Automotive cybersecurity beyond software: securing modern vehicles - Manufacturers' Monthly
Automotive cybersecurity beyond software: securing modern vehicles Manufacturers' Monthly
Transportation ecosystems are becoming more connected and therefore exposed to systemic cyber risks.
Automotive cybersecurity beyond software: securing modern vehicles Manufacturers' Monthly
Apple to Let Users Face-Unlock iPhone Duo, Addressing Key Drawback Bloomberg.com
Tesla Takes Cybercab Orders With Terms Even Musk Says Are Steep Bloomberg.com
US Shale Producers Take a Chance on Going Without Hedges Bloomberg.com
US Futures Drop as Market Looks to Nvidia Results, Anthropic IPO Bloomberg.com
AI provider keys that customers stored on Railway were stolen in an October breach and used to commit an estimated $740,000 in unauthorized spending, the platform-as-a-service provider said yesterday. It has promised to pay those charges itself when an AI provider will not refund them. The company builds and runs apps for its customers and stores their secrets, such as API keys and database
United Airlines Hit by System Outage Days After FAA Ground Stop Bloomberg.com
Ex-Robinhood Software Engineer Pleads Guilty to Illegal Trading Bloomberg.com
Malware can lurk inside just 0.00001% of a neural network. How, then, can any user tell it's there?
A documented New Zealand case demonstrates manufacturer-controlled post-sale modification of software-defined vehicle functionality. Tesla designated damaged vehicles as unsupported and transmitted over-the-air software updates that disabled their DC fast-charging capability. Tesla documentation independently confirms that its vehicles receive over-the-air software updates, including updates sent over cellular connections when needed. The case provides a non-Chinese comparison for remote OEM authority and demonstrates that post-sale manufacturer software control is a broader software-defined vehicle architecture and lifecycle issue. The evidence demonstrates remote modification of a specific vehicle function; it does not establish a general capability to remotely disable an entire Tesla vehicle.
Het Nationaal Cyber Security Centrum (NCSC) en de toezichthouders Rijksinspectie Digitale Infrastructuur (RDI), Inspectie Leefomgeving en Transport (ILT), Autoriteit Nucleaire Veiligheid en Stralingsbescherming (ANVS) en Nederlandse Voedsel- en Warenautoriteit (NVWA) hebben op woensdag 7 oktober tijdens de ONE Conference, officieel hun handtekening gezet onder nieuwe samenwerkafspraken. Deze stap vloeit voort uit de Cyberbeveiligingswet (Cbw), die organisaties verplicht maatregelen te nemen om hun digitale weerbaarheid te vergroten. Naast de afspraken tussen het NCSC en de toezichthouders, hebben de toezichthouders ook onderling afspraken vastgelegd.
Moderne voertuigen hebben steeds vaker digitale systemen die data verzamelen en verbonden zijn met internet. Volgens de AIVD kunnen verschillende partijen, waaronder statelijke actoren, interesse hebben in deze data en er toegang toe verkrijgen. De AIVD wijst daarbij op spionagerisico's van slimme voertuigen.
Moderne voertuigen bevatten in toenemende mate digitale systemen die data verzamelen en met internet verbonden zijn. De AIVD waarschuwt voor spionagerisico's rond moderne voertuigen en beschrijft dat verschillende partijen, waaronder statelijke actoren, toegang kunnen verkrijgen tot voertuigdata.
Project Lion Cage conducted a long-term technical assessment of a NIO ES8 software-defined electric vehicle. The researchers used spectrum analysis, Bluetooth sniffing, transmitter interception, GPS analysis, penetration testing and OSINT. They observed continuous data communication, including while the vehicle appeared to be turned off, with little variation throughout a 24-hour period. According to the researchers, 70 percent of observed data packets were heavily encrypted using an unknown protocol and 90 percent were routed to China. The assessment also identified camera capabilities relevant to facial and license plate recognition and concluded that the vehicle could function as a data collection platform. The research raises automotive cybersecurity, surveillance, data sovereignty, cloud dependency, software-defined vehicle and...
Ruter commissioned a technical security assessment comparing a new Yutong electric bus with a three-year-old VDL electric bus. The assessment identified materially different vehicle architectures. The tested VDL did not support autonomous over-the-air software updates and its critical functionality was effectively isolated from external access. The Yutong supported over-the-air updates and manufacturer diagnostics, with digital access to battery and power-supply control systems through the mobile network. The researchers concluded that the manufacturer had the technical capability to remotely change or disable software and that the assessed Kill Switch scenario was possible for the Yutong architecture. Exterior camera functionality on both tested buses was isolated, and the assessed image or video surveillance scenario was not...
Parliamentary motion requesting the Dutch government to analyse the risks posed by electric vehicles to national security. The motion notes the increasing presence of Chinese electric vehicles on the European market and questions concerning their cybersecurity. It requests that, where national-security risks are identified, mitigation options are developed, including consideration of access restrictions around military facilities, critical infrastructure and government buildings.
Parliamentary motion requesting the Dutch government to analyse the risks posed by electric vehicles to national security. The motion notes the increasing presence of Chinese electric vehicles on the European market and questions concerning their cybersecurity. It requests that, where national-security risks are identified, mitigation options are developed, including consideration of access restrictions around military facilities, critical infrastructure and government buildings.
Project Lion Cage conducted a long-term technical assessment of a NIO ES8 software-defined electric vehicle. The researchers used spectrum analysis, Bluetooth sniffing, transmitter interception, GPS analysis, penetration testing and OSINT. They observed continuous data communication, including while the vehicle appeared to be turned off, with little variation throughout a 24-hour period. According to the researchers, 70 percent of observed data packets were heavily encrypted using an unknown protocol and 90 percent were routed to China. The assessment also identified camera capabilities relevant to facial and license plate recognition and concluded that the vehicle could function as a data collection platform. The research raises automotive cybersecurity, surveillance, data sovereignty, cloud dependency, software-defined vehicle and national-security concerns.
Ruter commissioned a technical security assessment comparing a new Yutong electric bus with a three-year-old VDL electric bus. The assessment identified materially different vehicle architectures. The tested VDL did not support autonomous over-the-air software updates and its critical functionality was effectively isolated from external access. The Yutong supported over-the-air updates and manufacturer diagnostics, with digital access to battery and power-supply control systems through the mobile network. The researchers concluded that the manufacturer had the technical capability to remotely change or disable software and that the assessed Kill Switch scenario was possible for the Yutong architecture. Exterior camera functionality on both tested buses was isolated, and the assessed image or video surveillance scenario was not demonstrated. The assessment highlights the security significance of vehicle architecture, segmentation, remote OEM authority, OTA trust, supply-chain dependencies and external trust boundaries rather than manufacturer nationality alone.
A documented New Zealand case demonstrates manufacturer-controlled post-sale modification of software-defined vehicle functionality. Tesla designated damaged vehicles as unsupported and transmitted over-the-air software updates that disabled their DC fast-charging capability. Tesla documentation independently confirms that its vehicles receive over-the-air software updates, including updates sent over cellular connections when needed. The case provides a non-Chinese comparison for remote OEM authority and demonstrates that post-sale manufacturer software control is a broader software-defined vehicle architecture and lifecycle issue. The evidence demonstrates remote modification of a specific vehicle function; it does not establish a general capability to remotely disable an entire Tesla vehicle.