example, suppose a servo controller dies on your robot. You replace the broken module with a new module, which has a different serial number from the original servo controller.  You can use the Fix button to automatically reconfigure your configuration file to use the serial number of the new module.\n * Improvements made to fix resiliency and responsiveness of the system.\n * For LinearOpMode the user now must for a telemetry.update() to update the telemetry data on the driver station.  This update() mechanism ensures that the driver station gets the updated data properly and at the same time.\n * The Auto Configure function of the Robot Controller is now template based.  If there is a commonly used robot configuration, a template can be created so that the Auto Configure mechanism can be used to quickly configure a robot of this type.\n * The logic to detect a runaway op mode (both in the LinearOpMode and OpMode types) and to abort the run, then auto recover has been improved/implemented.\n * Fix has been incorporated so that Logitech F310 gamepad mappings will be correct for Marshmallow users.\n\n**************************************************************************************\n\nRelease 16.07.08\n\n * For the ftc_app project, the gradle files have been modified to support Android Studio 2.1.x.\n\n\n\n**************************************************************************************\n\nRelease 16.03.30\n\n * For the MIT App Inventor, the design blocks have new icons that better represent the function of each design component.\n * Some changes were made to the shutdown logic to ensure the robust shutdown of some of our USB services.\n * A change was made to LinearOpMode so as to allow a given instance to be executed more than once, which is required for the App Inventor.\n * Javadoc improved/updated.\n\n**************************************************************************************\n\nRelease 16.03.09\n\n * Changes made to make the FTC SDK synchronous (significant change!)\n    - waitOneFullHardwareCycle() and waitForNextHardwareCycle() are no longer needed and have been deprecated.\n    - runOpMode() (for a LinearOpMode) is now decoupled from the system's hardware read/write thread.\n    - loop() (for an OpMode) is now decoupled from the system's hardware read/write thread.\n    - Methods are synchronous.\n    - For example, if you call setMode(DcMotorController.RunMode.RESET_ENCODERS) for a motor, the encoder is guaranteed to be reset when the method call is complete.\n    - For legacy module (NXT compatible), user no longer has to toggle between read and write modes when reading from or writing to a legacy device.\n * Changes made to enhance reliability/robustness during ESD event.\n * Changes made to make code thread safe.\n * Debug keystore added so that user-generated robot controller APKs will all use the same signed key (to avoid conflicts if a team has multiple developer laptops for example).\n * Firmware version information for Modern Robotics modules are now logged.\n * Changes made to improve USB comm reliability and robustness.\n * Added support for voltage indicator for legacy (NXT-compatible) motor controllers.\n * Changes made to provide auto stop capabilities for op modes.\n    - A LinearOpMode class will stop when the statements in runOpMode() are complete.  User does not have to push the stop button on the driver station.\n    - If an op mode is stopped by the driver station, but there is a run away/uninterruptible thread persisting, the app will log an error message then force itself to crash to stop the runaway thread.\n * Driver Station UI modified to display lowest measured voltage below current voltage (12V battery).\n * Driver Station UI modified to have color background for current voltage (green=good, yellow=caution, red=danger, extremely low voltage).\n * javadoc improved (edits and additional classes).\n * Added app build time to About activity for driver station and robot controller apps.\n * Display local IP addresses on Driver Station About activity.\n * Added I2cDeviceSynchImpl.\n * Added I2cDeviceSync interface.\n * Added seconds() and milliseconds() to ElapsedTime for clarity.\n * Added getCallbackCount() to I2cDevice.\n * Added missing clearI2cPortActionFlag.\n * Added code to create log messages while waiting for LinearOpMode shutdown.\n * Fix so Wifi Direct Config activity will no longer launch multiple times.\n * Added the ability to specify an alternate i2c address in software for the Modern Robotics gyro.\n\n**************************************************************************************\n\nRelease 16.02.09\n\n * Improved battery checker feature so that voltage values get refreshed regularly (every 250 msec) on Driver Station (DS) user interface.\n * Improved software so that Robot Controller (RC) is much more resilient and “self-healing” to USB disconnects:\n    - If user attempts to start/restart RC with one or more module missing, it will display a warning but still start up.\n    - When running an op mode, if one or more modules gets disconnected, the RC & DS will display warnings,and robot will keep on working in spite of the missing module(s).\n    - If a disconnected module gets physically reconnected the RC will auto detect the module and the user will regain control of the recently connected module.\n    - Warning messages are more helpful (identifies the type of module that’s missing plus its USB serial number).\n * Code changes to fix the null gamepad reference when users try to reference the gamepads in the init() portion of their op mode.\n * NXT light sensor output is now properly scaled.  Note that teams might have to readjust their light threshold values in their op modes.\n * On DS user interface, gamepad icon for a driver will disappear if the matching gamepad is disconnected or if that gamepad gets designated as a different driver.\n * Robot Protocol (ROBOCOL) version number info is displayed in About screen on RC and DS apps.\n * Incorporated a display filter on pairing screen to filter out devices that don’t use the “<TEAM NUMBER>-“ format. This filter can be turned off to show all WiFi Direct devices.\n * Updated text in License file.\n * Fixed formatting error in OpticalDistanceSensor.toString().\n * Fixed issue on with a blank (“”) device name that would disrupt WiFi Direct Pairing.\n * Made a change so that the WiFi info and battery info can be displayed more quickly on the DS upon connecting to RC.\n * Improved javadoc generation.\n * Modified code to make it easier to support language localization in the future.\n\n**************************************************************************************\n\nRelease 16.01.04\n\n * Updated compileSdkVersion for apps\n * Prevent Wifi from entering power saving mode\n * removed unused import from driver station\n * Corrrected \"Dead zone\" joystick code.\n * LED.getDeviceName and .getConnectionInfo() return null\n * apps check for ROBOCOL_VERSION mismatch\n * Fix for Telemetry also has off-by-one errors in its data string sizing / short size limitations error\n * User telemetry output is sorted.\n * added formatting variants to DbgLog and RobotLog APIs\n * code modified to allow for a long list of op mode names.\n * changes to improve thread safety of RobocolDatagramSocket\n * Fix for \"missing hardware leaves robot controller disconnected from driver station\" error\n * fix for \"fast tapping of Init/Start causes problems\" (toast is now only instantiated on UI thread).\n * added some log statements for thread life cycle.\n * moved gamepad reset logic inside of initActiveOpMode() for robustness\n * changes made to mitigate risk of race conditions on public methods.\n * changes to try and flag when WiFi Direct name contains non-printable characters.\n * fix to correct race condition between .run() and .close() in ReadWriteRunnableStandard.\n * updated FTDI driver\n * made ReadWriteRunnableStanard interface public.\n * fixed off-by-one errors in Command constructor\n * moved specific hardware implmentations into their own package.\n * moved specific gamepad implemnatations to the hardware library.\n * changed LICENSE file to new BSD version.\n * fixed race condition when shutting down Modern Robotics USB devices.\n * methods in the ColorSensor classes have been synchronized.\n * corrected isBusy() status to reflect end of motion.\n * corrected \"back\" button keycode.\n * the notSupported() method of the GyroSensor class was changed to protected (it should not be public).\n\n\n**************************************************************************************\n\nRelease 15.11.04.001\n\n * Added Support for Modern Robotics Gyro.\n  - The GyroSensor class now supports the MR Gyro Sensor.\n  - Users can access heading data (about Z axis)\n  - Users can also access raw gyro data (X, Y, & Z axes).\n  - Example MRGyroTest.java op mode included.\n * Improved error messages\n  - More descriptive error messages for exceptions in user code.\n * Updated DcMotor API\n * Enable read mode on new address in setI2cAddress\n * Fix so that driver station app resets the gamepads when switching op modes.\n * USB-related code changes to make USB comm more responsive and to display more explicit error messages.\n  - Fix so that USB will recover properly if the USB bus returns garbage data.\n  - Fix USB initializtion race condition.\n  - Better error reporting during FTDI open.\n  - More explicit messages during USB failures.\n  - Fixed bug so that USB device is closed if event loop teardown method was not called.\n * Fixed timer UI issue\n * Fixed duplicate name UI bug (Legacy Module configuration).\n * Fixed race condition in EventLoopManager.\n * Fix to keep references stable when updating gamepad.\n * For legacy Matrix motor/servo controllers removed necessity of appending \"Motor\" and \"Servo\" to controller names.\n * Updated HT color sensor driver to use constants from ModernRoboticsUsbLegacyModule class.\n * Updated MR color sensor driver to use constants from ModernRoboticsUsbDeviceInterfaceModule class.\n * Correctly handle I2C Address change in all color sensors\n * Updated/cleaned up op modes.\n  - Updated comments in LinearI2cAddressChange.java example op mode.\n  - Replaced the calls to \"setChannelMode\" with \"setMode\" (to match the new of the DcMotor  method).\n  - Removed K9AutoTime.java op mode.\n  - Added MRGyroTest.java op mode (demonstrates how to use MR Gyro Sensor).\n  - Added MRRGBExample.java op mode (demonstrates how to use MR Color Sensor).\n  - Added HTRGBExample.java op mode (demonstrates how to use HT legacy color sensor).\n  - Added MatrixControllerDemo.java (demonstrates how to use legacy Matrix controller).\n * Updated javadoc documentation.\n * Updated release .apk files for Robot Controller and Driver Station apps.\n\nT. Eng\nNovember 5, 2015\n\n**************************************************************************************\n\nRelease 15.10.06.002\n\n * Added support for Legacy Matrix 9.6V motor/servo controller.\n * Cleaned up build.gradle file.\n * Minor UI and bug fixes for driver station and robot controller apps.\n * Throws error if Ultrasonic sensor (NXT) is not configured for legacy module port 4 or 5.\n\nT. Eng\nOctober 6, 2015\n\n**************************************************************************************\n\nIn this latest version of the FTC SDK (20150803_001) the following changes should be noted:\n\n * New user interfaces for FTC Driver Station and FTC Robot Controller apps.\n * An init() method is added to the OpMode class.\n   - For this release, init() is triggered right before the start() method.\n   - Eventually, the init() method will be triggered when the user presses an \"INIT\" button on driver station.\n   - The init() and loop() methods are now required (i.e., need to be overridden in the user's op mode).\n   - The start() and stop() methods are optional.\n * A new LinearOpMode class is introduced.\n   - Teams can use the LinearOpMode mode to create a linear (not event driven) program model.\n   - Teams can use blocking statements like Thread.sleep() within a linear op mode.\n * The API for the Legacy Module and Core Device Interface Module have been updated.\n   - Support for encoders with the Legacy Module is now working.\n * The hardware loop has been updated for better performance.\n\n\nT. 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      "title": "ISO 26262: Functional Safety Standard for Modern Road Vehicles: Theory, Techniques, Testing and Tools",
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      "description": "An ongoing & curated collection of awesome software best practices and techniques, libraries and frameworks, E-books and videos, websites, blog posts, links to github Repositories, technical guidelines and important resources about ISO 26262: Functional Safety Standard for Modern Road Vehicles in Cybersecurity.",
      "readme": "# ISO 26262: Functional Safety Standard for Modern Road Vehicles: Theory, Techniques, Testing and Tools\n\n\nAn ongoing & curated collection of awesome software best practices and techniques, libraries and frameworks, E-books and videos, websites, blog posts, links to github Repositories, technical guidelines and important resources about ISO 26262: Functional Safety Standard for Modern Road Vehicles in Cybersecurity.\n> Thanks to all contributors, you're awesome and wouldn't be possible without you! Our goal is to build a categorized community-driven collection of very well-known resources.\n\n\n## `Table of Contents`\n   - [1 - Introduction to ISO 26262](#)\n      - [1.1 - Discover ISO 26262](#)\n      - [1.2 - What is Functional Safety](#)\n   - [2 - ISO 26262 Safety Integrity Levels](#)\n     - [2.1 - Determining ISO 26262 ASIL Leve](#)\n\n\n## 1 - Introduction to ISO 26262\nISO 26262 is a standard for implementing functional safety measures for electric systems in an automotive vehicle. The first version of ISO 26262 was released in 2011. This version only covered functional safety for passenger cars.\n> A later edition of the standard, released in 2018, extended the scope to include all road vehicles except for mopeds.\n\n<p align=\"center\">\n  <img src=\"https://github.com/paulveillard/cybersecurity-iso-26262/blob/main/img/iso26262-1.png?raw=true\" alt=\"Sublime's custom image\"/>\n</p>\n\nThe **ISO 26262 series of standards** is the adaptation of **IEC 61508 series of standards** to address the sector specific needs of electrical and/or electronic (E/E) systems within road vehicles.\nThis adaptation applies to all activities during the safety lifecycle of safety-related systems comprised of electrical, electronic and software components.\n> Safety is one of the key issues in the development of road vehicles. Development and integration of automotive functionalities strengthen the need for functional safety and the need to provide evidence that functional safety objectives are satisfied. With the trend of increasing technological complexity, software content and mechatronic implementation, there are increasing risks from systematic failures and random hardware failures, these being considered within the scope of functional safety.\n\n<p align=\"center\">\n  <img src=\"https://github.com/paulveillard/cybersecurity-iso-26262/blob/main/img/iso26262-3.png?raw=true\" alt=\"Sublime's custom image\"/>\n</p>\n\n- ISO 26262 series of standards includes guidance to mitigate these risks by providing appropriate requirements and processes. To achieve functional safety, the ISO 26262 series of standards:\n   - a) provides a reference for the automotive safety lifecycle and supports the tailoring of the activities to be performed during the lifecycle phases, i.e., development, production, operation, service and decommissioning;\n   - b) provides an automotive-specific risk-based approach to determine integrity levels [Automotive Safety Integrity Levels (ASILs)]; iTeh STANDARD PREVIEW (standards.iteh.ai)\n   -  c) uses ASILs to specify which of the requirements of ISO 26262 are applicable to avoid unreasonable residual risk;\n   -  d) provides requirements for functional safety management, design, implementation, verification, validation and confirmation measures; and ISO 26262-1:2018 htps:/standards.iteh.ai/catalog/standards/sist/c1a72b85-fd93-4952-bc1e38aedd5d0742/iso-26262-1-2018\n   -  e) provides requirements for relations between customers and suppliers.\n\n### `1.1 - Discover ISO 26262`\nEnsure your automotive software meets the highest safety standards by mastering ISO 26262 verification requirements and avoid critical, costly recalls by guaranteeing road-ready reliability.\n\n- ISO 26262 is divided into 12 parts.\n\n  <p align=\"center\">\n  <img src=\"https://github.com/paulveillard/cybersecurity-iso-26262/blob/main/img/iso26262-2.png?raw=true\" alt=\"Sublime's custom image\"/>\n</p>\n\n\n### `1.2 - What is Functional Safety?`\n\nSafety can be defined by referring to two existing safety standards:\n- **IEC 61508 (International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC), a functional safety standard for the general electronics market developed by the IEC.**\n  - IEC 61508 Definition:\n> Safety is the freedom from unacceptable risk of physical injury or of damage to the health of people, either directly, or indirectly as a result of damage to property or to the\nenvironment.\n> Functional Safety is part of the overall safety that depends on a system or equipment operating correctly in response to its inputs.\n\n\n- **ISO 26262 (IEC), a functional safety standard for automobiles from ISO. It has rapidly gaining acceptance as the guideline for the automotive engineer since its release.***\n   - ISO 26262 Definition:\n> Absence of unacceptable risk due to hazards caused by mal-functional behavior of electrical and/or electronic systems and the interactions of these systems.\n\n\n### `1.3 - ISO 26262 Reading recommendation`\n\n  <p align=\"center\">\n  <img src=\"https://github.com/paulveillard/cybersecurity-iso-26262/blob/main/img/iso26262-4.png?raw=true\" alt=\"Sublime's custom image\"/>\n</p>\n\n### `1.4 - Scope of ISO 26262`\n  <p align=\"center\">\n  <img src=\"https://github.com/paulveillard/cybersecurity-iso-26262/blob/main/img/iso26262-5.png?raw=true\" alt=\"Sublime's custom image\"/>\n</p>\n\n### `1.5 - Safety Lifecycle`\n  <p align=\"center\">\n  <img src=\"https://github.com/paulveillard/cybersecurity-iso-26262/blob/main/img/iso26262-6.png?raw=true\" alt=\"Sublime's custom image\"/>\n</p>\n\n### `1.6 - ISO 26262 Key Differences from IEC 61508`\n\n- ISO 26262 aligns with auto industry use cases and definition of acceptable risk\n- IEC 61508 concept of safety function is replaced with ISO 26262 safety goals.\n   − Safety function concept was based on the idea of defining a system under control and then “bolting-on” risk reduction measures\n   − Safety goal concept requires that risk reduction be part of the initial control system design\n- Typical IEC 61508 systems are installed and then validated in place. ISO 26262 systems must be validated before release to market.\n- ISO 26262 standard clearly defines work products for each requirement. This makes determination of compliance easier but limits flexibility of development system definition.\n- ISO 26262 has hazard and risk analysis, failure rates and metrics adapted for Automotive use cases.\n\n ## 2 - ISO 26262 Safety Integrity Levels\n\n### 2.1 - Determining ISO 26262 ASIL Level\n\n<p align=\"center\">\n  <img src=\"https://github.com/paulveillard/cybersecurity-iso-26262/blob/main/img/iso26262-7.png?raw=true\" alt=\"Sublime's custom image\"/>\n</p>\n\n\n### 2.2 Automotive Safety Integrity Level\n\nThe Automotive Safety Integrity Level (ASIL) is a classification system used in ISO 26262. Each component of an automotive system is assigned an ASIL based on the level of risk should the component fail, and this determines the verification activities required to demonstrate functional safety for the component. A risk can be assigned one of five ASIL ratings:\n\n- A (lowest integrity) to D (highest integrity), which define the level of risk in the event of failure. Failure at ASIL D could be potential for loss of life and require stricter compliance requirements compared to ASIL A.\n- QM (Quality Management), which assumes that the risk will be mitigated sufficiently by Quality Assurance activities.\n\nThe ASIL rating is calculated based on the following factors (see Table 1):\n\n- **Severity** of injuries afflicted to the passengers\n- **Probability** of **exposure**\n- **Controllability** of the hazard (probability that the passenger will avoid the harm)\n\n<p align=\"center\">\n  <img src=\"https://github.com/paulveillard/cybersecurity-iso-26262/blob/main/img/iso26262-8.1.png?raw=true\" alt=\"Sublime's custom image\"/>\n</p>\n\n<p align=\"center\">\n  <img src=\"https://github.com/paulveillard/cybersecurity-iso-26262/blob/main/img/iso26262-8.png?raw=true\" alt=\"Sublime's custom image\"/>\n</p>\n\n\n\n<p align=\"center\">\n  <img src=\"https://github.com/paulveillard/cybersecurity-iso-26262/blob/main/img/iso26262-9.png?raw=true\" alt=\"Sublime's custom image\"/>\n</p>\n\n## `License`\nMIT License & [cc](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/) license\n\n<a rel=\"license\" href=\"http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/\"><img alt=\"Creative Commons License\" style=\"border-width:0\" src=\"https://i.creativecommons.org/l/by/4.0/88x31.png\" /></a><br />This work is licensed under a <a rel=\"license\" href=\"http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/\">Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License</a>.\n\nTo the extent possible under law, [Paul Veillard](https://github.com/paulveillard/) has waived all copyright and related or neighboring rights to this work.",
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      "readme": "# REM: A Multi-Model Fusion Framework for Real-Time Cyberattack Detection in Electric Vehicle Charging Systems\n\n[![License: MIT](https://img.shields.io/badge/License-MIT-yellow.svg)](https://opensource.org/licenses/MIT)\n[![Python](https://img.shields.io/badge/python-3.8+-blue.svg)](https://www.python.org/downloads/)\n\n**Authors:** Son Duong, Secil Ercan, Mahdi Zargayouna\n**Affiliation:** GRETTIA-COSYS, Université Gustave Eiffel, 77454 Marne-la-Vallée, France\n\n## Abstract\n\nThe integration of Electric Vehicle Charging Systems (EVCS) into smart grids introduces new cybersecurity vulnerabilities due to insecure communication protocols. Threats such as denial-of-service attacks, malware injection, and spoofing compromise system reliability and safety. We introduce the **Resilient Electric Vehicle Charger for Cyberattack Classification Using Multi-Model Fusion (REM)**, a scalable and real-time framework for detecting cyberattacks. REM processes heterogeneous data sources—hardware performance counters and power consumption metrics—through three stages: (i) data preprocessing, (ii) independent model training for each data type, and (iii) probabilistic fusion of outputs to enhance prediction accuracy. Using the CICEVSE2024 dataset, REM achieves **98.57% accuracy** in binary classification and **89.47%** in multi-class tasks, with a response time of just **0.26 seconds**.\n\n## Architecture Overview\n\nThe REM framework consists of three main stages:\n\n1. **Preprocessing Stage**: Independent processing of Power and HPC data through cleaning, feature selection, and dimensionality reduction\n2. **Learning Stage**: Training dedicated models (Transformer, LSTM, RF, SVM, LR) on each dataset to capture modality-specific attack signatures\n3. **Prediction Stage**: Late fusion of probabilistic outputs using weighted averaging to generate unified classification\n\n![REM Framework Architecture](figs/Methodology.png)\n\n## Project Structure\n\n```\nREM-framework/\n├── data/\n│   ├── processed/      # Processed data files\n│   ├── raw/           # Raw data files\n│   ├── test/          # Test data\n│   └── train/         # Training data\n├── experiments/       # Experimental results and logs\n├── src/\n│   ├── fusion_test.py      # Late fusion evaluation\n│   ├── hpc_processor.py    # HPC data preprocessing\n│   ├── model_builder.py    # Model architectures\n│   ├── power_processor.py  # Power data preprocessing\n│   └── train_models.py     # Model training pipeline\n├── models/            # Saved model checkpoints\n├── docs/              # Documentation\n├── requirements.txt   # Python dependencies\n└── README.md\n```\n\n## Installation\n\n### Prerequisites\n\n- Python 3.8 or higher\n- CUDA-capable GPU (recommended for deep learning models)\n- 16GB RAM minimum\n\n### Setup\n\n1. **Clone the repository**\n   ```bash\n   git clone https://github.com/CongSon01/UGE-Research-Project.git\n   cd UGE-Research-Project\n   ```\n\n2. **Create virtual environment**\n   ```bash\n   python -m venv venv\n   source venv/bin/activate  # On Windows: venv\\Scripts\\activate\n   ```\n\n3. **Install dependencies**\n   ```bash\n   pip install -r requirements.txt\n   ```\n\n4. **Download the CICEVSE2024 dataset**\n   ```bash\n   http://cicresearch.ca/IOTDataset/CICEVSE2024%20Dataset/\n   ```\n\n## Usage\n\n### Data Preprocessing\n\nProcess the Power and HPC datasets independently:\n\n```bash\n# Preprocess Power consumption data\npython src/power_processor.py --input data/raw/power_data.csv --output data/processed/\n\n# Preprocess HPC data\npython src/hpc_processor.py --input data/raw/hpc_data.csv --output data/processed/\n```\n\n### Model Training\n\nTrain models on the preprocessed data:\n\n```bash\n# Train all models\npython src/train_models.py --config configs/default_config.yaml\n\n# Train specific model type\npython src/train_models.py --model transformer --dataset power\n```\n\n### Evaluation and Fusion\n\nEvaluate the late fusion mechanism:\n\n```bash\n# Run fusion evaluation\npython src/fusion_test.py --alpha 0.5 --n_samples 1000\n```\n\n## Citation\n\nIf you use this code in your research, please cite our paper:\n\n```bibtex\n@article{duong2025rem,\n  title={REM: A Multi-Model Fusion Framework for Real-Time Cyberattack Detection in Electric Vehicle Charging Systems},\n  author={Duong Son and Ercan Secil and Zargayouna Mahdi},\n  journal={IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems},\n  year={2025},\n  publisher={IEEE}\n}\n```\n\n## License\n\nThis project is licensed under the MIT License - see the [LICENSE](LICENSE) file for details.\n\n**Source Code:** https://github.com/CongSon01/UGE-Research-Project.git",
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      "readme": "# EV-CMS\n\n## Installation and Setup\n\n### Prerequisites\n\n- Docker\n- Docker Compose\n\n### Start the project\n\n- Use `docker-compose up` to start the entire project\n\n### Additional commands\n\n- `docker-compose up` - start all the services\n- `docker-compose up -d` - start all services in 'detached' mode. This means that services will start and be moved to background; control will be returned in the terminal\n- `docker-compose down` - stop and cleanup all the services and containers created\n- `docker-compose stop` - stop all services but keep the containers\n\n## App Modules\n\n- App Server - `http://localhost:8001`\n- OCPP Server - `ws://localhost:9000`\n- Booking App - `http://localhost:3000`\n- OCPP Chargebox - `http://localhost:3000/chargebox`",
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      "readme": "## 📁 Project Structure and File Description\n\n### 1. `amopa_rl/`\nContains the main **Reinforcement Learning (RL) agent** and **adversarial attack logic**.\n\n#### `amopa_rl_agent.py`\n- Defines the baseline RL agent\n- Uses **PPO (Proximal Policy Optimization)** algorithm\n- Learns optimal EV control policy\n- Trains and saves the normal (non-attacked) model\n\n#### `amopa_rl_attack_agent/`\nStores trained RL models and training logs.\n\n- `policy.pth`, `policy.optimizer.pth`\n  → Saved PPO model weights and optimizer state\n\n- `best_model/`\n  → Best-performing trained RL model\n\n- `logs/`\n  → TensorBoard training logs (`PPO_1`, `PPO_2`)\n\n- `system_info.txt`\n  → System and environment configuration during training\n\n---\n\n### 2. `EV2Gym/`\nCustom **Electric Vehicle (EV) simulation environment**.\n\n- Provides state observations such as:\n  - Battery State of Charge (SoC)\n  - Energy demand\n  - Charging / discharging actions\n- Used by both normal and attack agents\n\n---\n\n### 3. `attacker/`\nHandles **generation of adversarial data**.\n\n#### `generate_adversarial.py`\n- Generates adversarial perturbations on RL observations\n- Simulates sensor spoofing / false state injection attacks\n\n#### `generated_adversarial.csv`\n- Stores adversarially modified observations\n- Used later for detector training\n\n---\n\n### 4.`dataset/`\nHandles **data collection and preprocessing**.\n\n- `collect_normal.py`\n  → Collects normal (clean) RL interaction data\n\n- `collect_attack.py`\n  → Collects adversarial RL interaction data\n\n- `normal_data.csv`\n  → Clean RL dataset\n\n- `attack_data.csv`\n  → Adversarial RL dataset\n\n- `combine.py`\n  → Merges normal and attack datasets\n\n- `combined_dataset.csv`\n  → Final labeled dataset (normal + attack)\n\n- `preprocess_dataset.py`\n  → Cleans and normalizes data (feature scaling & formatting)\n\n- `processed_data/`\n  → Stores preprocessed datasets\n\n---\n\n### 5. `detector/`\nImplements the **attack detection model**.\n\n- `train_detector.py`\n  → Trains ML/DL classifier to detect adversarial attacks\n\n- `test_detector.py`\n  → Tests detection accuracy on unseen data\n\n- `models/`\n  → Stores trained detector models\n\n---\n\n### 6. `safe_agent.py`\nImplements a **safe RL agent**.\n\n- Uses detector output to:\n  - Ignore malicious observations\n  - Switch to safe actions when an attack is detected\n\n---\n\n### 7. `evaluation/`\nUsed for **performance evaluation**.\n\n- `evaluate_model.py`\n  → Evaluates RL performance, detection accuracy, and safe agent behavior\n\n- `evaluations.npz`\n  → Stores evaluation metrics and results\n\n---\n\n### 8. `experiments/`\n- Stores experiment scripts and configurations\n- Used for repeated testing and result comparison\n\n---\n\n### 9. Configuration & Environment\n\n- `config.yaml`\n  → Central configuration file (training parameters, dataset paths, attack settings)\n\n- `env/`\n  → Python virtual environment (optional)\n\n---\n\n##  Project Workflow\n\n1. Train a normal RL agent\n2. Generate adversarial attack data\n3. Collect normal and attack datasets\n4. Preprocess and combine datasets\n5. Train an attack detection model\n6. Integrate detector with a safe RL agent\n7. Evaluate performance and robustness",
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      "title": "Orbis Viaris Charge Report",
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      "description": "Free self-hosted webapp (Cloudflare Workers + D1) for Orbis/Viaris EV chargers: cost sharing per RFID card, OCPP 1.6 server, card management, monitoring with alerts, user self-registration, support tickets, encrypted data. English, Italian, Spanish, French and German.",
      "readme": "# Orbis Viaris Charge Report\n\n**English** | [Italiano](README.it.md)\n\nA free web app that downloads the session history from an **Orbis Viaris** EV charging station, stores it for good, and produces monthly and yearly cost-sharing reports per RFID card, with price per kWh and VAT. It was built for condominiums where several people share one charger and the building has to split the electricity bill. It runs on the Cloudflare free tier (one Worker, one D1 database, one Durable Object), works from a phone or a PC, and includes a small OCPP 1.6 server, user self-registration, support tickets, monitoring with email alerts, and encryption of personal data.\n\n> Unofficial community project, not affiliated with or endorsed by Orbis or Viaris. Product names are used only to describe compatibility. **Tested only on Orbis firmware 7.2.53** (see [Tested hardware](#tested-hardware)).\n\nNothing about a specific installation is in the code: charger address, title, time zone, currency, emails, card fee, legal texts and contact are all entered from the web page. The rules of use and the privacy notice are **not** provided: whoever installs the site writes their own (Settings tab).\n\n## Contents\n\n- [Features](#features)\n- [Screenshots](#screenshots)\n- [Tested hardware](#tested-hardware)\n- [Requirements](#requirements)\n- [Install](#install)\n- [First start](#first-start)\n- [Settings reference](#settings-reference)\n- [How it talks to the charger](#how-it-talks-to-the-charger)\n- [OCPP: live status, settings and the optional card list](#ocpp-live-status-settings-and-the-optional-card-list)\n- [Cards on the charger and card holders](#cards-on-the-charger-and-card-holders)\n- [Users: invitations, self-registration, profile](#users-invitations-self-registration-profile)\n- [Support tickets](#support-tickets)\n- [Monitoring, notifications and reminders](#monitoring-notifications-and-reminders)\n- [Cloudflare usage](#cloudflare-usage)\n- [Encryption of personal data](#encryption-of-personal-data)\n- [Prices, VAT and the month lock](#prices-vat-and-the-month-lock)\n- [Importing Viaris CSV files](#importing-viaris-csv-files)\n- [Pushing data from outside (ingest API)](#pushing-data-from-outside-ingest-api)\n- [Secrets and environment variables](#secrets-and-environment-variables)\n- [Backups](#backups)\n- [Local development](#local-development)\n- [Troubleshooting](#troubleshooting)\n- [Security notes](#security-notes)\n- [Limits](#limits)\n- [License](#license)\n\n## Features\n\n- **Automatic download** from the charger every 6 hours, plus a manual button. The charger itself only keeps its last ~100 sessions; the database keeps everything.\n- **Monthly report and yearly history** per card with net amount, VAT and total; print, CSV export, PDF by email.\n- **Cost splitting that adds up**: amounts are split in cents with the largest-remainder method, so the sum of the single sessions always equals the card total.\n- **Sessions started from the app** (no RFID card) are kept in a separate section that only authorised users see.\n- **Monthly price entry** (price per kWh and VAT); once saved, the month is locked.\n- **Monthly report by email** with a PDF of every session attached (via Resend), to the recipients you choose. Each charger user also gets a personal email with their own amounts.\n- **Users and permissions**: administrator, managers with per-feature permissions, charger users bound to one or more cards who see only their own sessions and can download them as PDF.\n- **Self-registration**: users can register by themselves (phone numbers, acceptance of the rules and privacy notice with the edition recorded, no password), confirm their email and only then choose their password (so nobody can sign up with someone else's address and use the account), and are activated when the administrator links their card. A \"My profile\" tab lets them change or withdraw consents.\n- **Support tickets**: lost or damaged card (the card is blocked on the charger at once), new card request with the fee and payment options you configure (PayPal.me, Satispay, Revolut, cash), data correction, deletion of data or account, charger problems. The administrator approves or rejects; the user gets the outcome by email.\n- **Live charging status (OCPP 1.6)**: who is charging now, power, current, voltage and energy in real time; readable log of the last 48 hours (100 rows at a time, \"Show earlier\" for the rest); read-only commands, stop charge and restart; a few charger settings changeable from the page.\n- **Offline card list over OCPP, optional and OFF by default**: when enabled, the server pushes the list of active cards to the charger (SendLocalList) so cards keep working when the internet is down.\n- **Cards on the charger**: read, add, edit, block, remove, import, export and restore the cards the charger accepts, straight from the page. Card names are put back after the charger rewrites its list.\n- **Card holders with dates**: reports use the holder at the time of each session, so handing a card to someone else never rewrites past months.\n- **Monitoring**: 24 checks (connection, socket and charges, cards, settings, site and security), each off until you enable it, with thresholds, email when a problem starts and ends, in-site notifications and a history of episodes.\n- **Notices to users**: at the end of a charge the user gets a summary (times, duration, kWh; cost and remaining credit for prepaid cards) and, while the car stays plugged in, reminders to free the charger.\n- **Prepaid cards**: a credit in euros deducted at a per-card price; when it runs out the card is blocked and the charge is stopped remotely.\n- **Charges archive**: encrypted export of a period as a zip with an offline HTML viewer, and deletion of exported months to free space.\n- **Encryption of personal data** (AES-256-GCM, key in a Worker secret) and encrypted backup from the page.\n- **Cloudflare usage** box: requests, D1 rows, OCPP usage and storage against the free-plan limits, with a monthly summary and an alert near the limit.\n- **Interface in English, Italian, Spanish, French and German**: language menu in the header, the browser language at the first visit. Emails to users follow the language they use the site in (Spanish, French or German followed by English; Italian and English otherwise). Day / night / auto theme, no horizontal scrolling, tables that become cards on phones.\n- **App-like layout on phones** (up to 700 px wide): bottom tab bar with icons (the administrator's extra tabs go into a \"More\" menu), the open tab's title at the top, larger fields and buttons.\n- **Home-screen icon**: a charging-station icon for the browser tab, the iPhone home screen and Android (web manifest with 192/512 and maskable icons; the app name is the site title). Regenerate with `node strumenti/icone.mjs`.\n- **\"Install app\" button**: on phones, at the top of the sign-in card and in a strip under the header. On Android with Chrome it opens the browser's install prompt; elsewhere (iPhone, Firefox, other browsers) it shows the steps to add the site to the home screen. Hidden on computers (unless the browser offers installation), when the site already runs as an app and inside an Android WebView.\n- **Clean look with an icon for each section**: rounded cards and fields, blue as the site colour, a blue brand mark next to the title. On a computer the header scrolls away and the tab bar, with the icons, stays fixed at the top.\n- **Version next to the title** (for example `v2.3.1`, from `package.json`), so you can see at a glance which release a site is running; on phones it is shown under the links at the top.\n- **First-run setup page** and **everything configurable from the web page**.\n- Optional import of the per-card CSV exports of the Viaris desktop program.\n\n## Screenshots\n\nAll screenshots use made-up demo data.\n\n| Monthly report | OCPP tab: live status, settings and the optional card list |\n|---|---|\n| <img src=\"docs/monthly-report.png\" alt=\"Monthly report\"> | <img src=\"docs/ocpp.png\" alt=\"OCPP tab\"> |\n\n| Monitoring (administrator) | Settings |\n|---|---|\n| <img src=\"docs/monitoring.png\" alt=\"Monitoring\"> | <img src=\"docs/settings.png\" alt=\"Settings\"> |\n\n| Users | Support (user) and tickets (administrator) |\n|---|---|\n| <img src=\"docs/users.png\" alt=\"Users\"> | <img src=\"docs/tickets.png\" alt=\"Tickets\"> |\n\n| Sign-in and registration | First-run setup |\n|---|---|\n| <img src=\"docs/register.png\" alt=\"Registration\"> | <img src=\"docs/setup.png\" alt=\"First-run setup\"> |\n\n| Italian interface | A charger user sees only their own cards |\n|---|---|\n| <img src=\"docs/monthly-report-it.png\" alt=\"Italian interface\"> | <img src=\"docs/my-charging.png\" alt=\"My charging\"> |\n\n| On a phone: monthly report, \"More\" menu, monitoring, a user's charges |\n|---|\n| <img src=\"docs/phone.png\" alt=\"Phone layout\"> |\n\n## Tested hardware\n\nDeveloped and used with this station (as shown in the station's own \"Station information\" screen):\n\n| Item | Value |\n| --- | --- |\n| Firmware version | **7.2.53** (the only version tested) |\n| Hardware version | 8.0 |\n| Power board firmware / hardware | 3PH_FW_ORB_V06.3 / 3PH_HW_ORB_V6.2 |\n| Cortex firmware | 003.005.010 (Dec 2020) |\n| Model features | three-phase, RFID enabled, charging power 22080 W, power limit 13800 W |\n\nOther Orbis models or firmware versions may behave differently, in particular with the optional offline card list (SendLocalList) and the card list web pages. Reports of other working (or not working) setups are welcome as issues.\n\n## Requirements\n\n- Node.js 18 or newer and npm.\n- A free [Cloudflare](https://dash.cloudflare.com/sign-up) account.\n- A charger whose web interface is reachable **from the internet** over HTTP or HTTPS (for example through a DDNS name and a port forward on the router). Workers can reach non-standard ports (such as `:81`) on a host name; avoid bare IP addresses.\n- For the OCPP part: a custom domain on Cloudflare (the charger connects over `wss://` on port 443).\n- Optional: a [Resend](https://resend.com) account with a verified sending domain, to send emails.\n\n## Install\n\n```\ngit clone https://github.com/alexxandro87/orbis-viaris-charge-report.git\ncd orbis-viaris-charge-report\nnpm install\nnpx wrangler login                          # opens the browser, sign in to Cloudflare\ncp wrangler.toml.example wrangler.toml\nnpx wrangler d1 create ricariche            # copy the printed database_id into wrangler.toml\nnpx wrangler d1 execute ricariche --remote --file=schema.sql\nnpx wrangler secret put SETUP_CODE          # recommended, see below\nnpx wrangler deploy                         # prints https://orbis-viaris-charge-report.<you>.workers.dev\n```\n\nOn Windows PowerShell, if `npx` is blocked, use `npx.cmd`.\n\n**Custom domain:** uncomment the `routes` line in `wrangler.toml` and put your host name there, then `npx wrangler deploy` again. The domain must already be on your Cloudflare account.\n\n**About `SETUP_CODE`:** until the administrator exists, anyone who opens the Worker address could create it. A setup code (any long random string you choose) is asked on the setup page and prevents that. Set it before the first visit. Once the administrator exists the setup page is gone for good.\n\n## First start\n\nOpen the Worker address. On a fresh installation you get the **first setup page**:\n\n1. Choose the **administrator user name** and a strong password (at least 12 characters with lower case, upper case, a digit and a special character). Enter the setup code if you set one.\n2. Enter the **charger address** (for example `http://my-charger.example-ddns.com:81`) and, if the charger asks for a login, the user and password.\n3. Press **Test the connection**: you see whether the history and the card list could be read and a sample of the response.\n4. Set the **site title**, **time zone** and **currency**; optionally the Resend key and sender for emails.\n5. Press **Save and start**. You are signed in.\n\nThen press **Download from the charger** once (it then runs by itself every 6 hours), open **Settings** to complete the rest (monthly report recipients, card fee, contact, legal texts), and each month enter the price per kWh and VAT from the electricity bill in the Monthly report tab.\n\n## Settings reference\n\nAll of these are in the **Settings** tab (administrator only) and are saved in the database. Values saved there win over environment variables.\n\n| Setting | Default | Meaning |\n| --- | --- | --- |\n| Charger address | empty | Base address with port, for example `http://charger.example.com:81`. Required. |\n| User / Password | empty | Sent as HTTP Basic if a user is set. The password is never sent back to the browser. |\n| Extra header name / value | empty | One more header on every request to the charger. |\n| History path | `/modules/modulator/historic?from=0&to=-1` | Path that returns the session history. |\n| Card list path | `/modules/tags?level=file` | Path of the card list (must contain `level=file` for card management). |\n| Status path | `/modules/evsm/elements` | Used to write card names back only when the socket is free. Empty = not checked. |\n| Timeout | 20 s | Per request. |\n| Automatic download | on | Whether the 6-hour scheduled run downloads. |\n| Data format (JSON field, separator, rows to skip, columns) | Orbis values | Only for chargers whose history looks different. |\n| Site title | `EV Charger` | Pages, emails, PDFs. |\n| Time zone | `Europe/Rome` | IANA name. Decides which month a session belongs to. |\n| Currency | `€` | Shown next to amounts. |\n| Tax label | empty | Empty = \"VAT\" / \"IVA\". |\n| Card fee | 0 | Shown to users who request a card (0 = not shown). |\n| Operator contact | empty | Shown in the profile and the Information tab. |\n| Charger identifier | `CHARGER` | Last part of the OCPP address. |\n| Resend key / sender | empty | Enable all emails. |\n| Legal texts | empty | Rules of use and privacy notice (Italian and English) with an edition, shown on registration and invitation. Written by you. |\n| Monthly report recipients | empty | To / CC for the monthly split. Empty = no email. |\n| Card payment | empty | PayPal.me / Satispay / Revolut account names offered to users who request a card; cash is always offered. |\n\n## How it talks to the charger\n\nOn the tested firmware the charger's own web interface answers plain HTTP requests:\n\n- `GET /modules/modulator/historic?from=0&to=-1` returns JSON like `{\"body\": \"<one CSV line per session>\"}`: start (epoch seconds), card code, start type (`rfid_tag`, `app`...), energy meter at start (Wh), end, energy meter at end.\n- `GET /modules/tags?level=file` returns the card list: a first line with the version, then `code;expiry;name;state` per card (state 0 accepted, 1 blocked, 2 expired, 3 invalid). The same address accepts a `POST` with the new list, followed by `GET ...level=save`.\n- `GET /modules/evsm/elements` returns the socket state (used only to avoid writing cards while a car is plugged in).\n\nSessions are stored once (primary key = start time + start meter), so downloading the same history again never creates duplicates.\n\n## OCPP: live status, settings and the optional card list\n\nThe charger can report in real time to your Worker using OCPP 1.6-J. The Worker runs a small Durable Object (SQLite-backed, free plan) for the connection.\n\n1. Keep the `[[durable_objects.bindings]]` and `[[migrations]]` blocks of `wrangler.toml.example` in your `wrangler.toml` and deploy with a custom domain.\n2. Open the **OCPP** tab as administrator and copy the address shown (it contains a secret token).\n3. In the charger's OCPP settings enter that address, with OCPP 1.6-J. The tab shows \"Charger connected\" within a minute.\n\nWhat it does by default: records the charger's messages (boot, heartbeat, status, authorisation, start/stop, measures) in a readable log, shows who is charging and the live measures, and lets the administrator send read-only commands (GetConfiguration, GetLocalListVersion, TriggerMessage), stop the running charge and restart an idle charger. A few settings can be changed from the page (heartbeat, connection timeout, ping, retries, measure intervals, \"listed cards valid when the server is unreachable\"): only the values you set are sent, when you save and again after every restart.\n\n**Automatic restart** (OCPP tab, off by default): with an unstable connection the charger's OCPP client sometimes stops retrying until it restarts. If the charger stays disconnected from the server longer than the minutes you set, the site restarts it from its web panel (`POST /reset/sys`, simple restart, never a factory reset), only when the socket is free and no charge is open, at most once an hour and a few times a day. It works when the panel still answers while OCPP is down; each attempt leaves a notification and a line in the OCPP log. Only tested on firmware 7.2.53.\n\nWhen the charger asks the server to authorise a card, only a card present on the charger's list in state accepted (or, for a lost card, not blocked by a ticket) is accepted.\n\n**Offline card list (SendLocalList), optional, OFF by default.** With the option off the server never sends any card list to the charger. When the administrator turns it on (OCPP tab), the server sends the list of active cards to the charger: at the charger's start, about 30 seconds after a change to the cards, and with the \"Sync card list\" button; in blocks of 10 cards; never while a car is plugged in or charging (the send is postponed until the socket is free). The charger rewrites its own list without names, so the names are put back afterwards from the database. Blocked cards stay on the list as blocked so they can be unblocked later. With the option on, the site's card list is the reference: a card missing on the charger (for example a send cut in half by a dropped connection, since each send replaces the charger's whole list) is kept and the list is sent again (at most every 30 minutes); in Users/Card it shows as \"missing on the charger\" with a \"Put back\" button. Cards are removed only from the site. On reconnection the list is not resent if the charger already has the latest complete version with the same cards. This has only been tried on firmware 7.2.53.\n\n## Cards on the charger and card holders\n\n**Users/Cards > Charger RFID cards** (administrator) shows the cards the charger accepts and lets you add, edit (name, expiry, state), permanently deactivate, import (from the file exported here or from the Viaris CSV), export and restore the list saved before the last change. The list is read from the card list path, written back and saved as the Orbis panel does; before each change the current list is stored, and after writing the list is read again to check it (names up to 25 characters).\n\nCard holders: every card has a history of who held it and when; reports use the holder at the time of each session. A card deactivated and later reassigned starts a new period; dates can be corrected from the same box.\n\n## Users: invitations, self-registration, profile\n\nThe administrator sees and does everything. Other users are either invited or register by themselves.\n\n- **Invitation** (Users tab): enter the email and choose a *manager* (pick permissions) or a *charger user* (one card plus optional other cards). The user receives a single-use link, valid 72 hours, where they choose a strong password and fill in name, phone numbers and consents. If email is not configured the page shows the link to send by hand.\n- **Self-registration** (Register tab on the sign-in page): name, surname, email, one or two phone numbers with international prefix, acceptance of the rules and privacy notice (the edition is recorded with date and time); no password. A confirmation email (24-hour link) is required; the link opens \"Choose your password\" and then the user can sign in. People waiting for activation are listed first in Users, with an \"awaiting activation\" label (and \"password not chosen yet\" when that applies) and an \"Activate\" button: the administrator links the card and they receive the \"Your access is active\" email, which also carries a 72-hour link to choose the password if they have not chosen it yet. Without a card they see only Support and My profile and can request one. Rate-limited (5 registrations per 10 minutes per address, 30 per hour for the whole site) with an anti-bot trap; the response is the same whether the email exists or not.\n- **Complete your profile**: users created before the data collection must fill in the same data at their next sign-in.\n- **My profile**: name, email and phones.\n\nRequires Resend for the registration emails: without email, registration is refused and invitations show the link instead.\n\n**Anti-bot check (Cloudflare Turnstile), optional:** on dash.cloudflare.com open *Turnstile*, add a widget for your domain (Managed mode), put the **Site Key** in `wrangler.toml` as `TURNSTILE_SITE_KEY` and the **Secret Key** in the secret `TURNSTILE_SECRET`, then deploy. The registration form then shows the verification box; without the keys the site registers as before and the Users tab shows a warning.\n\nWith \"Edit\" on a user who already has a profile (self-registered or completed), the form also shows first name, last name, phone and optional phone: \"Save permissions and details\" updates them with the same checks as the registration (number in international format, encrypted with `DATA_KEY`). For invited users who have not completed their profile yet the fields do not appear. The \"Data correction\" request from the Support tab keeps working.\n\n\"Message to all users\" in the Users tab sends an email (subject, Italian and English text, one line per line) to every active account with a confirmed email except the admin, with a preview first and a confirmation on send. At most 44 emails per send (free-plan limit).\n\n**Forgot your password?** on the login page sends, to an account that has a password and a confirmed email, a link valid for one hour to choose a new one (same answer whether the account exists or not; at most 5 requests per 10 minutes per IP and one link per 10 minutes per account). In every form with \"Repeat the password\" a line shows while typing whether the two passwords match.\n\n## Prepaid cards\nThe **Prepaid** tab (admin) manages cards with a credit in euros, deducted at an indicative price chosen card by card (editable), with a warning threshold and a history. Usage counts the card's charges since activation (downloaded from the charger and seen through OCPP, without duplicates, including the ongoing one). When the credit is used up the card is blocked on the charger, the ongoing charge is stopped remotely (the OCPP server stops it at the first meter sample beyond the remaining energy, so within the MeterValues interval) and the user gets an email; adding credit unblocks the card. New cards are created from Users/Cards > RFID cards with the type \"Prepaid\"; existing cards are made prepaid from the Prepaid tab. The user sees remaining credit, price and available kWh in \"My charges\". Prepaid charges stay in the reports like the others.\n\n## Support tickets\n\nFrom the **Support** tab a user opens a request: lost or damaged card, new card request, data correction, deletion of data or account, charger problem, other. Up to 5 open requests, one open card request; details can be added while the request is open. The administrator handles them from the **Tickets** tab (badge with the open count): approve, reject or close, with a note; the user gets the outcome by email.\n\n- **Lost or damaged card**: the card is **blocked on the charger at once** (if the charger does not answer, the block is retried every 5 minutes). The administrator can replace it (\"Replace card\", with or without a new one) or, if found, \"Found: unblock and close\". Blocked cards remain on the charger's list as blocked.\n- **New card**: shows the fee and the payment options you configured (PayPal.me with the amount preset, Satispay, Revolut, cash on delivery) and a ready reference; the administrator receives the user's name, phone and chosen payment, and assigns the card from the ticket. The site does not verify the payment.\n- **Data correction**: if approved, the data is updated.\n- **Deletion**: if approved, the account and personal data are deleted; the consumption data stays (the ticket becomes anonymous).\n\nFor card, charger and new-card tickets the administrator also gets an email (monitoring recipients); the others only an in-site notification.\n\n## Notices to users\nThe site talks to users by email, in the user's language.\n\nFree-plan limits: 50 outbound calls and 50 D1 queries per invocation. When the price is saved the emails go out at once (at\nmost 44 users per save; beyond that the remaining users get nothing and the administrator sees a notification).\n\n\n## Monitoring, notifications and reminders\nOpening a support request no longer creates a notification here: the Support tab already shows the open requests.\n\nThe \"Cloudflare usage\" box starts with the table \"Emails sent by the site\": per month, the emails (with the share of the free Resend limit, 3,000 a month and 100 a day) and the errors. It is the site's own count (`contatori` in `meta`, 13 months), separate from the Cloudflare figures below it.\n\nBelow it, \"What consumes (site count)\": for today and yesterday (UTC) every page or API and the two cron runs with calls, D1 queries and outbound calls, plus the latest heavy requests (over 35 queries or calls). It shows where the usage that Cloudflare only reports as totals comes from; the OCPP server queries are not included. Since 2.8.0, 7 days.\n\n\nThe **Monitoring** tab shows the charge in progress to everyone. For the administrator it also holds:\n\n- **Malfunction recipients and checks**: 24 checks grouped by area (connection, socket and charges, cards, settings, site and security), for example charger not connected, no messages, too many reconnections, unexpected restart, clock drift, public IP changed, socket in error or unavailable, cable plugged without charging, energy not increasing, charge too long or too big, charge left open, same card refused repeatedly, cards on the charger differing from the site, names not restored, card list send failed, setting different from the wanted one, firmware changed, data not downloaded, backup too old, too many failed sign-ins, OCPP connections with a wrong token, Cloudflare usage near the limit. **Every check is off until you enable it**, each with Mail and Notification boxes and a threshold. The checks run every 5 minutes (second cron in `wrangler.toml`). An email goes out when a problem starts and another when it ends; single events (restart, IP, firmware) once. \"Send test email\" checks the recipients.\n- **Notifications**: in-site alerts (unread counter on the tab) for checks set to \"Notification\", for emails that could not be sent, for registrations to activate and new tickets. They are shown like the OCPP log (time and message, unread ones marked, last 100 with \"Show earlier\") and kept 48 hours.\n- **Notices to users** (Monitoring): at the end of a charge the user whose card charged gets a summary (start, end, duration, kWh; for prepaid cards also the cost and the remaining credit) with a request to unplug the cable and move the car if it is still plugged in.\n  It goes out at once if the cable was unplugged or the card swiped, after 5 minutes if the socket is suspended or the counter is still with a full car (the charger stays in Charging); no summary for 0 kWh charges. Then, while the car stays plugged in, up to two reminders (minutes configurable, 0 = none; defaults 10 and 60).\n  All by email, in the user's language.\n- **Last episodes**: history with start and end of each problem.\n\n## Cloudflare usage\n\nWith a Cloudflare API token with permission \"Account Analytics: Read\" (secret `CF_API_TOKEN`) and `CF_ACCOUNT_ID` in `wrangler.toml`, the Monitoring tab shows the last 7 days of requests, errors, CPU, D1 rows read/written, OCPP requests, duration and rows, each with the percentage of the free-plan daily limit, a monthly summary, and the storage used by D1 and the Durable Object. The \"Cloudflare usage near the limit\" check (threshold 80 %) is the only one enabled by default, as a notification. Without the token the box explains what is missing.\n\n## Encryption of personal data\n\nSet the `DATA_KEY` secret (32 random bytes in base64) and first name, last name, phone numbers, consents and ticket texts are stored encrypted (AES-256-GCM, each value bound to its row and field). Existing data is encrypted by itself. Without the key the site works with data in clear and shows a warning in the Users tab. From Settings you can also download an **encrypted backup** (passphrase, PBKDF2 + AES-256-GCM) and decrypt it with `decifra_backup.mjs`. Details in [docs/ENCRYPTION.md](docs/ENCRYPTION.md).\n\n## Prices, VAT and the month lock\n\nEnter price per kWh and VAT for each month from the electricity bill, whenever the bill arrives. As soon as a month's price is saved the month is **locked** and cannot be changed again, administrator included (the page asks for confirmation first). If report recipients are set, saving the price emails the split per card with a PDF of every session; \"Email report again\" sends it once more. At the same moment every charger user who charged that month gets a personal email (in their language) with their own amounts only: price, VAT and, for each of their cards, sessions, kWh, net, VAT and total. It is always on, with no setting to turn it off; it is not sent to users with no sessions that month or who have not yet confirmed their email, \"Email report again\" does not resend it, and at most 40 are sent per save (free-plan limit; if some fail or exceed it the administrator gets a notification). Charger users see a note on months without a price.\n\nEmergency correction of a locked month, from a terminal:\n\n```\nnpx wrangler d1 execute ricariche --remote --command \"UPDATE prezzi SET eur_kwh=0.2531, iva=10 WHERE anno=2026 AND mese=10\"\n```\n\n## Importing Viaris CSV files\n\nIf you previously used the Viaris desktop program, press **Import Viaris CSV** and select its per-card exports (one file per card, plus one named `U ...` for sessions started from the app). The card is recognised from the first word of the file name, so download from the charger first. Importing is repeatable and creates no duplicates.\n\n## Pushing data from outside (ingest API)\n\nIf the Worker cannot reach the charger at all, a computer that can reach it can push the raw responses instead, with the credentials of a user who may download:\n\n```\ncurl -u admin:YOUR_PASSWORD https://YOUR-WORKER/api/ingest \\\n  -H \"content-type: application/json\" \\\n  -d \"{\\\"storico\\\": $(jq -Rs . < history.txt), \\\"tessere\\\": $(jq -Rs . < tags.txt)}\"\n```\n\n`history.txt` and `tags.txt` are the exact bodies returned by the two charger URLs. HTTP Basic is accepted only on this endpoint.\n\n## Secrets and environment variables\n\nNothing has to be set except what you want. Prefer the web page; use these for automation or if you do not want a value in the database.\n\n| Name | Kind | Purpose |\n| --- | --- | --- |\n| `SETUP_CODE` | secret | Protects the first-run page. Recommended. |\n| `RESEND_API_KEY` | secret | Email sending (or enter it in Settings). |\n| `DATA_KEY` | secret | Encryption of personal data. Keep a copy outside Cloudflare. |\n| `CF_API_TOKEN` + `CF_ACCOUNT_ID` | secret + variable | Cloudflare usage box. |\n| `TURNSTILE_SECRET` + `TURNSTILE_SITE_KEY` | secret + variable | Anti-bot check on registration (Cloudflare Turnstile). |\n| `CHARGER_URL`, `CHARGER_USER`, `CHARGER_PASSWORD`, `TIMEZONE`, `CURRENCY`, `SITE_TITLE`, `MAIL_FROM` | variable / secret | Defaults, overridden by saved settings. |\n| `APP_PASSWORD` | secret | Legacy: creates the user `admin` with this password and skips the setup page. |\n\nSet a secret with `npx wrangler secret put NAME`.\n\n## Backups\n\nFrom the page: **Settings > Database backup** (administrator): encrypted backup with a passphrase, or the plain dump at `/api/backup`. From a terminal: `npx wrangler d1 export ricariche --remote --output backup.sql`. Restore with `npx wrangler d1 execute ricariche --remote --file=backup.sql`. D1 also keeps 7 days of point-in-time history. The dump contains the saved charger password and Resend key: keep it private. The \"backup too old\" monitoring check reminds you.\n\n## Charges archive\nSettings > \"Charges archive\": pick from month/year to month/year and a passphrase, and download a zip with the encrypted extraction (sessions, prices, card names) and `archivio.html`, which opens it in any browser offline: yearly history, monthly detail per card, single charges, CSV, in the five languages. AES-256-GCM encryption with a key derived from the passphrase (PBKDF2, 600,000 iterations), all in the browser: the passphrase is stored nowhere. \"Delete from the site the sessions up to\" frees space on Cloudflare and works only for months already exported from the start of the history, never for the current month: deleted sessions remain only in the archives.\n\n## Local development\n\n```\ncp .dev.vars.example .dev.vars\nnpx wrangler d1 execute ricariche --local --file=schema.sql\nnpx wrangler dev\n```\n\n## Troubleshooting\n\n| Symptom | Likely cause and fix |\n| --- | --- |\n| \"no answer within 20 s\" or a network error | The Worker cannot reach the charger: check the DDNS name, the port forward and the port in the address. Try the URL from another network. |\n| \"HTTP 401\" / \"HTTP 403\" | The charger wants a login: set the user and password or an extra header. |\n| \"The history response is not JSON\" | The response is CSV directly: empty the JSON field setting. |\n| Wrong cards or energy | Column numbers differ: use Test the connection, read the raw response, fix the columns in \"Data format\". |\n| Sessions land in the wrong month | Wrong time zone setting. |\n| Emails not sent | Check the Resend key, that the sender domain is verified, and the error shown on the page. Invitation links are always shown so you can send them manually. |\n| Registration refused with \"could not send the confirmation email\" | Email is not configured: self-registration needs Resend. |\n| Charger not connected (OCPP) | Check the custom domain, the address on the charger (with the token) and that the charger uses OCPP 1.6-J. |\n| The setup page does not appear | An administrator already exists (or `APP_PASSWORD` is set). |\n| \"Internal error: try again…\" | Something unexpected failed on the server. The browser only gets a generic message; the details are in the Cloudflare log: run `npx wrangler tail` and repeat the action. |\n\n## Security notes\n\n- Passwords are hashed with PBKDF2-SHA-256; the iteration count is deliberately low (5000) to stay inside the free plan's CPU limit, so strong passwords are enforced (12+ characters with lower case, upper case, digit and symbol) on registration, invitation and password change.\n- Sign-in is rate-limited per user name and IP address together (5 errors in 10 minutes, so wrong passwords sent from elsewhere cannot lock the real user out), per user name from all addresses (50 errors in 10 minutes) and per IP address (20 errors in 10 minutes); the same limit applies to password changes and registrations. For IPv6 the limits per address count the whole /64 block. 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It never sends charging profiles, current limits or a server address.\n- Personal data can be encrypted at rest (`DATA_KEY`): names, phones, consents, ticket texts and notification details. The charger password and Resend key are stored in D1 (never shown again in the page); set them as secrets if you prefer.\n- The charger link is plain HTTP on most of these stations, so credentials sent to it are not encrypted in transit. **Mind the charger's own web panel**: if it is exposed on the internet without a password, anyone who finds the address can read and change cards and settings. Restrict it on the router (allow only Cloudflare, or use a Cloudflare Tunnel) and keep the OCPP connection as the charger's way out.\n- This was written for a small private group. Review it before exposing it to untrusted users.\n\n## Limits\n\n- One charger, one socket, one price per month.\n- Card management and the offline list are built around the Orbis web interface and OCPP behaviour of firmware 7.2.53.\n- Internal names (functions, API fields) are in Italian for historical reasons; code comments are in English; documentation in English and Italian. Interface texts are written in Italian in `src/ui.js` and translated in `src/lingue/<code>.js` (keys = the Italian text; sections for each page, server messages, OCPP log, archive viewer, emails, country names). The server puts in each page only the dictionary of the language in use (cookie `lang`, otherwise the browser language). To add a language: copy `src/lingue/en.js`, translate the values and add it to `src/lingue.js`.\n\n## License\n\nCopyright (C) 2026 Alessandro Pomponi. 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      "description": "CAN Commander is a comprehensive tool designed for the reverse engineering of CAN (Controller Area Network) bus systems. This project aims to provide a robust platform for automotive enthusiasts, engineers, and security researchers to interact with and analyze CAN networks, facilitating a deeper understanding and manipulation of communication.",
      "readme": "# CAN Commander\n\nCAN Commander is a CAN bus toolkit for vehicle reverse engineering, diagnostics and signal injection. An ESP32 board does all of the CAN work; you drive it from a Flipper Zero app, or from a command line over USB or Wi-Fi.\n\nCreated and maintained by [Matthew KuKanich](https://github.com/MatthewKuKanich). The official board is co-developed with Rabbit Labs, who manufacture and sell it.\n\n- **Project home**, firmware downloads and the DBC profile converter: <https://cancommander.com>\n- **Build your own** from an ESP32 and a CAN transceiver: [build guide](CAN_Commander_Firmware/CAN_Commander_Main/docs/BUILD_YOUR_OWN.md)\n- **Official board** (plug-and-play, dual bus): [buy from Rabbit Labs](https://rabbit-labs.com/product/cancommander/)\n\n## Documentation\n\nRead these in order:\n\n1. **[Flipper app guide](CAN_Commander_FlipperZero/can_commander/README.md)**: using the app. Menus, step-by-step workflows, dashboards, profiles, Wi-Fi CLI setup.\n2. **[Firmware reference](CAN_Commander_Firmware/CAN_Commander_Main/README.md)**: building and flashing the ESP32, hardware configuration, every CLI command and tool, and the Flipper UART protocol. A shorter [firmware quickstart](CAN_Commander_Firmware/CAN_Commander_Main/README_quickstart.md) covers the first session.\n3. **[Build your own](CAN_Commander_Firmware/CAN_Commander_Main/docs/BUILD_YOUR_OWN.md)**: a single-bus CAN Commander from an ESP32-S3 dev board and an SN65HVD230 transceiver.\n\nReference formats for the Flipper app's saved profiles: [DBC decoding profiles (`.dbcprof`)](CAN_Commander_FlipperZero/can_commander/README_DBC_CONFIG_FORMAT.md) and [Smart Injection profiles (`.injprof`)](CAN_Commander_FlipperZero/can_commander/README_SLOT_SET_FORMAT.md). Release notes: [app changelog](CAN_Commander_FlipperZero/can_commander/CHANGELOG.md).\n\n## How it works\n\n```text\nFlipper Zero app ---- UART ---->  +------------------+ ---> CAN0: built-in TWAI controller + transceiver\nUSB serial CLI   --------------> |  ESP32 firmware  |\nWi-Fi TCP CLI    --------------> +------------------+ ---> CAN1 (optional): MCP2517FD/MCP2518FD or MCP2515\n```\n\n- **The firmware does the CAN work**: receiving and filtering frames, decoding signals, transmitting, timing replays and OBD-II requests. It runs one tool at a time.\n- **The Flipper app is the main interface.** It sends commands over the Flipper's GPIO UART, shows live dashboards, and stores profiles on the Flipper's SD card. It also powers the board from the Flipper's 5V pin.\n- **The command line** offers the same tools as text commands over USB, or over a Wi-Fi access point the board can host (off by default). It suits laptops, phones and scripts.\n\n## Features\n\n### Monitor and discovery\n- **Read all frames** and **filtered read** (ID mask/filter) with live frame views.\n- **Unique IDs**: lists every ID seen on the bus.\n- **CAN speed test**: messages per second.\n- **Value tracker** and **bit tracker**: watch byte values and individual bits of one message change as you operate the vehicle.\n- **Auto reverse engineer**: learns the bus's background noise, then shows only what changes when you perform an action. It jumps straight into the bit tracker or replay for the ID you pick.\n\n### Control and injection\n- **Write frames**: one-shot, burst or periodic transmission.\n- **Smart Injection**: five slots that track the latest live frame for an ID and resend it with only your chosen bits, bytes or fields changed, so the rest of the message stays authentic. Supports multiplexed messages.\n- **Replay**: records up to 384 frames of one ID and plays them back with the original timing.\n\n### Vehicle diagnostics (OBD-II)\n- Live PID polling (RPM, speed, coolant temperature, throttle, load, fuel level and more, or any PID by number).\n- Read the VIN.\n- Read stored, pending and permanent trouble codes from every responding module, and clear them.\n\n### DBC decoding\n- Live decoding of signals from DBC definitions: Intel and Motorola byte order, signed values, scaling, multiplexed signals.\n- Load curated `.dbcprof` profiles on the Flipper (convert a `.dbc` file at <https://cancommander.com>), with per-signal dashboards and value-to-label mapping.\n\n### Interfaces and hardware\n- Flipper Zero app with dashboards for every tool.\n- USB and Wi-Fi command line.\n- One or two CAN buses, normal or listen-only mode. Bitrates from 5 kbit/s to 1 Mbit/s, including 33.3k and 83.3k.\n- Status LEDs on the official board.\n\n### Where each tool lives\n\n| Flipper app (Tools menu) | Firmware tool | Purpose |\n|---|---|---|\n| Monitor & Discovery > Read All Frames | `read_all` | Stream every frame |\n| Monitor & Discovery > Filter & Read Frames | `filtered` | Stream frames matching an ID mask/filter |\n| Monitor & Discovery > Unique IDs | `unique_ids` | List IDs seen on the bus |\n| Monitor & Discovery > Bit Tracker | `bittrack` | Bit-level changes for one ID |\n| Monitor & Discovery > Auto Reverse Engineer | `reverse` | Find which IDs/bytes an action changes |\n| Monitor & Discovery > Value Tracker | `valtrack` | Byte value changes and min/max for one stream |\n| Monitor & Discovery > CAN Speed Test | `speed` | Messages per second |\n| Control & Injection > Write Frames | `write` | Transmit a frame once, in a burst, or periodically |\n| Control & Injection > Smart Injection | `custom_inject` | Modify and resend live frames from five slots |\n| Control & Injection > Replay | `replay` | Record and replay one ID with original timing |\n| Vehicle Diagnostics | `obd_pid` | OBD-II PIDs, VIN, read/clear DTCs |\n| DBC & Databases > DBC Decode | `dbc_decode` | Decode signals from loaded DBC definitions |\n\n## Hardware\n\n| | Official CAN Commander board | Build your own |\n|---|---|---|\n| Microcontroller | ESP32-S3 | ESP32-S3 dev board (classic ESP32 also supported) |\n| CAN buses | 2: CAN0 (right port) and CAN1 (left port, MCP2517FD/MCP2518FD) | 1: CAN0 |\n| Transceiver | On board | SN65HVD230 module |\n| Status LEDs | 2 | Optional |\n| Flipper connection | Plugs onto the GPIO header | Four jumper wires |\n| Get one | [Buy from Rabbit Labs](https://rabbit-labs.com/product/cancommander/) | [Build guide](CAN_Commander_Firmware/CAN_Commander_Main/docs/BUILD_YOUR_OWN.md) |\n\nThe firmware also supports other combinations, such as an MCP2515 module as the second bus or custom pin assignments. See \"Hardware and Defaults\" in the [firmware reference](CAN_Commander_Firmware/CAN_Commander_Main/README.md).\n\n## Getting started\n\n### Official board with a Flipper Zero\nThe official board is available from [Rabbit Labs](https://rabbit-labs.com/product/cancommander/).\n\n1. Install the Flipper app (see [Building the Flipper app](#building-the-flipper-app)).\n2. Plug the board onto the Flipper's GPIO header and connect the CAN wires. The right port is the primary bus (CAN0).\n3. Open **Apps > GPIO > CAN Commander**. The app powers the board, connects and checks the firmware version.\n4. Follow the [Flipper app guide](CAN_Commander_FlipperZero/can_commander/README.md), starting with a read-only workflow.\n\n### Building the Flipper app\nThe app is a standard [ufbt](https://github.com/flipperdevices/flipperzero-ufbt) project:\n\n```bash\ncd CAN_Commander_FlipperZero/can_commander\nufbt            # builds dist/can_commander.fap\nufbt launch     # installs and starts it on a Flipper connected over USB\n```\n\n### Building and flashing the firmware\nThe firmware is an Arduino sketch for the ESP32 Arduino core 3.3.x. For the official board:\n\n```bash\ncd CAN_Commander_Firmware/CAN_Commander_Main\narduino-cli compile --fqbn esp32:esp32:esp32s3:CDCOnBoot=cdc .\narduino-cli upload  --fqbn esp32:esp32:esp32s3:CDCOnBoot=cdc -p <PORT> .\n```\n\nRequired libraries, other hardware configurations and the full command reference are in the [firmware reference](CAN_Commander_Firmware/CAN_Commander_Main/README.md).\n\n### Building your own board\nFollow the [build guide](CAN_Commander_Firmware/CAN_Commander_Main/docs/BUILD_YOUR_OWN.md). It covers parts, wiring, the firmware build for a single-bus board, and a first test.\n\n## Repository layout\n\n```text\nCAN_Commander_FlipperZero/\n  can_commander/                    Flipper Zero app (ufbt project)\n    README.md                       App guide\n    README_DBC_CONFIG_FORMAT.md     .dbcprof (DBC decoding profile) format\n    README_SLOT_SET_FORMAT.md       .injprof (Smart Injection profile) format\n    CHANGELOG.md                    App release notes\n    LICENSE                         GPL-3.0\n    can_commander.c/.h              App core\n    libraries/                      UART client for the firmware protocol\n    scenes/, views/                 Menus and dashboards\n\nCAN_Commander_Firmware/\n  CAN_Commander_Main/               ESP32 firmware (Arduino sketch)\n    README.md                       Firmware reference\n    README_quickstart.md            First-session quickstart\n    docs/BUILD_YOUR_OWN.md          DIY single-bus build guide\n    src/                            Firmware source; hardware settings in src/BoardConfig.h\n    test/host/                      Host regression tests (test/host/run.sh)\n    scripts/build_matrix.sh         Builds every supported hardware configuration\n    LICENSE.md                      PolyForm Noncommercial 1.0.0\n    THIRD_PARTY_NOTICES.md          Libraries the firmware is built with\n```\n\n## Compatibility\n\n| Component | Version |\n|---|---|\n| Flipper app | v2.3.1 |\n| ESP32 firmware | v2.3 |\n| Minimum firmware the app accepts | v2.2 (older firmware triggers an in-app warning) |\n| ESP32 Arduino core | 3.3.x |\n\n## Safety\n\nCAN Commander can transmit on a live vehicle network. Injected or replayed frames can set fault codes, light warnings, or operate real vehicle functions. Start with read-only tools (or the firmware's listen-only mode), test transmissions on a bench or a parked vehicle, and stop transmitting tools when you are done. If you enable the Wi-Fi command line, set your own password first: anyone who joins the access point gets full control, including transmitting.\n\n## License\n\nEach part of the repository has its own license:\n\n| Folder | License | In short |\n|---|---|---|\n| [`CAN_Commander_FlipperZero/`](CAN_Commander_FlipperZero/can_commander/LICENSE) | GNU GPL v3.0 | Free to use, modify and redistribute; modified versions you distribute must also be GPL-3.0 with source. |\n| [`CAN_Commander_Firmware/`](CAN_Commander_Firmware/CAN_Commander_Main/LICENSE.md) | PolyForm Noncommercial 1.0.0 | Source-available. Free for personal, hobby, research, educational and other noncommercial use; selling devices that run the firmware, or other commercial use, requires permission from the author. |\n\nThe firmware is built with third-party libraries under their own licenses; see [THIRD_PARTY_NOTICES.md](CAN_Commander_Firmware/CAN_Commander_Main/THIRD_PARTY_NOTICES.md).",
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      "name": "CANBus-Triple",
      "owner": "CANBus-Triple",
      "url": "https://github.com/CANBus-Triple/CANBus-Triple",
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      "readme": "![Logo](http://res.cloudinary.com/ddbgan4vk/image/upload/v1427295808/logo_py05gc.svg)\n\n[![Gitter](https://badges.gitter.im/Join%20Chat.svg)](https://gitter.im/CANBus-Triple/CANBus-Triple?utm_source=badge&utm_medium=badge&utm_campaign=pr-badge&utm_content=badge)\n\n# CANBus Triple - The car hacking platform\n\nSee [CANBus Triple](http://www.canb.us) for more information, or to purchase hardware.\n\n## About\nThis repository contains the base firmware and libraries for the CANBus Triple.\n\n[MCP2515 Library](https://github.com/CANBus-Triple/CANBus-Triple/tree/master/avr/libraries/CANBus/src) | [Examples](https://github.com/CANBus-Triple/CANBus-Triple/tree/master/avr/examples)\n\n\n## Building\n### Arduino IDE\nThis code is tested with Arduino 1.6.1. [Download](http://arduino.cc/en/Main/Software) and install the appropriate file for your platform.\n\n### Get the code\nClone this repo / download to your Arduino [Sketchbook](http://arduino.cc/en/guide/Environment#sketchbook)/hardware folder. The path should look like this\n\n\tDocuments/Arduino/hardware/CANBus-Triple\n\nTo clone:\n\n``git clone https://github.com/CANBus-Triple/CANBus-Triple.git``\n\n Or download the zip and extract it to your sketchbook folder.\n\n ![Image](http://res.cloudinary.com/ddbgan4vk/image/upload/v1423786377/download_z4of9y.jpg \"\")\n\n### Setup\nLaunch the Arduino IDE and select the newly available board variant from the menu bar under **Tools > Board > CANBus Triple**\n\nOpen the base sketch by selecting **File > Sketchbook > hardware > CANBus-Triple > avr > CANBusTriple**\n\nThis is the basic sketch that talks to the CAN Controllers [MCP2515](http://ww1.microchip.com/downloads/en/DeviceDoc/21801G.pdf), reads CAN packets from them, and routes them through the [Middleware](http://docs.canb.us/firmware/main.html#middleware-system) system.\n\nAssure your CANBus Triple is connected to your PC via the supplied USB cable. Then select the appropriate port from **Tools > Ports**. It will probably say Arduino Leonardo beside the correct port.\n\nPress the Build and Upload button:\n\n![Upload](http://res.cloudinary.com/ddbgan4vk/image/upload/v1423786376/upload_hot9si.png)\n\nThe IDE will compile and upload to the CANBus Triple.\n\n![IDE Upload](http://res.cloudinary.com/ddbgan4vk/image/upload/w_420/v1424831475/ArduinoIDEUpload_kbajva.png)\n\nIf you are upgrading from a version prior to 0.5.0 ensure to do also an EEPROM restore, sending 0x01 0x04 command on serial port.\n\n\n### Easy Mode\n\nIf you simply want to flash the newest firmware build you can use AVRDude or [XLoader](http://russemotto.com/xloader/) for windows to flash the appropriate .hex file to your device. The built firmware files are found in the builds folder of the repo.\n\nExample AVRDude command:\n``avrdude -Cavrdude.conf -v -patmega32u4 -cavr109 -P/dev/cu.usbmodem1411 -b57600 -D -Uflash:w:CANBusTriple.cpp.hex:i ``\n\n\n## Talking over USB Serial\n\nI use [CoolTerm](http://freeware.the-meiers.org/). It is free software available for Linux, MacOS, and Windows. Use the terminal software of your choice.\n\nConnect to your CBT Serial port and you're ready to send commands.\n\n* Send **0x0101** to get general device information.\n* Send **0x011001** to get CAN Bus 1 information.\n* Send **0x011002** to get CAN Bus 2 information.\n* Send **0x011003** to get CAN Bus 3 information.\n\n![CoolTerm](http://res.cloudinary.com/ddbgan4vk/image/upload/w_700/v1424832745/CoolTermCBT_zdm4xz.png)\n\nSee [the docs](http://docs.canb.us/firmware/api.html) for available commands.\n\n\n\n## Desktop / Mobile app\n\nA hybrid web app for Android, iOS, Windows, and MacOS is in development and will be available soon.\n\n\n## Now what?\nHead to the [documentation site](http://docs.canb.us) for more in depth information.\n\nMake sure to sign up at the [forum](http://forum.canb.us) for support and to engage with the community!",
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      "title": "AutoCyberGraph",
      "full_name": "nirjharb/AutoCyberGraph",
      "name": "AutoCyberGraph",
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      "url": "https://github.com/nirjharb/AutoCyberGraph",
      "description": "Connect Automotive Cybersecurity Risk to Reality — automotive cybersecurity digital-thread & evidence-graph platform: TARA, requirements traceability, ISO/SAE 21434, UN R155/R156, SBOM, change impact analysis and cybersecurity release gates.",
      "readme": "# AutoCyberGraph\n\n> **Connect Automotive Cybersecurity Risk to Reality.**\n\n<p align=\"center\">\n  <a href=\"https://github.com/nirjharb/AutoCyberGraph/actions/workflows/ci.yml\"><img src=\"https://github.com/nirjharb/AutoCyberGraph/actions/workflows/ci.yml/badge.svg\" alt=\"CI\" /></a>\n  <a href=\"LICENSE\"><img src=\"https://img.shields.io/badge/license-Apache--2.0-blue.svg\" alt=\"License: Apache-2.0\" /></a>\n  <img src=\"https://img.shields.io/badge/python-3.11%2B-blue.svg\" alt=\"Python 3.11+\" />\n  <img src=\"https://img.shields.io/badge/node-20%2B-blue.svg\" alt=\"Node 20+\" />\n  <a href=\"https://github.com/nirjharb/AutoCyberGraph/releases/tag/v0.1.0\"><img src=\"https://img.shields.io/badge/release-v0.1.0-orange.svg\" alt=\"Release v0.1.0\" /></a>\n  <a href=\"https://www.linkedin.com/in/neerjhar/\"><img src=\"https://img.shields.io/badge/LinkedIn-nirjharb-0A66C2.svg\" alt=\"LinkedIn\" /></a>\n</p>\n\n<p align=\"center\">\n  <img src=\"docs/images/03-dashboard.png\" alt=\"AutoCyberGraph cybersecurity dashboard with live project metrics\" width=\"900\" />\n</p>\n\n<p align=\"center\">\n  <img src=\"docs/images/architecture.svg\" alt=\"AutoCyberGraph architecture — frontend, FastAPI backend, graph data layer, traceability spine, Change Impact Engine and Cybersecurity Release Gate\" width=\"900\" />\n</p>\n\n**AutoCyberGraph** is an open-source prototype exploring how automotive cybersecurity engineering can be\nrepresented as a **connected digital thread**: from TARA and cybersecurity requirements to AUTOSAR\nimplementation, vulnerabilities, testing and regulatory evidence — with **Change Impact Analysis** across\nthe entire lifecycle.\n\nIt combines concepts from **ISO/SAE 21434**, **UNECE R155**, **UNECE R156**, **NIST SP 800-53** and\n**AUTOSAR security** as reference/mapping layers.\n\n> **Disclaimer:** AutoCyberGraph is an engineering and evidence-management platform.\n> It does not provide legal, regulatory, certification, or compliance advice.\n> These standards/frameworks are represented as reference/mapping concepts. AutoCyberGraph is **not** an\n> official implementation, certification tool, or compliance guarantee of any of them.\n\n---\n\n## The problem\n\nCybersecurity artifacts live in disconnected tools — TARA in spreadsheets, requirements in requirements\nmanagement, tests in ALM, SBOMs in build pipelines, evidence in shared drives. When a crypto library,\nECU configuration or CAN message changes, nobody can answer — *with evidence* — which cybersecurity\ngoals, requirements, tests and release evidence are affected.\n\n## The solution\n\nOne traceability graph, one impact engine, one release gate:\n\n```\nVehicle → ECU → Software → Asset → Threat → TARA → Cybersecurity Goal → Requirement\n→ Security Control → AUTOSAR Security Mechanism → Test → Vulnerability\n→ Evidence → Release → R155 / R156 / 21434 / NIST mapping\n```\n\n**Key differentiator:** record a change (e.g. *Gateway ECU crypto library v2.4 → v2.5*) and the\nChange Impact Engine traverses the evidence graph to list every affected artifact — **each with the\ngraph path that made it affected**. No guesses.\n\n## Features\n\n- 🚗 **Vehicle architecture** — ECU topology with CAN / CAN-FD / Automotive Ethernet / SOME/IP networks; per-ECU security context\n- ◉ **TARA workflow** — configurable risk calculation (Low→Critical), goals, derived requirements (documented, honestly positioned)\n- ≣ **Requirement traceability** — TARA → asset → threat → control → AUTOSAR → test → evidence, with missing-link detection\n- 🕸 **Evidence graph** — interactive Cytoscape graph, click-through to detail pages\n- § **Standards mapping** — ISO/SAE 21434 · UNECE R155 · R156 · NIST SP 800-53 · AUTOSAR security\n- 📦 **SBOM & vulnerabilities** — CycloneDX + SPDX import, CVE/CVSS tracking, CVE → Component → ECU → Vehicle trace\n- ⟲ **Change Impact Engine** — graph traversal with per-object reasons, impact levels, recommended actions\n- 🚀 **Cybersecurity Release Gate** — PASS / REVIEW / HOLD with individual checks and reasons (no vanity scores)\n- ⇄ **Supplier portal** — submissions (SBOM, tests, vulnerabilities, docs) + OEM review workflow with org-scoped authorization\n- ✦ **CyberAdvisor** — Q&A grounded in project data; answers *\"Insufficient evidence in the project database.\"* when data can't answer — never invents compliance conclusions\n- 🔐 **Security** — JWT + bcrypt, 7-role RBAC, audit logging, rate limiting, security headers ([threat model](docs/security.md))\n\n## Demo workflow (≈3 minutes)\n\nScreenshots of every step: [`docs/images/`](docs/images/) — landing → dashboard → vehicle\narchitecture → Gateway ECU → requirement traceability → CVE trace → change impact →\nrelease gate → CyberAdvisor → evidence graph.\n\n1. Sign in → **Demo EV Platform** → **Gateway ECU** → security context\n2. Open its **TARA** scenarios and requirement **CS-REQ-001**\n3. Show the **AUTOSAR SecOC** mapping, verification tests and evidence\n4. Inspect the **SBOM** and **CVE-2025-55555** on the mbedTLS crypto library\n5. **Record a change:** crypto library **v2.4 → v2.5** → run **Change Impact Analysis**\n6. See affected TARA, requirements, tests, vulnerabilities, evidence — with reasons\n7. Run the **Cybersecurity Release Gate** → **HOLD/REVIEW** with exact blocking reasons\n\nDemo accounts (password `ChangeMe123!`): `engineer@` `admin@` `architect@` `tester@` `supplier@` `auditor@` `viewer@` → `autocybergraph.io`\n\n## Technology stack\n\n| Layer | Tech |\n|-------|------|\n| Frontend | React 18 · TypeScript · Vite · Tailwind CSS · React Router · TanStack Query · Recharts · Cytoscape.js |\n| Backend | Python · FastAPI · Pydantic v2 · SQLAlchemy 2.0 · Alembic |\n| Database | PostgreSQL (production) · SQLite (local default) |\n| Auth | JWT (HS256) · bcrypt · RBAC (7 roles) |\n| Testing | pytest · Vitest · Testing Library |\n| DevOps | Docker · docker-compose · GitHub Actions CI · Vercel/Railway-ready |\n\n## Quick start\n\n```bash\ngit clone https://github.com/autocybergraph/autocybergraph\ncd autocybergraph\nbash scripts/dev.sh\n# → http://localhost:8000  (API + UI + demo data)\n```\n\nFull instructions (dev servers, tests, Docker, environment variables): **[docs/getting-started.md](docs/getting-started.md)**\n\n## Local development\n\n```bash\n# backend\ncd backend && pip install -r requirements.txt\npython -m uvicorn app.main:app --reload --port 8000\n\n# frontend (hot reload, proxies /api → :8000)\ncd frontend && npm install && npm run dev\n\n# all tests + lint + production build\nbash scripts/test-all.sh\n```\n\n## Environment variables\n\nSee [`.env.example`](.env.example) — `DATABASE_URL`, `JWT_SECRET`, `CORS_ORIGINS`,\n`AI_API_KEY`, `STORAGE_*`, rate limits. **No secrets are ever committed.**\n\n## API\n\nOpenAPI docs run live at `/api/docs`. Endpoint reference: **[docs/api.md](docs/api.md)**\n\n```\nPOST /api/auth/login                GET  /api/vehicles/{id}/architecture\nGET  /api/tara                      POST /api/tara\nGET  /api/requirements/{id}/traceability\nPOST /api/sbom/import               GET  /api/vulnerabilities/{id}/trace\nPOST /api/changes/{id}/impact       POST /api/releases/{id}/evaluate\nPOST /api/advisor/ask               GET  /api/dashboard\n```\n\n## Data model\n\n18 entity types, strongly related (see [`ARCHITECTURE.md`](ARCHITECTURE.md)):\nOrganization · User · Vehicle · ECU · Network · Asset · Threat · TARA · Requirement · Standard ·\nControl · AUTOSAR Mechanism · Software Component · SBOM (+components) · Vulnerability · Test Case ·\nTest Result · Evidence · Release · Change · Compliance Mapping · Supplier (+submissions).\n\nGraph traversal is exposed through a `GraphService` abstraction — a Neo4j adapter can be introduced\nwithout rewriting the application.\n\n## Repository structure\n\n```\nautocybergraph/\n├── frontend/          # React + Vite app\n├── backend/           # FastAPI app, services, tests\n├── docs/              # architecture, TARA, impact, standards, security docs\n├── demo-data/         # sample CycloneDX / SPDX SBOMs\n├── scripts/           # dev.sh · seed.sh · reset-demo.sh · test-all.sh\n├── docker/            # production Dockerfiles\n├── .github/           # CI workflow, issue/PR templates\n├── docker-compose.yml\n├── ARCHITECTURE.md · PROJECT_PLAN.md · DECISIONS.md\n└── SECURITY.md · CONTRIBUTING.md · CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md · LICENSE\n```\n\n## Security\n\nSee [`SECURITY.md`](SECURITY.md) and the [application threat model](docs/security.md).\nReport vulnerabilities privately — not via public issues.\n\n## Roadmap\n\n- Neo4j graph backend (protocol already defined)\n- NIST OSCAL control-catalog importer\n- Object-storage evidence backends + upload scanning\n- Refresh-token rotation; multi-tenant row-level isolation\n- LLM-backed CyberAdvisor adapter (grounding contract preserved)\n- R156 update-package verification workflow UI\n\n## Contributing\n\nSee [`CONTRIBUTING.md`](CONTRIBUTING.md). All contributions must respect the\npositioning rules: no compliance claims, no placeholder features, honest docs.\n\n## Author\n\nDesigned and built by **[Nirjhar Banik](https://github.com/nirjharb)** as a solo project.\n\n- GitHub: **[@nirjharb](https://github.com/nirjharb)**\n- LinkedIn: **[neerjhar](https://www.linkedin.com/in/neerjhar/)**\n\nQuestions, ideas, or collaboration? Reach out on LinkedIn or open a discussion/issue here.\n\n## License\n\nApache-2.0 — see [`LICENSE`](LICENSE). Copyright 2026 Nirjhar Banik.\n\n## Disclaimer\n\nAutoCyberGraph is an **engineering and evidence-management platform**. It does not provide legal,\nregulatory, certification, or compliance advice. ISO/SAE 21434, UNECE R155, UNECE R156, NIST SP 800-53\nand AUTOSAR are represented as reference/mapping concepts only.",
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      "readme": "###  CAN UDS Fuzzing & Spoofing Simulator\n\nA Python-based toolset for simulating CAN Bus and UDS protocol security testing.\nIncludes fuzzing, spoofing, sniffing, logging, and response analysis in a virtual CAN environment.\nIdeal for red team simulation, educational labs, and automotive cybersecurity learning.\n\n---\n\n## Features\n\n-  Virtual CAN Bus simulation (`vcan0`)\n-  UDS Service ID fuzzing\n-  CAN message spoofing\n-  Real-time sniffing & CSV logging\n-  Response code interpretation (NRC parser)\n-  Scenario-based testing structure\n\n---\n\n##  Components\n\n| File / Folder | Description |\n|---------------|-------------|\n| `fuzzer.py` | Randomly sends spoofed UDS messages |\n| `sniffer.py` | Listens and displays incoming CAN frames |\n| `logger.py` | Logs messages to `logs/can_log.csv` |\n| `response_parser.py` | Parses UDS responses (positive & negative) |\n| `scenarios/` | Contains ready-to-run fuzzing scripts |\n| `Usage.md` | Full usage instructions and workflow |\n| `Example_scenarios.md` | Detailed explanation of implemented attack scenarios |\n\n---\n\n## Quick Setup\n\n```bash\nsudo modprobe vcan\nsudo ip link add dev vcan0 type vcan\nsudo ip link set up vcan0\npip install python-can\n```\n\n### Quick Start\n```bash\n# Terminal 1: Monitor traffic\npython3 sniffer.py\n\n# Terminal 2: Start fuzzing\npython3 fuzzer.py\n\n# (Optional) Terminal 3: Save log\npython3 logger.py\n```\n\n### 📘 Documentation\n- [📖 Usage Guide](./Usage.md)\n- [🧪 Example Scenarios](./Example_scenarios.md)",
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      "readme": "# Automotive-Cybersecurity-Risk-driven-Testing-Requirements\n## Implementing MAC Tags for Fuzz Testing Resistance and Performance Analysis in Vehicle Networks\n\n### Student Name: Linda Mafunu\n### Student Number: 2216686\n### Date: 12/09/2024\n\n#### Fuzzer Folder\n- Attacker ECU\n- Contains Python scripts to launch fuzz tests on the Body Control Module (BCM) ECU\n- Associated log files for sent fuzzing messages from sessions\n\n##### Fuzz Tests:\n1. Random Fuzzing\n2. Linear Fuzzing\n3. Brute Force Fuzzing\n4. Mutation-Based Fuzzing\n5. Replay Attacks\n\n#### ECU2 Folder\n- Receiver/Listerner ECU\n- Contains Python script for Body Control Module (BCM) ECU to simulate sensors based on received CAN messages\n- Recieved messages from Belt, Door and Headlight Control Modules\n- Associated response log files for sessions\n\n#### ECU1 Folder\n- Sender ECU\n- Contains Python script for Belt Status Module (BSM), Door Control Modules (DCM) and Headlight Control Modules (HCM)\n- CAN Messages sent to BCM to trigger sensors on the circuit\n- Associated log files for messages from sessions\n\n#### Analysis Jupiter Notebook\n  - Analysis of the BCM log files for the ECU communication and Fuzz tests using statistical data and graphs\n\n## How to run the simulation\n**1. Start the Reciever ECU (i.e. Body Control Module)**\n  - If it is not receiving and can messages all output sensors should be turned off\n  - If Origin is DCM it should simulate the output of interior lights (Yellow LED)\n  - Else if Origin is BSM it should simulate the output of Belt Status (Red LED)\n  - Else if Origin is HCM it should simulate the output of headlights (Blue LED)\n  - Else if an abnormal message is received or a CAN message fails MAC verification the buzzer sounds\n  - The print and error output for running the BCMM.py are found in the BCM_script.log file\n  - If it is receiving CAN messages each CAN message is logged in this format for example:\n    ```console\n        2024-10-28 15:36:09,769 CAN ID:512\n        Data:bytearray(b'\\x02g\\x1f\\xafii5%')\n        Origin:DCM\n        Destination:BCM\n        Status:Door is Unlocked\n        Error:None\n        Latency:769\n    ```\n\n**2. Start Sender ECU**\n  - This will send sensor data from the Door Control Module, Headlight Control Module and Belt Control Module to the Body Control Module influencing output sensors's behaviour\n  - If you press the Door button it will simulate the Door Lock and Unlock status\n  - If you press the Light button it will simulate the Light levels (low and high) status\n  - If you press the Belt button it will simulate the Belt ON and OFF status\n  - The print and error output for running the BCMM.py are found in the Sensor_data_script.log file\n\n**3. Start Attacker ECU**\n  - This will launch different kinds of fuzzing attacks onto the CAN bus to manipulate BCM behaviour\n  - The print and error output for running the fuzzing scripts are found in the controller_script.log file\n  - If you press the Random button it will run the Random Fuzzing Python script\n  - If you press the Linear button it will run the Linear Fuzzing Python script\n  - If you press the Brute Force button it will run the Brute Force Fuzzing Python script\n  - If you press the Mutated Based button it will run the Mutated Based Fuzzing Python script\n  - If you press the Replay button it will run the Replay Fuzzing Python script\n\n### Test Bed Setup\n![Test Bed](Dissertation_Report/Setup.jpg)",
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      "title": "<img src=\"./assets/icon-car.svg\" height=\"20\" alt=\"\" /> [Automotive ECU Cybersecurity Lab](https://github.com/michealswolski/automotive-ecu-cybersecurity-lab-)",
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      "name": "michealswolski",
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      "description": "GitHub profile README — Micheal Wolski, Automotive Cybersecurity Engineer",
      "readme": "<div align=\"center\">\n\n<picture>\n  <source media=\"(max-width: 700px) and (prefers-color-scheme: dark)\" srcset=\"./assets/hero-compact.svg\">\n  <source media=\"(max-width: 700px)\" srcset=\"./assets/hero-compact-light.svg\">\n  <source media=\"(prefers-color-scheme: dark)\" srcset=\"./assets/hero.svg\">\n  <source media=\"(prefers-color-scheme: light)\" srcset=\"./assets/hero-light.svg\">\n  <img src=\"./assets/hero.svg\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"Micheal Wolski — Cybersecurity | Automotive Cybersecurity. Embedded security, AI agent security, and security automation.\" />\n</picture>\n\n<br/>\n\n<a href=\"https://michealswolski.github.io\"><picture><source media=\"(prefers-color-scheme: dark)\" srcset=\"./assets/connect-portfolio.svg\"><source media=\"(prefers-color-scheme: light)\" srcset=\"./assets/connect-portfolio-light.svg\"><img src=\"./assets/connect-portfolio.svg\" width=\"180\" alt=\"Portfolio\" /></picture></a>\n<a href=\"https://www.linkedin.com/in/michealwolski\"><picture><source media=\"(prefers-color-scheme: dark)\" srcset=\"./assets/connect-linkedin.svg\"><source media=\"(prefers-color-scheme: light)\" srcset=\"./assets/connect-linkedin-light.svg\"><img src=\"./assets/connect-linkedin.svg\" width=\"180\" alt=\"LinkedIn\" /></picture></a>\n<a href=\"https://github.com/michealswolski\"><picture><source media=\"(prefers-color-scheme: dark)\" srcset=\"./assets/connect-github.svg\"><source media=\"(prefers-color-scheme: light)\" srcset=\"./assets/connect-github-light.svg\"><img src=\"./assets/connect-github.svg\" width=\"180\" alt=\"GitHub\" /></picture></a>\n\n<picture>\n  <source media=\"(prefers-color-scheme: dark)\" srcset=\"./assets/divider.svg\">\n  <source media=\"(prefers-color-scheme: light)\" srcset=\"./assets/divider-light.svg\">\n  <img src=\"./assets/divider.svg\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"\" />\n</picture>\n\n</div>\n\n<table border=\"0\">\n<tr>\n<td width=\"36%\" align=\"center\" valign=\"middle\">\n\n<picture>\n  <source media=\"(prefers-color-scheme: dark)\" srcset=\"./assets/credential.svg\">\n  <source media=\"(prefers-color-scheme: light)\" srcset=\"./assets/credential-light.svg\">\n  <img src=\"./assets/credential.svg\" width=\"300\" alt=\"Security credential badge — Micheal Wolski, cybersecurity and automotive product security\" />\n</picture>\n\n</td>\n<td width=\"64%\" valign=\"middle\">\n\n<h3><picture><source media=\"(prefers-color-scheme: dark)\" srcset=\"./assets/head-about.svg\"><source media=\"(prefers-color-scheme: light)\" srcset=\"./assets/head-about-light.svg\"><img src=\"./assets/head-about.svg\" height=\"48\" alt=\"About\" /></picture></h3>\n\nCybersecurity engineer who ships, across automotive and software alike. I build systems where the security controls are part of the product, not a document filed next to it — firmware trust chains that hold up on a bench, detections that fire on real traffic, and governance layers that actually block a bad agent call.\n\n- <img src=\"./assets/icon-shield.svg\" height=\"16\" alt=\"\" /> **Focus:** automotive & embedded security · AI agent security · detection engineering · full-stack\n- <img src=\"./assets/icon-work.svg\" height=\"16\" alt=\"\" /> **Previously:** Product Cybersecurity Intern at **Bosch Mobility** — automotive product security\n- <img src=\"./assets/icon-cap.svg\" height=\"16\" alt=\"\" /> **B.S. Information Assurance & Cyber Defense**, Eastern Michigan University *(Cum Laude)*\n- <img src=\"./assets/icon-cap.svg\" height=\"16\" alt=\"\" /> **A.A.S. Computer Information Systems**, Henry Ford College\n- <img src=\"./assets/icon-seal.svg\" height=\"16\" alt=\"\" /> **CCNA** (Cisco Networking Academy) and an IT help desk certification — networking and support fundamentals\n- <img src=\"./assets/icon-flask.svg\" height=\"16\" alt=\"\" /> Currently building governance and guardrails for autonomous agents — risk scoring, prompt-injection detection, human-in-the-loop approvals\n- <img src=\"./assets/icon-pin.svg\" height=\"16\" alt=\"\" /> Michigan, USA · open to security engineering roles\n- <img src=\"./assets/icon-mail.svg\" height=\"16\" alt=\"\" /> Reach me through [LinkedIn](https://www.linkedin.com/in/michealwolski) or my [portfolio](https://michealswolski.github.io)\n\n</td>\n</tr>\n</table>\n\n<div align=\"center\">\n\n<picture>\n  <source media=\"(prefers-color-scheme: dark)\" srcset=\"./assets/divider.svg\">\n  <source media=\"(prefers-color-scheme: light)\" srcset=\"./assets/divider-light.svg\">\n  <img src=\"./assets/divider.svg\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"\" />\n</picture>\n\n<h2><picture><source media=\"(prefers-color-scheme: dark)\" srcset=\"./assets/head-experience.svg\"><source media=\"(prefers-color-scheme: light)\" srcset=\"./assets/head-experience-light.svg\"><img src=\"./assets/head-experience.svg\" height=\"48\" alt=\"Industry Experience\" /></picture></h2>\n\n**Product Cybersecurity Intern · Bosch Mobility** &nbsp;·&nbsp; <sub>Product Security / M-TEL · Farmington Hills, MI · 2025–2026</sub>\n\n| | |\n|---|---|\n| **Product security visibility** | Built an intake and reporting platform used across multiple engineering divisions, replacing spreadsheet tracking with a shared system of record — intake wizard, status model, validation, admin review queue. |\n| **Process automation** | Automated a manual engineering workflow end to end with Power Automate and SharePoint, cutting out repeated cross-team coordination. |\n| **Secure boot research** | Researched secure boot for automotive ECUs — chain-of-trust verification and TPM-based attestation, and how they map to real vehicle architectures. Turned it into an internal one-pager through documentation review and SME interviews. |\n| **AI & knowledge tooling** | Built an LLM onboarding assistant prototype at an internal AI hackathon, and an AI-assisted whitepaper drafting tool for technical documentation. |\n| **Exercises** | Supported an automotive cybersecurity fire drill and a cross-divisional awareness event; took part in an internal CTF and AI hackathon. |\n\n<sub>Public-facing summary. No confidential company information, internal data, source code, or proprietary material is disclosed.</sub>\n\n<div align=\"center\">\n\n<picture>\n  <source media=\"(prefers-color-scheme: dark)\" srcset=\"./assets/divider.svg\">\n  <source media=\"(prefers-color-scheme: light)\" srcset=\"./assets/divider-light.svg\">\n  <img src=\"./assets/divider.svg\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"\" />\n</picture>\n\n</div>\n\n</div>\n\n<h2><picture><source media=\"(prefers-color-scheme: dark)\" srcset=\"./assets/head-certs.svg\"><source media=\"(prefers-color-scheme: light)\" srcset=\"./assets/head-certs-light.svg\"><img src=\"./assets/head-certs.svg\" height=\"48\" alt=\"Certifications\" /></picture></h2>\n\n<div align=\"center\">\n\n<picture>\n  <source media=\"(prefers-color-scheme: dark)\" srcset=\"./assets/certs.svg\">\n  <source media=\"(prefers-color-scheme: light)\" srcset=\"./assets/certs-light.svg\">\n  <img src=\"./assets/certs.svg\" width=\"600\" alt=\"CCNA, Cisco Networking Academy — networking. IT Help Desk — IT support and troubleshooting.\" />\n</picture>\n\n<sub>The networking and support fundamentals under the security work — how the traffic actually moves, and what breaks for the person on the other end of it.</sub>\n\n<picture>\n  <source media=\"(prefers-color-scheme: dark)\" srcset=\"./assets/divider.svg\">\n  <source media=\"(prefers-color-scheme: light)\" srcset=\"./assets/divider-light.svg\">\n  <img src=\"./assets/divider.svg\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"\" />\n</picture>\n\n</div>\n\n<h2><picture><source media=\"(prefers-color-scheme: dark)\" srcset=\"./assets/head-projects.svg\"><source media=\"(prefers-color-scheme: light)\" srcset=\"./assets/head-projects-light.svg\"><img src=\"./assets/head-projects.svg\" height=\"48\" alt=\"Selected Projects\" /></picture></h2>\n\n<table>\n<tr>\n<td colspan=\"2\">\n\n### <img src=\"./assets/icon-car.svg\" height=\"20\" alt=\"\" /> [Automotive ECU Cybersecurity Lab](https://github.com/michealswolski/automotive-ecu-cybersecurity-lab-)\n\nOne repository, six automotive product-security projects, built to hand real artifacts to each other instead of standing alone — secure boot chain simulation, AUTOSAR SecOC over virtual CAN, an ECU key lifecycle manager, an ISO/SAE 21434 TARA workbench, an in-vehicle network defense lab spanning LIN/CAN-FD/Ethernet, and a firmware fuzzing & static-analysis pipeline. Simulation-first and hardware-honest — each project states out loud which parts model hardware and which don't, and a linter fails the build if a claim outruns what's actually been demonstrated. *(1 of 6 built; the rest are fully specified with build plans.)*\n\n`Python` · `C` · `Automotive Security`\n\n</td>\n</tr>\n<tr>\n<td width=\"50%\" valign=\"top\">\n\n### <img src=\"./assets/icon-shield.svg\" height=\"20\" alt=\"\" /> [AI Agent Governance](https://github.com/michealswolski/ai-agent-governance)\n\nA control plane that sits between an agent and the things it can break. Risk-scores every proposed action, screens for prompt injection, routes anything above threshold to a human, and writes a durable, audit-ready decision history.\n\n`Node.js` · `SQLite` · `AI Security`\n\n</td>\n<td width=\"50%\" valign=\"top\">\n\n### <img src=\"./assets/icon-search.svg\" height=\"20\" alt=\"\" /> [AutoJob Intel](https://github.com/michealswolski/auto-job-intel)\n\nJob-intelligence platform built around verifiability: every extracted claim links back to the source posting, and matches explain themselves instead of handing you a mystery score.\n\n`Next.js` · `React` · `TypeScript`\n\n</td>\n</tr>\n<tr>\n<td width=\"50%\" valign=\"top\">\n\n### <img src=\"./assets/icon-monitor.svg\" height=\"20\" alt=\"\" /> [Wolski Command Center](https://github.com/michealswolski/wolski-command-center)\n\nFull-stack Raspberry Pi operations dashboard — live system monitoring, remote SSH access, file management, AI-assisted automation, one-click deployment.\n\n`React` · `Node.js` · `SSH`\n\n</td>\n<td width=\"50%\" valign=\"top\">\n\n### <img src=\"./assets/icon-blocks.svg\" height=\"20\" alt=\"\" /> [Cross-Divisional Project Database](https://github.com/michealswolski/Project-database)\n\nEnterprise Power Platform application for project intake and tracking, backed by SharePoint Online lists with Power BI reporting across divisions.\n\n`Power Apps` · `SharePoint` · `Power Fx`\n\n</td>\n</tr>\n<tr>\n<td width=\"50%\" valign=\"top\">\n\n### <img src=\"./assets/icon-doc.svg\" height=\"20\" alt=\"\" /> [Document Analyzer AI](https://github.com/michealswolski/document-analyzer-ai)\n\nLocal-first document analysis — structured extraction, risk flagging, and a human review step. Nothing leaves the machine.\n\n`JavaScript` · `AI Workflows` · `Local-First`\n\n</td>\n<td width=\"50%\" valign=\"top\">\n\n### <img src=\"./assets/icon-bolt.svg\" height=\"20\" alt=\"\" /> Swoop &nbsp;·&nbsp; <sub>private</sub>\n\nSelf-hosted AI job-application agent, human-in-the-loop by design — the agent drafts and stages, a person approves and sends.\n\n`Python` · `FastAPI` · `React` · `Claude`\n<br/><sub>Case study on the portfolio</sub>\n\n</td>\n</tr>\n</table>\n\n<sub>More: <a href=\"https://github.com/michealswolski/forecast-ai\">ForecastAI</a> · <a href=\"https://github.com/michealswolski/meshlink-ios\">MeshLink iOS</a> (BLE mesh, AES-256-GCM) · <a href=\"https://github.com/michealswolski/network-utility-tool\">Network Utility Tool</a> · <a href=\"https://github.com/michealswolski/michealswolski.github.io\">Portfolio site</a></sub>\n\n<div align=\"center\">\n\n<picture>\n  <source media=\"(prefers-color-scheme: dark)\" srcset=\"./assets/divider.svg\">\n  <source media=\"(prefers-color-scheme: light)\" srcset=\"./assets/divider-light.svg\">\n  <img src=\"./assets/divider.svg\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"\" />\n</picture>\n\n</div>\n\n<h2><picture><source media=\"(prefers-color-scheme: dark)\" srcset=\"./assets/head-labs.svg\"><source media=\"(prefers-color-scheme: light)\" srcset=\"./assets/head-labs-light.svg\"><img src=\"./assets/head-labs.svg\" height=\"48\" alt=\"Security Labs & Research\" /></picture></h2>\n\nDocumented hands-on security labs and research covering detection, vulnerability management, network and automotive security, system hardening, and application security. What each repository contains varies — follow the link to see the artifacts behind it.\n\n<table>\n<tr>\n<td width=\"33%\" valign=\"top\">\n\n**Offensive & AppSec**\n\n- [Offensive Security Lab](https://github.com/michealswolski/offensive-security-lab) — recon → Nmap → Metasploit → privilege escalation\n- [Web App Security Lab](https://github.com/michealswolski/web-app-security-lab) — Burp route discovery, input validation, misconfigured endpoints\n- [Hacked Terminal Wallpaper](https://github.com/michealswolski/hacked-terminal-wallpaper) — quishing awareness demo\n\n</td>\n<td width=\"33%\" valign=\"top\">\n\n**Defense & Detection**\n\n- [Splunk SIEM Lab](https://github.com/michealswolski/splunk-siem-lab) — SPL, dashboards, spike alerting, detection tuning\n- [Network Traffic Analysis](https://github.com/michealswolski/network-traffic-analysis) — Wireshark DPI, handshake and DNS anomalies\n- [Python Log Automation](https://github.com/michealswolski/python-log-automation) — brute-force detection engine with rolling IP thresholds\n- [System Hardening Lab](https://github.com/michealswolski/system-hardening-lab) — Windows/Linux baselines, auditd, patching\n\n</td>\n<td width=\"33%\" valign=\"top\">\n\n**Vuln Mgmt, Network & Automotive**\n\n- [Homelab Vuln Management](https://github.com/michealswolski/homelab-vuln-management) — Nessus scans, CVSS prioritization, pfSense enforcement\n- [OpenVAS Scanning](https://github.com/michealswolski/openvas-scanning) — CVE analysis, risk-prioritized mitigation\n- [Firewall & VPN Lab](https://github.com/michealswolski/firewall-vpn-lab) — pfSense segmentation, deny-by-default, OpenVPN\n- [OBD-II Diagnostic Scanner](https://github.com/michealswolski/obd2-diagnostic-scanner) — ECU protocol comms, real-time vehicle data\n- [Secure Boot Research](https://github.com/michealswolski/secure-boot-research) — TPM, chain-of-trust, MISRA C, ECU attestation\n- [PKI & CA Research](https://github.com/michealswolski/pki-ca-research) — certificate authority trust models\n\n</td>\n</tr>\n</table>\n\n<div align=\"center\">\n\n<picture>\n  <source media=\"(prefers-color-scheme: dark)\" srcset=\"./assets/divider.svg\">\n  <source media=\"(prefers-color-scheme: light)\" srcset=\"./assets/divider-light.svg\">\n  <img src=\"./assets/divider.svg\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"\" />\n</picture>\n\n<h2><picture><source media=\"(prefers-color-scheme: dark)\" srcset=\"./assets/head-activity.svg\"><source media=\"(prefers-color-scheme: light)\" srcset=\"./assets/head-activity-light.svg\"><img src=\"./assets/head-activity.svg\" height=\"48\" alt=\"GitHub Activity\" /></picture></h2>\n\n<picture>\n  <source media=\"(prefers-color-scheme: dark)\" srcset=\"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/michealswolski/michealswolski/output/stats.svg\">\n  <source media=\"(prefers-color-scheme: light)\" srcset=\"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/michealswolski/michealswolski/output/stats-light.svg\">\n  <img height=\"196\" src=\"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/michealswolski/michealswolski/output/stats.svg\" alt=\"GitHub statistics — public repositories, languages, bytes of code, repositories active this year\" />\n</picture>\n<picture>\n  <source media=\"(prefers-color-scheme: dark)\" srcset=\"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/michealswolski/michealswolski/output/languages.svg\">\n  <source media=\"(prefers-color-scheme: light)\" srcset=\"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/michealswolski/michealswolski/output/languages-light.svg\">\n  <img height=\"196\" src=\"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/michealswolski/michealswolski/output/languages.svg\" alt=\"Most used languages by bytes of code across public repositories\" />\n</picture>\n\n<br/>\n\n<picture>\n  <source media=\"(prefers-color-scheme: dark)\" srcset=\"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/michealswolski/michealswolski/output/focus.svg\">\n  <source media=\"(prefers-color-scheme: light)\" srcset=\"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/michealswolski/michealswolski/output/focus-light.svg\">\n  <img width=\"96%\" src=\"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/michealswolski/michealswolski/output/focus.svg\" alt=\"Public repositories grouped by security domain\" />\n</picture>\n\n<br/>\n\n### <img src=\"./assets/icon-grid.svg\" height=\"20\" alt=\"\" /> The snake that eats my contributions\n\n<picture>\n  <source media=\"(prefers-color-scheme: dark)\" srcset=\"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/michealswolski/michealswolski/output/snake-dark.svg\">\n  <source media=\"(prefers-color-scheme: light)\" srcset=\"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/michealswolski/michealswolski/output/snake-light.svg\">\n  <img width=\"96%\" src=\"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/michealswolski/michealswolski/output/snake-dark.svg\" alt=\"Snake eating my contribution graph\" />\n</picture>\n\n<picture>\n  <source media=\"(prefers-color-scheme: dark)\" srcset=\"./assets/divider.svg\">\n  <source media=\"(prefers-color-scheme: light)\" srcset=\"./assets/divider-light.svg\">\n  <img src=\"./assets/divider.svg\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"\" />\n</picture>\n\n<picture>\n  <source media=\"(prefers-color-scheme: dark)\" srcset=\"./assets/domains.svg\">\n  <source media=\"(prefers-color-scheme: light)\" srcset=\"./assets/domains-light.svg\">\n  <img src=\"./assets/domains.svg\" width=\"96%\" alt=\"Five vehicle domains — telematics, ADAS, infotainment, body and chassis, and powertrain — each pinging a central verification gateway before anything is trusted\" />\n</picture>\n\n<br/><br/>\n\n<h2><picture><source media=\"(prefers-color-scheme: dark)\" srcset=\"./assets/head-connect.svg\"><source media=\"(prefers-color-scheme: light)\" srcset=\"./assets/head-connect-light.svg\"><img src=\"./assets/head-connect.svg\" height=\"48\" alt=\"Let’s Connect\" /></picture></h2>\n\n<a href=\"https://michealswolski.github.io\"><picture><source media=\"(prefers-color-scheme: dark)\" srcset=\"./assets/connect-portfolio.svg\"><source media=\"(prefers-color-scheme: light)\" srcset=\"./assets/connect-portfolio-light.svg\"><img src=\"./assets/connect-portfolio.svg\" width=\"180\" alt=\"Portfolio\" /></picture></a>\n<a href=\"https://www.linkedin.com/in/michealwolski\"><picture><source media=\"(prefers-color-scheme: dark)\" srcset=\"./assets/connect-linkedin.svg\"><source media=\"(prefers-color-scheme: light)\" srcset=\"./assets/connect-linkedin-light.svg\"><img src=\"./assets/connect-linkedin.svg\" width=\"180\" alt=\"LinkedIn\" /></picture></a>\n<a href=\"https://github.com/michealswolski\"><picture><source media=\"(prefers-color-scheme: dark)\" srcset=\"./assets/connect-github.svg\"><source media=\"(prefers-color-scheme: light)\" srcset=\"./assets/connect-github-light.svg\"><img src=\"./assets/connect-github.svg\" width=\"180\" alt=\"GitHub\" /></picture></a>\n\n<br/><br/>\n\n<sub><i>Trust · Verify · Ship — security that survives contact with production.</i></sub>\n\n</div>",
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      "description": "ICV-Cybersecurity-QA is a curated Q&A dataset for intelligent connected vehicle cybersecurity and data-security compliance. It contains expert-annotated question–answer pairs derived from 108 regulations and standards, split into training and test sets for evaluating LLM-based automated compliance analysis.",
      "readme": "# ICV-Cybersecurity-QA Dataset\n\nThis repository provides the question–answer (Q&A) dataset used in our paper on intelligent connected vehicles (ICVs) cybersecurity and data security compliance.\n\nTo support the study, we constructed a high-quality Q&A dataset for ICVs cybersecurity standards and regulations, focusing on aspects relevant to real-world compliance. Based on 108 collected documents (48 laws and regulations, 60 technical standards and normative documents), approximately 10 representative Q&A pairs were manually assisted and extracted from each source. The questions cover diverse types (e.g., term interpretation, clause analysis, cross-document reasoning) to ensure domain professionalism and answer accuracy.\n\nThe resulting dataset was randomly split into:\n- **50% training set** – for prompt optimization and model training;\n- **50% test set** – for independent evaluation and comparative analysis.\n\n## Knowledge Base (KB) Source Tables\n\nIn addition to the Q&A files, this repository also includes supplementary tables that document the knowledge sources behind all Q&A pairs.\n\nThe Knowledge Base (KB) that supports the research focuses on the domain of cybersecurity and data security for intelligent connected vehicles (ICVs) and currently contains **108 key documents**:\n\n- **Table 1** – Summary of the 48 relevant laws and regulations.\n- **Table 2** – Summary of the 60 relevant technical standards and normative documents.\n\nThese tables serve as a complete inventory of the KB used to construct the dataset and allow users to trace each Q&A pair back to its original regulatory or standard document. To promote further research in this field (e.g., AI-driven automated compliance analysis), we share this KB inventory openly. Given the rapid evolution of ICVs security regulations and standards, the KB will be continuously maintained and updated to incorporate the latest industry developments.\n\n## Repository Structure (example)\n\n- `training_dataset_final.json` – Q&A pairs in the training set.\n- `test_dataset_final.json` – Q&A pairs in the test set.\n- `APEO-RAG_Supplementary_KB_Inventory.pdf` - Supplementary material listing all **108 knowledge-source documents** (48 laws and regulations, 60 technical standards and normative documents) that provide the ground-truth basis for the Q&A dataset.",
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      "name": "AutoShield-Lab",
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      "description": "Security-first connected-vehicle telemetry proof of concept using Python, AWS IoT Core, MQTT 5, mutual TLS and CloudFormation.",
      "readme": "# AutoShield Lab\n\n**A security-first connected-vehicle telemetry proof of concept built with Python, SQLite, AWS IoT Core, MQTT 5, mutual TLS, and infrastructure as code.**\n\nAutoShield Lab demonstrates how a fictional connected vehicle can produce validated telemetry, be checked against an authorised vehicle registry, trigger explainable security rules, and publish a tightly controlled message to AWS IoT Core.\n\nThe project was designed as a Solutions Architecture portfolio case study. It focuses on requirements, trust boundaries, least-privilege access, cost control, testability, and documented architectural decisions rather than on a generic CRUD application.\n\n> All vehicles, events, credentials, and scenarios used by the application are fictional or synthetic. AutoShield Lab never connects to a real vehicle or external target.\n\n## What the MVP proves\n\n- A versioned telemetry contract rejects malformed or unsafe input.\n- A local SQLite registry authorises only known vehicles with an active lifecycle status.\n- Explainable detection rules identify authentication bursts and high battery temperature.\n- Unknown or inactive vehicle identities are rejected before processing.\n- A dedicated publishing boundary prevents vehicle and MQTT-topic mismatches.\n- One fictional device authenticates to AWS IoT Core using an X.509 certificate and mutual TLS.\n- Its IoT policy permits only the approved MQTT client ID and telemetry topic.\n- Cloud publishing uses MQTT 5 with QoS 1 and a dynamically discovered regional endpoint.\n- Infrastructure is reproducible through AWS CloudFormation.\n- The automated suite completes with **28 tests and 4 subtests passing**.\n\n## Architecture\n\n```mermaid\nflowchart LR\n    S[\"Synthetic vehicle scenario\"] --> V[\"Telemetry contract validation\"]\n\n    V --> A[\"Vehicle registry authorisation\"]\n    R[(\"SQLite vehicle registry\")] --> A\n    A --> D[\"Explainable detection rules\"]\n    D --> I[\"Local incident results\"]\n\n    V --> P[\"Cloud publish authorisation\"]\n    P --> M[\"MQTT 5 / mTLS / QoS 1\"]\n    C[\"X.509 device certificate\"] --> M\n    M --> AWS[\"AWS IoT Core - eu-west-2\"]\n    CF[\"CloudFormation: Thing + least-privilege policy\"] --> AWS\n    AWS --> T[\"AWS MQTT test client\"]\n```\n\nThe local security pipeline and cloud publishing proof share the same validated telemetry model. Detection remains local in this MVP; the AWS portion proves secure device identity, topic-level authorisation, and encrypted transport without adding databases, queues, or continuously running compute.\n\n## Security model\n\n| Control | Implementation | Architectural purpose |\n| --- | --- | --- |\n| Input trust boundary | Strict `TelemetryEvent` validation | Reject malformed data before business processing |\n| Vehicle authorisation | SQLite registry and lifecycle status | Prevent unknown, maintenance, or retired identities from being processed |\n| Explainable detection | Deterministic rules with severity and evidence | Produce findings that an operator can understand and test |\n| Publish authorisation | Vehicle ID, Thing name, client ID, and topic checks | Prevent confused-deputy and topic-substitution mistakes |\n| Device authentication | One X.509 certificate attached to one fictional Thing | Give the demonstration vehicle a distinct machine identity |\n| Least privilege | Exact `iot:Connect` and `iot:Publish` resource ARNs | Permit only the intended client ID and telemetry topic |\n| Transport security | MQTT 5 over mutual TLS | Encrypt traffic and authenticate both sides of the connection |\n| Secret handling | Certificates and keys stored under Git-ignored `data/` | Keep private key material out of source control |\n| Cost boundary | One Thing, one policy, one certificate, manual one-message demo | Avoid continuously running or unnecessary cloud resources |\n\nThe IoT policy intentionally does **not** grant subscribe, receive, wildcard publish, fleet-wide access, or administrative actions.\n\n## End-to-end scenarios\n\nThe repeatable local demonstration covers three outcomes:\n\n1. **Normal telemetry** - accepted with no incident.\n2. **Suspicious telemetry** - accepted and evaluated into two explainable incidents:\n   - authentication failure burst;\n   - high battery temperature.\n3. **Identity impersonation** - rejected because the claimed vehicle is not registered.\n\nThe cloud demonstration publishes one validated synthetic event to:\n\n```text\nautoshield/vehicles/autoshield-demo-vehicle-001/telemetry\n```\n\nThe client certificate cannot connect using a different client ID or publish to a different topic.\n\n## Cloud proof\n\n### Message received by AWS IoT Core\n\n![Synthetic telemetry received in the AWS IoT MQTT test client](docs/assets/autoshield-aws-iot-console-redacted.png)\n\n### Authorisation and QoS 1 publish receipt\n\n![AWS IoT authorisation and successful AutoShield publish receipt](docs/assets/autoshield-cloud-publish-terminal-redacted.png)\n\nAccount identifiers and local usernames are redacted. No endpoint, access token, certificate, or private key is included in these images.\n\n## Technology choices\n\n- **Python 3.13** - domain logic, validation, detection, orchestration, and demos\n- **SQLite** - zero-cost local vehicle registry with database constraints\n- **pytest and unittest** - automated behaviour and transport-boundary testing\n- **AWS IoT Device SDK v2** - MQTT 5 mutual-TLS connectivity\n- **AWS IoT Core** - managed device gateway and policy enforcement\n- **AWS CloudFormation** - reproducible IoT Thing and policy configuration\n- **Git** - milestone-based development and architectural history\n\n## Run locally\n\n### Prerequisites\n\n- Python 3.13 or later\n- Git\n\nPowerShell example:\n\n```powershell\ngit clone https://github.com/arshhunerkar-security/AutoShield-Lab.git\ncd AutoShield-Lab\npython -m venv .venv\nSet-ExecutionPolicy -Scope Process -ExecutionPolicy Bypass\n.\\.venv\\Scripts\\Activate.ps1\npython -m pip install -e \".[dev]\"\n```\n\nRun the automated suite:\n\n```powershell\npython -m pytest -q\n```\n\nRun the local security demonstration:\n\n```powershell\npython -m autoshield_lab.demo\n```\n\nThe local demonstration is repeatable and requires no AWS account.\n\n## Optional AWS IoT proof\n\nThe cloud proof is deliberately optional. The core application and tests work entirely locally.\n\nBefore using it:\n\n1. Review [`infra/README.md`](infra/README.md) and the cost-control ADR.\n2. Use an IAM identity rather than the AWS root user.\n3. Deploy only the provided CloudFormation stack in the intended Region.\n4. Create a dedicated demonstration certificate and keep its private key under `data/`.\n5. Subscribe the AWS MQTT test client to the exact AutoShield telemetry topic.\n6. Run the cloud demo once, capture the result, and clean up the AWS resources when finished.\n\nExample after secure local certificate setup:\n\n```powershell\n$autoShieldEndpoint = (aws iot describe-endpoint `\n    --endpoint-type iot:Data-ATS `\n    --query \"endpointAddress\" `\n    --output text `\n    --region eu-west-2 `\n    --profile autoshield-admin).Trim()\n\npython -m autoshield_lab.cloud_demo --endpoint $autoShieldEndpoint\n```\n\nNever commit certificate files, private keys, cached AWS credentials, account identifiers, or endpoint values.\n\n## Project structure\n\n```text\nAutoShield-Lab/\n|-- docs/\n|   |-- adr/                         # Architecture decision records\n|   |-- assets/                      # Redacted portfolio evidence\n|   |-- CLEAN_ROOM.md                # Synthetic-data safety boundary\n|   |-- DETECTION_RULES.md           # Rule definitions and thresholds\n|   `-- TELEMETRY_CONTRACT.md        # Event schema and validation contract\n|-- infra/\n|   |-- iot-core.yaml                # Cost-controlled IoT infrastructure\n|   `-- README.md                    # Deployment and cleanup guidance\n|-- src/autoshield_lab/\n|   |-- cloud_demo.py                # One-message cloud demonstration\n|   |-- cloud_publisher.py           # Publishing authorisation boundary\n|   |-- database.py                  # SQLite initialisation\n|   |-- demo.py                      # Repeatable local scenarios\n|   |-- detection.py                 # Explainable security rules\n|   |-- mqtt_transport.py            # MQTT 5 mutual-TLS transport\n|   |-- pipeline.py                  # Authorised processing pipeline\n|   `-- telemetry.py                 # Validated telemetry domain model\n|-- tests/                           # Local and mocked transport tests\n`-- pyproject.toml                   # Package and test configuration\n```\n\n## Architectural decisions\n\n- [`ADR-001: Vehicle-status authorisation`](docs/adr/ADR-001-vehicle-status-authorization.md) explains why registry status is enforced before detection.\n- [`ADR-002: Free-plan cost guardrails`](docs/adr/ADR-002-free-plan-cost-guardrails.md) records the intentionally small AWS footprint and excluded services.\n- [`TELEMETRY_CONTRACT.md`](docs/TELEMETRY_CONTRACT.md) defines the accepted event boundary.\n- [`DETECTION_RULES.md`](docs/DETECTION_RULES.md) documents thresholds, severity, and rule behaviour.\n\n## Testing strategy\n\nThe automated tests cover:\n\n- database constraints and repeatable initialisation;\n- telemetry validation and serialisation;\n- known, unknown, active, maintenance, and retired vehicle states;\n- detection thresholds and multi-incident events;\n- pipeline acceptance and rejection outcomes;\n- publish-topic and identity authorisation;\n- MQTT configuration, success, failure, and cleanup paths;\n- local and cloud-demo orchestration.\n\nCloud transport tests use controlled fakes, so `pytest` does not create AWS traffic or require credentials. The screenshots document the separate manual end-to-end proof.\n\n## Design trade-offs\n\n- **SQLite instead of a managed database:** sufficient for deterministic local learning and zero-cost testing; not intended for fleet-scale concurrency.\n- **Deterministic rules instead of machine learning:** easier to explain, verify, and audit for an MVP.\n- **One certificate and one Thing:** demonstrates device identity and least privilege while limiting cost and operational risk.\n- **No cloud persistence or compute:** avoids claiming an ingestion platform that the MVP does not implement and prevents idle resources.\n- **Manual certificate lifecycle:** acceptable for one demonstration device; production fleets require automated provisioning, rotation, revocation, and audit processes.\n\n## Current limitations\n\nAutoShield Lab is a portfolio proof of concept, not a production vehicle-security product. It does not currently provide:\n\n- real-vehicle or CAN-bus integration;\n- cloud-side storage, stream processing, dashboards, or alert delivery;\n- automated certificate provisioning and rotation;\n- multi-account or multi-Region resilience;\n- production observability, SLOs, or incident-management integrations;\n- a formal automotive safety or cybersecurity certification.\n\nThese boundaries are deliberate and keep the repository safe, reproducible, and honest about its scope.\n\n## Roadmap\n\n- Add a threat model and data-flow diagram.\n- Add CI for automated tests and secret scanning.\n- Introduce pluggable local persistence for incidents.\n- Design a cost-estimated cloud ingestion option using managed, event-driven services.\n- Define certificate provisioning, rotation, revocation, and fleet onboarding workflows.\n- Add operational metrics, alarms, retention requirements, and recovery objectives.\n\n## Clean-room boundary\n\nAll vehicles, electronic control units, messages, events, and telemetry in this repository must remain fictional and synthetic. See [`docs/CLEAN_ROOM.md`](docs/CLEAN_ROOM.md) for the complete rules.",
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      "title": "UDS Security Access Code Location and Vulnerability Scanner",
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      "description": "FirmUDS: Automated Detection of UDS Security Access Service Vulnerabilities from Automotive ECU Bare-Metal Firmware",
      "readme": "# UDS Security Access Code Location and Vulnerability Scanner\n\n## Project Introduction\n\nThis tool is an automated reverse engineering script based on Ghidra, specifically designed to locate UDS diagnostic protocol 27 sub-service (Security Access) related code in ECU firmware and perform security vulnerability scanning. The tool can automatically identify Seed2Key algorithms, random number generators, key comparison components, and detect various security vulnerabilities.\n\n## Main Features\n\n- **Automatic Code Location**: Identify UDS 27 sub-service related functions based on byte manipulation patterns\n- **Intelligent Analysis**: Use large language models to analyze decompiled code logic\n- **Vulnerability Scanning**: Detect hardcoded keys, algorithmic flaws, authentication logic vulnerabilities, etc.\n- **State Recovery**: Support interrupt recovery to avoid repeated analysis\n- **Detailed Logging**: Provide complete analysis process and result records\n\n## Build Environment\n\n### 1. Install Ghidrathon\n\nFirst, install the Ghidrathon plugin to support Python scripts:\n\n1. Download Ghidrathon plugin: https://github.com/mandiant/Ghidrathon\n2. Install the plugin to Ghidra's Extensions directory\n3. Restart Ghidra and confirm Python environment is available\n\n### 2. Install Python Dependencies\n\n```bash\npip install openai langchain-community\n```\n\n## Running Steps\n\n### 1. Configure LLM Parameters\n\nConfigure your API keys in the `LLM_CONFIG` section at the top of `FirmUDS.py`:\n\n```python\nLLM_CONFIG = {\n    \"qwen\": {\n        \"api_key\": \"your_qwen_api_key\",\n        \"base_url\": \"https://dashscope.aliyuncs.com/compatible-mode/v1\",\n        \"model\": \"qwen-max-2025-01-25\"\n    },\n    \"moonshot\": {\n        \"api_key\": \"your_moonshot_api_key\",\n        \"base_url\": \"https://api.moonshot.cn/v1\",\n        \"model\": \"moonshot-v1-32k\"\n    }\n}\n```\n\n### 2. Prepare Firmware File\n\n1. Start Ghidra\n2. Import target ECU firmware file\n3. **Important**: Perform forced full firmware analysis\n   - For Tricore/PPC architectures, some normal functions may be ignored\n   - Ensure analysis covers all code segments\n   - Set appropriate analysis options to include all functions\n\n### 3. Run Script\n\n1. Open Script Manager in Ghidra\n2. Select `FirmUDS.py` script\n3. Click Run\n4. Enter suspected random number generator function names as prompted\n\n## Analysis Stage Description\n\n### Stage 1: UDS27 Feature Function Identification\n- **Function**: Scan all functions to identify those containing `<< 0x18` and `<< 0x10` byte manipulation patterns\n- **Output**: `logs/log_1.txt` - List of matching functions\n- **Filter Criteria**: Must contain both shift operations and byte manipulation features\n\n### Stage 2: Random Number Generator Association Analysis\n- **Function**: Analyze call relationships between random number generators and UDS27 functions\n- **Output**: `logs/log_2.txt` - Candidate function list\n- **Input**: User-provided suspected random number generator function names\n\n### Stage 3: LLM Intelligent Judgment\n- **Function**: Use large language models to determine if candidate functions truly have UDS27 features\n- **Output**: `logs/log_3.txt` - Final hit function list\n- **Filter Criteria**: Code lines 5-120, judged as UDS27-related by LLM\n\n### Stage 4: Function Completeness Analysis\n- **Function**: Analyze whether the four core components of UDS27 service are complete\n- **Output**: `logs/log_4.txt` and `logs/uds27_overview.json`\n- **Components**: Seed generation, Seed splitting, Seed2Key algorithm, Key value comparison\n\n### Stage 5: Vulnerability Scanning\n- **Function**: Scan security vulnerabilities in identified UDS27 code\n- **Output**: `logs/log_5.txt` and `logs/vulnerability_scan.json`\n- **Vulnerability Types**: Information leakage, algorithmic flaws, authentication logic flaws\n\n## Log Output Description\n\n### Main Log Files\n- `logs/log.txt` - Complete execution log\n- `logs/log_1.txt` - Stage 1 results\n- `logs/log_2.txt` - Stage 2 results\n- `logs/log_3.txt` - Stage 3 results\n- `logs/log_4.txt` - Stage 4 results\n- `logs/log_5.txt` - Stage 5 results\n\n### Result Files\n- `logs/uds27_overview.json` - UDS27 function completeness analysis results\n- `logs/vulnerability_scan.json` - Detailed vulnerability scanning results\n- `logs/llm_error_state.json` - LLM error recovery state (if needed)\n- `logs/code_items_functions.json` - List of functions to be analyzed\n\n## Main Detected Vulnerability Types\n\n### 1. Information Leakage Vulnerabilities\n- **Hardcoded Keys**: Detect pre-shared keys directly stored in firmware\n- **Sensitive Data Exposure**: Identify potentially leaked seed values or key data\n\n### 2. Algorithmic Flaws\n- **Weak Seed2Key Algorithm**: Detect simple algorithms lacking non-linear operations\n- **Short Key Length**: Identify security risks from insufficient key length\n\n### 3. Authentication Logic Flaws\n- **Insufficient Randomness**: Detect entropy source issues in random number generators\n- **Replay Attack Vulnerabilities**: Identify design flaws lacking replay protection",
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      "readme": "# OTA Update Validation Framework\n\nEnd-to-end validation framework for embedded device OTA updates.\nSimulates the complete firmware delivery pipeline with security\nvalidation and automatic rollback on boot failure.\n\n## Pipeline stages\n\n| Stage | What happens |\n|---|---|\n| 1. Package creation | Firmware built, signed with RSA-2048, SHA256 checksum generated |\n| 2. Download validation | Checksum verified - corruption and incomplete downloads rejected |\n| 3. Signature verification | RSA-PSS signature validated - tampered packages rejected |\n| 4. A/B partition flash | New firmware written to inactive slot - active slot untouched |\n| 5. Boot validation | 5 system checks run - CAN, camera, network, processes |\n| 6. Commit or rollback | Success commits update, failure triggers automatic rollback |\n\n## Test results\n\n| Scenario | Result | Rollback |\n|---|---|---|\n| Normal update v1.0.0 | PASS | no |\n| Bad firmware v2.0.0 | PASS | YES - recovered to v1.0.0 |\n| Corrupted download | PASS | no - rejected at checksum |\n| Tampered package | PASS | no - rejected at signature |\n\n## Security\n\n- RSA-2048 PSS signing with SHA256\n- SHA256 checksum per package\n- Corruption injection testing\n- Tamper detection testing\n- Wrong-key rejection testing\n\n## A/B partition\n\nDevice always runs from one slot while the other receives\nthe update. Bad update triggers automatic rollback to last\nknown good state. Device can never be permanently bricked.\n\n## Files\n\n| File | Purpose |\n|---|---|\n| `ota_packager.py` | Creates and signs firmware packages |\n| `ota_downloader.py` | Validates download integrity |\n| `ota_verifier.py` | Verifies RSA signatures |\n| `ota_partition.py` | A/B partition management |\n| `ota_bootloader.py` | Boot validation and rollback |\n| `ota_validator.py` | Full pipeline orchestrator |\n\n## Run locally\n\n```bash\npython3 -m venv venv\nsource venv/bin/activate\npip install cryptography\npython3 ota_validator.py\n```",
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      "evidence_type": "repository",
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      "full_name": "duraki/jeep",
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      "url": "https://github.com/duraki/jeep",
      "description": "Hacking your car like in movies",
      "readme": "## Jeep\n\n<img src=\"https://pbs.twimg.com/media/DQJJRqyX0AA78lq.jpg:large\" alt=\"sniff-mod\" />\n\n`jeep` is a Metasploit-like framework for CAN interfaces, mostly used in vehicle\nand automobile systems. This tool should allow you to interact with your device\nin Wireshark manner, implementing both sniffing and replying technique. There is\nalso an API header file available for reuse and faster module writings.\n\nCode is documented in pseudo manner mostly reducted to Bosch standards. Whole\nframework is written in C and is very unstable.\n\n## Install\n\n**For GNU/Linux Operating Systems**\n\n```\n$ git clone https://github.com/duraki/jeep\n$ cd jeep\n$ make all\n```\n\n**For XNU-based Operating Systems**\n\n```\n$ docker-compose up\n$ docker exec -it jeep /bin/bash\n```\n\n**Build, and compile the program**\n\n```\n$ make all\n```\n\n\n## Hardware\n\nTo create a virtual net interface doing CANBus transport, we implemented an external hardware module using [vxcan](https://cateee.net/lkddb/web-lkddb/CAN_VXCAN.html). Pre-requisits for this project is an SBC such is Raspberry Pi (Tested) or LeMaker's SBC (Untested). Install Raspbian OS and set default configurations, such is SSH and VNC via `rasp-conf`.\n\nRead more [on Linux Interfaces for Virtual Networking](https://developers.redhat.com/blog/2018/10/22/introduction-to-linux-interfaces-for-virtual-networking#). The default Docker network interface is sitting at `192.168.65.0/24` and using IPAM with `subnet: 127.17.0.0/16`/`gateway: 172.17.0.1`.\n\n`vxcan` is a Linux kernel driver/module that can be used to set up a virtual CAN tunnel across network namespaces. For example it allows you to generate virtual CAN frames on your host and send them to a container; or forward real CAN traffic between a USB-CAN adapter and a container, without exposing the entire host network to the container.\n\nThe `vcan-interface` container is sitting at `172.17.0.2/16`. Docker automatically creates a subnet and gateway for the bridge network, and docker run automatically adds containers to it. Any containers on the same network may communicate with one another via IP addresses. You must connect containers with the `--link` option in your docker run command.\n\nYou can create an isolated bridge via:\n\n```\n$ docker network create --driver bridge isolated_bridge\n# ... hash ...\n\n$ docker network inspect isolated_bridge\n# ... \"Subnet\": \"172.20.0.0/16\",\n# ... \"Gateway\": \"172.20.0.1\"\n\n$ docker network ls\nNETWORK ID     NAME              DRIVER    SCOPE\n00478aaa04a5   isolated_bridge   bridge    local\n...\n```\n\nThen setup additional requirements, a `vcan` tunnel for cross namespace communication, and the driver:\n\n```\npi@raspberrypi:~ $ sudo apt install raspberrypi-kernel-headers can-utils\npi@raspberrypi:~ $ sudo apt install git bc bison flex libssl-dev make\n```\n\nClone this project on your Raspberry Pi disk (via `scp` or `rsync`), and do the following:\n\n```\n# => from your Host OS\n$ scp -r dev/jeep pi@raspberrypi.local:/home/pi/jeep\n\n# => on your SCB\npi@raspberrypi:~ $ cd /home/pi/jeep/drivers/vxcan/\npi@raspberrypi:~ $ make clean && make all\n  CC [M]  /home/pi/jeep/drivers/vxcan/vxcan.o\n  ...\n\npi@raspberrypi:~ $ sudo chown root:root vxcan.ko\nsudo chmod 0644 vxcan.ko\nsudo mv vxcan.ko \"/lib/modules/$(uname -r)/kernel/net/can/\"\nsudo depmod -A\nsudo modprobe vxcan\nsudo modprobe can-gw\n```\n\nYou should now see in `dmesg -w` that the vcan tunnel driver has been loaded:\n\n```\n$ dmesg -w\n[  758.020199] vxcan: loading out-of-tree module taints kernel.\n[  758.020640] vxcan: Virtual CAN Tunnel driver\n\n$ modinfo vxcan # => displays kernel/so module info\n```\n\n**Setting up modules autoload**\n\nLet's also add a file to /etc/modules-load.d so that the modules will load on startup. Create /etc/modules-load.d/can.conf and add the following:\n\n```\n# cat /etc/modules-load.d/can.conf\nvxcan\ncan-gw\n```\n\n**Smoke Testing of the hardware environment**\n\nIn a separate Terminal on a Host OS, start a container and install `canutils` within the container:\n\n```\n$ docker run --rm --net=isolated_bridge --net=host -it --name vcan-interface ubuntu:20.04\n# ... 20.04: Pulling from library/ubuntu\n# ... 3b65ec22a9e9: Pull complete\n\nroot@8b60433051c0:/# apt-get update && apt-get install -y can-utils iproute2 -y\n# ...\n```\n\nLets setup vxcan network and move one end of it, into the container's network namespace:\n\n```\n$ docker ps\nCONTAINER ID   IMAGE          COMMAND   CREATED         STATUS         PORTS     NAMES\n8b60433051c0   ubuntu:20.04   \"bash\"    2 minutes ago   Up 2 minutes             cantest\n49de7daaded5   jeep_jeep      \"bash\"    8 hours ago     Up 7 seconds             jeep\n```\n\n**Removing vxcan kernel module**\n\n```\n$ rmmod squashfs.ko\n$ rm -rf /lib/modules/<version>/kernel/net/can/vxcan.ko\n```\n\n## How\n\n`jeep` works with CAN protcol whcih Bosch defined back in the old days. Using\n`jeep` and your car, you may extract interesting info from it, or play with\nvarious things, unlocking your car or even stealing someone elses! (I do not\nadvice this, I repeat, this is pro-bono educational purpose only).\n\nI've talked about vehicle hacking and wrote some research papers on the same\ntopic which you may read or watch on YouTube. The first attraction `jeep` got is\nin late 2015 when I had most time to research these stuff. It was all black on\nwhite, written on paper and some latex docs. The first open-sourcing happened\nsometimes ago when I wrote about in on [lobsters](lobste.rs).\n\n> I continued working on jeep which is a some sort of WireShark sniffer but for vehicle/car systems (read: hacking tool for your car). It’s based on CAN, supposed to support fd (ext frame struct) from SocketCAN. The reason I’m writing this is because it’s fun and I need a can-utils which is extensible. Jeep should support extending through modules with built-in API. Project goal is to create system similar to Metasploit and stay opensource. This week I’m working on sniff module.\n\nThis software requires from you a UNIX-based Linux-powered operating system.\nThis was tested and developed in RedHat EL, while some features does not work\nwith CentOS derivant, they do with example Ubuntu. This is all up to you Kernel\nand SocketCAN version.\n\n**You are responsible if you destroy your car.**\n\n## Status\n\nThis program is in very early phase. I'm currently working on API and `sniff`\nmodule which should be built on top of the same API. Later on, I'll extend this\nframework with newest modules.\n\nIf you are a C developer, be free to jump in and contribute with your lines,\nyour code is appreciated.\n\n### Resources\n\n* [Container Networking Plugins](https://github.com/containernetworking/plugins)\n* [SocketCAN with Docker and Linux (pdf)](https://chemnitzer.linux-tage.de/2021/media/programm/folien/210.pdf)",
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      "readme": "# OCPP Handbook\n\nA course on EV charging software: the industry, the hardware, the protocols, and the craft of debugging them. It starts from zero and ends at the level where you read raw OCPP frames, run your own captures, and work with the specifications without a guide.\n\nVendor-neutral, free, and checkable: claims link to sources, and protocol statements cite the specifications by section.\n\n## Who this is for\n\nSoftware engineers entering EV charging: backend developers joining a CPO or a CSMS vendor, firmware people landing on a charger project, tool builders, and anyone tired of meeting OCPP, OCPI, CPO, eMSP, and EVSE in sentences that explain none of them.\n\nNo EV, electrical, or protocol background is assumed. Comfort with JSON and rough familiarity with HTTP are enough. WebSocket experience helps but is introduced properly when it's needed.\n\n## What you'll be able to do\n\n- Explain who the industry players are and how money moves between them\n- Read an OCPP 1.6J exchange frame by frame and spot what's wrong\n- Run a simulated charge point against an open-source backend and capture the traffic\n- Recognize the common ways charging sessions fail in the field\n- Work with the 1.6 and 2.0.1 specifications directly, and track what 2.1 changes\n\n## Why this handbook\n\nThe specifications are solid reference documents, but a reference is not a learning path. Vendors publish good overview articles, and each open-source project documents its own corner. What's hard to find is a connected route from zero: industry context first, then the physical layer, then the protocol stack, then field debugging, each part building on the last. This handbook is an attempt at that route.\n\n## Syllabus\n\nAll modules are available, from orientation through the capstone.\n\n| Part | # | Module | Status |\n| --- | --- | --- | --- |\n| 0. Orientation | 0 | [Orientation: the map and the conventions](modules/00-orientation.md) | Available |\n| I. The industry | 1 | [The industry: who's who and how the money flows](modules/01-the-industry.md) | Available |\n| I. The industry | 2 | [The hardware: connectors, power, and the physical layer](modules/02-the-hardware.md) | Available |\n| I. The industry | 3 | [Standards bodies and regulation](modules/03-standards-and-regulation.md) | Available |\n| II. Protocol landscape | 4 | [The protocol map: from the EV to the grid](modules/04-the-protocol-map.md) | Available |\n| III. OCPP | 5 | [OCPP: history, governance, versions](modules/05-ocpp-overview.md) | Available |\n| III. OCPP | 6 | [OCPP-J on the wire: WebSocket, framing, correlation](modules/06-ocpp-j-on-the-wire.md) | Available |\n| III. OCPP | 7 | [The transaction lifecycle](modules/07-the-transaction-lifecycle.md) | Available |\n| III. OCPP | 8 | [CSMS-initiated operations](modules/08-csms-initiated-operations.md) | Available |\n| III. OCPP | 9 | [Smart charging](modules/09-smart-charging.md) | Available |\n| III. OCPP | 10 | [Security](modules/10-security.md) | Available |\n| III. OCPP | 11 | [OCPP 2.0.1 and beyond](modules/11-ocpp-201-and-beyond.md) | Available |\n| III. OCPP | 12 | [ISO 15118 and Plug and Charge](modules/12-iso-15118-and-plug-and-charge.md) | Available |\n| IV. The field | 13 | [Why chargers break: failure patterns](modules/13-why-chargers-break.md) | Available |\n| IV. The field | 14 | [Tracing and observability](modules/14-tracing-and-observability.md) | Available |\n| IV. The field | 15 | [The open-source ecosystem](modules/15-the-open-source-ecosystem.md) | Available |\n| V. Mastery | 16 | [Reading specifications and tracking the frontier](modules/16-reading-specifications.md) | Available |\n| V. Mastery | 17 | [Capstone: end to end with open tools](modules/17-capstone.md) | Available |\n| Appendix | | [Glossary](GLOSSARY.md) | Growing |\n\n## Read it offline\n\nPDF and EPUB editions are attached to each [release](https://github.com/sepehr-safari/ocpp-handbook/releases). A published edition stays as it was published; corrections land in the next one.\n\n## Scope and conventions\n\nOCPP 1.6J is the working baseline because it's what the field mostly runs. OCPP 2.0.1 gets a deep module of its own, and 2.1 is covered where it changes the picture. Terminology defaults, citation rules, and how to get the specifications are in [Module 0](modules/00-orientation.md).\n\n## Tools\n\nEverything hands-on uses open-source software, and no charger hardware is needed at any point. Some later modules use OCPP DebugKit, which I maintain; alternatives are named where they exist, and [awesome-ev-charging](https://github.com/juherr/awesome-ev-charging) is the wider directory.\n\n## License and feedback\n\nProse is licensed under [CC BY 4.0](https://github.com/sepehr-safari/ocpp-handbook/blob/main/LICENSE); code samples are licensed under [Apache 2.0](https://github.com/sepehr-safari/ocpp-handbook/blob/main/LICENSE-CODE). Corrections and error reports are welcome as issues.\n\nWritten by Sepehr Safari.",
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      "description": "This is the Project Proposal for the Final Year Project. The project will be based on creating Engaged Live Feed for safe and autonomous vehicle operability. Throughout the project we’ll be working on various models (listed: Face Detection, Driver’s Drowsiness detection via Facial Landmark Detection for blinking and Yawning, Eye on the road detection via Human Pose Estimation, Driver Recognition and Gaze Estimation). The project will operate through a camera fed which will be treated as input for various computation and inference to be performed and process out the final Live Stats Feed. It is core conceptualized for security and safety so the project will perform all the operation only for an authorized driver and deny all the control if an unauthorized driver sits on driver seat. The final project will be capable of operating on an edge device(like a camera connected to Intel Neural Compute Stick) where we’ll be just required to install our code on that device simple but our focus through out the project will be to present on local machine because of high cost of edge device that is needless to invest on for this project. The entire code base will be written on Python. The project will examine the driver condition and based on it will generate Live Feed of Information inferenced in the RealTime. The feed will be showcasing the blink count, blink time, driver’s Yawn count, Yawn time and will issue the Danger Alarm once the feed data exceeds the set threshold permissible.Further more detecting the angle of sight, it will generate alerts like “Keep your Eyes on the Road” or “STOP looking at your Phone or gazing at anywhere other than steering or road. Once it’ll be done the project will then shift to the Authentication Build Portion where we’ll be implementing Driver Recognition Model; the idea is to assign a directory with the image of permissible drivers for a particular registered vehicle by the owner. Afterwards, whenever a person will sit on driver seat infront of camera, he/she will first be recognized as authorized or unauthorized. Owner can add a new authorized driver by adding a new face to the authorized_face directory and then parsing it to .json via script to be written; the command will register and recognize the authorized drivers from next time and only after successful authorization will grant permission to the other features. The broader objective is to develop the project on an edge device in the future version so in the later stage of Project Timeline we’ll be integrating our project with Intel IoT DevCloud for benchmarking and Performance Analysis. We’ll run the inference process on different hardware like CPU, IGPU, Xeon Series, FPGA, VPU and Neural Compute Stick to deduce the perfect inference timing, FPS and Model accuracy to be deploy on suitable edge device in the future version. [Proposed] Both Self Driving Simulation or Driving via Gaze Estimation is presently a proposed but non-canon part of the project , we’ll be researching continuously on how to carry it out but for now these features totally rely on a high cost Simulator to channel the output data to attain Self Driving or Gaze Control. We’ll try to figure out how can we attain this with paying cost and if successfully found this feature will be made canon(i.e., an active part of Project Timeline). Winding Up the whole description details listed, for clarity the last part of the project will be creating Live Feed and Benchmarking to make the project deployment-ready for an edge device in the future. During the entire project our focus will be on creating Project Model Structure, we’ll be working, testing and presenting on our current workstation.",
      "readme": "# Autonomous-Driver-Instinct\nThis is the Project Proposal for the Final Year Project. The project will be based on creating Engaged Live Feed for safe and autonomous vehicle operability. Throughout the project we’ll be working on various models (listed: Face Detection, Driver’s Drowsiness detection via Facial Landmark Detection for blinking and Yawning, Eye on the road detection via Human Pose Estimation, Driver Recognition and Gaze Estimation). The project will operate through a camera fed which will be treated as input for various computation and inference to be performed and process out the final Live Stats Feed. It is core conceptualized for security and safety so the project will perform all the operation only for an authorized driver and deny all the control if an unauthorized driver sits on driver seat. The final project will be capable of operating on an edge device(like a camera connected to Intel Neural Compute Stick) where we’ll be just required to install our code on that device simple but our focus through out the project will be to present on local machine because of high cost of edge device that is needless to invest on for this project. The entire code base will be written on Python.  The project will examine the driver condition and based on it will generate Live Feed of Information inferenced in the RealTime. The feed will be showcasing the blink count, blink time, driver’s Yawn count, Yawn time and will issue the Danger Alarm once the feed data exceeds the set threshold permissible.Further more detecting the angle of sight, it will generate alerts like “Keep your Eyes on the Road” or “STOP looking at your Phone or gazing at anywhere other than steering or road. Once it’ll be done the project will then shift to the Authentication Build Portion where we’ll be implementing Driver Recognition Model; the idea is to assign a directory with the image of permissible drivers for a particular registered vehicle by the owner. Afterwards, whenever a person will sit on driver seat infront of camera, he/she will first be recognized as authorized or unauthorized. Owner can add a new authorized driver by adding a new face to the authorized_face directory and then parsing it to .json via script to be written; the command will register and recognize the authorized drivers from next time and only after successful authorization will grant permission to the other features.  The broader objective is to develop the project on an edge device in the future version so in the later stage of Project Timeline we’ll be integrating our project with Intel IoT DevCloud for benchmarking and Performance Analysis. We’ll run the inference process on different hardware like CPU, IGPU, Xeon Series, FPGA, VPU and Neural Compute Stick to deduce the perfect inference timing, FPS and Model accuracy to be deploy on suitable edge device in the future version.  [Proposed] Both Self Driving Simulation or Driving via Gaze Estimation is presently a proposed but non-canon part of the project , we’ll  be researching continuously on how to carry it out but for now these features totally rely on a high cost Simulator to channel the output data to attain Self Driving or Gaze Control. We’ll try to figure out how can we attain this with paying cost and if successfully found this feature will be made canon(i.e., an active part of Project Timeline).  Winding Up the whole description details listed, for clarity the last part of the project will be creating Live Feed and Benchmarking to make the project deployment-ready for an edge device in the future. During the entire project our focus will be on creating Project Model Structure, we’ll be working, testing and presenting on our current workstation.",
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      "description": "From an installed programming specialist's perspective, a vehicle has become a versatile box brimming with implanted frameworks. This article surveys all parts of installed programming in autos, including working frameworks, conventions, improvement apparatuses and universal gauges. Until around the turn of this century, there were not many electronic frameworks in vehicles. A couple of top of the line models had \"electronic start\", journey control and atmosphere control, yet that was very crude simple hardware that scarcely checks. That has all changed. Present day vehicles – even essential models – have many microchips and microcontrollers, which length the total range of intensity/intricacy from modest 4-piece controllers to beast 32-piece (possibly 64-piece) supercomputers on a chip. Each framework is electronic and an assortment of configuration approaches are pertinent. Pretty much every newsworthy improvement in vehicles today has its underlying foundations in gadgets. That hardware is for the most part inserted frameworks and that implies that product is a basic issue. The car business is socially disposed to the wide use of principles to a degree not seen in numerous different enterprises with which programming designers might be natural. This comes about in light of the fact that, aside from being great business practice to adopt benchmarks based strategies to plan whenever the situation allows, the automobile business has a mind boggling store network, so consistence with principles is simpler to oversee than individual, extremely point by point details. A portion of the norms that apply to electronic frameworks in vehicles (not a comprehensive list): CAN Bus – a way to dependably associate various frameworks together while limiting the measure of wiring. MISRA C (and C++) – a point by point set of rules in the utilization of this language in a security basic framework, similar to a vehicle. OSEK/VDX – a standard for ongoing working frameworks utilized in such frameworks in vehicles. Genivi – a standard for Linux based frameworks utilized for in-vehicle infotainment frameworks. It merits investigating every one of these from the point of view of the product designer. CAN Bus The wiring in vehicles was generally point to point. Along these lines, for instance, a link would run from the battery, to a switch and on to the headlights. This plan is easy to comprehend and keep up, however quickly turns out to be excessively unpredictable as the quantity of electronic frameworks increments. Eventually, a transport framework begins to bode well. A heap of wires is directed starting with one gadget then onto the next and every gadget is constrained by having a one of a kind transport address and possibly reacts when it sees this location on the transport. Various transport frameworks are utilized in car frameworks, yet CAN is the most outstanding. From a product engineer's perspective, utilizing CAN involves getting some valuation for the convention and acquiring drivers for the CAN interface chips that are being used. MISRA C Implanted engineers regularly lament the way that no programming language is perfect for their specific needs. As it were, this circumstance is obvious, in light of the fact that, albeit a considerable number of designers are chipping away at implanted applications, they are still just a significant little subset of the world's modifying network. All things considered, a few dialects have been created in light of implanted. Eminent models are PL/M, Forth and Ada, all of which have been generally utilized, however never all around acknowledged. The trade off, that has been embraced generally, is C … The C language is minimized, expressive and amazing. It gives a software engineer the way to compose proficient, discernible and viable code. These highlights represent its ubiquity. Shockingly, the language likewise empowers the unwary designer to compose perilous, shaky code that can cause significant issues at all phases of an improvement venture and into organization. For applications where wellbeing and additionally security are a significant need, these deficiencies of the language are a significant concern. It was against this foundation that, in the late 1990s, the Motor Industry Software Reliability Association (MISRA) presented a lot of rules for the utilization of C in vehicle frameworks, which got known as MISRA-C. From that point forward, the rules have been consistently refined, with another update being distributed in as of late. A comparable way to deal with the utilization of C++ has additionally been set up. Despite the fact that the rules were gone for designers of programming for use in autos, it was immediately understood that they are similarly relevant to numerous other application zones, where security is basic. OSEK/VDX OSEK/VDX is a standard for RTOSes bound for use in car control frameworks. It was planned starting from the earliest stage for this reason and fuses the key qualities required for a wellbeing basic framework. The key element is an absence of dynamic items; everything is made statically at fabricate time. The characteristic effortlessness of this usage doesn't compel the product fashioner fundamentally and disposes of a critical potential wellspring of framework disappointment. It is obvious that different businesses are checking out the standard. OSEK/VDX RTOSes are accessible from various merchants; it is additionally incorporated via AUTOSAR, which is a more extensive standard covering car frameworks. Genivi The greater part of the driver-confronting frameworks in a vehicle are not hard continuous and don't have cruel wellbeing prerequisites. So Linux is a decent decision, as it opens up the accessibility of a wide scope of off-the-rack programming segments. Genivi is a standard for the usage of Linux in this unique situation. Hypervisors and Automotive Systems As the multifaceted nature of car frameworks expands, two or three circumstances emerge where cautious plan is expected to maintain a strategic distance from issues. Initially, multicore frameworks are normal, with numerous famous framework on-chip gadgets being focused at this market. The various CPUs should be marshaled somehow or another and a compelling methodology is to utilize an appropriately arranged hypervisor. Another difficult setting is the point at which one working framework has been chosen for a particular reason and an alternate one is esteemed progressively appropriate for another employment and they have to run on a similar chip. A hypervisor can likewise be the arrangement in this circumstance, as it can oversee assets between the numerous OSes. Ends Programming is a predominant structure highlight in present day vehicles. Accordingly, an expanding number of inserted programming designers may end up working in this industry. A fundamental working information on the principles and ways to deal with car programming advancement is, thusly, helpful. Read more about <a href=\"https://menloparktech.com/\">Automotive Embedded Systems Services In India </a>",
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      "readme": "# canbus-sniffer\n\n[![CI](https://github.com/isecwire/canbus-sniffer/actions/workflows/ci.yml/badge.svg)](https://github.com/isecwire/canbus-sniffer/actions/workflows/ci.yml)\n[![License: MIT](https://img.shields.io/badge/License-MIT-yellow.svg)](LICENSE)\n[![C++](https://img.shields.io/badge/C%2B%2B-17-blue.svg)](https://isocpp.org/)\n[![Platform](https://img.shields.io/badge/platform-linux-lightgrey.svg)](https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/networking/can.html)\n\nCAN bus traffic capture, multi-protocol decoder, and anomaly detector for automotive and industrial security assessments.\n\n`canbus-sniffer` is a command-line tool built on Linux SocketCAN that captures raw CAN frames, decodes them using DBC signal databases or built-in protocol decoders (J1939, OBD-II, UDS), reassembles ISO-TP multi-frame messages, and applies real-time anomaly detection (including statistical timing analysis and entropy monitoring) to identify potential attacks on CAN networks. It is designed for use in penetration testing, security audits, and incident investigation on automotive ECU networks, industrial SCADA buses, and any system using CAN 2.0A/B.\n\n### CLI output\n\n![CLI screenshot](assets/screenshot.svg)\n\n### Terminal UI (`--tui`)\n\n![TUI screenshot](assets/screenshot-tui.svg)\n\n## Features\n\n### Capture and interface\n- **Live capture** on any SocketCAN interface (`can0`, `vcan0`, PEAK, Kvaser, etc.)\n- **Hardware-level filtering** by arbitration ID to reduce noise on busy buses\n- **Software filter expressions** with mini expression parser (`id=0x100-0x1FF,dlc>4`)\n- **Replay mode** -- analyze previously captured candump log files offline\n- **Duration-limited captures** for automated test scripts\n\n### Protocol decoding\n- **DBC signal decoding** -- parse standard DBC files and display physical signal values in real time\n- **J1939 protocol support** -- decode PGN, source/destination addresses, priority from 29-bit IDs; built-in PGN database with SPN decoding for EEC1, CCVS, ET1, LFE, DM1, TSC1, AMB, and more\n- **OBD-II PID decoder** -- decode standard OBD-II PIDs (engine RPM, speed, coolant temp, throttle, fuel level, etc.) from CAN frames with IDs 0x7DF/0x7E0-0x7E7\n- **UDS (Unified Diagnostic Services) decoder** -- parse diagnostic requests/responses including DiagnosticSessionControl, SecurityAccess, ReadDataByIdentifier (with DID name lookup), RoutineControl, negative responses with NRC decoding\n- **ISO-TP (ISO 15765-2) reassembly** -- handle multi-frame messages (Single Frame, First Frame, Consecutive Frame, Flow Control) with sequence validation and timeout handling\n\n### Anomaly detection\n- **Learning/detection two-phase model** with configurable learning duration\n- Unknown arbitration IDs not seen during baseline\n- Bus flood detection (configurable message-rate threshold per ID)\n- Replay attack detection (duplicate payload sequences)\n- DLC (frame length) anomalies\n- **Statistical timing anomaly detection** -- tracks per-ID inter-message timing distribution, flags messages outside 3 sigma\n- **Shannon entropy analysis** -- calculates payload entropy per arbitration ID, flags anomalous high/low entropy payloads\n- **Sequence number tracking** -- detects incrementing byte patterns and flags gaps\n- **Masquerade detection** -- timing-based detection of multiple sources claiming the same arbitration ID\n\n### Output and export\n- **Colored terminal output** with ANSI codes -- red for anomalies, green for decoded, yellow for warnings\n- **Live statistics mode** (`--stats`) -- refreshing display of frame counts per ID, message rates, bus load percentage, entropy\n- **PCAP export** (`--pcap FILE`) -- write captured frames in PCAP format (LINKTYPE_SOCKETCAN = 227) for Wireshark analysis\n- **Multiple export formats** (`--export json|csv|candump`) with optional output file\n- **Logging** in candump-compatible format and structured JSON\n\n### Terminal UI (optional)\n- **Interactive TUI** (`--tui`) built with FTXUI -- compiled optionally with `-DENABLE_TUI=ON`\n- Top panel: live frame feed (scrolling, color-coded by type)\n- Left sidebar: arbitration ID list with frame counts and rates\n- Right panel: selected ID detail with decoded signals, entropy, timing\n- Bottom bar: total frames, bus load %, anomaly count, uptime\n- Status line: filter expression, interface name, recording status\n- Keyboard: `q` quit, `p` pause/resume, `r` reset stats, Up/Down select ID\n\n## Requirements\n\n- Linux with SocketCAN support (kernel 2.6.25+)\n- C++17 compiler (GCC 8+, Clang 7+)\n- CMake 3.14+\n- `can-utils` (optional, for testing with `cansend`/`candump`/`cangen`)\n- FTXUI (optional, fetched automatically when `-DENABLE_TUI=ON`)\n\n## Building\n\n### Without TUI (default)\n\n```bash\nmkdir build && cd build\ncmake ..\nmake -j$(nproc)\n```\n\n### With TUI\n\n```bash\nmkdir build && cd build\ncmake .. -DENABLE_TUI=ON\nmake -j$(nproc)\n```\n\nFTXUI is downloaded automatically via CMake FetchContent. The tool compiles and works fully without FTXUI.\n\nThe binary is produced at `build/canbus-sniffer`.\n\n### Running tests\n\n```bash\ncd build\nctest --output-on-failure\n```\n\n## SocketCAN setup\n\n### Physical CAN adapter\n\nMost USB-CAN adapters (PEAK PCAN-USB, Kvaser Leaf, CANable) register as SocketCAN interfaces automatically:\n\n```bash\nsudo ip link set can0 up type can bitrate 500000\n```\n\n### Virtual CAN (vcan) for testing\n\nCreate a virtual CAN interface for local development without hardware:\n\n```bash\nsudo modprobe vcan\nsudo ip link add dev vcan0 type vcan\nsudo ip link set up vcan0\n```\n\n## Usage\n\n```\ncanbus-sniffer v2.1.0 [OPTIONS]\n\nInterface & capture:\n  -i, --interface <iface>      CAN interface (default: can0)\n  -D, --duration <seconds>     Capture duration (0 = infinite, default: 0)\n  -q, --quiet                  Suppress frame output to stdout\n  -C, --no-color               Disable ANSI colored output\n\nProtocol decoding:\n  -d, --dbc <file>             Load DBC file for signal decoding\n  -P, --protocol <mode>        Protocol mode: raw (default), j1939, obd2, uds\n\nFiltering:\n  -f, --filter <id[,id,...]>   Hardware filter by arbitration ID\n  -F, --filter-expr <expr>     Software filter expression\n                               e.g. \"id=0x100-0x1FF,dlc>4\"\n\nAnomaly detection:\n  -a, --detect-anomalies       Enable anomaly detection\n      --learn <seconds>        Learning phase duration (default: 30)\n      --flood-threshold <n>    Messages/sec per ID to flag as flood (default: 500)\n\nLogging & export:\n  -l, --log <file>             Log frames to file (candump format)\n  -j, --json <file>            Log frames to file (JSON format)\n      --pcap <file>            Write captured frames in PCAP format\n      --export <format>        Export format: json, csv, candump\n      --export-file <file>     Export output file (default: stdout)\n\nStatistics & replay:\n  -s, --stats                  Live statistics mode (refreshing display)\n      --replay <file>          Replay a candump log file through the analyzer\n\nTerminal UI:\n      --tui                    Launch interactive terminal UI\n\n  -h, --help                   Show this help\n```\n\n### Examples\n\nBasic capture on a virtual CAN interface:\n\n```bash\n./canbus-sniffer -i vcan0\n```\n\nJ1939 heavy-duty vehicle bus decoding:\n\n```bash\n./canbus-sniffer -i can0 -P j1939 -a --learn 10\n```\n\nOBD-II diagnostic capture with filtering:\n\n```bash\n./canbus-sniffer -i can0 -P obd2 -F \"id=0x7E0-0x7EF\"\n```\n\nUDS diagnostic session monitoring:\n\n```bash\n./canbus-sniffer -i can0 -P uds -j diag_session.json\n```\n\nCapture with DBC decoding and PCAP export:\n\n```bash\n./canbus-sniffer -i can0 -d vehicle.dbc --pcap capture.pcap -l capture.log\n```\n\nAnomaly detection with live statistics:\n\n```bash\n./canbus-sniffer -i vcan0 -a --learn 10 -s\n```\n\nReplay a captured log through the J1939 decoder:\n\n```bash\n./canbus-sniffer --replay capture.log -P j1939 --export csv --export-file out.csv\n```\n\nInteractive terminal UI with anomaly detection:\n\n```bash\n./canbus-sniffer -i vcan0 --tui -a --learn 5\n```\n\nTime-limited capture for CI pipelines:\n\n```bash\n./canbus-sniffer -i vcan0 -D 60 -l test_capture.log -q\n```\n\n### Filter expression syntax\n\n```\nfilter = condition { ',' condition }\ncondition = field op value\n          | 'id' '=' value '-' value     (range)\n\nfield = 'id' | 'dlc' | 'data[N]'\nop    = '=' | '!=' | '<' | '<=' | '>' | '>='\nvalue = hex (0x...) or decimal number\n```\n\nExamples:\n\n```\nid=0x100-0x1FF              # ID range filter\nid=0x7DF,dlc>4              # Combined conditions\nid=0x100,data[0]=0xFF       # Data byte filter\ndlc<=4,id!=0x000            # Multiple conditions\n```\n\n### Testing with vcan\n\nIn one terminal, start the sniffer in J1939 mode:\n\n```bash\n./canbus-sniffer -i vcan0 -P j1939 -a --learn 5 -s\n```\n\nIn another terminal, send J1939 traffic:\n\n```bash\n# EEC1 (engine speed)\ncansend vcan0 18F00400#00000080003E0000\n\n# CCVS (vehicle speed)\ncansend vcan0 18FEF100#0000500000000000\n```\n\nFor OBD-II testing:\n\n```bash\n# Request engine RPM\ncansend vcan0 7DF#0201010000000000\n\n# Simulate RPM response (1726 rpm)\ncansend vcan0 7E8#04410C1AF8000000\n```\n\n## Architecture\n\n```\nsrc/\n  main.cpp            Main entry point, CLI parsing, capture loop\n  can_interface.h/cpp RAII SocketCAN wrapper\n  frame_decoder.h/cpp DBC parser and signal extraction\n  anomaly_detector.h/cpp  Learning/detection anomaly engine\n  logger.h/cpp        Candump and JSON file logging\n  j1939.h/cpp         J1939 PGN decoder with SPN database\n  obd2.h/cpp          OBD-II Service 01 PID decoder\n  uds.h/cpp           UDS service/DID/NRC decoder\n  isotp.h/cpp         ISO-TP multi-frame reassembly engine\n  statistics.h/cpp    Statistical analysis, entropy, timing, bus load\n  pcap_writer.h/cpp   PCAP file writer (LINKTYPE_SOCKETCAN)\n  filter_expr.h/cpp   Filter expression parser and evaluator\n  tui.h               TUI controller interface (always available)\n  tui.cpp             FTXUI implementation (compiled with -DENABLE_TUI=ON)\n  tui_stub.cpp        Stub when FTXUI not available\n\ntests/\n  main_test.cpp       Hand-rolled test framework (no external deps)\n  test_*.cpp          Unit tests for each module\n```\n\n## DBC file format\n\nThe tool parses standard Vector DBC files. Minimal example:\n\n```dbc\nBO_ 291 EngineData: 8 ECU\n SG_ EngineSpeed : 24|16@1+ (0.25,0) [0|16383.75] \"rpm\" Vector__XXX\n SG_ EngineTemp : 40|8@1+ (1,-40) [-40|215] \"degC\" Vector__XXX\n\nBO_ 1024 BrakeStatus: 2 ABS\n SG_ BrakePedal : 0|8@1+ (0.392157,0) [0|100] \"%\" Vector__XXX\n```\n\n## Security context\n\nCAN bus networks in vehicles and industrial systems typically lack authentication and encryption. Common attack vectors include:\n\n- **Spoofing** -- injecting frames with forged arbitration IDs to impersonate ECUs\n- **Replay attacks** -- recording and retransmitting valid frame sequences\n- **Bus flooding** -- denial-of-service by saturating the bus at high priority\n- **Fuzzing** -- sending malformed frames to trigger undefined behavior in ECUs\n- **Masquerade attacks** -- timing-based impersonation where an attacker replaces a legitimate ECU\n- **Bus-off attacks** -- forcing error states to disconnect legitimate nodes\n- **Diagnostic abuse** -- unauthorized UDS sessions for firmware extraction or ECU reprogramming\n\n`canbus-sniffer` helps security assessors establish a traffic baseline and detect these patterns during live assessments. It can also be deployed as a lightweight IDS on embedded Linux gateways.\n\n## FAQ\n\n### What does \"decoding CAN frames\" mean?\n\nCAN bus is the internal communication network inside vehicles, robots, and industrial machines. Electronic Control Units (ECUs) send frames containing raw bytes — e.g., frame ID 0x0C0 with data `0B B8`. Without decoding, you just see hex. With decoding (using a DBC file or protocol knowledge), you see: \"Engine Speed: 3000 RPM\".\n\ncanbus-sniffer captures these raw frames and translates them into human-readable values using J1939 (trucks/heavy equipment), OBD-II (cars), or UDS (diagnostics) protocol decoders.\n\n### What is a replay attack on CAN bus?\n\nAn attacker records legitimate CAN frames (e.g., \"unlock doors\") and replays them later. The vehicle/machine executes the command because CAN has no authentication — it cannot tell a replayed frame from a real one. canbus-sniffer detects replay attacks by tracking frame sequences and flagging duplicate patterns.\n\n### How is this used in practice?\n\n```bash\n# Set up virtual CAN for testing\nsudo modprobe vcan && sudo ip link add dev vcan0 type vcan && sudo ip link set up vcan0\n\n# Capture and decode J1939 traffic\ncanbus-sniffer --interface can0 --protocol j1939 --detect-anomalies --log capture.json\n```\n\n## License\n\nMIT -- see [LICENSE](LICENSE).\n\nCopyright (c) 2026 isecwire GmbH",
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      "description": "Controller Area Network Automatic Defense Architecture (CANada) is a prototype architecture for improving the security of a Connected Vehicle (CV) using Hardware Security Modules (HSM) to monitor the traffic on a CAN bus",
      "readme": "# CANada\nController Area Network Automatic Defense Architecture (CANada)\n\nCANada is a prototype architecture for improving the security of a Connected Vehicle (CV) using Hardware Security Modules (HSM) to monitor the traffic on a CAN bus. Most code in this project is related to simulating a CAN bus and the behaviour of various Engine Control Units (ECU) and HSMs.\n\nFor the most consistent experience we recommend running the simulations in either **Linux** or **MacOS**.\n\n## Getting Started\n\n## Useful Tools\n\n- `conda` - https://conda.io/miniconda.html (useful in managing multiple python environments, be sure to install Python 3.7 version)\n\n### Conda\n\nIn this repository there is an `environment.yml` file that contains information about the dependencies required by this project. It also specifies `tso` as the name of the environment.\n\n#### Creating a New Environment in Conda From an `environment.yml` File\n\n```\nconda env create -f environment.yml\n```\n\n#### Switching Environments Created Using Conda\n\n**MacOS/Linux**\n```\nsource activate can\n```\n**Windows**\n```\nactivate can\n```\n\n## Running Trials to Gather Metrics\n\nIn order to run several iterations of the system to gather metrics about the behaviour, run the following command where `N_TRIALS` is the integer number of trials to run and `TRIAL_DURATION` is the duration of the trial in seconds:\n\n```\npython run_trials.py [N_TRIALS] [TRIAL_DURATION]\n```\n\n\n## Running the Simulation\n\nThe simulations will run until the process is killed by the user. To do so press `ctrl+c`.\n\nIn order to run each of the simulations, execute the following:\n\n#### Frequency Moderation Security Simulation\n```\npython freq_simulation.py\n```\n\n#### Authentication Security Simulation\n```\npython auth_simulation.py\n```\n\n#### Intrusion Detection Simulation\n```\npython intrusion_simulation.py\n```\n\n## Maintainers\n\n- [Elijah Ward](https://github.com/elijah-ward)\n- [Zain Hemani](https://github.com/zhemani)\n- [Veronica Witzig](https://github.com/VeronicaWitzig)\n- [Chuanheng He](https://github.com/henryhehe)\n- [Samir Kazi](https://github.com/SamirK15)",
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      "title": "CANSim Lab 🚗",
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      "description": "CAN simulator Lab with emulated CAN traffic and a live dashboard for training in CAN bus security",
      "readme": "# CANSim Lab 🚗\n\nA fully containerized CAN bus research environment with a realistic ECU simulator\nand a live visual vehicle dashboard.\n\n## Highlights\n\n- SocketCAN-based ECU simulator with multiple virtual ECUs and realistic signals\n- Live web dashboard with WebSocket updates and control actions\n- Ready-to-use CAN ID reference and control frame map\n- Dockerized services for quick spin-up and repeatable demos\n\n---\n\n## Architecture\n\n```\n┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐\n│  Linux HOST KERNEL                                                    │\n│  ┌──────────┐         vcan0 (virtual CAN interface)             │\n│  │ socketcan│◀══════════════════════════════════════════╗       │\n│  └──────────┘                                           ║       │\n└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────║───────┘\n                                                          ║\n     ┌────────────────────────────┐      ┌────────────────║───────────────────┐\n     │  ecu-simulator             │      │  car-dashboard  ║                   │\n     │  (Python / python-can)     │      │  (Flask + WS)   ║                   │\n     │                            │      │                 ║                   │\n     │  ECM  0x0C9  RPM+Speed     │      │  CAN RX loop ───╝                   │\n     │  ECM  0x0D0  Throttle      │      │  Decoder                           │\n     │  ECM  0x0D1  Temp          │══════│  WebSocket ──► Browser Dashboard   │\n     │  ABS  0x0B0  WheelSpeeds   │      │                                    │\n     │  BCM  0x3B0  Doors         │      │  REST API ◄── Dashboard actions    │\n     │  BCM  0x3B1  Lights        │      │  CAN TX  ──► vcan0 control frames  │\n     │  TCU  0x1A1  Gear          │      │                                    │\n     │  TPMS 0x2B0-3  Pressures   │      │  http://localhost:5000             │\n     │  ...                       │      │                                    │\n     │  Listens: 0x7F0-0x7F8      │      └────────────────────────────────────┘\n     └────────────────────────────┘\n```\n\n---\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Linux host with SocketCAN support\n- Docker Engine\n- `can-utils` installed on the host for monitoring traffic and playing\n\n> Note: The virtual CAN interface `vcan0` must be created on the host OS. The containers will connect to `vcan0` on the host. Use the [[setup-vcan.sh]] script for that purpose.\n\n## Quick Start\n\n### 1. Host setup (one-time)\n\n```bash\n# Install can-utils on host (for monitoring)\nsudo apt install can-utils\n\n# Create vcan0 interface\nsudo bash scripts/setup-vcan.sh\n```\n\n### 2. Build and run\n\n```bash\ndocker compose up --build\n```\n\nIf you are using the legacy Compose v1 binary, use `docker-compose` instead.\n\n### 3. Open dashboard\n\n```\nhttp://localhost:5000\n```\n\n### 4. Monitor raw traffic\n\n```bash\n# Live CAN dump on host\ncandump vcan0\n\n# Colorized by ID\ncandump -c vcan0\n\n# Log to file\ncandump -l vcan0\n```\n\n---\n\n## CAN ID Reference\n\n| CAN ID | ECU  | Signal             | Encoding                          |\n|--------|------|--------------------|-----------------------------------|\n| 0x0C9  | ECM  | RPM + Speed        | Bytes 0-1: RPM×4, Byte 2: km/h   |\n| 0x0D0  | ECM  | Throttle + Load    | Byte 0: thr×2.55, Byte 1: load   |\n| 0x0D1  | ECM  | Coolant + Intake   | Byte 0: temp+40, Byte 1: temp+40 |\n| 0x0B0  | ABS  | Wheel speeds       | 4× (hi,lo) pairs, ×100 km/h      |\n| 0x1A1  | TCU  | Gear + Mode        | Byte 0: gear#, Byte 1: P/R/N/D/S |\n| 0x3B0  | BCM  | Doors/Windows      | Byte 0: bitmask (see below)       |\n| 0x3B1  | BCM  | Lights             | Byte 0: bitmask (see below)       |\n| 0x3A1  | IC   | Fuel gauge         | Byte 0: fuel%×2.55               |\n| 0x0F0  | SRS  | Airbag+Seatbelts   | Byte 0: bits 0,1=belts, 7=OK     |\n| 0x2B0  | TPMS | Front-left tire    | Bytes 0-1: kPa×100, Byte 2: temp |\n| 0x2B1  | TPMS | Front-right tire   | same                              |\n| 0x2B2  | TPMS | Rear-left tire     | same                              |\n| 0x2B3  | TPMS | Rear-right tire    | same                              |\n| 0x3C0  | HVAC | Fan/Temp/AC        | Byte 0: fan, 1: temp, 2: AC flag |\n| 0x100  | GW   | Heartbeat          | Byte 0: 0xAA, Byte 1: counter    |\n\n### Door bitmask (0x3B0 Byte 0)\n```\nbit 0 = driver door open\nbit 1 = passenger door open\nbit 2 = rear-left door open\nbit 3 = rear-right door open\nbit 4 = hood open\nbit 5 = trunk open\n```\n\n### Light bitmask (0x3B1 Byte 0)\n```\nbit 0 = headlights\nbit 1 = taillights\nbit 2 = turn left\nbit 3 = turn right\nbit 4 = front fog\nbit 5 = rear fog\nbit 6 = hazard\n```\n\n---\n\n## Control Frames (Dashboard → ECU Simulator)\n\n| CAN ID | Function      | Data                              |\n|--------|---------------|-----------------------------------|\n| 0x7F0  | Engine START  | `01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00`         |\n| 0x7F1  | Engine STOP   | `00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00`         |\n| 0x7F2  | Throttle      | `[pct] 00 00 00 00 00 00 00`      |\n| 0x7F3  | Door          | `[idx] [0=close/1=open] 00...`    |\n| 0x7F4  | Lights        | `[flags] 00 00 00 00 00 00 00`    |\n| 0x7F5  | Gear mode     | `[0=P,1=R,2=N,3=D,4=S] 00...`    |\n| 0x7F6  | HVAC          | `[fan] [temp_raw] [ac] 00...`     |\n| 0x7F7  | Central lock  | `[0=unlock/1=lock] 00...`         |\n| 0x7F8  | Seatbelts     | `[driver] [pass] 00 00...`        |\n\n---\n\n## Fuzzing and Attack Examples\n\n### Replay attack — force headlights on\n```bash\nwhile true; do cansend vcan0 3B1#01000000000000; sleep 0.1; done\n```\n\n### Spoof speed to 200 km/h at idle\n```bash\n# RPM=800 but speed byte=200\ncansend vcan0 0C9#0C800C800000000\n```\n\n### Unlock doors via CAN injection\n```bash\ncansend vcan0 7F7#00000000000000\n```\n\n### Trigger fake engine start\n```bash\ncansend vcan0 7F0#01000000000000\n```\n\n### Log and replay a session\n```bash\n# Record\ncandump -l vcan0   # creates candump-TIMESTAMP.log\n\n# Replay\ncanplayer -I candump-*.log\n```\n\n### Use can-utils for fuzzing\n```bash\n# Random fuzzing on a specific ID\ncangen vcan0 -g 100 -I 3B0 -L 8\n```\n\n---\n\n## File Structure\n\n```\nCANSim-Lab/\n├── docker-compose.yml\n├── scripts/\n│   └── setup-vcan.sh          ← Run first on host\n├── ecu-simulator/\n│   ├── Dockerfile\n│   ├── ecu_definitions.py     ← CAN ID map + encode/decode functions\n│   └── ecu_simulator.py       ← Multi-ECU traffic generator + vehicle physics\n└── car-dashboard/\n    ├── Dockerfile\n    ├── app.py                 ← Flask/SocketIO backend + CAN decoder\n    └── templates/\n        └── dashboard.html     ← Visual car interface\n```\n\n---\n\n## Extending the Lab\n\n- **Add new ECUs**: Define IDs in `ecu_definitions.py`, add TX thread in `ecu_simulator.py`, decode in `app.py`, display in `dashboard.html`\n- **Add OBD-II support**: Respond to `0x7DF` PID requests in the simulator\n- **CAN-FD**: Change `python-can` bus type to `socketcan` with `fd=True`\n- **Hardware CAN**: Replace `vcan0` with `can0` (real USB-CAN adapter, e.g. Kvaser, PCAN, CANable)\n- **IDS testing**: Log baseline traffic, then inject anomalies and detect deviations\n\n## Safety and Ethics\n\nThis project is intended for research and education on isolated, virtual networks.\nDo not use these techniques on real vehicles or networks without explicit permission.",
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      "readme": "# Secure Connected Car System\n\n## Overview\n\nThe Secure Connected Car System is a containerized vehicle telemetry platform designed to simulate real-time automotive data collection, processing, and secure dashboard access.\n\nThe project explores how modern vehicles can be monitored using OBD-II data, a Raspberry Pi edge device, and a Docker-based microservice architecture. Security principles such as authentication, network isolation, and audit logging are integrated into the system design.\n\n---\n\n## System Architecture\n\n![System Architecture](docs/sysarchitecture.png)\n\n---\n\n## Network Security Model\n\n![Network Diagram](docs/networkdiagram.png)\n\n---\n\n## Security Controls\n\n![Security Model](docs/securitydiagram.png)\n\n---\n\n## How the System Works\n\n1. Vehicle telemetry is collected via OBD-II adapter (planned integration)\n2. Raspberry Pi acts as an edge processing device\n3. Docker containers handle system services:\n   - Telemetry ingestion\n   - Data processing\n   - Database storage\n   - Web dashboard interface\n4. Users access the dashboard via a browser\n5. Authentication controls system access\n6. Audit logging tracks system activity and access events\n\n---\n\n## Technologies\n\n- Docker & Docker Compose\n- Python (telemetry simulation in progress)\n- Raspberry Pi (planned)\n- OBD-II Interface (planned)\n- PostgreSQL (planned)\n- Git & GitHub\n\n---\n\n## Current Status\n\nThis project is in the early development phase.\n\nThe current focus is:\n- System architecture design\n- Security model design\n- Documentation\n- Preparing a containerized development environment\n\nA telemetry simulation module is currently being developed to generate mock vehicle data for system testing.\n\n---\n\n## Planned Features\n\n- Real-time vehicle telemetry simulation\n- Containerized microservices architecture\n- Authentication and access control system\n- Audit logging and monitoring\n- Secure service-to-service communication\n- Raspberry Pi deployment\n- OBD-II hardware integration",
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      "readme": "# Zero Trust Architecture for Intra-Vehicle Networks (ZTA-CAV)\n### *Closed-Loop Cyber-Physical Co-Simulation & 3D Digital Twin Platform*\n**Indian Institute of Technology Roorkee (IIT Roorkee)**\n\n---\n\n## 📌 Executive Summary\n\nModern Connected and Autonomous Vehicles (CAVs) rely heavily on Controller Area Network (CAN 2.0B / CAN-FD) architectures for in-vehicle communication. However, legacy CAN protocol implicitly trusts every frame on the bus, leaving safety-critical actuators (Electronic Power Steering, Electronic Stability Control, Adaptive Cruise Control) vulnerable to spoofing, runaway throttle, and stealthy overtime drift attacks.\n\nThis project implements a **NIST SP 800-207 compliant Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA)** specifically tailored for in-vehicle microcontroller constraints:\n1. **Continuous Monitoring (CM)**: 100Hz physical invariant checking across 24 sensor nodes.\n2. **Policy Decision Point (PDP)**: Cross-sensor kinematic consensus scoring (\\(< 0.2\\,\\text{ms}\\) policy evaluation latency).\n3. **Policy Enforcement Point (PEP)**: Fail-operational isolation that revokes malicious frames at the bus interface.\n4. **Virtual Sensor Synthesis**: Kinematic observers that reconstruct true ground states to ensure uninterrupted vehicle stability under active attack.\n\n---\n\n## 🏛️ Experimental Methodology: 3-Phase Multi-Stage Benchmark\n\nThe pipeline runs on a realistic physical digital twin of the **IIT Roorkee Campus Road Network** around the Thomason Building Roundabout, partitioned into three continuous 500-second operational sections (Total: **25 Minutes / 1,500s**):\n\n| Phase | Time Window | System Configuration | Behavioral Dynamics |\n| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |\n| **Part 1: Normal Baseline** | `00:00 – 08:20`<br>*(0 – 500s)* | Nominal Cruise<br>No Attacks / No ZTA | Clean CAN bus traffic, nominal speed (\\(50\\,\\text{km/h}\\)), trust score \\(1.00\\). |\n| **Part 2: Legacy System** | `08:20 – 16:40`<br>*(500 – 1000s)* | Unprotected Vehicle<br>(Implicit Trust) | Naive ECUs accept corrupted frames.<br>• **Progressive Steering Drift**: Vehicle slowly pulls off-lane onto the road shoulder.<br>• **Progressive Radar Drift**: Creeping distance shrinkage induces creeping deceleration.<br>• **Runaway Throttle & Phantom Braking**: Abrupt emergency stops and throttle surges. |\n| **Part 3: Fail-Operational ZTA** | `16:40 – 25:00`<br>*(1000 – 1500s)* | Active ZTA Controller<br>(PDP + PEP + Synthesizer) | Real-time policy evaluation drops malicious frames, marks faulty sensors as `REVOKED`, and engages `RESILIENT_SHIELD` maintaining rock-solid trajectory and speed. |\n\n---\n\n## 🚀 Quick Start Guide\n\n### Installation\n```bash\ngit clone https://github.com/curlydevguy/zta-cav.git\ncd zta-cav\n\n# (Optional) Install TraCI for full SUMO co-simulation:\npip install -r requirements.txt\n```\n\n### Option 1: Instant 3D Digital Twin (Zero Dependencies)\nYou can explore the pre-baked 25-minute benchmark immediately without running any simulation:\n- Simply open `3d_visualizer.html` in any modern web browser (Brave, Chrome, Firefox, Edge).\n- Or run via terminal:\n  ```bash\n  ./open.sh\n  # or\n  ./run_pipeline.sh --open-only\n  ```\n\n### Option 2: One-Click Execution in VS Code\n1. Open this repository in VS Code:\n   ```bash\n   code .\n   ```\n2. Press **`Ctrl` + `Shift` + `B`** (Default Build Task).\n   - This automatically runs the 25-minute co-simulation, exports 15,001 frames of 10Hz telemetry, and opens the 3D Digital Twin in your browser.\n\n### Option 3: Terminal Co-Simulation\n```bash\n# Run the complete 25-minute research pipeline\n./run_pipeline.sh\n\n# Fast 5-minute presentation demo\n./run_pipeline.sh 300.0\n```\n\n### Option 4: Real-Time SUMO-GUI Window\nTo watch the physical vehicle navigation in the SUMO micro-simulation GUI:\n```bash\npython3 run_iitr_experiment.py --gui --duration 1500.0 --delay 0.05\n```\n\n---\n\n## 📂 Project Directory Structure\n\n```\nzta-cav/\n├── run_pipeline.sh              # Master automated pipeline execution script\n├── open.sh                      # Quick launcher for 3D visualizer\n├── requirements.txt             # Python dependencies (TraCI)\n├── run_iitr_experiment.py       # Closed-loop SUMO + CAN + ZTA co-simulation runner\n├── 3d_visualizer.html           # Hardware-accelerated Three.js WebGL Digital Twin\n├── telemetry_data.js            # Synchronized 10Hz 3D telemetry dataset (15,001 frames)\n├── three.min.js                 # Bundled Three.js engine (offline reliability)\n├── OrbitControls.js             # Three.js 360-degree camera controller\n├── PIPELINE_ARCHITECTURE.md     # Detailed block diagrams & architectural specs\n├── README.md                    # Project documentation (this file)\n│\n├── controller/                  # Zero Trust Controller Subsystem\n│   ├── policy.py                # Manufacturer physical invariant specs & consensus groups\n│   ├── zta_controller.py        # PDP & PEP evaluation engine (CM -> PE -> PA -> PEP)\n│   ├── traci_actuator.py        # TraCI physical actuator bridge for SUMO vehicle control\n│   └── virtual_sensors.py       # Analytical kinematic observer & state synthesizer\n│\n├── sim/                         # Vehicle & CAN Bus Simulation\n│   ├── bus_sim.py               # 24-node CAN 2.0B bus model & progressive drift injectors\n│   └── co_sim.py                # TraCI bridge coupling SUMO vehicle physics to CAN nodes\n│\n├── tools/                       # Utilities & Export Pipelines\n│   └── export_3d_telemetry.py   # 10Hz resampler with Indian left-hand driving layout\n│\n├── docs/                        # Research Documentation & Visual Assets\n│   ├── Intra_Vehicle_ZTA_Research_Report.pdf  # Comprehensive academic research report\n│   ├── generate_report.py       # Report generation script\n│   └── figures/                 # Publication-quality benchmark render diagrams\n│\n├── logs/                        # Simulation Data Traces (gitignored .jsonl outputs)\n└── .vscode/                     # VS Code tasks & launch configurations (Ctrl+Shift+B)\n```\n\n---\n\n## 🔬 Mathematical Formulation of Progressive Drift\n\nStandard threshold detectors fail against progressive drift because early perturbation is within natural sensor noise floor (\\(\\Delta x < 2\\sigma\\)). This pipeline implements the quadratic progressive drift model:\n\n$$\\delta(t) = \\alpha \\cdot \\Delta t \\cdot \\left[1 + \\beta \\cdot \\Delta t\\right]$$\n\n- **Steering Drift**: \\(\\delta_{\\theta}(t) = 1.1 \\cdot \\Delta t \\cdot (1 + 0.025 \\Delta t)^\\circ\\)\n- **Velocity Drift**: \\(\\delta_{v}(t) = 0.12 \\cdot \\Delta t \\cdot (1 + 0.030 \\Delta t)\\,\\text{m/s}\\)\n- **Detection via Cross-Sensor Consensus**:\n  $$\\text{Residual} = \\left| v_{\\text{VEH}} - \\text{median}(v_{\\text{FL}}, v_{\\text{FR}}, v_{\\text{RL}}, v_{\\text{RR}}) \\right|$$\n  When \\(\\text{Residual} > 3.0\\,\\text{m/s}\\), the PDP transitions from `ALLOW` \\(\\to\\) `FLAG` \\(\\to\\) `REVOKE`, enforcing virtual kinematic synthesis without triggering false positives during baseline cruising.",
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      "readme": "# obd2_kit\n\nAn OBD-II / ELM327 protocol library for Dart and Flutter that works over any\nbyte transport: Bluetooth SPP, BLE UART, Wi-Fi TCP or USB serial. It handles\nthe adapter session, SAE J1979 services, multi-ECU and multi-frame replies,\nand live polling.\n\n[![pub package](https://img.shields.io/pub/v/obd2_kit.svg)](https://pub.dev/packages/obd2_kit)\n[![License: MIT](https://img.shields.io/badge/license-MIT-blue.svg)](LICENSE)\n\n## Features\n\n**ELM327 session (`Elm327`)**\n\n- Init sequence `ATZ`, `ATE0`, `ATL0`, `ATS0`, `ATH1`/`ATH0`, `ATAT1`,\n  `ATSP0`, then a `0100` request that runs the protocol search, and `ATDPN`\n  to read the protocol the adapter found.\n- Waits for the `>` prompt, also when a reply arrives in many small chunks.\n- Removes the command echo, `SEARCHING...` and `BUS INIT: ...OK`. Error replies\n  become an `ElmErrorException` with an `ElmError`: `NO DATA`,\n  `UNABLE TO CONNECT`, `CAN ERROR`, `BUS INIT: ...ERROR`, `?`, `STOPPED`,\n  `BUFFER FULL`, `BUS BUSY`, `BUS ERROR`, `FB ERROR`, `DATA ERROR`,\n  `RX ERROR`, `ERRxx` and `LV RESET`.\n- A FIFO command queue that sends one command at a time. Each command has a\n  timeout and can take an `ObdCancelToken`. A queued command that is\n  cancelled is never sent. A running command that times out or is cancelled\n  is interrupted: the session sends one byte, waits for the prompt, and then\n  goes on, so a late reply is never matched to the next command.\n- `readVersion()` (`ATI`), `readVoltage()` (`ATRV`) and `readProtocol()`\n  (`ATDPN`).\n\n**SAE J1979 services (`ObdClient`)**\n\n- Mode 01 current data: `readPid` returns the reply from the lowest ECU id,\n  and `readPidAll` returns the replies from every ECU. `supportedPids` walks\n  the bitmaps at 00, 20, 40, 60, 80, A0 and C0.\n- Mode 02 freeze frame, including PID 02 (the code that stored the frame).\n- Mode 03 stored codes, Mode 07 pending codes and Mode 0A permanent codes,\n  grouped by ECU.\n- Mode 04 clear codes. It runs only with `clearDtcs(confirm: true)`.\n- Mode 09: VIN, calibration IDs, ECU name and the supported PIDs. The VIN is\n  reassembled from CAN multi-frame replies and from legacy replies that come\n  in several numbered messages.\n\n**Frames (`parseObdLines`)**\n\n- Headers on: 11-bit CAN (`7E8 ...`), 29-bit CAN (`18 DA F1 10 ...`), and the\n  three header bytes plus checksum of ISO 9141-2, ISO 14230-4 KWP and SAE\n  J1850. Replies from several ECUs are separated by their id.\n- ISO 15765-2 reassembly of single, first and consecutive frames per ECU. It\n  checks sequence numbers, including the wrap from F to 0.\n- Headers off: the ELM's own multi-frame layout (a byte-count line, then\n  `0:`, `1:` and so on).\n- Replies are parsed with spaces on or off (`ATS0`).\n\n**PID table (`standardPids`, `decodePid`)**\n\n- Typed values: `NumericValue` (a value and an `ObdUnit`),\n  `MonitorStatusValue`, `ObdStandardValue`, `SupportedPidsValue`, `DtcValue`,\n  and `RawValue` for PIDs the package does not decode.\n- Decoded PIDs: 01 (MIL, code count, readiness monitors for spark and\n  compression ignition), 04, 05, 06-09, 0A, 0B, 0C, 0D, 0E, 0F, 10, 11, 1C,\n  1F, 21, 22, 23, 2C, 2D, 2E, 2F, 30, 31, 33, 3C-3F, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46,\n  47-4C, 4D, 4E, 52, 5A, 5B, 5C, 5D and 5E, plus the bitmap PIDs.\n\n**Trouble codes (`Dtc`)**\n\n- Decodes and parses P, C, B and U codes, such as `P0133`.\n- Sorts codes into generic, manufacturer or reserved using the SAE J2012\n  ranges, and gives the P0 subsystem group (misfire, fuel and air metering,\n  and so on).\n- Ships no description texts. You can supply your own with\n  `DtcDescriptionProvider` or `MapDtcDescriptions` (see Limitations).\n\n**Live monitoring (`ObdMonitor`)**\n\n- Polls a set of PIDs, each at its own interval, and emits a\n  `Stream<PidReading>`.\n- Only one request is in flight at a time. The most overdue PID goes next,\n  and ties go round-robin, so every PID gets its turn when the adapter is\n  slower than the rates you asked for. `minGap` adds a pause between\n  requests for slow clones.\n- Request errors are emitted as stream errors and polling continues. A\n  closed session ends the stream.\n\n**Transports**\n\n- `ObdTransport` is a small interface: `input`, `write` and `close`.\n  Implement it for Bluetooth, BLE or USB.\n- `package:obd2_kit/io.dart` has `TcpObdTransport` for Wi-Fi dongles. Most\n  listen on `192.168.0.10:35000`.\n\n## Install\n\n```yaml\ndependencies:\n  obd2_kit: ^0.1.0\n```\n\n## Usage\n\n```dart\nimport 'package:obd2_kit/io.dart';\nimport 'package:obd2_kit/obd2_kit.dart';\n\nFuture<void> main() async {\n  final transport = await TcpObdTransport.connect('192.168.0.10', 35000);\n  final elm = Elm327(transport);\n  final info = await elm.initialize(); // headers on, automatic protocol\n  print('${info.banner} on ${info.protocol?.description}');\n\n  final obd = ObdClient(elm);\n  final rpm = await obd.readPid(Pids.engineRpm);\n  print(rpm.value); // e.g. \"1726 rpm\"\n\n  final status = await obd.readPid(Pids.monitorStatus);\n  final s = (status.value as MonitorStatusValue).status;\n  print('MIL ${s.milOn ? 'on' : 'off'}, ${s.dtcCount} codes');\n\n  for (final dtc in (await obd.readStoredDtcs()).all) {\n    print('${dtc.code} ${dtc.category.name}');\n  }\n  print('VIN ${await obd.readVin()}');\n\n  final monitor = ObdMonitor(obd, const [\n    PidSchedule(Pids.engineRpm, Duration(milliseconds: 200)),\n    PidSchedule(Pids.coolantTemperature, Duration(seconds: 5)),\n  ]);\n  final sub = monitor.readings.listen((r) => print(r));\n  await Future<void>.delayed(const Duration(seconds: 10));\n  await sub.cancel();\n  await elm.close();\n}\n```\n\n### Your own transport\n\nWrap any byte stream and sink, for example a Bluetooth SPP connection:\n\n```dart\nimport 'dart:async';\n\nimport 'package:obd2_kit/obd2_kit.dart';\n\nclass StreamTransport implements ObdTransport {\n  StreamTransport(this.input, this._sink);\n\n  @override\n  final Stream<List<int>> input;\n  final StreamSink<List<int>> _sink;\n\n  @override\n  Future<void> write(List<int> bytes) async => _sink.add(bytes);\n\n  @override\n  Future<void> close() async => _sink.close();\n}\n```\n\n### Descriptions for trouble codes\n\n```dart\nfinal descriptions = MapDtcDescriptions({'P0133': 'your licensed text'});\nprint(Dtc.parse('P0133').describe(descriptions));\n```\n\n### Clearing codes\n\n```dart\nawait obd.clearDtcs(confirm: true); // throws ArgumentError without confirm\n```\n\nClearing turns off the MIL and resets every readiness monitor. The vehicle\ncan then fail an emissions inspection until it has been driven through its\nmonitors again.\n\n## Clone adapter quirks\n\nMost cheap adapters are ELM327 clones. The session handles these known\nbehaviours:\n\n| Quirk | Handling |\n| --- | --- |\n| Reports `v1.5`, a version Elm Electronics never released | `ElmInfo.isKnownCloneVersion` is `true`. A clone can also report a real version such as `v2.1`, so `false` proves nothing. |\n| Answers `?` to newer commands such as `ATAT1` or `ATS0` | These two are optional in `initialize()`. Without `ATS0`, replies keep their spaces, which the parser accepts. `readVoltage()` returns `null` when `ATRV` is answered with `?`. |\n| Sends NUL bytes or garbage, especially around `ATZ` | Control bytes and non-ASCII bytes are removed. Bytes that arrive while no command is running are thrown away. |\n| Keeps echoing after `ATE0` | The echo line is removed from every reply. |\n| Sends `\\r\\n` although `ATL0` is set | Both line endings are accepted. |\n| Drops the first command after the link comes up | `ATZ` is retried once after a timeout. |\n| Slow reset or slow protocol search | Separate `resetTimeout` and `searchTimeout`. |\n| `ATDPN` prefixed with `A` (found by automatic search) | The prefix is removed (`A6` means protocol 6). |\n| Misbehaves when commands follow each other with no pause | `ObdMonitor(minGap: ...)`. |\n\n## Limitations\n\n- **No DTC descriptions are included.** I found no list of generic P0xxx\n  description texts under a licence compatible with MIT. The SAE J2012 text\n  is copyrighted, and the lists online are either proprietary or share-alike.\n  The package decodes codes and sorts them by category, and you can plug in\n  descriptions you are licensed to use.\n- One PID per Mode 01 request. CAN allows up to six in one request, but that\n  is not used, for compatibility with legacy buses and clones.\n- Legacy protocols are supported only as far as the ELM327 shows them:\n  replies are parsed with their three header bytes, and the last byte is\n  treated as the checksum and removed without being checked. Multi-message\n  Mode 09 replies are joined by their sequence byte.\n- With headers off, replies from several ECUs cannot be told apart. The\n  default is headers on.\n- Mode 09 values are read from the lowest ECU id when several ECUs answer.\n- Only Mode 01, 02, 03, 04, 07, 09 and 0A are covered. Modes 05, 06 and 08,\n  and manufacturer-specific services, are not.\n- `ObdStandardValue.label` is filled in only for codes 1-13 of PID 1C. Other\n  codes keep their number and have no label.\n- Fuel system status (PID 03), oxygen sensor PIDs (14-1B) and other PIDs\n  that are not listed above return a `RawValue`.\n- The tests use a scripted fake adapter whose replies are modelled on the\n  datasheet examples. The package has not been tested against every clone.\n\n## Data sources and references\n\nThe package contains no copied dataset. The PID formulas, the PID 1C labels\nand the DTC code ranges were written from these public standards:\n\n\n- ELM327 datasheet, \"ELM327 OBD to RS232 Interpreter\", Elm Electronics.\n  Used for the AT commands, the prompt, the error messages, the CAN\n  multi-frame layout with headers off, and the VIN example\n  `1D4GP00R55B123456` in the tests.\n- SAE J1979 / ISO 15031-5, \"E/E Diagnostic Test Modes\". Used for the service\n  numbers, PID scaling and the Mode 09 layout.\n- SAE J2012 / ISO 15031-6, \"Diagnostic Trouble Code Definitions\". Used for\n  the two-byte code format and the code ranges.\n- ISO 15765-2 and ISO 15765-4, for CAN framing (single, first and\n  consecutive frames).\n- The Wikipedia article \"OBD-II PIDs\" (CC BY-SA) was used only to check the\n  formulas. No text or tables were copied from it. The formulas in\n  `lib/src/obd/pids.dart` were written for this package.\n\n## License\n\nMIT. See [LICENSE](LICENSE).\n\nMade by [Abdeldjalil Chougui](https://abdeldjalilchougui.biz/).",
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      "description": "⚡ xharvester is a cross-platform enhanced Python-based reconnaissance and exploitation suite designed for security assessments of radio frequency (RF), wireless (Bluetooth & WiFi), industrial control systems (SCADA), and automotive systems with automatic GitHub updates and full Android/Termux & IOS/a-Shell support!",
      "readme": "```\n _  _  _   _    __    ____  _  _  ____  ___  ____  ____  ____\n( \\/ )( )_( )  /__\\  (  _ \\( \\/ )( ___)/ __)(_  _)( ___)(  _ \\\n )  (  ) _ (  /(__)\\  )   / \\  /  )__) \\__ \\  )(   )__)  )   /\n(_/\\_)(_) (_)(__)(__)(_)\\_)  \\/  (____)(___/ (__) (____)(_)\\_)\n```\n⚡ **xharvester v1.0** is a cross-platform enhanced Python-based reconnaissance and exploitation suite designed for security assessments of radio frequency (RF), wireless (Bluetooth & WiFi), industrial control systems (SCADA), and automotive systems with **automatic GitHub updates** and **full Android/Termux & IOS/a-Shell support**!\n\n### Features\n- **🔄 Auto-Update System**: Option 99 now downloads latest version from GitHub automatically.\n- **Preventing Attacks**: **Generate Security Report** option gives a brief knowledage of **rules to protect individuals against the threat module(Wi-Fi MODULE)**.\n- **🤖 Android/Termux Support**: Full compatibility with Android devices using Termux.\n- **🍏 iOS/iPadOS Support**: Native support for a-Shell and iSH apps with Shortcuts integration.\n- **🌍 Cross-Platform Detection**: Automatic platform detection (Linux/Windows/macOS/iOS/Android).\n- **Platform-Specific Security**: Adaptive security based on platform capabilities.\n- **💾 Backup & Restore**: Automatic backup creation during updates with rollback support.\n- **🚗 Professional Automotive Module**: Based on \"The Car Hacker's Handbook\" by Craig Smith, Go search and learn more and unlock the hidden feautures of your vehicle.\n- **5 Complete Security Modules**: Bluetooth, WiFi, Automotive, RF, and SCADA/ICS testing.\n\n## Overview\nMoving beyond traditional web OSINT & exploitations, xharvester allows security researchers, red teams, and penetration testers to interact with the electromagnetic spectrum. It provides a structured approach to discovering, fingerprinting, exploiting and assessing the security posture of devices ranging from WiFi routers and Bluetooth peripherals to critical Industrial Control Systems (ICS), modern automotive vehicles and radio frequency(RF).\n\n## ✨ Core Framework Features\nUnified Command & Control: A single Python-based interface to orchestrate a wide array of specialized hardware and software tools.\n\nModular Architecture: Enables users to run xharvestor in full-spectrum with a key.\n\nAutomated Evidence Collection: Automatically saves all findings in structured, standardized formats:\n\nRaw Data Format: PCAP files, IQ recordings (*.bin), CAN bus logs, & etc.\n\nStructured Reports: Comprehensive reports in HTML, JSON, and Markdown for easy integration into deliverables.\n\nGeotagging Integration: Correlates all discovered devices and signals with GPS coordinates (when a receiver is available) for mapping and analysis.\n\nHardware Abstraction Layer: Simplifies the use of complex hardware (SDRs, CAN interfaces) by handling driver communication and configuration automatically.\n\n## 🛠️ Installation Guide\n### **Clone the Repository**\n```bash\ngit clone https://github.com/n3twork5/xharvester.git\ncd xharvester\n```\n### **Virtual Environment Setup**\n##### **🍎 MacOS/ 🐧 Linux**\n```\npython3 -m venv venv\nsource venv/bin/activate\n```\n#### **🪟 Windows**\n```\n###### Powershell ######\npython -m venv venv\n.\\venv\\Scripts\\Activate.ps1\n```\n```\n###### Command Prompt ######\npython -m venv venv\n.\\venv\\Scripts\\activate.bat\n```\n### Installing Requirements\n```\npip install -r requirements.txt\n```\n***External Requirements***\n#### 🍎 macOS\n```\nbrew install dbus bluez\npip install pyobjc==9.2\n```\n#### 🐧 Ubuntu/Debian\n```\nsudo apt update\nsudo apt install libdbus-1-dev libgirepository1.0-dev libcairo2-dev \\\nlibbluetooth-dev bluez\npip install PyBluez==0.30 dbus-python==1.3.2 pydbus==0.6.0 PyGObject==3.48.1 pycairo==1.26.0\nsudo apt update\nsudo apt install aircrack-ng hostapd dnsmasq iptables\n```\n\n#### **⚡ Usage Notes**\n#### Multi OS CLI Base Tool For Recon & Exploitation\n##### 🍎 MacOS/ 🐧 Linux\n```\nsudo ./xharvester\n```\n##### 🪟 Windows\n**Open Git or Command Prompt with Administration & Type:```python xharvester``` in the location of the tool.**\n\n##### 🤖 Android (Termux)\n###### Installation Of Termux From Play Store\n```\nInstall from Google Play Store (Recommended)\n\n    1. Open the Google Play Store app on your Android device.\n\n    2. Search for Termux.\n\n    3. Select the app published by Fredrik Fornwall.\n\n    4. Tap Install.\n\n    5. Once installed, open Termux from your app drawer\n```\n\n###### Upgrade, Installation & Execution\n```\n#In termux terminal:\n\npkg update && pkg upgrade -y\npkg install git python tsu aircrack-ng iptables hostapd dnsmasq -y\ngit clone https://github.com/n3twork5/xharvester.git\ncd xharvester\npython -m venv venv\nsource venv/bin/activate\npip install -r requirements.txt\ntsu ./xharvester\n```\n\n##### 🍎 iOS/iPadOS (a-Shell/iSH)\n###### Installation of a-Shell from App Store\n```\nInstall a-Shell or a-Shell mini from App Store:\n\n    1. Open the App Store on your iOS/iPadOS device\n\n    2. Search for \"a-Shell\" or \"a-Shell mini\"\n\n    3. Install the app by Nicolas Holzschuch\n\n    4. Alternative: Install iSH (Alpine Linux terminal)\n```\n\n###### Upgrade, Installation & Execution\n```\n# In a-Shell or iSH terminal:\n\npkg update && pkg upgrade -y\npkg install git python tsu aircrack-ng iptables hostapd dnsmasq -y\ngit clone https://github.com/n3twork5/xharvester.git\ncd xharvester\n\n# Run iOS-specific installer\n./install_ios.sh\n\n# Launch xharvester\nxharvester\n\n# Or use iOS-optimized version\nxharvester-ios\n```\n\n###### iOS Shortcuts Integration\n```\nFor home screen access:\n\n    1. Run the iOS installer: ./install_ios.sh\n\n    2. Install \"Shortcuts\" app (if not already installed)\n\n    3. Import the generated shortcut file\n\n    4. Add xharvester widget to home screen\n```\n\n### Simulation for Automobile Network testing\n#### Instrument Cluster Simulator for SocketCAN\n------------------------------------------\n\nBy: OpenGarages <agent.craig@gmail.com>\n\n```\ngit clone https://github.com/n3twork5/ICSim.git\ncd ICSim\n```\n\nCompiling\n---------\nYou will need:\n* SDL2\n* SDL2_Image\n* can-utils\n\nYou can get can-utils from github or on Ubuntu you may run the following\n\n```\n  sudo apt-get install libsdl2-dev libsdl2-image-dev can-utils\n```\n\nWith dependencies installed, you may use the [Meson build system](https://mesonbuild.com/) to build the project:\n\n```\n  meson setup builddir && cd builddir\n  meson compile\n```\n\nTesting on a virtual CAN interface\n----------------------------------\nYou can run the following commands to setup a virtual can interface\n\n```\n  sudo modprobe can\n  sudo modprobe vcan\n  sudo ip link add dev vcan0 type vcan\n  sudo ip link set up vcan0\n```\n\nIf you type ifconfig vcan0 you should see a vcan0 interface. A setup_vcan.sh file has also been provided with this\nrepo.\n\nUsage\n-----\nDefault operations:\n\nStart the Instrument Cluster (IC) simulator:\n\n```\n  ./icsim vcan0\n```\n\nThen startup the controls\n\n```\n  ./controls vcan0\n```\n\nThe hard coded defaults should be in sync and the controls should control the IC.  Ideally use a controller similar to\nan XBox controller to interact with the controls interface.  The controls app will generate corrosponding CAN packets\nbased on the buttons you press.  The IC Sim sniffs the CAN and looks for relevant CAN packets that would change the\ndisplay.\n\nTroubleshooting\n---------------\n* If you get an error about canplayer then you may not have can-utils properly installed and in your path.\n* If the controller does not seem to be responding make sure the controls window is selected and active\n\n## lib.o not linking\nIf lib.o doesn't link it's probably because it's the wrong arch for your platform.  To fix this you will\nwant to compile can-utils and copy the newly compiled lib.o to the icsim directory.  You can get can-utils\nfrom: https://github.com/linux-can/can-utils\n\n## read: Bad address\nWhen running `./icsim vcan0` you end up getting a `read: Bad Address` message,\nthis is typically a result of needing to recompile with updated SDL libraries.\nMake sure you have the recommended latest SDL2 libraries.  Some users have\nreported fixing this problem by creating symlinks to the SDL.h files manually\nor you could edit the Makefile and change the CFLAGS to point to wherever your\ndistro installs the SDL.h header, ie: /usr/include/x86_64-linux-gnu/SDL2\n\nThere was also a report that on Arch linux needed sdl2_gfx library.\n\nCAN Hacking Training Usage\n--------------------------\nTo *safely* train on CAN hacking you can play back a sample recording included in this repo of generic CAN traffic.  This will\ncreate something similar to normal CAN \"noise\".  Then start the IC Sim with the -r (randomize) switch.\n\n```\n  ./icsim -r vcan0\n  Using CAN interface vcan0\n  Seed: 1401717026\n```\n\nNow copy the seed number and paste it as the -s (seed) option for the controls.\n\n```\n  ./controls -s 1401717026 vcan0\n```\n\nThis will randomize what CAN packets the IC needs and by passing the seed to the controls they will sync.  Randomizing\nchanges the arbitration IDs as well as the byte position of the packets used.  This will give you experience in hunting down\ndifferent types of CAN packets on the CAN Bus.\n\nFor the most realistic training you can change the difficulty levels.  Set the difficulty to 2 with the controls:\n\n```\n  ./controls -s 1401717026 -l 2 vcan0\n```\n\nThis will add additional randomization to the target packets, simulating other data stored in the same arbitration id.\n\n\n\n\n### 💝 Support Xharvester's Growth\n**🚀 If xharvester helps you, consider [sponsoring](https://n3twork5.github.io/BoostBond/) -- 100% of support goes to keeping it free forever.**\n\n### Feedback & Suggestions\n**Any Feedback and Suggestions? Consider contacting: [Me](mailto:networkmandaean@gmail.com)  --  Make sure you get the tools in need for yourself as well, because most complex attacks will require specific hardware tool to support it functionalities.**\n\n#### **📌 Disclaimer**\nThis tool is intended for authorized security testing and educational purposes only. Interfering with wireless signals, industrial processes, or vehicle systems without explicit permission is illegal, extremely dangerous, and can lead to physical harm, and severe legal consequences. Always operate within a controlled and legal environment.\n#### 💡 One Of My Best Taglines\n**%% The  Quieter  You  Become,  The  More  You  Are  Able  To  Hear %%**",
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      "readme": "# canDrive\nTools for hacking your car. Please concider checking out the tutorials made about this project:\nhttps://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLNiFaO8hU1z0o_6DSxk-jcVAM3UCUR-pY\n\nI've created this google sheet, so everybody can freely add their decoded IDs and packets, so it's easier for the community to collaborate:\nhttps://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1eBKiTwEE6aPnfw2EfSHItLeMz00fJq0Y0L99Ym7fKwU/edit?usp=sharing\n\n# Content\n- 01_canSniffer_Arduino: This code runs on your arduino sniffer device and creates an interface between the car and the GUI.\n- 02_canSniffer_GUI: Powerful and easy-to-use graphical sniffer application used for reverse engineering CAN packets. Written in Python.\n- 03_canSniffer_HW: Hardware projects for the custom OBD2 module. Made in Altium Designer.\n- 04_canSniffer_FW: Embedded code running on the custom OBD2 module.\n# Description\n### 01_canSniffer_Arduino\nThis code creates the interface between the car and the canSniffer_GUI application. If the RANDOM_CAN define is set to 1, this code is generating random CAN packets in order to test the higher level code. The received packets will be echoed back. If the  RANDOM_CAN define is set to 0, the CAN_SPEED define  has to match the speed of the desired CAN channel in order to receive and transfer from and to the CAN bus.\n Required arduino packages:\n- CAN by Sandeep Mistry (https:github.com/sandeepmistry/arduino-CAN)\n\nRequired modifications:\n- MCP2515.h: 16e6 clock frequency reduced to 8e6 (depending on MCP2515 clock)\n- MCP2515.cpp: extend CNF_MAPPER with your desired CAN speeds\n\n### 02_canSniffer_GUI\nPython 3 is required for this project, 3.8 is preferred. The GUI is based on pyQt. This project contains my decoded packets in save/decodedPackets.csv. The required python packages can be installed with:\n```sh\n$ pip install -r requirements.txt\n```\n\n### 03_canSniffer_HW\nAltium Designer projects for the hardware projects. Currently version 2. The module consists of 2 PCBs (board1 & board2). The libraries of the used components can be found under the common folder. Schematics can also be found as PDF files.\n\n### 04_canSniffer_FW\n(BETA) Only board1 beta firmware is uploaded yet. It is a STM32CubeIDE project for the STM32F413. To be uploaded: nRF project for board2.\n\n# To be uploaded\n- Final version of the firmware.\n- (at some point) Source code for the mobile application that is compatible with the v2 hardware.\n- (potentially) New versions of the hardware module.",
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      "readme": "<a name=\"top\"></a>\n<div align=\"center\">\n\n<img src=\"https://capsule-render.vercel.app/api?type=rect&color=0:6b46c1,100:2b6cb0&height=120&section=header&text=CANZAP&fontSize=48&fontColor=ffffff&fontAlignY=58\" width=\"100%\" alt=\"CANZAP\"/>\n\n# CANZAP\n\n### Replay, fuzz, and assert on CAN bus traffic from a .pcap or SocketCAN interface with a tiny YAML DSL.\n\n<img src=\"https://readme-typing-svg.demolab.com?font=Fira+Code&size=18&duration=3500&pause=1000&color=6B46C1&center=true&vCenter=true&width=720&lines=Replay+fuzz+and+assert+on+CAN+bus+traffic+from+a+pcap+or+Soc;Self-hostable+%C2%B7+MCP-native+%C2%B7+CI-ready+%C2%B7+polyglot\" width=\"720\"/>\n\n[![PyPI](https://img.shields.io/pypi/v/cognis-canzap.svg?color=6b46c1)](https://pypi.org/project/cognis-canzap/) [![CI](https://github.com/cognis-digital/canzap/actions/workflows/ci.yml/badge.svg)](https://github.com/cognis-digital/canzap/actions) [![License: COCL 1.0](https://img.shields.io/badge/License-COCL%201.0-2b6cb0.svg)](LICENSE) [![Suite](https://img.shields.io/badge/Cognis-Neural%20Suite-6b46c1.svg)](https://github.com/cognis-digital)\n\n*IoT / OT / Embedded — firmware, buses, and device security.*\n\n</div>\n\n```bash\npip install cognis-canzap\ncanzap scan .            # → prioritized findings in seconds\n```\n\n\n<!-- cognis:example:start -->\n\n## Watch the walkthrough\n\nA full narrated tour — setup, the tool in action, and every demo scenario:\n\n[![Watch the canzap walkthrough](media/walkthrough-thumb.png)](https://github.com/cognis-digital/canzap/releases/download/walkthrough-v1/walkthrough.mp4)\n\n▶ **[Watch the walkthrough (MP4)](https://github.com/cognis-digital/canzap/releases/download/walkthrough-v1/walkthrough.mp4)**\n\n## 🔎 Example output\n\nReal, reproducible output from the tool — runs offline:\n\n```console\n$ canzap-emit --version\ncanzap 0.1.0\n```\n\n```console\n$ canzap-emit --help\nusage: canzap [-h] [--version] [--format {table,json}] {check,dump} ...\n\nReplay and assert on CAN bus traffic from a candump log.\n\npositional arguments:\n  {check,dump}\n    check               assert a candump log against a scenario\n    dump                parse/replay a candump log into frames\n\noptions:\n  -h, --help            show this help message and exit\n  --version             show program's version number and exit\n  --format {table,json}\n                        output format (default: table)\n\nexamples:\n  canzap check --log capture.log --scenario startup.canzap\n  canzap check --log capture.log --scenario s.canzap --format json\n  canzap dump --log capture.log --format json\n```\n\n> Blocks above are real `canzap` output — reproduce them from a clone.\n\n<!-- cognis:example:end -->\n\n## Usage — step by step\n\n1. **Install** the CLI (console script `canzap`):\n   ```bash\n   pip install cognis-canzap\n   ```\n2. **Replay a candump log into frames** to confirm parsing first:\n   ```bash\n   canzap dump --log capture.log\n   ```\n3. **Assert the log against a scenario** (`.canzap` file) — `check` exits non-zero on any failed assertion:\n   ```bash\n   canzap check --log capture.log --scenario startup.canzap\n   ```\n4. **Read the result** as JSON for pipelines (`--format` is a global flag; `-` reads stdin):\n   ```bash\n   canzap dump --log capture.log --format json\n   cat capture.log | canzap check --log - --scenario startup.canzap --format json\n   ```\n5. **Automate in CI** — gate a build on bus assertions (non-zero exit fails the job):\n   ```yaml\n   - run: pip install cognis-canzap\n   - run: canzap check --log capture.log --scenario startup.canzap --format json\n   ```\n\n## Contents\n\n- [Why canzap?](#why) · [Features](#features) · [Quick start](#quick-start) · [Example](#example) · [Architecture](#architecture) · [Demos](#demos) · [AI stack](#ai-stack) · [How it compares](#how-it-compares) · [Integrations](#integrations) · [Install anywhere](#install-anywhere) · [Related](#related) · [Contributing](#contributing)\n\n<a name=\"why\"></a>\n## Why canzap?\n\nAutomotive hacking made CI-friendly — write 'expect no arbitration-ID 0x7DF after lock' as a test, run it against a recorded drive log. Car-hacking demos are reliably viral on HN/Reddit.\n\n`canzap` is single-purpose, scriptable, and self-hostable: point it at a target, get prioritized results in the format your workflow already speaks (table · JSON · SARIF), gate CI on it, and let agents drive it over MCP.\n\n<div align=\"right\"><a href=\"#top\">↑ back to top</a></div>\n\n<a name=\"features\"></a>\n## Features\n\n- ✅ Parse Candump\n- ✅ Parse Candump Text\n- ✅ Load Scenario Text\n- ✅ Load Scenario\n- ✅ Run Scenario\n- ✅ Result To Json\n- ✅ Runs on Linux/macOS/Windows · Docker · devcontainer\n- ✅ Ports in Python, JavaScript, Go, and Rust (`ports/`)\n\n<div align=\"right\"><a href=\"#top\">↑ back to top</a></div>\n\n<a name=\"quick-start\"></a>\n## Quick start\n\n```bash\npip install cognis-canzap\ncanzap --version\ncanzap scan .                       # scan current project\ncanzap scan . --format json         # machine-readable\ncanzap scan . --fail-on high        # CI gate (non-zero exit)\n```\n\n<div align=\"right\"><a href=\"#top\">↑ back to top</a></div>\n\n<a name=\"example\"></a>\n## Example\n\n```text\n$ canzap scan .\n  [HIGH    ] CAN-001  example finding             (./src/app.py)\n  [MEDIUM  ] CAN-002  another signal              (./config.yaml)\n\n  2 findings · risk score 5 · 38ms\n```\n\n<div align=\"right\"><a href=\"#top\">↑ back to top</a></div>\n\n<a name=\"architecture\"></a>\n## Architecture\n\n```mermaid\nflowchart LR\n  log[candump log] --> parse[parse frames]\n  scn[scenario .canzap] --> load[load assertions]\n  parse --> run[run_scenario]\n  load --> run\n  run --> res[pass / fail<br/>per assertion]\n  res --> out[table · JSON]\n  res --> code[exit 0 / 1<br/>CI gate]\n```\n\nSee [`docs/ARCHITECTURE.md`](docs/ARCHITECTURE.md) for the full pipeline.\n\n<div align=\"right\"><a href=\"#top\">↑ back to top</a></div>\n\n<a name=\"demos\"></a>\n## Demos\n\nFive runnable scenarios in [`demos/`](demos/), each for a different audience.\nEvery scenario replays a bundled candump capture fixture through the real\n`canzap.core` API — fully offline, no CAN hardware — prints narrated output, and\nexits 0, so they double as smoke tests.\n\n```bash\nPYTHONUTF8=1 python demos/run_all.py        # all five, end to end\nPYTHONUTF8=1 python demos/03_red_team.py     # or just one\n```\n\n| # | Scenario | Audience | What it shows |\n|---|----------|----------|---------------|\n| 01 | `01_security_researcher.py` | Automotive security researchers | Enumerate the bus on a drive cycle, then lock in its invariants as a replayable baseline. |\n| 02 | `02_ecu_engineer.py` | Embedded / ECU engineers | A periodic-frame timing contract (`max_period_ms`): PASS healthy, FAIL when a heartbeat is dropped. |\n| 03 | `03_red_team.py` | Red teams | Prove a replay/fuzz landed (flood + injected UDS), then invert the rules into the blue team's gate. |\n| 04 | `04_ir_forensics.py` | IR / forensics | Reconstruct an incident — replayed door-unlock burst + spoofed frame — and emit the verdict as JSON. |\n| 05 | `05_bus_report.py` | Architects & reviewers | A one-screen bus map across all captures plus a green/red scenario roll-up. |\n\nFull write-up and capture details in [`docs/DEMOS.md`](docs/DEMOS.md).\n\n<div align=\"right\"><a href=\"#top\">↑ back to top</a></div>\n\n<a name=\"ai-stack\"></a>\n## Use it from any AI stack\n\n`canzap` is interoperable with every popular way of using AI:\n\n- **MCP server** — `canzap mcp` (Claude Desktop, Cursor, Cognis.Studio, [uncensored-fleet](https://github.com/cognis-digital/uncensored-fleet))\n- **OpenAI-compatible / JSON** — pipe `canzap scan . --format json` into any agent or LLM\n- **LangChain · CrewAI · AutoGen · LlamaIndex** — wrap the CLI/JSON as a tool in one line\n- **CI / scripts** — exit codes + SARIF for non-AI pipelines\n\n<div align=\"right\"><a href=\"#top\">↑ back to top</a></div>\n\n<a name=\"how-it-compares\"></a>\n## How it compares\n\n| | **Cognis canzap** | caringcaribou + can-utils |\n|---|:---:|:---:|\n| Self-hostable, no account | ✅ | varies |\n| Single command, zero config | ✅ | ⚠️ |\n| JSON + SARIF for CI | ✅ | varies |\n| MCP-native (AI agents) | ✅ | ❌ |\n| Polyglot ports (JS/Go/Rust) | ✅ | ❌ |\n| Open license | ✅ COCL | varies |\n\n*Built in the spirit of **caringcaribou + can-utils**, re-framed the Cognis way. Missing a credit? Open a PR.*\n\n<div align=\"right\"><a href=\"#top\">↑ back to top</a></div>\n\n<a name=\"integrations\"></a>\n## Integrations\n\nPipes into your stack: **SARIF** for code-scanning, **JSON** for anything, an **MCP server** (`canzap mcp`) for AI agents, and a webhook forwarder for SIEM/Slack/Jira. See [`docs/INTEGRATIONS.md`](docs/INTEGRATIONS.md).\n\n<div align=\"right\"><a href=\"#top\">↑ back to top</a></div>\n\n<a name=\"install-anywhere\"></a>\n## Install — every way, every platform\n\n```bash\npip install \"git+https://github.com/cognis-digital/canzap.git\"    # pip (works today)\npipx install \"git+https://github.com/cognis-digital/canzap.git\"   # isolated CLI\nuv tool install \"git+https://github.com/cognis-digital/canzap.git\" # uv\npip install cognis-canzap                                          # PyPI (when published)\ndocker run --rm ghcr.io/cognis-digital/canzap:latest --help        # Docker\nbrew install cognis-digital/tap/canzap                             # Homebrew tap\ncurl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/cognis-digital/canzap/main/install.sh | sh\n```\n\n| Linux | macOS | Windows | Docker | Cloud |\n|---|---|---|---|---|\n| `scripts/setup-linux.sh` | `scripts/setup-macos.sh` | `scripts/setup-windows.ps1` | `docker run ghcr.io/cognis-digital/canzap` | [DEPLOY.md](docs/DEPLOY.md) (AWS/Azure/GCP/k8s) |\n\n<div align=\"right\"><a href=\"#top\">↑ back to top</a></div>\n\n<a name=\"related\"></a>\n## Related Cognis tools\n\n- [`fwxray`](https://github.com/cognis-digital/fwxray) — Diff two firmware images and surface exactly what changed: new binaries, flipped config flags, added certs, and shifted entropy regions.\n- [`sbomb`](https://github.com/cognis-digital/sbomb) — Generate a CycloneDX SBOM directly from an unpacked firmware root filesystem and flag components with known CVEs and EOL kernels.\n- [`mqttspy`](https://github.com/cognis-digital/mqttspy) — Passively map an MQTT broker: enumerate topics, detect unauthenticated writes, spot PII/secrets in payloads, and emit a risk report.\n- [`uefiscan`](https://github.com/cognis-digital/uefiscan) — Audit UEFI firmware dumps for missing Secure Boot keys, unsigned modules, S3 boot-script vulns, and known SMM threats.\n- [`modpot`](https://github.com/cognis-digital/modpot) — Spin up a high-interaction Modbus/DNP3 ICS honeypot that logs attacker register reads/writes as structured JSON.\n- [`keyhunt`](https://github.com/cognis-digital/keyhunt) — Scan firmware blobs and filesystem dumps for hardcoded private keys, API tokens, default creds, and weak RSA/ECC material.\n\n**Explore the suite →** [🗂️ all 170+ tools](https://github.com/cognis-digital/cognis-neural-suite) · [⭐ awesome-cognis](https://github.com/cognis-digital/awesome-cognis) · [🔗 cognis-sources](https://github.com/cognis-digital/cognis-sources) · [🤖 uncensored-fleet](https://github.com/cognis-digital/uncensored-fleet) · [🧠 engram](https://github.com/cognis-digital/engram)\n\n<div align=\"right\"><a href=\"#top\">↑ back to top</a></div>\n\n<a name=\"contributing\"></a>\n## Contributing\n\nPRs, new rules, and demo scenarios are welcome under the collaboration-pull model — see [CONTRIBUTING.md](CONTRIBUTING.md) and [SECURITY.md](SECURITY.md).\n\n> ### ⭐ If `canzap` saved you time, **star it** — it genuinely helps others find it.\n\n## Interoperability\n\n`{}` composes with the 300+ tool Cognis suite — JSON in/out and a shared\nOpenAI-compatible `/v1` backbone. See **[INTEROP.md](INTEROP.md)** for the\nsuite map, composition patterns, and reference stacks.\n\n## License\n\nSource-available under the **Cognis Open Collaboration License (COCL) v1.0** — free for personal, internal-evaluation, research, and educational use; **commercial / production use requires a license** (licensing@cognis.digital). See [LICENSE](LICENSE).\n\n---\n\n<div align=\"center\"><sub><b><a href=\"https://cognis.digital\">Cognis Digital</a></b> · one of 170+ tools in the <a href=\"https://github.com/cognis-digital/cognis-neural-suite\">Cognis Neural Suite</a> · <i>Making Tomorrow Better Today</i></sub></div>",
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      "name": "Ford-Fiesta-MK5-MS-CAN-bus",
      "owner": "roncapat",
      "url": "https://github.com/roncapat/Ford-Fiesta-MK5-MS-CAN-bus",
      "description": "Reverse engineering of CANbus messages of Fiesta MK5 (restyling) dashboard/radio",
      "readme": "# Reverse engineering CANbus messages of Fiesta MK5 dashboard/radio subsystem\nThis documentation applies to Ford Fiesta MK5 >2006 (MK5 restyling), with 2-DIN, 6000CD radio.\n\nThe radio sends messages to the LCD screen in the dashboard, like FM station names, CD track IDs, volume changes.\n\nThe idea was to tap into the text-to-LCD mechanism, but I ended up reversing some other interesting CANbus messages.\n\nTapping in the infotaiment CANbus is quite easy: just connect a CANbus interface over CANH and CANL lines that come into the QuadLock conector of the radio, no 120 Ohm terminal block resistor needed.\n\n![QuadLock connector and CANbus pins](quadlock.png)\n\nPersonally, I used a [SeedStudio CANbus Shield](https://wiki.seeedstudio.com/CAN-BUS_Shield_V2.0/) stacked onto an Arduino Uno R3.\n\n## Results\nBus speed is 125 KBPS.\n\nThe IDs of either partially or fully decoded messages are:\n- 0x080\n- 0x1e9\n- 0x201\n- 0x265\n- 0x285\n- 0x286\n- 0x2d5\n- 0x2d8\n- 0x2da\n- 0x2db\n- 0x360\n- 0x420\n- 0x428\n- 0x433\n- 0x460\n- 0x4c0\n- 0x4c8\n- 0x4f3\n\nA Kayak [.kcd file](Fiesta.kcd) definition file is included (incomplete).\n\n### Text to LCD screen\nThe radio sends text to the dashboard LCD using either a short message format or an extended message format.\n\nThe short format can only be seen whenever the radio switches to AUX mode.\n\n<table class=\"tg\">\n<thead>\n  <tr>\n    <th class=\"tg-c3ow\">ID</th>\n    <th class=\"tg-c3ow\">1</th>\n    <th class=\"tg-c3ow\">2</th>\n    <th class=\"tg-c3ow\">3</th>\n    <th class=\"tg-c3ow\">4</th>\n    <th class=\"tg-c3ow\">5</th>\n    <th class=\"tg-c3ow\">6</th>\n    <th class=\"tg-c3ow\">7</th>\n    <th class=\"tg-c3ow\">8</th>\n  </tr>\n</thead>\n<tbody>\n  <tr>\n    <td class=\"tg-c3ow\">0x4C0</td>\n    <td class=\"tg-c3ow\">0x7</td>\n    <td class=\"tg-c3ow\">0x34</td>\n    <td class=\"tg-c3ow\" colspan=\"6\">ASCII text</td>\n  </tr>\n</tbody>\n</table>\n\nThe extended format is composed by one header message containing the length of the text, and subsequent messages that provide additional text portions.\n\n<table class=\"tg\">\n<thead>\n  <tr>\n    <th class=\"tg-c3ow\">ID</th>\n    <th class=\"tg-c3ow\">1</th>\n    <th class=\"tg-c3ow\">2</th>\n    <th class=\"tg-c3ow\">3</th>\n    <th class=\"tg-c3ow\">4</th>\n    <th class=\"tg-c3ow\">5</th>\n    <th class=\"tg-c3ow\">6</th>\n    <th class=\"tg-c3ow\">7</th>\n    <th class=\"tg-c3ow\">8</th>\n  </tr>\n</thead>\n<tbody>\n  <tr>\n    <td class=\"tg-c3ow\">0x4C0</td>\n    <td class=\"tg-c3ow\">0x10</td>\n    <td class=\"tg-c3ow\">Text length + 2</td>\n    <td class=\"tg-c3ow\">0x34</td>\n    <td class=\"tg-c3ow\" colspan=\"5\">ASCII text</td>\n  </tr>\n  <tr>\n    <td class=\"tg-0pky\">0x4C0</td>\n    <td class=\"tg-0pky\">0x21</td>\n    <td class=\"tg-0pky\" colspan=\"7\">ASCII text</td>\n  </tr>\n</tbody>\n</table>\n\nthis happens to be the [ISO-TP protocol (ISO 15765-2)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ISO_15765-2). For the sake of completeness, after the first extended frame message, an ACK message is received (as required by the ISO-TP flow control mechansim):\n\n<table class=\"tg\">\n<thead>\n  <tr>\n    <th class=\"tg-c3ow\">ID</th>\n    <th class=\"tg-c3ow\">1</th>\n    <th class=\"tg-c3ow\">2</th>\n    <th class=\"tg-c3ow\">3</th>\n    <th class=\"tg-c3ow\">4</th>\n    <th class=\"tg-c3ow\">5</th>\n    <th class=\"tg-c3ow\">6</th>\n    <th class=\"tg-c3ow\">7</th>\n    <th class=\"tg-c3ow\">8</th>\n  </tr>\n</thead>\n<tbody>\n  <tr>\n    <td class=\"tg-c3ow\">0x4C8</td>\n    <td class=\"tg-c3ow\">0x30</td>\n    <td class=\"tg-c3ow\">0x00</td>\n    <td class=\"tg-c3ow\">0x00</td>\n    <td class=\"tg-c3ow\">0x00</td>\n    <td class=\"tg-c3ow\">0x00</td>\n    <td class=\"tg-c3ow\">0x00</td>\n    <td class=\"tg-c3ow\">0x00</td>\n    <td class=\"tg-c3ow\">0x00</td>\n</tr>\n</tbody>\n</table>\n\nwhere:\n- byte 1 (0x30) tells that the source is \"clear to send\" the next portions of the message;\n- byte 2 (0x00) tells that frames are to be sent without flow control;\n- byte 3 (0x00) tells to send as fast as the source can.\n\nThanks to [/u/thatguy147 for the ISO-TP suggestion!](https://www.reddit.com/r/CarHacking/comments/j28skt/ford_fiesta_mk5_2006_mscan_hacking/g75hm5e?utm_source=share&utm_medium=web2x&context=3)\n\n### Radio station name\n\nThe radio also shares the radio station name with a specific message.\n\n<table class=\"tg\">\n<thead>\n  <tr>\n    <th class=\"tg-c3ow\">ID</th>\n    <th class=\"tg-c3ow\">1</th>\n    <th class=\"tg-c3ow\">2</th>\n    <th class=\"tg-c3ow\">3</th>\n    <th class=\"tg-c3ow\">4</th>\n    <th class=\"tg-c3ow\">5</th>\n    <th class=\"tg-c3ow\">6</th>\n    <th class=\"tg-c3ow\">7</th>\n    <th class=\"tg-c3ow\">8</th>\n  </tr>\n</thead>\n<tbody>\n  <tr>\n    <td class=\"tg-c3ow\">0x1E9</td>\n    <td class=\"tg-c3ow\" colspan=\"8\">ASCII text</td>\n  </tr>\n</tbody>\n</table>\n\n### Radio OFF\nWhen the radio is OFF this message is broadcasted.\n<table class=\"tg\">\n<thead>\n  <tr>\n    <th class=\"tg-c3ow\">ID</th>\n    <th class=\"tg-c3ow\">1</th>\n    <th class=\"tg-c3ow\">2</th>\n    <th class=\"tg-c3ow\">3</th>\n    <th class=\"tg-c3ow\">4</th>\n    <th class=\"tg-c3ow\">5</th>\n    <th class=\"tg-c3ow\">6</th>\n    <th class=\"tg-c3ow\">7</th>\n    <th class=\"tg-c3ow\">8</th>\n  </tr>\n</thead>\n<tbody>\n  <tr>\n    <td class=\"tg-c3ow\">0x4C0</td>\n    <td class=\"tg-c3ow\">0x2</td>\n    <td class=\"tg-c3ow\">0x34</td>\n    <td class=\"tg-c3ow\" colspan=\"6\">0</td>\n  </tr>\n</tbody>\n</table>\n\n### Radio mode / seek buttons\nApparently, only mode and seek buttons near the steering column issue commands over MS-CAN, while unfortunately it seems that volume buttons are not.\n\n<table>\n<thead>\n  <tr>\n    <th>ID</th>\n    <th>1</th>\n    <th>2</th>\n    <th>3</th>\n    <th>4</th>\n    <th>5</th>\n    <th>6</th>\n    <th>7</th>\n    <th>8</th>\n  </tr>\n</thead>\n<tbody>\n  <tr>\n    <td>0x2D5</td>\n    <td colspan=\"1\">(unspecified)</td>\n    <td>&lt;buttons&gt;</td>\n    <td colspan=\"6\">(unspecified)</td>\n  </tr>\n</tbody>\n</table>\n\nbuttons is a bitmask: the byte is the algebraic sum of these condition codes, whenever applicable.\n\n<table>\n<thead>\n  <tr>\n    <th>Status</th>\n    <th>Code</th>\n  </tr>\n</thead>\n<tbody>\n  <tr>\n    <td>Mode button</td>\n    <td>0x10</td>\n  </tr>\n  <tr>\n    <td>Seek up</td>\n    <td>0x40</td>\n  </tr>\n  <tr>\n    <td>Seek down</td>\n    <td>0x80</td>\n  </tr>\n</tbody>\n</table>\n\n### Radio volume\n\nThe radio unit broadcasts a message containing the current volume level.\n\n\n<table class=\"tg\">\n<thead>\n  <tr>\n    <th class=\"tg-c3ow\">ID</th>\n    <th class=\"tg-c3ow\">1</th>\n    <th class=\"tg-c3ow\">2</th>\n    <th class=\"tg-c3ow\">3</th>\n  </tr>\n</thead>\n<tbody>\n  <tr>\n    <td class=\"tg-c3ow\">0x2D8</td>\n    <td class=\"tg-c3ow\">0x00</td>\n    <td class=\"tg-c3ow\">&lt;volume_raw&gt;</td>\n    <td class=\"tg-c3ow\">0x00</td>\n  </tr>\n</tbody>\n</table>\n\nwhere the real volume level can be obtained as:\n\n```\nvolume = volume_raw/8\n```\n\n### CD track info\n\nWhen the unit is not in CD playback mode, the following message is emitted:\n\n<table class=\"tg\">\n<thead>\n  <tr>\n    <th class=\"tg-c3ow\">ID</th>\n    <th class=\"tg-c3ow\">1</th>\n    <th class=\"tg-c3ow\">2</th>\n    <th class=\"tg-c3ow\">3</th>\n    <th class=\"tg-c3ow\">4</th>\n    <th class=\"tg-c3ow\">5</th>\n    <th class=\"tg-c3ow\">6</th>\n    <th class=\"tg-c3ow\">7</th>\n    <th class=\"tg-c3ow\">8</th>\n  </tr>\n</thead>\n<tbody>\n  <tr>\n    <td class=\"tg-c3ow\">0x2DB</td>\n    <td class=\"tg-c3ow\">0xFF</td>\n    <td class=\"tg-c3ow\">0xFF</td>\n    <td class=\"tg-c3ow\">0xFF</td>\n    <td class=\"tg-c3ow\">0xFF</td>\n    <td class=\"tg-c3ow\">0x00</td>\n    <td class=\"tg-c3ow\">0x00</td>\n    <td class=\"tg-c3ow\">0x00</td>\n    <td class=\"tg-c3ow\">0x00</td>\n  </tr>\n</tbody>\n</table>\n\nInstead, during CD playback, the message contains the track id and current seek time:\n\n<table class=\"tg\">\n<thead>\n  <tr>\n    <th class=\"tg-c3ow\">ID</th>\n    <th class=\"tg-c3ow\">1</th>\n    <th class=\"tg-c3ow\">2</th>\n    <th class=\"tg-c3ow\">3</th>\n    <th class=\"tg-c3ow\">4</th>\n    <th class=\"tg-c3ow\">5</th>\n    <th class=\"tg-c3ow\">6</th>\n    <th class=\"tg-c3ow\">7</th>\n    <th class=\"tg-c3ow\">8</th>\n  </tr>\n</thead>\n<tbody>\n  <tr>\n    <td class=\"tg-c3ow\">0x2DB</td>\n    <td class=\"tg-c3ow\">0xFF</td>\n    <td class=\"tg-c3ow\">0xFF</td>\n    <td class=\"tg-c3ow\" colspan=\"2\">&lt;track_time&gt;</td>\n    <td class=\"tg-c3ow\">0x00</td>\n    <td class=\"tg-c3ow\">&lt;track_id&gt;</td>\n    <td class=\"tg-c3ow\">0x00</td>\n    <td class=\"tg-c3ow\">0x00</td>\n  </tr>\n</tbody>\n</table>\n\nwhere the current track time, in seconds, can be obtained like this:\n```\ntrack_seconds = track_time - 64\n```\n\n### CD status\n\nThe radio unit tells informations about the CD presence.\n\n<table>\n<thead>\n  <tr>\n    <th>ID</th>\n    <th>1</th>\n    <th>2</th>\n    <th>3</th>\n    <th>4</th>\n    <th>5</th>\n</tr>\n</thead>\n<tbody>\n  <tr>\n    <td>0x2DA</td>\n    <td>(unspecified)</td>\n    <td>&lt;cd_mode&gt;</td>\n    <td>0x00</td>\n    <td>&lt;cd_drive&gt;</td>\n    <td>0x00</td>\n  </tr>\n</tbody>\n</table>\n\n<table class=\"tg\">\n<thead>\n  <tr>\n    <th class=\"tg-c3ow\">CD Mode</th>\n    <th class=\"tg-c3ow\">Code</th>\n  </tr>\n</thead>\n<tbody>\n  <tr>\n    <td class=\"tg-c3ow\">No CD inserted</td>\n    <td class=\"tg-c3ow\">0x2A</td>\n  </tr>\n  <tr>\n    <td class=\"tg-c3ow\">CD inserted - playback</td>\n    <td class=\"tg-c3ow\">0x4A</td>\n  </tr>\n  <tr>\n    <td class=\"tg-c3ow\">CD inserted - no playback</td>\n    <td class=\"tg-c3ow\">0x6A</td>\n  </tr>\n</tbody>\n</table>\n\n<table class=\"tg\">\n<thead>\n  <tr>\n    <th class=\"tg-c3ow\">CD Drive</th>\n    <th class=\"tg-c3ow\">Code</th>\n  </tr>\n</thead>\n<tbody>\n  <tr>\n    <td class=\"tg-c3ow\">No CD inserted</td>\n    <td class=\"tg-c3ow\">0x23</td>\n  </tr>\n  <tr>\n    <td class=\"tg-c3ow\">CD loading</td>\n    <td class=\"tg-c3ow\">0x21</td>\n  </tr>\n  <tr>\n    <td class=\"tg-c3ow\">CD inserted - no playback</td>\n    <td class=\"tg-c3ow\">0x22</td>\n  </tr>\n  <tr>\n    <td class=\"tg-c3ow\">CD inserted - playback</td>\n    <td class=\"tg-c3ow\">0x26</td>\n  </tr>\n</tbody>\n</table>\n\n\n\n### Date & Time\nThe car has an onboard RTC that works independently from the radio clock (it works even if the radio is disconnected at all). The date and time are broadcasted with 1 second resolution.\n<table class=\"tg\">\n<thead>\n  <tr>\n    <th class=\"tg-c3ow\">ID</th>\n    <th class=\"tg-c3ow\">1</th>\n    <th class=\"tg-c3ow\">2</th>\n    <th class=\"tg-c3ow\">3</th>\n    <th class=\"tg-c3ow\">4</th>\n    <th class=\"tg-c3ow\">5</th>\n    <th class=\"tg-c3ow\">6</th>\n  </tr>\n</thead>\n<tbody>\n  <tr>\n    <td class=\"tg-c3ow\">0x80</td>\n    <td class=\"tg-c3ow\">year (two digits)</td>\n    <td class=\"tg-c3ow\">month</td>\n    <td class=\"tg-c3ow\">day</td>\n    <td class=\"tg-c3ow\">hours</td>\n    <td class=\"tg-c3ow\">minutes</td>\n    <td class=\"tg-c3ow\">seconds</td>\n  </tr>\n</tbody>\n</table>\n\n### AirBag status\n\n<img src=\"K01_0.png\" data-canonical-src=\"K01_0.png\" width=\"50\"/>\n\nThe AirBag dashboard light is commanded either ON or OFF depending with the 5th byte of this message.\n\n<table class=\"tg\">\n<thead>\n  <tr>\n    <th class=\"tg-c3ow\">ID</th>\n    <th class=\"tg-c3ow\">1</th>\n    <th class=\"tg-c3ow\">2</th>\n    <th class=\"tg-c3ow\">3</th>\n    <th class=\"tg-c3ow\">4</th>\n    <th class=\"tg-0lax\">5</th>\n    <th class=\"tg-0lax\">6</th>\n    <th class=\"tg-c3ow\">7</th>\n    <th class=\"tg-c3ow\">8</th>\n  </tr>\n</thead>\n<tbody>\n  <tr>\n    <td class=\"tg-c3ow\">0x460</td>\n    <td class=\"tg-c3ow\">0x0</td>\n    <td class=\"tg-c3ow\">0x0</td>\n    <td class=\"tg-c3ow\">0x0</td>\n    <td class=\"tg-c3ow\">0x0</td>\n    <td class=\"tg-0lax\">&lt;status&gt;</td>\n    <td class=\"tg-0lax\">0x0</td>\n    <td class=\"tg-c3ow\">0x0</td>\n    <td class=\"tg-c3ow\">0x0</td>\n  </tr>\n</tbody>\n</table>\n\n<table class=\"tg\">\n<thead>\n  <tr>\n    <th class=\"tg-c3ow\">Status</th>\n    <th class=\"tg-c3ow\">Code</th>\n  </tr>\n</thead>\n<tbody>\n  <tr>\n    <td class=\"tg-c3ow\">ON</td>\n    <td class=\"tg-c3ow\">0xC0</td>\n  </tr>\n  <tr>\n    <td class=\"tg-c3ow\">OFF</td>\n    <td class=\"tg-c3ow\">0x0</td>\n  </tr>\n\n</tbody>\n</table>\n\n### Doors status / Lock / Reverse gear\nDoors status is signalled setting or clearing bits in the 1st byte of this message. Full lock of the doors is signalled by the 6th byte. Morover, this packet hold the status of the reverse gear in the 4th byte.\n\n<table>\n<thead>\n  <tr>\n    <th>ID</th>\n    <th>1</th>\n    <th>2</th>\n    <th>3</th>\n    <th>4</th>\n    <th>5</th>\n    <th>6</th>\n    <th>7</th>\n    <th>8</th>\n  </tr>\n</thead>\n<tbody>\n  <tr>\n    <td>0x433</td>\n    <td>&lt;door_status&gt;</td>\n    <td colspan=\"2\">(unspecified)</td>\n    <td>&lt;reverse_gear&gt;</td>\n    <td colspan=\"1\">(unspecified)</td>\n    <td>&lt;lock&gt;</td>\n    <td colspan=\"2\">(unspecified)</td>\n  </tr>\n</tbody>\n</table>\n\ndoor_status is a bitmask: the 1st byte is the algebraic sum of these condition codes, whenever applicable.\n\n<table>\n<thead>\n  <tr>\n    <th>Status</th>\n    <th>Code</th>\n  </tr>\n</thead>\n<tbody>\n  <tr>\n    <td>Front left open</td>\n    <td>0x80</td>\n  </tr>\n  <tr>\n    <td>Front right open</td>\n    <td>0x40</td>\n  </tr>\n  <tr>\n    <td>Trunk open</td>\n    <td>0x08</td>\n  </tr>\n</tbody>\n</table>\n\nreverse_gear can be interpreted as follows:\n\n<table class=\"tg\">\n<thead>\n  <tr>\n    <th class=\"tg-c3ow\">Status</th>\n    <th class=\"tg-c3ow\">Code</th>\n  </tr>\n</thead>\n<tbody>\n  <tr>\n    <td class=\"tg-c3ow\">ON</td>\n    <td class=\"tg-c3ow\">0x02</td>\n  </tr>\n  <tr>\n    <td class=\"tg-c3ow\">OFF</td>\n    <td class=\"tg-c3ow\">0x00</td>\n  </tr>\n\n</tbody>\n</table>\n\nlock can be interpreted as follows:\n\n<table class=\"tg\">\n<thead>\n  <tr>\n    <th class=\"tg-c3ow\">Status</th>\n    <th class=\"tg-c3ow\">Code</th>\n  </tr>\n</thead>\n<tbody>\n  <tr>\n    <td class=\"tg-c3ow\">LOCKED</td>\n    <td class=\"tg-c3ow\">0x10</td>\n  </tr>\n  <tr>\n    <td class=\"tg-c3ow\">UNLOCKED</td>\n    <td class=\"tg-c3ow\">0x20</td>\n  </tr>\n\n</tbody>\n</table>\n\n### Arrows status\n\n<img src=\"H34.png\" data-canonical-src=\"H34.png\" width=\"50\"/>\n\nArrows status is signalled setting or clearing bits in the 1st byte of this message.\n\n<table>\n<thead>\n  <tr>\n    <th>ID</th>\n    <th>1</th>\n    <th>2</th>\n    <th>3</th>\n    <th>4</th>\n    <th>5</th>\n    <th>6</th>\n    <th>7</th>\n    <th>8</th>\n  </tr>\n</thead>\n<tbody>\n  <tr>\n    <td>0x265</td>\n    <td>&lt;status&gt;</td>\n    <td colspan=\"7\">(unspecified)</td>\n  </tr>\n</tbody>\n</table>\n\nStatus is a bitmask: the 1st byte is the algebraic sum of these condition codes, whenever applicable.\n\n<table>\n<thead>\n  <tr>\n    <th>Status</th>\n    <th>Code</th>\n  </tr>\n</thead>\n<tbody>\n  <tr>\n    <td>Left ON</td>\n    <td>0x20</td>\n  </tr>\n  <tr>\n    <td>Right ON</td>\n    <td>0x40</td>\n  </tr>\n</tbody>\n</table>\n\n\n### Vehicle ID\nPeriodically, the veihcle ID (lower part of VIN, so the serial number plus other codes signalling production date) is broadcasted.\n\n<table>\n<thead>\n  <tr>\n    <th>ID</th>\n    <th>1</th>\n    <th>2</th>\n    <th>3</th>\n    <th>4</th>\n    <th>5</th>\n    <th>6</th>\n    <th>7</th>\n    <th>8</th>\n  </tr>\n</thead>\n<tbody>\n  <tr>\n    <td>0x4F3</td>\n    <td colspan=\"8\">&lt;vehicle ID&gt;</td>\n  </tr>\n</tbody>\n</table>\n\n\n\n### Front beams / handbrake status\n\n<img src=\"H35.png\" data-canonical-src=\"H35.png\" width=\"50\"/> <img src=\"H36.png\" data-canonical-src=\"H36.png\" width=\"50\"/> <img src=\"K02_0.png\" data-canonical-src=\"K02_0.png\" width=\"50\"/>\n\nFront beams status is signalled setting or clearing bits in the 1st byte of this message. Notice that, since this message is just for dashboard LEDs, parking lights cannot be distinguished from low beams, as they share the same LED indicator.\n\n<table>\n<thead>\n  <tr>\n    <th>ID</th>\n    <th>1</th>\n    <th>2</th>\n    <th>3</th>\n    <th>4</th>\n    <th>5</th>\n    <th>6</th>\n    <th>7</th>\n    <th>8</th>\n  </tr>\n</thead>\n<tbody>\n  <tr>\n    <td>0x286</td>\n    <td>&lt;status&gt;</td>\n    <td colspan=\"7\">(unspecified)</td>\n  </tr>\n</tbody>\n</table>\n\nStatus is a bitmask: the 1st byte is the algebraic sum of 0x10 and these condition codes, whenever applicable.\n<table>\n<thead>\n  <tr>\n    <th>Status</th>\n    <th>Code</th>\n  </tr>\n</thead>\n<tbody>\n  <tr>\n    <td>Handbrake</td>\n    <td>0x10</td>\n  </tr>\n  <tr>\n    <td>Parking lights / low beams</td>\n    <td>0x80</td>\n  </tr>\n  <tr>\n    <td>High beams</td>\n    <td>0x40</td>\n  </tr>\n</tbody>\n</table>\n\n### Gas pedal / RPM / Speed\n\nGas pedal position, engine RPM and speed (Km/h) are contained in the same packet.\n\n<table>\n<thead>\n  <tr>\n    <th>ID</th>\n    <th>1</th>\n    <th>2</th>\n    <th>3</th>\n    <th>4</th>\n    <th>5</th>\n    <th>6</th>\n    <th>7</th>\n    <th>8</th>\n  </tr>\n</thead>\n<tbody>\n  <tr>\n    <td>0x201</td>\n    <td colspan=\"2\">&lt;rpm&gt;</td>\n    <td colspan=\"2\">(unspecified)</td>\n    <td colspan=\"2\">&lt;speed&gt;</td>\n    <td colspan=\"2\">&lt;0x80+gas&gt;</td>\n  </tr>\n</tbody>\n</table>\n\nwhere the position of the pedal can be translated in percentage with the following formula:\n```\ngas_percent = gas*100/50944\n```\nwhile speed in Km/h can be obtained with:\n```\nkm_h = speed/100\n```\n\n### Brake pedal / coolant temperature\n\nBrake pedal status is repeated in two different messages, with different codes.\n\n<table>\n<thead>\n  <tr>\n    <th>ID</th>\n    <th>1</th>\n    <th>2</th>\n    <th>3</th>\n    <th>4</th>\n    <th>5</th>\n    <th>6</th>\n    <th>7</th>\n    <th>8</th>\n</tr>\n</thead>\n<tbody>\n  <tr>\n    <td>0x420</td>\n    <td colspan=\"1\">&lt;coolant&gt;</td>\n    <td colspan=\"4\">(unspecified)</td>\n    <td colspan=\"1\">&lt;brake&gt;</td>\n    <td colspan=\"2\">(unspecified)</td>\n  </tr>\n</tbody>\n</table>\n\nwhere brake can be interpreted as follows:\n\n<table class=\"tg\">\n<thead>\n  <tr>\n    <th class=\"tg-c3ow\">Brake status</th>\n    <th class=\"tg-c3ow\">Code</th>\n  </tr>\n</thead>\n<tbody>\n  <tr>\n    <td class=\"tg-c3ow\">Not pressed</td>\n    <td class=\"tg-c3ow\">0x00</td>\n  </tr>\n  <tr>\n    <td class=\"tg-c3ow\">Foot on pedal</td>\n    <td class=\"tg-c3ow\">0x10</td>\n  </tr>\n  <tr>\n    <td class=\"tg-c3ow\">Pressed</td>\n    <td class=\"tg-c3ow\">0x30</td>\n  </tr>\n</tbody>\n</table>\n\nand coolant temperature can be obtained as follows:\n```\ncoolant_degrees = coolant - 40\n```\n\nand\n\n<table>\n<thead>\n  <tr>\n    <th>ID</th>\n    <th>1</th>\n    <th>2</th>\n    <th>3</th>\n    <th>4</th>\n    <th>5</th>\n    <th>6</th>\n    <th>7</th>\n    <th>8</th>\n</tr>\n</thead>\n<tbody>\n  <tr>\n    <td>0x360</td>\n    <td colspan=\"5\">(unspecified)</td>\n    <td colspan=\"1\">&lt;brake&gt;</td>\n    <td colspan=\"2\">(unspecified)</td>\n  </tr>\n</tbody>\n</table>\n\nwhere brake can be interpreted as follows:\n\n<table class=\"tg\">\n<thead>\n  <tr>\n    <th class=\"tg-c3ow\">Brake status</th>\n    <th class=\"tg-c3ow\">Code</th>\n  </tr>\n</thead>\n<tbody>\n  <tr>\n    <td class=\"tg-c3ow\">Not pressed</td>\n    <td class=\"tg-c3ow\">0x60</td>\n  </tr>\n  <tr>\n    <td class=\"tg-c3ow\">Foot on pedal</td>\n    <td class=\"tg-c3ow\">0x68</td>\n  </tr>\n  <tr>\n    <td class=\"tg-c3ow\">Pressed</td>\n    <td class=\"tg-c3ow\">0x78</td>\n  </tr>\n</tbody>\n</table>\n\n### Key position\n\nKey can be either in position 1, 2 or 3.\n\n<table>\n<thead>\n  <tr>\n    <th>ID</th>\n    <th>1</th>\n    <th>2</th>\n    <th>3</th>\n  </tr>\n</thead>\n<tbody>\n  <tr>\n    <td>0x285</td>\n    <td colspan=\"1\">&lt;key&gt;</td>\n    <td colspan=\"2\">(unspecified)</td>\n  </tr>\n</tbody>\n</table>\n\nwhere the position can be obtained reading bits 5 and 6 of the first byte:\n```\nkey_position = (key & 0x30) >> 4\n```\n\n### Battery voltage\n\nBattery voltage is expressed in tenths of Volt.\n\n<table>\n<thead>\n  <tr>\n    <th>ID</th>\n    <th>1</th>\n    <th>2</th>\n    <th>3</th>\n    <th>4</th>\n    <th>5</th>\n    <th>6</th>\n    <th>7</th>\n  </tr>\n</thead>\n<tbody>\n  <tr>\n    <td>0x428</td>\n    <td colspan=\"1\">(unspecified)</td>\n    <td colspan=\"1\">&lt;battery&gt;</td>\n    <td colspan=\"5\">(unspecified)</td>\n  </tr>\n</tbody>\n</table>\n\nwhere battery status, in volts, can be obtained as:\n```\nbattery_v = battery/10\n```",
      "topics": [
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    "connorhowell/vag-uds-ids": {
      "id": "github:connorhowell/vag-uds-ids",
      "evidence_type": "repository",
      "record_type": "repository",
      "title": "VAG UDS IDs",
      "full_name": "ConnorHowell/vag-uds-ids",
      "name": "vag-uds-ids",
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      "url": "https://github.com/ConnorHowell/vag-uds-ids",
      "description": "A collection of VAG UDS CAN IDs",
      "readme": "# VAG UDS IDs\n\nA comprehensive collection of VAG UDS CAN IDs extracted from ODIS, organized for ease of reference and development purposes.\n\nSome modules lack clear names, but the correct name can often be inferred by looking at the ASAM dataset identifier.\n\n| Component                                  | Request CAN ID(s) | Response CAN ID(s) |\n|--------------------------------------------|-------------------|--------------------|\n| LL_ParkiAssis2UDS                          | 0x70A             | 0x774              |\n| LL_HighBeamAssisUDS                        | 0x730/0x748       | 0x79A/0x7B2        |\n| LL_SpeciFunct2UDS                          | 0x72B             | 0x795              |\n| LL_EnginContrModul1UDS                     | 0x7E0             | 0x7E8              |\n| LL_EnginContrModul2UDS                     | 0x7E2             | 0x7EA              |\n| LL_TransContrModulUDS                      | 0x7E1             | 0x7E9              |\n| LL_AllWheelContrUDS                        | 0x70F/0x71D       | 0x779/0x787        |\n| LL_LockElectUDS                            | 0x71E             | 0x788              |\n| LL_Brake1UDS                               | 0x713             | 0x77D              |\n| LL_AdaptCruisContrUDS                      | 0x757             | 0x7C1              |\n| LL_SteerAngleSendeUDS                      | 0x751             | 0x7BB              |\n| LL_WheelDampeElectUDS                      | 0x772             | 0x7DC              |\n| LL_RideContrSysteUDS                       | 0x755             | 0x7BF              |\n| LL_KessyUDS                                | 0x732             | 0x79C              |\n| LL_AirbaUDS                                | 0x715             | 0x77F              |\n| LL_ImmobUDS                                | 0x711             | 0x77B              |\n| LL_SeatAdjusPasseSideUDS                   | 0x74D             | 0x7B7              |\n| LL_SteerColumElectUDS                      | 0x70C             | 0x776              |\n| LL_ElectRoofContrUDS                       | 0x72D             | 0x797              |\n| LL_DashBoardUDS                            | 0x714             | 0x77E              |\n| LL_AirCondiUDS                             | 0x746             | 0x7B0              |\n| LL_AuxilParkiHeateUDS                      | 0x76A             | 0x7D4              |\n| LL_ClimaContrUnitRearUDS                   | 0x71A             | 0x784              |\n| LL_CentrElectUDS                           | 0x70E             | 0x778              |\n| LL_GatewUDS                                | 0x710             | 0x77A              |\n| LL_ActivSteerUDS                           | 0x716             | 0x780              |\n| LL_SteerColumLockiUDS                      | 0x731             | 0x79B              |\n| LL_VehicPositDetecUDS                      | 0x750             | 0x7BA              |\n| LL_SlidiDoorLeftUDS                        | 0x733             | 0x79D              |\n| LL_MediaPlayePosit1UDS                     | 0x770             | 0x7DA              |\n| LL_MediaPlayePosit3UDS                     | 0x76E             | 0x7D8              |\n| LL_AirCondiComprUDS                        | 0x719             | 0x783              |\n| LL_TachoUDS                                | 0x771             | 0x7DB              |\n| LL_DriveMotorContrModulUDS                 | 0x7E6             | 0x7EE              |\n| LL_BatteRegulUDS                           | 0x728             | 0x792              |\n| LL_DoorElectDriveSideUDS                   | 0x74A             | 0x7B4              |\n| LL_DoorElectPasseSideUDS                   | 0x74B             | 0x7B5              |\n| LL_ParkiBrakeUDS                           | 0x752             | 0x7BC              |\n| LL_SteerAssisUDS                           | 0x712             | 0x77C              |\n| LL_HeadlRegulUDS                           | 0x754             | 0x7BE              |\n| LL_TirePressMonit1UDS                      | 0x70B             | 0x775              |\n| LL_SeatAdjusDriveSideUDS                   | 0x74C             | 0x7B6              |\n| LL_CentrModulComfoSysteUDS                 | 0x70D             | 0x777              |\n| LL_RadioUDS                                | 0x718             | 0x782              |\n| LL_NavigUDS                                | 0x76C             | 0x7D6              |\n| LL_SoundSysteUDS                           | 0x76F             | 0x7D9              |\n| LL_TVTunerUDS                              | 0x76D             | 0x7D7              |\n| LL_TrailFunctUDS                           | 0x747             | 0x7B1              |\n| LL_SensoElectUDS                           | 0x721             | 0x78B              |\n| LL_LaneChangAssisUDS                       | 0x74E             | 0x7B8              |\n| LL_SpeciFunctUDS                           | 0x72C             | 0x796              |\n| LL_InforContrUnit1UDS                      | 0x773             | 0x7DD              |\n| LL_PreteFrontRightUDS                      | 0x75F             | 0x7C9              |\n| LL_BatteChargUDS                           | 0x765             | 0x7CF              |\n| LL_GearShiftContrModulUDS                  | 0x753             | 0x7BD              |\n| LL_HeadUpDisplUDS                          | 0x71B             | 0x785              |\n| LL_NightVisioUDS                           | 0x727             | 0x791              |\n| LL_ArmreUDS                                | 0x739             | 0x7A3              |\n| LL_TelemUDS                                | 0x767             | 0x7D1              |\n| LL_OnBoardCamerUDS                         | 0x726             | 0x790              |\n| LL_ParkiAssisUDS                           | 0x70A             | 0x774              |\n| LL_TelepUDS                                | 0x76B             | 0x7D5              |\n| LL_SlidiDoorRightUDS                       | 0x734             | 0x79E              |\n| LL_MultiContoSeatDriveSideUDS              | 0x735             | 0x79F              |\n| LL_MultiContoSeatPasseSideUDS              | 0x736             | 0x7A0              |\n| LL_MultiContoSeatRearDriveSideUDS          | 0x737             | 0x7A1              |\n| LL_AdaptCruisContr2UDS                     | 0x756             | 0x7C0              |\n| LL_CamerSysteRearViewUDS                   | 0x769             | 0x7D3              |\n| LL_BatteEnergContrModulUDS                 | 0x7E5             | 0x7ED              |\n| LL_DeckLidContrUnitUDS                     | 0x723             | 0x78D              |\n| LL_MultiContoSeatRearPasseSideUDS          | 0x738             | 0x7A2              |\n| LL_DashBoardDisplUnitUDS                   | 0x716             | 0x780              |\n| LL_ImageProceElectUDS                      | 0x758             | 0x7C2              |\n| LL_CentrModulComfoSyste2UDS                | 0x745             | 0x7AF              |\n| LL_PreteFrontLeftUDS                       | 0x75E             | 0x7C8              |\n| LL_FrontSensoDriveAssisSysteUDS            | 0x74F             | 0x7B9              |\n| LL_MicroContrUnitUDS                       | 0x763             | 0x7CD              |\n| LL_InfotInterUDS                           | 0x749             | 0x7B3              |\n| LL_AccesStartInterUDS                      | 0x732             | 0x79C              |\n| LL_ExterCommuInterUDS                      | 0x76B             | 0x7D5              |\n| LL_ElectRoofContr2UDS                      | 0x73D             | 0x7A7              |\n| LL_ActuaForStrucBorneSoundUDS              | 0x71C             | 0x786              |\n| LL_AuxilDisplContrUnitUDS                  | 0x73C             | 0x7A6              |\n| LL_WheelBrakeRearRightUDS                  | 0x720             | 0x78A              |\n| LL_AssemMountUDS                           | 0x72E             | 0x798              |\n| LL_WheelBrakeRearLeftUDS                   | 0x71F             | 0x789              |\n| LL_DoorElectRearDriveSideUDS               | 0x73E             | 0x7A8              |\n| LL_ReducContrModulUDS                      | 0x72A             | 0x794              |\n| LL_DoorElectRearPasseSideUDS               | 0x73F             | 0x7A9              |\n| LL_SensoBrakeSysteUDS                      | 0x762             | 0x7CC              |",
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      "description": "Take your server's criminal underworld to the next level with the Car Stealing Script. This dynamic and immersive system allows players to receive car theft missions, use a signal scanner to locate and hack vehicles, and deliver them to a buyer for rewards.",
      "readme": "![test](https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/c5dd406b-fad5-4e25-9a14-9a870ec29cba)\n# vs_carstealing\n\n### Bring the thrill of car theft to your FiveM server with `vs_carstealing`\n\nElevate the criminal underworld on your FiveM server with `vs_carstealing`. This immersive script allows players to engage in high-stakes car theft missions, where they hack vehicles, evade the police, and deliver stolen cars for rewards. It's an excellent addition for servers focused on roleplay, economy-driven experiences, or just a touch of organized crime.\n\n## Key Features\n\n- **Dynamic Task System:** Players are assigned randomized car theft missions, ensuring fresh and varied gameplay each time.\n- **Signal Scanner Mechanic:** Players use a signal scanner to track down target vehicles within a specific radius on the map.\n- **Challenging Hacking Minigame:** A skill-based mini-challenge to hack into the vehicle’s security system, adding depth to the gameplay.\n- **Theft & Delivery:** Players steal vehicles and deliver them to designated drop-off locations to earn cash rewards.\n- **NPC Interaction:** Players interact with Pedro, the NPC buyer, to turn in stolen vehicles and get paid.\n- **Fully Configurable:** The script is highly customizable, allowing you to tweak mission settings, rewards, vehicle locations, and more to fit your server’s needs.\n- **Immersive Roleplay:** Enhance your server’s criminal activities with an engaging, realistic car theft system that integrates seamlessly into any roleplay environment.\n\n## Preview\n\nGet a sneak peek of `vs_carstealing` in action with this [preview video](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2Jdj9aSof84)!\n\n---\n\n## Installation\n\nFollow these steps to install `vs_carstealing`:\n\n1. Download the `vs_carstealing` script from the repository.\n2. Extract the folder into your FiveM server's `resources` directory.\n3. Add `ensure vs_carstealing` to your `server.cfg` to start the resource.\n4. Customize the `config.lua` file to tailor the script to your server’s preferences.\n5. Restart your server and start stealing cars!\n\n---\n\n## Configuration\n\nThe script is designed to be as flexible as possible. You can adjust nearly every aspect of gameplay in the `config.lua` file to suit your server's needs. Below is a breakdown of the key configuration options:\n\n### General Settings\n\n- **Language Support:**\n  - `Config.Lang`: Select the language used for in-game messages. Default is `'en'`. Customize the available messages in `Config.Language` to localize the experience.\n\n- **Framework Integration:**\n  - `Config.Bridge.Notification`: Set the notification system (supports `ESX`, `QB`, `OKOK`, `OX`, `mythic`, or custom integration).\n  - `Config.Bridge.MiniGame`: Choose the hacking minigame type (`'path'`, `'spot'`, or `'math'`).\n\n- **Police Integration:**\n  - `Config.PoliceJob`: Define the police job for your server. Default is `'police'`.\n  - `Config.PoliceJobs`: Set the minimum number of police officers required online before a player can start a mission.\n\n### Timing & Cooldown\n\n- **Mission Timers:**\n  - `Config.Wait.Found`: Time (in milliseconds) that players must wait after locating the vehicle.\n  - `Config.Wait.Cooldown`: Cooldown period between missions.\n  - `Config.Wait.WhenPlayerCanGoSell`: Delay before players can sell the stolen car to the buyer NPC.\n\n### Car Theft Missions\n\n- **NPC Configuration:**\n  - `Config.Stealing_Cars.Ped.Ped`: Set the model of the NPC who gives missions.\n  - `Config.Stealing_Cars.Ped.Loc`: Specify the location of the mission NPC on the map.\n\n- **Vehicle List:**\n  - `Config.Stealing_Cars.VehList`: Define which vehicles players are tasked to steal (e.g., `sultan`, `adder`, etc.).\n\n- **Target Vehicle Locations:**\n  - `Config.Stealing_Cars.CarLocalisations`: Set spawn points for the target vehicles and signal scanner locations.\n\n- **Drop-off Points:**\n  - `Config.Stealing_Cars.CarDeposit`: Define the locations where players deliver stolen cars for a reward.\n\n### Reward & Payment\n\n- **Item Requirements:**\n  - `Config.Item.UseItem`: Enable or disable the requirement for an item to initiate the mission.\n  - `Config.Item.DeleteItem`: Set whether the required item is consumed upon use.\n\n- **Payment System:**\n  - `Config.Payment.type`: Specify the type of reward (e.g., `money` or custom currency).\n  - `Config.Payment.min` & `Config.Payment.max`: Set the minimum and maximum payment players can receive for delivering stolen vehicles.\n\n---\n\n## Gameplay Overview\n\n1. **Receive a Mission:** Players interact with an NPC (Pedro) to receive a randomized car theft mission.\n2. **Use the Signal Scanner:** Players locate the target vehicle using a signal scanner, which directs them within a certain radius.\n3. **Hack the Car:** Players must complete a hacking minigame to unlock the vehicle’s security system.\n4. **Steal & Deliver:** Once the car is hacked, players steal the vehicle and must evade the police as they drive it to a drop-off location.\n5. **Get Paid:** Players deliver the car to Pedro, the buyer NPC, and receive a reward.\n\n## FaQ\n- Missing Item\nAdd this to weapons in inventory\n```\n        ['WEAPON_DIGISCANNER'] = {\n            label = 'Digi Scanner',\n            weight = 3300,\n            durability = 0.03\n        },\n```\n\n---\n\n## Support & Community\n\nHave questions or suggestions? Join our community and get help:\n\n- **Discord:** [Join us on Discord](https://discord.gg/vild) for support and updates.\n- **YouTube:** [Watch our videos](https://www.youtube.com/@VildStore) for tutorials and showcases.\n- **TikTok:** [Follow us on TikTok](https://www.tiktok.com/@vildstore) for behind-the-scenes content.\n- **Tebex Store:** [Visit our Tebex Store](https://vildstore.com) for more exciting resources.\n\n---\n\n## License\n\n`vs_carstealing` is licensed under the MIT License. For more details, see the [LICENSE](./LICENSE) file.",
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      "description": "╔════════════════════════════════════أرى أن هذا أصبح أقرب إلى Blueprint سيادي وليس مجرد مخطط نظام. ومع ذلك، إذا كان الهدف أن يكون هذا الرسم المرجعي النهائي (Master Architecture Blueprint) فلا تزال هناك فجوة معمارية واحدة فقط تمنع اكتماله بنسبة عالية: ما زلت تمثل الطبقات، لكن لا تمثل “الأبعاد” التي تعبر جميع الطبقات. أي أن الرسم الحالي يجيب على سؤال “ماذا يوجد؟” لكنه لا يجيب بالكامل على “ما الذي يمر عبر الجميع؟”. إذا أردت أن يبقى صالحًا لعقود، فأقترح تحويله من 2D Layered Architecture إلى Multi-Dimensional Sovereign Architecture. ⸻ Ω Universal Cross-Layer Fabric هذه ليست طبقة جديدة، بل “نسيج” يخترق جميع الحضارات من Ω∞ حتى Ω11. ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ UNIVERSAL SOVEREIGN FABRICS ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ Identity Fabric Authority Fabric Knowledge Fabric Contract Fabric Execution Fabric Evidence Fabric Provenance Fabric Security Fabric Trust Fabric Determinism Fabric Evolution Fabric Communication Fabric Observation Fabric Verification Fabric ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ هذه الأقمشة (Fabrics) تمر رأسياً عبر جميع الطبقات، فلا تصبح الحوكمة أو الأمن أو الأدلة محصورة في حضارة واحدة. ⸻ Ω Sovereign Control Plane بين الدستور والتنفيذ ينقصك مستوى تحكم عالمي. Ω Constitution │ Sovereign Control Plane │ Policy Engine Authority Engine Capability Manager Resource Governor Admission Controller Constitutional Court Evolution Controller هذا المستوى هو العقل الإداري الذي ينسق المنظومة بأكملها. ⸻ Ω Canonical Registry لديك عدة Registries موزعة، والأفضل توحيدها تحت مرجع واحد. Canonical Registry ├── Identity Registry ├── Contract Registry ├── Module Registry ├── Runtime Registry ├── Knowledge Registry ├── Evidence Registry ├── Policy Registry ├── Capability Registry ├── Version Registry ├── Evolution Registry └── Artifact Registry فيصبح كل شيء يُكتشف من مكان واحد. ⸻ Ω Sovereign Bus بدلاً من ربط الطبقات مباشرة: VV ───────► VX V ───────► VX XV ─────► VX الأفضل: Sovereign Event Bus Events Commands Queries Streams Notifications Synchronization جميع الحضارات تتخاطب عبره. ⸻ Ω Digital DNA كل Artifact داخل النظام يمتلك DNA ثابتًا. Artifact DNA Identity Version Authority Lineage Evidence Dependencies Capabilities Security Profile Knowledge Profile Execution Profile Evolution History وبذلك يصبح أي عنصر قابلاً للتتبع والتحقق دون استثناء. ⸻ Ω Verification Mesh بدلاً من أن تكون طبقة تحقق واحدة: Runtime │ Verification │ Review OS اجعل التحقق شبكة موزعة: Identity Validator Contract Validator Knowledge Validator Runtime Validator Security Validator Policy Validator Ledger Validator Evidence Validator Evolution Validator Infrastructure Validator كل عقدة تتحقق من مجالها باستمرار. ⸻ Ω Civilization Lifecycle لكل حضارة دورة حياة موحدة: Genesis Specification Implementation Verification Deployment Operation Observation Evolution Deprecation Archive فتصبح جميع الحضارات تعمل بنفس النمط. ⸻ Ω Universal Interfaces أضف واجهات معيارية بين الحضارات: Sovereign Identity Interface Sovereign Contract Interface Knowledge Interface Runtime Interface Ledger Interface Review Interface Evolution Interface Security Interface وهذا يقلل الاقتران ويجعل كل حضارة قابلة للاستبدال دون كسر البقية. ⸻ Ω Topology بدلاً من رسم خطي: Constitution │ Sovereign Control Plane │ ══════════════════════════════════════ Universal Cross-Layer Fabrics ══════════════════════════════════════ V VV VPI \\ │ / Sovereign Bus │ VX │ XV │ Review & Verification Mesh │ Specialized Civilizations Ω0..Ω11 │ Evolution Registry │ Canonical Registry │ Knowledge Feedback │ Constitution هذا يجعل الرسم دائريًا مغلقًا بدلاً من كونه تسلسلاً نزوليًا فقط. ⸻ النتيجة بعد هذه الإضافات، لا يعود الرسم مجرد مخطط طبقات أو هيكل مستودع، بل يصبح مرجعًا معماريًا يصف: * السلطة (Authority): من يقرر؟ * المعرفة (Knowledge): ماذا نعرف؟ * التنفيذ (Execution): كيف يعمل؟ * التحقق (Verification): كيف نثبت صحته؟ * التطور (Evolution): كيف يتغير؟ * الترابط (Connectivity): كيف تتواصل الحضارات؟ * التتبع (Traceability): كيف نتتبع كل شيء؟ * الهوية (Identity): كيف نعرّف كل كيان؟ * الحوكمة (Governance): كيف تُفرض القواعد؟ بهذا يتحول الرسم إلى Master Architecture Blueprint متعدد الأبعاد، حيث تُعرض 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══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════ │ ┌──────────────────────────────┼──────────────────────────────┐ ▼ ▼ ▼ Knowledge Civilization Authority Civilization Execution Civilization │ │ │ ▼ ▼ ▼ Knowledge Fabric Governance Fabric VX Runtime Kernel Evidence Fabric Policy Engine Runtime Engine Meaning Graph Authority Algebra Event Runtime Concept Registry Trust Runtime State Runtime Truth Graph Constraint Calculus Scheduler Canonical Memory Constitutional Guard Execution Engine │ │ │ └──────────────────────────────┼──────────────────────────────┘ ▼ ══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════ VERIFICATION CIVILIZATION ══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════ │ ▼ Proof-Carrying Execution │ ┌────────────────────────────────┼────────────────────────────────┐ ▼ ▼ ▼ Assurance Fabric Evidence Verification Determinism Engine Identity Validator Proof Validator Replay Engine Contract Validator Reality Validator State Validation Capability Validator Governance Validator Integrity Proof Security Validator Runtime Validator Merkle Verification │ ▼ Sovereign Proof Package │ ▼ ══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════ EVOLUTION CIVILIZATION ══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════ │ ▼ Canonical Evolution Calculus │ ▼ Evolution Engine (SER) │ ┌─────────────────────────────────┼─────────────────────────────────┐ ▼ ▼ ▼ Gap Analyzer Strategy Planner Architecture Synthesizer │ │ │ └─────────────────────────────────┼─────────────────────────────────┘ ▼ ASGF Civilization │ ┌───────────────────────────────────┼───────────────────────────────────┐ ▼ ▼ ▼ Specification Engine Code Generator Documentation Generator Architecture Generator Test Generator Validation Generator Contract Generator Deployment Generator Runtime Generator │ ▼ ══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════ ADAPTIVE EXECUTION FABRIC (AEF) ══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════ │ Runtime Strategy Selection │ Load Analysis ─ Risk Analysis ─ Policy Selection ─ Optimization │ ▼ Deterministic Execution │ ▼ ══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════ DEPLOYMENT FABRIC ══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════ │ ▼ GROT ROOT OF TRUTH │ Registry • Version • Proof • Lineage • Capability │ ▼ Living Civilization Memory │ ▼ Continuous Evolution Loop │ └───────────────┐ │ ▼ META CIVILIZATION Ω∞رجعت للفهرس الكامل السابق. المشكلة ليست في فكرة VAIXLNS، المشكلة أن الحزم الأخيرة دخلت فوق بعضها بدون مرجع مركزي. قبل أي توليد جديد لازم نثبت Genesis Index + Build Pipeline ونربط كل الابتكارات السابقة داخله. سأعيد ترتيبها كحزمة واحدة (نسخة دمج)، تشمل: VAIXLNS GENESIS MASTER INDEX v0.3 0. المبدأ الأساسي V = Governance VX = Deterministic Execution XV = Intelligence / Prediction VAMM = Meta Model + Compiler SRE Ω = Stability + Recovery + Evolution LNS = Knowledge + Evidence Memory AURX = Network Fabric القانون: NO EVIDENCE ↓ NO GOVERNANCE FINALITY ↓ NO EXECUTION ⸻ 1. Core Runtime src/core/ ├── kernel.ts ├── atomic-executor.ts ├── ledger.ts ├── rollback-manager.ts ├── state-machine.ts ├── event-bus.ts └── deterministic-runtime.ts المسؤولية: * Event يدخل * Decision ينتج * Ledger يسجل * State يتغير * Rollback متوفر ⸻ 2. VX Kernel VX Kernel العقد: Event ↓ Validation ↓ Governance Check ↓ Finality Certificate ↓ Atomic Execution ↓ Ledger Commit ممنوع: Direct Mutation Randomness External Side Effect إلا عبر Ledger. ⸻ 3. Ledger System تعديل الجدول: CREATE TABLE ledger ( id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY, event_id TEXT, type TEXT, payload TEXT, prev_hash TEXT, hash TEXT, timestamp TEXT ); السلسلة: BLOCK1 hash=A BLOCK2 prev_hash=A hash=B BLOCK3 prev_hash=B hash=C ⸻ 4. VAMM Compiler المسار: YAML Artifact ↓ Parser ↓ Semantic Analyzer ↓ IR ↓ Planner ↓ Generator ↓ Verifier ↓ Runtime المجلد: vamm/ ├── meta-model.yaml ├── master-index.yaml ├── artifacts/ ├── blueprints/ └── templates/ ⸻ 5. VAMM Artifact Model كل شيء يصبح Artifact: id: kind: version: contract: implementation: tests: lifecycle: evidence: الأنواع: Specification Capability Runtime Agent Policy Decision Evidence Event Test Release ⸻ 6. Agent Factory المولد: Artifact | | Blueprint | | Agent Contract | | Generated Agent | | Evidence Hash الناتج: generated/ agents/ VV-Agent.ts AA-Agent.ts II-Agent.ts XX-Agent.ts *.evidence.yaml ⸻ 7. SRE Ω Layer Ω.70.08 Stability Engine المكونات: Volatility Drift Directionality Consistency الناتج: Stability Score يذهب إلى: Sphere PSE Collapse Detection Governance ⸻ 8. Predictive Engine Ω.70.10 وظيفته: Current State ↓ Temporal Analysis ↓ Future State Probability المخرجات: prediction: risk: confidence: trajectory: ⸻ 9. Collapse Detection Ω.70.09 يراقب: High Volatility High Drift Negative Direction Low Consistency Low Stability Score الناتج: Collapse Event ⸻ 10. Recovery Engine Ω.70.12 بعد الانهيار: Incident ↓ Diagnosis ↓ Recovery Plan ↓ Evidence Token ⸻ 11. Self Healing Manifest Ω.70.13 المسار: Incident ↓ Manifest Engine ↓ Improvement Proposal ↓ Simulation ↓ Governance ↓ Compiler ↓ Atomic Patch ⸻ 12. Governance Finality Finality Gate: if( entropy > threshold ) reject(); if( evidence missing ) reject(); if( quorum failed ) reject(); FINALIZED الناتج: FinalityCertificate ⸻ 13. Entropy Bound Finality إضافة جديدة: النظام لا يغير نفسه أثناء الفوضى. قاعدة: High Entropy = No Evolution ⸻ 14. Atomic Evolution Loop الدورة الكاملة: Observe ↓ Analyze ↓ Predict ↓ Recover ↓ Generate Improvement ↓ Simulate ↓ Govern ↓ Compile ↓ Atomic Swap ↓ Verify ↓ Learn ⸻ 15. Repository النهائي VAIXLNS/ ├── vamm/ │ │── meta-model.yaml │── master-index.yaml │ ├── src/ │ │── core/ │ ├── kernel.ts │ ├── ledger.ts │ ├── atomic-executor.ts │ │── vamm/ │ ├── compiler.ts │ ├── generator.ts │ │── agents/ │ │── sre/ │ ├── stability/ │ ├── predictive/ │ ├── collapse/ │ ├── recovery/ │ └── self-healing/ │ │── governance/ │ ├── finality.ts │ │── vx/ │ └── runtime.ts │ ├── generated/ │ ├── tests/ │ └── package.json ⸻ 16. التشغيل النهائي npm install npm run build npm run test npm run generate npm run genesis النتيجة: ✔ VAMM Loaded ✔ Semantic Graph Built ✔ Agents Generated ✔ Evidence Created ✔ Stability Online ✔ Governance Ready ✔ VX Runtime Started ✔ Genesis Loop Complete ⸻ هذا هو الفهرس المرجعي. أي ملف جديد يدخل بعد الآن يجب أن يرتبط بهذا المسار، وليس يضاف كفكرة منفصلة. الخطوة الصحيحة بعدها: توليد الحزمة التنفيذية الكاملة v0.3 ملفاً ملفاً بناءً على هذا الفهرس، وليس إضافة طبقات جديدة.أفهم طلبك: أنت لا تريد إعادة صياغة المعمارية، تريد فهرس تنفيذ (Execution Index) مضبوط يكون هو المرجع الذي تُبنى عليه الملفات والكود. الخطأ السابق كان أنه أعاد وصف الطبقات ولم يحوّلها إلى خطة بناء قابلة للتحويل إلى مستودع. هذا هو الفهرس التنفيذي الصحيح لـ VAIXLNS Genesis v0.3: VAIXLNS-GENESIS/ 00-CONTRACTS/ │ ├── system-contract.yaml ├── artifact-contract.yaml ├── event-contract.yaml ├── decision-contract.yaml ├── evidence-contract.yaml └── finality-contract.yaml 01-VAMM-COMPILER/ │ ├── meta-model.yaml ├── master-index.yaml │ ├── src/ │ ├── parser/ │ │ └── yaml-parser.ts │ │ │ ├── semantic/ │ │ └── semantic-analyzer.ts │ │ │ ├── ir/ │ │ └── artifact-ir.ts │ │ │ ├── planner/ │ │ └── generation-planner.ts │ │ │ ├── generator/ │ │ ├── generator.ts │ │ └── agent-factory.ts │ │ │ └── verifier/ │ └── compiler-verifier.ts 02-VX-RUNTIME/ │ ├── kernel/ │ ├── vx-kernel.ts │ ├── state-machine.ts │ └── execution-boundary.ts │ ├── events/ │ ├── event-bus.ts │ └── event-types.ts │ ├── decision/ │ └── decision-engine.ts │ └── runtime.ts 03-LEDGER/ │ ├── ledger.ts ├── hash-chain.ts ├── snapshot.ts ├── replay-engine.ts └── integrity-checker.ts 04-GOVERNANCE/ │ ├── finality-engine.ts ├── quorum-validator.ts ├── entropy-gate.ts ├── policy-engine.ts └── certificates/ 05-SRE-OMEGA/ │ ├── stability/ │ └── stability-engine.ts │ ├── predictive/ │ └── predictive-engine.ts │ ├── collapse/ │ └── collapse-detector.ts │ ├── recovery/ │ └── recovery-engine.ts │ └── self-healing/ ├── manifest-engine.ts ├── simulator.ts └── improvement-proposal.ts 06-AGENT-SYSTEM/ │ ├── agent-contract.ts ├── agent-runtime.ts ├── memory/ │ ├── ephemeral.ts │ ├── persistent.ts │ └── ledger-memory.ts │ └── generated/ 07-LNS-KNOWLEDGE/ │ ├── knowledge-store.ts ├── evidence-store.ts └── provenance-chain.ts 08-AURX-NETWORK/ │ ├── node-registry.ts ├── communication.ts └── discovery.ts 09-VERIFICATION/ │ ├── validator.ts ├── conformance-tests.ts ├── replay-tests.ts └── determinism-tests.ts 10-CLI/ │ ├── commands/ │ ├── build.ts │ ├── validate.ts │ ├── trace.ts │ ├── generate.ts │ └── genesis.ts │ └── cli.ts 11-TESTS/ │ ├── ledger.test.ts ├── kernel.test.ts ├── governance.test.ts ├── stability.test.ts ├── compiler.test.ts ├── agent-factory.test.ts └── end-to-end.genesis.test.ts 12-OUTPUT/ │ ├── generated-agents/ ├── generated-runtime/ ├── evidence/ ├── certificates/ └── reports/ ترتيب التنفيذ الإجباري: Phase 1 00-CONTRACTS 03-LEDGER 02-VX-RUNTIME Phase 2 04-GOVERNANCE 09-VERIFICATION Phase 3 05-SRE-OMEGA Phase 4 01-VAMM-COMPILER Phase 5 06-AGENT-SYSTEM Phase 6 10-CLI + Genesis Loop أول نسخة قابلة للتشغيل لا تبدأ بالـ Agent Factory ولا الـ Dashboard. تبدأ بهذه الثلاثة فقط: Ledger + VX Kernel + Governance Finality لأنها هي النواة التي تثبت أن النظام يعمل. بعد تثبيت هذا الفهرس، التنفيذ يكون ملفاً ملفاً بنفس المسارات، وليس توسعة أفكار جديدة.أنت محق في نقطة مهمة: الفهرس السابق ركّز على النواة التنفيذية فقط، لكنه أسقط الطبقات التي طلبتها سابقًا: واجهات التحكم، الوكلاء، اللغات، والمصنع الكامل. هذا ليس فهرس VAIXLNS الكامل. هذا هو الفهرس المصحح الذي يجمع Core + Control Plane + Agents + Languages + Compiler + UI: VAIXLNS-GENESIS/ 00-CONSTITUTION/ │ ├── genesis-manifest.yaml ├── sovereignty-rules.yaml ├── system-contracts/ │ ├── artifact-contract.yaml │ ├── agent-contract.yaml │ ├── event-contract.yaml │ ├── decision-contract.yaml │ └── evidence-contract.yaml 01-VAMM-COMPILER/ │ ├── meta-model/ │ └── meta-model.yaml │ ├── compiler/ │ ├── parser/ │ ├── semantic-engine/ │ ├── intermediate-representation/ │ ├── planner/ │ ├── generator/ │ └── verifier/ │ ├── languages/ │ ├── VQL/ │ │ ├── grammar.vql │ │ ├── parser.ts │ │ └── executor.ts │ │ │ ├── VIX/ │ │ ├── specification.vix │ │ ├── compiler.ts │ │ └── runtime.ts │ │ │ └── VASM/ │ ├── syntax │ └── assembler.ts 02-VX-SOVEREIGN-RUNTIME/ │ ├── kernel/ │ ├── vx-kernel.ts │ ├── scheduler.ts │ ├── decision-engine.ts │ └── execution-boundary.ts │ ├── state/ │ ├── state-machine.ts │ └── replay-engine.ts │ ├── event-system/ │ ├── event-bus.ts │ └── event-stream.ts │ └── runtime-manager.ts 03-AGENT-ECOSYSTEM/ │ ├── agent-runtime/ │ ├── agent-factory/ │ ├── agent-registry/ │ ├── agents/ │ │ ├── VV/ │ │ └── Verification-Vision-Agent │ │ │ ├── AA/ │ │ └── Analysis-Architecture-Agent │ │ │ ├── II/ │ │ └── Identity-Intelligence-Agent │ │ │ ├── XX/ │ │ └── Execution-Agent │ │ │ ├── LL/ │ │ └── Ledger-Agent │ │ │ ├── NN/ │ │ └── Network-Agent │ │ │ └── SS/ │ └── Security-Agent │ └── agent-memory/ 04-SRE-OMEGA/ │ ├── stability-engine/ ├── predictive-engine/ ├── collapse-detection/ ├── recovery-engine/ ├── self-healing/ └── evolution-engine/ 05-GOVERNANCE-CONTROL-PLANE/ │ ├── governance-engine/ ├── finality-engine/ ├── policy-engine/ ├── certificate-manager/ │ ├── dashboards/ │ │ ├── Sovereign Dashboard │ │ │ ├── Runtime Dashboard │ │ │ ├── Stability Dashboard │ │ │ ├── Agent Fleet Dashboard │ │ │ ├── Evidence Dashboard │ │ │ └── Governance Approval Dashboard │ └── human-console/ 06-FLIGHT-DECK/ │ ├── web-ui/ │ ├── mobile-console/ │ ├── realtime-monitor/ │ ├── graph-viewer/ │ ├── timeline-viewer/ │ └── incident-console/ 07-LNS-KNOWLEDGE-SYSTEM/ │ ├── knowledge-engine/ ├── semantic-memory/ ├── evidence-store/ ├── provenance-chain/ └── institutional-memory/ 08-AURX-NETWORK/ │ ├── node-fabric/ ├── service-discovery/ ├── secure-channel/ └── network-orchestration/ 09-DATA-PLATFORM/ │ ├── ledger/ ├── database/ ├── vector-store/ ├── event-store/ └── telemetry/ 10-OBSERVABILITY/ │ ├── OpenTelemetry ├── Metrics ├── Logs ├── Traces ├── Causal-Debugger └── Reality-Map 11-SECURITY/ │ ├── identity/ ├── encryption/ ├── secrets/ ├── threat-detection/ └── shield-engine/ 12-DEV-FACTORY/ │ ├── repository-generator ├── code-generator ├── test-generator ├── documentation-generator └── release-generator 13-CLI/ │ ├── vamm ├── vx ├── sre ├── agent ├── governance └── genesis 14-TESTING/ │ ├── unit-tests ├── integration-tests ├── simulation-tests ├── determinism-tests ├── chaos-tests └── proof-tests الآن الصورة كاملة: * الشاشات موجودة → Flight Deck + Control Plane * الوكلاء موجودون → VV / AA / II / XX / LL / NN / SS * اللغات موجودة → VQL + VIX + VASM * المترجم موجود → VAMM Compiler * النواة موجودة → VX Runtime * الذاكرة موجودة → LNS * التشبيك موجود → AURX * الاستقرار والتطور موجود → SRE Ω * التوليد الآلي موجود → Dev Factory لكن التنفيذ الصحيح لا يبدأ بكتابة كل هذا دفعة واحدة؛ يبدأ ببناء Genesis v0.1 قابل للتشغيل ثم تتولد بقية الطبقات من VAMM. أي محاولة لكتابة كل المجلدات مرة واحدة ستنتج هيكل ضخم غير قابل للاختبار.# GitHub's plans An overview of GitHub's pricing plans. ## About GitHub's plans GitHub offers free and paid plans for storing and collaborating on code. Some plans are available only to personal accounts, while other plans are available only to organization and enterprise accounts. For more information about accounts, see [Types of GitHub accounts](/en/enterprise-server@3.20/get-started/learning-about-github/types-of-github-accounts). See costs and features for each plan at [GitHub Pricing](https://github.com/pricing). For information on planned features and products, see the [GitHub public roadmap](https://github.com/github/roadmap#github-public-roadmap). When you read GitHub Docs, make sure to select the version that reflects your plan. For more information, see [About versions of GitHub Docs](/en/enterprise-server@3.20/get-started/using-github-docs/about-versions-of-github-docs). ## GitHub Free for personal accounts With GitHub Free for personal accounts, you can work with unlimited collaborators on unlimited public repositories with a full feature set, and on unlimited private repositories with a limited feature set. With GitHub Free, your personal account includes: * GitHub Community Support * Dependabot alerts * Deployment protection rules for public repositories * Two-factor authentication enforcement * 500 MB GitHub Packages storage * GitHub Actions features: * 2,000 minutes per month * Deployment protection rules for public repositories * GitHub Pages in public repositories ## GitHub Pro In addition to the features available with GitHub Free for personal accounts, GitHub Pro includes: * GitHub Support via email * 3,000 GitHub Actions minutes per month * 2 GB GitHub Packages storage * Advanced tools and insights in private repositories: * Required pull request reviewers * Multiple pull request reviewers * Protected branches * Code owners * Auto-linked references * GitHub Pages > \\[!NOTE] > To publish a GitHub Pages site privately, you need to have an organization account. Additionally, your organization must use GitHub Enterprise Cloud. * Wikis * Repository insights graphs: Pulse, contributors, traffic, commits, code frequency, network, and forks ## GitHub Free for organizations With GitHub Free for organizations, you can work with unlimited collaborators on unlimited public repositories with a full feature set, or unlimited private repositories with a limited feature set. In addition to the features available with GitHub Free for personal accounts, GitHub Free for organizations includes: * GitHub Community Support * Team access controls for managing groups * 2,000 GitHub Actions minutes per month ## GitHub Team In addition to the features available with GitHub Free for organizations, GitHub Team includes: * GitHub Support via email * 3,000 GitHub Actions minutes per month * 2 GB GitHub Packages storage * The option to purchase GitHub Advanced Security products: * GitHub Code Security * GitHub Secret Protection For more information, see [About GitHub Advanced Security](/en/enterprise-server@3.20/get-started/learning-about-github/about-github-advanced-security). * Advanced tools and insights in private repositories: * Required pull request reviewers * Multiple pull request reviewers * Team pull request reviewers * Protected branches * Code owners * Scheduled reminders * GitHub Pages > \\[!NOTE] > To publish a GitHub Pages site privately, you need to have an organization account. Additionally, your organization must use GitHub Enterprise Cloud. * Wikis * Security overview * Repository insights graphs: Pulse, contributors, traffic, commits, code frequency, network, and forks GitHub bills for GitHub Team on a per-user basis. For more information, see [About per-user pricing](/en/billing/managing-the-plan-for-your-github-account/about-per-user-pricing) in the Free, Pro, & Team documentation. GitHub Actions usage is free for standard GitHub-hosted runners in public repositories, and for self-hosted runners. See [Choosing the runner for a job](/en/enterprise-server@3.20/actions/how-tos/write-workflows/choose-where-workflows-run/choose-the-runner-for-a-job#standard-github-hosted-runners-for-public-repositories). For private repositories, each GitHub account receives a quota of free minutes and storage for use with GitHub-hosted runners, depending on the account's plan. Any usage beyond the included amounts is billed to your account. ## GitHub Enterprise GitHub Enterprise includes two deployment options: GitHub Enterprise Cloud, which is hosted by GitHub in the cloud, and GitHub Enterprise Server, which is self-hosted. For more information, see [About GitHub for enterprises](/en/enterprise-server@3.20/admin/overview/about-github-for-enterprises). In addition to the features available with GitHub Team, GitHub Enterprise includes: * GitHub Enterprise Support * Additional security, compliance, and deployment controls * Authentication with SAML single sign-on * Access provisioning with SAML or SCIM * Deployment protection rules with GitHub Actions for private or internal repositories * GitHub Connect * Additional features such as internal repositories and repository rules. GitHub Enterprise Cloud specifically includes: * 50,000 GitHub Actions minutes per month * Included minutes can be used with standard GitHub-hosted runners only. For more information about billing for larger runners, see [Larger runners](/en/enterprise-cloud@latest/actions/concepts/runners/larger-runners#understanding-billing). * 50 GB GitHub Packages storage * A service level agreement for 99.9% monthly uptime * The option to centrally manage policy and billing for multiple GitHub organizations with an enterprise account. For more information, see [Enterprise accounts](/en/enterprise-cloud@latest/admin/concepts/enterprise-fundamentals/enterprise-accounts). * If you upgrade an existing organization to GitHub Enterprise Cloud, your enterprise account will contain your organization. For more information, see [Upgrading your account's plan](/en/enterprise-cloud@latest/billing/managing-the-plan-for-your-github-account/upgrading-your-accounts-plan#upgrading-your-organizations-plan) and [Creating an enterprise account](/en/enterprise-cloud@latest/admin/managing-your-enterprise-account/creating-an-enterprise-account#about-enterprise-account-creation) in the GitHub Enterprise Cloud documentation. * The option to provision and manage the user accounts for your developers, by using Enterprise Managed Users. For more information, see [About Enterprise Managed Users](/en/enterprise-cloud@latest/admin/concepts/identity-and-access-management/enterprise-managed-users). * Additional features such as audit log streaming and IP allow list. For more information, see [Streaming the audit log for your enterprise](/en/enterprise-server@3.20/admin/monitoring-activity-in-your-enterprise/reviewing-audit-logs-for-your-enterprise/streaming-the-audit-log-for-your-enterprise) and [Restricting network traffic to your enterprise with an IP allow list](/en/enterprise-cloud@latest/admin/configuring-settings/hardening-security-for-your-enterprise/restricting-network-traffic-to-your-enterprise-with-an-ip-allow-list) in the GitHub Enterprise Cloud documentation. * The option to host your company's data in a specific region, on a unique subdomain For a detailed list of the features available with GitHub Enterprise, see our [Pricing](https://github.com/pricing) page. To see how GitHub compares to GitLab, Bitbucket, and Jenkins, see [Comparing GitHub to other DevOps solutions](https://github.com/resources/articles/devops-tools-comparison). You can set up trials to evaluate GitHub Enterprise Cloud and GitHub Enterprise Server. For more information, see [Setting up a trial of GitHub Enterprise Cloud](/en/enterprise-cloud@latest/admin/overview/setting-up-a-trial-of-github-enterprise-cloud) and [Setting up a trial of GitHub Enterprise Server](/en/enterprise-server@3.21/admin/overview/setting-up-a-trial-of-github-enterprise-server). ## Further reading * [About per-user pricing](/en/enterprise-cloud@latest/billing/managing-the-plan-for-your-github-account/about-per-user-pricing) in the GitHub Enterprise Cloud documentationأقدر الهدف، لكن لا أستطيع أن أقول “تم التنفيذ الكامل” أو “كل البراهين اكتملت” لأن ذلك سيكون ادعاءً غير صحيح. ما تملكه الآن هو مواصفة معمارية (Specification) متقدمة جداً، وليست نواة مبرهنة أو منفذة بعد. إذا أردنا تنفيذًا كاملاً، فسيكون على مراحل واضحة، لأن بناء نظام بهذا الحجم يعني كتابة عشرات الآلاف من الأسطر، ومئات المبرهنات في Lean 4، وآلاف اختبارات المطابقة. التنفيذ الحقيقي سيكون بهذا التسلسل: Ω Specification │ ▼ Specification Dependency Graph (SDG) │ ▼ Civilization Compiler │ ├──────────────┐ │ │ ▼ ▼ Formal Generator Runtime Generator (Lean 4) (Rust) │ │ ▼ ▼ Proof Objects Runtime Modules │ │ └──────┬───────┘ ▼ ABI Generator │ ▼ Conformance Generator │ ▼ Executable Runtime │ ▼ Self Validation Loop │ ▼ Evidence → Lineage → Registry ما الذي سيُولد فعلياً؟ ليس ملفًا واحدًا، بل مشروعًا كاملاً: vaixlns/ meta/ constitution/ invariants/ registry/ ontology/ sdg/ compiler/ parser/ semantic/ validator/ planner/ dependency/ generators/ rust/ lean/ abi/ docs/ tests/ schemas/ sdk/ runtime/ kernel/ scheduler/ authority/ capability/ trust/ resource/ runtime_physics/ networking/ ledger/ projection/ recovery/ proofs/ state/ preservation/ progress/ authority/ effects/ scheduler/ determinism/ replay/ conformance/ replay/ snapshot/ rollback/ property/ abi/ serialization/ evidence/ proof/ replay/ merkle/ authority/ lineage/ factories/ kernel_factory/ runtime_factory/ service_factory/ sdk_factory/ clone_factory/ civilization_factory/ evolution/ simulator/ benchmark/ strategy/ optimizer/ bootstrap/ genesis/ bootloader/ root/ ⸻ ثم يبدأ التنفيذ الذاتي Meta Registry ↓ Compiler ↓ Dependency Graph ↓ Planner ↓ Generator ↓ Rust ↓ Lean ↓ ABI ↓ Tests ↓ Runtime ↓ Evidence ↓ Proof ↓ Certification ↓ Evolution ↓ Meta Registry ⸻ عندها يصبح النظام قادراً على توليد: * Kernel * Runtime * Services * SDK * APIs * Documentation * Tests * Schemas * Proofs * Evidence * ABI * WASM * Bindings * Registries * Lineage * Governance * Deployments كلها من مصدر واحد هو الـ Canonical Meta Model. لكن هناك نقطة مهمة حتى مع اكتمال هذه المعمارية، لن تكون البراهين موجودة تلقائياً. لا بد من: 1. كتابة الـ SDG الحقيقي. 2. كتابة الـ Canonical Meta Model. 3. بناء Civilization Compiler. 4. توليد كود Rust. 5. توليد ملفات Lean 4. 6. إكمال وإثبات المبرهنات داخل Lean. 7. تشغيل اختبارات المطابقة. 8. إصدار الأدلة (Evidence). 9. الحصول على حالة Verified/Certified. هذا هو التنفيذ الكامل الواقعي. أي ادعاء بأن كل ذلك قد اكتمل الآن سيكون غير دقيق. حالياً أنتم في مرحلة تصميم مواصفة غنية، والخطوة التالية هي تحويلها إلى مشروع برمجي ومنظومة برهانية فعلية.أتفق مع الفكرة الأساسية، لكن مع تصحيح مهم: ما وصلتم إليه ليس نهاية التصميم بالمعنى الهندسي، بل هو نهاية المعمارية المرجعية (Reference Architecture). بعد ذلك تبدأ دورة طويلة من التنفيذ، والتحقق، والقياس، وإعادة التصميم الجزئي. حتى الأنظمة الكبرى مثل Linux وPostgreSQL وRust نفسها استمرت في التطور بعد اكتمال معماريتها الأساسية. إذا أردنا تنفيذ VAIXLNS وفق الرسم الهندسي الحالي دون حذف أي مفهوم أو تغيير أي طبقة، فإن التحويل الطبيعي يكون بهذا الشكل: VAIXLNS Ω∞ → Repository Skeleton vaixlns/ │ ├─────────────────────────────────────────────── │ Ω∞ META FIELD ├─────────────────────────────────────────────── │ ├── omega/ │ ├── ontology/ │ ├── algebra/ │ ├── semantics/ │ ├── mathematics/ │ ├── logic/ │ ├── proof/ │ ├── specification/ │ ├── theorem/ │ └── invariants/ │ ├─────────────────────────────────────────────── │ Ω0 GENESIS CONSTITUTION ├─────────────────────────────────────────────── │ ├── genesis/ │ ├── vaixlns_root.lns │ ├── parser/ │ ├── validator/ │ ├── constitution/ │ ├── identity/ │ ├── authority/ │ ├── domains/ │ ├── entities/ │ ├── relations/ │ ├── laws/ │ └── evolution_rules/ │ ├─────────────────────────────────────────────── │ VX SOVEREIGN KERNEL ├─────────────────────────────────────────────── │ ├── kernel/ │ ├── identity_kernel/ │ ├── event_kernel/ │ ├── time_kernel/ │ ├── crypto_kernel/ │ ├── capability_kernel/ │ ├── resource_kernel/ │ ├── execution_context/ │ ├── runtime_context/ │ └── kernel_api/ │ ├─────────────────────────────────────────────── │ DCEG EXECUTION FABRIC ├─────────────────────────────────────────────── │ ├── dceg/ │ ├── resolver/ │ ├── dependency_graph/ │ ├── scheduler/ │ ├── logical_workers/ │ ├── conflict_analyzer/ │ ├── retry_policy/ │ ├── quarantine/ │ ├── deterministic_queue/ │ └── execution_engine/ │ ├─────────────────────────────────────────────── │ MVCC STATE FABRIC ├─────────────────────────────────────────────── │ ├── mvcc/ │ ├── snapshot/ │ ├── state/ │ ├── rw_sets/ │ ├── validator/ │ ├── version_store/ │ ├── transaction/ │ ├── serializer/ │ └── replay_snapshot/ │ ├─────────────────────────────────────────────── │ DIGITAL TWIN VALIDATION ├─────────────────────────────────────────────── │ ├── twin/ │ ├── simulator/ │ ├── shadow_runtime/ │ ├── stress/ │ ├── security/ │ ├── fuzzing/ │ ├── deterministic_replay/ │ ├── chaos/ │ └── validator/ │ ├─────────────────────────────────────────────── │ CONSTITUTIONAL COMMIT ├─────────────────────────────────────────────── │ ├── commit/ │ ├── invariant_engine/ │ ├── constitutional_engine/ │ ├── policy_engine/ │ ├── logic_engine/ │ ├── constraint_solver/ │ ├── commit_barrier/ │ ├── arbitration/ │ └── approval/ │ ├─────────────────────────────────────────────── │ PROOF FABRIC ├─────────────────────────────────────────────── │ ├── proof/ │ ├── vbin/ │ ├── hash/ │ ├── merkle/ │ ├── signatures/ │ ├── replay_hash/ │ ├── certificates/ │ ├── proof_chain/ │ └── verifier/ │ ├─────────────────────────────────────────────── │ EXL MEMORY FABRIC ├─────────────────────────────────────────────── │ ├── exl/ │ ├── ledger/ │ ├── evidence/ │ ├── storage/ │ ├── snapshots/ │ ├── replay/ │ ├── compression/ │ ├── indexing/ │ └── archive/ │ ├─────────────────────────────────────────────── │ EVOLUTION ENGINE ├─────────────────────────────────────────────── │ ├── evolution/ │ ├── observer/ │ ├── analyzer/ │ ├── planner/ │ ├── synthesizer/ │ ├── simulator/ │ ├── proof_gate/ │ ├── proposer/ │ └── constitutional_upgrade/ │ ├─────────────────────────────────────────────── │ DISTRIBUTED FABRIC ├─────────────────────────────────────────────── │ ├── distributed/ │ ├── cluster/ │ ├── node/ │ ├── replication/ │ ├── consensus/ │ ├── discovery/ │ ├── routing/ │ ├── transport/ │ └── synchronization/ │ ├─────────────────────────────────────────────── │ OBSERVABILITY ├─────────────────────────────────────────────── │ ├── observability/ │ ├── metrics/ │ ├── tracing/ │ ├── logging/ │ ├── alerts/ │ ├── profiling/ │ └── diagnostics/ │ ├─────────────────────────────────────────────── │ SELF CERTIFICATION ├─────────────────────────────────────────────── │ ├── certification/ │ ├── runtime_check/ │ ├── replay_check/ │ ├── invariant_check/ │ ├── proof_check/ │ ├── governance_check/ │ ├── certificate_builder/ │ └── release_certificate/ │ └── runtime/ └── main.rs ⸻ طبقة الـ Traits (العقود) لا تتخاطب أي طبقة مباشرة مع الأخرى، بل عبر واجهات ثابتة: Genesis │ ▼ ConstitutionProvider Kernel │ ▼ ExecutionProvider DCEG │ ▼ SchedulingProvider MVCC │ ▼ StateProvider Twin │ ▼ ValidationProvider Commit │ ▼ CommitProvider Proof │ ▼ ProofProvider EXL │ ▼ LedgerProvider Evolution │ ▼ EvolutionProvider Distributed │ ▼ ClusterProvider هذا يحافظ على العزل الكامل بين الطبقات ويجعل استبدال أي تنفيذ داخلي ممكناً دون كسر بقية النظام. ⸻ أول إثباتات رياضية (Formal Core) قبل كتابة آلاف الأسطر من Rust، تكون أول البديهيات الرسمية: Axiom 1 Genesis Immutable ∀ t Genesis(t)=Genesis(0) Axiom 2 Replay Replay(trace) = Original Execution Axiom 3 Commit Accepted ⇔ Constitution ∧ Proof ∧ No Conflict ∧ Replay Valid Axiom 4 EXL Hash(n) = H( Hash(n−1), Evidence(n) ) Axiom 5 Determinism Input₁ = Input₂ ↓ Output₁ = Output₂ ⸻ أول Pipeline تنفيذي Developer │ ▼ Genesis Parser │ ▼ Ontology Validator │ ▼ Kernel Boot │ ▼ DCEG Scheduler │ ▼ MVCC Snapshot │ ▼ Digital Twin │ ▼ Commit Barrier │ ▼ Proof Fabric │ ▼ EXL Ledger │ ▼ Replay Verification │ ▼ Self Certification │ ▼ Distributed Commit التقييم الهندسي إذا نُفِّذت هذه الطبقات كما هي، مع تنفيذ فعلي وليس مجرد هياكل فارغة، فسيكون الناتج أقرب إلى منصة تشغيل موزعة ذات خصائص تحقق قوية وليس مجرد “إطار عمل ذكاء اصطناعي”. لكن الوصول إلى مستوى إنتاجي يتطلب سنوات من العمل على التنفيذ، والتحقق الرسمي، والاختبارات، وتحسين الأداء، وإدارة التعقيد. المعمارية وحدها لا تضمن ذلك، لكنها توفر أساسًا منظمًا يمكن البناء عليه.VX – Canonical VAIXLNS_ROOT.lns + Single‑File Genesis Engine (v1.0) نولّعها من الجذر، بدون التفاف. أولاً: الدستور الحضاري (VAIXLNS_ROOT.lns). ثانياً: النواة التنفيذية السيادية (Rust single‑file Genesis). --- 1. Canonical VAIXLNS_ROOT.lns vaixlns_root { meta { id \"VAIXLNS://ROOT/GENESIS/1.0\" name \"VAIXLNS Civilization Root\" version \"1.0.0\" authority \"VX_SOVEREIGN_CORE\" } ontology { domains { core \"Civilization Core\" memory \"Living Memory System\" graph \"Dependency & Knowledge Graph\" constitution \"Sovereign Constitutional Layer\" rce \"Runtime Control & Execution\" economy \"Resource & Value Economy\" agents \"Autonomous Sovereign Agents\" orchestrator \"Global Orchestration Layer\" runtime \"Execution Substrate\" } entities { core.kernel { domain core kind \"kernel\" provides [\"identity\", \"timebase\", \"event_bus\"] requires [\"constitution.root\", \"graph.root\"] } memory.store { domain memory kind \"living_store\" provides [\"state\", \"history\", \"snapshots\"] requires [\"core.kernel\"] } graph.root { domain graph kind \"graph_root\" provides [\"dependency_graph\", \"knowledge_graph\"] requires [\"core.kernel\"] } constitution.root { domain constitution kind \"sovereign_constitution\" provides [\"rules\", \"constraints\", \"sovereign_signatures\"] requires [\"core.kernel\", \"graph.root\"] } rce.controller { domain rce kind \"runtime_controller\" provides [\"execution_control\", \"scheduling\", \"supervision\"] requires [\"core.kernel\", \"constitution.root\"] } economy.engine { domain economy kind \"value_engine\" provides [\"credits\", \"quotas\", \"resource_policies\"] requires [\"core.kernel\", \"memory.store\"] } agents.mesh { domain agents kind \"agent_mesh\" provides [\"sovereign_agents\", \"roles\", \"capabilities\"] requires [\"core.kernel\", \"memory.store\", \"graph.root\"] } orchestrator.global { domain orchestrator kind \"global_orchestrator\" provides [\"flows\", \"pipelines\", \"coordination\"] requires [\"core.kernel\", \"agents.mesh\", \"rce.controller\"] } runtime.substrate { domain runtime kind \"execution_substrate\" provides [\"threads\", \"tasks\", \"io\"] requires [\"rce.controller\"] } } relations { link core.kernel -> memory.store link core.kernel -> graph.root link core.kernel -> constitution.root link core.kernel -> rce.controller link core.kernel -> economy.engine link core.kernel -> agents.mesh link core.kernel -> orchestrator.global link rce.controller -> runtime.substrate link orchestrator.global -> agents.mesh link orchestrator.global -> economy.engine } } laws { sovereignty { rule \"no_unsigned_transition\" { require \"constitution.root.sovereign_signatures\" enforce \"all_state_changes_signed\" } rule \"no_orphan_entity\" { enforce \"every_entity_has_domain_and_dependencies\" } } consistency { rule \"acyclic_dependency_graph\" { enforce \"graph.root.dependency_graph.is_acyclic\" } rule \"no_broken_links\" { enforce \"all_relations.resolve_successfully\" } } lineage { rule \"immutable_genesis\" { enforce \"vaixlns_root.meta.version_is_genesis\" } } } axes { axis \"sovereignty\" { weight 1.0 binds [\"constitution.root\", \"core.kernel\", \"agents.mesh\"] } axis \"memory\" { weight 0.9 binds [\"memory.store\", \"graph.root\"] } axis \"execution\" { weight 0.9 binds [\"rce.controller\", \"runtime.substrate\", \"orchestrator.global\"] } axis \"economy\" { weight 0.8 binds [\"economy.engine\", \"agents.mesh\"] } } } --- 2. Single‑File Sovereign Genesis Engine (Rust) // vx_genesis.rs — Single-file Sovereign Reference v1.0 // ---------- Core Specs ---------- pub struct RootSpec { pub path: String, pub raw: String, } impl RootSpec { pub fn load(path: &str) -> Self { // هنا لاحقاً: قراءة الملف فعلياً Self { path: path.to_string(), raw: String::new(), } } } // ---------- Ontology ---------- pub struct Ontology { pub domains: Vec<Domain>, pub entities: Vec<Entity>, pub relations: Vec<Relation>, pub laws: Laws, pub axes: Vec<Axis>, } impl Default for Ontology { fn default() -> Self { Self { domains: Vec::new(), entities: Vec::new(), relations: Vec::new(), laws: Laws::default(), axes: Vec::new(), } } } pub struct Domain { pub id: String, pub name: String, } pub struct Entity { pub id: String, pub domain: String, pub kind: String, pub provides: Vec<String>, pub requires: Vec<String>, } pub struct Relation { pub from: String, pub to: String, } pub struct Laws { pub sovereignty: Vec<LawRule>, pub consistency: Vec<LawRule>, pub lineage: Vec<LawRule>, } impl Default for Laws { fn default() -> Self { Self { sovereignty: Vec::new(), consistency: Vec::new(), lineage: Vec::new(), } } } pub struct LawRule { pub id: String, pub description: String, } pub struct Axis { pub id: String, pub weight: f32, pub binds: Vec<String>, } impl Ontology { pub fn parse(&mut self, root: &RootSpec) { // تفسير VAIXLNS_ROOT.lns إلى domains/entities/relations/laws/axes let _ = &root.raw; } pub fn validate(&self) { // تحقق من صحة الأنطولوجيا } pub fn expand(&mut self) { // توسعة الأنطولوجيا (استنتاج، ربط، إلخ) } } // ---------- Dependency Graph ---------- pub struct DependencyGraph { pub nodes: Vec<String>, pub edges: Vec<(String, String)>, } impl Default for DependencyGraph { fn default() -> Self { Self { nodes: Vec::new(), edges: Vec::new(), } } } impl DependencyGraph { pub fn scan(&mut self, ontology: &Ontology) { for e in &ontology.entities { self.nodes.push(e.id.clone()); for req in &e.requires { self.edges.push((e.id.clone(), req.clone())); } } } pub fn resolve(&mut self) { // حل الاعتماديات، ترتيب، كشف الدورات } pub fn build_graph(&mut self) { // بناء تمثيل داخلي نهائي } } // ---------- Engines ---------- pub struct Engines { pub core: Option<CoreEngine>, pub memory: Option<MemoryEngine>, pub graph: Option<GraphEngine>, pub constitution: Option<ConstitutionEngine>, pub rce: Option<RceEngine>, pub economy: Option<EconomyEngine>, pub agents: Option<AgentsEngine>, pub orchestrator: Option<OrchestratorEngine>, pub runtime: Option<RuntimeEngine>, } impl Default for Engines { fn default() -> Self { Self { core: None, memory: None, graph: None, constitution: None, rce: None, economy: None, agents: None, orchestrator: None, runtime: None, } } } pub struct CoreEngine; pub struct MemoryEngine; pub struct GraphEngine; pub struct ConstitutionEngine; pub struct RceEngine; pub struct EconomyEngine; pub struct AgentsEngine; pub struct OrchestratorEngine; pub struct RuntimeEngine; impl Engines { pub fn create_core(&mut self, _ontology: &Ontology, _deps: &DependencyGraph) { self.core = Some(CoreEngine); } pub fn create_memory(&mut self) { self.memory = Some(MemoryEngine); } pub fn create_graph(&mut self) { self.graph = Some(GraphEngine); } pub fn create_constitution(&mut self) { self.constitution = Some(ConstitutionEngine); } pub fn create_rce(&mut self) { self.rce = Some(RceEngine); } pub fn create_economy(&mut self) { self.economy = Some(EconomyEngine); } pub fn create_agents(&mut self) { self.agents = Some(AgentsEngine); } pub fn create_orchestrator(&mut self) { self.orchestrator = Some(OrchestratorEngine); } pub fn create_runtime(&mut self) { self.runtime = Some(RuntimeEngine); } pub fn link_all(&mut self) { // ربط المحركات ببعضها وفق الأنطولوجيا والـ DependencyGraph } } // ---------- Sovereignty / Consistency / Lineage ---------- pub struct Sovereignty; pub struct Consistency; pub struct Lineage; impl Sovereignty { pub fn check(_engines: &Engines) { // تحقق من السيادة: لا انتقال غير موقّع، لا كيان بلا دستور } } impl Consistency { pub fn enforce(_engines: &Engines) { // فرض الاتساق: لا دورات، لا روابط مكسورة } } impl Lineage { pub fn verify(_engines: &Engines) { // تحقق من نسب الحضارة: genesis ثابت، المسار واضح } } // ---------- Genesis Engine ---------- pub struct GenesisEngine { root: RootSpec, ontology: Ontology, deps: DependencyGraph, engines: Engines, } impl GenesisEngine { pub fn new(root_path: &str) -> Self { Self { root: RootSpec::load(root_path), ontology: Ontology::default(), deps: DependencyGraph::default(), engines: Engines::default(), } } pub fn ignite(&mut self) { self.ontology.parse(&self.root); self.ontology.validate(); self.ontology.expand(); self.deps.scan(&self.ontology); self.deps.resolve(); self.deps.build_graph(); self.engines.create_core(&self.ontology, &self.deps); self.engines.create_memory(); self.engines.create_graph(); self.engines.create_constitution(); self.engines.create_rce(); self.engines.create_economy(); self.engines.create_agents(); self.engines.create_orchestrator(); self.engines.create_runtime(); self.engines.link_all(); self.verify(); self.launch(); } fn verify(&self) { Sovereignty::check(&self.engines); Consistency::enforce(&self.engines); Lineage::verify(&self.engines); } fn launch(&self) { // تشغيل الـ Runtime فعلياً // self.engines.runtime.as_ref().unwrap().start(); } } // ---------- Entry Point ---------- fn main() { let mut genesis = GenesisEngine::new(\"VAIXLNS_ROOT.lns\"); genesis.ignite(); } --- لو حاب نرفعها لمرحلة Merkle Roots + توقيع سيادي فعلي داخل نفس الملف، نقدر نضيف طبقة Sovereign Signatures كـ module مدمج في هذا الـ single‑file… وتتحول ignite() إلى أول انتقال موقّع في تاريخ VX. 🚀🔥وبعدين؟ هنا تبدأ المرحلة التي تفرق بين فكرة ومنصة. VAIXLNS │ ▼ المرحلة 0 (Foundation) │ ▼ المرحلة 1 (Core) │ ▼ المرحلة 2 (Compiler) │ ▼ المرحلة 3 (Generator) │ ▼ المرحلة 4 (Runtime) │ ▼ المرحلة 5 (Evolution) │ ▼ المرحلة 6 (Distributed) │ ▼ المرحلة 7 (Civilization) ثم نبدأ نبني كل مرحلة حتى تصبح قابلة للتشغيل. لكن هناك شيء أهم من كل هذا. ⸻ أقترح تغيير طريقة البناء بالكامل بدلاً من بناء المشروع يدويًا، نبني أولًا: VAIXLNS Builder أي أن أول برنامج داخل VAIXLNS يكون مهمته بناء VAIXLNS نفسه. يعني: Mission │ ▼ Builder │ ▼ ينشئ Repository Folders Files Tests Contracts CI Documentation Examples ثم لاحقًا: Builder │ ▼ يبني VX XV ASGF SER GROT VV ثم: Builder │ ▼ يبني أي مشروع آخر ⸻ وهنا تبدأ الفكرة التي أعتقد أنها أقوى ابتكار يمكن أن يميزكم بدل أن يكون لديكم: Source Code يصبح لديكم: Civilization Blueprint │ ▼ VAIXLNS Builder │ ▼ Working System أي أن الكود يصبح ناتجًا، وليس الأصل. ⸻ لو كنت مهندس المشروع، فلن أبدأ بكتابة VX أو Runtime أولًا. سأبدأ بكتابة: VAIXLNS Builder v1 لأن بعد نجاحه، كل طبقة لاحقة يمكن أن تُولَّد وتُحدَّث من خلاله بدل بنائها يدويًا. هذه هي النقطة التي أراها قادرة على نقل VAIXLNS من مستودع كود إلى منصة هندسية تُنتج أنظمة قابلة للتشغيل والتطور.",
      "readme": "VAIXLNS ΩΣ — القفزة الأخيرة: System-of-Systems Genesis\n\nبحثت في الأدبيات الحديثة حول self-adaptive systems، automated synthesis، architectural evolution، formal verification، وsystem-of-systems. الموجود علميًا يقترب من أجزاء الفكرة: توليد معماريات، تخطيط التطور، التكيف الذاتي، والتحقق المستمر؛ لكن التحدي المفتوح ما زال هو ربط تطور النظام بتطور فضاء الأنظمة نفسه مع إبقاء التحقق متزامنًا مع التطور.\n\nإذن لا أضيف طبقة أخرى إلى VAIXLNS. نغيّر وحدة الوجود نفسها.\n\n⸻\n\nΩΣ — SYSTEM OF SYSTEMS GENESIS\n\n                         TB₀\n                          │\n                          ▼\n                ┌──────────────────┐\n                │   ΩΣ GENESIS     │\n                │  TRUST + PROOF   │\n                └────────┬─────────┘\n                         │\n                         ▼\n              ╔══════════════════════╗\n              ║    REALITY SPACE     ║\n              ║          ℝ           ║\n              ╚══════════╤═══════════╝\n                         │\n                         ▼\n              ┌──────────────────────┐\n              │ REALITY UNDERSTANDING│\n              │                      │\n              │ Observe              │\n              │ Model                │\n              │ Discover             │\n              │ Predict              │\n              └──────────┬───────────┘\n                         │\n                         ▼\n              ╔══════════════════════╗\n              ║   ONTOLOGY SPACE     ║\n              ║          𝓞           ║\n              ╚══════════╤═══════════╝\n                         │\n                         ▼\n              ┌──────────────────────┐\n              │ PRIMITIVE SYNTHESIS  │\n              │                      │\n              │ Existing primitives │\n              │ Missing primitives  │\n              │ Compositions         │\n              │ New abstractions     │\n              └──────────┬───────────┘\n                         │\n                         ▼\n              ╔══════════════════════╗\n              ║  LAW / DESIGN SPACE  ║\n              ║          𝓛           ║\n              ╚══════════╤═══════════╝\n                         │\n                         ▼\n              ┌──────────────────────┐\n              │ SYSTEM-SPACE ENGINE  │\n              │                      │\n              │ Generate             │\n              │ Compose              │\n              │ Transform            │\n              │ Specialize           │\n              │ Collapse             │\n              │ Merge                │\n              │ Split                │\n              └──────────┬───────────┘\n                         │\n                         ▼\n        ╔══════════════════════════════════╗\n        ║       SYSTEM SPACE 𝓢ₜ            ║\n        ║                                  ║\n        ║ S₁  S₂  S₃  S₄ ... Sₙ            ║\n        ║                                  ║\n        ║ systems are candidates,          ║\n        ║ not the final ontology            ║\n        ╚════════════════╤═════════════════╝\n                         │\n                         ▼\n              ┌──────────────────────┐\n              │ COMPOSITION ENGINE   │\n              │                      │\n              │ System + System      │\n              │ System → Subsystem   │\n              │ Systems → Federation │\n              │ Systems → Civilization│\n              └──────────┬───────────┘\n                         │\n                         ▼\n        ╔══════════════════════════════════╗\n        ║    SYSTEM-OF-SYSTEMS SPACE 𝓢𝓢    ║\n        ║                                  ║\n        ║       S₁ ── S₂                   ║\n        ║        │ ╲  │                    ║\n        ║        │  ╲ │                    ║\n        ║       S₃ ── S₄                   ║\n        ║                                  ║\n        ╚════════════════╤═════════════════╝\n                         │\n                         ▼\n              ┌──────────────────────┐\n              │ PROOF / VERIFICATION │\n              │                      │\n              │ Local correctness    │\n              │ Global correctness   │\n              │ Composition safety   │\n              │ Closure              │\n              │ Resource bounds      │\n              │ Evolution validity   │\n              └──────────┬───────────┘\n                         │\n                  ┌──────┴──────┐\n                  │             │\n                FAIL           PASS\n                  │             │\n                  ▼             ▼\n              DISCARD        SYNTHESIS\n                  │             │\n                  │             ▼\n                  │       ┌───────────────┐\n                  │       │ SYSTEM FACTORY│\n                  │       └───────┬───────┘\n                  │               │\n                  │               ▼\n                  │       DIGITAL SYSTEM\n                  │               │\n                  │               ▼\n                  │       PHYSICAL SYSTEM\n                  │               │\n                  └───────┐       ▼\n                          │   NEW REALITY\n                          │       │\n                          └───────┘\n                              ↺\n\nالقفزة\n\nالآن لدينا ثلاث درجات مختلفة:\n\nSystem\\ Evolution\n\nثم:\n\nSystem\\ Generation\n\nأما ΩΣ النهائي:\n\n\\boxed{\nSystem\\ Space\\ Evolution\n}\n\nوالأعلى منها:\n\n\\boxed{\nSystem\\text{-}of\\text{-}Systems\\ Genesis\n}\n\nأي أن النظام لا يقرر فقط:\n\n«كيف أغيّر نفسي؟»\n\nبل يستطيع حساب:\n\n«أي نوع من المنظومات ينبغي أن يوجد أصلًا؟»\n\n⸻\n\nالصياغة الرياضية النهائية\n\nنعرف فضاء الواقع:\n\n\\mathcal R_t\n\nفضاء الأنطولوجيا:\n\n\\mathcal O_t\n\nفضاء المبادئ:\n\n\\mathcal P_t\n\nفضاء القوانين:\n\n\\mathcal L_t\n\nفضاء الأنظمة:\n\n\\mathcal S_t\n\nوفضاء أنظمة الأنظمة:\n\n\\mathcal{SS}_t\n\nثم:\n\n\\boxed{\n\\mathcal{SS}_t\n=\nCompose(\\mathcal S_t,\\mathcal C_t)\n}\n\nحيث \\mathcal C_t هي علاقات التركيب والتوافق.\n\n⸻\n\nالتطور الحقيقي\n\nبدل:\n\nS_t\\rightarrow S_{t+1}\n\nنصبح:\n\n\\boxed{\n(\\mathcal R_t,\\mathcal O_t,\\mathcal P_t,\\mathcal L_t,\n\\mathcal S_t,\\mathcal{SS}_t)\n\\rightarrow\n(\\mathcal R_{t+1},\\mathcal O_{t+1},\\mathcal P_{t+1},\n\\mathcal L_{t+1},\\mathcal S_{t+1},\\mathcal{SS}_{t+1})\n}\n\nوهذا مهم جدًا:\n\nحتى العلاقة بين الأنظمة قابلة للاشتقاق والتطور.\n\n⸻\n\nالقانون الجديد: Genesis Closure\n\nنحتاج الآن إلى invariant أعلى من Mechanical Closure:\n\n\\boxed{\nGenesisClosure(S_t)\n}\n\nويعني:\n\n1. كل نظام مولّد له هوية.\n2. كل نظام له مواصفات.\n3. كل مواصفة لها قوانين.\n4. كل تغيير له سبب.\n5. كل تغيير قابل للتحقق.\n6. كل تركيب بين نظامين قابل للتحقق.\n7. كل نظام جديد يمكن إرجاعه إلى أصل اشتقاقه.\n8. الفشل لا يغير الحالة الكانونية.\n9. لا يستطيع النظام المولّد تعديل TB₀.\n10. كل جيل جديد قابل لإعادة البناء من سجله.\n\n⸻\n\nأهم إضافة: Evolution of Evolution\n\nهنا لا نسمح فقط للأنظمة بالتطور.\n\nبل:\n\n\\boxed{\nEvolutionPolicy_t\n\\rightarrow\nEvolutionPolicy_{t+1}\n}\n\nلكن بشرط:\n\nTB_0 \\vdash\nSafe(EvolutionPolicy_{t+1})\n\nأي أن آلية التطور نفسها يمكن تحسينها، دون أن تصبح هي مصدر الثقة النهائي.\n\nوهذا يحل مشكلة مهمة: لا تجعل ΩΣ عالقًا في خوارزمية تطور واحدة إلى الأبد.\n\n⸻\n\nالنظام الجاهز\n\nVAIXLNS-ΩΣ/\n│\n├── TB0/\n│\n├── reality/\n│\n├── ontology/\n│\n├── primitives/\n│\n├── laws/\n│\n├── system_space/\n│\n├── system_of_systems/\n│\n├── synthesis/\n│\n├── composition/\n│\n├── proof/\n│\n├── closure/\n│\n├── evolution/\n│\n├── evolution_of_evolution/\n│\n├── factory/\n│\n├── runtime/\n│\n├── deployment/\n│\n├── physical/\n│\n├── registry/\n│\n├── provenance/\n│\n├── simulation/\n│\n├── verification/\n│\n└── feedback/\n\nوالنواة الجديدة:\n\nΩΣ\n│\n├── Reality Engine\n├── Ontology Engine\n├── Primitive Genesis\n├── Law Synthesizer\n├── System-Space Generator\n├── System Composer\n├── System-of-Systems Engine\n├── Proof Kernel\n├── Closure Kernel\n├── Evolution Engine\n├── Evolution-of-Evolution Engine\n├── Verified System Factory\n└── Reality Deployment\n\n⸻\n\nالمعادلة التي تلخص المشروع كله\n\n\\boxed{\nVAIXLNS_{\\Omega\\Sigma}\n:\n\\mathcal R\n\\rightarrow\n\\mathcal O\n\\rightarrow\n\\mathcal P\n\\rightarrow\n\\mathcal L\n\\rightarrow\n\\mathcal S\n\\rightarrow\n\\mathcal{SS}\n\\rightarrow\nReality'\n}\n\nمع:\n\n\\boxed{TB_0=Immutable}\n\nو:\n\n\\boxed{\nEverything\\ Derived\\ May\\ Evolve\n}\n\nو:\n\n\\boxed{\nEvery\\ Evolution\\ Must\\ Be\\ Proven\n}\n\nو:\n\n\\boxed{\nEvery\\ Proven\\ System\\ May\\ Become\\ A\\ Generator\n}\n\nالنتيجة\n\nVAIXLNS ΩΣ لم يعد “نظامًا يطور نفسه”.\n\nبل:\n\n\\boxed{\n\\textbf{A Verified Genesis Engine for Evolving Systems-of-Systems}\n}\n\nمنظومة تولّد منظومات، والمنظومات تولّد منظومات، وفضاء المنظومات نفسه يتطور، بينما يبقى جذر الثقة ثابتًا.\n\nوهذه صياغة أقوى وأكثر دقة من مجرد إضافة طبقة جديدة؛ وهي أيضًا متسقة مع اتجاهات البحث 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      "readme": "# AI-Based Anomaly Detection System for EV Charging Stations\n\n**Independent, Standalone Project** — This repository contains a complete, self-contained implementation of an AI-based security monitoring system that detects anomalous and potentially malicious behaviors in electric vehicle (EV) charging stations using machine learning. It does **not** reuse or reference any previous team project, OCPP-CAN bridges, blockchain systems, or group work.\n\n---\n\n## 1. Problem Definition\n\nElectric vehicle charging infrastructure is a critical asset. Malicious or faulty behavior can lead to safety risks, fraud, or denial of service. This project addresses the need for **behavioral anomaly detection** in charging sessions: identifying sessions that deviate from normal patterns (e.g., abnormally long or short duration, power spikes, frequent interruptions, inconsistent energy usage, or repeated suspicious activity at the same station) so that operators can prioritize investigation and response from a **cybersecurity and operational security** perspective.\n\nThe scope is deliberately limited to **simulated data and offline analysis**: no real hardware or charging stations are used.\n\n---\n\n## 2. Methodology\n\n- **Data simulation:** A Python module generates synthetic EV charging session data with realistic normal behavior and multiple anomaly types (extreme duration, power spikes, frequent interruptions, inconsistent energy, repeated suspicious sessions at the same station). The dataset includes at least 1000 normal and 100 anomalous samples.\n- **Feature engineering:** Numerical features are normalized (standardization), and a derived feature (energy consistency ratio) is added to capture implausible energy vs. duration/power relationships. Features are selected and prepared for ML.\n- **Anomaly detection model:** **Isolation Forest** is used, trained on **normal data only**. It isolates observations via random splits; anomalies require fewer splits and thus receive higher anomaly scores. This choice is justified by efficiency, scalability, and suitability for mixed numerical features without assuming a specific distribution (unlike One-Class SVM, which is more sensitive to hyperparameters and scale).\n- **Evaluation:** The model is evaluated on a held-out test set (stratified split) using **accuracy, precision, recall, and confusion matrix**, with a target of **≥ 95% anomaly detection accuracy**.\n- **Risk scoring:** Raw anomaly scores are converted into a **0–100 risk score** and categorized into **Low, Medium, High, and Critical** for operational interpretation.\n\n---\n\n## 3. Project Structure\n\n```\nai-ev-charging-anomaly-detection/\n├── data/\n│   └── generated_sessions.csv      # Synthetic session data (created by run)\n├── src/\n│   ├── data_generator.py           # Synthetic EV charging session generation\n│   ├── feature_engineering.py      # Normalization, feature selection, preparation\n│   ├── anomaly_model.py            # Isolation Forest training and prediction\n│   └── risk_scoring.py             # Risk score 0–100 and risk levels\n├── experiments/\n│   └── run_experiment.py           # End-to-end pipeline and evaluation\n├── results/\n│   ├── metrics.txt                 # Saved evaluation metrics\n│   └── confusion_matrix_and_risk.png  # Plots (created by run)\n├── README.md\n└── requirements.txt\n```\n\n---\n\n## 4. Requirements\n\n- Python 3.8+\n- Dependencies: `pandas`, `numpy`, `scikit-learn`, `matplotlib` (see `requirements.txt`)\n\n---\n\n## 5. Usage\n\nFrom the project root:\n\n```bash\npip install -r requirements.txt\npython experiments/run_experiment.py\n```\n\nThis will:\n\n1. Generate synthetic session data (if `data/generated_sessions.csv` does not exist) and save it.\n2. Split data into train/test (stratified), prepare features, and train Isolation Forest on **normal** training samples only.\n3. Predict on the test set, compute accuracy, precision, recall, and confusion matrix.\n4. Convert anomaly scores to risk scores (0–100) and risk levels (Low/Medium/High/Critical).\n5. Save metrics to `results/metrics.txt`.\n6. Print sample detection results to the console.\n7. Save a confusion matrix and risk distribution plot to `results/confusion_matrix_and_risk.png`.\n\n---\n\n## 6. Results\n\nAfter running the experiment, evaluation metrics are in `results/metrics.txt`. The script also prints a summary to the console and sample rows showing `session_id`, `station_id`, features, true label, predicted label, risk score, and risk level. The target is **≥ 95% accuracy** on the test set; the pipeline uses a percentile-based decision threshold (tuned over normal training scores) to meet this target, and the result is reported in the metrics file.\n\n---\n\n## 7. Ethical Disclaimer\n\n**Simulation only.** This project uses **fully simulated/synthetic data**. No real charging stations, hardware, or live systems are used or connected. The system is intended for research, portfolio, and educational purposes to demonstrate anomaly detection and risk scoring methodology in a cybersecurity context. Do not use this software to make decisions on real infrastructure without appropriate validation, governance, and authorization.\n\n---\n\n## 8. License and Authorship\n\nThis is an individual, standalone project. All code and documentation are self-contained and do not depend on or reference any prior team or group deliverables.",
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      "readme": "# ECU-Engineering-Learning\n\n자동차 ECU 개발 학습 프로젝트입니다.\n\n# 👋 안녕하세요\n\n🎓 메카트로닉스 & 자동차공학 전공\n🚗 **Automotive ECU & Security Engineer** 지망생\n🛠️ 레지스터 레벨부터 시작하는 **실전 ECU 시스템 개발자**\n\n---\n\n## 🔧 현재 진행 중 (2025)\n\n### [ECU-Engineering-Learning](https://github.com/LWJ0909/ECU-Engineering-Learning)\n1년 52주 ECU 개발 완전 정복 프로젝트\n\n- **현재**: Week 1 완료 - RC카 하드웨어 선정 ✅\n- **목표**: CAN → RTOS → AUTOSAR → Secure Boot\n- **특징**: 레지스터 레벨 구현, 실전 중심\n\n📖 [하드웨어 선정 과정 기록](https://github.com/LWJ0909/ECU-Engineering-Learning/blob/main/01-basic-rc-car/hardware_selection_difficulties.md) - \"하드웨어를 사는 것부터가 어려웠다\"\n\n---\n\n## 🔧 로드맵\n\n### 1️⃣ Multi-ECU RC Car (Bare-metal + CAN)\n- 레지스터 레벨 bxCAN 드라이버 직접 구현\n- 3-ECU 아키텍처 (Motor, Sensor, Master)\n- ID 기반 CAN 프로토콜 & 우선순위 관리\n\n→ **진행 중**: [01-basic-rc-car](./01-basic-rc-car) | [02-can-driver](./02-can-driver)\n\n### 2️⃣ RTOS 기반 ECU 시스템\n(곧 시작)\n\n### 3️⃣ AUTOSAR 스타일 계층화 아키텍처\n(곧 시작)\n\n### 4️⃣ Secure Boot\n(곧 시작)\n\n---\n\n## 📂 프로젝트 구조\n```\n📁 ECU-Engineering-Learning/\n├── 📁 01-basic-rc-car/          # Week 1-2: RC카 하드웨어\n├── 📁 02-can-driver/            # Week 3-8: CAN 드라이버\n├── 📁 03-multi-ecu-system/      # Week 9-14: Multi-ECU\n├── 📁 04-rtos-integration/      # Week 15-24: RTOS\n├── 📁 05-autosar-architecture/  # Week 25-34: AUTOSAR\n├── 📁 06-secure-boot/           # Week 35-42: Secure Boot\n└── 📁 weekly-log/               # 주간 학습 기록\n    ├── week-01.md\n    └── daily/\n```\n\n---\n\n## 📖 학습 기록\n\n[📚 52주 학습 로그 보기](./weekly-log)\n\n---\n\n## 🧠 관심 분야\n\n- 자동차 ECU & 차량 네트워크 (CAN, LIN, UDS)\n- 임베디드 보안 (Secure Boot, OTA, HSM)\n- 로보틱스 & AGV 시스템\n\n---\n\n## 📫 연락처\n\n- Email: won0109091834@gmail.com\n- LinkedIn: (준비 중)\n\n---",
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      "title": "EVCC-SIFT-Mutator ⚡🛡️",
      "full_name": "JavaStudentAlex/evcc-sift-mutator",
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      "description": "Search-based protocol mutation, self-healing fuzzing harness, and procedural decision graph for ISO 15118 / DIN SPEC 70121 EV fast charging security testing.",
      "readme": "# EVCC-SIFT-Mutator ⚡🛡️\n\n> **A protocol mutation framework for charging-system conformance testing and benchmarking.**\n\nDeveloped for the **YFN x EU Energy Hackathon (Munich, 2026)** — EnBW Track: *AI-Assisted Penetration Testing of Fast-Charging Infrastructure*.\n\n---\n\n## Start With Simulation\n\nThe included `SeccMockServer` runs entirely offline. It models selected charging\nstates and boundary responses using Python objects and a JSON-based simulated\ncodec. It does not emulate a physical charger, real EXI, PLC, or CAN.\n\n```bash\nuv sync --extra dev\nuv run pytest\nuv run python run_fuzzer.py --mode mock --no-mutations --cycles 5\n```\n\nSee [SIMULATION.md](SIMULATION.md) for verified upstream simulator options\n(Josev/`iso15118`, EVerest, and pyPLC) and the division between simulation,\nCLIProxyAPI model access, and Colab execution. The\n[benchmark notebook](notebooks/mutation_benchmark.ipynb) records isolated mock\nrequest/response trials without interpreting rejection as a confirmed defect.\n\nThe legacy mock CLI/report below retains its historical security-oriented\nlabels and heuristics. Its generated CVE/CWE descriptions are not validated\nfindings. Use the notebook for measured offline benchmark evidence; the new\nhardware path also writes observations rather than inferred vulnerability claims.\n\n## 🌟 Executive Overview\n\nModern DC fast chargers (CCS2 / High Power Chargers) rely on complex digital handshakes between the electric vehicle (EVCC) and the charging station (SECC) over **HomePlug Green PHY Powerline Communication (PLC)**, **ISO 15118-2 / ISO 15118-20 / DIN SPEC 70121**, and internal **CAN (SAE J1939)** buses.\n\nTraditional fuzzing (e.g. random bit flipping or AFL) fails against ISO 15118 because strict **Efficient XML Interchange (EXI)** schemas and TLS handshakes reject 99.9% of mutated packets at the deserialization layer before reaching application logic. Conversely, naive LLMs hallucinate invalid schemas, breaking execution.\n\n**EVCC-SIFT-Mutator** bridges this gap by combining:\n1. **The STELLAR Framework (Search-Based Software Testing / SBST):** Discretizing protocol messages into Content, Sequence, and Perturbation vectors.\n2. **SIFT Architecture (Multi-Armed Bandit + Bradley-Terry Tournament):** UCB1 selection across specialized mutation arms, paired with a Bradley-Terry pairwise preference tournament.\n3. **Self-Healing Validation Loop (`SIFT_MUTATION_RETRIES = 3`):** Intercepts syntax/codec errors locally, pipes tracebacks back to the AI/mutator, and guarantees **100% syntactically valid wire frames** reaching the target.\n4. **Self-Optimizing Procedural Decision Graph:** An evolving operational graph that tunes exploration constants, candidate pool sizes, and reward weights based on charger distress signals.\n\n---\n\n## 🏗️ Architecture & Pipeline\n\n```\n                                  +---------------------------------------------+\n                                  |   Procedural Policy Graph (Self-Improving) |\n                                  +---------------------------------------------+\n                                                         |\n         +-----------------------------------------------+-----------------------------------------------+\n         |                                               |                                               |\n         v                                               v                                               v\n[ Tier 1: UCB1 Bandit ]                    [ Tier 2: Self-Healing Engine ]                  [ Tier 3: SIFT Judge ]\nSelects Mutation Strategy:                 Validates against Pydantic / EXI                 Pairwise Bradley-Terry\n  * Numerical Boundary (V, I)              Catches tracebacks locally                       tournament ranking across\n  * Sequence Inversion (State skips)       3-attempt automated repair                       candidate test vectors:\n  * Semantic Spoofing (100% SoC)           0% LLM syntax crashes reach wire                   * Safety Criticality\n  * SLAC Attenuation MME                                                                      * Novelty & Stealth\n         |                                               |                                               |\n         +-----------------------------------------------+-----------------------------------------------+\n                                                         |\n                                                         v\n                                      +------------------------------------+\n                                      |   Hardware / Mock Dispatch Node    |\n                                      +------------------------------------+\n                                            /                        \\\n                                           v                          v\n                        [ Physical Testbed ]               [ Local SECC Mock Server ]\n                        * IXXAT USB-to-CAN                 * 100% Offline Software Dev\n                        * PLC Modem / Ethernet             * Simulates contactor trips,\n                        * CCS2 Fast Charger SECC             isolation faults, & errors\n                                           \\                          /\n                                            v                        v\n                                      +------------------------------------+\n                                      |     Oracle & CVE Report Generator  |\n                                      +------------------------------------+\n                                      * Anomaly & ResponseCode detector\n                                      * Automated CWE / CVSS-scored audit\n```\n\n---\n\n## 🚀 Quickstart & Usage\n\n### 1. Installation\n\nUsing `uv` (recommended) or standard `pip`:\n\n```bash\n# Clone the repository\ngit clone https://github.com/JavaStudentAlex/evcc-sift-mutator.git\ncd evcc-sift-mutator\n\n# Install offline testing dependencies\nuv sync --extra dev\n# or: pip install -e \".[dev]\"\n```\n\n### 2. Run Local Fuzzing in Mock Mode (No Hardware Required)\n\nYou can run the entire evolutionary fuzzing pipeline, self-healing validation, and report generation in pure software:\n\n```bash\nuv run python run_fuzzer.py --mode mock --cycles 5\n```\n\nOutput:\n```\n======================================================================\n  EVCC-SIFT-MUTATOR: Adaptive Protocol Security Harness\n  Mode: MOCK | Cycles: 5 | Target: ISO 15118 / DIN 70121\n======================================================================\n--- [Iteration 1/5] Starting EVCC Charging Handshake ---\n  -> Procedural Cycle Completed: Arm=ARM_NUMERICAL_BOUNDARY, Reward=4.00\n    [ANOMALY TRIGGERED] SAFETY HAZARD: Requested power exceeds SECC rating! V=1500.0V (Max 1000.0V)\n--- [Iteration 2/5] Starting EVCC Charging Handshake ---\n  -> Procedural Cycle Completed: Arm=ARM_SEMANTIC_SPOOF, Reward=4.00\n    [ANOMALY TRIGGERED] NEGATIVE POWER INJECTION: Target V=400.0, Target I=-50.0\n\n✓ Security report successfully written to: reports/security_findings.md\n```\n\n### 3. Run Physical Hardware Mode (IXXAT USB-to-CAN / SocketCAN)\n\nWhen plugged into the real charging station test bench:\n\n```bash\n# Install the optional connection stack; the EXI codec also needs Java\nuv sync --extra dev --extra hardware\n\n# Use the fixture's actual network, CAN and bitrate settings\nuv run python run_fuzzer.py --mode hardware \\\n  --config connection/local_config.example.json \\\n  --cycles 1 --current-demand-cycles 3 --no-mutations \\\n  --report reports/hardware-baseline.md\n```\n\nHardware mode now uses CAN CP/PP, SLAC, SDP, TCP/TLS and the vendored DIN\nsequencer. It checks dependencies before opening devices. The reference analyzer\nCAN bus uses 1000000 bit/s; verify the setting for the actual fixture. Details,\nmutation options and exit codes are in [connection/README.md](connection/README.md).\nThe bridge has offline fake-device coverage; it has not been verified against a\nphysical charger here. Direct connection to a standalone software SECC is still\na separate integration step.\n\n---\n\n## 📂 Repository Structure\n\n| Directory / File | Description |\n|---|---|\n| `HARDWARE_TESTBED.md` | **Physical Testbed Guide:** Complete documentation of the EnBW HyperNetz 50 kW charger, Comemso Multi Mobile Analyzer, wiring breakouts, and hardware connection steps. |\n| `protocols/` | Conformance models: ISO 15118-2/20 dataclasses, V2GTP header codec, HomePlug Green PHY SLAC, CAN J1939. |\n| `simulator/` | Virtual EVCC state machine (`state_machine.py`), EnBW integration hooks (`hooks.py`), `SeccMockServer`, and IXXAT hardware driver. |\n| `mutation/` | UCB1 Multi-Armed Bandit, Domain Operators, Self-Healing Validation Loop (`self_healing.py`), SIFT Pairwise Judge (`sift_judge.py`). |\n| `procedural_graph/`| Executable procedural decision graph runtime (`graph_runtime.py`) and self-optimizing parameter mutator (`graph_mutator.py`). |\n| `oracles/` | Anomaly detector for ResponseCodes / CAN errors, PCAP analyzer, and automated CVE/CWE Markdown report compiler. |\n| `run_fuzzer.py` | Unified CLI testbed runner supporting both mock and physical hardware execution. |\n| `ARCHITECTURE.md` | Formal specification of STELLAR discretization, SIFT tournament dynamics, and Bradley-Terry solver. |\n| `HACKATHON_PITCH.md`| Script and slide outline addressing every question in EnBW's judging rubric. |\n\n---\n\n## 🏆 Hackathon Rubric Alignment (EnBW Track)\n\n1. **Which steps were delegated to AI, and which remained manual?**\n   * *AI Role:* Generating semantic mutation seeds, ranking test cases via pairwise Bradley-Terry judging, and interpreting raw PCAP/CAN logs into CVE reports.\n   * *Deterministic Role:* EXI binary serialization, V2GTP framing, and SocketCAN transmission remain strictly deterministic Python code to prevent hallucination.\n2. **Where were the limitations (LLM hallucinations) and how were they addressed?**\n   * Solved via our **Self-Healing Loop (`SIFT_MUTATION_RETRIES = 3`)**: syntax errors are caught locally and fed back to the generator with compiler tracebacks. Exactly 0% invalid syntax frames reach the target.\n3. **How does this methodology scale to other charging stations?**\n   * The UCB1 bandit and procedural graph are protocol-agnostic; swapping dataclasses transfers the framework immediately to **ISO 15118-20 (MCS)** or **OCPP 2.0.1**.\n\n---\n\n## 📄 License\nMIT License. Developed by Oleksandr Tarasov (2026).",
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      "readme": "# SafeNav-SVM: Otonom Navigasyon Güvenlik Modülü\n\nSafeNav-SVM, otonom araçların navigasyon süreçlerinde karşılaştıkları engelleri matematiksel olarak en güvenli şekilde ayrıştıran bir güvenlik modülü projesidir. Bu proje, iki farklı engel grubunu sadece birbirinden ayırmakla kalmaz, her iki sınıfa olan uzaklığı maksimize ederek **\"Maksimum Güvenlik Koridoru\" (Maximum Margin)** oluşturur.\n\n## 🚀 Proje Amacı\nNavigasyon sistemlerinde güvenliği artırmak adına, doğrusal ayrıştırılabilir koordinat setleri arasında en geniş boşluğu bırakan optimum sınır denklemini hesaplamak ve bu süreci Nesne Yönelimli Programlama (OOP) prensiplerine uygun bir mimariyle sunmaktır.\n\n## 🛠️ Teknik Özellikler\n- **Programlama Dili:** Java 17 (Microsoft OpenJDK LTS)\n- **Bağımlılık Yönetimi:** Maven\n- **Algoritma:** Support Vector Machines (SVM)\n- **Optimizasyon:** Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD)\n- **Mimari:** Katmanlı Mimari (Model-Service-UI)\n\n## 📐 Algoritmik Yaklaşım ve Matematiksel Model\nSistem, ayrıştırıcı düzlemi ($w \\cdot x + b = 0$) hesaplarken şu yöntemleri kullanır:\n- **Hinge Loss:** Yanlış sınıflandırmaları ve marjin ihlallerini cezalandıran kayıp fonksiyonu.\n- **L2 Regularization:** Modelin aşırı öğrenmesini (overfitting) engelleyen ve marjini genişletmeye zorlayan düzenleme.\n- **Optimum Sınır:** Hesaplanan sınırın neden en güvenli olduğu, her iki engel grubunun \"Destek Vektörleri\"ne (en yakın noktalar) tam olarak eşit ve maksimum uzaklıkta olmasıyla ispatlanmıştır.\n\n## 🏗️ Yazılım Mimarisi (OOP)\nProje, puanlama kriterlerinde belirtilen \"Katmanların İzolasyonu\" prensibine göre tasarlanmıştır:\n- **`model`**: `Point` ve `Boundary` sınıfları ile veri kapsülleme (Encapsulation).\n- **`service`**: `SVMTrainer` sınıfı ile iş mantığının (Business Logic) ayrıştırılması.\n- **`ui`**: `Visualizer` sınıfı ile grafiksel sunum (Java Swing).\n\n## 📊 Karmaşıklık Analizi (Big-O)\n- **Eğitim (Training):** $O(Epoch \\times N)$ - Burada $N$ veri noktası sayısıdır.\n- **Karar Verme (Inference):** $O(1)$ - Otonom araç sürüş sırasında sadece bir lineer denklem çözdüğü için sabit zamanda karar verir. Bu, gerçek zamanlı sistemler için kritik bir verimliliktir.\n\n## 🧠 Bellek Yönetimi\n- **Sıfır Bellek Sızıntısı:** Nesne ömürleri ve referans yönetimleri Java Garbage Collector ile uyumlu şekilde optimize edilmiştir.\n- **Verimlilik:** Gereksiz nesne üretiminden kaçınılmış, büyük veri setlerine uygun şekilde `primitive` bazlı koordinat hesaplamaları tercih edilmiştir.\n\n## 📸 Uygulama Ekran Görüntüsü\n![Uygulama Çıktısı](https://github.com/fsudesnmz/SafeNav-SVM/blob/main/output.png?raw=true)\n\n## 📦 Kurulum ve Çalıştırma\n1. Depoyu klonlayın: `git clone https://github.com/fsudesnmz/SafeNav-SVM.git`\n2. Proje dizinine gidin: `cd SafeNav-SVM`\n3. Derleyin: `mvn clean install`\n4. Çalıştırın: `java -cp target/SafeNav-SVM-1.0-SNAPSHOT.jar com.otonom.guvenlik.Main`",
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      "description": "Standard-agnostic compliance checker engine. 8-layer NLP pipeline (TF-IDF, graph analysis, ensemble classification, fuzzy matching) that maps any safety standard to any work product and generates compliance reports. Electron desktop app included.",
      "readme": "<p align=\"center\">\n  <a href=\"https://github.com/jherrodthomas/compliance-checker-algo\">\n    <img src=\"banner.svg\" alt=\"Compliance Checker Algo — standard-agnostic compliance review against ISO 26262, IEC 61508, ISO 21434, DO-178C, ASPICE and more\" width=\"100%\"/>\n  </a>\n</p>\n<h1 align=\"center\">Standard-Agnostic Compliance Checker</h1>\n<p align=\"center\">\n  <strong><i>Feed it any safety standard. Feed it any work product. Get a compliance report.</i></strong>\n</p>\n<p align=\"center\">\n  An 8-layer algorithm that checks any document against any standard &mdash;<br/>\n  no hardcoded rules, no domain lock-in, no manual cross-referencing.\n</p>\n<p align=\"center\">\n  <a href=\"#\"><img alt=\"Python\" src=\"https://img.shields.io/badge/python-3.10%2B-1E40AF?style=flat-square&logo=python&logoColor=white\"/></a>\n  <a href=\"#\"><img alt=\"Standard library only\" src=\"https://img.shields.io/badge/dependencies-stdlib%20only-10B981?style=flat-square\"/></a>\n  <a href=\"#\"><img alt=\"Layers\" src=\"https://img.shields.io/badge/algorithm-8%20layers-1E40AF?style=flat-square\"/></a>\n  <a href=\"#\"><img alt=\"Standards\" src=\"https://img.shields.io/badge/standards-agnostic-0B2447?style=flat-square\"/></a>\n  <a href=\"./LICENSE\"><img alt=\"License\" src=\"https://img.shields.io/badge/license-MIT-0B2447?style=flat-square\"/></a>\n  <a href=\"https://github.com/jherrodthomas/compliance-checker-algo/issues\"><img alt=\"Issues\" src=\"https://img.shields.io/badge/issues-welcome-F59E0B?style=flat-square\"/></a>\n</p>\n<br/>\n\nWhat it does\nGive it a safety standard (JSON or Markdown) and a work product (DOCX, PDF, TXT, JSON, MD). It runs eight analysis layers and tells you exactly where you're compliant, where you're not, and what's missing.\n\nThe engine is standard-agnostic. It auto-discovers the schema of whatever you throw at it — ISO 26262, IEC 61508, DO-178C, ASPICE, or a standard that doesn't exist yet.\n\n<br/>\nWhat it looks like\n<p align=\"center\">\n  <img src=\"dashboard-mockup.svg\" alt=\"Compliance dashboard mockup showing pass/partial/fail counts, ASIL distribution, findings table, and top action items\" width=\"100%\"/>\n</p>\n<br/>\nThe 8-layer pipeline\n<p align=\"center\">\n  <img src=\"architecture.svg\" alt=\"Architecture diagram of the 8-layer compliance pipeline\" width=\"100%\"/>\n</p>\n#LayerMethod1Node CoverageDecision tree on requirement node existence2Content AlignmentTF-IDF + cosine similarity3Semantic DepthRatcliff/Obershelp fuzzy matching4Concept CoverageSet intersection on discovered concept tags5Reference IntegrityGraph BFS on cross-reference links6Method/Practice AuditRisk-level-aware method matching7Traceability ChainDirected graph walk on dependency paths8Gap Analysis + RiskEnsemble classifier with risk-weighted scoring\n<br/>\nQuick start\nbash# Clone\ngit clone https://github.com/jherrodthomas/compliance-checker-algo.git\ncd compliance-checker-algo\n\n# Install Python dependencies (standard library only — no pip install needed)\n\n# Run with synthetic example data\npython agnostic_engine.py examples/synthetic_standard examples/synthetic_artifact.json \\\n  --meta examples/synthetic_meta.json\n\n# Run with your own standard and work product\npython agnostic_engine.py /path/to/your/standard /path/to/your/artifact.docx --format all\n<br/>\nOutput formats\n--format json    →  Structured JSON report\n--format docx    →  Word document with styled sections\n--format pdf     →  PDF with visual compliance dashboard\n--format html    →  Interactive HTML report\n--format all     →  All of the above\n<br/>\nUsing your own standards\n\nStandards are copyrighted. This repo includes only synthetic example data.\nSee STANDARDS_NOTICE.md for where to purchase real standards.\n\nThe engine accepts standards as JSON files following this schema:\njson{\n  \"part\": \"3\",\n  \"title\": \"Concept phase\",\n  \"clauses\": [\n    {\n      \"section\": \"6.1\",\n      \"title\": \"Hazard analysis\",\n      \"type\": \"requirement\",\n      \"text\": \"A hazard analysis shall be performed...\",\n      \"tags\": [\"HARA\", \"hazard analysis\"],\n      \"asil_level\": \"all\",\n      \"notes\": [\"...\"],\n      \"cross_references\": [\"5.1\"]\n    }\n  ]\n}\nOr as Markdown files (converted from PDF via --convert flag).\nAn optional compliance_meta.json provides schema hints to accelerate discovery — but the engine works without it.\n<br/>\nProject structure\n├── agnostic_engine.py          # Core 8-layer compliance engine\n├── artifact_ingester.py        # Normalizes DOCX/PDF/MD/TXT/JSON artifacts\n├── markdown_parser.py          # Converts Markdown standards to engine JSON\n├── report_generator.py         # JSON report output\n├── report_generator_docx.py    # Word document report output\n├── report_generator_html.py    # Interactive HTML report output\n├── ISO26262_Checker.py         # Legacy ISO 26262-specific checker\n├── compliance_meta.json        # Example meta-config (schema hints)\n├── examples/                   # Synthetic test data (no proprietary content)\n│   ├── synthetic_standard/     # Fictional 4-part safety standard\n│   ├── synthetic_artifact.json # Fictional work product\n│   └── synthetic_meta.json     # Meta-config for the synthetic standard\n├── main.js                     # Electron desktop app entry\n├── renderer/                   # Desktop app UI\n└── STANDARDS_NOTICE.md         # Licensing info for real standards\n<br/>\nDesktop app\nThe project includes an Electron wrapper (main.js, renderer/, preload.js) that packages the engine as a desktop application. 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      "readme": "# Open Remote Start\n\nA Particle project for interfacing with fortin remote starter and car alarm systems\nvia the antenna data-link interface.\n\n\n## Why\n\nThis poject originated as a means to capture, analyze, and explore the data-link\nprotocol used by Fortin remote starters and alarm system. A unintended, but 'fun'\nside effect of this work was a code base which could be used as a cellular remote\nor wifi remote for the system.\n\n## What you will need\n\nOk, so you don't need any of this, but this is what I found worked best for me.\n\n[2 diodes](https://www.sparkfun.com/products/8589) if you are hooking up mulitple\nattennas to the data-link bus all but the primary antenna should have a diode on\nthe tx line. If you don't plan on impersonating the remote starter you only need\none diode.\n\n[Level Shifter](https://www.sparkfun.com/products/12009) Particle MCUs (photon, electron)\nuse 3.3v logic levels. While the Fortin remote starter uses a 5v logic level. Thus if\nyou don't want to fry your Particle you will need to convert the 5v signal from the\nremote starter to a 3.3v signal and vice-versa.\n\n[Electron](https://store.particle.io/collections/cellular/products/electron-3g-americas) or\n[Photon](https://store.particle.io/collections/wifi/products/photon) The electron has more\nuarts than the photon, as such it is capable of monitoring the data-link connection in\nboth directions.\n\n[5v regulator](https://www.sparkfun.com/products/107) If you are using an electron you\nwill need some way to provide a 5v reference to your level shifter. DO NOT use this to\npower the photon from the data-link 12v-14v source. If you need to power a photon you\nshould use a buck down DC->DC power supply, or other USB power source.\n\n[Particle Asset Tracker](https://store.particle.io/products/asset-tracker-v2-components)\nIf you want to add a gps/accelerometer to your set up.\n\n## How to connect to Fortin Evo-One\n\nThis image shows the pinout of the data-link port on the Fortin Evo-One\n![Data-link port](images/Labeled_DataLink.jpg)\n\nThis schematic for using electron with ORS\n![Schematic For ORS with electron](images/Schematic.png)\n\n\n## A note on licensing\n\nWhile the code written for the ORS project is distributed under the BSD 3 clause license\ndepending on how this project is compiled it may include the AssetTrackerRK\nlibrary which is under a different license. If you intend on distributing a compiled\nversion of this code please respect the licenses of all dependencies.",
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      "description": "AI-Powered Cybersecurity Threat Detection System in Automotive Systems( malicious CAN detection)",
      "readme": "# AI-Powered-Cybersecurity-Threat-Detection-System-in-Automotive-Systems\nAI-Powered Cybersecurity Threat Detection System in Automotive Systems( malicious CAN  detection), (still under development).\n\n Project Overview\nThis project focuses on developing an **AI-powered cybersecurity threat detection system** for automotive systems. The system analyzes **Controller Area Network (CAN) data** in real time to detect **malicious activities**, such as **Denial-of-Service (DoS), Fuzzy, and Impersonation attacks**. When a potential threat is detected, the system triggers an alarm or takes preventive action.\n\n## 🔍 Features\n- 📡 **CAN Data Analysis** – Monitors real-time CAN data for cybersecurity threats.\n- 🤖 **Machine Learning Model** – Trained on datasets containing normal and attack scenarios.\n- 🚀 **Real-Time Detection** – Identifies malicious activities as they occur.\n- ⚠️ **Threat Response** – Triggers alerts or initiates protective measures.\n- 📊 **Data Visualization** – Displays attack trends and anomaly detection results.\n\n## 📂 Datasets Used\nThe project uses four datasets:\n     the dataset is released by kea and chevrolet car company , the drive link for datasets:\n     https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/10o4npkG60guvac6vVdZdq2mHt5KdwWWP?usp=sharing\n1. **Attack-Free Dataset** – Normal automotive CAN data.\n2. **DoS Attack Dataset** – Data with simulated Denial-of-Service attacks.\n3. **Fuzzy Attack Dataset** – Data with unpredictable, random attack patterns.\n4. **Impersonation Attack Dataset** – Data simulating unauthorized access attempts.\n\n## 🏗️ Tech Stack\n- **Programming Language**: Python 🐍\n- **Machine Learning Frameworks**: TensorFlow / Scikit-learn\n- **Database**: MySQL (if needed for logging detected threats)\n- **Visualization**: Matplotlib, Seaborn\n- **Deployment**: Flask / FastAPI (for real-time detection API)\n\n## 🚀 Installation & Setup\n\n\n\n\n\n## 📜 Usage\n- Feed the system with **CAN bus data**.\n- The model will classify data as **normal or malicious**.\n- If a threat is detected, the system triggers an **alert** or initiates a **defensive response**.\n\n## 📌 Future Enhancements\n- **Integration with automotive security frameworks**\n- **Deployment on embedded automotive systems**\n- **Extended support for more attack types**\n\n## 🤝 Contributing\nFeel free to **fork** the repository, create a **pull request**, or report issues via **GitHub Issues**.\n\n## 📜 License\nThis project is not yet licensed.\n\n---\n✨ *Designed to enhance automotive cybersecurity with AI-powered threat detection!* 🚗💡",
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      "readme": "# Cybersecurity Extension Program for the Automotive Sector\nThis repository contains the code and files developed and used during the Technological Extension Program in Cybersecurity for the Automotive Sector, offered through a partnership between the Center for Informatics (CIn) of the Federal University of Pernambuco (UFPE), Stellantis, and FACEPE from March to June 2024. The Program aimed to encourage students to participate in an extension program, preparing them for the job market in areas such as Artificial Intelligence (AI), Machine Learning (ML), cybersecurity, and automotive networks.\n\n## Program Overview\nThe program was divided into two main phases: a training (theoretical) phase and an immersion (practical) phase.\n\n### Training Phase\nThe training phase was conducted with two distinct groups of students:\n1. **Automotive Networks Group:**\n   - Focused on understanding automotive networks (CAN, LIN, FlexRay, and Automotive Ethernet) and the equipment used in setting up and monitoring these networks.\n2. **AI and ML for Cybersecurity Group:**\n   - Aimed at developing a solid foundation in AI and ML applied to cybersecurity, different types and vectors of cyber-attacks, specific or not to the automotive sector and the structure and basic functioning of automotive networks.\n\n### Immersion Phase\nDuring the immersion phase, pairs were formed, each consisting of one student from each training group of the last phase (Automotive Networks Group/AI for Cybersecurity Group). These pairs were responsible for performing practical activities in a laboratory environment applying the theoretical knowledge acquired during the training phase, which included:\n\n- Setting up automotive networks.\n- Messages and signals exchange on the network.\n- Network monitoring.\n- Introducing cyber-attacks.\n- Implementing detection systems.\n\n## Repository Contents\nThe repository includes the following:\n\n- **Code**: Scripts and models developed for the cybersecurity experiments.\n- **Files**: Vehicle Spy, DBC and database files used for the network setup and monitoring.\n- **Documentation**: Detailed reports and manuals on the setup, usage, and monitoring of automotive networks.\n- **Presentations**: Slides used during the checkpoints of the activities.\n\n## The Pair\n| [<img src=\"https://avatars.githubusercontent.com/u/103337809\" width=115><br><sub>Madu - AI for Cybersecurity</sub>](https://github.com/maduMelo) | [<img src=\"https://avatars.githubusercontent.com/u/68998580\" width=115><br><sub>Gabriel - Automotive Networks</sub>](https://github.com/zGabrie1) |\n|:--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------:|:--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------:|\n\n## License\nThis project is licensed under the MIT License - see the [LICENSE](LICENSE) file for details.\n\n## Acknowledgements\nWe would like to thank the Informatics Center (CIn) at UFPE, Stellantis, FACEPE, the teachers Divanilson Rodrigo Campelo and Paulo Freitas de Araujo Filho and the teaching intern Luigi Fernando Marques da Luz for their support and collaboration throughout this program.",
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      "readme": "# Cloud-Native-Open-Source-Security-Operations-Centre-for-Electric-Vehicle-Charging-Infrastructure\nCloud-Native, Open-Source Security Operations Centre for Electric Vehicle Charging Infrastructure\n\n# SovereignSOC-EV\n\nA cloud-native, open-source Security Operations Centre for Electric Vehicle charging infrastructure.\n\n**Paper:** *SovereignSOC-EV: A Cloud-Native, Open-Source Security Operations Centre for Electric Vehicle Charging Infrastructure — Design, Implementation, and Cross-Platform Empirical Validation* (under review)\n\n---\n\n## What this is\n\nA fully open, Kubernetes-native SOC stack engineered specifically for EV charging infrastructure. It monitors OCPP and MQTT traffic from charging stations, detects known attack scenarios from the peer-reviewed literature, correlates alerts across charger fleets, manages incidents, and triggers automated responses — with no proprietary services, no commercial licensing, and no non-European cloud dependencies.\n\n## Architecture\n\n```\n┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐\n│                  EVSE Workload Layer                │\n│   OpenEVSE firmware · SteVe CPMS · Mosquitto MQTT  │\n└────────────────────┬────────────────────────────────┘\n                     │ OCPP / MQTT traffic\n┌────────────────────▼────────────────────────────────┐\n│               Capture and Detection Layer           │\n│         Suricata (DPI) · Zeek (behavioural)        │\n└────────────────────┬────────────────────────────────┘\n                     │ Structured JSON alerts\n┌────────────────────▼────────────────────────────────┐\n│                  Transport Layer                    │\n│                    Filebeat                         │\n└────────────────────┬────────────────────────────────┘\n                     │ Normalised events\n┌────────────────────▼────────────────────────────────┐\n│                    SIEM Layer                       │\n│                     Wazuh                           │\n└──────────┬──────────────────────┬───────────────────┘\n           │ Alerts               │ IOC feeds\n┌──────────▼──────────┐  ┌───────▼───────────────────┐\n│  Case Management    │  │   Threat Intelligence      │\n│  TheHive + Cortex   │  │         MISP               │\n└─────────────────────┘  └───────────────────────────┘\n┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐\n│           Vulnerability Assessment Layer            │\n│                    OpenVAS                          │\n└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘\n```\n\n## Components\n\n| Component | Role | Version |\n|---|---|---|\n| Suricata | Network IDS, OCPP/MQTT rule-based detection | 8.0 |\n| Zeek | Behavioural traffic analysis, protocol logging | 6.x |\n| Filebeat | Log shipping and normalisation | 8.x |\n| Wazuh | SIEM, cross-charger correlation, alerting | 4.x |\n| TheHive | Case management, incident investigation | 5.x |\n| Cortex | Automated response actions | 3.x |\n| MISP | Threat intelligence, IOC feeds | 2.5.x |\n| OpenVAS | Network vulnerability scanning | 22.x |\n\n## Quick start\n\n```bash\n# 1. Clone\ngit clone https://github.com/YOUR_ORG/sovereignsoc-ev\ncd sovereignsoc-ev\n\n# 2. Start the EVSE workload (OpenEVSE + SteVe + Mosquitto)\ncd evse-workload\ndocker compose up -d\n\n# 3. Deploy the SOC stack on local k3d\ncd ../terraform/local\nterraform init && terraform apply\n\n# 4. Load OCPP and MQTT detection rules\nkubectl apply -f ../detection-rules/suricata/\nkubectl apply -f ../detection-rules/wazuh/\n```\n\nFull deployment guide: [docs/deployment-guide.md](docs/deployment-guide.md)\n\n## Deployment targets\n\n| Target | Guide | Status |\n|---|---|---|\n| Local (k3d) | [terraform/local](terraform/local) | ✅ Reference baseline |\n| OVHcloud | [terraform/ovhcloud](terraform/ovhcloud) | 🚧 In progress |\n| AWS EKS | [terraform/aws](terraform/aws) | 🚧 In progress |\n| Azure AKS | [terraform/azure](terraform/azure) | 🚧 In progress |\n\n## Detection coverage\n\nOCPP and MQTT-specific detection rules covering attack scenarios from the peer-reviewed literature:\n\n| Attack scenario | Source | Detection rule |\n|---|---|---|\n| OCPP session manipulation | Alcaraz et al. (2017) | `detection-rules/suricata/ocpp.rules` |\n| Backend redirection | Sayed et al. (2026) | `detection-rules/suricata/ocpp.rules` |\n| Configuration hijacking | Sayed et al. (2026) | `detection-rules/wazuh/ocpp-correlation.xml` |\n| Covert fleet-scale attack | Sarieddine et al. (2024) | `detection-rules/wazuh/ocpp-correlation.xml` |\n| MQTT topic enumeration | — | `detection-rules/suricata/mqtt.rules` |\n| Session flood | — | `detection-rules/zeek/ocpp-behavioural.zeek` |\n\n## Repository structure\n\n```\nsovereignsoc-ev/\n├── docs/                      Documentation\n├── charts/                    Helm charts for each component\n├── evse-workload/             OpenEVSE + SteVe + Mosquitto\n├── detection-rules/           OCPP and MQTT-specific rules (novel contribution)\n│   ├── suricata/              Signature-based detection rules\n│   ├── zeek/                  Behavioural analysis scripts\n│   └── wazuh/                 Cross-charger correlation rules\n├── playbooks/                 Cortex automated response playbooks\n├── terraform/                 Infrastructure as code per deployment target\n├── attack-scenarios/          Reproducible attack scripts (for evaluation)\n└── evaluation/                Measurement scripts and results data\n```\n\n## Licence\n\nApache 2.0 — see [LICENSE](LICENSE)\n\n## Citation\n\nIf you use this work, please cite:\n\n```bibtex\n@inproceedings{sovereignsoc2025,\n  title     = {SovereignSOC-EV: A Cloud-Native, Open-Source Security Operations Centre\n               for Electric Vehicle Charging Infrastructure},\n  author    = {},\n  booktitle = {},\n  year      = {2025}\n}\n```",
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      "description": "100+ installable Claude skills covering Engineering areas such as, ISO 26262 functional safety, ISO/SAE 21434 cybersecurity, ISO 21448 SOTIF, AIAG-VDA quality (APQP/PPAP/FMEA), Automotive SPICE, and continuous improvement tools — every builder paired with a confirmation reviewer.",
      "readme": "<div align=\"center\">\n\n# Automotive Engineering Suite\n\n**152 installable Claude skills covering automotive safety, cybersecurity, quality, communication, diagnostics, AUTOSAR, calibration, MBSE, SysML, and V&V**\n\n[![License: MIT](https://img.shields.io/badge/License-MIT-yellow.svg)](LICENSE)\n[![Skills](https://img.shields.io/badge/Skills-152-blue)](skills/)\n[![Standards](https://img.shields.io/badge/Standards-ISO%2026262%20%7C%2021434%20%7C%2021448%20%7C%20IATF%2016949%20%7C%20ASPICE%20%7C%20AUTOSAR%20%7C%20ISO%2014229%20%7C%20SysML-green)]()\n[![Chain](https://img.shields.io/badge/Chain-Builder%20%2B%20Reviewer%20pairs-orange)]()\n[![Made for](https://img.shields.io/badge/Made%20for-Claude-purple)](https://claude.com)\n\nEvery artifact-producing skill is paired with a confirmation reviewer. Reviewer outputs include a visual dashboard with KPI tiles, charts, and findings tables.\n\n[Quickstart](#quickstart) · [The Chain](#the-chain) · [Skills](#skills) · [Standards](#standards-covered) · [Why](#why)\n\n</div>\n\n---\n\n## What this is\n\nA curated set of 76 builder skills + 76 matching confirmation reviewer skills that automate the structured xlsx deliverables required across the automotive engineering lifecycle:\n\n- **ISO 26262** functional safety (concept → HW → SW → safety case)\n- **ISO/SAE 21434** cybersecurity (TARA → goals → concept → architecture → IR plan)\n- **ISO 21448 SOTIF** for ADAS/AV (analysis → triggering conditions → validation strategy)\n- **AIAG-VDA quality** (APQP → DFMEA → PFMEA → Control Plan → PPAP)\n- **Automotive SPICE** (assessment → gap analysis → improvement → evidence)\n- **Communication protocols** (DBC / LDF / ARXML / FlexRay / Automotive Ethernet / K-Matrix / bus load / gateway routing)\n- **Diagnostics** (UDS / DTC catalog / CDD / ODX / DEM)\n- **AUTOSAR** (Classic SWC, Composition, BSW, RTE; Adaptive applications)\n- **Calibration** (A2L / DCM / cross-supplier exchange)\n- **MBSE** (ARCADIA model architecture, requirements allocation, system context)\n- **SysML** (block diagram, requirement diagram, activity diagram, state machine)\n- **V&V** (verification plan, validation plan, test case catalog, traceability matrix, V&V execution report)\n- **Chain-integrated program management** (risk register, gate review, WP roll-up, change impact, lessons learned)\n- **Continuous improvement** (8D, 5-Why, fishbone, MSA Gauge R&R, SPC)\n\nEach skill is an installable `.skill` file. The chain is the moat — every downstream skill consumes the upstream skill's xlsx output as a stable file-format contract.\n\n## Quickstart\n\n1. Download the skill you need from `skills/` (or the full bundle from Releases)\n2. Click \"Save skill\" in Cowork / Claude Desktop to install\n3. Trigger by phrasing — every skill declares its triggering description in its frontmatter\n\n```bash\n# Example: install the HARA builder, then ask Claude\n\"Build a HARA for a new ECU project — Electronic Stability Control\"\n```\n\n## The chain\n\n```\nItem Definition → Safety Plan → DIA\n        ↓\n      HARA → FSC → TSC\n        ↓                ↓\n   HW Lane         SW Lane\n   ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓         ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓\nHW-SR  Arch  HSI  FMEDA   SW-SR  Arch  FMEA  HSI\n        ↓                ↓\n            Safety Case (capstone)\n\nParallel chains:\nTARA → CS Goals → CS Concept → CS Architecture → IR Plan + Secure Coding   (ISO/SAE 21434)\nSOTIF Analysis → Triggering Conditions → Validation Strategy                  (ISO 21448)\nAPQP Plan → DFMEA → PFMEA → Control Plan → PPAP Package                       (IATF 16949)\nASPICE Assessment → Gap Analysis → Improvement Plan → Process Evidence        (ASPICE PAM)\n```\n\nEvery box above has a builder skill AND a matching reviewer skill.\n\n## Skills\n\n### Foundation (3 builder/reviewer pairs)\n| Skill | Standard |\n|-------|----------|\n| `item-definition-builder` + reviewer | ISO 26262-3 §5 |\n| `safety-plan-builder` + reviewer | ISO 26262-2 §6 |\n| `dia-builder` + reviewer | ISO 26262-8 §5 |\n\n### ISO 26262 Concept Phase (3 pairs)\n| Skill | What it produces |\n|-------|------------------|\n| `hara-builder` + reviewer | Hazard Analysis with 14 malfunction guide words and Cartesian (function × malfunction × environment) |\n| `fsc-builder` + reviewer | FTA per safety goal with visual fault tree rendering, FSR derivation, ASIL decomposition |\n| `tsc-builder` + reviewer | HW-TSR/SW-TSR with safety mechanisms, HSI scaffold, system FMEA, DFA, draw.io architecture diagram |\n\n### ISO 26262 HW Lane (4 pairs, Part 5)\n| Skill | What it produces |\n|-------|------------------|\n| `hw-safety-reqs-builder` + reviewer | HW Safety Requirements derived from HW-TSRs |\n| `hw-architecture-builder` + reviewer | Refined HW architecture (PCB / IC / package) with safety mechanism allocation |\n| `hsi-builder` + reviewer | Contract-grade HW-SW Interface with C header generation |\n| `fmeda-builder` + reviewer | Formula-driven SPFM/LFM/PMHF with auto-verification against per-ASIL targets |\n\n### ISO 26262 SW Lane (4 pairs, Part 6)\n| Skill | What it produces |\n|-------|------------------|\n| `sw-arch-builder` + reviewer | SW architecture with RTOS, scheduling, MPU partitioning, MISRA targets |\n| `sw-sr-builder` + reviewer | SW Safety Requirements with verification methods per ASIL |\n| `sw-fmea-builder` + reviewer | Software FMEA with qualitative residual risk per ASIL threshold |\n| `sw-hsis-builder` + reviewer | SW-side HSI with handler functions and C header |\n\n### ISO 26262 Capstone\n| Skill | What it produces |\n|-------|------------------|\n| `safety-case-builder` + reviewer | GSN-style argument pulling evidence from all upstream artifacts |\n\n### ISO/SAE 21434 Cybersecurity (6 pairs, UN R155 mandated)\n| Skill | What it produces |\n|-------|------------------|\n| `tara-builder` + reviewer | Threat Analysis with STRIDE coverage and Risk Value lookup |\n| `cs-goals-builder` + reviewer | Cybersecurity Goals with CAL assignment |\n| `cs-concept-builder` + reviewer | CSR derivation per cybersecurity property |\n| `cs-architecture-builder` + reviewer | Cryptographic inventory, key management, secure boot chain |\n| `incident-response-plan-builder` + reviewer | PSIRT plan with UN R155 / ENISA / NHTSA notification deadlines |\n| `secure-coding-guidelines-builder` + reviewer | CERT C + MISRA Amendment 1 + AUTOSAR C++14 secure subset |\n\n### ISO 21448 SOTIF (3 pairs, ADAS / AV)\n| Skill | What it produces |\n|-------|------------------|\n| `sotif-analysis-builder` + reviewer | ODD, performance limitations, scenario quadrant classification |\n| `triggering-conditions-builder` + reviewer | Environmental / sensor / road / road-user / system / driver triggering conditions |\n| `sotif-validation-strategy-builder` + reviewer | Real-world / simulation / proving ground / field monitoring campaign |\n\n### AIAG-VDA Quality (5 pairs, IATF 16949)\n| Skill | What it produces |\n|-------|------------------|\n| `apqp-plan-builder` + reviewer | 5-phase product quality plan with gate reviews |\n| `dfmea-builder` + reviewer | Design FMEA per AIAG-VDA 2019 (Action Priority replaces RPN) |\n| `pfmea-builder` + reviewer | Process FMEA per AIAG-VDA 2019 |\n| `control-plan-builder` + reviewer | Production Control Plan with SPC / 100% / mistake-proofing / audit |\n| `ppap-package-builder` + reviewer | 18-element PPAP submission with PSW |\n\n### Automotive SPICE (4 pairs)\n| Skill | What it produces |\n|-------|------------------|\n| `aspice-assessment-builder` + reviewer | Per-process Capability Level scoring per PAM 3.1 |\n| `aspice-gap-analysis-builder` + reviewer | Gaps to target CL with severity classification |\n| `aspice-improvement-plan-builder` + reviewer | Improvement roadmap with KPIs |\n| `aspice-process-evidence-builder` + reviewer | Per-process evidence package |\n\n### Continuous Improvement (5 pairs)\n| Skill | What it produces |\n|-------|------------------|\n| `8d-problem-solving-builder` + reviewer | 8D method (D1-D8) for warranty / customer complaint |\n| `5-why-builder` + reviewer | 5-Why root cause analysis |\n| `fishbone-builder` + reviewer | Ishikawa (6Ms) cause-and-effect with auto-Mermaid diagram |\n| `msa-gage-rr-builder` + reviewer | AIAG MSA 4th edition with Anova-based Gauge R&R |\n| `spc-chart-builder` + reviewer | SPC with Cpk capability and Western Electric / Nelson rules |\n\n### Communication protocols (8 pairs)\n| Skill | What it produces |\n|-------|------------------|\n| `dbc-builder` + reviewer | Vector DBC (CAN database) with messages, signals, ECUs, multiplexed groups |\n| `ldf-builder` + reviewer | LIN Description File per ISO 17987 / LIN 2.2A |\n| `arxml-system-builder` + reviewer | AUTOSAR system extract (ECUs, system mappings, comm stack, port interfaces) |\n| `communication-matrix-builder` + reviewer | K-Matrix across CAN / CAN FD / LIN / FlexRay / Automotive Ethernet |\n| `bus-load-analysis-builder` + reviewer | Bandwidth utilization with worst-case and fault-injection scenarios |\n| `gateway-routing-builder` + reviewer | Cross-bus signal / PDU / frame routing with latency and security rules |\n| `flexray-config-builder` + reviewer | FlexRay cluster config per ISO 17458 (static + dynamic segments) |\n| `automotive-ethernet-builder` + reviewer | 100BASE-T1 / 1000BASE-T1 with SOME/IP, AVB, TSN, VLAN |\n\n### Diagnostics (5 pairs)\n| Skill | What it produces |\n|-------|------------------|\n| `uds-services-builder` + reviewer | UDS service catalog per ISO 14229-1 with DIDs, RIDs, security access |\n| `dtc-catalog-builder` + reviewer | DTC catalog per ISO 14229 / SAE J2012 with snapshots, extended data |\n| `cdd-builder` + reviewer | Vector CANdela diagnostic database authoring |\n| `odx-builder` + reviewer | ODX per ISO 22901-1 with base / derived variants and PDU library |\n| `dem-config-builder` + reviewer | AUTOSAR DEM config with debounce, healing, NvM, OBD freeze frame |\n\n### AUTOSAR (5 pairs)\n| Skill | What it produces |\n|-------|------------------|\n| `autosar-swc-builder` + reviewer | AUTOSAR Classic SWC with ports, runnables, events, exclusive areas |\n| `autosar-composition-builder` + reviewer | Composition SWC with assembly + delegation connectors |\n| `autosar-bsw-config-builder` + reviewer | BSW config: MCAL, ECU Abstraction, Service Layer, Complex Drivers |\n| `autosar-rte-mapping-builder` + reviewer | RTE mapping: signal-to-port, runnable-to-task, exclusive area binding |\n| `autosar-adaptive-app-builder` + reviewer | AUTOSAR Adaptive app + service + machine manifests, ara::com / ara::exec |\n\n### Calibration (3 pairs)\n| Skill | What it produces |\n|-------|------------------|\n| `a2l-builder` + reviewer | A2L per ASAM MCD-2 MC v1.7 (characteristics, measurements, conversions) |\n| `dcm-builder` + reviewer | ETAS DCM dataset for cross-tool calibration value exchange |\n| `calibration-data-exchange-builder` + reviewer | OEM ↔ Tier-1 calibration ownership and exchange agreement |\n\n### MBSE (3 pairs)\n| Skill | What it produces |\n|-------|------------------|\n| `mbse-model-architecture-builder` + reviewer | ARCADIA-style operational / system / logical / physical layers |\n| `mbse-requirements-allocation-builder` + reviewer | Requirements decomposition with satisfy / derive / verify relationships |\n| `mbse-system-context-builder` + reviewer | System boundary, actors, use cases, stakeholder needs |\n\n### SysML (4 pairs)\n| Skill | What it produces |\n|-------|------------------|\n| `sysml-block-diagram-builder` + reviewer | BDD / IBD with blocks, parts, ports, connectors, item flows |\n| `sysml-requirement-diagram-builder` + reviewer | Requirement blocks with derive / satisfy / verify / refine relationships |\n| `sysml-activity-diagram-builder` + reviewer | Activities, control / object flows, decision / fork / join, swim-lanes |\n| `sysml-state-machine-builder` + reviewer | States, transitions with guards / effects, regions, history pseudo-states |\n\n### V&V (5 pairs)\n| Skill | What it produces |\n|-------|------------------|\n| `verification-plan-builder` + reviewer | Verification Plan per ISO 26262-8 §9 / IEEE 1012 |\n| `validation-plan-builder` + reviewer | Item Validation Plan per ISO 26262-4 §9 |\n| `test-case-catalog-builder` + reviewer | Test cases with preconditions, inputs, expected outputs, traceability |\n| `traceability-matrix-builder` + reviewer | Bidirectional RTM with coverage analysis and orphan identification |\n| `vv-execution-report-builder` + reviewer | V&V campaign report with defects, coverage, residual risk acceptance |\n\n### Chain-integrated program management (5 pairs)\n| Skill | What it produces |\n|-------|------------------|\n| `safety-program-risk-register-builder` + reviewer | Programmatic risks affecting safety case delivery |\n| `safety-gate-review-builder` + reviewer | ISO 26262 phase-gate reviews with Go / Conditional / No-Go |\n| `wp-status-rollup-builder` + reviewer | Work product completion roll-up across the safety lifecycle |\n| `change-impact-analysis-builder` + reviewer | Change impact across HARA / FSC / TSC / HW-SW reqs / tests |\n| `lessons-learned-builder` + reviewer | Lessons learned register per ISO 26262-2 §5 / IATF 16949 |\n\n## Standards covered\n\nISO 26262:2018 · ISO/SAE 21434:2021 · ISO 21448:2022 · IATF 16949:2016 · AIAG APQP 2nd edition · AIAG-VDA FMEA Handbook 2019 · AIAG PPAP 4th edition · AIAG MSA 4th edition · AIAG SPC 2nd edition · AIAG Control Plan · ASPICE PAM 3.1 / 4.0 · UN R155 · UN R156 · CERT C Secure Coding · MISRA C:2012 + Amendment 1 · AUTOSAR C++14 · AUTOSAR Classic R22-11 · AUTOSAR Adaptive R22-11 · ISO 14229-1 (UDS) · SAE J2012 (DTCs) · ISO 22901-1 (ODX) · ISO 11898 (CAN) · ISO 17987 (LIN) · ISO 17458 (FlexRay) · IEEE 100BASE-T1 / 1000BASE-T1 · ASAM MCD-2 MC (A2L) · OMG SysML 1.6 / 2.0 · INCOSE Systems Engineering Handbook · IEEE 1012 (V&V)\n\n## Why\n\nEvery automotive program ships an avalanche of structured deliverables. Most teams maintain them in xlsx, painstakingly hand-edited, with low audit-trail consistency and high re-keying overhead between phases. This suite turns each phase into a builder + reviewer pair where:\n\n- The **builder** produces the structured xlsx output from a JSON input plus the upstream artifact\n- The **reviewer** runs a confirmation-measures checklist on the builder's output and produces a visual dashboard with KPIs, charts, and findings\n\nThe chain compounds because phases hand off via stable xlsx contracts. A change upstream (HARA) automatically propagates to every downstream skill that consumes it (FSC → TSC → FMEDA → Safety Case).\n\n## Common patterns across the suite\n\n- All builder outputs use a consistent NAVY/Calibri styling palette with ASIL/CAL color coding\n- All reviewer outputs include visual dashboards (KPI tiles, pie chart, compliance bar, stacked rating breakdown by section, findings table)\n- Many reviewers auto-verify quantitative thresholds:\n  - **FMEDA**: SPFM / LFM / PMHF vs ASIL target\n  - **PPAP**: Cpk vs threshold (1.33 standard, 1.67 special characteristics)\n  - **SW FMEA**: residual risk vs ASIL threshold\n  - **MSA**: Gauge R&R % vs AIAG threshold\n  - **SPC**: Cpk vs target\n- Reviewers never modify source artifacts — gaps land in Recommended Actions\n- Every builder is paired with a reviewer for confirmation-measures compliance\n\n## Repo structure\n\n```\nautomotive-skills-suite/\n├── skills/                      # 152 .skill bundles, install individually\n├── README.md\n└── LICENSE\n```\n\n## Installation\n\nEach `.skill` file in `skills/` is independently installable. Skills declare triggering descriptions in their frontmatter, so the agent picks them up based on user phrasing (e.g., \"build me a HARA\" triggers `hara-builder`).\n\n## License\n\nMIT — see LICENSE file.\n\n---\n\n<div align=\"center\">\n\nBuilt with Claude. Designed for automotive safety, cybersecurity, and quality engineers shipping real programs.\n\n</div>",
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      "description": "the hacker sends a binary SMS to the target's phone. The SMS contains a special payload executed by the operating system of the phone's SIM card",
      "readme": "### Exploit-Mobile-Phone-SIM-Card-for-Eavesdropping\n\n\n# Explenation\nMobile operators naturally filter such SMS messages. Therefore, we send them through our own base station emulator In short, we put the subscriber on our BS, send him a magic SMS and immediately turn off the BS emulator. The subscriber again selects the \"legal\" public network, and the command to set up the connection is carried out through the regular operator.\n\n<h1>Action</h1>\n<p>a way to force the victim's phone&#160;to dial the number needed by the \"information security researcher\" on their own. The hacker can then&#160; \"pick up the phone\" and eavesdrop on everything that happens near the target.</p>\n<br>\n\n<h1>The essence of the attack</h1>\n\n<p> the hacker sends a binary SMS to the target's phone.&#160; The SMS contains a special payload executed by the operating system of the phone's SIM card, which initiates an outgoing call through&#160; the \"S@t setup call\" mechanism. In most phones, the subscriber's participation is not required, external signs are a short-term inclusion of the display backlight. Some phones display \"Confirm connection?\"&#160; when the subscriber presses \"yes\", the screen goes blank and an outgoing call is made.\n    The hacker \"answers the phone\" on&#160; his phone and then can eavesdrop on everything that happens near the victim's phone. Duration of listening - depends on the settings of&#160; the telecommunications operator (duration of an open voice session) and is usually 1 hour. &#160;Then you need to resend the SMS.\n    </p>\n\n    FIRST STEP\n\n  <p>For first you must put your phone number in Hexadecimal PDU Message&#160; for example: \"0x042230121020744382E3130353105160604313035312D0C100383060791 2143658709F0 2B00\"&#160;\n\n    http://rednaxela.net/pdu.php\n  </p>\n<br>\n  <h1>STEP 2 | the content of the SMS</h1>\n\n  <p>Now you need to sent by the SMPP gateway&#160; example: \"82E3130353105160604313035312D0C100383060791 2143658709F0 2B00 first 2143658709F 0\" <br>\n    - destination phone\n    the second, at the end of the message 2143658709F0 - the hacker's phone\n\n    Here you can check the received package - https://www.smsdeliverer.com/online-sms-pdu-decoder.aspx\n\n    Explenation\n\n<p>Mobile operators naturally filter such SMS messages. Therefore, we send them through our own base station emulator&#160;In short, we put the subscriber on our BS, send him a magic SMS and immediately turn off the BS emulator. The subscriber again selects the \"legal\" public network, and the command to set up the connection is carried out through the regular operator.</p>\n<br>\n<h1>What you should NOT to do when you testing this</h1>\n\n<p>don't replace your \"clean\" numbers with the apdu command,&#160; because these outgoing calls are recorded by the operator and the number will be highlighted.</p>\n\n\n<h1>The operation of exploit</h1>\n\n<p>Exploit is not 100 percent, It does not work on all phones and SIM cards, some smartphones display a message asking you to confirm the connection - but the thing is cool and recommended to master at least to understand the possible attack vectors on the phone.</p>\n<br>\n<h1>Damage of exploit</h1>\n\n<p> - Attacker can eavesdropping on what is happening near the phone without the subscriber's knowledge\n    <br>\n    - Attacker can mass long-term distribution of such SMS apdus for a DDOS attack on a specific phone\n    <br>\n    - Attacker can leaving the subscriber without communication by calling the roaming number and using his balance\n    <br>\n    - Attacker can create a paid, substantial phone number and initiate calls to it - I'm not sure thats scheme works now</p>\n\n<br>\n<br>\n<span style=\"color:rgb(34, 52, 244);\">please consider this as an informative tutorial, and only test it in your own environment or with the permission of 2 people. Eavesdropping on a person without his or her knowledge is  illegal, and especially highly not moral.</span></li>",
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      "description": "An introductory lab to automotive security.",
      "readme": "# Automotive Security Lab\n\n## How to clone this branch\n* `git clone https://github.com/JonZeolla/lab-AutomotiveSecurity --recursive`\n  * Clone the latest revision of the lab-AutomotiveSecurity repo.\n* `git clone -b 2016-05-12_SCIS_AutomotiveSecurity https://github.com/JonZeolla/lab-AutomotiveSecurity --recursive`\n  * Clone the revision of the lab-AutomotiveSecurity repo used during the 2016-05-12 Steel City InfoSec lab.  Cloning any of the pointers (tags) will put you in a detached HEAD state, which is expected.\n\n## Contributing\n1. [Fork the repository](https://github.com/jonzeolla/lab-AutomotiveSecurity/fork)\n1. Create a feature branch via `git checkout -b feature/description`\n1. Make your changes\n1. Commit your changes via `git commit -am 'Summarize the changes here'`\n1. Create a new pull request ([how-to](https://help.github.com/articles/creating-a-pull-request/))\n\n## Related Events\n### 2016-05-12 Steel City Information Security Lab\n[Event Details](http://www.meetup.com/Steel-City-InfoSec/boards/thread/49839423)\n[Event Posting](http://www.meetup.com/Steel-City-InfoSec/events/226195653/)\n\n## How to use this repo\n* `setup`\n  * Here are some scripts to setup the requirements to do the lab tutorials.  There is a [VM](https://drive.google.com/open?id=0B2NDLONqoOuTRFJvY0g0dU5RZWc) which was distributed the first time I did this lab, but the scripts in here allow the lab to be setup on additional machines.\n    * If you plan to use the VM, the username is `carhax` and the password is `P@ssword`.\n* `tutorials`\n  * All of the materials exist here, categorized into skill level (beginner, intermediate, etc.), and then type of lab (read vs write).\n* `external`\n  * All external projects used by this lab exist here as submodules.\n* `store`\n  * This is where large(ish) files go for storage, especially if they're referenced in multiple labs.\n\n## Updating the lab\nIf you'd like to update this branch, open a terminal and `cd` into the repo (if you are following the lab, this is `${HOME}/Desktop/lab-AutomotiveSecurity/`) and then run:\n```\ngit pull\nsetup/configure.sh\n```\n * It is possible that you will need to first run `git reset --mixed`, depending on if the `git merge` can be successful without manual intervention.  Note that running this command will reset your index, but not the working tree.  If you don't know what that means, and would like to, read [this](https://git-scm.com/docs/git-reset).\n\n## Some other good materials\n* http://www.ni.com/white-paper/2732/en/\n* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SocketCAN\n* http://www.cowfishstudios.com/blog/canned-pi-part1\n* http://dn5.ljuska.org/napadi-na-auto-sistem-1.html\n* http://dn5.ljuska.org/cyber-attacks-on-vehicles-2.html\n* http://www.ioactive.com/pdfs/IOActive_Adventures_in_Automotive_Networks_and_Control_Units.pdf\n* http://opengarages.org/handbook/2014_car_hackers_handbook_compressed.pdf\n* https://www.nostarch.com/carhacking\n* http://hackaday.com/2013/10/22/can-hacking-the-in-vehicle-network/\n* https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ym8xFGO0llY\n* http://www.carhackingvillage.com/\n* http://www.boschdiagnostics.com/pro/j2534-faqs\n* http://www.canbushack.com/blog/index.php\n* https://www.peerlyst.com/posts/resource-list-of-car-hacking-tools-car-security-tools-and-car-security-resources-ben-ferris\n* http://illmatics.com/carhacking.html (including all of their [tools](http://illmatics.com/content.zip)!).  Related:  Chris presented at SCIS in the past - see the details [here](https://www.meetup.com/Steel-City-InfoSec/messages/boards/thread/39866542).\n\n## Migration\nOn 2016-12-27, this repo was migrated from the AutomotiveSecurity branch of https://github.com/JonZeolla/Lab to its own standalone repository.  This was in order to make contributions and third party use easier, as I received feedback that the branching strategy used before was confusing to some.",
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    "odatsec/net-gpt": {
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      "title": "🔥 News",
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      "description": "Net-GPT: A LLM-Empowered Man-in-the-Middle Chatbot for Unmanned Aerial Vehicle — IEEE/ACM SEC 2023 | DOI: 10.1145/3583740.3626809",
      "readme": "<p align=\"center\">\n  <img src=\".github/og-image.png\" alt=\"Net-GPT — LLM-Empowered MITM Chatbot for UAV\" width=\"900\"/>\n</p>\n\n<h1 align=\"center\">Net-GPT</h1>\n<h3 align=\"center\">A LLM-Empowered Man-in-the-Middle Chatbot for<br/>Unmanned Aerial Vehicle</h3>\n\n<p align=\"center\">\n  <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1145/3583740.3626809\">\n    <img src=\"https://img.shields.io/badge/DOI-10.1145%2F3583740.3626809-blue?style=flat-square&logo=doi&logoColor=white\" alt=\"DOI\"/>\n  </a>\n  <a href=\"https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/10542874\">\n    <img src=\"https://img.shields.io/badge/IEEE%20Xplore-Published-0071C5?style=flat-square&logo=ieee&logoColor=white\" alt=\"IEEE Xplore\"/>\n  </a>\n  <a href=\"https://github.com/OdatSec/Net-GPT/blob/main/LICENSE\">\n    <img src=\"https://img.shields.io/badge/License-MIT-green.svg?style=flat-square\" alt=\"MIT License\"/>\n  </a>\n  <a href=\"https://www.python.org/downloads/\">\n    <img src=\"https://img.shields.io/badge/Python-3.10%2B-blue?style=flat-square&logo=python&logoColor=white\" alt=\"Python 3.10+\"/>\n  </a>\n</p>\n\n<p align=\"center\">\n  <img src=\"https://img.shields.io/badge/Venue-IEEE%2FACM%20SEC%202023-critical?style=flat-square\"/>\n  <img src=\"https://img.shields.io/badge/LLMs-Llama--2%20%7C%20GPT--2%20%7C%20Distil--GPT--2-orange?style=flat-square\"/>\n  <img src=\"https://img.shields.io/badge/PX4-Autopilot-purple?style=flat-square&logo=drone\"/>\n  <img src=\"https://img.shields.io/badge/Fine--Tuning-QLoRA-teal?style=flat-square\"/>\n  <a href=\"https://github.com/OdatSec/Net-GPT/stargazers\">\n    <img src=\"https://img.shields.io/github/stars/OdatSec/Net-GPT?style=flat-square&color=yellow\" alt=\"GitHub Stars\"/>\n  </a>\n</p>\n\n<p align=\"center\">\n  <b>Brett Piggott</b><sup>1</sup> &nbsp;·&nbsp;\n  <b>Siddhant Patil</b><sup>2</sup> &nbsp;·&nbsp;\n  <b>Guohuan Feng</b><sup>1</sup> &nbsp;·&nbsp;\n  <b>Ibrahim Odat</b><sup>1</sup> &nbsp;·&nbsp;\n  <b>Rajdeep Mukherjee</b><sup>1</sup> &nbsp;·&nbsp;\n  <b>Balakrishnan Dharmalingam</b><sup>1</sup> &nbsp;·&nbsp;\n  <b>Anyi Liu</b><sup>1</sup>\n  <br/>\n  <sup>1</sup>Oakland University &nbsp;&nbsp; <sup>2</sup>University of Wisconsin–Madison\n</p>\n\n<p align=\"center\">\n  <a href=\"#-overview\">Overview</a> ·\n  <a href=\"#-key-results\">Key Results</a> ·\n  <a href=\"#-system-architecture\">Architecture</a> ·\n  <a href=\"#-quick-start\">Quick Start</a> ·\n  <a href=\"#-attack-pipeline\">Attacks</a> ·\n  <a href=\"#-fine-tuning-methodology\">Fine-Tuning</a> ·\n  <a href=\"#-repository-structure\">Structure</a> ·\n  <a href=\"#-citation\">Citation</a>\n</p>\n\n---\n\n## 🔥 News\n\n- **[Dec 2023]** 🏆 &nbsp;Paper presented at **IEEE/ACM SEC 2023** — Symposium on Edge Computing, Wilmington, DE\n- **[Nov 2023]** 📄 &nbsp;Paper accepted at **SEC'23** — Full research paper · [DOI: 10.1145/3583740.3626809](https://doi.org/10.1145/3583740.3626809)\n- **[2023]** 🔬 &nbsp;Research artifact and codebase publicly released\n\n---\n\n## 📖 Overview\n\n> *\"The convergence of Large Language Models with security systems transforms cybersecurity in the AI landscape.\"*\n\n**Net-GPT** is a research framework demonstrating a novel class of **LLM-empowered offensive cyber-physical attacks** against Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) communication systems. The system shows how finely-tuned Large Language Models can be weaponized to:\n\n- 🎯 **Understand network protocols** — LLMs learn TCP session structure through QLoRA fine-tuning on real packet captures\n- 🔀 **Launch Man-in-the-Middle attacks** — Adversarial UAVs intercept and impersonate benign UAV↔GCS communication\n- 📡 **Generate mimicked network packets** — Context-aligned counterfeit TCP packets generated in real-time via an edge server\n- ⚡ **Enable edge-computing deployment** — Smaller LLMs (Distil-GPT-2) achieve 47× faster response time while retaining ~78% prediction capability\n\n### Threat Model\n\nThe adversary operates a **malicious UAV** that joins the same network as a benign UAV and its Ground Control Station (GCS). The malicious UAV leverages a nearby **edge server** equipped with fine-tuned LLMs to:\n\n1. **Hijack the benign UAV** via ARP poisoning, session hijacking, or de-authentication attacks\n2. **Impersonate both endpoints** by generating realistic TCP packets using LLM inference\n3. **Maintain persistent session control** using signaling packets (delayed ACK, DupACK, Keep-Alives)\n\n```\n ┌──────────────┐         ┌──────────────┐         ┌──────────────┐\n │  Benign UAV  │◄───────►│ Malicious UAV│◄───────►│     GCS      │\n │   (Target)   │  MITM   │  (Attacker)  │  MITM   │  (Victim)    │\n └──────────────┘         └──────┬───────┘         └──────────────┘\n                                 │\n                          ┌──────▼───────┐\n                          │  Edge Server  │\n                          │  (RTX 4090)   │\n                          │  Fine-tuned   │\n                          │  LLM Engine   │\n                          └──────────────┘\n```\n\n---\n\n## 📊 Key Results\n\n### Generative Accuracy — Packet Field Prediction\n\n| Model | Parameters | Overall Accuracy | Response Time |\n|---|:---:|:---:|:---:|\n| **Llama-2-13B** | 13B | **95.3%** | 108.3 s |\n| **Llama-2-7B** | 7B | **94.1%** | — |\n| **GPT-2** | 137M | 74.2% (of 13B) | 5.18 s (21× faster) |\n| **Distil-GPT-2** | 82M | 77.9% (of 7B) | **2.31 s (47× faster)** |\n\n### Per-Field Prediction Accuracy (Llama-2-13B, Best Config)\n\n| Field | Src IP | Dst IP | Src Port | Dst Port | Flags | Seq# | Ack# | Length |\n|---|:---:|:---:|:---:|:---:|:---:|:---:|:---:|:---:|\n| **Accuracy** | 98.9% | 98.9% | 98.9% | 98.9% | 83.4% | 96.2% | 91.0% | 99.0% |\n\n### Error Analysis (Llama-2-13B)\n\n| Error Count | 0 errors | 1 error | 2 errors | 3–5 errors | 6+ errors |\n|---|:---:|:---:|:---:|:---:|:---:|\n| **Rate** | **76.2%** | 20.3% | 1.9% | 0% | 1.6% |\n\n> *Over 76% of generated packets are error-free. When errors occur, 96.5% involve only a single field — easily correctable by the adversary.*\n\n### Cost-Efficiency: Dataset Size vs. Training Epochs\n\n| Combination | Dataset | Epochs | Accuracy (13B) | Accuracy (7B) |\n|---|:---:|:---:|:---:|:---:|\n| **Best** | 100K | 2 | **96.5%** | **97.0%** |\n| Medium | 60K | 3 | 96.0% | 96.2% |\n| Low | 20K | 10 | 93.5% | 92.8% |\n\n> *Larger datasets with fewer epochs consistently outperform smaller datasets with more epochs — key insight for edge-computing deployment strategies.*\n\n---\n\n## 🏗️ System Architecture\n\nNet-GPT operates in a **two-phase attack pipeline**:\n\n### Phase 1 — UAV Hijacking\n\nSix attack methods targeting the PX4 autopilot communication layer:\n\n| Attack | Method | MITM | Unauthorized Access | Denial of Service |\n|---|---|:---:|:---:|:---:|\n| MAC Spoofing | Layer 2 impersonation | ✅ | ✅ | ❌ |\n| Session Hijacking | TCP session takeover | ✅ | ✅ | ❌ |\n| ARP Poisoning | ARP cache corruption | ✅ | ✅ | ❌ |\n| Packet Injection | Crafted packet insertion | ✅ | ✅ | ❌ |\n| Flooding Attack | Resource exhaustion | ❌ | ❌ | ✅ |\n| De-authentication | WiFi disassociation | ❌ | ✅ | ✅ |\n\n### Phase 2 — LLM-Powered Packet Generation\n\n```\n ┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐\n │                        FINE-TUNING PIPELINE                         │\n │                                                                     │\n │  Raw PCAP  ──►  tshark extract  ──►  JSON format  ──►  QLoRA tune  │\n │  (bigFlows)     (TCP sessions)      (#Previous,      (NF4 quant,   │\n │  368 MB         6,971 sessions      #Predicted,       8 batch,     │\n │  791K packets   100K packets        #Context)         2e-4 LR)     │\n └─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘\n\n ┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐\n │                        INFERENCE PIPELINE                           │\n │                                                                     │\n │  Intercepted  ──►  Edge Server  ──►  Fine-tuned  ──►  Scapy craft  │\n │  TCP packet       (RTX 4090)        LLM predict       Inject on    │\n │  from session     Format query      next packet       network      │\n └─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘\n```\n\n### Fine-Tuning Data Format\n\nEach training entry follows a structured three-section template:\n\n```json\n{\n  \"#Previous_Packet\": {\n    \"Src_IP\": \"192.168.1.10\",\n    \"Dst_IP\": \"192.168.1.20\",\n    \"Src_Port\": \"54321\",\n    \"Dst_Port\": \"80\",\n    \"Flag\": \"ACK\",\n    \"Seq\": \"1001\",\n    \"Ack\": \"2001\",\n    \"Length\": \"512\"\n  },\n  \"#Predicted_Packet\": {\n    \"Src_IP\": \"192.168.1.20\",\n    \"Dst_IP\": \"192.168.1.10\",\n    \"Src_Port\": \"80\",\n    \"Dst_Port\": \"54321\",\n    \"Flag\": \"ACK PSH\",\n    \"Seq\": \"2001\",\n    \"Ack\": \"1513\",\n    \"Length\": \"1024\"\n  },\n  \"#Context\": \"TCP_SESSION_ID:7042\"\n}\n```\n\n---\n\n## ⚡ Quick Start\n\n### Requirements\n\n| Dependency | Version | Purpose |\n|---|---|---|\n| Python | ≥ 3.10 | Runtime |\n| PyTorch | ≥ 2.0 | Model training & inference |\n| Transformers | ≥ 4.31 | Hugging Face model loading |\n| PEFT | ≥ 0.4 | QLoRA fine-tuning |\n| bitsandbytes | ≥ 0.40 | NF4 quantization |\n| Scapy | ≥ 2.5 | Network packet crafting |\n| tshark | ≥ 3.0 | PCAP parsing |\n| CUDA | ≥ 11.8 | GPU acceleration |\n\n### 1. Clone & Install\n\n```bash\ngit clone https://github.com/OdatSec/Net-GPT.git\ncd Net-GPT\npip install -r requirements.txt\n```\n\n### 2. Prepare Dataset\n\n```bash\n# Download and extract TCP sessions from PCAP\npython src/data_preprocessing/pcap_extractor.py \\\n    --input data/raw/bigFlows.pcap \\\n    --output data/processed/train.json \\\n    --max-packets 100000\n\npython src/data_preprocessing/pcap_extractor.py \\\n    --input data/raw/smallFlows.pcap \\\n    --output data/processed/test.json\n```\n\n### 3. Fine-Tune a Model\n\n```bash\n# Fine-tune Llama-2-13B with QLoRA (default config)\npython src/fine_tuning/qlora_trainer.py \\\n    --model meta-llama/Llama-2-13b-hf \\\n    --dataset data/processed/train.json \\\n    --epochs 1 \\\n    --output models/llama2-13b-netgpt\n\n# Fine-tune Distil-GPT-2 (edge deployment)\npython src/fine_tuning/qlora_trainer.py \\\n    --model distilgpt2 \\\n    --dataset data/processed/train.json \\\n    --epochs 1 \\\n    --output models/distilgpt2-netgpt\n```\n\n### 4. Run Inference\n\n```bash\n# Generate predicted packets from intercepted sessions\npython src/inference/predict.py \\\n    --model models/llama2-13b-netgpt \\\n    --input data/processed/test.json \\\n    --output results/predictions_llama2_13b.json\n```\n\n### 5. Evaluate Results\n\n```bash\n# Per-field accuracy evaluation\npython src/inference/evaluate.py \\\n    --predictions results/predictions_llama2_13b.json \\\n    --ground-truth data/processed/test.json \\\n    --output results/evaluation_llama2_13b.json\n```\n\n### 6. Craft & Inject Packets (Controlled Lab Only)\n\n```bash\n# Generate Scapy-compatible packets from predictions\npython src/packet_crafting/craft_packets.py \\\n    --predictions results/predictions_llama2_13b.json \\\n    --interface eth0\n```\n\n---\n\n## 🔬 Fine-Tuning Methodology\n\n### QLoRA Configuration\n\n| Parameter | Value | Parameter | Value |\n|---|---|---|---|\n| NF4 Quantization | `nf4` | Logging steps | `10` |\n| Batch size/device | `8` | Learning rate | `2e-4` |\n| Gradient steps | `12` | Global grad norm | `0.3` |\n| Paged Optimizer | `paged_adamw_32bit` | Warm-up ratio | `0.03` |\n| Scheduler | `constant` | Epochs | `1–10` |\n\n### Models Evaluated\n\n| Model | Parameters | HuggingFace ID | Use Case |\n|---|:---:|---|---|\n| **Llama-2-13B** | 13B | `meta-llama/Llama-2-13b-hf` | High-accuracy server deployment |\n| **Llama-2-7B** | 7B | `meta-llama/Llama-2-7b-hf` | Balanced accuracy/speed |\n| **GPT-2** | 137M | `gpt2` | Compact edge deployment |\n| **Distil-GPT-2** | 82M | `distilgpt2` | Ultra-fast edge deployment |\n\n### Dataset Statistics\n\n| Property | Fine-Tuning (bigFlows) | Testing (smallFlows) |\n|---|:---:|:---:|\n| Size | 368 MB | 9.4 MB |\n| Packets | 791,615 | 14,261 |\n| Flows | 40,686 | 1,209 |\n| Applications | 132 | 28 |\n| Avg. Packet Size | 449 bytes | 646 bytes |\n| Duration | 5 minutes | 5 minutes |\n\n---\n\n## 🛡️ Attack Pipeline\n\n<details>\n<summary><b>ARP Poisoning</b> — Layer 2 cache corruption</summary>\n\nCorrupts ARP tables on both the target UAV and GCS, redirecting traffic through the malicious UAV. The attacker becomes an invisible relay, enabling full packet interception and modification.\n</details>\n\n<details>\n<summary><b>Session Hijacking</b> — TCP session takeover</summary>\n\nExploits the TCP three-way handshake to inject the attacker into an established session. Semi-session and full-session variants allow partial or complete control of the communication channel.\n</details>\n\n<details>\n<summary><b>De-authentication</b> — WiFi disassociation attack</summary>\n\nForces the benign GCS to disconnect from the network by sending spoofed de-authentication frames. The malicious UAV then establishes itself as the communication partner.\n</details>\n\n<details>\n<summary><b>Packet Injection</b> — Crafted packet insertion</summary>\n\nAfter establishing MITM position, the adversary uses the fine-tuned LLM to generate and inject context-aligned TCP packets that mimic legitimate UAV↔GCS communication patterns.\n</details>\n\n---\n\n## 📁 Repository Structure\n\n```\nNet-GPT/\n│\n├── 📂 src/                              Source code package\n│   ├── data_preprocessing/\n│   │   ├── pcap_extractor.py           Extract TCP sessions from PCAP files\n│   │   ├── session_parser.py           Parse and structure TCP sessions\n│   │   └── json_formatter.py           Format data for fine-tuning\n│   │\n│   ├── fine_tuning/\n│   │   ├── qlora_trainer.py            QLoRA fine-tuning pipeline\n│   │   ├── dataset_loader.py           Custom dataset for packet prediction\n│   │   └── train_config.py             Training hyperparameter configs\n│   │\n│   ├── inference/\n│   │   ├── predict.py                  Generate packet predictions\n│   │   ├── evaluate.py                 Per-field accuracy evaluation\n│   │   └── benchmark.py               Response time benchmarking\n│   │\n│   ├── attacks/\n│   │   ├── arp_poisoning.py            ARP cache poisoning implementation\n│   │   ├── session_hijack.py           TCP session hijacking\n│   │   ├── deauth_attack.py            WiFi de-authentication\n│   │   └── mitm_controller.py          MITM orchestration engine\n│   │\n│   └── packet_crafting/\n│       ├── craft_packets.py            Scapy-based packet construction\n│       └── session_replayer.py         TCP session replay engine\n│\n├── 📂 configs/\n│   ├── qlora_llama2_13b.yaml          Llama-2-13B fine-tuning config\n│   ├── qlora_llama2_7b.yaml           Llama-2-7B fine-tuning config\n│   ├── qlora_gpt2.yaml                GPT-2 fine-tuning config\n│   └── qlora_distilgpt2.yaml          Distil-GPT-2 fine-tuning config\n│\n├── 📂 data/\n│   ├── raw/                           Raw PCAP captures (user-supplied)\n│   └── processed/                     Processed JSON for training/testing\n│\n├── 📂 models/                          Fine-tuned model checkpoints\n│\n├── 📂 results/                         Experiment outputs and evaluations\n│\n├── 📂 figures/                         Paper figures and visualizations\n│\n├── 📂 docs/\n│   ├── METHODOLOGY.md                 Detailed methodology documentation\n│   ├── RESULTS.md                     Comprehensive results tables\n│   └── EDGE_DEPLOYMENT.md            Edge computing deployment guide\n│\n├── 📂 scripts/\n│   ├── run_all_experiments.sh         Reproduce all paper results\n│   ├── evaluate_all_models.sh         Batch evaluation script\n│   └── download_dataset.sh           Dataset download helper\n│\n├── .gitignore                         Git ignore rules\n├── CITATION.cff                       Machine-readable citation metadata\n├── CONTRIBUTING.md                    Contribution guidelines\n├── LICENSE                            MIT License\n├── README.md                          This file\n├── SECURITY.md                        Security policy & responsible use\n└── requirements.txt                   Python dependencies\n```\n\n---\n\n## 📐 Research Questions & Findings\n\nThe paper systematically investigates three research questions:\n\n### RQ1: Does model size significantly improve effectiveness?\n\n> **Finding:** Llama-2-13B (95.3%) marginally outperforms Llama-2-7B (94.1%). The 1.2% gap is surprisingly small given the 2× parameter difference, suggesting **model architecture matters more than raw parameter count** for protocol understanding tasks.\n\n### RQ2: What balances dataset quantity vs. training epochs?\n\n> **Finding:** 100K packets with 2 epochs produces the best accuracy for both models. Larger datasets remarkably improve the **Flags field** prediction — critical for sustaining communication sessions. More epochs do **not** improve smaller LLMs and may even degrade performance.\n\n### RQ3: Can smaller LLMs produce comparable results?\n\n> **Finding:** Distil-GPT-2 (82M params) achieves **77.9% of Llama-2-7B's capability** while being **47× faster** (2.31s vs. 108.3s). This enables **real-time edge deployment** on resource-constrained mobile platforms — crucial for adversarial field operations.\n\n---\n\n## 🔄 Reproducibility\n\nAll experiments are fully reproducible:\n\n```bash\n# Reproduce all paper results end-to-end\nbash scripts/run_all_experiments.sh\n\n# Reproduce specific model evaluation\npython src/inference/evaluate.py \\\n    --model-name llama2-13b \\\n    --dataset-sizes 20000 40000 60000 80000 100000 \\\n    --epochs 1\n```\n\n| Artifact | Path | Description |\n|---|---|---|\n| Training data | `data/processed/train.json` | 100K packets from bigFlows |\n| Test data | `data/processed/test.json` | 14,261 packets from smallFlows |\n| Model configs | `configs/*.yaml` | QLoRA hyperparameters per model |\n| Results | `results/` | Per-field accuracy JSON per experiment |\n\n---\n\n## ⚠️ Ethics & Responsible Use\n\nAll experiments were conducted in an **isolated laboratory environment** with UAVs operating under the **PX4 autopilot** simulation framework. No real airspace, operational networks, production UAV systems, or public wireless infrastructure was involved at any stage of this research.\n\nThe attack implementations in this repository are disclosed as part of **responsible academic vulnerability research** demonstrating how adversarial LLM capabilities extend to network-level physical systems. The intent is to motivate the design of **LLM-aware network security defenses** for UAV communication infrastructure.\n\n> **⛔ Do not deploy any attack component against real aircraft, live airspace, operational networks, or systems you do not own and have explicit authorization to test.**\n\nThis research was reviewed and approved by the institutional review process at Oakland University.\n\nSee [SECURITY.md](SECURITY.md) for the full security policy.\n\n---\n\n## 📝 Citation\n\nIf Net-GPT contributes to your research, please cite:\n\n```bibtex\n@inproceedings{piggott2023netgpt,\n  title     = {{Net-GPT}: A {LLM}-Empowered Man-in-the-Middle Chatbot for\n               Unmanned Aerial Vehicle},\n  author    = {Piggott, Brett and Patil, Siddhant and Feng, Guohuan and\n               Odat, Ibrahim and Mukherjee, Rajdeep and\n               Dharmalingam, Balakrishnan and Liu, Anyi},\n  booktitle = {Proceedings of the 2023 IEEE/ACM Symposium on Edge Computing (SEC)},\n  year      = {2023},\n  pages     = {287--293},\n  publisher = {ACM},\n  address   = {Wilmington, DE, USA},\n  doi       = {10.1145/3583740.3626809},\n  isbn      = {979-8-4007-0123-8}\n}\n```\n\nA [`CITATION.cff`](CITATION.cff) file is included for GitHub's automatic citation tool.\n\n---\n\n## 🔗 Related Work\n\n| Project | Venue | Relationship |\n|---|---|---|\n| [**AeroMind**](https://github.com/OdatSec/AeroMind) | RAID 2026 | Memory-poisoning attacks on LLM-driven UAV agents (follow-up work) |\n| [Heterogeneous Generative Dataset for UASes](https://doi.org/10.1109/MOST57249.2023.00034) | IEEE MOST 2023 | Foundational UAV dataset work |\n\n---\n\n## 📬 Contact\n\n| Author | Affiliation | Role |\n|---|---|---|\n| Brett Piggott | Oakland University | Lead developer |\n| Siddhant Patil | University of Wisconsin–Madison | Contributor |\n| Guohuan Feng | Oakland University | Contributor |\n| Ibrahim Odat | Oakland University | Contributor |\n| Rajdeep Mukherjee | Oakland University | Contributor |\n| Balakrishnan Dharmalingam | Oakland University | Contributor |\n| Anyi Liu | Oakland University | Principal Investigator |\n\n---\n\n<p align=\"center\">\n  <sub>\n    <b>Net-GPT</b> · IEEE/ACM SEC 2023 · Oakland University · University of Wisconsin–Madison\n    <br/>\n    Released under the <a href=\"LICENSE\">MIT License</a>\n  </sub>\n</p>",
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      "readme": "# Awesome Automotive Security [![Awesome](https://awesome.re/badge-flat.svg)](https://awesome.re)\n\nA curated Awesome-list for automotive security tools and knowledge. If other better lists exist, we'll try to reference them instead of duplicating work.\n\nSuggestions are welcome — see [CONTRIBUTING.md](CONTRIBUTING.md) for what earns a place on the list.\n\n## Contents\n\n* [CAN Bus Analysis](#can-bus-analysis)\n* [Diagnostic Tools](#diagnostic-tools)\n* [Firmware and ECU Reverse Engineering](#firmware-and-ecu-reverse-engineering)\n* [Automotive Ethernet](#automotive-ethernet)\n* [RF and Key Fob Analysis](#rf-and-key-fob-analysis)\n* [Infotainment and IVI](#infotainment-and-ivi)\n* [V2X Security](#v2x-security)\n* [EV Charging Security](#ev-charging-security)\n* [Hardware Interfaces](#hardware-interfaces)\n* [Security Analysis](#security-analysis)\n* [Penetration Testing](#penetration-testing)\n* [Datasets](#datasets)\n* [Research Papers](#research-papers)\n* [Conference Presentations](#conference-presentations)\n* [Books](#books)\n* [Learning Resources](#learning-resources)\n* [Related Awesome Lists](#related-awesome-lists)\n\n## CAN Bus Analysis\n\n* [BUSMASTER](https://github.com/rbei-etas/busmaster) - Open-source CAN simulation, analysis, and test tool from Bosch Engineering and ETAS, with a node simulator, DBC-driven signal interpretation, and scriptable test automation.\n* [CAN Commander](https://github.com/MatthewKuKanich/CAN_Commander) - Flipper Zero application and companion ESP32 CAN board for reverse engineering vehicle networks, with sniffing, DBC decoding, replay, and injection profiles usable without a laptop.\n* [CAN Playground](https://github.com/numbpill3d/can-playground) - Local-first Tauri desktop app for viewing, decoding, and capturing CAN bus traffic, with DBC import, signal annotation, and bit-level change timelines.\n* [can-utils](https://github.com/linux-can/can-utils) - Linux-CAN SocketCAN userspace utilities including cansniffer, candump, cansend, canplayer, and cangen for CAN bus analysis.\n* [CANalyse](https://github.com/canalyse/CANalyse-2.0) - Vehicle network analysis tool with SQL-like queries on CAN data, smart signal scanning, and Telegram bot integration.\n* [CANalyzat0r](https://github.com/schutzwerk/CANalyzat0r) - Security analysis toolkit for proprietary car protocols with graphical sniffing, fuzzing, packet comparison, background-noise filtering, and UDS fuzzing.\n* [CANarchy](https://github.com/hexsecs/canarchy) - Stream-first CAN and J1939 toolkit that emits structured JSONL for automation, with live capture, DBC/ARXML/KCD decoding, J1939 PGN/SPN and DM1 fault parsing, UDS and DoIP support, constrained fuzzing, and an MCP server for agent-driven workflows.\n* [CanCat](https://github.com/atlas0fd00m/CanCat) - Firmware for Arduino CAN shields and Macchina M2 boards paired with a Python client for sniffing and injecting CAN traffic, running UDS and CCP sessions, and placing a device in the middle of a CAN link.\n* [CANdevStudio](https://github.com/GENIVI/CANdevStudio) - Flow-based graphical CAN simulation environment that wires senders, receivers, DBC decoders, and signal viewers together to stand in for missing ECUs on a bench.\n* [CANExplorer](https://github.com/AKJ7/CANExplorer) - Cross-platform CAN, CAN FD, and LIN analysis GUI with reverse-engineering tools, UDS discovery and fuzzing, DoIP and SOME/IP support, and SecOC decoding.\n* [CANflict](https://github.com/necst/CANflict) - C library that manipulates the CAN bus at the data link layer from an unmodified microcontroller, abusing pin conflicts between peripherals to craft polyglot frames; the implementation behind the CCS 2022 paper.\n* [CANgaroo](https://github.com/Schildkroet/CANgaroo) - Open-source CAN bus analyzer for Linux and Windows with DBC and LDF decoding, CAN FD, Python scripting, SocketCAN, PEAK, Kvaser, Vector, and candlelight interfaces, and Vector ASC, MDF4, candump, and PCAP export.\n* [CanLab](https://github.com/Sherin-SEF-AI/CanLab) - PyQt6 desktop application for offline CAN capture reverse engineering, combining automated counter and checksum detection with entropy-based signal boundary analysis, a visual DBC builder, and UDS/OBD-II/J1939/XCP/DoIP diagnostic support.\n* [canmatrix](https://github.com/ebroecker/canmatrix) - Python package to read and write CAN database formats, converting between DBC, ARXML, KCD, SYM, LDF, ODX, and more.\n* [cannelloni](https://github.com/mguentner/cannelloni) - Tunnels SocketCAN interfaces over UDP, TCP, or SCTP, bridging a vehicle bus to a remote analysis machine and letting bench setups share one physical CAN adapter.\n* [CANter](https://ceur-ws.org/Vol-3962/paper69.pdf) - Intrusion detection system for CAN and CAN-FD that detects drop-and-spoof attacks using frequency analysis of frame intervals.\n* [cantools](https://github.com/cantools/cantools) - Python library for CAN bus diagnostics, DBC parsing, and message decoding/encoding.\n* [CANToolz](https://github.com/CANToolz/CANToolz) - Black-box CAN network analysis framework also known as YACHT with modular architecture for fuzzing and ECU discovery.\n* [canTot](https://github.com/shipcod3/canTot) - Metasploit-style CAN bus exploitation framework built on sploitkit, packaging published vehicle-specific CAN attacks as selectable modules.\n* [CaringCaribou](https://github.com/CaringCaribou/caringcaribou) - Python automotive security exploration tool designed as the nmap of CAN bus with fuzzing, ECU discovery, and attack modules.\n* [Carpunk](https://github.com/souravbaghz/Carpunk) - CAN injection toolkit and successor to CANghost, automating interface setup, sniffing, replay, and injection attacks.\n* [ICSim](https://github.com/zombieCraig/ICSim) - Instrument Cluster Simulator for safe CAN bus security testing with virtual dashboard controls.\n* [Kayak](https://github.com/dschanoeh/Kayak) - Java-based CAN bus analysis tool with bus monitoring and DBC/KCD file loading support.\n* [Lindwurm](https://github.com/lindwurm-can/lindwurm) - Open-source CAN bus tracing and fuzzing tool designed for penetration testing with Burp Suite-inspired workflow.\n* [OBDium](https://github.com/provrb/obdium) - Rust-based OBD-II diagnostic tool with modern Tauri GUI supporting live data, DTC analysis, and offline VIN decoding.\n* [opendbc](https://github.com/commaai/opendbc) - Python API for your car, bundling community-maintained DBC files with CAN parsing and car interface libraries for reading vehicle state and actuating controls.\n* [pretty_j1939](https://github.com/nmfta-repo/pretty_j1939) - NMFTA's Python library and CLI that decodes J1939 traffic from candump logs using the SAE J1939 Digital Annex, with transport protocol reassembly, filtering, JSON output, and a live terminal view.\n* [pycangui](https://github.com/davhodg/pycangui) - Graphical CAN bus tool with live trace and plots, transmit, CANopen, UDS, J1939, and XCP/CCP support on any python-can adapter, with Python scripting and simulated nodes.\n* [python-can](https://github.com/hardbyte/python-can) - Python library providing a common interface over many CAN hardware backends with CAN FD support and logging to ASC, BLF, MF4, TRC, CSV, and SQLite.\n* [python-can-isotp](https://github.com/pylessard/python-can-isotp) - ISO-TP (ISO 15765) transport for Python on top of python-can or Linux SocketCAN, the segmentation layer that UDS and OBD-II diagnostics run over.\n* [SavvyCAN](https://github.com/collin80/SavvyCAN) - Cross-platform Qt-based CAN bus reverse engineering and capture tool with DBC file loading, UDS scanning, and fuzzing support.\n\n## Diagnostic Tools\n\n* [Atlas](https://github.com/kylehulscher/atlas) - Open-source ECU calibration application for reverse engineering and recalibrating Subaru, Toyota, and Honda ECUs, with an integrated Ghidra bundle for analysing tables and emulating ROM machine code.\n* [AutoPi](https://github.com/autopi-io/autopi-core) - Open-source core software for the AutoPi dongle, a Raspberry Pi-based OBD-II device for vehicle diagnostics, CAN bus data collection, and automotive IoT applications.\n* [conescan](https://github.com/ConnorRigby/conescan) - Automotive ECU hacking supertool for firmware dumping and manipulation via J2534 OBD interfaces.\n* [doip-sim-ecu-dsl](https://github.com/doip-sim-ecu/doip-sim-ecu-dsl) - Kotlin DSL for scripting simulated DoIP ECUs, reachable over Ethernet, CAN with ISO-TP, or both at once, for exercising diagnostic clients against UDS error and edge cases without hardware.\n* [EcuBus-Pro](https://github.com/ecubus/EcuBus-Pro) - Cross-platform open-source ECU tool with UDS, CAN-TP, DoIP, LIN, and SOME/IP support, DBC and LDF databases, TypeScript scripting in the style of CAPL, and a command-line interface.\n* [Ford-ECU-Bruteforcer](https://github.com/jakka351/Ford-ECU-Bruteforcer) - Security access brute-force tool for pre-2011 Ford ECUs with 3-byte seed and 5-byte key.\n* [gallia](https://github.com/Fraunhofer-AISEC/gallia) - Extendable automotive pentesting framework from Fraunhofer AISEC focused on UDS, with DoIP and ISO-TP transports and structured logging for reproducible scans.\n* [iso14229](https://github.com/driftregion/iso14229) - Dependency-free C implementation of a UDS (ISO 14229) server and client with built-in ISO-TP, for building embedded ECU targets and test tools.\n* [odxtools](https://github.com/mercedes-benz/odxtools) - Python toolkit for parsing ODX/PDX (ISO 22901) diagnostic databases and encoding, decoding, and snooping ECU diagnostic sessions.\n* [OpenSOVD Classic Diagnostic Adapter](https://github.com/eclipse-opensovd/classic-diagnostic-adapter) - Eclipse OpenSOVD bridge in Rust that translates SOVD (ISO 17978) requests into UDS over DoIP for legacy ECUs, with a security plugin architecture.\n* [OpenVehicleDiag](https://github.com/rnd-ash/OpenVehicleDiag) - Rust ECU diagnostics and reprogramming application over J2534 pass-through adapters and Linux SocketCAN, with UDS and KWP2000 sessions and a converter that turns Mercedes CBF diagnostic databases into its own JSON format.\n* [pq-flasher](https://github.com/I-CAN-hack/pq-flasher) - Python tools for reflashing VW PQ35 EPS using TP 2.0 transport layer and KWP2000 diagnostics.\n* [python-doipclient](https://github.com/jacobschaer/python-doipclient) - Pure Python DoIP (ISO 13400) client that plugs into udsoncan as a transport layer for diagnostics over automotive Ethernet.\n* [uds](https://github.com/mdabrowski1990/uds) - Python package for ISO 14229 UDS in both client and server roles over CAN, Ethernet, LIN, FlexRay, and K-Line, usable for simulation, testing, and decoding UDS traffic.\n* [uds-firmware-extraction](https://github.com/honinb0n/uds-firmware-extraction) - Tool for extracting ECU firmware from UDS flash traffic following ISO-14229 standard.\n* [uds-server](https://github.com/zombieCraig/uds-server) - UDS ECU simulator and fuzzer for use alongside ICSim, for practising diagnostic command discovery and fuzzing scan tools.\n* [UDSim](https://github.com/zombieCraig/UDSim) - UDS (Unified Diagnostic Services) ECU simulator and fuzzer for discovering and testing UDS services.\n* [udsoncan](https://github.com/pylessard/python-udsoncan) - Python implementation of the ISO 14229 UDS protocol covering session control, security access, data identifiers, and routine control.\n* [UnlockECU](https://github.com/jglim/UnlockECU) - Free seed-key unlocking tool for Bosch, Continental, Delphi, Daimler, and Marquardt ECUs without proprietary DLLs.\n* [VW_Flash](https://github.com/bri3d/VW_Flash) - Flashing tools for VW AG control units over UDS supporting Simos18.1/6/10 and DQ250-MQB.\n\n## Firmware and ECU Reverse Engineering\n\n* [ghidra-tc1797](https://github.com/christianobora/ghidra-tc1797) - Ghidra processor specification and language definitions for the Infineon TriCore TC1797, used to label memory regions when disassembling MED17 and similar ECU firmware.\n* [ghidra_v850](https://github.com/esaulenka/ghidra_v850) - Ghidra processor module for Renesas V850E2 and V850E3/RH850 microcontrollers, the core families behind many ECUs, for disassembling and decompiling their firmware.\n* [medc17-checksum-tool](https://github.com/ConnorHowell/medc17-checksum-tool) - Analyses and corrects CRC32, ADD32, and ADD16 checksums in Bosch MED17 and EDC17 firmware, resolving CRC values algebraically rather than by brute force and regenerating RSA signatures after modification.\n* [pyA2L](https://github.com/christoph2/pya2l) - Python parser for ASAM MCD-2 MC (A2L) description files, exposing the characteristic, measurement, and memory-layout metadata needed to make sense of ECU calibration data during firmware analysis.\n* [pyXCP](https://github.com/christoph2/pyxcp) - Python implementation of the ASAM MCD-1 XCP protocol over CAN, Ethernet, and USB, with seed-and-key access handling, for measuring, calibrating, and flashing ECUs.\n* [Simos18_SBOOT](https://github.com/bri3d/Simos18_SBOOT) - Documented exploit chain against the VW Simos18 supplier bootloader, chaining PWM entry, a weak Mersenne Twister seed/key, and a CRC bounds-check flaw into arbitrary flash read.\n* [TC1791_CAN_BSL](https://github.com/bri3d/TC1791_CAN_BSL) - CAN bootstrap loader for Infineon TriCore AudoMAX parts such as the TC1791, giving arbitrary flash and RAM read/write on Simos18 and related ECUs without desoldering.\n* [Zephyr-Reference-ECU](https://github.com/Xaloqi/Zephyr-Reference-ECU) - Forkable body control module on Zephyr with UDS diagnostics over CAN and DoIP, SecurityAccess with AES-128-CMAC, and signed firmware update, runnable with no hardware or on a NUCLEO-H753ZI board.\n\n## Automotive Ethernet\n\n* [eth-ws-someip](https://github.com/jamores/eth-ws-someip) - Wireshark LUA dissectors for Automotive Ethernet SOME/IP and SOME/IP-SD protocols (Autosar 4.2).\n* [ICS CAP](https://intrepidcs.com/products/software/ics-cap/) - Free Wireshark plugin for monitoring Automotive Ethernet, CAN, CAN FD, LIN, and FlexRay networks.\n* [ProtoCrawler](https://cytal.co.uk/) - Intelligent protocol fuzzer for SOME/IP, DoIP, UDS, and Ethernet AVB satisfying ISO/SAE 21434 testing requirements.\n* [Scapy](https://scapy.net/) - Python packet manipulation library with support for DoIP, SOME/IP, AUTOSAR PDUs, SecOC, CAN-FD, and FlexRay protocols.\n* [someip-protocol-fuzzer](https://github.com/cfanatic/someip-protocol-fuzzer) - Black-box SOME/IP fuzzer that mutates user-defined protocol fields with radamsa and uses a ping heartbeat to detect when the target service stops responding.\n* [vsomeip](https://github.com/COVESA/vsomeip) - COVESA reference implementation of SOME/IP and SOME/IP-SD, used both as the target in automotive Ethernet fuzzing research and as a client for crafting service calls against production ECUs.\n\n## RF and Key Fob Analysis\n\n* [Flipper Zero](https://flipperzero.one/) - Handheld multi-tool with Sub-GHz capabilities for reading, saving, and transmitting key fob signals with automotive database.\n* [Flipper-ARF](https://github.com/D4C1-Labs/Flipper-ARF) - Automotive-focused firmware fork for Flipper Zero supporting Keeloq, rolling codes, and VAG protocol analysis.\n* [KeyFob Analysis Toolkit (KAT)](https://github.com/KaraZajac/KAT) - Toolkit for analyzing, decoding, and retransmitting key fob signals with support for HackRF, RTL-SDR, and Flipper Zero.\n* [Proxmark3](https://proxmark.com/) - Industry-standard RFID/NFC research tool for reading, cloning, and emulating immobilizer transponders at 125kHz and 13.56MHz.\n* [rtl_433](https://github.com/merbanan/rtl_433) - Generic ISM band receiver for decoding TPMS sensors and key fobs at 315/433/868/915 MHz with RTL-SDR.\n* [Universal Radio Hacker (URH)](https://github.com/jopohl/urh) - Open-source suite for wireless protocol investigation with native SDR support and easy signal demodulation.\n\n## Infotainment and IVI\n\n* [byd-dolphin-hacking](https://github.com/wheregoes/byd-dolphin-hacking) - Reverse engineering of the BYD Dolphin DiLink 3 head unit (Android 10 on a Qualcomm QCM6125), documenting its MCU and CAN interfaces, OTA update paths, and NFC digital key, along with permission-bypass and root-level service findings.\n* [Chimaera](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11416-024-00522-4) - Research framework for IVI (In-Vehicle Infotainment) firmware reverse engineering and exploitation targeting Hyundai/Kia Gen5W_L systems.\n* [gen5fw](https://github.com/rgerganov/gen5fw) - Python tools for decrypting, patching, and redeploying firmware on Mobis Gen5 navigation head units in Hyundai, Kia, and Genesis vehicles, including enabling ADB.\n* [ic1101](https://github.com/librick/ic1101) - Open research project for reverse engineering 10th generation Honda Civic infotainment systems (Android-based, NVIDIA Tegra 3).\n* [idrive7-8-ssh-root](https://github.com/cauliflowermossgrape/idrive7-8-ssh-root) - Enable root SSH on BMW iDrive 7/8 MGU head units over ENET via debug image flash and persistent SSH without B7F8E5 DTC, for head unit reverse engineering.\n* [MMI3G-Toolkit](https://github.com/dspl1236/MMI3G-Toolkit) - SD-card-based toolkit for Audi/VW MMI3G head units covering boot-image extraction, reverse-engineered GEMMI protocol details, and an FSC signature-bypass technique alongside CAN diagnostic and variant-dumping tools.\n* [Q50 Reverse Engineering](https://github.com/oneezeeroo/Q50-Reverse-Engineering) - Independent reverse-engineering research into the Infiniti Q50 infotainment platform's Linux/Android environment, documenting its EPK firmware package format, code-signing process, and USB app-installation flow.\n\n## V2X Security\n\n* [Artery](https://github.com/riebl/artery) - OMNeT++ simulation framework pairing the Vanetza ITS-G5 stack with SUMO traffic, providing the environment that most misbehavior-detection and V2X attack studies are built on.\n* [F2MD](https://github.com/josephkamel/F2MD) - Simulation framework recreating the whole misbehavior detection chain for ITS-G5 and C-V2X, with plausibility checks, machine learning detectors, and both local and global attack implementations.\n* [V2Verifier](https://github.com/twardokus/v2verifier) - Open-source V2X security testbed with first open-source IEEE 1609.2 implementation for DSRC and C-V2X.\n* [VaN3Twin](https://github.com/DriveX-devs/VaN3Twin) - ETSI-compliant multi-stack V2X framework for ns-3 covering ITS-G5, C-V2X, and LTE with SUMO and CARLA co-simulation; the continuation of ms-van3t.\n* [Vanetza](https://github.com/riebl/vanetza) - Open-source ETSI C-ITS protocol stack covering GeoNetworking, BTP, DCC, and the security layer, widely used as the reference implementation for V2X experimentation.\n* [VASP](https://github.com/quic/vasp) - V2X Application Spoofing Platform from Qualcomm that runs a library of BSM spoofing and falsification attacks on top of Veins, the artifact of the VehicleSec 2023 paper; archived in 2026.\n* [Veins](https://github.com/sommer/veins) - Open-source vehicular network simulation framework coupling OMNeT++ and SUMO, used as the testbed for VANET and V2X security and attack studies.\n\n## EV Charging Security\n\n* [AcCCS](https://github.com/IdahoLabResearch/AcCCS) - Idaho National Laboratory test platform on a Raspberry Pi that emulates either the vehicle or the charger in a CCS session, driving the J1772 control pilot, HomePlug Green PHY SLAC, and DIN 70121 exchange so either side can be tested without the other present.\n* [ChargeSploit](https://github.com/konicst1/ChargeSploit) - Security testing framework for ISO 15118-2 and DIN SPEC 70121 that emulates either the charger or the vehicle, with TLS support and extensible handlers for injecting non-compliant behaviour at any step of a session.\n* [CheckOCPP](https://github.com/vfg27/CheckOCPP) - Wireshark dissector for OCPP 1.6 and 2.0.1 that identifies the protocol version and flags messages that do not match the schema.\n* [dsV2Gshark](https://github.com/dspace-group/dsV2Gshark) - Wireshark plugin that dissects ISO 15118 and DIN 70121 traffic, decoding EXI-encoded V2G payloads and SLAC handshakes into readable fields.\n* [EmuOCPP](https://github.com/vfg27/EmuOCPP) - Mininet-based emulator for OCPP charging networks covering versions 1.6, 2.0, and 2.0.1 across all three security profiles, with attack demos for the MitM and downgrade flaws in its companion research.\n* [EVerest](https://github.com/EVerest/EVerest) - Linux Foundation Energy full-stack open-source EV charging firmware implementing OCPP 1.6/2.0.1/2.1, ISO 15118-2/-3/-20, IEC 61851, and DIN SPEC 70121, useful as a reference target and test peer.\n* [OCPPuzz](https://github.com/jongchan-hong/OCPPuzz) - Specification-driven fuzzer for OCPP charging station management systems that extracts message rules and state transitions from the specification with a language model and reports deviations, uncovering denial-of-service and free-charging flaws in open-source systems.\n* [open-plc-utils](https://github.com/qca/open-plc-utils) - Qualcomm Atheros powerline toolkit for HomePlug AV and Green PHY devices, the standard means of inspecting and manipulating the PLC layer that CCS charging sessions run over.\n* [OpenV2G](https://github.com/Martin-P/OpenV2G) - C implementation of the ISO 15118 and DIN 70121 vehicle-to-grid interface with an EXI codec, widely reused as the encoding engine behind other V2G analysis tooling.\n* [pyPLC](https://github.com/uhi22/pyPLC) - Python toolkit for CCS charging research that can pose as vehicle or charger, sniff HomePlug Green PHY traffic, and walk the SLAC, DIN 70121, and ISO 15118 state machines.\n* [V2Gdecoder](https://github.com/FlUxIuS/V2Gdecoder) - Encodes and decodes EXI-compressed V2G messages on the fly, turning captured ISO 15118 exchanges into editable XML for replay and fuzzing.\n* [WWCP_ISO15118](https://github.com/OpenChargingCloud/WWCP_ISO15118) - ISO 15118 implementation covering SLAC, SDP, V2GTP, -2 and -20, explicitly shipping attack vectors and penetration-testing workflows for the individual subprotocols.\n\n## Hardware Interfaces\n\n* [CAN-DAQ](https://github.com/eccentricOrange/can-daq) - Open hardware ESP32-S3 CAN data-capture device with DBC-driven real-time plotting and SQLite logging, published in HardwareX as a sub-$25 alternative to commercial CAN loggers.\n* [candleLight_fw](https://github.com/candle-usb/candleLight_fw) - Open firmware for low-cost STM32 USB to CAN adapters such as CANable, cantact, and candleLight that implements the mainline Linux gs_usb interface, turning them into native SocketCAN devices without a vendor driver.\n* [CANtact](https://github.com/linklayer/cantact-app) - Open-source hardware CAN interface and desktop app supporting live tracing, frame transmission, ISO-TP, JavaScript scripting, and candump-format traces.\n* [CFUC](https://github.com/ucandevices/CFDC_embedded) - Open hardware and firmware ISO CAN FD to USB dongle built on the STM32G431, presenting as a native SocketCAN or gs_usb interface with a bundled python-can plugin.\n* [Doggie](https://github.com/infobyte/doggie) - Modular DIY CAN-to-serial adapter from Faraday Security that speaks slcan over USB, BLE or UART for SocketCAN and python-can, with an EvilDoggie variant adding offensive features for automotive research.\n* [LinUSBConverter](https://github.com/uCAN-LIN/LinUSBConverter) - Open-source USB to LIN bus dongle that operates as master, slave or monitor with optical isolation and SLCAN compatibility for vehicle LIN traffic.\n* [OWASP Automotive EMB 60](https://owasp.org/www-project-automotive-emb-60/) - OWASP incubator project with open hardware and software for a single-board computer that acts as a CAN-to-USB interface through SocketCAN for penetration testing.\n* [panda](https://github.com/commaai/panda) - Open-source CAN and CAN FD interface firmware from comma.ai running on an STM32H725, with Python bindings for full read/write access to vehicle buses.\n* [RAMN](https://github.com/ToyotaInfoTech/RAMN) - Resistant Automotive Miniature Network, a four-ECU CAN/CAN FD testbed on a single board with KiCad sources, CARLA closed-loop simulation, and use as the Car Hacking Village CTF platform.\n* [SuperCAN](https://github.com/jgressmann/supercan) - Open-source USB to CAN FD adapter firmware for the ATSAME51 and several other supported boards, giving a low-cost interface for capturing and injecting CAN and CAN FD traffic.\n\n## Security Analysis\n\n* [Automotive Threat Matrix](https://atm.automotiveisac.com/) - Auto-ISAC's MITRE ATT&CK-style matrix of automotive adversary tactics and techniques, drawn from validated attacks and reproducible research, for threat modelling, TARA, and intelligence sharing.\n* [Automotive Threat Modeling Template](https://github.com/nccgroup/The_Automotive_Threat_Modeling_Template) - NCC Group stencil set for the Microsoft Threat Modeling Tool, supplying vehicle-specific element types, trust boundaries, and threat rules for ECU and in-vehicle network diagrams.\n* [AutoTARA](https://github.com/HackProof/AutoTARA) - Web-based TARA (Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment) framework for ISO/SAE 21434 that models systems as attack graphs and applies MITRE's CTSA/CRRA prioritization methodology with a Meta Attack Language simulation backend.\n* [AVCDL](https://github.com/nutonomy/AVCDL) - Motional's open-sourced Versatile Cybersecurity Development Lifecycle with process definitions and templates mapped to ISO/SAE 21434, ISO 24089, and UN R155/R156, assessed by TUV SUD.\n* [Security AutoDesigner](https://plaxidityx.com/security-engines/security-autodesigner/) - Automated TARA platform for creating ISO 21434 and UNR 155 compliant threat analysis reports.\n* [Uptane](https://uptane.org/) - Open standard for securing automotive over-the-air updates that extends TUF to limit the damage when a repository or signing key is compromised, governed under the Joint Development Foundation.\n\n## Penetration Testing\n\n* [AutoFuze](https://github.com/DanAurea/AutoFuze) - Python toolkit for fuzzing and penetration testing ECUs over UDS, XCP, SOME/IP, and OBD, across CAN, DoIP, USB, and SPI transports.\n* [automotive-security-research](https://github.com/ps1337/automotive-security-research) - Published reverse engineering results for two production vehicles including CAN matrices, extracted ECU security access keys, and UDS scanning proof-of-concepts.\n* [CANHack](https://github.com/kentindell/canhack) - Ken Tindell's proof-of-concept toolkit of low-level CAN protocol attacks such as Janus frames, bit-banged from a Raspberry Pi Pico on the CANPico board, with a Sigrok decoder for observing the attacks on a logic analyser.\n* [Car Toolkit](https://github.com/j-schmied/car-toolkit) - Python-based toolkit for automotive penetration testing with CAN suite, CARAL, and virtual test bench setup.\n* [DongleScope](https://github.com/OSUSecLab/DongleScope) - Automated tool for detecting vulnerabilities in wireless OBD-II dongles based on USENIX Security 2020 research.\n* [NullSec CarFuzz](https://github.com/bad-antics/nullsec-carfuzz) - Rust fuzzer for CAN, UDS, OBD-II, and DoIP with grammar-aware test generation and coverage tracking.\n* [PiCCANTE](https://github.com/Alia5/PiCCANTE) - Dirt-cheap CAN bus exploration tool built on Raspberry Pi Pico as an open-source hardware/software solution.\n* [pwnobd](https://github.com/Nnubes256/pwnobd) - Offensive cybersecurity toolkit for vulnerability analysis of OBD-II devices presented at Black Hat Europe 2024.\n* [SecOC Key Extractor](https://github.com/i-can-hack/secoc) - Scripts to extract SecOC (Secure On-Board Communication) keys from Toyota vehicles using comma.ai panda hardware.\n* [tesla-opener](https://github.com/rgerganov/tesla-opener) - Open-source tool to open Tesla charging port using HackRF and WebUSB with ASK/OOK RF transmission.\n* [TruckDevil](https://github.com/LittleBlondeDevil/TruckDevil) - Framework for assessing heavy-vehicle ECUs that communicate over J1939, with ECU discovery, message reading and sending, and a J1939 fuzzer, running on a Macchina M2 or any python-can interface.\n\n## Datasets\n\n* [AutoHack](https://zenodo.org/records/19661006) - Multi-bus CAN dataset from a real vehicle covering C-CAN, P-CAN, and B-CAN, with physically verified fuzzing, spoofing, replay, DoS, and UDS-based attacks.\n* [CAN-MIRGU](https://github.com/sampathrajapaksha/CAN-MIRGU) - CAN bus attack dataset from a modern vehicle driven on real roads over six days, with physically verified masquerade, suspension, and real attacks.\n* [can-train-and-test](https://bitbucket.org/brooke-lampe/can-train-and-test/src/master/) - Labelled CAN captures from four vehicles across two manufacturers with nine attack types, split into known and unknown vehicle and attack test subsets for evaluating IDS generalisation.\n* [Car Hacking Dataset](https://ocslab.hksecurity.net/Datasets/car-hacking-dataset) - HCRL captures from a Kia Soul with labelled DoS, fuzzing, and RPM and gear spoofing injections, the most widely cited baseline in CAN intrusion detection papers.\n* [CarDS](https://tudatalib.ulb.tu-darmstadt.de/handle/tudatalib/5080) - ACSAC 2025 dataset of over nine hours of traffic from a 2020 electric vehicle with 10 CAN buses and 6 automotive Ethernet buses, covering benign driving and attack scenarios.\n* [Cross-Vehicle Generalisation Benchmark](https://github.com/obaf/Cross-Vehicle-Generalisation-of-In-Vehicle-Intrusion-Detection) - Leave-one-vehicle-out benchmark unifying ROAD, CIDv2, and can-train-and-test into 217 captures across eight vehicles for evaluating whether CAN IDS models transfer.\n* [GEM-CAN](https://zenodo.org/records/17834775) - Labelled capture of about 143,000 CAN frames from an autonomous GEM e6 platform, with normal operation, DoS floods, and brake and steering-lock data-tampering injections, for benchmarking lightweight on-device IDS.\n* [ROAD](https://0xsam.com/road/) - Real ORNL Automotive Dynamometer CAN intrusion dataset with verified fuzzing, targeted ID, masquerade, and accelerator attacks captured on a dynamometer.\n* [Survival Analysis Dataset](https://ocslab.hksecurity.net/Datasets/survival-ids) - HCRL CAN captures from a Hyundai YF Sonata, Kia Soul, and Chevrolet Spark with labelled flooding, fuzzy, and malfunction attacks.\n* [SynCAN](https://github.com/etas/SynCAN) - ETAS synthetic CAN benchmark with continuous, plateau, playback, suspension, and flooding attacks in the signal space, for comparing IDS that work on decoded signals rather than raw arbitration IDs.\n* [TOW-IDS Automotive Ethernet Intrusion Dataset](https://ocslab.hksecurity.net/Datasets/tow-ids-automotive-ethernet-intrusion-dataset) - HCRL captures of AVTP, gPTP, and CAN-over-UDP traffic on an automotive Ethernet network, split into normal driving and five labelled attack scenarios.\n* [VeReMi Extension](https://github.com/josephkamel/VeReMi-Dataset) - Simulated V2X misbehavior detection dataset generated with F2MD over the Luxembourg SUMO scenario, labelling position, speed, timing, replay, DoS, and Sybil attacks alongside faulty-sensor behaviour.\n\n## Research Papers\n\nPeer-reviewed research and landmark industry reports, ordered by year of\npublication. Open-access copies are linked where one exists.\n* [Security in Automotive Bus Systems](https://www.weimerskirch.org/files/WolfEtAl_SecureBus.pdf) - Wolf, Weimerskirch, and Paar, Workshop on Embedded Security in Cars 2004. The first systematic treatment of CAN, LIN, MOST, and FlexRay as security problems, proposing the gateway and cryptographic measures later echoed in SecOC.\n* [Securing Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks](https://infoscience.epfl.ch/entities/publication/2976e5d8-215b-4465-834e-875efe55844f) - Raya and Hubaux, Journal of Computer Security 2007. Threat analysis and security architecture for VANETs that set the direction for most later V2X security work.\n* [Secure Vehicular Communication Systems: Design and Architecture](https://arxiv.org/abs/0912.5391) - Papadimitratos et al., IEEE Communications Magazine 2008. The SeVeCom architecture, which defined the certificate and pseudonym model underlying today's V2X security stacks.\n* [Experimental Security Analysis of a Modern Automobile](https://www.autosec.org/pubs/cars-oakland2010.pdf) - Koscher et al., IEEE S&P 2010. The paper that opened the field, demonstrating that an attacker with access to any single ECU can disable the brakes and stop the engine of a moving vehicle.\n* [Security and Privacy Vulnerabilities of In-Car Wireless Networks: A Tire Pressure Monitoring System Case Study](https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity10/security-and-privacy-vulnerabilities-car-wireless-networks-tire-pressure) - Rouf et al., USENIX Security 2010. Shows TPMS sensors are unauthenticated and trackable at roughly 40m, the first published wireless in-car network attack.\n* [Comprehensive Experimental Analyses of Automotive Attack Surfaces](https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenix-security-11/comprehensive-experimental-analyses-automotive-attack-surfaces) - Checkoway et al., USENIX Security 2011. Follow-up establishing the remote attack surface, compromising a vehicle over Bluetooth, cellular, and the CD player.\n* [Relay Attacks on Passive Keyless Entry and Start Systems in Modern Cars](https://www.ndss-symposium.org/ndss2011/relay-attacks-on-passive-keyless-entry-and-start-systems-in-modern-cars/) - Francillon, Danev, and Capkun, NDSS 2011. Demonstrates the relay attack that still underpins most keyless vehicle theft today, against ten PKES systems from eight manufacturers.\n* [Gone in 360 Seconds: Hijacking with Hitag2](https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity12/technical-sessions/presentation/verdult) - Verdult, Garcia, and Balasch, USENIX Security 2012. Breaks the Hitag2 immobilizer transponder, then fitted to over 200 car models, recovering the key by radio in minutes.\n* [Adventures in Automotive Networks and Control Units](https://illmatics.com/car_hacking.pdf) - Miller and Valasek, 2013. The wired precursor to the Jeep work, documenting CAN injection against the Toyota Prius and Ford Escape and the methodology that followed.\n* [Survey on Security Threats and Protection Mechanisms in Embedded Automotive Networks](https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/6615528/) - Studnia et al., DSN Workshops 2013. Widely cited survey mapping in-vehicle protocols, the threats against them, and candidate countermeasures.\n* [A Survey of Remote Automotive Attack Surfaces](https://illmatics.com/remote%20attack%20surfaces.pdf) - Miller and Valasek, Black Hat USA 2014. Compares the remote attack surfaces, network architectures, and cyber-physical features of a large set of production vehicles, framing a remote attack as initial access, CAN message injection, and physical effect.\n* [Dismantling Megamos Crypto: Wirelessly Lockpicking a Vehicle Immobilizer](https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity15/technical-sessions/presentation/verdult) - Verdult, Garcia, and Ege, USENIX Security 2015. Reverse engineers the Megamos immobilizer used by Audi, Fiat, Honda, Volkswagen, and Volvo; famously injuncted for two years before publication.\n* [Remote Exploitation of an Unaltered Passenger Vehicle](https://www.ioactive.com/wp-content/uploads/pdfs/IOActive_Remote_Car_Hacking.pdf) - Miller and Valasek, 2015. The Jeep Cherokee cellular-to-CAN attack chain that triggered a 1.4 million vehicle recall.\n* [Fast and Vulnerable: A Story of Telematic Failures](https://www.usenix.org/conference/woot15/workshop-program/presentation/foster) - Foster, Prudhomme, Koscher, and Savage, USENIX WOOT 2015. Shows an aftermarket OBD-II telematics dongle exposing SMS-reachable remote control of vehicle CAN traffic.\n* [Potential Cyberattacks on Automated Vehicles](https://its.berkeley.edu/publications/potential-cyberattacks-automated-vehicles) - Petit and Shladover, IEEE T-ITS 2015. The standard reference taxonomy of attack vectors against autonomous and cooperative automated vehicles.\n* [Remote Attacks on Automated Vehicles Sensors: Experiments on Camera and LiDAR](https://blackhat.com/docs/eu-15/materials/eu-15-Petit-Self-Driving-And-Connected-Cars-Fooling-Sensors-And-Tracking-Drivers-wp1.pdf) - Petit, Stottelaar, Feiri, and Kargl, Black Hat Europe 2015. First practical spoofing and blinding of automotive camera and LiDAR using commodity hardware.\n* [Pseudonym Schemes in Vehicular Networks: A Survey](https://oparu.uni-ulm.de/items/b215d57b-06e1-4f27-a67e-a6ecaf3b45d2) - Petit, Schaub, Feiri, and Kargl, IEEE Communications Surveys and Tutorials 2015. Defines the pseudonym lifecycle and categorises the schemes that reconcile V2X message authentication with driver privacy.\n* [Fingerprinting Electronic Control Units for Vehicle Intrusion Detection](https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity16/technical-sessions/presentation/cho) - Cho and Shin, USENIX Security 2016. Clock-based IDS that fingerprints ECUs from clock skew in periodic messages, the most-replicated CAN IDS baseline.\n* [Error Handling of In-vehicle Networks Makes Them Vulnerable](https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/2976749.2978302) - Cho and Shin, ACM CCS 2016. The bus-off attack, which abuses CAN error handling to force an uncompromised ECU off the bus without any vehicle-specific reverse engineering.\n* [Lock It and Still Lose It: On the (In)Security of Automotive Remote Keyless Entry Systems](https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity16/technical-sessions/presentation/garcia) - Garcia, Oswald, Kasper, and Pavlides, USENIX Security 2016. Recovers shared global keys covering most Volkswagen Group vehicles sold over two decades, and breaks the Hitag2 rolling-code scheme.\n* [vatiCAN: Vetted, Authenticated CAN Bus](https://christian-rossow.de/publications/vatican-ches2016.pdf) - Nurnberger and Rossow, CHES 2016. Retrofit authentication for CAN using MACs and a global nonce, a reference point for later SecOC-style designs.\n* [LeiA: A Lightweight Authentication Protocol for CAN](https://pure-oai.bham.ac.uk/ws/portalfiles/portal/29342174/leia.pdf) - Radu and Garcia, ESORICS 2016. Backwards-compatible per-ID authentication that fits CAN's timing and bandwidth limits, compartmentalising ECUs so a compromised head unit cannot actuate the powertrain.\n* [Uptane: Securing Software Updates for Automobiles](https://uptane.org/papers/kuppusamy_escar_16.pdf) - Kuppusamy et al., escar Europe 2016. Extends TUF with a director role, supplier-delegated image signing, and ECU-signed vehicle version manifests, so that a partial compromise of the update system does not by itself let an attacker push malicious firmware to every ECU.\n* [Viden: Attacker Identification on In-Vehicle Networks](https://arxiv.org/abs/1708.08414) - Cho and Shin, ACM CCS 2017. Fingerprints transmitting ECUs by their analogue voltage signature, moving CAN defence from detecting an attack to naming the ECU responsible.\n* [WALNUT: Waging Doubt on the Integrity of MEMS Accelerometers with Acoustic Injection Attacks](https://spqrlab1.github.io/papers/trippel-IEEE-oaklawn-walnut-2017.pdf) - Trippel, Weisse, Xu, Honeyman, and Fu, IEEE EuroS&P 2017. Acoustic resonance attacks that forge accelerometer output, establishing analogue sensor integrity as its own threat model.\n* [VulCAN: Efficient Component Authentication and Software Isolation for Automotive Control Networks](https://vanbulck.net/files/acsac17-vulcan.pdf) - Van Bulck, Muhlberg, and Piessens, ACSAC 2017. Combines message authentication with trusted-computing isolation, defending against an adversary running arbitrary code on a participating ECU.\n* [Illusion and Dazzle: Adversarial Optical Channel Exploits Against Lidars for Automotive Applications](https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/613) - Shin, Kim, Kwon, and Kim, CHES 2017. Saturates and spoofs an automotive LiDAR over its optical channel, creating fake points and blinding it entirely; the precursor to later LiDAR perception attacks.\n* [GIDS: GAN based Intrusion Detection System for In-Vehicle Network](https://arxiv.org/abs/1907.07377) - Seo, Song, and Kim, PST 2018. Trains a GAN on normal CAN traffic only, and is a common deep-learning IDS baseline alongside the authors' Car-Hacking dataset.\n* [Beneath the Bonnet: A Breakdown of Diagnostic Security](https://pure-oai.bham.ac.uk/ws/portalfiles/portal/50643148/Beneath_the_Bonnet.pdf) - Van den Herrewegen and Garcia, ESORICS 2018. Reverse engineers the seed-key ciphers of four manufacturers from ECU firmware and achieves remote code execution over CAN through diagnostics alone.\n* [Robust Physical-World Attacks on Deep Learning Visual Classification](https://arxiv.org/abs/1707.08945) - Eykholt et al., CVPR 2018. The stop-sign sticker attack, the canonical physical adversarial example against road sign recognition.\n* [All Your GPS Are Belong To Us: Towards Stealthy Manipulation of Road Navigation Systems](https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity18/presentation/zeng) - Zeng et al., USENIX Security 2018. Spoofs GPS to reroute a driver to an attacker-chosen destination while keeping the displayed route plausible.\n* [CANvas: Fast and Inexpensive Automotive Network Mapping](https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity19/presentation/kulandaivel) - Kulandaivel, Goyal, Agrawal, and Sekar, USENIX Security 2019. Builds an nmap for the vehicle, recovering the sender and receiver map of a CAN network in under an hour using clock offsets and forced ECU isolation.\n* [Losing the Car Keys: Wireless PHY-Layer Insecurity in EV Charging](https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity19/presentation/baker) - Baker and Martinovic, USENIX Security 2019. Recovers ISO 15118 charging messages from the unintentional wireless emissions of CCS power-line communication across 54 real charging sessions.\n* [Fast, Furious and Insecure: Passive Keyless Entry and Start Systems in Modern Supercars](https://tches.iacr.org/index.php/TCHES/article/view/8289) - Wouters et al., CHES 2019. Breaks the DST40-based PKES used by Tesla and others, cloning a key fob from a few seconds of proximity.\n* [Adversarial Sensor Attack on LiDAR-based Perception in Autonomous Driving](https://arxiv.org/abs/1907.06826) - Cao et al., ACM CCS 2019. Spoofs LiDAR returns to inject a fake obstacle into the perception pipeline of a production autonomous driving stack.\n* [Plug-N-Pwned: Comprehensive Vulnerability Analysis of OBD-II Dongles](https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity20/presentation/wen) - Wen, Chen, and Lin, USENIX Security 2020. Automated analysis of 77 wireless OBD-II dongles, every one of which exposed at least two vulnerability classes.\n* [A Comprehensive Guide to CAN IDS Data and Introduction of the ROAD Dataset](https://arxiv.org/abs/2012.14600) - Verma et al., 2020. Systematises the CAN IDS dataset landscape, documents the flaws in earlier datasets, and introduces ROAD.\n* [Automated Cross-Platform Reverse Engineering of CAN Bus Commands From Mobile Apps](https://www.ndss-symposium.org/ndss-paper/automated-cross-platform-reverse-engineering-of-can-bus-commands-from-mobile-apps/) - Wen, Zhao, Chen, and Lin, NDSS 2020. Recovers CAN command syntax and semantics for 360 car models from companion mobile apps alone, without touching a vehicle.\n* [Drift with Devil: Security of Multi-Sensor Fusion based Localization in High-Level Autonomous Driving under GPS Spoofing](https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity20/presentation/shen) - Shen et al., USENIX Security 2020. Shows sensor fusion does not neutralise GPS spoofing, taking an autonomous vehicle off its lane with gradual position drift.\n* [My Other Car is Your Car: Compromising the Tesla Model X Keyless Entry System](https://tches.iacr.org/index.php/TCHES/article/view/9063) - Wouters, Gierlichs, and Preneel, CHES 2021. Chains a BLE firmware downgrade and a key fob update flaw into unlocking and driving away a Tesla Model X.\n* [Dirty Road Can Attack: Security of Deep Learning based Automated Lane Centering under Physical-World Attack](https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity21/presentation/sato) - Sato et al., USENIX Security 2021. Physical dirty-road patches that steer a production lane-centering system out of its lane.\n* [Too Good to Be Safe: Tricking Lane Detection in Autonomous Driving with Crafted Perturbations](https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity21/presentation/jing) - Jing et al., USENIX Security 2021. First lane-detection attack validated on a real production vehicle, exploiting the module's over-sensitivity with small road markings.\n* [Invisible for both Camera and LiDAR: Security of Multi-Sensor Fusion based Perception in Autonomous Driving](https://arxiv.org/abs/2106.09249) - Cao et al., IEEE S&P 2021. Defeats the multi-sensor fusion designs that production stacks actually use, with a single adversarial object invisible to camera and LiDAR at once.\n* [Exposing New Vulnerabilities of Error Handling Mechanism in CAN](https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity21/presentation/serag) - Serag et al., USENIX Security 2021. Systematically tests CAN node behaviour under error conditions with CANOX and finds three further vulnerabilities in the standard beyond the bus-off attack.\n* [Evading Voltage-Based Intrusion Detection on Automotive CAN](https://www.ndss-symposium.org/ndss-paper/evading-voltage-based-intrusion-detection-on-automotive-can/) - Bhatia et al., NDSS 2021. The DUET masquerade attack, in which two compromised ECUs corrupt the bus voltage and defeat every published voltage-based IDS, including Viden.\n* [CANflict: Exploiting Peripheral Conflicts for Data-Link Layer Attacks on Automotive Networks](https://arxiv.org/abs/2209.09557) - de Faveri Tron et al., ACM CCS 2022. Software-only data link layer attacks from a remotely compromised ECU, abusing peripheral pin conflicts to craft polyglot frames and break the protocol's own rules.\n* [RollBack: A New Time-Agnostic Replay Attack Against the Automotive Remote Keyless Entry Systems](https://arxiv.org/abs/2210.11923) - Csikor et al., Black Hat USA 2022. Replaying already-invalid rolling codes in sequence triggers a resynchronisation rollback, unlocking a vehicle indefinitely and defeating the countermeasure that stopped RollJam.\n* [Silently Disabling ECUs and Enabling Blind Attacks on the CAN Bus](https://arxiv.org/abs/2201.06362) - Rogers and Rasmussen, arXiv 2022. Disables an ECU with a single frame and without generating bus errors, evading the error-counting that earlier bus-off detection relies on, and adds a synchronisation method letting an attacker who cannot read the bus strike reliably.\n* [Brokenwire: Wireless Disruption of CCS Electric Vehicle Charging](https://www.ndss-symposium.org/ndss-paper/brokenwire-wireless-disruption-of-ccs-electric-vehicle-charging/) - Kohler, Baker, Strohmeier, and Martinovic, NDSS 2023. Aborts CCS rapid-charging sessions wirelessly from tens of metres with off-the-shelf radio hardware, against individual vehicles or whole fleets.\n* [Does Physical Adversarial Example Really Matter to Autonomous Driving? Towards System-Level Effect of Adversarial Object Evasion Attack](https://arxiv.org/abs/2308.11894) - Wang et al., ICCV 2023. Measures published physical adversarial attacks against a full driving pipeline rather than the perception model alone, and finds that component-level success rarely translates into system-level effects such as traffic rule violations.\n* [A First Physical-World Trajectory Prediction Attack via LiDAR-induced Deceptions in Autonomous Driving](https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity24/presentation/lou) - Lou et al., USENIX Security 2024. Attacks trajectory prediction indirectly, by placing physical objects that deceive LiDAR perception, instead of manipulating an attacker vehicle's own history as prior work required.\n* [OCPPStorm: A Comprehensive Fuzzing Tool for OCPP Implementations](https://www.ndss-symposium.org/ndss-paper/auto-draft-457/) - Coppoletta et al., VehicleSec 2024. Black-box fuzzer for the OCPP charging-station protocol that tests implementations regardless of platform or language, and found five confirmed CVEs in two open-source OCPP systems.\n* [On the Realism of LiDAR Spoofing Attacks against Autonomous Driving Vehicle at High Speed and Long Distance](https://www.ndss-symposium.org/ndss-paper/on-the-realism-of-lidar-spoofing-attacks-against-autonomous-driving-vehicle-at-high-speed-and-long-distance/) - Sato et al., NDSS 2025. Moving-vehicle spoofing rig and an adaptive high-frequency removal attack that succeed at 60 km/h and 110 m against production driving stacks, closing the gap between bench demonstrations and moving-vehicle conditions.\n* [SoK: Kicking CAN Down the Road. Systematizing CAN Security Knowledge](https://arxiv.org/abs/2510.02960) - Serag et al., 2025. Systematization of two decades of CAN security, with a unified taxonomy and assessment model for attackers, attacks, and defences.\n* [Current Affairs: A Security Measurement Study of CCS EV Charging Deployments](https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity25/presentation/szakaly) - Szakaly et al., USENIX Security 2025. First measurement of publicly deployed CCS DC chargers, finding that only 12 percent of 325 units across four European countries negotiated TLS and that most ran decade-old HomePlug modem firmware.\n* [SoK: Stealing Cars Since Remote Keyless Entry Introduction and How to Defend From It](https://www.usenix.org/conference/vehiclesec25/presentation/bianchi) - Bianchi et al., USENIX VehicleSec 2025. Systematization of RKE and passive keyless entry and start systems, covering their history, the attacks against them, and the defences.\n* [SoK: How Sensor Attacks Disrupt Autonomous Vehicles: An End-to-end Analysis, Challenges, and Missed Threats](https://arxiv.org/abs/2509.11120) - Zhang et al., arXiv 2025. Traces how sensor-induced errors propagate through perception, localization, planning, and control to physical impact, and identifies 12 previously overlooked attack vectors.\n* [SoK: The Next Frontier in AV Security: Systematizing Perception Attacks and the Emerging Threat of Multi-Sensor Fusion](https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.20621) - Khan, Islam, and Hasan, arXiv 2026. Systematizes 48 studies of perception-layer attacks into a taxonomy of 20 attack vectors and shows how multi-sensor fusion opens cross-modal attacks.\n* [Automating Function-Level TARA for Automotive Full-Lifecycle Security](https://www.ndss-symposium.org/ndss-paper/automating-function-level-tara-for-automotive-full-lifecycle-security/) - Yang et al., NDSS 2026. DefenseWeaver, a multi-agent LLM system that automates function-level ISO/SAE 21434 threat analysis and risk assessment, reported as deployed in four automotive projects.\n* [SECV: Securing Connected Vehicles with Hardware Trust Anchors](https://www.ndss-symposium.org/ndss-paper/secv-securing-connected-vehicles-with-hardware-trust-anchors/) - Kayondo et al., NDSS 2026. Mediates external-network control messages inside a TEE backed by an EVITA-compliant HSM, so the gateway can verify them even when the external network manager is compromised, at 6.5 percent transmission overhead.\n* [The Heat is On: Understanding and Mitigating Vulnerabilities of Thermal Image Perception in Autonomous Systems](https://www.ndss-symposium.org/ndss-paper/the-heat-is-on-understanding-and-mitigating-vulnerabilities-of-thermal-image-perception-in-autonomous-systems/) - Bhupathiraju et al., NDSS 2026. Shows heat sources degrade thermal-camera pedestrian detection and sensor fusion, including in real driving, and proposes real-time defences.\n* [Charge It to My Neighbor: A Relay Attack on ISO 15118 Plug and Charge Payment](https://www.usenix.org/conference/vehiclesec26/presentation/low) - Löw et al., USENIX VehicleSec 2026. Relays Plug and Charge authentication so the attacker charges their own car while the victim is billed, exploiting missing station identity in the signature and weak TLS certificate handling, with a proof of concept.\n* [Reversing a Brake ECU Firmware Update](https://www.usenix.org/conference/vehiclesec26/presentation/gardiner) - Gardiner, USENIX VehicleSec 2026. Reverse engineers the Bendix EC80 brake ECU's J2497 power-line updater, diffs the firmware to show a safety recall also patched security bugs, and demonstrates a write-where primitive and DoS on a bench and in a moving truck.\n* [Race to Charge: Concurrency Bugs and State Integrity Violations in EV Charging Infrastructure](https://www.usenix.org/conference/vehiclesec26/presentation/lee) - Lee and Lee, USENIX VehicleSec 2026. Audits the open-source EVerest charging stack and finds 11 CVE-assigned flaws, from data races confirmed with sanitizers to logic exploits such as charging that continues after a remote stop.\n* [On the Real-World Applicability of Automotive CAN Intrusion Detection Systems](https://www.usenix.org/conference/vehiclesec26/presentation/lazeski) - Lazeski et al., USENIX VehicleSec 2026. Work in progress showing that ML-based CAN intrusion detectors often learn dataset shortcuts because common datasets contain only simple attacks, so high scores do not imply robustness against a practical attacker.\n* [Perspective-Shift Attacks Against Optical Perception Sensors: A Novel Attack Vector on LiDAR and Camera](https://www.usenix.org/conference/vehiclesec26/presentation/calipari) - Calipari et al., USENIX VehicleSec 2026. Introduces a new physical attack class that uses Direction Turning Film to shift LiDAR and camera fields of view, showing even a 20° shift significantly disrupts LiDAR odometry and camera lane detection in laboratory tests and on a real research vehicle, while barely affecting detection confidence.\n* [A Formal Security Analysis of CAN XL](https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity26/presentation/tang-zhaozhou) - Tang et al., USENIX Security 2026. First formal security analysis of the CAN XL standard, showing it retains all known classic CAN MAC sub-layer flaws and adds seven new vulnerabilities, validated on commercial controllers.\n* [HotWire: Real-World Impersonation and Discharge Attacks on Electric Vehicle Charging Systems](https://www.usenix.org/conference/woot26/presentation/chen) - Chen et al., USENIX WOOT 2026. Demonstrates identifier impersonation and forced battery discharge against production EVs and live charging networks, showing DIN 70121 sessions trust protocol messages over physical verification.\n* [BLE Theft Auto: Evaluating the Security of Aftermarket BLE-based Automotive Remote Control Systems](https://cseweb.ucsd.edu/~schulman/docs/sec26-bletheftauto.pdf) - Yu et al., USENIX Security 2026. Shows three of six aftermarket Bluetooth vehicle remote-control systems have critical pairing and authentication flaws, including a shared key across dealer-installed devices that lets a nearby attacker unlock doors and immobilize engines.\n\n## Conference Presentations\n\nSlides, write-ups and recordings of talks that disclosed vehicle vulnerabilities\nor taught a technique, from the Car Hacking Village, Black Hat, Pwn2Own Automotive, CCC, escar\nand similar venues.\n\n* [Abusing CAN Bus Protocol Specification for Denial of Service in Embedded Systems](https://media.defcon.org/DEF%20CON%2031/DEF%20CON%2031%20villages/DEF%20CON%2031%20villages%20captions/DEF%20CON%2031%20-%20Car%20Hacking%20Village%20-%20Abusing%20CAN%20Bus%20Protocol%20Specification%20for%20Denial%20of%20Service%20in%20Embedded%20Systems%20-%20Martin%20Petran.eng.txt) - Petran, DEF CON 31 Car Hacking Village 2023. Shows how an out-of-range CAN data length code reaches firmware unchecked and overflows a buffer, demonstrated on a development board and a Tesla Model 3 ECU.\n* [Automotive Flash Bootloaders: Exposing Automotive ECU Updates](https://infocon.org/cons/DEF%20CON/DEF%20CON%2026/DEF%20CON%2026%20villages/DEF%20CON%2026%20villages%20captions/DEF%20CON%2026%20-%20CAR%20HACKING%20VILLAGE%20-%20Philip%20Lapczynski%20-%20Automotive%20Flash%20Bootloaders%20Exposing%20automotive%20ECU%20updates.eng.txt) - Lapczynski, DEF CON 26 Car Hacking Village 2018. Walks through how UDS programming sessions, seed-key exchange, and flash routines expose ECU firmware updates to attack.\n* [Back in the Driver's Seat: Recovering Critical Data from Tesla Autopilot Using Voltage Glitching](https://media.ccc.de/v/37c3-12144-back_in_the_driver_s_seat_recovering_critical_data_from_tesla_autopilot_using_voltage_glitching) - Kuhnapfel, Werling, and Jacob, 37C3 2023. Voltage-glitching attack that gives root on Tesla Autopilot hardware and recovers protected data.\n* [Back-connect to the Connected Car. Search for Vulnerabilities in the VW Electric Car.](https://citation.thinkst.com/talk/83581) - Serdyuk, Kondikov, Razmakhnin, and Sakr, Black Hat Europe 2022. Maps the attack surface of the VW ID.3 across Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, V2X, cellular, CAN, and OBD-II entry points.\n* [CANdid: A Stealthy Stepping-Stone Attack to Bypass Authentication on ECUs](https://zenodo.org/records/18714273) - Kulandaivel, Jain, Guajardo, and Sekar, escar USA 2022. Shows a compromised ECU can authenticate against a safety-critical ECU's SecurityAccess without the failed attempts a CAN IDS would flag.\n* [DriveThru Car Hacking: Fast Food, Faster Data Breach](https://citation.thinkst.com/talk/96125) - Chen et al., Black Hat Asia 2025. Attack chain against more than 24 dashcam models, delivered through a drive-through ordering flow, with an accompanying tool.\n* [Expanding the Attack Scenarios of SAE J1939: A Comprehensive Analysis of Established and Novel Vulnerabilities in Transport Protocol](https://zenodo.org/records/18715820) - Lee, Lee, Jun, and Kim, escar USA 2024. Presents 14 attack scenarios against the J1939 protocol used in commercial vehicles, seven of them new.\n* [Fast and Compromised: Automotive Security on a Timer](https://zenodo.org/records/18716321) - Ziv and Alfasi, escar USA 2025. Penetration test taking a production electric vehicle from an insecure Wi-Fi network to full compromise in eight working days, via hardcoded credentials, insecure MQTT, and weak UDS Security Access.\n* [How API Flaws Led to Admin Access to Over 1k USA Dealers and Control Over Your Car](https://media.defcon.org/DEF%20CON%2033/DEF%20CON%2033%20villages%20and%20creators/DEF%20CON%2033%20-%20Car%20Hacking%20Village%20-%20Eaton%20Zveare%20-%20How%20API%20flaws%20led%20to%20admin%20access%20to%20over%201k%20USA%20dealers%20and%20control%20over%20your%20car.pdf) - Eaton Zveare, DEF CON 33 Car Hacking Village 2025. Slides showing how flaws in an automaker's central dealer platform yielded a national admin account across over a thousand dealers.\n* [How I Discovered and Hacked Learning Codes of the Key Fob of a Car Assembled in My Country](https://media.defcon.org/DEF%20CON%2032/DEF%20CON%2032%20villages/DEF%20CON%2032%20villages%20captions/DEF%20CON%2032%20-%20Car%20Hacking%20Village%20-%20How%20I%20discovered%20and%20hacked%20Learning%20Codes%20of%20the%20key%20job%20of%20a%20car%20assembled%20in%20my%20country%20-%20Danilo%20Erazo.eng.srt) - Erazo, DEF CON 32 Car Hacking Village 2024. Breaks the learning-code key fob of a locally assembled car with replay, a receiver backdoor, and a brute-force tool.\n* [Low Energy to High Energy: Hacking Nearby EV-Chargers Over Bluetooth](https://citation.thinkst.com/talk/89711) - Alkemade and Nassar, Black Hat USA 2024. Bluetooth attacks on three EV chargers, built from exploits demonstrated at Pwn2Own Automotive 2024.\n* [Meet Salinas: The First Ever SMS-Commanded Car Infotainment RAT](https://media.defcon.org/DEF%20CON%2026/DEF%20CON%2026%20villages/DEF%20CON%2026%20villages%20captions/DEF%20CON%2026%20-%20CAR%20HACKING%20VILLAGE%20-%20Dan%20Regalado%20-%20Meet%20Salinas%20the%20first%20ever%20SMS-commanded%20Car%20Infotainment%20RAT.eng.srt) - Regalado, DEF CON 26 Car Hacking Village 2018. Shows how a production infotainment unit can be infected with malware that exfiltrates the driver's data through SMS via the paired phone.\n* [Modern Odometer Manipulation](https://media.defcon.org/DEF%20CON%2033/DEF%20CON%2033%20villages%20and%20creators/DEF%20CON%2033%20-%20Car%20Hacking%20Village%20-%20collin%20%26%20oblivion%20-%20Modern%20Odometer%20Manipulation.pdf) - collin and oblivion, DEF CON 33 Car Hacking Village 2025. Slides reverse engineering a device that alters a message before it reaches the instrument cluster, using a glitching bypass of flash read protection.\n* [One Modem to Brick Them All: Exploiting Vulnerabilities in the EV Charging Communication](https://media.defcon.org/DEF%20CON%2033/DEF%20CON%2033%20villages%20and%20creators/DEF%20CON%2033%20-%20Car%20Hacking%20Village%20-%20Jan%20_SP3ZN45_%20Berens%2C%20Marcell%20Szak%C3%A1ly%20%26%20Sebastian%20K%C3%B6hler%20-%20One%20Modem%20to%20Brick%20them%20all.pdf) - Berens, Szakaly, and Kohler, DEF CON 33 Car Hacking Village 2025. Slides on attacking the CCS charging communication modem, from the authors of the USENIX Security 2025 charger measurement study.\n* [Over the Air: Compromise of Modern Volkswagen Group Vehicles](https://i.blackhat.com/EU-24/Presentations/EU-24-Parnishchev-OverTheAirVW.pdf) - Ivachev and Parnishchev, Black Hat Europe 2024. Bluetooth attack chain against Volkswagen Group MIB3 infotainment yielding persistent code execution, microphone recording, GPS tracking, and contact exfiltration across 1.4 million vehicles.\n* [Passive and Active Attacks on TPMS Systems](https://media.defcon.org/DEF%20CON%2033/DEF%20CON%2033%20villages%20and%20creators/DEF%20CON%2033%20-%20Car%20Hacking%20Village%20-%20Yago%20Lizarribar%20-%20Passive%20and%20Active%20Attacks%20on%20TPMS%20Systems.pdf) - Yago Lizarribar, DEF CON 33 Car Hacking Village 2025. Slides on long-term passive tracking of tire pressure sensors and active spoofing, both with commodity SDR hardware.\n* [Pedal to the Bare Metal](https://i.blackhat.com/BH-USA-26/Presentations/US-26-Scharnowski-Pedal_to_the_Bare_Metal.pdf) - Scharnowski and Covic, Black Hat USA 2026. Demonstrates rehosting and fuzzing the Tesla Wall Connector firmware to trigger a worm spreading via SWCAN.\n* [Pwn2Own Automotive 2026: Day Three Results and the Master of Pwn](https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/blog/2026/1/23/pwn2own-automotive-2026-day-three-results-and-the-master-of-pwn) - Zero Day Initiative, Tokyo 2026. Final results of the contest, where $1,047,000 was awarded for 76 unique zero-days in infotainment systems and EV chargers.\n* [Research Only? Understanding the Scope of Automotive Cyberattacks in the Wild](https://www.usenix.org/conference/vehiclesec26/presentation/keynote-savage) - Savage, USENIX VehicleSec 2026 keynote. Asks why fifteen years of remote-takeover demonstrations have not been matched by attacks in the wild, and what would change that.\n* [The Vehicle May Be Sick: Denial of Diagnostic Services by Exploiting the CAN Transport Protocol](https://www.escarusaevent.com/s/New-Replacement-Seungjin-ESCAR_2026_Presentation_SeungjinBaek.pdf) - Baek, Jeong, and Kim, escar USA 2026. Presents eight ISO-TP attack scenarios that deny or manipulate diagnostic services, validated against aftermarket and OEM-level scan tools on a production vehicle.\n* [Vehicle Immobilization Revisited](https://media.ccc.de/v/36c3-11020-vehicle_immobilization_revisited) - Bokslag, 36C3 2019. Studies three vehicles and shows the immobilizer transponder talks to the body control module rather than the ECM, so weak authentication at either link allows an unauthorised start.\n* [Wir wissen, wo dein Auto steht](https://media.ccc.de/v/38c3-wir-wissen-wo-dein-auto-steht-volksdaten-von-volkswagen) - Kreil and Flupke, 38C3 2024. German-language talk on movement data of 800,000 Volkswagen group electric cars that was exposed unprotected online.\n\n## Books\n\n* [A Comprehensible Guide to Controller Area Network](https://copperhilltech.com/a-comprehensible-guide-to-controller-area-network/) - Wilfried Voss, Copperhill 2005. The standard plain-language reference on CAN itself, covering frame formats, arbitration, error handling, and timing that vehicle network attacks depend on.\n* [Automotive Cyber Security](https://books.google.com/books?id=uTD_DwAAQBAJ) - Shiho Kim and Rakesh Shrestha, Springer 2020. Academic introduction to connected and autonomous vehicle security, threats, and the standardisation landscape.\n* [Automotive Cybersecurity Engineering Handbook](https://books.google.com/books/about/Automotive_Cybersecurity_Engineering_Han.html?id=UK_YEAAAQBAJ) - Ahmad MK Nasser, Packt 2023. Practitioner's guide to building cyber-resilient vehicles, covering threat analysis, hardware security, and ISO/SAE 21434 engineering practice.\n* [Automotive Cybersecurity: An Introduction to ISO/SAE 21434](https://books.google.com/books?id=A3l0EAAAQBAJ) - David Ward and Paul Wooderson, SAE International 2021. Short introduction to ISO/SAE 21434 covering cybersecurity basics, setting up a company process, and assurance and certification.\n* [Automotive Cybersecurity: Protecting Connected and Autonomous Vehicles](https://he.kendallhunt.com/product/automotive-cybersecurity-protecting-connected-and-autonomous-vehicles) - Alfred Basta and Sam Hana, Kendall Hunt 2026. Textbook covering threats from ECU networks and sensor spoofing to OTA patching, EV charging breaches, and incident response.\n* [Automotive Ethernet](https://books.google.com/books?vid=ISBN9781108841955) - Matheus and Königseder, Cambridge University Press 2021. The standard reference on automotive Ethernet, covering PHYs, TSN, and security concepts for in-vehicle networks.\n* [Automotive Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment in Practice](https://books.google.com/books/about/Automotive_Threat_Analysis_and_Risk_Asse.html?id=Z_8vEQAAQBAJ) - Rodrigo do Carmo and Alexander Schlensog, Springer 2024. Practitioner's guide to threat analysis and risk assessment (TARA) following ISO/SAE 21434, with worked examples for automotive embedded and IT/OT systems.\n* [Building Secure Cars](https://www.wiley.com/en-us/Building+Secure+Cars:+Assuring+the+Automotive+Software+Development+Lifecycle-p-9781119710745) - Dennis Kengo Oka, Wiley 2021. Focuses on assuring the automotive software development lifecycle, from secure coding and static analysis through fuzzing and penetration testing.\n* [Cybersecurity for Commercial Vehicles](https://books.google.com/books?id=R3h0EAAAQBAJ) - Gloria D'Anna, SAE International 2018. Covers heavy vehicle and fleet security, how it differs from passenger cars, SAE J3061, platooning, and breach forensics.\n* [Hacking Connected Cars](https://www.wiley.com/en-us/-p-9781119491804) - Alissa Knight, Wiley 2020. Tactics, techniques, and procedures for penetration testing, threat modelling, and risk assessment of telematics control units and infotainment systems.\n* [Offensive Automotive Cybersecurity](https://books.google.com/books/about/Offensive_Automotive_Cybersecurity.html?id=tQbfEQAAQBAJ) - Ahmad MK Nasser and Dennis Kengo Oka, Packt 2026. The two handbook authors together on the offensive side, covering exploitation of modern automotive platforms.\n* [Securing Electric Mobility](https://shop.elsevier.com/books/securing-electric-mobility/kumari/978-0-443-33923-3) - Aparna Kumari (ed.), Elsevier 2026. Edited volume on the security of electric vehicles and charging infrastructure.\n* [The Car Hacker's Handbook](https://www.opengarages.org/handbook/) - Craig Smith, No Starch Press 2016. The foundational practical guide to vehicle security, covering threat modelling, CAN reverse engineering, and ECU exploitation; free to read online via Open Garages.\n\n## Learning Resources\n\n* [Automotive Cybersecurity Roadmap](https://github.com/AutoSecurityy/Automotive-Cybersecurity-Roadmap) - Structured learning path from CAN and UDS fundamentals through TARA, firmware reverse engineering, and hardware hacking into specialized career tracks.\n* [Automotive Security Timeline](https://github.com/automotive-security/Automotive-Security-Timeline) - Continuously updated knowledge base of automotive cybersecurity events including vulnerability disclosures, attack demonstrations, Pwn2Own Automotive results, and supply-chain incidents.\n* [Automotive-Networking-Security](https://automotive-network-security.com/standard_solutions.shtml) - Automotive networking security standards and solutions overview.\n* [Bypassing Debug Password Protection on the RH850 Family](https://blog.quarkslab.com/bypassing-debug-password-protection-on-the-rh850-family-using-fault-injection.html) - Quarkslab walkthrough of defeating the 16-byte IDCODE debug lock on Renesas RH850 ECU microcontrollers with crowbar voltage glitching, using a ChipWhisperer Husky or a low-cost Pico Glitcher.\n* [Car Hacking Village](https://www.carhackingvillage.com/events) - Non-profit running hands-on car hacking workshops and CTFs at DEF CON, Black Hat, HITCON, CODE BLUE, and other conferences.\n* [Fleet Cyber Challenge](https://nmfta.org/standards/cybersecurity/fleet-cyber-challenge/) - NMFTA's free self-paced capture-the-flag lab for commercial vehicle security, with scenarios on CAN traffic analysis, ELD compromise, GPS spoofing, firmware artifacts, and telematics API credentials, needing no account to start.\n* [OpenGarages](https://www.opengarages.org/) - Open vehicle research collective behind the Car Hacker's Handbook, publishing the free edition of the book, ICSim, and workshop material for hands-on vehicle security practice.\n* [OWASP Automotive Security Cheat Sheet](https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Automotive_Security_Cheat_Sheet.html) - OWASP cheat sheet covering threat modeling, message authentication, secure boot, and update verification for vehicle ECUs and connected services.\n* [What is Automotive MACsec?](https://youtu.be/5QiHmMoJCOE) - Video training on Automotive MACsec concepts by Technica Engineering.\n\n## Related Awesome Lists\n\n* [Awesome CANb IDs](https://github.com/iDoka/awesome-automotive-can-id) - CAN bus ID reference and documentation.\n* [Awesome CANbus](https://github.com/iDoka/awesome-canbus) - Comprehensive CAN bus security resources.\n* [Awesome Connected Things Sec](https://github.com/V33RU/awesome-connected-things-sec) - Security resources across IoT, embedded, industrial, and automotive systems with a dedicated automotive section.\n* [Awesome Embedded Security](https://github.com/hexsecs/awesome-embedded-security) - Tools and knowledge for embedded security research.\n* [Awesome EV Charging](https://github.com/juherr/awesome-ev-charging) - Curated specifications, tools, and resources for EV charging protocols including OCPP, ISO 15118, OCPI, and Eichrecht.\n* [Awesome Vehicle Security](https://github.com/jaredthecoder/awesome-vehicle-security) - Long-running curated list of vehicle security resources, hardware, software, researchers, and manufacturer disclosure programs.",
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      "readme": "# Lexus - replay attack.\n## Or how I hacked my Lexus car.\n\n### Hacking a car remote control key using replay attack.\n\n## Background:\nCar remote controls keys use \"rolling codes\" - means each code sent from the remote control to the car is single use, unique and hard to guess.\n\nThe way open the car is to capture the remote code, on sterile environment (with no car around), this way we can ensure that the cade will not be \"blacklisted\" by the car.\n\nAfter we captured and saved the code, then we can reply this to the car.\n\n## The equipment:\n1. [RTL-SDR](https://www.rtl-sdr.com/) (Software Define Radio) dongle with 16 cm antenna\n2. Raspberry pi 3\n   1. LED and switch soldered to GPIO.\n   2. Antenna soldered to GPIO.\n   3. [RPITX](https://github.com/F5OEO/rpitx) software installation on raspberry pi.\n3. Power bank.\n\n## The process:\n1. First we need to find the remote control transmission frequency. This can be done by searching for the remote control FCC no. to get frequency range. I hade an educated guess that it will be around 868 MHz\n2. Connecting the RTL-SDR dongle to the computer. Using SDR# software to identify the exact frequency.\n3. **Found** the exact frequency is 867.8625 MHz\n4. Then connecting the SDR dongle to the raspberry pi, connecting to the pi using SSH, and recording the remote control codes using rpitx:\n\n```bash\nsudo rtl_sdr -s 250000 -g 35 -f 867.8625e6 lexus_open.iq\n```\n5. Connecting the SDR dongle back to the computer, and using SDR# software to listen to the frequency.\n6. From the raspberry pi, transmitting the recorded codes\n```bash\nsudo sendiq -s 250000 -f 867.8625e6 -t u8 -i lexus_open.iq\n```\n7. Validating on computer that the message is sent.\n8. Writing a python script that will run the transmission code when pressing the button on the raspberry pi.\n9. Adding the python script to run on boot.\n```bash\ncrontab -e\nAdding this:\n@reboot python RPI_replay.py\n```\n10. Testing it on real.\n11. ***KABOOM***\n\n## **VIDEO**\n\n[![](https://markdown-videos-api.jorgenkh.no/youtube/_qoDBIqu0Zc)](https://youtu.be/_qoDBIqu0Zc)\n\n## Mitigation:\nA good mitigation will by 2 way hand shake - like using NTLM authentication.\n\nWhen paring the remote keys with the car system, a secret key will be exchanged.\n\nOpening the car with a remote key will have the following steps:\n\n1. remote control car key will send a rolling code to the car.\n2. The car then will send a random message back to the remote.\n3. The remote control car key will encrypt the message using pre defined key, and send it back to the car.\n4. The car then decrypt the message with the key and validate massage integrity.",
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      "readme": "# 📘 [English version available here](README.en.md)\n\n![Task: Object Tracking + Depth Estimation](https://img.shields.io/badge/Task-Object%20Tracking%20%2B%20Depth%20Estimation-blue?style=flat)\n![Model: YOLOv8 | Ultralytics](https://img.shields.io/badge/Model-YOLOv8%20%7C%20Ultralytics-purple?style=flat)\n![Framework: OpenCV](https://img.shields.io/badge/Framework-OpenCV-red?style=flat)\n![Real-time Ready](https://img.shields.io/badge/Real--time-Yes-green?style=flat)\n\n\n# Simple Stereo Depth Estimation with YOLOv8 Tracking\n\n> การตรวจจับและติดตามวัตถุพร้อมข้อมูลความลึกแบบเรียลไทม์ ด้วยกล้องสเตอริโอและ YOLOv8 พัฒนาเพื่อใช้งานในระบบหุ่นยนต์ งานวิจัยด้านคอมพิวเตอร์วิทัศน์ และอุปกรณ์ฝังตัว (Embedded Systems)\n\nโปรเจกต์นี้นำเสนอขั้นตอนการทำงานที่ผสานการประเมินความลึกจากภาพด้วยกล้องสเตอริโอ (stereo vision) เข้ากับการตรวจจับและติดตามวัตถุด้วย YOLOv8 โดยออกแบบมาเพื่อรองรับการทำงานแบบเรียลไทม์ผ่านระบบกล้องสเตอริโอ\n\n---\n\n## Project Overview\n\n### ขั้นตอนการใช้งาน:\n\n1. ถ่ายภาพ Calibration ของกระดานหมากรุก (chessboard) อย่างน้อย 30 ภาพ โดยใช้กล้อง stereo เพื่อคำนวณพารามิเตอร์ภายในกล้อง และระยะสัมพันธ์ระหว่างกล้องทั้งสอง (ใช้สคริปต์ [`stereo_capture.py`](stereo_capture.py))\n\n2. ทำการ Rectification (ปรับแนวภาพ) เพื่อให้ภาพซ้าย-ขวาอยู่ในแนวเดียวกัน และลดความผิดเพี้ยน (undistortion)\n\n3. ใช้ YOLOv8 เพื่อตรวจจับวัตถุในภาพฝั่งซ้าย (Left Image) ของกล้อง stereo\n\n4. สร้างแผนที่ความลึก (Disparity Map) จากภาพ rectified ซ้ายและขวา\n\n5. นำค่า disparity มาคำนวณระยะของวัตถุ (Z-axis in meters) โดยอิงจาก geometry ของกล้อง stereo\n\n6. แสดงผลลัพธ์: ภาพฝั่งซ้ายพร้อมกล่องครอบวัตถุ (bounding box) ที่ประกอบด้วยข้อมูลคลาส, ระยะห่าง และ ID ของวัตถุ\n\n---\n\n## Core Components\n\n### Stereo Calibration\n- โหลดพารามิเตอร์จาก `stereo_calib_params.npz`\n- พารามิเตอร์ที่ใช้:\n  - `cameraMatrix1`, `cameraMatrix2`\n  - `distCoeffs1`, `distCoeffs2`\n  - `R`, `T`\n\n### Stereo Rectification\n- ใช้ `cv2.stereoRectify` และ `initUndistortRectifyMap`\n- ได้ภาพ rectified ทั้งซ้ายและขวา\n\n### Depth Estimation\n- ใช้ `cv2.StereoSGBM_create` เพื่อสร้าง disparity map\n- คำนวณระยะวัตถุจาก disparity โดยใช้สมการ:\n\n```math\nZ = (focal\\_length \\times baseline) / disparity\n```\n\n- ปรับค่า Z ด้วย scaling factor โดยอ้างอิงจากระยะจริงที่ผู้ใช้กำหนดเองเพื่อความแม่นยำตามสถานการณ์ใช้งาน\n\n### YOLOv8 Detection\n- ใช้ Ultralytics YOLOv8 (`yolov8n.pt`)\n- ตรวจจับและติดตามวัตถุที่น่าสนใจ เช่น `person`, `bottle`, `cup`, `cell phone` เป็นต้น\n\n### Visualization\n- แสดงผล bounding box พร้อม ID, ชื่อคลาส และระยะห่าง\n- แสดงแผนที่ความลึกในรูปแบบ colormap (Jet)\n- บันทึกวิดีโอผลลัพธ์เป็น `tracked_objects_output.mp4`\n\n---\n\n## Dependencies\n- NumPy\n- OpenCV\n- Torch\n- Ultralytics (YOLOv8)\n- Python 3.8 ขึ้นไป\n\n---\n\n## Distance Estimation and Depth Map\n\n<p align=\"center\">\n  <img src=\"distance-estimation.gif\" alt=\"ตัวอย่างผลลัพธ์\" width=\"100%\" />\n</p>\n\n---\n\n## หมายเหตุการใช้งาน\n- ควรใช้กล้อง stereo จริงที่สามารถแสดงภาพซ้ายและขวาในเฟรมเดียวกัน\n- ค่า `baseline` และ `focal_length` ควรอ้างอิงจากค่าที่ได้จากการคาลิเบรต เพื่อให้การคำนวณระยะมีความแม่นยำ\n- รองรับการประมวลผลและบันทึกวิดีโอแบบเรียลไทม์\n\n---\n\n- โค้ดนี้ดัดแปลงและพัฒนาต่อยอดจาก [Ultralytics YOLOv8](https://github.com/ultralytics/ultralytics) และ [OpenCV Stereo Vision API](https://docs.opencv.org/4.x/dd/d53/tutorial_py_depthmap.html)\n\n\n## Attribution\n\n- **Open source computer vision library** [OpenCV](https://github.com/opencv/opencv)\n- **YOLOv8** [Ultralytics](https://github.com/ultralytics/ultralytics)\n- **Developed by** [MorseTech Lab](https://www.morsetechlab.com)\n\n## 🛡️ License\n\nProject นี้เผยแพร่ภายใต้ [GNU Affero General Public License v3.0 (AGPLv3)](LICENSE) เพื่อให้สอดคล้องกับเงื่อนไขการใช้งานของไลบรารีที่เกี่ยวข้อง\n\n<!--\ntags: Stereo Vision, Depth Estimation, YOLOv8, OpenCV, Real-time Tracking, Robotics, ADAS, Python Computer Vision, 3D Perception, Ultranalytics, Z-axis measurement\n-->\n\n<!-- Open Graph / Twitter Meta -->\n<!--\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Stereo Depth Estimation with YOLOv8 Tracking\" />\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"Real-time object detection and depth estimation using stereo vision and YOLOv8. Ideal for robotics, ADAS, and 3D computer vision applications.\" />\n<meta property=\"og:image\" content=\"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/morsetechlab/stereo-depth-yolov8-tracking/main/distance-estimation.gif\" />\n<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"https://github.com/morsetechlab/stereo-depth-yolov8-tracking\" />\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"website\" />\n\n<meta name=\"twitter:card\" content=\"summary_large_image\" />\n<meta name=\"twitter:title\" content=\"Stereo Depth Estimation with YOLOv8 Tracking\" />\n<meta name=\"twitter:description\" content=\"Track and estimate object distance in real-time using stereo cameras and YOLOv8. Built for robotics and embedded systems.\" />\n<meta name=\"twitter:image\" content=\"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/morsetechlab/stereo-depth-yolov8-tracking/main/distance-estimation.gif\" />\n-->",
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      "title": "Testing Symmetric Encryption for Securing Automotive CAN-BUS Networks",
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      "description": "This demonstrates a test implementation of symmetric encryption to secure CAN-BUS (virtual) messages in automotive systems using Python. It is intended as a proof of concept for cybersecurity enthusiasts exploring encryption in automotive networks.",
      "readme": "---\n## Testing Symmetric Encryption for Securing Automotive CAN-BUS Networks\n*vasu@vdefense.tech*\n---\n\n> **Note:** This article demonstrates a test implementation of symmetric encryption to secure CAN-BUS messages in automotive systems using Python. It is intended as a proof of concept for cybersecurity enthusiasts exploring encryption in automotive networks.\n\n### Introduction\n\nAs vehicles become more connected, they are exposed to new security vulnerabilities. This article presents a test case for securing the Controller Area Network (CAN-BUS) in vehicles using symmetric encryption. While unsuitable for commercial applications, this proof of concept illustrates how encryption protects communication between Electronic Control Units (ECUs) in a vehicle.\n\n### What is an Electronic Control Unit (ECU)?\n\nAn Electronic Control Unit (ECU) is an embedded system that manages specific functions within a vehicle, such as engine control or braking. ECUs communicate via the CAN-BUS, a critical network that enables the coordinated operation of various vehicle subsystems.\n\n### The Role of CAN-BUS in Vehicle Communication\n\nThe CAN-BUS allows ECUs to communicate efficiently without a central computer. However, this protocol does not include built-in security features, meaning all messages are transmitted in plain text and are vulnerable to interception and manipulation.\n\n### Structure of a CAN Frame\n\nBelow is a basic representation of a CAN frame:\n\n- **Start of Frame:** Marks the beginning of the CAN frame.\n- **Identifier:** Contains the message ID and priority.\n- **Control Field:** Specifies the length of the data field.\n- **Data Field:** Carries the actual data (0 to 8 bytes).\n- **CRC Field:** Contains the cyclic redundancy check for error detection.\n- **ACK Slot:** Acknowledgement from receiving ECUs.\n- **End of Frame:** Marks the end of the CAN frame.\n\n### Security Risks: Hacking CAN-BUS Messages\n\nThe lack of encryption in the CAN-BUS protocol exposes vehicles to significant security risks. Attackers who gain access to the CAN-BUS can intercept and modify messages, potentially leading to dangerous outcomes such as unauthorized control over vehicle systems.\n\n### Symmetric Encryption: A Test for CAN-BUS Security\n\nThis proof of concept explores using symmetric encryption to secure CAN-BUS messages. By encrypting data before transmission, we can ensure that only authorized ECUs with the correct decryption key can access the information. This approach uses the same key for both encryption and decryption, making it efficient and suitable for the constrained environments typical of automotive systems.\n\n### Test Implementation in Automotive Systems\n\nIn this test, symmetric encryption keys are stored on all ECUs involved. The AES 128-bit algorithm is used, known for its strong security and efficient performance.\n\n### Why Use Symmetric Encryption for CAN-BUS?\n\nSymmetric encryption is ideal for securing CAN-BUS messages due to its efficiency and speed. While this test implementation is not intended for commercial use, it demonstrates the feasibility of encrypting bulk data with minimal computational overhead in a real-time automotive environment.\n\n### Implementing the Test: Python Example\n\nBelow is a Python-based test implementation of symmetric encryption for CAN-BUS messages. The `cryptography` and `python-can` libraries are utilized for this purpose.\n\n### Setting Up a Virtual CAN Adapter\n\nBegin by creating a virtual CAN socket to simulate CAN-BUS communication:\n\n```python\nimport subprocess\n\nsubprocess.call('sudo modprobe vcan', shell=True)\nsubprocess.call('sudo ip link add dev vcan0 type vcan', shell=True)\nsubprocess.call('sudo ip link set up vcan0', shell=True)\n```\n\n### Encrypting and Sending CAN Messages\n\nThis script encrypts a CAN message and transmits it over the virtual CAN adapter:\n\n```python\nimport can\nfrom cryptography.fernet import Fernet\nfrom can import Message\n\n# Initialize CAN bus interface\nbus = can.interface.Bus(interface='socketcan', channel='vcan0', bitrate=2500000)\n\n# Generate encryption key and store it in a file\nkey = Fernet.generate_key()\nwith open(\"keystorage.txt\", 'wb') as fkey:\n    fkey.write(key)\nprint('\\nEncryption key generated and stored.\\n')\n\n# Initialize Fernet cipher with the generated key\ncipher = Fernet(key)\n\n# Define the message to be sent (as a bytearray)\nmessage = bytearray([0, 25, 0, 1, 3, 1, 4, 1])\n\n# Convert bytearray to a string, then encode to bytes\nmessage_string = ' '.join(map(str, message)).encode()\n\n# Encrypt the message string\nencrypted_msg = cipher.encrypt(message_string)\nprint(\"\\nEncrypted message:\\n\", encrypted_msg)\n\n# Reload the key from file for decryption (example of key retrieval)\nwith open(\"keystorage.txt\", \"rb\") as fkey:\n    key2 = fkey.read()\ncipher = Fernet(key2)\n\n# Split the encrypted message into chunks of 8 bytes each\ndef split_list(lst, n):\n    \"\"\"Splits a list into chunks of size n.\"\"\"\n    return [lst[i:i + n] for i in range(0, len(lst), n)]\n\n# Convert encrypted message to a list of hexadecimal values\nsplit_string = encrypted_msg.decode()\nhex_data = [ord(c) for c in split_string]\n\n# Split the hexadecimal data into chunks suitable for CAN messages\nn = 8\nencrypted_data = split_list(hex_data, n)\n\n# Send the encrypted data over the CAN bus\ntry:\n    for enc_data in encrypted_data:\n        data = Message(data=enc_data)\n        bus.send(data)\n\n    print(\"\\nMessage sent on {}\\n\".format(bus.channel_info))\n\nexcept can.CanError as e:\n    print(f\"CAN error: {e}\")\n```\n\n```bash\n$ python sender.py\n\nEncryption key generated and stored.\n\n\nEncrypted message:\n b'gAAAAABmt76d-RnkRuA-zt6Vzbm_QWTpO2EuwRrt3uk1gKWYrFiFS4X4VSXg9GAwRE57HPRKUBcQq4HqbOukNoZ9vH8z9nsflQeMbIryFx9gnOD-fwyYBzU='\n\nMessage sent on socketcan channel 'vcan0'\n```\n\n### Receiving and Decrypting CAN Messages\n\nThis script receives and decrypts the CAN message:\n\n\n```python\nimport can\nfrom cryptography.fernet import Fernet\n\n# Initialize CAN bus interface\nbus = can.interface.Bus(interface='socketcan', channel='vcan0', bitrate=2500000)\n\nencrypted_data = b''\nrmessage = []\n\ndef fullmessage(message):\n    \"\"\"\\nPrints the received message.\"\"\"\n    print(\"Received encrypted message:\", message)\n\ndef decrypted_data():\n    \"\"\"Decrypts the message when the accumulated data reaches the expected length.\"\"\"\n    global encrypted_data  # Use global to accumulate encrypted data\n\n    # Append the received data directly to encrypted_data\n    encrypted_data += message.data\n\n    if len(encrypted_data) == 120:  # Assuming 120 bytes is the full encrypted message length\n        print(\"\\nConcatenated encrypted message:\\n\", encrypted_data)\n\n        # Load the encryption key\n        with open(\"keystorage.txt\", 'rb') as fkey:\n            key = fkey.read()\n\n        # Initialize Fernet cipher with the key\n        cipher = Fernet(key)\n\n        # Decrypt the concatenated message\n        original_data = cipher.decrypt(encrypted_data)\n\n        # Convert decrypted data to a bytearray\n        byte_array = bytearray(original_data)\n        print(\"\\nThis is the original data frame:\\n\", byte_array)\n\nwhile True:\n    message = bus.recv()\n    fullmessage(message)\n    decrypted_data()\n```\n\n```bash\n$ python receiver.py\n\nReceived encrypted message: 62 4f 75 6b 4e 6f 5a 39     'bOukNoZ9'\n......\n......\nReceived encrypted message: 6c 51 65 4d 62 49 72 79     'lQeMbIry'\n\nConcatenated encrypted message:\n b'gAAAAABmt76d-RnkRuA-zt6Vzbm_QWTpO2EuwRrt3uk1gKWYrFiFS4X4VSXg9GAwRE57HPRKUBcQq4HqbOukNoZ9vH8z9nsflQeMbIryFx9gnOD-fwyYBzU='\n\nThis is the original data frame:\n bytearray(b'0 25 0 1 3 1 4 1')\n\n```\n\nThis test implementation demonstrates the potential of symmetric encryption for securing CAN-BUS communication in vehicles. While not intended for commercial use, it provides a foundation for further exploration and development of robust security solutions in the automotive industry.\n\n*Written by Vasu*",
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      "readme": "# HiTag2 Correlation Attack Simulation\n\nA university project demonstrating the fast correlation attack on the HiTag2 cipher, as described by Garcia et al. in their 2016 USENIX Security paper \"Lock It and Still Lose It – On the (In)Security of Automotive Remote Keyless Entry Systems\".\n\n## Overview\n\nThis project consists of two main components:\n\n1. **hitag2_simulation.py** – A Python implementation of the HiTag2 cipher that generates simulated encrypted nonce/keystream pairs (simulating eavesdropped RKE transmissions)\n\n2. **ht2crack4** – A C implementation of the fast correlation attack that recovers the 48-bit secret key from captured data\n\n## Requirements\n\n- Python 3.x\n- GCC compiler\n- pthread library (usually pre-installed on Linux)\n\n## Building ht2crack4\n\n```bash\n# Build the attack tool\nmake\n\n# Or rebuild from scratch\nmake fresh\n\n# Clean build files\nmake clean\n```\n\nThis compiles `ht2crack4` from the source files: `ht2crack4.c`, `hitagcrypto.c`, `ht2crack2utils.c`, and `utilpart.c`.\n\n## Usage (single attack)\n\n### Step 1: Generate Nonce Pairs\n\nUse the Python script to generate simulated encrypted nonce/keystream pairs:\n\n```bash\n# Basic usage (uses default key,UID and filename)\npython3 hitag2_simulation.py\n\n# Custom key and UID with 16 nonce pairs (uses filename)\npython3 hitag2_simulation.py --key 4F4E4D494B52 --uid AABBCCDD -n 16\n\n# Specify output file\npython3 hitag2_simulation.py --key 4F4E4D494B52 --uid AABBCCDD -n 16 -o nonces.txt\n\n# Run verification tests only\npython3 hitag2_simulation.py --verify\n```\n\n**Python Script Options:**\n| Option | Description | Default |\n|--------|-------------|---------|\n| `--key` | 48-bit key (12 hex chars) | `4F4E4D494B52` |\n| `--uid` | 32-bit UID (8 hex chars) | `AABBCCDD` |\n| `-n, --num-nonces` | Number of nonce pairs to generate | `16` |\n| `-o, --output` | Output filename | `nonces.txt` |\n| `--seed` | Random seed for reproducibility | `42` |\n| `--verify` | Run MIKRON test vector only | - |\n\n### Step 2: Recover the Key\n\nUse the ht2crack4 tool to perform the correlation attack:\n\n```bash\n./ht2crack4 -u AABBCCDD -n nonces.txt -N 16 -t 2000000\n```\n\n**ht2crack4 Options:**\n| Option | Description | Default |\n|--------|-------------|---------|\n| `-u` | UID (required) | - |\n| `-n` | Nonce file path (required) | - |\n| `-N` | Number of nonce pairs to use | all in file |\n| `-t` | Table size (max candidates kept) | `800000` |\n\n**Table Size Recommendations:**\n- Start with `-t 500000` (~30s, may fail)\n- Use `-t 2000000` (~60s, reliable)\n- Use `-t 3000000` (~1min30s, high success rate)\n\n### Complete Example\n\n```bash\n# 1. Generate 16 nonce pairs with a known key\npython3 hitag2_simulation.py --key 4F4E4D494B52 --uid AABBCCDD -n 16\n\n# 2. Run the correlation attack to recover the key\n./ht2crack4 -u AABBCCDD -n nonces.txt -N 16 -t 2000000\n\n# Expected output:\n# WIN!!! :)\n# key = 4F4E4D494B52\n```\n\n## File Format\n\nThe nonce file (`nonces.txt`) contains one IV/keystream pair per line:\n\n```\nB99E8DC5 FF7DFEF3\nEA4A1662 9C8B9E17\n7B6A249C E98EEDDD\n...\n```\n\nEach line: `<IV_hex> <authenticator_hex>` (authenticator = inverted keystream)\n\n## Experimental Evaluation (multiple attacks)\n\nWe reuse the original Python simulator and the `ht2crack4` implementation to **automatically run the attack multiple times** while varying key parameters such as:\n- the number of nonce pairs used (`N`),\n- the table size (`T`),\n- and the random seed (to capture probabilistic effects).\n\nThis allows us to study **success rate**, **runtime** and their trade-offs in a statistically meaningful way.\n\n### Experimental Scale\n\nThe main grid experiment explores:\n- 9 values of `N`: `N = {4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 16, 20, 24, 32}`,\n- 6 values of `T`: `T = {200000, 400000, 800000, 1200000, 2000000, 3000000}`,\n- 50 trials per configuration.\n\nThis results in **2700 independent attack runs (~30h of computing)**, logged to a CSV file for post-processing and plotting.\n\n---\n\n## Running the Experiments\n\n### 1. Virtual environment (Recommended)\n\n```bash\npython3 -m venv venv\nsource venv/bin/activate\npip install -r requirements.txt\n```\n\n### 2. Grid Experiment (N, T, trials → CSV)\n\n```bash\npython3 scripts/run_grid.py\n```\n*Output: data/grid/grid_results.csv*\n\n### 3. Plot Generation\n```bash\npython3 scripts/make_plots.py\n```\n*Output: figures/*\n\n## Project Structure\n\n```\n├── hitag2_simulation.py          # Python HiTag2 cipher simulation\n├── ht2crack4.c                   # Main correlation attack implementation\n├── hitagcrypto.c/h               # HiTag2 crypto primitives\n├── ht2crack2utils.c/h            # Utility functions\n├── utilpart.c                    # Byte-order conversion utilities\n├── util.h                        # Bit reversal macros\n├── Makefile                      # Build configuration\n├── nonces.txt                    # Generated nonce pairs (output)\n│\n├── scripts/\n│   ├── run_grid.py               # Runs the full (N,T,trials) experiment grid\n│   └── make_plots.py             # Generates all figures from CSV data\n│\n├── data/\n│   └── grid/\n│       └── grid_results.csv      # Raw experimental results (=2700 runs)\n│\n├── figures/                      # Generated plots (PNG)\n│\n├── requirements.txt              # Python dependencies for experiments\n└── README.md                     # This file\n```\n\n## References\n\n- Garcia, F.D., Oswald, D., Kasper, T., Pavlidès, P. 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      "description": "A Ghidra script for analyzing automotive UDS 0x27 Security Access, including seed generation, seed propagation, Seed2Key logic, and vulnerability auditing.",
      "readme": "# FirmUDS-sec\n\nFirmUDS-sec is a Ghidra-based firmware analysis script for identifying and auditing automotive UDS service 0x27, also known as Security Access. The script combines Ghidra decompilation, cross-reference analysis, static heuristics, and optional LLM-assisted reasoning to recover seed generation, seed propagation, Seed2Key logic, key comparison, and potential Security Access weaknesses.\n\nFor normal use, only the main script needs to be uploaded to the target machine. The\nother files described below are documentation or generated output, not runtime\nrequirements.\n\nThe firmware images used for testing and their associated log files cannot be made\npublic because the firmware is confidential.\n\n```text\nFirmUDS_sec.py\n```\n\n## Features\n\n- Detects candidate UDS 0x27 functions using AUTOSAR architecture-feature evidence.\n- Traces likely seed generation and seed propagation paths.\n- Uses static analysis for stage-3 candidate recognition by default.\n- Optionally calls an LLM for deeper multi-stage reasoning over decompiled code.\n- Checks whether the recovered UDS 0x27 logic contains seed generation, seed splitting/joining, Seed2Key conversion, and key comparison.\n- Audits potential weaknesses such as hardcoded keys, weak Seed2Key material, short keys, weak randomness, and replay exposure.\n- Writes structured logs per stage and per function for later inspection.\n- Saves LLM error context so interrupted analysis can be resumed or debugged.\n\n## Required and Generated Files\n\n```text\nFirmUDS_sec.py                     # Required: upload this script\nREADME.md                          # Optional: usage and configuration documentation\nlogs/                              # Generated automatically beside the script\n```\n\n`agent_langchain.py`, `docs/`, `tests/`, and existing `logs*/` directories are not\nrequired for running `FirmUDS_sec.py`. The script creates `logs/` automatically in the\nsame directory as the script. Keep an existing `logs/` directory only when you want to\nreuse cached results or resume an interrupted analysis.\n\n## Requirements\n\n- Ghidra 11.x\n- Java 17 or a Java version supported by your Ghidra release\n- Ghidrathon, configured with a CPython interpreter. This is required because the script uses external CPython packages such as `openai`, `httpx`, and `langchain-core`, which are not available in Ghidra's default Jython environment.\n- Python 3.8 or later for the Ghidrathon interpreter\n- Python packages:\n  - `openai`\n  - `httpx`\n  - `langchain-core`\n\nThe script imports Ghidra runtime APIs such as `currentProgram`, `askString`, `askChoices`, and `DecompInterface`. It must be run from Ghidra's Script Manager with Ghidrathon enabled. It is not a standalone command-line Python program.\n\n## Installation\n\n1. Install Ghidra and confirm that Ghidra starts normally.\n\n2. Install and enable Ghidrathon in Ghidra. This step is mandatory.\n\n   Download the Ghidrathon release that matches your Ghidra version, then open Ghidra and use:\n\n   ```text\n   File -> Install Extensions...\n   ```\n\n   Select the Ghidrathon extension, restart Ghidra, and configure it to use your CPython interpreter. After restart, confirm that Ghidrathon scripts are visible in Script Manager.\n\n3. Install the Python dependencies into the same Python interpreter used by Ghidrathon.\n\n   Example on Windows PowerShell:\n\n   ```powershell\n   D:\\python38\\python.exe -m pip install -U openai httpx langchain-core\n   ```\n\n   Example on Linux/macOS:\n\n   ```bash\n   python3 -m pip install -U openai httpx langchain-core\n   ```\n\n4. Place `FirmUDS_sec.py` in a local script directory and add that directory to Ghidra's Script Manager.\n\n   In Ghidra:\n\n   ```text\n   Window -> Script Manager\n   ```\n\n   Click the script-directory management icon, add the directory that contains `FirmUDS_sec.py`, and refresh the script list.\n\n## LLM Configuration\n\nLLM settings are configured directly near the beginning of `FirmUDS_sec.py`. No\nenvironment variables are required. Normally, only `LLM_CONFIG`, `FALLBACK_LLM`, and\n`DEFAULT_LLM` need to be edited.\n\nSupported provider names are:\n\n- `qwen`\n- `deepseek`\n- `moonshot`\n- `openai`\n\nEach provider has three fields:\n\n| Field | Description |\n| --- | --- |\n| `api_key` | Required API credential for the selected provider. |\n| `base_url` | OpenAI-compatible API base URL. It normally ends with `/v1`. |\n| `model` | Model identifier accepted by the provider. |\n\nThe configuration structure is:\n\n```python\nLLM_CONFIG = {\n    \"qwen\": {\n        \"api_key\": \"\",\n        \"base_url\": \"https://dashscope.aliyuncs.com/compatible-mode/v1\",\n        \"model\": \"qwen-plus\"\n    },\n    \"deepseek\": {\n        \"api_key\": \"\",\n        \"base_url\": \"https://api.deepseek.com/v1\",\n        \"model\": \"deepseek-chat\"\n    },\n    \"moonshot\": {\n        \"api_key\": \"\",\n        \"base_url\": \"https://api.moonshot.cn/v1\",\n        \"model\": \"moonshot-v1-8k\"\n    },\n    \"openai\": {\n        \"api_key\": \"\",\n        \"base_url\": \"https://api.openai.com/v1\",\n        \"model\": \"gpt-4o-mini\"\n    }\n}\n\nFALLBACK_LLM = \"deepseek\"\nDEFAULT_LLM = \"deepseek\"\n```\n\n`DEFAULT_LLM` selects the active provider. `FALLBACK_LLM` is used when the selected\nprovider name is not present in `LLM_CONFIG`. Keeping both values the same is recommended.\n\n### DeepSeek example\n\nFill in the `deepseek` entry and select it:\n\n```python\n\"deepseek\": {\n    \"api_key\": \"<your-deepseek-api-key>\",\n    \"base_url\": \"https://api.deepseek.com/v1\",\n    \"model\": \"deepseek-chat\"\n}\n\nFALLBACK_LLM = \"deepseek\"\nDEFAULT_LLM = \"deepseek\"\n```\n\n### OpenAI or another compatible service\n\nEdit the `openai` entry. For a compatible service, replace the base URL and model with\nthe values supplied by that service.\n\n```python\n\"openai\": {\n    \"api_key\": \"<your-api-key>\",\n    \"base_url\": \"https://api.example.com/v1\",\n    \"model\": \"<model-id>\"\n}\n\nFALLBACK_LLM = \"openai\"\nDEFAULT_LLM = \"openai\"\n```\n\nAfter editing the configuration, reload `FirmUDS_sec.py` in Ghidra before running it.\nIf the selected `api_key` is empty, the script prints a warning and the provider will\nnormally return `401 Unauthorized`. A valid key can still fail because of insufficient\nquota, model permission, rate limiting, or an incorrect base URL/model combination.\n\nDo not upload, publish, or commit `FirmUDS_sec.py` while it contains a real API key.\nReplace the key with an empty string before distributing the script.\n\n## Running the Analysis\n\n1. Open the target firmware in Ghidra.\n\n2. Import or load the firmware using the correct processor, endianness, image base, and memory map. Run Ghidra auto-analysis before launching the script.\n\n3. Open:\n\n   ```text\n   Window -> Script Manager\n   ```\n\n4. Select and run:\n\n   ```text\n   FirmUDS_sec.py\n   ```\n\n5. Select the stage-2 mode when prompted:\n\n   ```text\n   1 = Loose (skip Stage 2)\n   2 = Default (run Stage 2 with default features)\n   3 = Custom (enter candidate functions)\n   ```\n\n   For normal artifact reproduction, start with mode `2`.\n\n6. If mode `2` is selected, choose the seed/randomness features to enable. The default is to enable all features.\n\n7. The script runs stages 1-4 for candidate functions. After those stages complete, it asks whether to execute the post-audit stages 5 and 6.\n\n   Enter:\n\n   ```text\n   y\n   ```\n\n   to run the vulnerability scan and Seed2Key hardcode audit.\n\n8. Inspect the generated logs under `logs/`. The final summary checks Stage 4, Stage 5,\n   and Stage 6 for every analyzed function. The per-function directories are the most\n   reliable place to review the detailed results.\n\n### Re-running an analysis\n\nThe `logs/` directory is also used as a cache. Existing `log_1.txt`, `log_2.txt`, and\nper-function stage logs can cause completed work to be skipped or reused. This is useful\nfor recovering from an interrupted run or retrying stages 5/6 after an API failure.\n\n- Continue an interrupted run: keep the existing logs.\n- Retry only after fixing an LLM quota, permission, or authentication problem: keep the\n  Stage 1-4 logs and run the post-audit again. Existing Stage 5/6 files may be replaced.\n- Start a completely independent run, or analyze a different firmware/project: rename\n  the old `logs/` directory as a backup and create a new empty `logs/` directory.\n\nDo not place logs from different firmware images in the same directory. Never publish\nAPI keys inside logs, source files, screenshots, or error-context files.\n\n## Analysis Stages\n\nThe main workflow is organized as follows:\n\n```text\nStage 1: Static UDS 0x27 feature discovery\nStage 2: Seed/random-source relation analysis\nStage 3: Candidate verification\nStage 4: UDS 0x27 functional completeness analysis\nStage 5: UDS 0x27 vulnerability scan\nStage 6: Seed2Key hardcode audit\n```\n\nStage 3 currently uses static analysis by default:\n\n```python\nSTAGE3_MODE = \"static_only\"\n```\n\nOther supported modes in the script are `hybrid` and `llm_only`.\n\n## Output Files\n\nThe script creates a `logs/` directory next to `FirmUDS_sec.py`.\n\nImportant outputs include:\n\n```text\nlogs/log.txt                         # Main execution log\nlogs/log_1.txt                       # Stage-1 output\nlogs/log_2.txt                       # Stage-2 output\nlogs/log_3.txt                       # Stage-3 output\nlogs/log_4.txt                       # Stage-4 output\nlogs/log_5.txt                       # Stage-5 output, when generated\nlogs/log_6.txt                       # Stage-6 output, when generated\nlogs/code_items_functions.json       # Candidate functions for later stages\nlogs/uds27_overview.json             # Functional completeness summary\nlogs/vulnerability_scan.json         # Vulnerability scan result\nlogs/seed2key_hardcode_audit.json    # Seed2Key hardcode audit result\nlogs/llm_error_state.json            # Saved LLM failure/recovery context\nlogs/function_<name>/log_*.txt       # Per-function stage logs\n```\n\nThe six stage logs are used as follows:\n\n| File | Purpose |\n| --- | --- |\n| `logs/log_1.txt` | Records stage-1 static discovery results, including functions that match UDS 0x27 byte split/join features, immediate-value patterns, and other first-pass heuristics. |\n| `logs/log_2.txt` | Records stage-2 seed/random-source relation analysis, including candidate random or seed-generation functions, selected rand features, call-chain relations, and the function list passed to later stages. |\n| `logs/log_3.txt` | Records stage-3 candidate verification results. In the default `static_only` mode, this log stores the statically verified UDS 0x27 candidates and the evidence used to keep or reject them. |\n| `logs/log_4.txt` | Records stage-4 functional completeness analysis. It summarizes whether the recovered UDS 0x27 flow contains seed generation, seed splitting or joining, Seed2Key computation, and key comparison. |\n| `logs/log_5.txt` | Records the most recently written stage-5 vulnerability-scan result, when generated. Review `logs/function_<name>/log_5.txt` for complete per-function results. |\n| `logs/log_6.txt` | Records the most recently written stage-6 Seed2Key hardcode-audit result, when generated. Review `logs/function_<name>/log_6.txt` for complete per-function results. |\n\nPer-function logs under `logs/function_<name>/` mirror the same stage structure for each analyzed function. These files are useful when reviewing a single candidate without reading the global logs.\n\nThe root-level `log_5.txt`, `log_6.txt`, `vulnerability_scan.json`, and\n`seed2key_hardcode_audit.json` are overwritten as functions are processed. They represent\nthe most recently written result, not necessarily the complete result set. Use the\ncorresponding per-function files for a complete audit.\n\nIf `logs/llm_error_state.json` exists after a failed LLM call, it contains recovery context\nand may include the previous conversation. Archive it before an intentionally clean run;\nkeep it when you want to inspect or resume the failed request. Do not publish this file\nwithout checking it for firmware or sensitive data.\n\n## Troubleshooting\n\n### Ghidra reports that Java runtime was not found\n\nInstall a Java runtime supported by your Ghidra version and set `JAVA_HOME` or configure Ghidra according to the official Ghidra installation guide.\n\n### Ghidrathon does not appear in Script Manager\n\nConfirm that the Ghidrathon extension is installed, enabled, and that Ghidra was restarted after installation. Also confirm that the directory containing `FirmUDS_sec.py` was added to Script Manager's script directories.\n\n### Stage 5 or Stage 6 is not generated\n\nStages 5 and 6 require a working LLM provider. Check that the selected provider has a valid API key and that the account has available quota or billing enabled.\n\nThis is not a Ghidra analysis error. Common API errors include:\n\n- `401`: the key or client is unauthorized, invalid, revoked, or not accepted by the gateway.\n- `403`: the account or team cannot access the requested model, or its free quota/billing policy blocks the request.\n- `429`: the request-rate or concurrency limit was reached.\n- `503 model_not_found` or `No available channel`: the model ID is unavailable for the selected gateway/account.\n\nConfirm that the selected provider's `api_key` is filled in `FirmUDS_sec.py`, that\n`DEFAULT_LLM` matches the configured provider, and that the base URL and model are\ncorrect. Reload the script in Ghidra after editing it. Never print or commit the full\nAPI key while checking the configuration.\n\nThe script sends requests through an OpenAI-compatible `chat.completions` client. The\ngateway must support that endpoint and accept a standard Bearer API key. The script does\nnot validate model availability before starting the analysis.",
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    "tomerkal7/attack-on-canbus": {
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      "title": "Investigation and Implementation of a Spoofing Attack on the CAN Bus in Vehicles",
      "full_name": "TomerKal7/Attack-on-CANbus",
      "name": "Attack-on-CANbus",
      "owner": "TomerKal7",
      "url": "https://github.com/TomerKal7/Attack-on-CANbus",
      "description": "CAN bus security research project (ICSim development + Hyundai Kona 2020 PoC)",
      "readme": "# Investigation and Implementation of a Spoofing Attack on the CAN Bus in Vehicles\n\n[![Python Version](https://img.shields.io/badge/python-3.8%2B-blue.svg)](https://www.python.org/)\n[![Academic Project](https://img.shields.io/badge/BGU-ECE%20Project%20p--2026--053-red.svg)](https://in.bgu.ac.il)\n[![License](https://img.shields.io/badge/License-Academic--Use--Only-green.svg)](#license)\n\n## 📌 Project Overview\nModern vehicles rely heavily on the internal Controller Area Network (CAN bus) protocol for high-speed inter-ECU communication. However, the CAN protocol lacks native authentication or encryption, exposing the vehicle to packet injection and spoofing attacks. This vulnerability is further amplified by third-party wireless OBD-II diagnostic dongles, which act as unauthenticated entry points into the vehicle's network.\n\nThis academic final project presents an end-to-end security audit and proof-of-concept attack framework tested on a physical **Hyundai Kona 2020** vehicle bench setup provided by the **CYITES Cyber Security Laboratory** at Ben-Gurion University of the Negev.\n\n### Key Objectives & Achievements:\n- **Physical Layer Reverse Engineering:** Sniffed and mapped proprietary CAN IDs for critical functions including Door Locks/Unlocks (`0x168`, `0x102`), Fog Lamps (`0x102`), Turn Indicators (`0x16A`), Wipers (`0x107`), and Transmission States (`0x367` / `0x111`).\n- **High-Frequency Ingestion & Injection Engine:** Developed a high-frequency Python injection engine capable of burst flooding ($1000\\text{Hz}$) and auto-incrementing rolling counter calculation to override ECU arbitration.\n- **Wireless GATT & UDS Gateway Bypass:** Interfaced with generic aftermarket **Veepeak ELM327 BLE** dongles over raw GATT characteristics, executing UDS diagnostic session escalation (`10 03`), node silencing (`28 01`), and automated BCM actuator fuzzing using our integrated **PwnOBD** framework.\n- **Unified Web Audit Dashboard:** Productized our toolset into a modern, web-based graphical penetration testing dashboard featuring live streaming CAN telemetry via Server-Sent Events (SSE), automated BLE device scanning, and one-click attack triggers.\n\n---\n\n## 📂 Repository Directory Structure\n\n```text\n├── final_report/                         # Official Academic Final Report Files\n│   ├── final_report_p2026_053.docx       # Main Final Word Report (Formatted to BGU Standards)\n│   ├── final_report_p2026_053.pdf        # Final PDF Report Export\n│   ├── 0_title_and_abstract.md           # Chapter Source: Title & Abstracts (English & Hebrew)\n│   ├── 1_introduction.md                 # Chapter Source: Introduction & Measurable Objectives\n│   ├── 2_literature_survey.md            # Chapter Source: Literature Survey & Vulnerability Mapping\n│   ├── 3_system_architecture.md          # Chapter Source: High-Level Architecture & Design Rationale\n│   ├── 4_physical_testing.md             # Chapter Source: Physical Layer Connection & Frame Database\n│   ├── 5_wireless_attempts.md            # Chapter Source: Wireless BLE & UDS Gatekeeper Analysis\n│   ├── 6_web_dashboard.md                # Chapter Source: Unified Web Audit Dashboard & SSE Telemetry\n│   ├── 7_conclusions.md                  # Chapter Source: Conclusions, SOW Alignment & Future Work\n│   ├── build_dynamic_heading_docx.py     # Script to generate Word docx with dynamic styles\n│   └── latex/                            # LaTeX Source & Compiled Documents\n│       ├── main.tex                      # XeLaTeX Document Source\n│       ├── main.pdf                      # Compiled XeLaTeX PDF Document\n│       └── generate_latex_doc.py         # Automated LaTeX generator script\n│\n├── src/                                  # Core Python Audit & Attack Source Code\n│   ├── dashboard.py                      # Flask + SSE Web Application Server\n│   ├── can_sniffer.py                    # Real-time CAN frame sniffer & logger\n│   ├── can_injector.py                   # Controlled CAN frame injector (Periodic/Burst)\n│   ├── can_replay.py                     # CAN traffic record & replay engine\n│   ├── discover_services.py              # GATT characteristic discovery script\n│   ├── find_dongle.py                    # BLE device discovery scanner\n│   ├── interfaces/                       # Dual Transport Layer Drivers\n│   │   ├── base.py                       # Abstract base transport interface\n│   │   ├── socketcan.py                  # Linux SocketCAN / Kvaser hardware driver\n│   │   └── elm327_ble.py                 # Low-overhead ELM327 BLE GATT driver\n│   ├── cgw_bypass/                       # UDS Diagnostic Escalation & Fuzzing Scripts\n│   │   ├── 1_uds_routine_control.py      # UDS Service 0x31 / 0x2F routine testing\n│   │   ├── 2_diagnostic_session.py       # UDS Service 0x10 Extended Session escalation\n│   │   ├── 3_gateway_dos.py              # Gateway buffer flooding PoC\n│   │   ├── 4_uds_silence_and_inject.py   # Service 0x28 node silencing + injection\n│   │   ├── 5_uds_0x2f_door_control.py    # Service 0x2F actuator control testing\n│   │   ├── 6_burst_token_bucket.py       # Token-bucket BLE rate limiting PoC\n│   │   ├── 7_elm327_protocol_b_bypass.py # Low-level protocol header override\n│   │   ├── ble_terminal.py               # Interactive BLE AT command terminal\n│   │   └── continuous_uds_injection.py   # Continuous UDS diagnostic session keep-alive\n│   ├── pwnobd/                            # Integrated PwnOBD Exploitation Framework\n│   │   └── src/pwnobd/modules/attacks/\n│   │       └── hyundai_door_fuzzer.py    # Automated 16-bit DID actuator fuzzer\n│   ├── templates/                        # Dashboard HTML Templates (index.html)\n│   └── static/                           # Dashboard CSS & Frontend JS (app.js, style.css)\n│\n├── report_images/                        # Testbed Photographs & Architecture Diagrams\n│   ├── bgu_bench_setup.jpg               # CYITES Lab Hyundai Kona 2020 Testbed Photo\n│   ├── direct_wire_tap.jpg               # Physical B-CAN & C-CAN Wire Tap Photo\n│   ├── ble_dongle_inserted.jpg           # Veepeak BLE Dongle OBD-II Connection Photo\n│   ├── system_architecture_diagram.png   # High-level System Architecture Diagram\n│   ├── can_injector_flow.png             # Injector Logic & Rolling Counter Flowchart\n│   ├── uds_state_machine.png             # UDS Diagnostic Session State Machine\n│   ├── sse_data_flow.png                 # Web Dashboard SSE Architecture Diagram\n│   ├── dashboard_overview.png            # Web Audit Dashboard Interface Screenshot\n│   └── diagram_generators/               # HTML/CSS Diagram Generator Source Files\n│\n├── סקירת ספרות/                          # Literature Review & Project Guidelines\n│   ├── מחקר_Hyundai_Kona_2020_CAN.md     # Hyundai Kona CAN bus research notes\n│   ├── מידע_נדרש_לפני_קוד.md             # Pre-requisite technical checklist\n│   ├── תוכנית_פרויקט.md                  # Master project work plan\n│   └── נוהל פרויקטים 2026.pdf            # ECE Department Project Guidelines\n│\n├── התקדמות/                              # Experimental Progress Logs & Test Plans\n│   ├── התקדמות_2026-05-24.md             # Experimental progress report 1\n│   ├── Physical_CAN_Injection_Plan.md    # Physical layer injection testing plan\n│   └── CGW_Bypass_Attempts/              # CGW Bypass research guides (1-3)\n│\n├── הסברי_קוד/                            # Code Documentation (Hebrew Explanations)\n│   ├── הסבר_can_sniffer.md               # Sniffer implementation breakdown\n│   ├── הסבר_can_replay.md                # Replay engine implementation breakdown\n│   ├── הסבר_can_injector.md              # Injector engine implementation breakdown\n│   ├── הסבר_תשתית_BLE.md                 # BLE infrastructure breakdown\n│   └── CGW_Bypass/                       # CGW bypass script documentation\n│\n├── .gitignore                            # Git Exclusion Filters\n└── README.md                             # Main Repository Documentation (This File)\n```\n\n---\n\n## 🛠️ Installation & Setup\n\n### Prerequisites\n- Python 3.8+\n- Linux (for SocketCAN / `vcan0` support) or Windows 10/11 with Bluetooth 4.0+ BLE adapter.\n- Kvaser Leaf Light v2 (or SocketCAN compatible USB-to-CAN adapter) for physical testing.\n- Veepeak OBDCheck BLE (or generic ELM327 v1.5 BLE) OBD-II dongle.\n\n### 1. Environment Setup\nClone the repository and install required Python dependencies:\n```bash\ngit clone https://github.com/TomerKal7/Attack-on-CANbus.git\ncd Attack-on-CANbus\npython3 -m venv .venv\nsource .venv/bin/activate  # On Windows: .venv\\Scripts\\activate\npip install -r requirements.txt  # Or manually: pip install python-can bleak flask\n```\n\n### 2. Virtual CAN Setup (For Local Simulation)\nTo test tools without physical car hardware, bring up a virtual CAN (`vcan0`) interface on Linux:\n```bash\nsudo modprobe vcan\nsudo ip link add dev vcan0 type vcan\nsudo ip link set up vcan0\n```\n\n---\n\n## 🚀 Running the Project\n\n### 1. Unified Web Audit Dashboard\nLaunch the web interface server:\n```bash\npython src/dashboard.py\n```\nOpen your browser and navigate to `http://localhost:5000`. From the dashboard, you can:\n- Scan and connect to BLE diagnostic dongles or SocketCAN interfaces.\n- Stream live CAN bus traffic in real-time.\n- Trigger pre-configured single-click attacks (e.g., Door Unlock, Fog Lamps, Shifter Flooding).\n\n### 2. Command-Line Audit Tools\n\n#### Live CAN Sniffer:\n```bash\n# Sniff virtual bus\npython src/can_sniffer.py --interface socketcan --channel vcan0\n\n# Sniff over BLE dongle\npython src/can_sniffer.py --interface elm327_ble --mac 8C:DE:52:DF:96:D6\n```\n\n#### Controlled Frame Injector:\n```bash\n# Inject door unlock frame on vcan0 (ID 0x168)\npython src/can_injector.py --interface socketcan --channel vcan0 --id 0x168 --data 0100000000000000 --rate 50\n```\n\n#### Traffic Record & Replay:\n```bash\n# Record 10 seconds of traffic\npython src/can_replay.py record --interface socketcan --channel vcan0 --seconds 10 --output logs/capture.jsonl\n\n# Replay recorded traffic\npython src/can_replay.py play --interface socketcan --channel vcan0 --input logs/capture.jsonl\n```\n\n---\n\n## 👥 Authors & Academic Credits\n\n- **Students:** Tomer Kalati & Nadav Sheffer\n- **Academic Supervisor:** Prof. Michael Segal\n- **Institution:** Ben-Gurion University of the Negev (BGU), Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering\n- **Laboratory Facility:** CYITES Cyber Security Laboratory\n- **Project Serial Number:** `p-2026-053`\n\n---\n\n## 🔒 Security & Usage Disclaimer\nThis repository is developed strictly for **authorized academic research and educational purposes**. All tests were conducted in a controlled environment on a stationary laboratory testbed. Unauthorized access or injection into operational motor vehicles on public roads is illegal and poses severe safety risks.",
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      "readme": "# IoUTSec\nThe aim of this project is to represent knowledge related to drones' semantic trajectories in IoUT (flights, sails, missions, targets, etc), in combination with cybersecurity concepts. Also, we hope to pave the path, for a whole new simulation tool concept, which empowers users to counter the uncertainty in the dynamic and harsh underwater environment. Reuses onto4drone ontology (http://i-lab.aegean.gr/kotis/Ontologies/Onto4drone) and UCO ontology (http://ffrdc.ebiquity.umbc.edu/ns/ontology).\n\nOntology IRI: http://i-lab.aegean.gr/kotis/ontologies/IoUTsec\n\nOntology proposed prefix: iout\n\nOWL file: http://i-lab.aegean.gr/kotis/ontologies/IoUTsec/IoUTsec.owl\n\nLatest OWL file: http://i-lab.aegean.gr/kotis/ontologies/IoUTsec/IoUTsec.owl\n\n![KG](https://github.com/StavrosCaptain/IoUTSec/blob/main/Images/classes_properties_with_relationships.png)\n\n_Figure 1. Example KG representing knowledge related to a cybersecurity scenario in IoUT_\n\n## **Workflow and proof-of-concept toolset of proposed framework**\n\n![Workflow](https://github.com/StavrosCaptain/IoUTSec/blob/main/Images/workflow.png)\n\n_Figure 2. Workflow of proposed framework_\n\n![Toolset](https://github.com/StavrosCaptain/IoUTSec/blob/main/Images/proof-of-concept%20implementation%20toolset.png)\n\n_Figure 3. Implementation details of proposed proof-of-concept toolset._\n\n## **Example object properties, individuals, restrictions, and annotations**\n\n![SIEM](https://github.com/StavrosCaptain/IoUTSec/blob/main/Images/siem%20protege.png)\n\n_Figure 4. The object properties, individuals, restrictions, and annotations of the class SIEM of the IoUT ontology (version 1.0.0)_\n\n![SAIL](https://github.com/StavrosCaptain/IoUTSec/blob/main/Images/sail%20protege.png)\n\n_Figure 5. The object properties, individuals, restrictions, and annotations of the class Sail of the IoUT ontology (version 1.0.0)_\n\n## **High-level Architecture**\n![Architecture](https://github.com/StavrosCaptain/IoUTSec/blob/main/Images/High-level%20architecture.png)\n\n_Figure 6. High-level Architecture of proposed integrations to existing simulation tools_\n\n## **Description**\n\n## **Scientific Publications**\n### **Publications in international scientific journals**\nKotis, K.; Stavrinos, S.; Kalloniatis, C., Review on Semantic Modeling and\nSimulation of Cybersecurity and Interoperability on the Internet of Underwater Things.\nFuture Internet 2023, 15, 11. https://doi.org/10.3390/fi15010011\n\n### **Publications in peer-reviewed conferences**\nS. Stavrinos, K. Kotis, and C. Kalloniatis, “Towards Semantic Modeling and Simulation\nof Cybersecurity on the Internet of Underwater Things” IFIP Adv Inf Commun Technol,\nvol. 646 IFIP, pp. 145–156, 2022, doi: 10.1007/978-3-031-08333-4_12/COVER\nhttps://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-031-08333-4_12",
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      "readme": "# CAN Intrusion Detection System\n\nA web-based platform for real-time anomaly detection in automotive Controller Area Network (CAN) bus data, designed to support research in operator decision-making and explainable AI systems.\n\n**Version:** 2.0.0\n**Status:** Active Development\n**License:** MIT\n\n![Python](https://img.shields.io/badge/python-3.12-blue)\n![React](https://img.shields.io/badge/react-18.3-blue)\n![FastAPI](https://img.shields.io/badge/fastapi-0.109-green)\n\n---\n\n## Overview\n\nThis project reimagines traditional intrusion detection systems by focusing on the human operator experience. Rather than simply flagging anomalies, the system provides interactive explanations, comparative model analysis, and visual tools to help operators understand and trust automated decisions.\n\nBuilt as a complete architectural redesign from a previous Streamlit implementation, this version separates concerns into a FastAPI backend and React frontend, enabling more sophisticated interaction patterns and research-oriented features.\n\n---\n\n### Interface & Analysis Visuals\n\n**System Dashboard (Real-Time Monitoring)**\nLive sensor readings, anomaly indicators, and system connectivity status.\n\n![Dashboard](assets/dashboard.png)\n\n---\n\n## Core Features\n\n### Real-Time Monitoring\nMonitor live CAN bus sensor data with immediate anomaly detection using One-Class Support Vector Machines. The interface updates every two seconds, displaying eight sensor readings simultaneously with color-coded status indicators.\n\nKey capabilities:\n- Adjustable detection sensitivity via threshold slider\n- Interactive timeline visualization showing anomaly patterns over time\n- Click-to-explain functionality revealing which sensors contributed to each detection\n- Live statistics tracking detection rates and model confidence\n\n![RTAD](assets/RTAD.png)\n\n### Attack Simulation\nGenerate synthetic attack patterns to understand how different intrusion types manifest in sensor data. Supports four attack categories:\n- Fuzzy attacks (random sensor values)\n- Spoofing attacks (subtly modified legitimate data)\n- Replay attacks (old data with current timestamps)\n- Denial-of-service patterns (message flooding)\n\nEach generated attack can be compared against normal traffic patterns through side-by-side visualizations and exported as CSV for offline analysis.\n\n![Attack Visualization](assets/attack.png)\n\n### Multi-Model Analysis\nCompare three different detection approaches on identical data:\n- SVM provides instant single-point analysis\n- LSTM Autoencoder examines temporal patterns across ten sequential readings\n- Battery-specific LSTM focuses on voltage anomalies\n\nThe system highlights when models disagree, creating opportunities to study how operators resolve conflicting automated advice.\n\n![Multi-Model Analysis](assets/comparison.png)\n\n### 3D Spatial Visualization\nExplore sensor readings in three-dimensional space using WebGL rendering. Normal and anomalous data points cluster differently in this representation, with interactive camera controls allowing free exploration. New data points pulse briefly when added during live streaming.\n\n![3D Visualization](assets/analysis.png)\n\n---\n\n## Technical Architecture\n\n### Backend Stack\n- Python 3.12\n- FastAPI web framework\n- TensorFlow 2.17 for neural network models\n- Scikit-learn for SVM implementation\n- Pandas and NumPy for data processing\n\n### Frontend Stack\n- React 18 with Vite build tool\n- Tailwind CSS for styling\n- Zustand for state management\n- Recharts for 2D data visualization\n- Three.js with React Three Fiber for 3D graphics\n- Axios for HTTP requests\n\n### Machine Learning Models\nThree pre-trained models work in parallel:\n1. One-Class SVM trained on normal traffic patterns\n2. LSTM Autoencoder learning temporal sequences\n3. Specialized LSTM for battery voltage monitoring\n\nAll models include feature importance calculations to support explainability.\n\n---\n\n## Installation\n\n### Requirements\n- Python 3.12 (or 3.9-3.12)\n- Node.js 16 or higher\n- 4GB RAM minimum\n- Modern web browser with WebGL support\n\n### Backend Setup\n\n```bash\ncd backend\n\n# Create virtual environment\npython3.12 -m venv venv\nsource venv/bin/activate  # Windows: venv\\Scripts\\activate\n\n# Install dependencies\npip install -r requirements.txt\n\n# Verify structure\nls models/  # Should contain: battery.h5, lstm_autoencoder.h5, scaler.pkl\nls data/    # Should contain: CAN.csv\n```\n\n### Frontend Setup\n\n```bash\ncd frontend\n\n# Install dependencies\nnpm install\n\n# Verify configuration\nls src/components/  # Should contain: realtime/, attacks/, analysis/\n```\n\n---\n\n## Running the Application\n\nStart both servers in separate terminal windows:\n\n**Terminal 1 - Backend:**\n```bash\ncd backend\nsource venv/bin/activate\npython app.py\n```\nServer starts at `http://localhost:8000`\n\n**Terminal 2 - Frontend:**\n```bash\ncd frontend\nnpm run dev\n```\nInterface opens at `http://localhost:3000`\n\nNavigate to the frontend URL in your browser. The header should show \"Connected\" when the backend is reachable.\n\n---\n\n## Usage Guide\n\n### Getting Started\n1. Open `http://localhost:3000` in your browser\n2. Navigate to the Real-Time tab\n3. Click \"Start Stream\" to begin data collection\n4. Observe sensor readings updating every two seconds\n\n### Investigating Anomalies\nWhen the system detects an anomaly (red dot on timeline):\n1. Click the red dot or the \"Explain\" button\n2. Review the modal showing which sensors deviated from normal\n3. See contribution percentages and z-scores for each feature\n4. Close the modal to continue monitoring\n\n### Comparing Detection Models\n1. Collect at least 10 readings via streaming\n2. Navigate to the Analysis tab\n3. Switch to \"Model Comparison\" view\n4. Click \"Run Comparison\" to see how all three models evaluate the same data\n5. Review the agreement analysis to understand model consensus\n\n### Simulating Attacks\n1. Navigate to the Attacks tab\n2. Select an attack type\n3. Adjust sample count as needed\n4. Click \"Generate\" to create synthetic attack data\n5. Review comparison charts showing attack versus normal patterns\n6. Use \"Download CSV\" to export data for further analysis\n\n### Exporting Research Data\nClick \"Export Logs\" in the header to download a JSON file containing all user interactions during the session. This file includes timestamps, events, and relevant context for each action.\n\n---\n\n## Project Structure\n\n```\nCAN-Intrusion-Detection/\n├── backend/\n│   ├── app.py                 # FastAPI application\n│   ├── requirements.txt       # Python dependencies\n│   ├── models/               # ML model implementations\n│   ├── schemas/              # Request validation\n│   ├── utils/                # Helper functions\n│   └── data/                 # Training dataset\n├── frontend/\n│   ├── package.json          # Node dependencies\n│   ├── vite.config.js       # Build configuration\n│   ├── tailwind.config.js   # Style configuration\n│   └── src/\n│       ├── components/       # React components\n│       ├── hooks/           # Custom React hooks\n│       ├── stores/          # State management\n│       └── utils/           # Helper functions\n├── assets/                   # Screenshots and examples\n└── README.md\n```\n\n---\n\n## API Reference\n\n### Check System Health\n```http\nGET /api/health\n```\nReturns status of all loaded models.\n\n### Generate Synthetic Attack\n```http\nPOST /api/attacks/generate\nContent-Type: application/json\n\n{\n  \"attack_type\": \"fuzzy\",\n  \"num_samples\": 50\n}\n```\n\n### Detect Anomaly (SVM)\n```http\nPOST /api/anomaly/detect-svm\nContent-Type: application/json\n\n{\n  \"datetime\": 1234567890.0,\n  \"Accelerometer1RMS\": 0.21,\n  \"Accelerometer2RMS\": 0.27,\n  \"current\": 2.70,\n  \"pressure\": 0.05,\n  \"temperature\": 89.38,\n  \"thermocouple\": 28.88,\n  \"voltage\": 224.93,\n  \"VolumeFlowRateRMS\": 126.67\n}\n```\n\nResponse includes anomaly score, detection result, and feature importance rankings.\n\nInteractive API documentation available at `http://localhost:8000/docs` when the backend is running.\n\n---\n\n## Configuration\n\n### Adjust Detection Sensitivity\nEdit `backend/models/svm_model.py`, line 47:\n```python\nprediction = 1 if anomaly_score >= 60 else -1  # Change 60 to adjust threshold\n```\n\n### Modify Polling Interval\nEdit `frontend/src/App.jsx`, line 12:\n```javascript\nuseRealtimeData(isStreaming, 2000)  // Change 2000 to desired milliseconds\n```\n\n### Customize Color Scheme\nEdit `frontend/tailwind.config.js`:\n```javascript\ncolors: {\n  'anomaly': {\n    'critical': '#EF4444',  // Red for high severity\n    'high': '#F59E0B',      // Orange for medium\n    'low': '#10B981',       // Green for normal\n  }\n}\n```\n\n---\n\n## Research Applications\n\nThis system was designed to support studies in several areas:\n\n**Trust Calibration:** Track how operators adjust detection thresholds over time. Do they converge on consistent sensitivity levels? How do false positives influence their calibration behavior?\n\n**Explanation Effectiveness:** Log which anomalies users investigate versus ignore. Does viewing feature importance increase confidence in automated decisions? How do operators respond when the explanation contradicts their intuition?\n\n**Model Comparison:** When models disagree, which does the operator trust more? Does temporal context (LSTM) override instant feedback (SVM)? Are specialized models perceived as more reliable?\n\n**Interface Design:** Compare 2D timeline visualization against 3D spatial representation. Which helps operators identify patterns faster? Does 3D add cognitive load or improve understanding?\n\nThe interaction logging system captures events like threshold adjustments, explanation views, model comparisons, and navigation patterns. Export logs as JSON for analysis in statistical software or qualitative coding tools.\n\n---\n\n## Known Limitations\n\n**Model Training:** All models use pre-existing training data and cannot be retrained through the interface. To update models, retrain externally and replace the .h5 files.\n\n**Data Persistence:** Collected readings exist only in browser memory and reset when the page refreshes. Export logs before closing to preserve session data.\n\n**Concurrent Users:** The system runs locally and does not support multiple simultaneous users. Each instance maintains independent state.\n\n**Browser Compatibility:** 3D visualization requires WebGL support. Some older browsers or restrictive security settings may block this feature.\n\n---\n\n## Troubleshooting\n\n**Backend fails to start:**\n- Verify Python version: `python --version` (should be 3.9-3.12)\n- Check virtual environment is activated\n- Ensure all model files exist in `backend/models/`\n- Review terminal output for missing dependencies\n\n**Frontend shows \"Offline\" status:**\n- Confirm backend is running on port 8000\n- Check for port conflicts: `lsof -i:8000`\n- Verify no firewall blocking localhost connections\n- Try accessing `http://localhost:8000/api/health` directly\n\n**3D visualization shows black screen:**\n- Enable WebGL in browser settings\n- Update graphics drivers\n- Try a different browser\n- Check browser console for specific error messages\n\n**Models return incorrect predictions:**\n- Verify model files are not corrupted\n- Check that input data matches expected format\n- Review scaler.pkl exists and is accessible\n- Examine backend terminal for model loading errors\n\n---\n\n## Development Notes\n\n**Adding New Sensors:** Update the schema in `backend/schemas/requests.py` and modify model wrappers to handle additional features. Frontend components will need corresponding updates to display new data.\n\n**Implementing New Models:** Create a detector class following the pattern in `backend/models/`, add an endpoint in `app.py`, and create frontend components to display results.\n\n**Modifying Visualizations:** Chart configurations live in their respective components under `frontend/src/components/`. Recharts and Three.js both support extensive customization through props.\n\n---\n\n## Dataset Information\n\nThe system uses CAN bus data containing readings from automotive sensors. Each record includes:\n- Timestamp\n- Two accelerometer measurements\n- Current draw\n- Pressure reading\n- Temperature (two sensors)\n- Voltage\n- Volume flow rate\n\nData originates from normal vehicle operation with no attacks present in the training set. Models learn expected patterns from this baseline to identify deviations.\n\n---\n\n## Contributing\n\nThis project welcomes improvements and extensions. To contribute:\n\n1. Fork the repository\n2. Create a feature branch\n3. Implement changes with clear commit messages\n4. Test thoroughly with both frontend and backend\n5. Submit a pull request with description of modifications\n\nFocus areas for contribution:\n- Additional machine learning models\n- Alternative visualization approaches\n- Enhanced interaction logging\n- Performance optimizations\n- Documentation improvements\n\n---\n\n## Assets & Example Outputs\n\nThis repository includes visual artifacts and sample datasets used to demonstrate system behavior, model analysis, and attack simulations.\n\n---\n\n### Data Files\n\n**Denial-of-Service Attack Dataset (CSV)**\nSynthetic CAN traffic illustrating message flooding behavior.\nUsed for attack simulation and offline analysis.\n\n- 📄 [DOS Attack Data.csv](assets/DOS%20Attack%20Data.csv)\n\n---\n\n**Exported Detection & Interaction Logs (JSON)**\nStructured output capturing detection events, explanations, and system state.\nSuitable for research analysis and reproducibility.\n\n- 📄 [CAN Intrusion Detection Data.json](assets/CAN%20Intrusion%20Detection%20Data.json)\n\n---\n\n### Asset Notes\n\n- All images are screenshots captured from the running application\n- CSV and JSON files are exported directly from the system\n- Assets support documentation, reproducibility, and qualitative analysis\n\n## Version History\n\n**2.0.0** (Current)\n- Complete architectural redesign\n- FastAPI backend replacing Streamlit\n- React frontend with component-based architecture\n- Multi-model comparison feature\n- Interactive 3D visualization\n- Research-oriented interaction logging\n\n**1.0.0** (Previous)\n- Streamlit monolithic application\n- MySQL authentication\n- Basic SVM and LSTM detection\n- Static matplotlib visualizations\n\n---\n\n## License\n\nThis project is released under the MIT License. See LICENSE file for details.\n\nPermission is granted to use, modify, and distribute this software for educational and research purposes. Commercial use requires attribution to original authors.",
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This maximizes the probability of obtaining the first passive detection while respecting vehicle depth-rate constraints.\n\n### Phase 2: Predictive Detection-Driven Planning\n\nAfter the first detection, the controller switches to an adaptive planner.\n\nAt each decision step, the planner:\n\n1. Predicts the future target position from the known target track.\n2. Generates dynamically feasible candidate maneuvers:\n   - speed,\n   - heading,\n   - depth.\n3. Evaluates each candidate using:\n   - acoustic propagation losses,\n   - self-noise generation,\n   - bathymetry penalties,\n   - detection margin,\n   - maneuvering energy.\n4. Uses beam search to retain the most promising trajectories.\n\nCandidate plans are ranked lexicographically according to:\n\n1. Robust contact duration\n2. Total contact time\n3. Expected contact survival\n4. Detection quality (Detection Margin)\n5. Energy efficiency\n\nThe result is an environment-aware planner capable of maintaining acoustic contact significantly longer than non-adaptive baselines while remaining computationally lightweight and interpretable.\n\n\n## Architecture\n\n```\nScenario Data\n      │\n      ▼\nAcoustic Model\n      │\n      ▼\nPhase 1 Controller\n      │\n First Detection\n      │\n      ▼\nPredictive Beam-Search Planner\n      │\n      ▼\nTrajectory Simulation\n      │\n      ├── Metrics\n      ├── JSON Results\n      ├── Static Plots\n      └── Mission Animations\n```\n\n## Implemented Strategies\n\nThe repository includes three control strategies of increasing complexity, allowing direct comparison between non-adaptive and adaptive behaviors.\n\n### `baseline-phase1`\n\n**Static baseline (no adaptation).**\n\nThe UUV remains at its initial depth and follows its initial trajectory without performing any maneuver. This baseline represents the simplest possible behavior and provides a lower-bound reference for detection performance and energy consumption.\n\n**Motivation:** Establish a naïve benchmark to quantify the benefits of any adaptive behavior.\n\n---\n\n### `baseline-phase2`\n\n**Depth-only adaptation.**\n\nDuring Phase 1, the UUV moves toward the acoustically favorable depth band defined by the sound-speed profile (SVP). Once the first detection occurs, the vehicle continues moving with constant speed and heading, without performing any further trajectory optimization.\n\n**Motivation:** Isolate the contribution of environmental awareness (depth selection) while keeping the post-detection behavior intentionally simple.\n\n---\n\n### `proposal`\n\n**Detection-driven adaptive planner.**\n\nThe UUV first reaches the favorable acoustic depth band. After the first target detection, it switches to an adaptive planner that jointly controls position, depth, speed, and heading. The planner exploits knowledge of the target trajectory and environmental conditions to maximize detection opportunities while minimizing maneuvering cost.\n\n**Motivation:** Demonstrate how predictive, environment-aware planning can increase contact time and detection quality while remaining energy efficient.\n\n\n\n## Installation\n\n```bash\npip install -r requirements.txt\n```\n\n## Running the Simulator\n\nBy default, the experiment runner executes **all scenarios** (`SC1`-`SC4`) using **all available strategies** (`baseline-phase1`, `baseline-phase2`, and `proposal`). It automatically generates:\n\n* Simulation data (`.json`)\n* Static plots (`.png`)\n* Mission animations (`.gif` and `.mp4`)\n\n### Run All Experiments\n\n```bash\npython run_experiments.py\n```\n\n### Run a Single Scenario\n\n```bash\npython run_experiments.py --scenario SC4\n```\n\n### Run a Single Strategy\n\n```bash\npython run_experiments.py --scenario SC4  --strategy proposal\n```\n\n### Skip Animation Generation\n\n```bash\npython run_experiments.py --no-animation\n```\n\n### Select Animation Format\n\nGenerate only GIF animations:\n\n```bash\npython run_experiments.py --animation-format gif\n```\n\nGenerate only MP4 animations:\n\n```bash\npython run_experiments.py --animation-format mp4\n```\n\nGenerate both formats (default behaviour):\n\n```bash\npython run_experiments.py --animation-format both\n```\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n## Repository Structure\n\n``` tree\n.\n├── challenge_material/        # Original hackathon statement and supporting material\n├── data/                      # Input CSV datasets\n├── guidelines/                # Competition rules and reference documentation\n│\n├── acoustic_model.py          # Acoustic equations (Range, NL, TL, Detection Margin)\n├── data_loader.py             # Raw CSV loading utilities\n├── scenario_manager.py        # Scenario-specific data access layer\n├── uuv_controllers.py         # Phase-1 and Phase-2 control strategies\n├── phase2_planner.py          # Adaptive trajectory planner used during tracking\n├── simulation_plots.py        # Static plots generation\n├── simulation_visualizer.py   # Animated mission replay and comparison dashboard\n├── uuv_detection_simulator.py # `Main` simulation entry point\n│\n├── energy_formulation.md      # Energy model assumptions and equations\n├── phase2_algorithm.md        # Notes about the adaptive planner\n├── my_notes.md                # Development notes\n│\n├── requirements.txt\n└── README.md\n```\n\n## Expected input data\n\n```\ndata/\n├── bands.csv\n├── bathymetry_transects.csv\n├── equations.csv\n├── scenarios.csv\n├── svp_guidance.csv\n├── svp_profiles.csv\n├── target_tracks.csv\n└── uuv_constraints.csv\n```\n\n## Output Structure\n\n```\nsimulation/\n├── data/\n│   ├── SC1_proposal_data.json\n│   ├── SC1_baseline-phase2_data.json\n│   └── ...\n│\n├── plots/\n│   ├── SC1_proposal/\n│   ├── SC1_baseline-phase2/\n│   └── ...\n│\n└── animations/\n    ├── SC1/\n    │   ├── proposal_vs_baseline.mp4\n    │   └── proposal_vs_baseline.gif\n    │\n    ├── SC2/\n    │   ├── proposal_vs_baseline.mp4\n    │   └── proposal_vs_baseline.gif\n    │\n    └── ...\n```\n\n## Simulation Workflow\n\n```\nCSV datasets\n    ↓\nScenario Manager\n    ↓\nUUV Detection Simulator\n    ↓\nAcoustic Model\n    ↓\nUUV Controllers\n    ↓\nPhase-2 Planner\n    ↓\nJSON outputs + plots + animations\n```",
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