โ† Threat Register

T-069 ยท Critical Infrastructure and National Security

Simultaneous disruption of multiple vehicle fleets and mobility providers through a shared dependency (Single point of failure)

Risk: High โ€”No correlated evidenceRegulatory

Threat analysis

Analysis / Description

A shared cloud platform, software component, communication provider, update service, supplier, credential, or other dependency is compromised or fails, causing several vehicle fleets or mobility providers to be disrupted at the same time. It emphasizes that the threat is defined by a single point of dependency causing simultaneous, cross-organization disruption, rather than an isolated supplier or fleet incident.

Assessment

Primary domain
Infrastructure
Secondary domains
Vehicle; Society
Affects
Infrastructure, Vehicle, Society
Impact
Severe (score 5)
Probability
Medium (score 2)
Source
NHTSA 2022; ENISA Transport Threat Landscape

Impact rationale

"CATASTROPHIC" economic and territorial impacts are credible if one shared provider, component, key, architecture or update path simultaneously disrupts several OEMs, fleets or vital mobility providers. Physical and societal effects may be very serious.

Likelihood rationale

Shared dependencies are common, but catastrophic disruption requires a highly concentrated dependency, widespread use, limited independent fallback of different domains, and a compromise or failure capable of affecting several organizations simultaneously. In the next 5 years, this could lead to a Unlikely scenario.

Risk rationale

T-001 covers large-scale disruption; T-031/T-033 supply-chain risk; T-049 fleet-scale underestimation; T-052/T-055 external dependencies; T-056 support failure. T-069 explicitly assesses correlated concentration risk across them.

External Evidence

Evidence supporting this threat

CVEs, academic research, strategic signals, real-world incidents and authoritative assessments from the correlation pipeline, plus public repositories from the existing evidence pipeline.

T-069
No external evidence currently identified

No CVEs, papers, signals, incidents, assessments or repositories currently meet the configured correlation criteria. Absence of matched evidence does not demonstrate absence of the threat.

How evidence was matched to this threat

Technical surfaces: -
Terms: single point of failure, shared dependency, supply chain
CVE, paper, signal, incident, assessment and narrative correlations are generated by correlate_evidence.py. Repository mappings remain sourced from the existing evidence pipeline.

Regulatory traceability

UN Regulation No. 155

NCRC review-baseline mapping of T-069 to UN R155 requirements and Annex 5. Analytical traceability only, not a determination of compliance, non-compliance or legal effect.

RDW BASELINE

R155 coverage: Cross-cutting / Shared dependency / single point of failure

Protected high-level baseline / cross-cutting.

R155 REQUIREMENT RELEVANCE

Main-text R155 CSMS, vehicle-type and type-approval relations. Expert review required.

reviewcsms

Management of supplier and service-provider dependencies

R155 references: 5.1.1(a) / 7.2.2.5 / 7.3.2

Candidate generated from title/description evidence, optionally supported by category fields; expert review required.

reviewvehicle type

Exhaustive vehicle-type risk assessment including external systems and other relevant risks

R155 references: 7.3.3

Candidate generated from title/description evidence, optionally supported by category fields; expert review required.

ANNEX 5 ANALYTICAL CANDIDATES

Analytical candidate relationships from the promoted review baseline.

5Mappings
5Review
reviewAnnex 5score 0.62
Part A / Table A1 / Ref 12.4

Compromise of cryptographic keys of the software provider

NCRC rationale: Candidate generated from shared technical concepts, an attack-path bridge, or multiple non-generic terms; expert review required.

compromiseproviderupdate
Corresponding mitigations (1)
B / - / M11 Security controls protect stored cryptographic keys
reviewAnnex 5score 0.62
Part A / Table A1 / Ref 3.2

Loss of information in the cloud

NCRC rationale: Candidate generated from shared technical concepts, an attack-path bridge, or multiple non-generic terms; expert review required.

cloud
Corresponding mitigations (1)
C / - / M4 Security controls minimise cloud-computing risks
reviewAnnex 5score 0.60
Part A / Table A1 / Ref 1.3

Unauthorized physical access to the server

NCRC rationale: Candidate generated from shared technical concepts, an attack-path bridge, or multiple non-generic terms; expert review required.

physical
Corresponding mitigations (1)
C / - / M8 System design and access control prevent unauthorized access to personal or system-critical data
reviewAnnex 5score 0.60
Part A / Table A1 / Ref 18.1

External interfaces such as USB or other ports used as a point of attack

NCRC rationale: Candidate generated from shared technical concepts, an attack-path bridge, or multiple non-generic terms; expert review required.

otherpoint
Corresponding mitigations (1)
B / - / M22 Security controls are applied to external interfaces
reviewAnnex 5score 0.58
Part A / Table A1 / Ref 8.1

Sending a large number of garbage data to vehicle information systems

NCRC rationale: Candidate generated from shared technical concepts, an attack-path bridge, or multiple non-generic terms; expert review required.

communicationlarge
Corresponding mitigations (1)
B / - / M13 Measures detect and recover from denial-of-service attacks