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T-067 · Mobility Services and Large-Scale Disruptions

Unauthorized manipulation of fleet, dispatch, teleoperation and operational mobility-control platforms

Risk: High —No correlated evidenceRegulatory

Threat analysis

Analysis / Description

Attackers may compromise centralized platforms used to dispatch, supervise, route, remotely assist, or control vehicle fleets and then use legitimate platform functions to manipulate mobility operations.

Assessment

Primary domain
User
Secondary domains
Vehicle; Infrastructure
Affects
User, Vehicle, Infrastructure
Impact
High (score 4)
Probability
High (score 3)
Source
NHTSA 2022

Impact rationale

"VERY SERIOUS" impact may arise when fleet, dispatch, teleoperation, remote-assistance or emergency-support platforms are manipulated to reroute, immobilize or issue unsafe instructions to many vehicles or essential fleets.

Likelihood rationale

Fleet and operational platforms are increasingly connected to cloud services, APIs, mobile applications, and third-party systems. A high-impact attack remains dependent on privileged access, broad command authority, inadequate tenant separation, and failure of authentication, monitoring, and command-limiting controls.

Risk rationale

T-001 and T-011 cover disruption, T-047 vehicle influence and T-049 fleet-scale impact. T-067 adds centralized operational supervision and command as the initiating attack surface.

External Evidence

Evidence supporting this threat

CVEs, academic research, strategic signals, real-world incidents and authoritative assessments from the correlation pipeline, plus public repositories from the existing evidence pipeline.

T-067
No external evidence currently identified

No CVEs, papers, signals, incidents, assessments or repositories currently meet the configured correlation criteria. Absence of matched evidence does not demonstrate absence of the threat.

How evidence was matched to this threat

Technical surfaces: Telematics, Backend / Cloud
Terms: teleoperation, dispatch, fleet
CVE, paper, signal, incident, assessment and narrative correlations are generated by correlate_evidence.py. Repository mappings remain sourced from the existing evidence pipeline.

Regulatory traceability

UN Regulation No. 155

NCRC review-baseline mapping of T-067 to UN R155 requirements and Annex 5. Analytical traceability only, not a determination of compliance, non-compliance or legal effect.

RDW BASELINE

R155 coverage: Cross-cutting / Fleet, dispatch, teleoperation and mobility-control platforms

Protected high-level baseline / cross-cutting.

R155 REQUIREMENT RELEVANCE

Main-text R155 CSMS, vehicle-type and type-approval relations. Expert review required.

No main-text R155 requirement relation was generated for this threat.
ANNEX 5 ANALYTICAL CANDIDATES

Analytical candidate relationships from the promoted review baseline.

5Mappings
5Review
reviewAnnex 5score 0.62
Part A / Table A1 / Ref 29.2

Circumvention of network separation to gain control

NCRC rationale: Candidate generated from shared technical concepts, an attack-path bridge, or multiple non-generic terms; expert review required.

controlcouldseparation
Corresponding mitigations (1)
B / - / M23 Cybersecurity best practices are followed for software/hardware development, system design/integration, with appropriate testing
reviewAnnex 5score 0.62
Part A / Table A1 / Ref 32.1

Physical manipulation or replacement of electronic hardware or sensor inputs

NCRC rationale: Candidate generated from shared technical concepts, an attack-path bridge, or multiple non-generic terms; expert review required.

couldmanipulation
Corresponding mitigations (1)
B / - / M9 Measures prevent and detect unauthorized access
reviewAnnex 5score 0.62
Part A / Table A1 / Ref 5.1

Communication channels permit code injection

NCRC rationale: Candidate generated from shared technical concepts, an attack-path bridge, or multiple non-generic terms; expert review required.

Corresponding mitigations (2)
B / - / M10 Vehicle verifies authenticity and integrity of messages it receives
B / - / M6 Security by design minimises risk
reviewAnnex 5score 0.62
Part A / Table A1 / Ref 5.3

Communication channels permit overwrite of vehicle-held data/code

NCRC rationale: Candidate generated from shared technical concepts, an attack-path bridge, or multiple non-generic terms; expert review required.

Corresponding mitigations (1)
B / - / M7 Access-control techniques and designs protect system data/code
reviewAnnex 5score 0.60
Part A / Table A1 / Ref 16.1

Manipulation of functions designed to remotely operate vehicle systems

NCRC rationale: Candidate generated from shared technical concepts, an attack-path bridge, or multiple non-generic terms; expert review required.

manipulationremotely
Corresponding mitigations (1)
B / - / M20 Security controls are applied to systems with remote access