Defined security procedures are not followed
NCRC rationale: Threat register explicitly identifies Annex 5 area 4.3.4.
T-061 · Governance, Regulation, and Oversight
Threat analysis
Sub-level threats from Annex 5 for this threat includes legitimate actors able to take actions that would unwittingly facilitate a cyber attack
"VERY SERIOUS" impact is possible when a manipulated, negligent or malicious trusted person gains authority over updates, diagnostics, backend commands, fleet operations or sensitive data. Legitimate access can bypass technical barriers and enable wide effects.
Human error, social engineering, excessive privileges, credential sharing, and insider misuse are persistent risks throughout the vehicle ecosystem. Significant consequences are especially credible where access is not restricted by least privilege, segregation of duties, approval controls, activity monitoring etc. as part of the Quality/Cybersecurity management system.
T-019 and T-022 address oversight, T-042 physical media and T-048 lifecycle visibility. T-061 explicitly covers the human action and authorized-access pathway missing from the original set.
External Evidence
CVEs, academic research, strategic signals, real-world incidents and authoritative assessments from the correlation pipeline, plus public repositories from the existing evidence pipeline.
No CVEs, papers, signals, incidents, assessments or repositories currently meet the configured correlation criteria. Absence of matched evidence does not demonstrate absence of the threat.
Technical surfaces: -
Terms: social engineering, phishing, insider
CVE, paper, signal, incident, assessment and narrative correlations are generated by correlate_evidence.py. Repository mappings remain sourced from the existing evidence pipeline.
Regulatory traceability
NCRC review-baseline mapping of T-061 to UN R155 requirements and Annex 5. Analytical traceability only, not a determination of compliance, non-compliance or legal effect.
R155 coverage: 4.3.4 / Unintended human actions and staff privilege abuse
Protected high-level baseline / direct.
Main-text R155 CSMS, vehicle-type and type-approval relations. Expert review required.
Analytical candidate relationships from the promoted review baseline.
NCRC rationale: Threat register explicitly identifies Annex 5 area 4.3.4.
NCRC rationale: Threat register explicitly identifies Annex 5 area 4.3.4.
NCRC rationale: Candidate generated from shared technical concepts, an attack-path bridge, or multiple non-generic terms; expert review required.
NCRC rationale: Candidate generated from shared technical concepts, an attack-path bridge, or multiple non-generic terms; expert review required.
NCRC rationale: Candidate generated from shared technical concepts, an attack-path bridge, or multiple non-generic terms; expert review required.